LONDON — Countries focused on reopening the Strait of Hormuz will meet for a security summit in the near future, which the U.K. has offered to host. More than 30 nations including United Arab Emirates, the U.K., France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands have now signed a joint statement agreeing to work on “appropriate efforts” to safeguard the major trade route. A British official, granted anonymity because they are not authorized to speak on the record, said Tuesday the U.K. wanted to help “build this coalition and develop momentum” in order to “open a route safe through the Strait of Hormuz, and provide that reassurance to merchant shipping.” They added that cooperation between like-minded partners would include a security conference on the topic, which could be hosted in London or Portsmouth, the home of the Royal Navy on the south coast of England. NATO chief Mark Rutte and British PM Keir Starmer now appear to be leading the push to restart traffic through the Strait, despite skepticism from other allies. The same British official discussed options for securing the channel, such as deploying autonomous minehunting systems from a mothership in the Gulf, while conceding this would not be possible while the current level of hostilities continue. They expressed confidence that “we will see different nations coming forwards with different offers to support us”and “we will be able to find in the right conditions a coalition that will be able to provide that assurance to the merchant shipping industry.”

BERLIN — German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier on Tuesday condemned U.S. President Donald Trump for going to war with Iran, calling the conflict a violation of international law and warning of a transatlantic rupture comparable to Germany’s break with Russia. Steinmeier’s role in German politics is largely ceremonial, but his sharp criticism of the war and the U.S. president is likely to put additional pressure on German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who has stopped short of other European leaders in calling the war illegal even as he has grown increasingly critical of what he sees as the lack of an exit strategy on the part of the U.S. and Israel. “This war violates international law,” said Steinmeier, who is a member of the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD), which rules in a coalition with Merz’s conservatives and has been more critical of the ongoing attacks. “There is little doubt that, in any case, the justification of an imminent attack on the U.S. does not hold water,” he added. Steinmeier, speaking in front of an audience of German diplomats in Berlin, criticized Trump for withdrawing from the nuclear deal with Iran during his first term in office. The president, who served as Germany’s foreign minister from 2013 to 2017, had helped negotiate that deal. “This war is also — and please bear with me when I say this, as someone directly involved — a politically disastrous mistake,” said Steinmeier. “And that’s what frustrates me the most. A truly avoidable, unnecessary war, if its goal was to stop Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.” Despite the president’s largely symbolic role, his strident criticism is likely to fuel a growing domestic debate over Germany’s stance on the Iran war and its relationship with the U.S. Merz and his fellow conservatives were initially far more supportive of the U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran than many other EU countries, arguing that Germany shares the goal of regime change in Tehran. But as the conflict has expanded and the economic and security effects on the EU’s biggest economy have become clearer, the chancellor has become far more openly critical, saying the war has raised “major questions” about Europe’s security. Steinmeier, who refrained from criticizing Israel directly, also compared the transatlantic rift during Trump’s second term to Germany’s divorce from Russia in the wake of Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. “Just as I believe there will be no going back to the way things were before February 24, 2022 in our relationship with Russia, so I believe there will be no going back to the way things were before January 20, 2025 in transatlantic relations,” Steinmeier said, referring to the day of Trump’s second inauguration. “The rupture is too deep.” Steinmeier then urged his country to become more independent of the U.S., both in terms of defense and technology, arguing that such autonomy is necessary to prevent Trump administration interference in his country’s domestic politics. The German military “must become the backbone of conventional defense in Europe,” he said. “In the technological sphere, our dependence on the U.S. is even greater. This makes it all the more important that we do not simply accept this situation.”

BRUSSELS — Access to confidential EU documents by the Russia-friendly Alternative for Germany party is raising concerns that sensitive deliberations are being exposed to Moscow, three EU diplomats and four German lawmakers have said. German MPs — including from the far-right AfD — have access to a databank containing thousands of EU files. Those include confidential notes from meetings of ambassadors where the bloc’s diplomats hash out their countries’ positions on geopolitical issues such as plans to fund Ukraine using frozen Russian assets. “The problem is that we have a party, the AfD, of which there are justified suspicions of information leaking to China or Russia,” said Greens lawmaker Anton Hofreiter, chair of the Bundestag’s EU affairs committee. Those suspicions are shaping how sensitive talks are conducted, as diplomats increasingly factor in the risk of exposure. Budapest was accused in media reports over the weekend of passing information about confidential discussions by EU leaders to Moscow, claims Hungary’s foreign minister described as “fake news.” EU countries already meet in smaller groups over concerns that “less-than-loyal” countries leak sensitive information to the government of Russian President Vladimir Putin, a European government official said. “We’re taking all kinds of precautions in Brussels to protect sensitive meetings and information,” said one senior EU diplomat. But the access that AfD MPs have to the confidential materials “leaves a giant, Putin-shaped hole in our security measures.”  “We’re all careful about sharing sensitive information in a format with 27 EU member states,” another diplomat said. “Whether because of [Hungarian leader Viktor] Orbán or because of the German system … we don’t freely share all information as you would among your closest confidants in a setting with 27 member states around the table. That’s the Hungarian factor, and that’s the AfD factor.” An “ambassador cannot guarantee that any sensitive things he says in Coreper [the EU ambassadors’ format] are not going straight to the Russians or China,” the diplomat continued. The diplomats POLITICO spoke to said they weren’t aware of these concerns being raised in any official capacity — “more at the watercooler,” the same diplomat said, adding there’s lots of chatter about concerns on the sidelines of meetings, particularly among countries in Europe’s northwest. The AfD denies it passes information from the system to Russia or China. “We do not comment on baseless allegations,” a spokesperson for the AfD’s parliamentary group said in response to a request for comment.   A LEAKY SYSTEM Unlike in other national parliaments, all MPs and their aides in Germany’s Bundestag have access to EuDoX, a databank containing thousands of EU files ranging from ministerial summit briefing notes to summaries of confidential meetings among ambassadors. The system was set up as a safeguard against unchecked executive power, a particular concern in Germany given its Nazi past. The documents — around 25,000 per year — are put into the system by a special unit within the Bundestag that gets them from the government. The databank contains “restricted” documents, the lowest classification of confidential information.   “In principle, this [access] is absolutely right and necessary in order to fulfill our task … to monitor the federal government, and since a great deal of this takes place at the EU level, it is, as I said, necessary,” the Greens’ Hofreiter said. Experts also noted that the government is well aware that a large number of people have access to the system and that this creates the possibility of leaks.   “Considering that EuDoX is a relatively open platform with 5,000 authorized users, there is nothing particularly sensitive in it. The federal government knows exactly what it is feeding into it,” said law professor Sven Hölscheidt from the Free University Berlin, who has studied the databank. But seven German lawmakers or their aides who use the databank told POLITICO the AfD’s access is a security risk. “The AfD’s apparent closeness to Putin, the contacts between numerous AfD lawmakers and the Russian embassy, their trips to Moscow, their adoption of Russian propaganda narratives, and their deliberate attempts to obtain security-related information through parliamentary inquiries are causing sleepless nights for all those who care deeply about the country’s security,” said Roland Theis, a senior lawmaker for German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s conservatives in the Bundestag’s EU affairs committee. Centrist lawmakers have said AfD politicians expose information that could be of interest to Russian intelligence. That includes government information on local drone defenses, Western arms transports to Ukraine, and authorities’ knowledge of Russian sabotage and hybrid activities in the Baltic Sea region. Late last year, the party’s lawmakers were widely accused of using their right to submit parliamentary questions to gather information for the Kremlin, claims the party’s leadership rejected. Earlier in 2025, a former aide to MEP Maximilian Krah was convicted of spying for China. “In general, we view the AfD’s handling of sensitive information with great concern,” said Johannes Schraps, a senior SPD lawmaker in the Bundestag’s EU affairs committee, adding that this concern “stems from a broader pattern.” The Bundestag administration took some steps toward securing information last year, Schraps said, including denying some AfD staff members access to buildings and parliamentary IT systems. Chris Lunday and Max Griera contributed reporting.

ROME — Italian right-wing Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s crushing defeat in Monday’s referendum on judicial reform has shattered her aura of political invincibility, and her opponents now reckon she can be toppled in a general election expected next year. The failed referendum is the the first major misstep of her premiership, and comes just as she seemed in complete control in Rome and Brussels, leading Italy’s most stable administration in years. Her loss is immediately energizing Italy’s fragmented opposition, making the country’s torpid politics suddenly look competitive again. Meloni’s bid to overhaul the judiciary — which she accused of being politicized and of left-wing bias — was roundly rejected, with 54 percent voting “no” to her reforms. An unexpectedly high turnout of 59 percent is also likely to alarm Meloni, underscoring how the vote snowballed into a broader vote of confidence in her and her government. She lost heavily in Italy’s three biggest cities: In the provinces of Rome, the “no” vote was 57 percent, Milan 54 percent and Naples 71 percent. In Naples, about 50 prosecutors and judges gathered to open champagne and sing Bella Ciao, the World War II anti-fascist partisan anthem. Activists, students and trade unionists spontaneously marched to Rome’s Piazza del Popolo chanting “resign, resign.”  In a video posted on social media, Meloni put a brave face on the result. “The Italians have decided and we will respect that decision,” she said. She admitted feeling some “bitterness for the lost opportunity … but we will go on as we always have with responsibility, determination and respect for Italy and its people.” In truth, however, the referendum will be widely viewed as a sign that she is politically vulnerable, after all. It knocks her off course just as she was setting her sights on major electoral reforms that would further cement her grip on power. One of her main goals has been to shift to a fixed-term prime ministership, which would be elected by direct suffrage rather than being hostage to rotating governments. Those ambitions look far more fragile now. The opposition groups that have struggled to dent Meloni’s dominance immediately scented blood. After months on the defensive, they pointed to Monday’s result as proof that the prime minister can be beaten and that a coordinated campaign can mobilize voters against her. Matteo Renzi, former prime minister and leader of the centrist Italia Viva party, predicted Meloni would now be a “lame duck,” telling reporters that “even her own followers will now start to doubt her.” When he lost a referendum in 2016 he resigned as prime minister. “Let’s see what Meloni will do after this clamorous defeat,” he said.  Elly Schlein, leader of the opposition Democratic Party, said: “We will beat [Meloni] in the next general election, I’m sure of that. I think that from today’s vote, from this extraordinary democratic participation, an unexpected participation in some ways, a clear political message is being sent to Meloni and this government, who must now listen to the country and its real priorities.”  Former Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte, leader of the populist 5Star Movement heralded “a new spring and a new political season.” Angelo Bonelli , leader of the Greens and Left Alliance, told reporters the result was “an important signal for us because it shows that there is a majority in the country opposed to the government.” ‘PARALLEL MAFIA’ The referendum itself centered on changes to how judges and prosecutors are governed and disciplined, including separating their career paths and reshaping their oversight bodies. The government framed the reforms as a long-overdue opportunity to fix a system where politicized legal “factions” impede the government’s ability to implement core policies on issues such as migration and security. Justice Minister Carlo Nordio called prosecutors a “parallel mafia,” while his chief of staff compared parts of the judiciary to “an execution squad.”   A voter is given a ballot at a polling station in Rome, Italy, on March 22, 2026. | Riccardo De Luca/Anadolu via Getty Images Meloni’s opponents viewed the defeated reforms differently, casting them as an attempt to weaken a fiercely independent judiciary and concentrate power. That framing helped turn a technical vote into a broader political contest, one that opposition parties were able to rally around. It was a clash with a long and bitter political history. The Mani Pulite (Clean Hands) investigations of the 1990s, which wiped out an entire political class, left a legacy of mistrust between politicians and the judiciary. The right, in particular, accused judges of running a left-wing vendetta against them. Under Meloni’s rule that tension has repeatedly resurfaced, with her government clashing with courts, saying judges are thwarting initiatives to fight migration and criminality. Meloni herself stepped late into the campaign, after initially keeping some distance, betting that her personal involvement could shift the outcome. She called the referendum an “historic opportunity to change Italy.” In combative form this month, she had called on Italians not squander their opportunity to shake up the judges. If they let things continue as they are now, she warned: “We will find ourselves with even more powerful factions, even more negligent judges, even more surreal sentences, immigrants, rapists, pedophiles, drug dealers being freed and putting your security at risk.” It was to no avail, and Meloni was hardly helped by the timing of the vote. Her ally U.S. President Donald Trump is highly unpopular in Italy and the war in Iran has triggered intense fears among Italians that they will have to pay more for power and fuel. The main upshot is that Italy’s political clock is ticking again. REGAINING THE INITIATIVE For Meloni, the temptation will be to regain the initiative quickly. That could even mean trying to press for early elections before economic pressures mount and key EU recovery funds wind down later this year. The logic of holding elections before economic conditions deteriorate further would be to prevent a slow bleeding away of support, said Roberto D’Alimonte, professor of political science at the Luiss University in Rome. But Italy’s President Sergio Mattarella has the ultimate say about when to dissolve parliament and parliamentarians, whose pensions depend on the legislature lasting until February, could help him prevent elections by forming alternative majorities. D’Alimonte said Meloni’s “standing is now damaged.” “There is no doubt she comes out of this much weaker. The defeat changes the perception of her. She has lost her clout with voters and to some extent in Europe. Until now she was a winner and now she has shown she can lose,” he added. She must now weigh whether to identify scapegoats who can take the fall — potentially Justice Minister Nordio, a technocrat with no political support base of his own.  Meloni is expected to move quickly to regain control of the agenda. She is due to travel to Algeria on Wednesday to advance energy cooperation, a trip that may also serve to pivot the political conversation back to economic and foreign policy aims. But the immediate impact of the vote is clear: A prime minister who entered the referendum from a position of strength but now faces a more uncertain political landscape, against an opposition newly convinced she can be beaten.

Many describe our geopolitical moment as one of instability, but that word feels too weak for what we are living through. Some, like Mark Carney, argue that we are facing a rupture: a break with assumptions that anchored the global economic and political order for decades. Others, like Christine Lagarde, see a profound transition, a shift toward a new configuration of power, technology and societal expectations. Whichever perception we adopt, the implication is clear: leaders can no longer rely on yesterday’s mental models, institutional routines or governance templates. Johanna Mair is the Director of the Florence School of Transnational Governance at the European University Institute in Florence, where she leads education, training and research on governance beyond the nation state. Security, for example, is no longer a discrete policy field. It now reaches deeply into energy systems, artificial intelligence, cyber governance, financial stability and democratic resilience, all under conditions of strategic competition and mistrust. At the same time, competitiveness cannot be reduced to productivity metrics or short-term growth rates. It is about a society’s capacity to innovate, regulate effectively and mobilize investment toward long-term objectives — from the green and digital transitions to social cohesion. This dense web of interdependence is where transnational governance is practiced every day. The European Union illustrates this reality vividly. No single member state can build the capacity to manage these transformations on its own. EU institutions and other regional bodies shape regulatory frameworks and collective responses; corporations influence infrastructure and supply chains; financial institutions direct capital flows; and civic actors respond to social fragmentation and governance gaps. Effective leadership has become a systemic endeavour: it requires coordination across these levels, while sustaining public legitimacy and defending liberal democratic principles. > Our mission is to teach and train current and future leaders, equipping them > with the knowledge, skills and networks to tackle global challenges in ways > that are both innovative and grounded in democratic values. The Florence School of Transnational Governance (STG) at the European University Institute was created precisely to respond to this need. Located in Florence and embedded in a European institution founded by EU member states, the STG is a hub where policymakers, business leaders, civil society, media and academia meet to work on governance beyond national borders. Our mission is to teach and train current and future leaders, equipping them with the knowledge, skills and networks to tackle global challenges in ways that are both innovative and grounded in democratic values. What makes this mission distinctive is not only the topics we address, but also how and with whom we address them. We see leadership development as a practice embedded in real institutions, not a purely classroom-based exercise. People do not come to Florence to observe transnational governance from a distance; they come to practice it, test hypotheses and co-create solutions with peers who work on the frontlines of policy and politics. This philosophy underpins our portfolio of programs, from degree offerings to executive education. With early career professionals, we focus on helping them understand and shape governance beyond the state, whether in international organizations, national administrations, the private sector or civil society. We encourage them to see institutions not as static structures, but as arrangements that can and must be strengthened and reformed to support a liberal, rules-based order under stress. At the same time, we devote significant attention to practitioners already in positions of responsibility. Our Global Executive Master (GEM) is designed for experienced professionals who cannot pause their careers, but recognize that the governance landscape in which they operate has changed fundamentally. Developed by the STG, the GEM convenes participants from EU institutions, national administrations, international organizations, business and civil society — professionals from a wide range of nationalities and institutional backgrounds, reflecting the coalitions required to address complex problems. The program is structured to fit the reality of leadership today. Delivered part time over two years, it combines online learning with residential periods in Florence and executive study visits in key policy centres. This blended format allows participants to remain in full-time roles while advancing their qualifications and networks, and it ensures that learning is continuously tested against institutional realities rather than remaining an abstract exercise. Participants specialize in tracks such as geopolitics and security, tech and governance, economy and finance, or energy and climate. Alongside this subject depth, they build capabilities more commonly associated with top executive programs than traditional public policy degrees: change management, negotiations, strategic communication, foresight and leadership under uncertainty. These skills are essential for bridging policy design and implementation — a gap that is increasingly visible as governments struggle to deliver on ambitious agendas. Executive study visits are a core element of this practice-oriented approach. In a recent Brussels visit, GEM participants engaged with high-level speakers from the European Commission, the European External Action Service, the Council, the European Parliament, NATO, Business Europe, Fleishman Hillard and POLITICO itself. Over several days, they discussed foreign and security policy, industrial strategy, strategic foresight and the governance of emerging technologies. These encounters do more than illustrate theory; they give participants a chance to stress-test their assumptions, understand the constraints facing decision-makers and build relationships across institutional boundaries. via EUI Throughout the program, each participant develops a capstone project that addresses a strategic challenge connected to a policy organization, often their own employer. This ensures that executive education translates into institutional impact: projects range from new regulatory approaches and partnership models to internal reforms aimed at making organizations more agile and resilient. At the same time, they help weave a durable transnational network of practitioners who can work together beyond the programme. Across our activities at the STG, a common thread runs through our work: a commitment to defending and renewing the liberal order through concrete practice. Addressing the rupture or transition we are living through requires more than technical fixes. It demands leaders who can think systemically, act across borders and design governance solutions that are both unconventional and democratically legitimate. > Across our activities at the STG, a common thread runs through our work: a > commitment to defending and renewing the liberal order through concrete > practice. In a period defined by systemic risk and strategic competition, leadership development cannot remain sectoral or reactive. It must be interdisciplinary, practice-oriented and anchored in real policy environments. At the Florence School of Transnational Governance, we aim to create precisely this kind of learning community — one where students, fellows and executives work side by side to reimagine how institutions can respond to global challenges. For policymakers and professionals who recognize themselves in this moment of rupture, our programs — including the GEM — offer a space to step back, learn with peers and return to their institutions better equipped to lead change. The task is urgent, but it is also an opportunity: by investing in transnational governance education today, we can help lay the foundations for a more resilient and inclusive order tomorrow.

HOW TWO WARS ARE PULLING EUROPE AND THE US APART The EU is worried President Trump could abandon Ukraine if the bloc doesn’t support him in the Middle East. By NICHOLAS VINOCUR in Brussels Illustration by Natália Delgado/ POLITICO  The biggest fear of European leaders is that Donald Trump’s war in Iran will lead him to abandon Ukraine. Governments are terrified that the U.S. president could retaliate against America’s European allies for spurning his appeals for assistance in the Middle East, primarily by cutting off what’s left of U.S. help for Kyiv, according to four EU diplomats with knowledge of their discussions. As they scramble to avoid a permanent break in the transatlantic relationship, leaders hope their offer of limited support for his action against Tehran will suffice to convince Trump to stay the course in the conflict with Russia. The war in Iran “must not divert our attention from the support we give Ukraine,” French President Emmanuel Macron said at the end of last week’s EU summit in Brussels. It’s easy to see why EU leaders are so anxious. In recent days Trump has repeatedly blasted them for failing to do more to help him unblock the Strait of Hormuz, the shipping route used by about 20 percent of the world’s oil that has effectively been closed by Iran. He has also explicitly linked continued U.S. involvement in NATO to the Middle East conflict. “NATO IS A PAPER TIGER!” he railed in a Truth Social Post over the weekend. “They complain about the high oil prices they are forced to pay, but don’t want to help open the Strait of Hormuz … COWARDS,” he concluded. “[W]e will remember.” At the same time, further deepening fears about the transatlantic alliance, Moscow offered Washington a quid pro quo under which the Kremlin would stop sharing intelligence with Iran if Washington ceased supplying Ukraine with intel about Russia, POLITICO revealed on Friday. While the U.S. declined the offer, according to two people familiar with the U.S.-Russia negotiations, the fact it was proffered in the first place points to a possible tradeoff between U.S. involvement in Ukraine and the Middle East. “There’s a crack right now emerging between, you know, Europe and the U.S., which, again, as an avid pro-American and transatlanticist, I lament,” Finnish President Alexander Stubb said in an interview with the Daily Telegraph. “But it’s a reality that I have to live with. And I obviously try to salvage what I can.” MISSILES LIKE CANDIES Governments are concerned that the war in Iran is using up missiles and air defense munitions that Kyiv needs to protect itself against Russia, the four EU diplomats, who were granted anonymity to discuss sensitive diplomatic exchanges, told POLITICO. “When you see what Trump did on Greenland, how he cut off intelligence-sharing with Ukraine on a whim, there’s always a risk [that Trump could remove U.S. support for Ukraine],” one of the diplomats said. “The concern is obviously that the Middle East is taking attention away from Ukraine,” added a second diplomat from a mid-sized EU country. “The Emiratis are shooting out Patriot [air defense missiles] like candies, whereas Ukraine desperately needs them. It can’t become an either-or situation” in which the U.S. only has enough bandwidth for one conflict and abandons Ukraine, the diplomat added. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has been explicit about the risk of such a tradeoff, telling the BBC on Thursday that he had a “very bad feeling” about the impact of the Middle East war on Ukraine. He lamented the fact that as the war goes on, U.S.-led peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia are being “constantly postponed” in what the Kremlin calls a “situational pause.” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is pictured at Moncloa Palace in Madrid, Spain on March 18, 2026. | Alberto Gardin/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images Ukrainian negotiators traveled over the weekend to the U.S. for talks with Trump’s envoys, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. The latter praised the talks as “constructive” in a post on X, but gave no hint of when negotiations with Russia would resume. DAMAGE CONTROL European leaders, including France’s Emmanuel Macron, Britain’s Keir Starmer and NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte, are ramping up efforts to show they support the U.S. president’s goal of freeing up the Strait of Hormuz. In a now familiar role, Rutte has been outspoken in praising Trump’s efforts. The former Dutch prime minister last week called the destruction of Iran’s military capacity by the U.S. and Israel “very important,” linking it to “European security” at a time when some EU leaders, like Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez, have criticized the war as “illegal.” Macron has been more circumspect in public, but active behind the scenes. In two separate calls with Trump before last Thursday’s gathering of EU leaders, the French president assured his U.S. counterpart that France would help clear the Strait when conditions allow, according to comments from Trump himself and a third EU diplomat who was briefed on the calls. “This is about managing the man,” the diplomat said. In the early hours of Friday, Macron — who has otherwise pledged to send a naval detachment to the Strait of Hormuz after the hot phase of the war dies down — said France was pursuing the aim of freeing it up via the United Nations. In response to a question from POLITICO at the European Council on Thursday, the French leader said Paris intends to “sound out its main partners” about tabling a resolution in the Security Council on securing freedom of navigation in the vital waterway. Trump is no fan of the United Nations, but he could see an advantage to a U.N. Security Council resolution that forms the basis for a broader coalition to free up the Strait, a fourth EU diplomat said. The southern suburbs of Beirut after an Israeli airstrike on March 10, 2026. | Fadel Itani/AFP via Getty Images The U.K.’s Starmer is also doing more to help Trump in the Middle East. Following reports that Iran had fired a ballistic missile at the Diego Garcia U.S.-U.K. base in the Indian Ocean, Starmer gave the U.S. a green light to use British bases to launch strikes on Iranian sites targeting the Strait of Hormuz. Previously he had only granted permission for the bases to be used for defensive strikes. Starmer was also the main organizer of a statement signed by seven EU and allied countries (the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Canada and Japan) in which they expressed their “readiness to contribute to appropriate efforts to ensure safe passage through the Strait.” Asked about the intent of this statement, which doesn’t promise any immediate material help, the third diplomat said: “It’s part of the same effort. We need to show Trump we are active in the Middle East. It’s in our interests, but also in Ukraine’s.” Such pledges remain vague for now. Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz have both asserted they have no intention of being drawn into the war in Iran. But as far as Trump is concerned, “appearances matter — sometimes more than substance,” said the same diplomat.

Ivo Daalder, a former U.S. ambassador to NATO, is a senior fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center and host of the weekly podcast “World Review with Ivo Daalder.” He writes POLITICO’s From Across the Pond column. Like many, I used to believe that former U.S. President George W. Bush’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003 was the biggest strategic mistake America had made, at least since the Vietnam War. That is, until now. U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to join Israel in a war against Iran is a far bigger strategic error, and one with far bigger strategic consequences. The reasons for this are many, ranging from the immediate impact on the region and the global economy to the longer-term upshots for Russia and China, as well as the repercussions for U.S. alliances and America’s global standing. That much is already clear — and we’re only three weeks in. Let’s start with the similarities: Much like the Iraq War, the war against Iran began based on the presumption that the regime in power would swiftly fall and that a new, more moderate and less antagonistic one would take its place. In both instances, the idea was to remove the greatest destabilizing threat in the Middle East — Saddam Hussein’s regime in the initial case, the theocratic dictatorship in Tehran in the latter — through the swift and decisive use of military force. But while Bush understood that defeating a regime required ground forces, it seems Trump simply hoped that airpower alone would suffice. As a result, Hussein’s regime fell swiftly — though Bush did vastly underestimate what would be required to rebuild a stable, let alone a democratic, Iraq in its place. But the Iranian government, as U.S. intelligence officials themselves have testified, “appears to be intact” despite Israel killing many of its key political and security leaders through targeted strikes. Focusing on the region at large, Bush’s misjudgment eventually contributed to a large-scale insurgency, which strengthened Iran’s influence in Iraq and the wider Middle East. In contrast, Trump’s miscalculation has left in place a regime that, aside from assuring its own survival, is now singularly focused on inflicting as much damage on the U.S. and its allies as it possibly can. Iranian drones and missiles have already attacked Israel and the Gulf states, targeted critical energy production facilities and effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz, which hosts one-fifth of the world’s oil and gas export transits. The Salalah oil storage fire in Oman is pictured on March 13, 2026. | Gallo Images/Orbital Horizon/Copernicus Sentinel Data 2026 Less than a month in, the world is now witnessing the largest oil and gas disruption in history. And as the fighting escalates to include gas and oil production infrastructure, the global economic consequences will be felt by every single country for months, if not years, to come — even if the conflict were to end soon. The damage that has already been inflicted on the global economy is far greater than the economic consequences of the Iraq War in its entirety. But that’s not all. Geopolitically, the U.S.-Israel war with Iran will also have far greater reverberations than the war in Iraq ever did. For one, the Bush administration spent a lot of time and effort trying to get allies on board to participate in and support the war. It didn’t fully succeed in this, as key allies like Germany and France continued opposing the war. But it tried. Trump, by contrast, didn’t even try to get America’s most important allies on board. Not only that, he even failed to inform them of his decision. And yet, when Iran responded predictably by closing the Strait of Hormuz, the U.S. president then demanded allies send their navies to escort tankers — despite the U.S. Navy so far refusing to do so. And while it’s true that Iraq left many U.S. allies — even those that joined the war, like the U.K. — deeply scarred, Iran has convinced U.S. allies they can no longer rely on the U.S., and that Washington is now a real threat to their economic security. That, too, will have a lasting impact well beyond anything the war in Iraq did. Finally, the fact remains that when Bush decided to invade Iraq, Russia and China were still minor global powers. Russian President Vladimir Putin was only just starting his effort to stabilize the economy and rebuild Russia’s military power, while China had just joined the World Trade Organization and was still a decade or more away from becoming an economic superpower. In other words, America’s blunder in Iraq occurred at a time when the strategic consequences for the global balance of power were still manageable. Trump’s Iran debacle is occurring at a time when China is effectively competing with the U.S. for global power and influence, and Russia is engaged in the largest military action in Europe since the end of World War II. A woman sifts through the rubble in her house in Tehran, Iran on March 15, 2026 after it was damaged by missile attacks two days before. | Majid Saeedi/Getty Images Both stand to benefit greatly. Russia is the short-term winner here. Oil prices are rising, generating more than $150 million per day in extra income for Moscow to feed its war machine. The U.S. is relaxing its sanctions against Russia in a vain attempt to stall prices from ballooning at the pump. All the while, Ukraine is being left to contend with Russia’s missile and drone attacks without the advanced defensive weaponry that’s now being used to protect Israel and the Gulf instead. China, meanwhile, is watching as the U.S. diverts its military forces from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East, where they will likely remain for months, if not years. These forces include a carrier strike group, a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense anti-missile system from Korea, and a Marine Expeditionary Force from Japan. And while a disruption in oil and gas supply will be a short-term problem for Beijing too, China’s rapid transition to renewables and close alignment with energy-rich Russia will leave it well placed to confidently confront the future. Bush and Trump both came to office determined to avoid the mistaken wars of their predecessors. Nevertheless, they both embarked on military adventures fed by a hubristic belief in American power. But while the U.S. was strong enough — and its adversaries still weak enough — to recoup much of the damage inflicted by Bush’s war, the war unfolding in Iran today will leave behind an America that will have lost much of its global power, standing and influence, destined to confront rising adversaries all on its own.

BRUSSELS — The EU is limiting the flow of confidential material to Hungary and leaders are meeting in smaller groups — as Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk warned of long-standing suspicions Viktor Orbán’s government is sharing information with Russia. But there will not be any formal EU response to a fresh set of allegations because of the possible impact on the Hungarian election on April 12, according to five European diplomats and officials who told POLITICO they were concerned about the risk of Budapest leaking sensitive information to the Kremlin. “The news that Orbán’s people inform Moscow about EU Council meetings in every detail shouldn’t come as a surprise to anyone,” Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who has backed Hungarian opposition leader Péter Magyar in the election, wrote on X on Sunday. “We’ve had our suspicions about that for a long time. That’s one reason why I take the floor only when strictly necessary and say just as much as necessary.” In a report on Saturday the Washington Post said that Orbán’s government maintained close contacts with Moscow throughout the war in Ukraine, and Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó used breaks during meetings with other member countries to update his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov. Worries about Hungary sending information directly to Moscow were behind the rise of breakout formats with like-minded leaders, instead of holding meetings with all 27 EU members, said one of the European government officials, who, like others in this article, was granted anonymity to speak freely about sensitive matters. “Overall the less-than-loyal member states are the main reason why most of relevant European diplomacy is now happening in different smaller formats — E3, E4, E7, E8, Weimar, NB8, JEF, etc,” the official said.  The numerals refer to the number of European leaders in the group. The Weimar alliance comprises France, Germany and Poland. NB8 is the eight countries in the Nordics and Baltics. JEF is the Joint Expeditionary Force of 10 northern European nations. ‘FAKE NEWS’ Former Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis, who frequently attended Council meetings where Szijjártó was present, told POLITICO he was warned as early as 2024 that the Hungarian side could be passing on information to Russia, and that he and his counterparts had limited the information they shared when he was present. Even ahead of a critical NATO summit in Vilnius in 2023, envoys moved to cut Budapest’s delegation out of sensitive talks, Landsbergis said. “We would only speak in formal terms, later breaking out to speak without Hungary about the achievables of the summit,” he said.  The Bucharest Group of Nine, a club of countries on the military alliance’s Eastern Flank, reportedly contemplated kicking Budapest out of the format the following year over failures to agree on support for Ukraine. Hungary’s Europe Minister János Bóka told POLITICO the reports over the weekend were “fake news” designed as “a desperate reaction to [Orban’s party] Fidesz gaining momentum in the election campaign. But the Hungarian people won’t be deceived.” János Bóka, Hungary’s EU affairs minister, is pictured at a General Affairs Council in Brussels, Belgium on Jan. 28, 2025. | Martin Bertrand/Hans Lucas/AFP via Getty Images For his part, Szijjártó rejected the content of the Washington Post article and accused the media of putting forward “conspiracy theories that are more preposterous than anything seen before.” More information could be held back in light of the fresh allegations, one of the diplomats said.  “There is an argument to be made for classification of info and documents on the EU side,” the diplomat said. While using the classified designation “isn’t a silver bullet,” it could “serve as a deterrent against leaks and the passing of sensitive info to third parties. It would also make investigations more automatic.” NO SURPRISES The five diplomats said they were unsurprised by the news, but that any formal response would depend on whether Orbán is re-elected in April. Despite lagging behind Magyar’s Tisza in the polls, the Hungarian prime minister told POLITICO on Friday he could “certainly” secure another term. “It undermines trust, cooperation, and the integrity of the European Union,” said a second diplomat of the allegations. “It’s a deplorable situation. If he stays after [the] election, I think the EU need to find ways to deal with this in another manner.” Another cautioned that whatever the EU and its leaders do, Orbán will use it in his favor in the campaign. “I don’t think anybody is eager to do anything that would add oil to fire before April 12,” they said. Despite widespread agreement on the threat posed by Russia, a fourth diplomat pointed out that the content of discussions among leaders and foreign ministers are routinely reported in the press and frequently take place in an unrestricted format, meaning leaders don’t leave their phones outside to minimize the risk of surveillance. But the optics of an EU government working so closely with a hostile state remains politically explosive. “The fact that the Hungarian foreign minister, a close friend of [Russian Foreign Minister] Sergey Lavrov, has been reporting to the Russians practically minute by minute from every EU meeting is outright treason,” Magyar said at a campaign rally over the weekend. “This man has not only betrayed his own country, but Europe as well.” The allegations come as Orbán’s foreign supporters set course for Budapest to help him campaign in the final stretch of the elections. Polish President Karol Nawrocki — a political rival of Tusk’s — will attend events on Monday, while U.S. Vice President JD Vance will jet in ahead of the vote next month.  Orbán refused to sign off on €90 billion in much-needed loans for Ukraine at Friday’s European Council, sparking a furious reaction from fellow leaders. “It wouldn’t be surprising if this proves true,” said a fifth EU diplomat of the allegations. “Hungary has long been [Russian President Vladimir] Putin’s ally within the EU and continues to sabotage European security. The blocked €90 billion is simply the latest example of that pattern.”

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk on Sunday said a media report alleging Hungary’s foreign minister regularly called his Russian counterpart to brief him during EU summits “shouldn’t come as a surprise to anyone.” “We’ve had our suspicions about that for a long time,” Tusk posted on social media network X. “That’s one reason why I take the floor only when strictly necessary and say just as much as necessary.” The Washington Post in a story published Saturday quoted an anonymous European security official as saying that Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó made regular phone calls during breaks at EU summits to provide his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, with “live reports on what’s been discussed” and possible solutions. POLITICO has not independently verified the story. Szijjártó denied the claims in a post on X on Sunday, calling it “fake news.” Szijjártó was responding to a X post by Poland’s Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Radosław Sikorski that referenced the Washington Post claim. “This would explain a lot, Peter. @FM_Szijjarto,” Sikorski wrote. “Fake news as always,” Szijjártó responded to Sikorski. “You are telling lies in order to support Tisza Party to have a pro-war puppet government in Hungary. You will not have it!” The Post’s story also said that Russia’s foreign intelligence service (SVR) had proposed staging an assassination attempt against Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán to boost plummeting public support ahead of next month’s parliamentary election in that country. It cited an “an internal report for the SVR obtained and authenticated by a European intelligence service and reviewed by The Washington Post.” Orbán goes head to head in the polls next month with conservative opposition leader Péter Magyar, for the Tisza Party, who has emerged as a serious challenger. Szijjártó extended his defense against the allegations in a post on Facebook. Hungarians can “see clearly that this fake news, these lies that are part of Ukrainian propaganda, are not created for anything else, except to support the Tisza Party in the Hungarian election and to influence the outcome of the elections,” Szijjártó said on Facebook. Magyar weighed into the controversy on the campaign trail. “The fact that the Hungarian foreign minister, a good friend of Sergei Lavrov, reports to the Russians almost every minute about every EU meeting is pure treason,” Magyar said in the Hungarian village of Nyúl, as reported by Hungarian outlet Telex. “This man has betrayed not only his country, but Europe.”

YOKOSUKA, Japan — Germany is seeking to deepen defense ties with Japan, with Defense Minister Boris Pistorius proposing a new agreement to make it easier for troops from both countries to operate on each other’s territory. Speaking at Japan’s Yokosuka naval base after talks with Japanese Defense Minister Shinjirō Koizumi on Sunday, Pistorius said Berlin had floated a so-called Reciprocal Access Agreement — a framework designed to “ease the exchange of soldiers in each other’s countries and significantly reduce bureaucratic hurdles.” Such agreements allow partner countries to deploy troops on each other’s soil more easily for training, exercises or operations by streamlining legal and administrative procedures. Japan has signed similar deals with countries like the United Kingdom and Australia as it deepens its own security ties amid rising regional tensions. The proposal marks a step beyond Germany’s recent Indo-Pacific engagements, which have largely focused on joint exercises and short-term deployments. It signals a shift toward more structured military cooperation with Berlin’s partners in the region. Pistorius framed the move as part of a broader response to growing global instability. “How close our partnership is has become clear in light of the current developments in Iran and the Middle East,” he said, pointing to Japan’s heavy reliance on energy imports through the Strait of Hormuz. “The freedom of sea routes must be guaranteed and protected.” Germany and Japan share an interest in securing global trade routes, he added, stressing that both countries remain committed to the rules-based international order. “We are united by the conviction that the strength of the law must prevail,” Pistorius said. The initiative also reflects a broader strategic shift in Berlin and Tokyo. As both governments face rising pressure from authoritarian powers — from Russia’s war in Ukraine to China and North Korea in East Asia — they are increasingly treating their security challenges as interconnected, translating those shared concerns into closer bilateral defense cooperation.