Chinese technology giant Huawei is participating in 16 projects funded by the
European Commission’s Horizon Europe research and innovation program despite
being dubbed a high-risk supplier.
The Commission restricted Huawei from accessing Horizon projects in 2023 after
saying that it (and another Chinese telecom supplier, ZTE) posed “materially
higher risks than other 5G suppliers” in relation to cybersecurity and foreign
influence.
However, public data reviewed by POLITICO’s EU Influence newsletter shows that
Huawei still takes part in several projects, many of which are in sensitive
fields like cloud computing, 5G and 6G telecom technology and data centers.
These projects mean Huawei has been working alongside universities and tech
companies in Spain, France, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium,
Finland and Italy. It also has access to the intellectual property generated by
the projects, as the contracts require the sharing of information as well as
joint ownership of the results between partners.
A Commission spokesperson confirmed that of the 16 projects, 15 were signed
before the restrictions took place. The remaining project “was signed in 2025
and was assessed as falling outside the scope of the existing restrictions.”
Many of the projects started in January 2023, with the contracts running out at
the end of this year, while others will last until 2027, 2028 and 2030.
“Huawei participates in and implements projects funded under Horizon Europe in a
lawful and compliant manner,” a company spokesperson said.
One of the projects is to develop data privacy and protection tools in the
fields of AI and big data, along with Italy’s National Research Council, the
University of Malaga, the University of Toulouse, the University of Calabria,
and a Bavarian high-tech research institute for software-intensive systems.
Huawei received €207,000 to lead the work on “design, implementation, and
evaluation of use cases,” according to the contract for that project, seen by
POLITICO.
COMMISSION CRACKDOWN
Last month the Commission proposed a new Cybersecurity Act that would restrict
Huawei from critical telecoms networks under EU law, after years of asking
national capitals to do so voluntarily.
“I’m not satisfied [with] how the member states … have been implementing our 5G
Toolbox,” the Commission’s executive VP for tech and security policy, Henna
Virkkunen, told POLITICO at the time, referring to EU guidelines to deal with
high-risk vendors. “We know that we still have high-risk vendors in our 5G
networks, in the critical parts … so now we will have stricter rules on this.”
The Commission is also working on measures to cut Chinese companies out of
lucrative public contracts.
Bart Groothuis, a liberal MEP working on the Cybersecurity Act, told POLITICO
that the Commission should “honor the promises and commitments” it made “and
push them out.”
“They should be barred from participating. Period.”
Huawei was also involved in an influence scandal last year, with Belgian
authorities investigating whether the tech giant exerted undue influence over EU
lawmakers. The scandal led to Huawei’s being banned from lobbying on the
premises of the European Commission and the European Parliament.
Tag - Internet of Things
MUNICH, Germany — U.S. officials have countered Europe’s push for technology
sovereignty from America with a clear message: It’s China you should worry
about, not us.
The European Union is rolling out a strategy to reduce its reliance on foreign
technology suppliers. Donald Trump’s return to office has put the focus on
American cloud giants, companies like Elon Musk’s Starlink and X and others —
with European officials increasingly concerned that Washington has too much
control over Europe’s digital infrastructure.
As political leaders and security and intelligence officials met in Germany for
the Munich Security Conference, Washington sought to calm nerves. The idea that
Trump can pull the plug on the internet is not “a credible argument,” the United
States’ National Cyber Director Sean Cairncross told an audience Thursday.
Europe and the U.S. “face the same sort of threat and the same threat actors,”
said Cairncross, who advises Trump on cybersecurity policy. Rather than weaning
off America, wean off China, he said: “There is a clean tech stack. It is
primarily American. And then there is a Chinese tech stack.”
Claiming that U.S. tech is as risky as Chinese tech is “a giant false
equivalency,” according to Cairncross. “Personal data doesn’t get piped to the
state in the United States,” he said, referencing concerns that the Beijing
government has laws requiring firms to hand over data for Chinese surveillance
and espionage purposes.
The attempt to quell concerns is notable even if it may not change the direction
of travel in Europe. The European Commission wants to boost homegrown technology
with a “tech sovereignty” package this spring. It presented a cybersecurity
proposal in January that, if approved, could be used to root out suppliers that
pose security risks — including from America.
“We want to ensure that we don’t have risky dependencies when it comes to
critical sectors,” the Commission’s Executive Vice President Henna Virkkunen
told POLITICO in an interview in Munich on Friday. “We see this in AI, quantum
technologies and semiconductors — we must have a certain level of capacity
ourselves.”
Europe’s attempt to pivot away from U.S. dependencies, while not new, has gained
support in past months as the transatlantic alliance creaked. The POLITICO
Poll conducted in February showed far more people described the U.S. as an
unreliable ally than a reliable one across four countries, including half the
adults polled in Germany and 57 percent in Canada.
“The leadership claim of the U.S. is being challenged, perhaps already lost,”
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz told the conference Friday.
REBALANCING ACT
Europe is still working out what a forceful attempt to build technology
sovereignty would look like, as it reforms everything from industrial policy
programs to procurement rules and data and cybersecurity requirements on
companies and governments.
Top European cyber officials in Munich told POLITICO that technological
sovereignty does not mean cutting ties with trusted partners.
Vincent Strubel, director of France’s cybersecurity agency ANSSI, said
sovereignty means avoiding being bound by rules set elsewhere. “It’s about
identifying what leverage non-European countries may have based on the
technology they provide,” Strubel said in an interview. “It’s not about being
friendly or unfriendly with any country — it’s about recognizing that we
[currently] have no say in how that leverage might be used.”
Claudia Plattner, head of Germany’s cybersecurity agency BSI, said, “We need to
become more independent. We need to strengthen our local and European industries
… We need to become digitally successful — that is essential to economic
strength and to security.”
The BSI plans to test sovereign cloud offerings from several large tech
companies, including AWS and Google. The testing will examine whether European
services can operate independently from parent systems and will help inform
Germany’s national cloud strategy.
Critics of Europe’s efforts to turn away from the U.S. say it is bound to lead
to worse security.
Christopher Ahlberg, the CEO of threat intelligence firm Recorded Future, said
he understood that things like military command and control must remain
national, “but if you start choosing sub-par cyber products just to achieve
sovereignty, you’re going to be target No. 1 because threat actors will discover
the vulnerabilities.”
COMMON GROUND ON CHINA
While tensions persist over the U.S.’s dominant position, Washington and
European capitals have common ground when it comes to caution over Chinese tech.
The EU is drafting legal requirements to cut out Chinese tech from critical
supply chains including telecom networks, energy grids, security systems and
railways. That move drew the ire of the Chinese government, which called it
“blatant protectionism.”
Many of the measures mirror what U.S. authorities have done in the past decade.
“The U.S. understands what national security is. They don’t want to hear: ‘The
U.S. is a threat.’ But they understand resilience,” said Sébastien Garnault, a
prominent French cyber policy consultant.
Trump “is putting America first, and the same goes in cyberspace,” Cairncross
said. But, he added, “we don’t want it to be America alone. We want that
partnership.”
Laurens Cerulus contributed reporting.
China’s foreign ministry on Wednesday said a new European Commission proposal to
restrict high-risk tech vendors from critical supply chains amounted to “blatant
protectionism,” warning European officials that Beijing will take “necessary
measures” to protect Chinese firms.
Beijing has “serious concerns” over the bill, Chinese foreign ministry
spokesperson Guo Jiakun told reporters, according to state news agencies’
reports.
“Using non-technical standards to forcibly restrict or even prohibit companies
from participating in the market, without any factual evidence, seriously
violates market principles and fair competition rules,” Guo said.
The European Commission on Tuesday unveiled its proposal to revamp the bloc’s
Cybersecurity Act. The bill seeks to crack down on risky technology vendors in
critical supply chains ranging across energy, transport, health care and other
sectors.
Though the legislation itself does not name any specific countries or companies,
it is widely seen as being targeted at China. 5G suppliers Huawei and ZTE are in
the EU’s immediate crosshairs, while other Chinese vendors are expected to be
hit at a later stage.
European Commission spokesperson Thomas Regnier responded to the Chinese foreign
ministry, saying Europe has allowed high-risk vendors from outside the EU in
strategic sectors for “far too long.”
“We are indeed radically changing this. Because we cannot be naive anymore,”
Regnier said in a statement. The exclusion of high-risk suppliers will always be
based on “strong risk assessments” and in coordination with EU member countries,
he said.
China “urges the EU to avoid going further down the wrong path of
protectionism,” the Chinese foreign ministry’s Guo told reporters. He added the
EU bill would “not only fail to achieve so-called security but will also incur
huge costs,” saying some restrictions on using Huawei had already “caused
enormous economic losses” in Europe in past years.
European telecom operators warned Tuesday that the law would impose
multi-billion euro costs on the industry if restrictions on using Huawei and ZTE
were to become mandatory across Europe.
A Huawei spokesperson said in a statement that laws to block suppliers based on
their country of origin violate the EU’s “basic legal principles of fairness,
non-discrimination, and proportionality,” as well as its World Trade
Organization obligations. The company “reserve[s] all rights to safeguard our
legitimate interests,” the spokesperson said.
ZTE did not respond to requests for comment on the EU’s plans.
BRUSSELS — First it was telecom snooping. Now Europe is growing worried that
Huawei could turn the lights off.
The Chinese tech giant is at the heart of a brewing storm over the security of
Europe’s energy grids. Lawmakers are writing to the European Commission to urge
it to “restrict high-risk vendors” from solar energy systems, in a letter seen
by POLITICO. Such restrictions would target Huawei first and foremost, as the
dominant Chinese supplier of critical parts of these systems.
The fears center around solar panel inverters, a piece of technology that turns
solar panels’ electricity into current that flows into the grid. China is a
dominant supplier of these inverters, and Huawei is its biggest player. Because
the inverters are hooked up to the internet, security experts warn the inverters
could be tampered with or shut down through remote access, potentially causing
dangerous surges or drops in electricity in Europe’s networks.
The warnings come as European governments have woken up to the risks of being
reliant on other regions for critical services — from Russian gas to Chinese
critical raw materials and American digital services. The bloc is in a stand-off
with Beijing over trade in raw materials, and has faced months of pressure from
Washington on how Brussels regulates U.S. tech giants.
Cybersecurity authorities are close to finalizing work on a new “toolbox” to
de-risk tech supply chains, with solar panels among its key target sectors,
alongside connected cars and smart cameras.
Two members of the European Parliament, Dutch liberal Bart Groothuis and Slovak
center-right lawmaker Miriam Lexmann, drafted a letter warning the European
Commission of the risks. “We urge you to propose immediate and binding measures
to restrict high-risk vendors from our critical infrastructure,” the two wrote.
The members had gathered the support of a dozen colleagues by Wednesday and are
canvassing for more to join the initiative before sending the letter mid next
week.
According to research by trade body SolarPower Europe, Chinese firms control
approximately 65 percent of the total installed power in the solar sector. The
largest company in the European market is Huawei, a tech giant that is
considered a high-risk vendor of telecom equipment. The second-largest firm is
Sungrow, which is also Chinese, and controls about half the amount of solar
power as Huawei.
Huawei’s market power recently allowed it to make its way back into SolarPower
Europe, the solar sector’s most prominent lobby association in Brussels, despite
an ongoing Belgian bribery investigation focused on the firm’s lobbying
activities in Brussels that saw it banned from meeting with European Commission
and Parliament officials.
Security hawks are now upping the ante. Cybersecurity experts and European
manufacturers say the Chinese conglomerate and its peers could hack into
Europe’s power grid.
“They can disable safety parameters. They can set it on fire,” Erika Langerová,
a cybersecurity researcher at the Czech Technical University in Prague, said in
a media briefing hosted by the U.S. Mission to the EU in September.
Even switching solar installation off and on again could disrupt energy supply,
Langerová said. “When you do it on one installation, it’s not a problem, but
then you do it on thousands of installations it becomes a problem because the …
compound effect of these sudden changes in the operation of the device can
destabilize the power grid.”
Surges in electricity supply can trigger wider blackouts, as seen in Spain and
Portugal in April. | Matias Chiofalo/Europa Press via Getty Images
Surges in electricity supply can trigger wider blackouts, as seen in Spain and
Portugal in April.
Some governments have already taken further measures. Last November, Lithuania
imposed a ban on remote access by Chinese firms to renewable energy
installations above 100 kilowatts, effectively stopping the use of Chinese
inverters. In September, the Czech Republic issued a warning on the threat posed
by Chinese remote access via components including solar inverters. And in
Germany, security officials already in 2023 told lawmakers that an “energy
management component” from Huawei had them on alert, leading to a government
probe of the firm’s equipment.
CHINESE CONTROL, EU RESPONSE
The arguments leveled against Chinese manufacturers of solar inverters echo
those heard from security experts in previous years, in debates on whether or
not to block companies like video-sharing app TikTok, airport scanner maker
Nuctech and — yes — Huawei’s 5G network equipment.
Distrust of Chinese technology has skyrocketed. Under President Xi Jinping, the
Beijing government has rolled out regulations forcing Chinese companies to
cooperate with security services’ requests to share data and flag
vulnerabilities in their software. It has led to Western concerns that it opens
the door to surveillance and snooping.
One of the most direct threats involves remote management from China of products
embedded in European critical infrastructure. Manufacturers have remote access
to install updates and maintenance.
Europe has also grown heavily reliant on Chinese tech suppliers, particularly
when it comes to renewable energy, which is powering an increasing proportion of
European energy. Domestic manufacturers of solar panels have enough supply to
fill the gap that any EU action to restrict Chinese inverters would create,
Langerová said. But Europe does not yet have enough battery or wind
manufacturers — two clean energy sector China also dominates.
China’s dominance also undercuts Europe’s own tech sector and comes with risks
of economic coercion. Until only a few years ago, European firms were
competitive, before being undercut by heavily subsidized Chinese products, said
Tobias Gehrke, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign
Relations. China on the other hand does not allow foreign firms in its market
because of cybersecurity concerns, he said.
The European Union previously developed a 5G security toolbox to reduce its
dependence on Huawei over these fears.
It is also working on a similar initiative, known as the ICT supply chain
toolbox, to help national governments scan their wider digital infrastructure
for weak points, with a view to blocking or reduce the use of “high-risk
suppliers.”
According to Groothuis and Lexmann, “binding legislation to restrict risky
vendors in our critical infrastructure is urgently required” across the European
Union. Until legislation is passed, the EU should put temporary measures in
place, they said in their letter.
Huawei did not respond to requests for comment before publication.
This article has been updated.
A major outage of Amazon Web Services servers affecting multiple websites Monday
morning prompted immediate calls for Europe to boost its tech sovereignty.
Slack, Snapchat, Signal and Perplexity were among the affected sites. Amazon Web
Services (AWS) offers cloud servers that allow these services and millions of
other websites and platforms to run.
Brussels is in the midst of a debate on how to achieve digital sovereignty, and
what that means exactly, with cloud services at the center of the conversation.
EU leaders are expected to take a position during a high-level summit meeting
later this week.
“Today’s outage shows how concentrated power makes the internet fragile and this
lack of resilience hits our economies as a result,” technologist Robin Berjon
said in an email. Berjon co-founded the Eurostack project — an initiative
campaigning to make Europe self-reliant in digital services.
“Europe’s dependency on monopoly cloud companies like Amazon is a security
vulnerability and an economic threat we can’t ignore,” Cori Crider, executive
director of the Future of Technology Institute, said in an email.
According to AWS’s health dashboard, which shows a “running log of AWS service
interruptions for the past 12 months,” the outage originated with servers in
North America and specifically Virginia.
That prompted reaction including from Ulrike Franke, senior fellow at the
European Council on Foreign Relations: “My robot vacuum cleaner no longer works
and can someone explain why a robot in Paris is linked to U.S. East? Talk about
European digital sovereignty…” she posted on Bluesky.
“These disruptions are not just technical issues, they’re democratic failures,”
said Corinne Cath-Speth, head of digital at civil society group Article 19.
“When a single provider goes dark, critical services go offline with it — media
outlets become inaccessible, secure communication apps like Signal stop
functioning, and the infrastructure that serves our digital society crumbles.”
“We urgently need diversification in cloud computing,” she added.
Transcription service Trint said in an email that it had experienced disruption
but “customers on our EU servers should be largely unaffected.”
In a statement shared with media outlets, Amazon Web Services said: “We continue
to observe recovery across most of the affected AWS Services. We can confirm
global services and features that rely on US-EAST-1 have also recovered. We
continue to work towards full resolution and will provide updates as we have
more information to share.”
Asked at a briefing of reporters in Brussels on Monday, European Commission
spokesperson Markus Lammert said the outage “would be a question for the
companies, this is not for us to comment on.”
With regard to how it had affected the Commission’s own operations, Paula Pinho,
chief spokesperson for the European Commission, said: “We were more using for
instance e-mails. We go back to our traditional methods.”
Pieter Haeck contributed reporting.
The European Commission has opened a door marked danger. In July it issued a
guidance letter blessing the creation of what is known as an Automotive
Licensing Negotiation Group (Auto LNG). In doing so, it gave the green light to
rival carmakers to form a cartel-like entity to negotiate licenses for patents
that underpin standardized technologies (standards essential patents, or
SEPs).
>
SEPs are vital in many industries because they enable devices and services to
interoperate seamlessly across different manufacturers, platforms and
geographies. They cover technologies such as Wi-Fi, 5G and video coding, and are
integral to the Internet of Things.
> SEPs are vital in many industries because they enable devices and services to
> interoperate seamlessly across different manufacturers, platforms and
> geographies.
For decades, EU competition law treated the collective bargaining among
competitors that LNGs of any kind represent as off-limits. The timing of the
change was not incidental.
In September the Commission also released draft revisions of its Technology
Transfer Block Exemption Regulation and Technology Transfer Guidelines (TTG).
Together, these texts shape how Europe manages its innovation economy, including
its SEP licensing market.
A success story at stake
On the positive side, the drafts reaffirm the importance of transparent patent
pools. Such pools bring together complementary SEPs owned by multiple parties
and make them available through a single license. Pools cut transaction costs,
create efficiencies and provide clarity to technology implementers.
SEP owners who contribute technology to a standard promise to license their
patents on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. Pools put that
commitment into practice by offering a single license that the market can accept
or reject.
The draft TTG strengthens requirements for transparency and governance in pools
by emphasizing the importance of essentiality checks, published terms, open
participation and safeguards against collusion. These measures codify practices
many pools already follow. In doing so, the Commission is rightly cementing
transparent pools’ role as trusted intermediaries in SEP licensing.
LNGs and FRAND cannot co-exist
Properly structured pools only succeed if implementers view their terms as
balanced; they cannot ‘enforce’ acceptance into existence. When the market
pushes back, pools adjust. That responsiveness makes them both pro-competitive
and self-correcting.
LNGs invert that logic. As coalitions of buyers, their explicit objective is to
aggregate purchasing power to secure discounts from the prevailing FRAND rate —
all while their members continue to use the technology. However, the
non-discrimination limb of FRAND makes across the board ‘group discounts’ very
hard to square with commitments owed to all implementers, including those that
have already taken licenses, directly or through a pool. This distorts
competition by enabling buyers to exert undue pressure on licensors.
The draft TTG seeks to allay concerns by requiring LNG participation to be open
and internally non-discriminatory, yet it does not grapple with the external
effect on the SEP holder’s non-discrimination duty. That omission risks forcing
a de facto “LNG rate” onto the whole market.
Asymmetry and holdout risk
The asymmetry here is striking. If price talks fail for tangible inputs,
suppliers can simply stop shipments. Not so with SEPs: once standardized, the
technology is embedded and keeps being used unless long, costly litigation is
pursued. This reality gives coordinated buyers leverage to delay or avoid paying
– a textbook recipe for holdout and cartel-like behavior.
Some argue that if licensors can license jointly through pools, licensees should
be able to do so in LNGs. This is false logic. Pools aggregate non-competing
assets to make complementary patents accessible. LNGs aggregate competing buyers
to dictate price, a monopsony dynamic that competition law has long treated with
suspicion. Pools, by contrast, have no such power. They live or die by market
acceptance. Their incentive is to align with existing demand.
Process shortcuts, shaky justifications
Equally troubling is how the Commission chose to act. The July letter was issued
under an ‘informal guidance’ procedure, an opaque tool usually used to clarify
cutting-edge cases. SEP holders and smaller innovators were not consulted,
despite being directly affected.
The substantive justification is no better. Both the Commission and Germany’s
Bundeskartellamt, which had previously authorized the ALNG in June 2024, leaned
on a market-share threshold, finding automakers represent less than 15 percent
of the ‘general mobile communications’ market.
However, connected cars represent a completely separate vertical, with distinct
technical features like vehicle-to-vehicle communication, and the market
threshold should apply to it specifically. Furthermore, in licensing markets, a
coordinated 15 percent holdout can freeze dealmaking across the board. That risk
is ignored.
> Connected cars represent a completely separate vertical, with distinct
> technical features.
Meanwhile, the invocation of decarbonization as a reason to tolerate cartel-like
structures conflates policy domains. Climate objectives, however worthy, cannot
excuse weakening competition law guardrails.
Keep the back door closed
Pools already deliver the benefits LNGs claim — lower transaction costs, broader
access, transparent terms, market efficiencies — without cartel risks. Most
importantly, the FRAND framework, tested in courts and practice, continues to
support rapid technology rollouts across the EU and is fully compatible with
pools. It is utterly incompatible with LNGs. To adhere to FRAND principles that
are the cornerstone of SEP licensing worldwide, LNGs cannot exist.
> Pools already deliver the benefits LNGs claim — lower transaction costs,
> broader access, transparent terms, market efficiencies — without cartel risks.
If the Commission wants to modernize SEP policy, it should do so openly and only
when market failures are identified. This involves consultation to establish
clear criteria and evidence of consumer benefit. By contrast, its current
approach threatens to disrupt efficient markets, squeeze royalties that fund
research and development, and slow Europe’s pace of innovation.
In reinforcing transparent pools, the Commission got one big thing right with
its draft TTG. It should not squander that by blessing LNGs.
Roberto Dini has more than 40 years’ experience in patent licensing and is
recognized as one of the global market’s most respected experts.
For a detailed analysis of the legal, economic and procedural defects in the
Auto LNG approach — and a fuller comparison between pools and LNGs — see: Auto
Licensing Negotiation Groups are a Bad, Anticompetitive Idea.