The U.S. is offering Ukraine security guarantees similar to those it would receive as part of NATO, American officials said Monday. The offer is the strongest and most explicit security pledge the Trump administration has put forward for Ukraine, but it comes with an implicit ultimatum: Take it now or the next iteration won’t be as generous. The proposal of so-called Article 5-like guarantees comes amid marathon talks among special envoy Steve Witkoff, President Donald Trump’s son-in-law and adviser Jared Kushner and Ukrainian and European officials in Berlin as Washington tries to pressure Kyiv into accepting terms that will end the war. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and many European leaders have been reluctant to reach a deal without an explicit U.S. security guarantee, fearful that Russia, after a period of time, would attack again. This latest U.S. offer appears to be an effort to assuage those concerns but also to push Zelenskyy to act quickly. “The basis of that agreement is basically to have really, really strong guarantees, Article 5-like,” a senior U.S. official said. “Those guarantees will not be on the table forever. Those guarantees are on the table right now if there’s a conclusion that’s reached in a good way.” President Donald Trump said later Monday that he had spoken with Zelenskyy and European leaders by phone. Trump also said he had spoken to Russian President Vladimir Putin, but did not say when. “I think we’re closer now than we have been ever, and we’ll see what we can do,” Trump told reporters at the White House. Asked if the offer for security guarantees had a time limit, he said “the time limit is whenever we can get it done.” The discussions over the weekend largely focused on detailing the security guarantees that the U.S. and Europe would provide Ukraine, but they also included territory and other matters. Witkoff and Kushner were joined by Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, head of U.S. European Command as well as the top commander for NATO. The U.S. expects that Russia would accept such an arrangement in a final deal, as well as permit Ukraine to join the European Union. That could prove to be an overly optimistic assessment, given the Kremlin’s refusal to give ground in peace talks so far. And Moscow has yet to weigh in on any of the new agreements being worked out in Europe over the last few days. “We believe the Russians, in a final deal, will accept all these things which allow for a strong and free Ukraine. Russia, in a final deal, has indicated they were open to Ukraine joining the EU,” a second U.S. official said. Both officials were granted anonymity because of the sensitive nature of the negotiations. It was not clear when or how the Trump administration would bring the new details to Moscow. Russia expects the U.S. side will update it on the talks, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said. He added Putin “is open to peace, to a serious peace and serious decisions. He is absolutely not open to any tricks aimed at stalling for time.” The Kremlin said Monday it expected to be updated on the Berlin talks by the U.S. side. Asked whether the negotiations could be over by Christmas, Peskov said trying to predict a potential time frame for a peace deal was a “thankless task.” The second U.S. official said the Ukrainian delegation was pleasantly “surprised” by Trump’s willingness to agree to firmer security guarantees and to have them ratified by Congress so that they will endure beyond his presidency. The U.S. side also spoke highly of its European counterparts, who have been worried for months that the Trump team would force Ukraine to agree to unfavorable conditions. European officials also sounded upbeat. “The legal and material security guarantees that the U.S. has put on the table here in Berlin are remarkable,” German Chancellor Friedrich Merz told reporters during a press conference after the talks Monday. Merz, along with his counterparts from Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, U.K., Sweden and the EU put out a statement welcoming “significant progress” in the U.S. effort and committing to helping Ukraine to end the war and deter Russian aggression, including through a European-led multinational force for Ukraine supported by the U.S. Over the weekend Zelenskyy conceded that Ukraine would not seek NATO membership, a condition that Russia has repeatedly sought. Trump, who skipped this week’s meetings in Berlin but has been briefed twice by Witkoff and Kushner, planned to call into a dinner Monday for attending heads of state, foreign ministers and security officials, the U.S. officials said. “He’s really pleased with where [things] are,” the first U.S. official said. Witkoff and Kushner also sought to narrow disputes between Ukraine and Russia over what territory Moscow would control in a final deal. Russia has so far insisted on controlling Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region, even parts that Moscow hasn’t captured. One of the U.S. officials said the talks focused on many of the specific territorial considerations, stating that there is a proposal in the works but yet to be finalized for Russia and Ukraine to split control of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant with each country having access to half of the energy produced by the plant. But the American officials mostly avoided specifics on how they aimed to bridge other gaps on territorial disputes. They said they left Zelenskyy with “thought-provoking ideas” on how to do so. After Zelenskyy responds to the proposals, Witkoff and Kushner will discuss the matter with Russia. “We feel really good about the progress that we’ve made, including on territories,” the first official said. Next the U.S. will convene working groups, likely in Miami this weekend, where military officials will pore over maps to solve the remaining territorial issues. “We believe that we have probably solved for … 90 percent of the issues between Ukraine and Russia, but there’s some more things that have to be worked out,” the first U.S. official said. Hans Joachim Von Der Burchard in Berlin contributed to this report.

A fair, fast and competitive transition begins with what already works and then rapidly scales it up.  Across the EU commercial road transport sector, the diversity of operations is met with a diversity of solutions. Urban taxis are switching to electric en masse. Many regional coaches run on advanced biofuels, with electrification emerging in smaller applications such as school services, as European e-coach technologies are still maturing and only now beginning to enter the market. Trucks electrify rapidly where operationally and financially possible, while others, including long-haul and other hard-to-electrify segments, operate at scale on HVO (hydrotreated vegetable oil) or biomethane, cutting emissions immediately and reliably. These are real choices made every day by operators facing different missions, distances, terrains and energy realities, showing that decarbonization is not a single pathway but a spectrum of viable ones.  Building on this diversity, many operators are already modernizing their fleets and cutting emissions through electrification. When they can control charging, routing and energy supply, electric vehicles often deliver a positive total cost of ownership (TCO), strong reliability and operational benefits. These early adopters prove that electrification works where the enabling conditions are in place, and that its potential can expand dramatically with the right support. > Decarbonization is not a single pathway but a spectrum of viable ones chosen > daily by operators facing real-world conditions. But scaling electrification faces structural bottlenecks. Grid capacity is constrained across the EU, and upgrades routinely take years. As most heavy-duty vehicle charging will occur at depots, operators cannot simply move around to look for grid opportunities. They are bound to the location of their facilities.  The recently published grid package tries, albeit timidly, to address some of these challenges, but it neither resolves the core capacity deficiencies nor fixes the fundamental conditions that determine a positive TCO: the predictability of electricity prices, the stability of delivered power, and the resulting charging time. A truck expected to recharge in one hour at a high-power station may wait far longer if available grid power drops. Without reliable timelines, predictable costs and sufficient depot capacity, most transport operators cannot make long-term investment decisions. And the grid is only part of the enabling conditions needed: depot charging infrastructure itself requires significant additional investment, on top of vehicles that already cost several hundreds of thousands of euros more than their diesel equivalents.  This is why the EU needs two things at once: strong enablers for electrification and hydrogen; and predictability on what the EU actually recognizes as clean. Operators using renewable fuels, from biomethane to advanced biofuels and HVO, delivering up to 90 percent CO2 reduction, are cutting emissions today. Yet current CO2 frameworks, for both light-duty vehicles and heavy-duty trucks, fail to recognize fleets running on these fuels as part of the EU’s decarbonization solution for road transport, even when they deliver immediate, measurable climate benefits. This lack of clarity limits investment and slows additional emission reductions that could happen today. > Policies that punish before enabling will not accelerate the transition; a > successful shift must empower operators, not constrain them. The revision of both CO2 standards, for cars and vans, and for heavy-duty vehicles, will therefore be pivotal. They must support electrification and hydrogen where they fit the mission, while also recognizing the contribution of renewable and low-carbon fuels across the fleet. Regulations that exclude proven clean options will not accelerate the transition. They will restrict it.  With this in mind, the question is: why would the EU consider imposing purchasing mandates on operators or excessively high emission-reduction targets on member states that would, in practice, force quotas on buyers? Such measures would punish before enabling, removing choice from those who know their operations best. A successful transition must empower operators, not constrain them.  The EU’s transport sector is committed and already delivering. With the right enablers, a technology-neutral framework, and clarity on what counts as clean, the EU can turn today’s early successes into a scalable, fair and competitive decarbonization pathway.  We now look with great interest to the upcoming Automotive Package, hoping to see pragmatic solutions to these pressing questions, solutions that EU transport operators, as the buyers and daily users of all these technologies, are keenly expecting. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is IRU – International Road Transport Union  * The ultimate controlling entity is IRU – International Road Transport Union  More information here.

Europe’s chemical industry has reached a breaking point. The warning lights are no longer blinking — they are blazing. Unless Europe changes course immediately, we risk watching an entire industrial backbone, with the countless jobs it supports, slowly hollow out before our eyes. Consider the energy situation: this year European gas prices have stood at 2.9 times higher than in the United States. What began as a temporary shock is now a structural disadvantage. High energy costs are becoming Europe’s new normal, with no sign of relief. This is not sustainable for an energy-intensive sector that competes globally every day. Without effective infrastructure and targeted energy-cost relief — including direct support, tax credits and compensation for indirect costs from the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) — we are effectively asking European companies and their workers to compete with their hands tied behind their backs. > Unless Europe changes course immediately, we risk watching an entire > industrial backbone, with the countless jobs it supports, slowly hollow out > before our eyes. The impact is already visible. This year, EU27 chemical production fell by a further 2.5 percent, and the sector is now operating 9.5 percent below pre-crisis capacity. These are not just numbers, they are factories scaling down, investments postponed and skilled workers leaving sites. This is what industrial decline looks like in real time. We are losing track of the number of closures and job losses across Europe, and this is accelerating at an alarming pace. And the world is not standing still. In the first eight months of 2025, EU27 chemicals exports dropped by €3.5 billion, while imports rose by €3.2 billion. The volume trends mirror this: exports are down, imports are up. Our trade surplus shrank to €25 billion, losing €6.6 billion in just one year. Meanwhile, global distortions are intensifying. Imports, especially from China, continue to increase, and new tariff policies from the United States are likely to divert even more products toward Europe, while making EU exports less competitive. Yet again, in 2025, most EU trade defense cases involved chemical products. In this challenging environment, EU trade policy needs to step up: we need fast, decisive action against unfair practices to protect European production against international trade distortions. And we need more free trade agreements to access growth market and secure input materials. “Open but not naïve” must become more than a slogan. It must shape policy. > Our producers comply with the strictest safety and environmental standards in > the world. Yet resource-constrained authorities cannot ensure that imported > products meet those same standards. Europe is also struggling to enforce its own rules at the borders and online. Our producers comply with the strictest safety and environmental standards in the world. Yet resource-constrained authorities cannot ensure that imported products meet those same standards. This weak enforcement undermines competitiveness and safety, while allowing products that would fail EU scrutiny to enter the single market unchecked. If Europe wants global leadership on climate, biodiversity and international chemicals management, credibility starts at home. Regulatory uncertainty adds to the pressure. The Chemical Industry Action Plan recognizes what industry has long stressed: clarity, coherence and predictability are essential for investment. Clear, harmonized rules are not a luxury — they are prerequisites for maintaining any industrial presence in Europe. This is where REACH must be seen for what it is: the world’s most comprehensive piece of legislation governing chemicals. Yet the real issues lie in implementation. We therefore call on policymakers to focus on smarter, more efficient implementation without reopening the legal text. Industry is facing too many headwinds already. Simplification can be achieved without weakening standards, but this requires a clear political choice. We call on European policymakers to restore the investment and profitability of our industry for Europe. Only then will the transition to climate neutrality, circularity, and safe and sustainable chemicals be possible, while keeping our industrial base in Europe. > Our industry is an enabler of the transition to a climate-neutral and circular > future, but we need support for technologies that will define that future. In this context, the ETS must urgently evolve. With enabling conditions still missing, like a market for low-carbon products, energy and carbon infrastructures, access to cost-competitive low-carbon energy sources, ETS costs risk incentivizing closures rather than investment in decarbonization. This may reduce emissions inside the EU, but it does not decarbonize European consumption because production shifts abroad. This is what is known as carbon leakage, and this is not how EU climate policy intends to reach climate neutrality. The system needs urgent repair to avoid serious consequences for Europe’s industrial fabric and strategic autonomy, with no climate benefit. These shortcomings must be addressed well before 2030, including a way to neutralize ETS costs while industry works toward decarbonization. Our industry is an enabler of the transition to a climate-neutral and circular future, but we need support for technologies that will define that future. Europe must ensure that chemical recycling, carbon capture and utilization, and bio-based feedstocks are not only invented here, but also fully scaled here. Complex permitting, fragmented rules and insufficient funding are slowing us down while other regions race ahead. Decarbonization cannot be built on imported technology — it must be built on a strong EU industrial presence. Critically, we must stimulate markets for sustainable products that come with an unavoidable ‘green premium’. If Europe wants low-carbon and circular materials, then fiscal, financial and regulatory policy recipes must support their uptake — with minimum recycled or bio-based content, new value chain mobilizing schemes and the right dose of ‘European preference’. If we create these markets but fail to ensure that European producers capture a fair share, we will simply create new opportunities for imports rather than European jobs. > If Europe wants a strong, innovative resilient chemical industry in 2030 and > beyond, the decisions must be made today. The window is closing fast. The Critical Chemicals Alliance offers a path forward. Its primary goal will be to tackle key issues facing the chemical sector, such as risks of closures and trade challenges, and to support modernization and investments in critical productions. It will ultimately enable the chemical industry to remain resilient in the face of geopolitical threats, reinforcing Europe’s strategic autonomy. But let us be honest: time is no longer on our side. Europe’s chemical industry is the foundation of countless supply chains — from clean energy to semiconductors, from health to mobility. If we allow this foundation to erode, every other strategic ambition becomes more fragile. If you weren’t already alarmed — you should be. This is a wake-up call. Not for tomorrow, for now. Energy support, enforceable rules, smart regulation, strategic trade policies and demand-driven sustainability are not optional. They are the conditions for survival. If Europe wants a strong, innovative resilient chemical industry in 2030 and beyond, the decisions must be made today. The window is closing fast. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is CEFIC- The European Chemical Industry Council  * The ultimate controlling entity is CEFIC- The European Chemical Industry Council  More information here.

Mathias Döpfner is chair and CEO of Axel Springer, POLITICO’s parent company. America and Europe have been transmitting on different wavelengths for some time now. And that is dangerous — especially for Europe. The European reactions to the new U.S. National Security Strategy paper and to Donald Trump’s recent criticism of the Old Continent were, once again, reflexively offended and incapable of accepting criticism: How dare he, what an improper intrusion! But such reactions do not help; they do harm. Two points are lost in these sour responses. First: Most Americans criticize Europe because the continent matters to them. Many of those challenging Europe — even JD Vance or Trump, even Elon Musk or Sam Altman — emphasize this repeatedly. The new U.S. National Security Strategy, scandalized above all by those who have not read it, states explicitly: “Our goal should be to help Europe correct its current trajectory. We will need a strong Europe to help us successfully compete, and to work in concert with us to prevent any adversary from dominating Europe.” And Trump says repeatedly, literally or in essence, in his interview with POLITICO: “I want to see a strong Europe.” The transatlantic drift is also a rupture of political language. Trump very often simply says what he thinks — sharply contrasting with many European politicians who are increasingly afraid to say what they believe is right. People sense the castration of thought through a language of evasions. And they turn away. Or toward the rabble-rousers. My impression is that our difficult American friends genuinely want exactly what they say they want: a strong Europe, a reliable and effective partner. But we do not hear it — or refuse to hear it. We hear only the criticism and dismiss it. Criticism is almost always a sign of involvement, of passion. We should worry far more if no criticism arrived. That would signal indifference — and therefore irrelevance. (By the way: Whether we like the critics is of secondary importance.) Responding with hauteur is simply not in our interest. It would be wiser — as Kaja Kallas rightly emphasized — to conduct a dialogue that includes self-criticism, a conversation about strengths, weaknesses and shared interests, and to back words with action on both sides. Which brings us to the second point: Unfortunately, much of the criticism is accurate. Anyone who sees politics as more than a self-absorbed administration of the status quo must concede that for decades Europe has delivered far too little — or nothing at all. Not in terms of above-average growth and prosperity, nor in terms of affordable energy. Europe does not deliver on deregulation or debureaucratization; it does not deliver on digitalization or innovation driven by artificial intelligence. And above all: Europe does not deliver on a responsible and successful migration policy. The world that wishes Europe well looked to the new German government with great hope. Capital flows on the scale of trillions waited for the first positive signals to invest in Germany and Europe. For it seemed almost certain that the world’s third-largest economy would, under a sensible, business-minded and transatlantic chancellor, finally steer a faltering Europe back onto the right path. The disappointment was all the more painful. Aside from the interior minister, the digital minister and the economics minister, the new government delivers in most areas the opposite of what had been promised before the election. The chancellor likes to blame the vice chancellor. The vice chancellor blames his own party. And all together they prefer to blame the Americans and their president. Instead of a European fresh start, we see continued agony and decline. Germany still suffers from its National Socialist trauma and believes that if it remains pleasantly average and certainly not excellent, everyone will love it. France is now paying the price for its colonial legacy in Africa and finds itself — all the way up to a president driven by political opportunism — in the chokehold of Islamist and antisemitic networks. In Britain, the prime minister is pursuing a similar course of cultural and economic submission. And Spain is governed by socialist fantasists who seem to take real pleasure in self-enfeeblement and whose “genocide in Gaza” rhetoric mainly mobilizes bored, well-heeled daughters of the upper middle class. Hope comes from Finland and Denmark, from the Baltic states and Poland, and — surprisingly — from Italy. There, the anti-democratic threats from Russia, China and Iran are assessed more realistically. Above all, there is a healthy drive to be better and more successful than others. From a far weaker starting point, there is an ambition for excellence. What Europe needs is less wounded pride and more patriotism defined by achievement. Unity and decisive action in defending Ukraine would be an obvious example — not merely talking about European sovereignty but demonstrating it, even in friendly dissent with the Americans. (And who knows, that might ultimately prompt a surprising shift in Washington’s Russia policy.) That, coupled with economic growth through real and far-reaching reforms, would be a start. After which Europe must tackle the most important task: a fundamental reversal of a migration policy rooted in cultural self-hatred that tolerates far too many newcomers who want a different society, who hold different values, and who do not respect our legal order. If all of this fails, American criticism will be vindicated by history. The excuses for why a European renewal is supposedly impossible or unnecessary are merely signs of weak leadership. The converse is also true: where there is political will, there is a way. And this way begins in Europe — with the spirit of renewal of a well-understood “Europe First” (what else?) — and leads to America. Europe needs America. America needs Europe. And perhaps both needed the deep crisis in the transatlantic relationship to recognize this with full clarity. As surprising as it may sound, at this very moment there is a real opportunity for a renaissance of a transatlantic community of shared interests. Precisely because the situation is so deadlocked. And precisely because pressure is rising on both sides of the Atlantic to do things differently. A trade war between Europe and America strengthens our shared adversaries. The opposite would be sensible: a New Deal between the EU and the U.S. Tariff-free trade as a stimulus for growth in the world’s largest and third-largest economies — and as the foundation for a shared policy of interests and, inevitably, a joint security policy of the free world. This is the historic opportunity that Friedrich Merz could now negotiate with Donald Trump. As Churchill said: “Never waste a good crisis!”

Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music * Amazon Music He’s not even European — yet Donald Trump has topped POLITICO’s annual P28 ranking of the most powerful people who will shape Europe in 2026. EU Confidential host Sarah Wheaton takes you inside the gala in Brussels — where commissioners, MEPs, diplomats, lobbyists and journalists packed into a glittering room, even as the mood underneath the sparkle felt unusually tense. At the event, Ursula von der Leyen sat down with Carrie Budoff Brown, POLITICO’s executive editor, for an exclusive on-stage conversation — offering one of her first public reactions to Trump’s sharp criticism of EU leaders as “weak,” and Washington’s dramatic new security strategy, which seeks to undermine them. Be sure to check out the full 2026 ranking here. Plus, we bring you Sarah’s conversation with Balázs Orbán, the Hungarian prime minister’s political director, who offers a perspective far outside the Brussels mainstream — on Ukraine, on Europe’s political direction, and on where he believes the EU keeps going wrong. And finally, we have a taste of Anne McElvoy’s interview with Nick Thomas-Symonds, the U.K.’s minister for European relations (for more, head to: Politics at Sam and Anne’s ). And if you haven’t yet, listen to the exclusive interview our colleague Dasha Burns did with Donald Trump on our sister podcast The Conversation.

BRUSSELS — European banks and other finance firms should decrease their reliance on American tech companies for digital services, a top national supervisor has said. In an interview with POLITICO, Steven Maijoor, the Dutch central bank’s chair of supervision, said the “small number of suppliers” providing digital services to many European finance companies can pose a “concentration risk.” “If one of those suppliers is not able to supply, you can have major operational problems,” Maijoor said. The intervention comes as Europe’s politicians and industries grapple with the continent’s near-total dependence on U.S. technology for digital services ranging from cloud computing to software. The dominance of American companies has come into sharp focus following a decline in transatlantic relations under U.S. President Donald Trump. While the market for European tech services isn’t nearly as developed as in the U.S. — making it difficult for banks to switch — the continent “should start to try to develop this European environment” for financial stability and the sake of its economic success, Maijoor said. European banks being locked in to contracts with U.S. providers “will ultimately also affect their competitiveness,” Maijoor said. Dutch supervisors recently authored a report on the systemic risks posed by tech dependence in finance. Dutch lender Amsterdam Trade Bank collapsed in 2023 after its parent company was placed on the U.S. sanctions list and its American IT provider withdrew online data storage services, in one of the sharpest examples of the impact on companies that see their tech withdrawn. Similarly a 2024 outage of American cybersecurity company CrowdStrike highlighted the European finance sector’s vulnerabilities to operational risks from tech providers, the EU’s banking watchdog said in a post-mortem on the outage. In his intervention, Maijoor pointed to an EU law governing the operational reliability of banks — the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) — as one factor that may be worsening the problem. Those rules govern finance firms’ outsourcing of IT functions such as cloud provision, and designate a list of “critical” tech service providers subject to extra oversight, including Amazon Web Services, Google Cloud, Microsoft and Oracle. DORA, and other EU financial regulation, may be “inadvertently nudging financial institutions towards the largest digital service suppliers,” which wouldn’t be European, Maijoor said. “If you simply look at quality, reliability, security … there’s a very big chance that you will end up with the largest digital service suppliers from outside Europe,” he said. The bloc could reassess the regulatory approach to beat the risks, Maijoor said. “DORA currently is an oversight approach, which is not as strong in terms of requirements and enforcement options as regular supervision,” he said. The Dutch supervisors are pushing for changes, writing that they are examining whether financial regulation and supervision in the EU creates barriers to choosing European IT providers, and that identified issues “may prompt policy initiatives in the European context.” They are asking EU governments and supervisors “to evaluate whether DORA sufficiently enhances resilience to geopolitical risks and, if not, to consider issuing further guidance,” adding they “see opportunities to strengthen DORA as needed,” including through more enforcement and more explicit requirements around managing geopolitical risks. Europe could also set up a cloud watchdog across industries to mitigate the risks of dependence on U.S. tech service providers, which are “also very important for other parts of the economy like energy and telecoms,” Maijoor said. “Wouldn’t there be a case for supervision more generally of these hyperscalers, cloud service providers, as they are so important for major parts of the economy?” The European Commission declined to respond.

BRUSSELS — The EU has struck a political agreement to overhaul the bloc’s foreign direct investment screening rules, the Council of the EU announced on Thursday, in a move to prevent strategic technology and critical infrastructure from falling into the hands of hostile powers. The updated rules — the first major plank of European Commission President’s Ursula von der Leyen’s economic security strategy — would require all EU countries to systematically monitor investments and further harmonize the way those are screened within the bloc. The agreement comes just over a week after Brussels unveiled a new economic security package. Under the new rules, EU countries would be required to screen investments in dual-use items and military equipment; technologies like artificial intelligence, quantum technologies and semiconductors; raw materials; energy, transport and digital infrastructure; and election infrastructure, such as voting systems and databases. As previously reported by POLITICO, foreign entities investing into specific financial services must also be subject to screening by EU capitals. “We achieved a balanced and proportionate framework, focused on the most sensitive technologies and infrastructures, respectful of national prerogatives and efficient for authorities and businesses alike,” said Morten Bødskov, Denmark’s minister for industry, business and financial affairs. It took three round of political talks between the three institutions to seal the update, which was a key priority for the Danish Presidency of the Council of the EU. One contentious question was which technologies and sectors should be subject to mandatory screening. Another was how capitals and the European Commission should coordinate — and who gets the final say — when a deal raises red flags. Despite a request from the European Parliament, the Commission will not get the authority to arbitrate disputes between EU countries on specific investment cases. Screening decisions will remain firmly in the purview of national governments. “We’re making progress. The result of our negotiations clearly strengthens the EU’s security while also making life easier for investors by harmonising the Member States’ screening mechanism,” said the lead lawmaker on the file, French S&D Raphaël Glucksmann. “Yet more remains to be done to ensure that investments bring real added value to the EU, so that our market does not become a playground for foreign companies exploiting our dependence on their technology. The Commission has committed to take an initiative; it must now act quickly,” he said in a statement to POLITICO. This story has been updated.

President Donald Trump said Wednesday that U.S. forces had seized a “very large” oil tanker off the coast of Venezuela, a major move against the South American country. “As you probably know, we have just seized a tanker on the coast of Venezuela, a large tanker, very large, the largest one ever seized actually,” Trump said at an event at the White House. The White House did not provide additional details about the vessel. A person familiar with the matter, granted anonymity to discuss the sensitive seizure, said the ship was en route to Cuba. The oil, the person said, would be sold by state firm Cubametales to Asian energy brokers. The Cuban Embassy in Washington did not immediately respond to a request for comment. It’s a major escalation of the pressure campaign the U.S. has waged against Venezuela. The Trump administration has restored tough sanctions against the South American petrostate and built up military presence in the Caribbean in an effort to pressure Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro to cede power to the opposition.

Prime minister’s questions: a shouty, jeery, very occasionally useful advert for British politics. Here’s what you need to know from the latest session in POLITICO’s weekly run-through. What they sparred about: Labour’s internal woes. Tory Leader Kemi Badenoch couldn’t resist using the penultimate PMQs of 2025 to land a punch by bringing up Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s future, as rumors about his political survival continue to swirl. They’re behind you! Badenoch asked the PM why Labour MPs were “describing him as a caretaker prime minister.” That framing wasn’t helped by the influential think tank Labour Together canvassing party members about possible leadership runners and riders. Starmer brushed off that initial attack by claiming his own MPs were “very proud” of the budget and focused on “the single most important issue,” i.e., the cost of living. State of secretaries: The Tory leader said Starmer “has lost control of his party” and Cabinet ministers were “so busy trying to replace him that they have taken their eyes off the ball.” She then worked through contenders often mooted — probing the PM on their records in respective Whitehall departments. Igniting the fires: Badenoch said Energy Secretary Ed Miliband was trying to “recycle himself as leader” despite Starmer’s predecessor but one insisting he didn’t want to become Labour leader again. Then followed a spat about energy bills, though Starmer highlighted Badenoch’s own difficulty, with plenty of ex-Tories jumping ship to Reform UK. The “real question is who’s next,” he joked. Playground banter: “He could power the national grid on all of that hot air,” the Tory leader cried, turning her attention to Education Secretary Bridget Phillipson and teacher numbers (Labour promised 6,500). The PM tore into the Conservatives’ record on education, saying “they should be utterly ashamed.” Cop out: “Wrong,” Badenoch dismissively replied, having another go on police numbers (managed, of course, by Home Secretary and darling of the Labour right, Shabana Mahmood). The PM said there would be “3,000 more by the end of March” and Badenoch should “get up and say sorry” for their time in government. “Wrong,” the Tory leader mused again. More in anger than in sorrow: Despite the rapid range of policies, Badenoch tied her criticism together by stating “everything is getting worse” and, quoting the famous Saatchi & Saatchi poster, “Labour isn’t working.” Starmer wasn’t going down without a fight, calling the Tory leader “living proof you can say whatever you like when nobody is listening to anything you have to say.” So much for the season of goodwill … Helpful backbench intervention of the week: York Central MP Rachael Maskell deplored the Tories’ attitude to child poverty and highlighted Labour’s work managing this issue. The PM, breathing a sigh of relief to bag a friendly question from the often Labour rebel, plugged the government’s work with a dig at Badenoch for good measure. Oh, and: Dartford MP Jim Dickson ripped into Reform UK’s governance of Kent County Council, claiming their so-called DOGE unit actually stood for “deluded, overconfident, gormless and embarrassing.” Starmer was more than happy, listing their eventful spell across local government since May and slamming comments by Reform politicians. Totally unscientific scores on the doors: Starmer 5/10. Badenoch 7/10. The endless internal Labour rows about Starmer’s future and the party’s languishing popularity gave the Tory leader a plethora of material. Though not sticking to one topic, Badenoch used possible contenders as a springboard to flag the government’s policy challengers. The PM rightly raised the Tories’ own problems with Reform UK and terrible polling numbers, but struggled to brush off the narrative that his time in No 10 is numbered.

BRUSSELS — The European Commission has proposed rolling back several EU environmental laws including industrial emissions reporting requirements, confirming previous reporting by POLITICO. It’s the latest in a series of proposed deregulation plans — known as omnibus bills — as Commission President Ursula von der Leyen tries to make good on a promise to EU leaders to dramatically reduce administrative burden for companies.   The bill’s aim is to make it easier for businesses to comply with EU laws on waste management, emissions, and resource use, with the Commission stressing the benefits to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) which make up 99 percent of all EU businesses. The Commission insisted the rollbacks would not have a negative impact on the environment. “We all agree that we need to protect our environmental standards, but we also at the same time need to do it more efficiently,” said Environment Commissioner Jessika Roswall during a press conference on Wednesday.  “This is a complex exercise,” said Executive Vice President Teresa Ribera during a press conference on Wednesday. “It is not easy for anyone to try to identify how we can respond to this demand to simplify while responding to this other demand to keep these [environmental] standards high.”  Like previous omnibus packages, the environmental omnibus was released without an impact assessment. The Commission found that “without considering other alternative options, an impact assessment is not deemed necessary.” This comes right after the Ombudswoman found the Commission at fault for “maladministration” for the first omnibus.   The Commission claims “the proposed amendments will not affect environmental standards” — a claim that’s already under attack from environmental groups.   MORE REPORTING CUTS  The Commission wants to exempt livestock and aquaculture operators from reporting on water, energy and materials use under the industrial emissions reporting legislation.  EU countries, competent authorities and operators would also be given more time to comply with some of the new or revised provisions in the updated Industrial Emissions Directive while being given further “clarity on when these provisions apply.”  The Commission is also proposing “significant simplification” for environmental management systems (EMS) — which lay out goals and performance measures related to environmental impacts of an industrial site — under the industrial and livestock rearing emissions directive.  These would be completed by industrial plants at the level of a company and not at the level of every installation, as it currently stands.   There would also be fewer compliance obligations under EU waste laws.   The Commission wants to remove the Substances of Concern in Products (SCIP) database, for example, claiming that it “has not been effective in informing recyclers about the presence of hazardous substances in products and has imposed substantial administrative costs.”  Producers selling goods in another EU country will also not have to appoint an authorized representative in both countries to comply with extended producer responsibility (EPR). The Commission calls it a “stepping stone to more profound simplification,” also reducing reporting requirements to just once per year.  The Commission will not be changing the Nature Restoration Regulation — which has been a key question in discussions between EU commissioners — but it will intensify its support to EU countries and regional authorities in preparing their draft National Restoration Plans.  The Commission will stress-test the Birds and Habitats Directives in 2026 “taking into account climate change, food security, and other developments and present a series of guidelines to facilitate implementation,” it said.  CRITIQUES ROLL IN   Some industry groups, like the Computer & Communications Industry Association, have welcomed the changes, calling it a “a common-sense fix.” German center-right MEP Pieter Liese also welcomed the omnibus package, saying, “[W]e need to streamline environmental laws precisely because we want to preserve them. Bureaucracy and paperwork are not environmental protection.” But environmental groups opposed the rollbacks.  “The Von der Leyen Commission is dismantling decades of hard-won nature protections, putting air, water, and public health at risk in the name of competitiveness,” WWF said in a statement. The estimated savings “come with no impact assessment and focus only on reduced compliance costs, ignoring the far larger price of pollution, ecosystem decline, and climate-related disasters,” it added.   The Industrial Emissions Directive, which entered into force last year and is already being transposed by member countries, was “already much weaker than what the European Commission had originally proposed” during the last revision, pointed out ClientEarth lawyer Selin Esen.  “The Birds and Habitats Directives are the backbone of nature protection in Europe,” said BirdLife Europe’s Sofie Ruysschaert. “Undermining them now would not only wipe out decades of hard-won progress but also push the EU toward a future where ecosystems and the communities that rely on them are left dangerously exposed.”