BERLIN — Germany will launch a new federal counter-drone unit as concerns mount over a surge of suspicious drones overflying military sites and critical infrastructure, Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt said Tuesday. The formation will be part of the federal police’s national special operations arm, and will be trained and certified specifically for drone detection and neutralization, Dobrindt said at an event outside Berlin. The unit will eventually grow to 130 officers, deployed across Germany and moved quickly to hot spots when needed. Germany has over €100 million budgeted this year and next for counter-drone technology, the minister said. The systems include sensors and jammers designed to disrupt hostile drone signals, with the capability to intercept or shoot them down if necessary. “It is an important signal that we are confronting hybrid threats,” Dobrindt said. “We are creating a clear mission to detect, intercept and, yes, also shoot down drones when necessary. We cannot accept that hybrid threats, including drones, become a danger to our security.” Dobrindt said Germany will procure systems from both German and Israeli manufacturers, with further purchases expected in the coming months. This week, Germany’s state interior ministers are also due to decide whether to establish a joint federal-state counter-drone center, bringing together federal and state police forces and the military to coordinate detection and response. Berlin’s new unit marks its most significant move so far toward a standing national counter-drone capability. German security agencies have tracked hundreds of suspicious drone flyovers this year, including near barracks, naval facilities and critical infrastructure. Officials warn that small, commercially available drones are increasingly deployed in Europe for espionage, probing defenses and hybrid operations. Some European governments have pointed the finger of blame at Russia, but so far proof is lacking. Airports across Europe have also been forced to close thanks to overflying drones. Last month, the U.K., France and Germany sent staff and equipment to help Belgium counter drone incursions around sensitive facilities. Many countries are trying to figure out how to deal with the drones in a safe and legal way, as shooting them down could endanger people on the ground.

Europe’s security does not depend solely on our physical borders and their defense. It rests on something far less visible, and far more sensitive: the digital networks that keep our societies, economies and democracies functioning every second of the day. > Without resilient networks, the daily workings of Europe would grind to a > halt, and so too would any attempt to build meaningful defense readiness. A recent study by Copenhagen Economics confirms that telecom operators have become the first line of defense in Europe’s security architecture. Their networks power essential services ranging from emergency communications and cross-border healthcare to energy systems, financial markets, transport and, increasingly, Europe’s defense capabilities. Without resilient networks, the daily workings of Europe would grind to a halt, and so too would any attempt to build meaningful defense readiness. This reality forces us to confront an uncomfortable truth: Europe cannot build credible defense capabilities on top of an economically strained, structurally fragmented telecom sector. Yet this is precisely the risk today. A threat landscape outpacing Europe’s defenses The challenges facing Europe are evolving faster than our political and regulatory systems can respond. In 2023 alone, ENISA recorded 188 major incidents, causing 1.7 billion lost user-hours, the equivalent of taking entire cities offline. While operators have strengthened their systems and outage times fell by more than half in 2024 compared with the previous year, despite a growing number of incidents, the direction of travel remains clear: cyberattacks are more sophisticated, supply chains more vulnerable and climate-related physical disruptions more frequent. Hybrid threats increasingly target civilian digital infrastructure as a way to weaken states. Telecom networks, once considered as technical utilities, have become a strategic asset essential to Europe’s stability. > Europe cannot deploy cross-border defense capabilities without resilient, > pan-European digital infrastructure. Nor can it guarantee NATO > interoperability with 27 national markets, divergent rules and dozens of > sub-scale operators unable to invest at continental scale. Our allies recognize this. NATO recently encouraged members to spend up to 1.5 percent of their GDP on protecting critical infrastructure. Secretary General Mark Rutte also urged investment in cyber defense, AI, and cloud technologies, highlighting the military benefits of cloud scalability and edge computing – all of which rely on high-quality, resilient networks. This is a clear political signal that telecom security is not merely an operational matter but a geopolitical priority. The link between telecoms and defense is deeper than many realize. As also explained in the recent Arel report, Much More than a Network, modern defense capabilities rely largely on civilian telecom networks. Strong fiber backbones, advanced 5G and future 6G systems, resilient cloud and edge computing, satellite connectivity, and data centers form the nervous system of military logistics, intelligence and surveillance. Europe cannot deploy cross-border defense capabilities without resilient, pan-European digital infrastructure. Nor can it guarantee NATO interoperability with 27 national markets, divergent rules and dozens of sub-scale operators unable to invest at continental scale. Fragmentation has become one of Europe’s greatest strategic vulnerabilities. The reform Europe needs: An investment boost for digital networks At the same time, Europe expects networks to become more resilient, more redundant, less dependent on foreign technology and more capable of supporting defense-grade applications. Security and resilience are not side tasks for telecom operators, they are baked into everything they do. From procurement and infrastructure design to daily operations, operators treat these efforts as core principles shaping how networks are built, run and protected. Therefore, as the Copenhagen Economics study shows, the level of protection Europe now requires will demand substantial additional capital. > It is unrealistic to expect world-class, defense-ready infrastructure to > emerge from a model that has become structurally unsustainable. This is the right ambition, but the economic model underpinning the sector does not match these expectations. Due to fragmentation and over-regulation, Europe’s telecom market invests less per capita than global peers, generates roughly half the return on capital of operators in the United States and faces rising costs linked to expanding security obligations. It is unrealistic to expect world-class, defense-ready infrastructure to emerge from a model that has become structurally unsustainable. A shift in policy priorities is therefore essential. Europe must place investment in security and resilience at the center of its political agenda. Policy must allow this reality to be reflected in merger assessments, reduce overlapping security rules and provide public support where the public interest exceeds commercial considerations. This is not state aid; it is strategic social responsibility. Completing the single market for telecommunications is central to this agenda. A fragmented market cannot produce the secure, interoperable, large-scale solutions required for modern defense. The Digital Networks Act must simplify and harmonize rules across the EU, supported by a streamlined governance that distinguishes between domestic matters and cross-border strategic issues. Spectrum policy must also move beyond national silos, allowing Europe to avoid conflicts with NATO over key bands and enabling coherent next-generation deployments. Telecom policy nowadays is also defense policy. When we measure investment gaps in digital network deployment, we still tend to measure simple access to 5G and fiber. However, we should start considering that — if security, resilience and defense-readiness are to be taken into account — the investment gap is much higher that the €200 billion already estimated by the European Commission. Europe’s strategic choice The momentum for stronger European defense is real — but momentum fades if it is not seized. If Europe fails to modernize and secure its telecom infrastructure now, it risks entering the next decade with a weakened industrial base, chronic underinvestment, dependence on non-EU technologies and networks unable to support advanced defense applications. In that scenario, Europe’s democratic resilience would erode in parallel with its economic competitiveness, leaving the continent more exposed to geopolitical pressure and technological dependency. > If Europe fails to modernize and secure its telecom infrastructure now, it > risks entering the next decade with a weakened industrial base, chronic > underinvestment, dependence on non-EU technologies and networks unable to > support advanced defense applications. Europe still has time to change course and put telecoms at the center of its agenda — not as a technical afterthought, but as a core pillar of its defense strategy. The time for incremental steps has passed. Europe must choose to build the network foundations of its security now or accept that its strategic ambitions will remain permanently out of reach. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is Connect Europe AISBL * The ultimate controlling entity is Connect Europe AISBL * The political advertisement is linked to advocacy on EU digital, telecom and industrial policy, including initiatives such as the Digital Networks Act, Digital Omnibus, and connectivity, cybersecurity, and defence frameworks aimed at strengthening Europe’s digital competitiveness. More information here.

Jamie Dettmer is opinion editor and a foreign affairs columnist at POLITICO Europe. “These are the times that try men’s souls,” wrote pamphleteer Thomas Paine in the dark days of December 1776, as America’s war to free itself of the British seemed doomed. In a bid to lift flagging spirits, he continued: “Tyranny, like hell, is not easily conquered; yet we have this consolation with us, that the harder the conflict, the more glorious the triumph.” That victory was sorely in doubt for much of the war, but the revolutionaries persevered, and with French assistance — which has often been downplayed since — they triumphed after eight years of brutish conflict. Ukraine’s struggle has been longer. In effect, the country has been fighting to be free of Russia since 2014, and right now, these times are, indeed, trying Ukrainian souls. As it stands, there is scant grounds for optimism that, for all its heroism, Ukraine can turn things around. The country is unlikely to emerge from its most perilous winter of the war in a stronger position, better able to withstand what’s being foisted upon it. In fact, it could be in a much weaker state — on the battlefield, the home front, and in terms of its internal politics. Indeed, as it tries to navigate its way through America’s divisive “peace plan,” this might be the best Ukraine can hope for — or at least some variation that doesn’t entail withdrawing from the territory in eastern Ukraine it has managed to retain. On the battlefield, Ukraine’s forces are currently hard pressed and numerically disadvantaged. Or, as lawmaker Mariana Bezuhla recently argued: “Ukrainian commanders simply can’t keep up” and are “being jerked around within a framework set by the enemy.” Meanwhile, on the home front, pummeling Russian drone attacks and airstrikes are degrading the country’s power system and wrecking its natural gas infrastructure, which keeps 60 percent of Ukrainians warm during the frigid winter months. The country is also running out of money. It’s hard to see a Europe mired in debt providing the $250 billion Kyiv will need in cash and arms to sustain the fight for another four years — and that’s on top of the $140 billion reparations loan that might be offered if Belgium lifts its veto on using Russia’s immobilized assets held in Brussels. If all that weren’t enough, Ukraine is being roiled by a massive corruption scandal that appears to implicate Ukrainian presidential insiders, sapping the confidence of allies and Ukrainians alike. It’s also providing those in the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump and the MAGA movement with ammunition to argue that Washington should be done with Ukraine. And now, of course, Kyiv is having to cope with a contentious U.S. effort to end Russia’s war, which has been advanced in such a chaotic diplomatic process that it wouldn’t be out of place in an episode of “The West Wing.” At times, negotiations have descended into farce, with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio forswearing the original peace plan one minute, saying it came from Russia and not a Trump administration proposal, only to swiftly backtrack. And earlier this week, a Reuters report suggested the 28-point plan was, in fact, modeled on a Russian proposal that Kremlin officials shared with their U.S. counterparts in mid-October. Meanwhile, on the home front, pummeling Russian drone attacks and airstrikes are degrading the country’s power system and wrecking its natural gas infrastructure. | Mykola Tys/EPA But for all the buffoonery — including reports that Special Envoy Steve Witkoff coached high-ranking Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov on how Russian President Vladimir Putin should speak to Trump — a tweaked 19-point version of the “peace plan” may well be the best Ukraine can realistically expect, even though it heavily favors Russia. As this column has argued before, a Ukrainian triumph was always unlikely — that is if by triumph one means the restoration of the country’s 1991 borders and NATO membership. This isn’t through any fault of Ukraine, the David in the fight against Goliath, but rather that of Kyiv’s Western allies, who were never clear-sighted or practical in their thinking, let alone ready to do what was necessary to defeat Russia’s revanchism and vanquish a Putin regime heedless of the death toll of even its own troops. Despite their high-blown rhetoric, at no stage in the conflict have Ukraine’s allies agreed on any clear war aims. Some pressed for a debate, among them former Lithuanian foreign minister Gabrielius Landsbergis, who was worried about a mismatch between Western magniloquence and what the U.S. and Europe were actually prepared to do and give. “We talk about victory, and we talk about standing with Ukraine to the very end — but let’s also talk about this,” he told POLITICO in a 2023 interview. But that debate never happened because of fears it would disunite allies. Nonetheless, Western leaders continued to characterize the war as a contest between good and evil, with huge stakes for democracy. They cast it as a struggle not only for territory but between liberal and autocratic values, and as one with global consequences. But in that case, why be restrained in what you supply? Why hold back on long-range munitions and tanks? Why delay supplying F-16s? And why prevent Ukraine from using Western-supplied long-range missiles to strike deeper into Russia? Or, as Ukraine’s former top commander Gen. Valery Zaluzhny fumed in the Washington Post: “To save my people, why do I have to ask someone for permission what to do on enemy territory?” For former Ukrainian foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba, for all its talk of standing with Ukraine for as long as it takes, the West never really grasped the war’s importance or consequences: “You cannot win a war where Russia clearly knows what its strategic goal is in every detail; [where] Ukraine knows what its strategic goal is in every detail; but [where] the West, without whom Ukraine cannot win, does not know what it is fighting for,” he told POLITICO last year. “This is the real tragedy of this war.” At times, negotiations have descended into farce, with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio forswearing the original peace plan one minute, saying it came from Russia and not a Trump administration proposal, only to swiftly backtrack. | Martial Trezzini/EPA The currently discussed 19-point plan is, of course, an improvement on the original 28-point plan — nonetheless, it is an ugly and shameful one. But this is what happens if you run down your military forces and arms production for decades, fail to draw enforceable red lines and don’t ask hard questions before making grand promises. For Ukraine, such a poor deal that leaves it with weak security guarantees, without 20 percent of its territory and prohibits it from joining NATO, will have great domestic consequences and carry the high likelihood of civil strife. It isn’t hard to see how the army and its veterans might react. Many of them will see it as a stab in the back, an enraging betrayal that needs to be punished. It will also mean rewarding Putin’s thuggishness and no real accountability for the bestial nature of his army’s atrocious behavior or the unlawful, detestable deportations from occupied parts of Ukraine to Russia. And it will, no doubt, embolden the axis of autocrats. The American Revolution had lasting global consequences — so, too, will this war.

BRUSSELS — European Parliament members this week rubbished the EU executive’s Democracy Shield plan, an initiative aimed at bolstering the bloc’s defenses against Russian sabotage, election meddling and cyber and disinformation campaigns. The Commission’s plan “feels more like a European neighborhood watch group chat,” Kim van Sparrentak, a Dutch member of the Greens group, told a committee meeting on Monday evening. On Tuesday, EU Justice Commissioner Michael McGrath faced the brunt of that censure before the full Parliament plenary, as centrist and left-leaning lawmakers panned the plan for its weaknesses and far-right members warned that Brussels is rolling out a propaganda machine of its own. “We want to see more reform, more drive and more actions,” Swedish center-right lawmaker Tomas Tobé, who leads the Parliament’s report on the matter, told McGrath. The European Democracy Shield was unveiled Nov. 12 as a response to Russia’s escalating meddling in the bloc. In past months, Europe has been awash in hybrid threats. Security services linked railway disruptions in Poland and the Baltics to Russian-linked saboteurs, while unexplained drone flyovers have crippled public services in Belgium and probed critical infrastructure sites across the Nordics. At the same time, pro-Kremlin influence campaigns have promoted deepfake videos and fabricated scandals and divisive narratives ahead of elections in Moldova, Slovakia and across the EU, often using local intermediaries to mask their origins.   Together these tactics inform a pressure campaign that European security officials say is designed to exhaust institutions, undermine trust and stretch Europe’s defenses.  The Democracy Shield was a key pledge President Ursula von der Leyen made last year. But the actual strategy presented this month lacks teeth and concrete actions, and badly fails to meet the challenge, opponents said. While “full of new ways to exchange information,” the strategy presents “no other truly new or effective proposals to actually take action,” said van Sparrentak, the Dutch Greens lawmaker.  EU RESPONSE A WORK IN PROGRESS Much of the Shield’s text consists of calls to support existing initiatives or proposed new ones to come later down the line.   One of the pillars of the initiative, a Democratic Resilience Center that would pool information on hybrid warfare and interference, was announced by von der Leyen in September but became a major sticking point during the drafting of the Shield before its Nov. 12 unveiling.  The final proposal for the Center lacks teeth, critics said. Instead of an independent agency, as the Parliament had wanted, it will be a forum for exchanging information, two Commission officials told POLITICO.  The Center needs “a clear legal basis” and should be “independent” with “proper funding,” Tobé said Tuesday.   Austrian liberal Helmut Brandstätter said in a comment to POLITICO that “some aspects of the center are already embedded in the EEAS [the EU’s diplomatic service] and other institutions. Instead of duplicating them, we should strive to consolidate and streamline our tools.” EU countries also have to opt into participating in the center, creating a risk that national authorities neglect its work.  RIGHT BLASTS EU ‘CENSORSHIP’  For right-wing and far-right forces, the Shield reflects what they see as EU censorship and meddling by Brussels in European national politics.   “The stated goals of the Democracy Shield look good on paper but we all know that behind these noble goals, what you actually want is to build a political machinery without an electoral mandate,” said Csaba Dömötör, a Hungarian MEP from the far-right Patriots group.   “You cannot appropriate the powers and competence of sovereign countries and create a tool which is going to allow you to have an influence on the decisions of elections” in individual EU countries, said Polish hard-right MEP Beata Szydło.   Those arguments echo some of the criticisms by the United States’ MAGA movement of European social media regulation, which figures like Vice President JD Vance have previously compared to Soviet-era censorship laws.  The Democracy Shield strategy includes attempts to support European media organizations and fact-checking to stem the flood of disinformation around political issues. Romanian right-wing MEP Claudiu-Richard Târziu said her country’s 2024 presidential elections had been cancelled due to “an alleged foreign intervention” that remained unproven.  “This Democracy Shield should not create a mechanism whereby other member states could go through what Romania experienced in 2024 — this is an attack against democracy — and eventually the voters will have zero confidence,” he said.  In a closing statement on Tuesday at the plenary, Commissioner McGrath defended the Democracy Shield from its hard-right critics but did not respond to more specific criticisms of the proposal.  “To those who question the Shield and who say it’s about censorship. What I say to you is that I and my colleagues in the European Commission will be the very first people to defend your right to level robust debate in a public forum,” he said.

Sweden has asked its cyber agency to bolster security measures ahead of a general election next year, warning for what it called a “serious security situation.” Cyberattacks against Sweden are on the rise, the country’s defense ministry said Friday. “Threats in the cyber domain are increasing and Sweden is far from spared,” Civil Defense Minister Carl-Oskar Bohlin said. Sweden is holding a general election on Sept. 13 next year. Given the increase in attacks, the government has told the agency to assess the threats to Sweden, propose defenses and plan cyber exercises, it said. European countries have braced for cyber and disinformation attacks around recent votes. These hacking and disinformation campaigns have often been linked to Russia, and disruptive cyberattacks against official websites and IT infrastructure are now common. Romania cancelled a presidential election outcome in December due to Russian interference, while Moldova recently called in EU assistance ahead of an election featuring cyberattacks it pinned on Moscow.  The Swedish cyber agency will report its initial findings to the defense ministry by March next year. 

Top EU diplomat Kaja Kallas sounded the alarm for Europe on Wednesday after Warsaw accused Russian-backed operatives of carrying out an explosion targeting a Polish railway. “It is clear that these kinds of attacks are an extreme danger also for our critical infrastructure,” Kallas told journalists in Brussels on Wednesday. “We have to have a strong response because what Russia is trying to do is two things. On one hand to test us, to see how far they can go … And next they also try to sow fear within our society,” she said. Kallas was speaking hours after Poland said it was shutting down Russia’s last consulate in the country due to the railway sabotage, which Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said had been executed by Ukrainians working for Russia. The Polish incident is just the latest in a string of so-called hybrid attacks to hit European countries in recent weeks, from airspace violations by Russian warplanes to drone disruption at airports across the continent to cyber attacks and acts of disruptive vandalism. EU countries are debating how to respond to such attacks, with some leaders calling for a more robust response clearly attributing the attacks to Russia while others warn against coming out too strongly and spooking the public. “Now our response is also dependent on those two factors,” added Kallas. “They want to sow fear inside our societies … if our response is too strong then the fear increases, which is what Russia wants. So we really have to have a balanced approach,” she said. She added that Europe should “send a message of unity to Russia that they cannot get away with these attacks but at the same time give assurances to our society that there is nothing to be afraid of.” Her message echoed what Finnish President Alexander Stubb told POLITICO earlier this week: “My recommendation is to stay calm. Have a little bit more sisu [grit]. Don’t get too flustered.”

The German government is set to get new powers to bar risky Chinese technology suppliers from its critical infrastructure. Lawmakers in the federal Bundestag parliament on Thursday approved legislation that would give new tools to the Interior Ministry to ban the use of components from specific manufacturers in critical sectors over cybersecurity risks. The measures resemble what European countries have done in the telecom sector, but the new German bill applies to a much wider range of sectors, including energy, transport and health care. The law comes as German Chancellor Friedrich Merz on Thursday signaled a tougher stance against Chinese tech giant Huawei, telling a business conference in Berlin that he “won’t allow any components from China in the 6G network.” Merz is set to discuss the issue at a major digital sovereignty summit co-hosted by Germany and France next week. The fresh scrutiny for supply chain security in the EU’s largest economy — a manufacturing powerhouse with a complex relationship with China — comes at a time when the European Union is considering how best to tackle cyber risks in supply chains dominated by Chinese firms. Governments are looking beyond the telecom sector, pushing for action in areas such as solar power and connected cars. European cybersecurity officials are finalizing an ICT Supply Chain Toolbox to help governments mitigate the risks, and the European Commission is preparing an overhaul of its Cybersecurity Act to address the issue, expected in January. The German legislation implements the EU’s NIS2 Directive, a critical infrastructure cybersecurity law. The Bundesrat, Germany’s upper legislative chamber, still has to sign off on the bill, which is expected next Friday. The key question is whether Germany is willing to use its powers, said Noah Barkin, a senior advisor at Rhodium Group, a think tank. On telecoms, “this helps lay the groundwork for pushing Huawei out of the 5G network, but it doesn’t guarantee that the political will will be there to take that decision,” he said.  The Interior Ministry could already block telecom operators from using particular components under an existing German IT security law. The law’s 2021 revision was widely seen as an attempt to get Chinese firms like Huawei and ZTE out of telecom network due to fears of cybersecurity and security risks. The Interior Ministry intervened in 2024, but it has never formally blocked the use of specific components under that law. For its new cyber law, the government originally proposed to extend the measures applying to the telecom industry to the electricity sector as well. But parliament’s version now applies to all critical sectors, which under the EU’s NIS2 law includes areas such as transport, health care and digital infrastructure.  German center-left lawmaker Johannes Schätzl, the digital policy spokesperson for the SPD, said this is a “logical step, because cyber and hybrid threats do not stop at sectoral boundaries.” The Interior Ministry will be required to consult with other arms of government when considering bans or blocks of certain suppliers, the bill said. In the past, some ministries like the digital and economy departments have been more reluctant to banning Chinese components, in part due to fears of economic retaliation from Beijing. Industry, too, could resist the new measures. German technology trade association Bitkom on Thursday said that the new rules could be unpredictable and therefore “detrimental.”

The U.K. is following France and Germany in providing staff and equipment to help Belgium counter drone incursions around sensitive facilities, British Chief of the Defense Staff Richard Knighton told the BBC on Sunday. Belgium’s Defense Minister Theo Francken thanked “our British friends” for their decision to deploy an anti-drone team in Belgium, after similar moves by France and Germany were announced in recent days. Airports in Brussels and Liège were forced to suspend flights last week after unidentified drones were spotted in their airspace, and other drones overflew the port of Antwerp recently. Even Belgium’s military bases have been targeted. Incursions of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) over the EU’s critical infrastructure sites have escalated in recent months, with the European Commission dubbing them part of the hybrid war that Russia is conducting against the bloc. Russia denies the allegations. Belgium’s National Air Security Center will be fully operational by Jan. 1, 2026, Francken said after holding an emergency meeting of the National Security Council on Thursday. Meanwhile, the Belgian government asked for help from Berlin, Paris and London, which are all sending air force experts. Germany’s Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said that the drone incursions are linked to the ongoing talks on using Russian frozen assets to help fund Ukraine’s effort to defend itself against Moscow’s all-out invasion. The assets are mostly held in Belgium’s Euroclear facility. “This is a measure aimed at spreading insecurity, at fearmongering in Belgium: Don’t you dare to touch the frozen assets. This cannot be interpreted any other way,” Pistorius said at a Friday press conference, Reuters reported. Belgium’s government did not explicitly point fingers at Moscow, but the country’s secret service has little doubt about the origin of the drones, according to VRT. Francken said on Saturday that “Russia is clearly a plausible suspect.”

Elisabeth Braw is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, the author of the award-winning “Goodbye Globalization” and a regular columnist for POLITICO. Over the past two years, state-linked Russian hackers have repeatedly attacked Liverpool City Council — and it’s not because the Kremlin harbors a particular dislike toward the port city in northern England. Rather, these attacks are part of a strategy to hit cities, governments and businesses with large financial losses, and they strike far beyond cyberspace. In the Gulf of Finland, for example, the damage caused to undersea cables by the Eagle S shadow vessel in December incurred costs adding up to tens of millions of euros — and that’s just one incident. Russia has attacked shopping malls, airports, logistics companies and airlines, and these disruptions have all had one thing in common: They have a great cost to the targeted companies and their insurers. One can’t help but feel sorry for Liverpool City Council. In addition to looking after the city’s half-million or so residents, it also has to keep fighting Russia’s cyber gangs who, according to a recent report, have been attacking ceaselessly: “We have experienced many attacks from this group and their allies using their Distributed Botnet over the last two years,” the report noted, referring to the hacktivist group NoName057(16), which has been linked to the Russian state. “[Denial of Service attacks] for monetary or political reasons is a widespread risk for any company with a web presence or that relies on internet-based systems.” Indeed. Over the past decades, state-linked Russian hackers have targeted all manner of European municipalities, government agencies and businesses. This includes the 2017 NotPetya attack, which brought down “four hospitals in Kiev alone, six power companies, two airports, more than 22 Ukrainian banks, ATMs and card payment systems in retailers and transport, and practically every federal agency,” as well as a string of multinationals, causing staggering losses of around $10 billion. More recently, Russia has taken to targeting organizations and businesses in other ways as well. There have been arson attacks, including one involving Poland’s largest shopping mall that Prime Minister Donald Tusk subsequently said was definitively “ordered by Russian special services.” There have been parcel bombs delivered to DHL; fast-growing drone activity reported around European defense manufacturing facilities; and a string of suspicious incidents damaging or severing undersea cables and even a pipeline. The costly list goes on: Due to drone incursions into restricted airspace, Danish and German airports have been forced to temporarily close, diverting or cancelling dozens of flights. Russia’s GPS jamming and spoofing are affecting a large percentage of commercial flights all around the Baltic Sea. In the Red Sea, Houthi attacks are causing most ships owned by or flagged in Western countries to redirect along the much longer Cape of Good Hope route, which adds costs. The Houthis are not Russia, but Russia (and China) could easily aid Western efforts to stop these attacks — yet they don’t. They simply enjoy the enormous privilege of having their vessels sail through unassailed. The organizations and companies hit by Russia have so far managed to avert calamitous harm. But these attacks are so dangerous and reckless that people will, sooner or later, lose their lives. There have been arson attacks, including one involving Poland’s largest shopping mall that Prime Minister Donald Tusk subsequently said was definitively “ordered by Russian special services.” | Aleksander Kalka/Getty Images What’s more, their targets will continue losing a lot of money. The repairs of a subsea data cable alone typically costs up to a couple million euros. The owners of EstLink 2 — the undersea power cable hit by the Eagle S— incurred losses of nearly €60 million. Closing an airport for several hours is also incredibly expensive, as is cancelling or diverting flights. To be sure, most companies have insurance to cover them against cyber attacks or similar harm, but insurance is only viable if the harm is occasional. If it becomes systematic, underwriters can no longer afford to take on the risk — or they have to significantly increase their premiums. And there’s the kicker: An interested actor can make disruption systematic. That is, in fact, what Russia is doing. It is draining our resources, making it increasingly costly to be a business based in a Western country, or even a city council or government authority, for that matter. This is terrifying — and not just for the companies that may be hit. But while Russia appears far beyond the reach of any possible efforts to convince it to listen to its better angels, we can still put up a steely front. The armed forces put up the literal steel, of course, but businesses and civilian organizations can practice and prepare for any attacks that Russia, or other hostile countries, could decide to launch against them. Such preparation would limit the possible harm such attacks can lead to. It begs the question, if an attack causes minimal disruption, then what’s the point of instigating it in the first place? That’s why government-led gray-zone exercises that involve the private sector are so important. I’ve been proposing them for several years now, and for every month that passes, they become even more essential. Like the military, we shouldn’t just conduct these exercises — we should tell the whole world we’re doing so too. Demonstrating we’re ready could help dissuade sinister actors who believe they can empty our coffers. And it has a side benefit too: It helps companies show their customers and investors that they can, indeed, weather whatever Russia may dream up.

Jamie Dettmer is opinion editor and a foreign affairs columnist at POLITICO Europe. As Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine nearly four years ago, Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, then head of Ukraine’s state-owned national power company Ukrenergo, was scrambling to keep the lights on. Somehow, he succeeded and continued to do so every year, earning the respect of energy executives worldwide by ensuring the country was able to withstand Russian missile and drone strikes on its power grid and avoid catastrophic blackouts — until he was abruptly forced to resign in 2024, that is. Kudrytskyi’s dismissal was decried by many in the energy industry and also prompted alarm in Brussels. At the time, Kudrytskyi told POLITICO he was the victim of the relentless centralization of authority that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his powerful head of office Andriy Yermak often pursue. He said he feared “corrupt individuals” would end up taking over the state-owned company. According to his supporters, it is that kind of talk — and his refusal to remain silent — that explains why Kudrytskyi ended up in a glass-enclosed cubicle in a downtown Kyiv courtroom last week, where he was arraigned on embezzlement charges. Now, opposition lawmakers and civil society activists are up in arms, labeling this yet another example of Ukraine’s leadership using lawfare to intimidate opponents and silence critics by accusing them of corruption or of collaboration with Russia. Zelenskyy’s office declined to comment. Others who have received the same treatment include Zelenskyy’s predecessor in office, Petro Poroshenko, who was sanctioned and arraigned on corruption charges this year — a move that could prevent him from standing in a future election. Sanctions have frequently been threatened or used against opponents, effectively freezing assets and blocking the sanctioned person from conducting any financial transactions, including using credit cards or accessing bank accounts. Poroshenko has since accused Zelenskyy of creeping “authoritarianism,” and seeking to “remove any competitor from the political landscape.” That may also explain why Kudrytskyi has been arraigned, according to opposition lawmaker Mykola Knyazhitskiy, who believes the use of lawfare to discredit opponents is only going to get worse as the presidential office prepares for a possible election next year in the event there’s a ceasefire. They are using the courts “to clear the field of competitors” to shape a dishonest election, he fears. Others, including prominent Ukrainian activist and head of the Anti-Corruption Action Center Daria Kaleniuk, argue the president and his coterie are using the war to monopolize power to such a degree that it threatens the country’s democracy. Kaleniuk was in the courtroom for Kudrytskyi’s two-hour arraignment, and echoes the former energy boss’s claim that the prosecution is “political.” According to Kaleniuk, the case doesn’t make any legal sense, and she said it all sounded “even stranger” as the prosecutor detailed the charges against Kudrytskyi: “He failed to show that he had materially benefited in any way” from an infrastructure contract that, in the end, wasn’t completed, she explained. The case in question is related to a contract Kudrytskyi authorized seven years ago as Ukrenergo’s then-deputy director for investments. But the subcontractor didn’t even begin work on the assigned infrastructure improvements, and Ukrenergo was able to claw back an advance payment that was made. Kaleniuk’s disquiet is also echoed by opposition lawmaker Inna Sovsun, who told POLITICO, “there’s no evidence that [Kudrytskyi] enriched himself.” “There was no damage done. I can’t help but think that this is all politically motivated,” she said. Sovsun turned up to the arraignment to offer herself as a bail guarantor if needed — two other lawmakers offered to act as guarantors as well, but the judge instead decided on another procedure to set Kudrytskyi free from pre-trial detention by requiring the payment of bail bond of $325,000.   One senior Ukrainian adviser, who asked not to be identified so they could speak about the case, dismissed the defense’s description of the case against Kudrytskyi as being politically motivated and claiming there was no substance to the embezzlement allegations. “People should wait on this case until the full hearing,” he added. But for former Deputy Prime Minister Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze, the case “doesn’t look good from any angle — either domestically or when it comes to international partners.” The timing, she said, is unhelpful for Ukraine, as it coincides with Kyiv’s ongoing appeal for more European energy assistance ahead of what’s likely to be the war’s most perilous winter. With Russia mounting missile and drone strikes on a far larger scale than before, Ukraine’s energy challenge is likely to be even more formidable. And unlike previous winters, Russia’s attacks have been targeting Ukraine’s drilling, storage and distribution facilities for natural gas in addition to its electrical power grid. Sixty percent of Ukrainians currently rely on natural gas to keep their homes warm. Some Ukrainian energy executives also fear Kudrytskyi’s prosecution may be part of a preemptive scapegoating tactic to shift blame in the event that the country’s energy system can no longer withstand Russian attacks. Citing unnamed sources, two weeks ago Ukrainian media outlet Ukrainska Pravda reported that former energy executives fear they are being lined up to be faulted for failing to do enough to boost the energy infrastructure’s resilience and harden facilities. “They need a scapegoat now,” a foreign policy expert who has counseled the Ukrainian government told POLITICO. “There are parts of Ukraine that probably won’t have any electricity until the spring. It’s already 10 degrees Celsius in Kyiv apartments now, and the city could well have extended blackouts. People are already pissed off about this, so the president’s office needs scapegoats,” he said, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss the matter freely. “The opposition is going to accuse Zelenskyy of failing Ukraine, and argue he should have already had contingencies to prevent prolonged blackouts or a big freeze, they will argue,” he added. Senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and author of “Battleground Ukraine” Adrian Karatnycky also worries about the direction of political travel. “While he’s an inspirational and brave wartime leader, there are, indeed, worrying elements to Zelenskyy’s rule,” he said.