BRUSSELS — Donald Trump says he wants to reshape politics in Europe. For many voters in major European democracies, it feels like he already has. Trump’s return as U.S. president is far more significant for voters in Germany, France and the U.K. than the election of their own national leaders, according to respondents to the first international POLITICO Poll. The finding vividly illustrates the impact of Trump’s first year back in the White House on global politics, with his sway felt particularly keenly in Europe. The online survey, conducted by the independent London-based polling company Public First, also shows many Europeans share Trump’s critical assessment in a POLITICO interview earlier this week of the relative weakness of their own national leaders. The poll had more than 10,000 respondents from the U.S., Canada and the three biggest economies in Europe: Germany, France and the United Kingdom. For leaders like Germany’s Chancellor Friedrich Merz and French President Emmanuel Macron, it makes particularly grim reading: They are seen by their own voters as having largely failed to handle the unpredictable American president effectively so far. EU leaders fared worst of all. In France, only 11 percent thought Brussels had done a good job of handling Trump, with 47 percent saying EU leadership had navigated the relationship badly. Britain’s Prime Minister Keir Starmer gets a slightly better rating — his record on managing Trump is seen as neither good nor bad. “These results show how much Trump has shaped the last year of political conversation not just in the U.S., but globally,” said Seb Wride, head of polling at Public First. “This is true for the public as much as it is for policymakers — the fact that so many believe Trump’s election, on the other side of the world, has been more significant for their own country than their own leaders’ election lays this bare.” The polling comes at an acutely sensitive moment for transatlantic relations. A new White House National Security Strategy unveiled last week destroyed any notion of American neutrality toward its historic allies in Europe, instead launching a crusade to convert the region’s democracies to his own MAGA ideology. POLITICO on Tuesday named Trump as the most powerful person shaping European politics, at the top of its annual P28 list. The list is not an endorsement or award. It reflects, instead, each individual’s capacity to shape Europe’s politics and policies in the year ahead, as assessed by the POLITICO newsroom and the power players POLITICO’s journalists speak with. In a White House interview on Monday with POLITICO’s Dasha Burns for a special episode of “The Conversation,” Trump expanded on the message, saying he would endorse candidates from parties in Europe who shared his outlook — especially on shutting down immigration. ELECTIONS MATTER, BUT SOME MORE THAN OTHERS In an effort to unpack Trump’s disruptive influence on international affairs since he returned for his second term in January, Public First conducted an online survey of 10,510 adults aged 18 and over, between Dec. 5 and Dec. 9. The research found that in Germany and the U.K. over half of respondents considered Trump’s election even more important than the elections of their own leaders, even though both Merz and Starmer have only relatively recently won power themselves. In Germany, 53 percent of people thought Trump’s election was more significant for their country than the election of Merz, compared with 25 percent who thought the German election was more important. In the U.K., 54 percent said Trump’s return was more significant than Starmer’s Labour Party taking power and ending 14 years of Conservative rule, compared with 28 percent who said the change of national government last year was more important for Britain.  French voters were a little less stark in their view, but still 43 percent thought Trump’s victory was more significant, against 25 percent who believed Macron’s election had a bigger impact on France. In Canada, however, respondents were split. Mark Carney’s victory in April, on the back of a campaign promise to stand up to Trump, was viewed by 40 percent as more significant than Trump’s return to power. Only slightly more — 45 percent — said Trump’s win was more significant for Canada than Carney’s. TRANSPARENCY TRUMPS STRENGTH In his interview with POLITICO, Trump denounced European leaders as “weak,” provoking retorts from politicians across the European Union and even prompting the pope to urge him not to “break apart” the transatlantic alliance. The researchers found that Europeans broadly shared Trump’s view that their leaders were weak, at least in comparison to him. They rated Trump as more “strong and decisive” than their own leader, by 74 percent to 26 percent in Germany; 73 percent to 27 percent in France; and 69 percent to 31 percent in the U.K. Canada was again the notable exception, with 60 percent saying Carney is stronger and more decisive compared to Trump, and only 40 percent saying the reverse.  Overall, however, the quality of being a strong and decisive leader is not seen as the most desirable trait among voters questioned in the survey. Far more important across all five countries in the research, including the U.S., is being honest and transparent.  “Strength is not the most important trait for a leader, but it is clearly an area where European leaders’ approach fall short so his words in the POLITICO interview will ring true,” said Wride.  Pollsters also asked how people felt their own leaders were handling the whirlwind of geopolitical upheaval in Trump’s second term. In France and Germany, more people think their leaders handled Trump badly than approved: Only 24 percent thought Merz had done a good job, while 34 percent thought his handling of Trump had been bad.  In France, Macron fared even worse. Just 16 percent of respondents said he had done well compared to 39 percent who thought he had done badly at managing relations with the White House. The verdict on Starmer was mixed: 29 percent thought he was handling Trump well, the same proportion as said he was doing badly. That represents an underwhelming verdict on a prime minister who has made a priority of maintaining a warm and effective alliance with the U.S. president.  RESISTANCE VS. STANDING UP TO TRUMP The research found that people in Europe wanted their leaders to stand up to Trump and challenge him, rather than prioritize getting along with him. However, when asked how their own particular national leaders should behave, Europeans took the opposite view, saying collaboration was more important than challenging the president.  Canadians remained punchy regardless, with a slight preference for Carney to confront Trump.  “Perhaps the only opportunity Trump has offered national leaders is the opportunity to stand up to him, something which we find tends to improve perceptions of them,” said Wride, from Public First. “Having fallen short on this, from the public’s perspective, leaders are seen to have largely failed to respond for the last year.” This edition of The POLITICO Poll was conducted from Dec. 5 to Dec. 9, surveying 10,510 adults online, with at least 2,000 respondents each from the U.S., Canada, U.K., France and Germany. Results for each country were weighted to be representative on dimensions including age, gender and geography, and have an overall margin of sampling error of ±2 percentage points for each country. Smaller subgroups have higher margins of error. The survey is an ongoing project from POLITICO and Public First, an independent polling company headquartered in London, to measure public opinion across a broad range of policy areas. You can find new surveys and analysis each month at politico.com/poll. Have questions or comments? Ideas for future surveys? Email us at poll@politico.com.

As a frontline NATO heavyweight, Poland is seething at being relegated to the diplomatic sidelines on a potential peace deal in Ukraine. When leaders from the U.K., France, Germany and Ukraine gathered in London this week to align their stances on Washington’s fast-moving push for a peace deal, Poland wasn’t to be found on the guest list. It was the second snub in as many months, after Warsaw also missed an invitation to a crunch peace summit in Geneva on Nov. 23. Poland’s exclusion from the top table is a bitter blow for a country that has taken one of the EU’s most active positions on Ukraine — and the right-wing nationalist camp around President Karol Nawrocki has wasted no time in blaming liberal Prime Minister Donald Tusk for the flop. “Poland’s absence in London is yet another example of Donald Tusk’s incompetence,” Marek Pęk, a senator from the nationalist Law and Justice party, raged after the Downing Street meeting, calling Tusk “a second-tier politician in Europe.” The reasons for Polish frustration are clear. Poland not only hosts 1 million Ukrainian refugees and acts as the key supply hub for Ukraine, but Warsaw also plays a pivotal role in pressing Europe toward rearmament. Poland is NATO’s highest per capita spender on defense and wants to more than double its military — already the alliance’s third biggest — to 500,000 personnel. TUSK ON THE MARGINS Tusk has also betrayed some frustration at Poland’s exile to the diplomatic margins. After the meeting in Geneva, he asked to be added to the joint European communiqué — a face-saving request that Warsaw commentators said merely underlined Poland’s absence. Donald Tusk has betrayed some frustration at Poland’s exile to the diplomatic margins. | Halil Sagirkaya/Anadolu via Getty Images In Berlin last week, standing beside German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Tusk tried to defuse the awkwardness over the diplomatic rebuff to Poland with a touch of irony. “I don’t want to stir emotions, but let’s say this plainly: Not everyone in Washington — and certainly no one in Moscow — wants Poland to be present everywhere,” he said, before adding that he took this banishment — presumably a reflection of Poland’s dogged defense of Ukraine — “as a compliment.” The government insists nothing unusual occurred in London. The format “was proposed by Prime Minister [Keir] Starmer,” government spokesperson Adam Szłapka said, arguing that “there are dozens of such formats, and they change constantly. Not every format produces results, and Poland does not have to — and should not — participate in all of them.”  He noted that Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski had joined a call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Starmer after the meeting — proof, he said, that Poland “remains fully engaged.” Polish officials are also quick to point out there are no actual peace negotiations with Russia, at least for now. “These are snapshots, not the architecture,” one diplomat said of Warsaw’s absences. “It’s too early for hysteria.” The diplomat, like others in this story, was granted anonymity to speak freely on a topic of political sensitivity. FROM PLAYMAKER TO BYSTANDER In the early years of the war, Poland was impossible to ignore. It sent much of its arsenal to Ukraine, cajoled Berlin into sending Leopard tanks to Kyiv, and served as NATO’s indispensable logistics hub, most notably from an airbase near the city of Rzeszów. President Karol Nawrocki has been busy building up his own foreign-policy credentials. | Alexi J. Rosenfeld/Getty Images But much of that leverage has faded. Poland’s Soviet-era weapons stocks are depleted and its vast rearmament drive won’t free up anything it can spare abroad for years. Meanwhile, France, Germany and the U.K. are now promising new air-defense systems, long-range missiles and — crucially — are willing to contribute troops to any future monitoring or peacekeeping mission in Ukraine. Even if they are just that — promises — Poland has already ruled that out. In discussions now centered on cease-fire enforcement and security guarantees, past support matters less than deployable assets, and Kyiv has adjusted accordingly. Zelenskyy is now leaning heavily on capitals that can bring something new to the table. “Americans don’t want us, European leaders don’t want us, Kyiv doesn’t want us — so who does?” former Prime Minister Leszek Miller said after the London talks. “Something unpleasant is happening, and we should stop pretending otherwise.” Former President Bronisław Komorowski, a political ally of Tusk, argued that Poland’s absence reflected geopolitical realities, not diplomatic failure.  London brought together “the three strongest European countries” — politically, militarily and economically — the ones contributing the most to Ukraine’s war effort, he said. Poland, he added, “is simply weaker,” and while Europe values Warsaw’s role, it must be “in line with its real weight.” SPLIT-SCREEN DIPLOMACY Poland’s quest for diplomatic heft is hardly helped by its difficulties speaking with one voice abroad. As Tusk focuses on European coordination efforts, nationalist opposition-backed President Nawrocki has been busy building up his own foreign-policy credentials, jetting off to Washington, cultivating contacts around Donald Trump’s administration, and speaking publicly about Poland’s “independent voice.”  The two sides exchange frequent jabs. Tusk recently reminded Nawrocki that the Polish constitution entrusts foreign policy to the government, not to the presidency. Despite the theatrics, both camps share the same hard line on Russia. What they don’t share is a strategy for navigating Washington. Government officials acknowledge Nawrocki currently has more direct access to the White House.  His senior foreign policy adviser, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, puts it bluntly: “Trump will never meet Tusk. He will meet the president. Thanks to him, Poland still has a channel to Washington.” Nawrocki’s circle argues this gives him leverage Tusk can’t match. Without access to Trump, Tusk “adds nothing distinctive” to high-level Western conversations, Saryusz-Wolski told POLITICO. In his view, unless someone with the president’s standing asserts Poland’s interests at the highest level, the country will simply follow whatever compromise Paris, Berlin and London shape with Washington. Officials concede privately that a channel to Washington matters — and for now, Nawrocki has it. Still, they also warn that betting everything on a single, unpredictable U.S. president is risky, especially after the new U.S. security strategy openly signaled that Europe must take far greater responsibility for its own defense. The consequence of Nawrocki handling diplomacy with Trump while Tusk deals with Europe is that it can look like two foreign policies at once. “The problem is not Poland’s position,” said a senior Western European diplomat, referring to the country’s pro-Ukraine stance. “The problem is knowing who speaks for Poland.” If it’s any consolation to Tusk, Germany’s Merz insists that he is taking Warsaw’s position into account. “My position toward Poland is very clear: We do nothing without close coordination with Poland,” the chancellor told Tusk last week.

BRUSSELS — The EU’s top defense official issued an unusually sharp warning on Wednesday, arguing that the new U.S. National Security Strategy “surprises by its clear antagonism towards the European Union” and amounts to a geopolitical play to prevent Europe from ever becoming a unified power. In a strongly worded blog post published just days after Washington released its 2025 NSS, EU Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius argued that Washington’s framing of Europe’s supposed “civilizational erasure” is not rooted in genuine concerns about values or democracy, but in hard-edged U.S. geopolitical calculations.  “EU unity is against USA interests,” Kubilius wrote, summarizing the logic he said underpins the Trump administration’s document. He pointed to passages in the strategy urging Washington to “cultivate resistance” inside European countries and to work with nationalist parties opposed to deeper integration, language he interpreted as evidence the U.S. is ready “to fight against the European Union, against our strength through unity.” Trump’s view on Europe was underlined in an interview with POLITICO where he denounced European leaders as “weak” and that he would endorse candidates in European elections, even at the risk of offending local sensitivities. Kubilius wrote that the U.S. now sees a more cohesive EU as a potential challenger to American influence. “The US National Security Strategy’s antagonistic language on the European Union comes not from American sentimental emotions about ‘good old Europe,’ but from deep strategic considerations,” he wrote. Kubilius linked the strategy’s worldview to the ideas of Elbridge Colby — now a senior Pentagon official — whose book “The Strategy of Denial” argues that the U.S. must prevent any region from forming a dominant power capable of constraining American access to markets.  Kubilius noted that Colby identifies “the European Union or a more cohesive entity emerging from it” as being “capable of establishing regional hegemony and unduly burdening or even excluding US trade and engagement.” Kubilius argued that this strategic perspective, rather than ideological disagreements, explain the NSS’s unusually hostile tone toward Brussels. “Let’s hope,” he concluded, there “will be enough prudence on American soil not to fight against the emerging power of European unity.”

BRUSSELS — Donald Trump’s barrage of attacks on the European Union is forcing its leaders to confront the unthinkable: a future in which America is no longer their primary security guarantor and Europe has to organize its own defense far sooner than anyone imagined. In anticipation of a reduced American role, EU leaders are already road-testing a Europe-led security order. Many of the most important decisions regarding Ukraine are being hammered out in a loose “coalition of the willing,” which is led by the U.K. and France and also includes Germany.  Meanwhile, EU policymakers are exploring deeper coordination through the U.K.-led Joint Expeditionary Force or by pushing for a stronger “European pillar” inside NATO — an idea long backed by Paris and now gaining traction in Berlin. A senior defense official from a mid-sized European country said that conversations about security guarantees for Ukraine with American officials had grown “awkward.” More significantly, the official said, so had discussions about Article 5 — the clause in the NATO treaty that requires allies to come to each other’s defense if one is attacked. “The uncertainty” on how the U.S. would behave in the event of an attack on a frontline state “is just too high,” said the official. OPEN QUESTION Other current and former security officials said the key question was no longer if Europe would take over primary responsibility for its defense and security, but when. The absence of U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio at a recent meeting of NATO foreign ministers — something that has happened only a handful of times in alliance history — sparked concern among EU and former NATO officials. That grew to alarm after his deputy Christopher Landau berated EU countries for prioritizing their own defense industries instead of continuing to buy from the U.S. The efforts to carve out new forums, independent of Washington, got a new push last week with the publication of the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy.  “The days of the United States propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over,” reads the document. “Wealthy, sophisticated nations … must assume primary responsibility for their regions.” In Europe, the document argued, mass migration is “transforming the continent and creating strife.” “Should present trends continue, the continent will be unrecognizable in 20 years or less. As such, it is far from obvious whether certain European countries will have economies and militaries strong enough to remain reliable allies.” If NATO allies become majority non-European, it continued, “it is an open question whether they will view their place in the world, or their alliance with the United States, in the same way as those who signed the NATO charter.” Andrius Kubilius, a former Lithuanian prime minister, said he wants to use the coming year to flesh out provisions in the clause to spell out what actions countries would take to defend one another. | Thierry Monasse/Getty Images In an interview Monday, Trump doubled down on the idea that a Europe subjected to “mass migration” is “decaying” and aimless. The bloc’s “weak” leaders simply “don’t know what to do,” he told POLITICO’s Dasha Burns for a special episode of The Conversation.  “The people coming in have a totally different ideology,” he added. “They’ll be much weaker, and they’ll be much different.” NEW EUROPEAN ORDER In the face of relentless attacks from the Trump administration, the European Union is quietly working on establishing new security guarantees in case the NATO one proves unreliable. “The question is whether we need to have some kind of additional security guarantees and institutional arrangements in order to be ready — in case Article 5 suddenly is not implemented,” EU Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius told POLITICO at the end of November. Even so, “we should always count on Article 5,” he added.   One legal basis for such a guarantee can be found in the EU’s common defense clause, Article 42.7, which was born after the Kosovo war of the late 1990s when then-French and British leaders Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair jointly pushed for Europe to take defense into its own hands. Kubilius, a former Lithuanian prime minister, added that he wants to use the coming year to flesh out provisions in the clause to spell out what actions countries would take to defend one another. He pointed to recent comments by U.S. NATO Ambassador Matthew Whitaker suggesting that Germany should take over NATO’s top military job from an American.  The comment “is a signal that really Americans are asking us to take care about European defense.” END OF AN ERA With European military chiefs and intelligence agencies warning that an attack from Russia could come as early as 2028, traditional European attitudes toward defense — and reliance on the United States — are quickly shifting. Until recently, Germany has been unwavering in its support for a U.S.-led NATO. But under Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Berlin is now holding talks with Paris about how the French nuclear deterrent could contribute to Europe’s security. At the same time, Merz has shown a growing willingness to differ from Washington on the subject of Ukraine and Europe’s security architecture. Parts of the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy were “unacceptable,” the conservative leader said on Tuesday. The document confirmed Merz’s view that “we in Europe, and therefore in Germany, must become much more independent of the United States in security policy.” The shift reflects changing dynamics within Germany’s security establishment. In a statement, Roderich Kiesewetter, a former German army general staff officer and a conservative lawmaker in the Bundestag, called Trump’s security strategy a “slap in the face.” “Anyone who writes about partners in this way won’t defend them when it really counts,” he wrote. “What does that mean? The era of the ‘security guarantee’ is over.” CAPABILITY GAPS The challenge for Europe is how to move from rhetoric to action. The stakes are huge — not least because embracing continental defense would involve major tradeoffs on welfare spending, which in turn could topple governments. Another obstacle is institutional. Given that the United States is the biggest partner inside NATO, the alliance is not a place where allies can plan for any sort of post-American future. “That would defeat the very purpose of NATO,” said one senior alliance diplomat. Inside the alliance there is no contingency planning for a NATO without the U.S., according to three NATO diplomats. They interpret the signals from Washington not as a prelude to U.S. withdrawal from the alliance but as a powerful wakeup call for Europe as Washington refocuses on the Arctic and the Indo-Pacific. “The United States and NATO allies take our Article 5 commitments … very seriously,” Whitaker, the U.S. ambassador, said last week. “Article 5 is ironclad.” “But we have expectations,” he said at the Doha Forum in Qatar, namely “[Europeans] picking up the conventional defense of the European continent.” A third and particularly daunting task for Europeans would be to replicate or replace military capacities currently provided by the U.S. Europeans provide up to 60 percent of capabilities in some domains, said Oana Lungescu, a former NATO spokesperson who is now a fellow at the Royal United Services Institute think tank. But in others — such as intelligence, heavy airlift and deep strikes — the United States typically provides an outsized share. “It would be very hard for Europeans to fill some of those capability gaps, certainly within a year or two,” Lungescu said. Some officials pointed to the fact that even if the Trump administration wants to leave NATO, the U.S. Congress might stand in the way. Indeed, U.S. defense legislation set for a vote as soon as this week would place new restrictions on reducing troop levels in Europe, a bipartisan rebuke of the Trump administration’s strategy. Anthony Gardner, a former U.S. ambassador to the EU, said the NSS was nothing less than a “betrayal of 80 years of U.S. bipartisan policy.” For many Europeans, the message is clear. The Trump administration has laid out its position. More than ever, Europe is listening — and taking action.

MONS, Belgium — Fewer American troops in Europe will not strain the continent’s defenses, said NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, brushing off unease around U.S. commitment to the alliance. “I am confident in the capabilities” of Europe and Canada, the four-star U.S. general said at the alliance’s sprawling military operational command in southern Belgium. “We’re ready today to meet any crisis or contingency.” Grynkewich’s comments come amid concerns around an anticipated pullback ofAmerican troops from Europe resulting from President Donald Trump’s upcoming defense strategy. The so-called posture review is widely expected to involve a redeployment of U.S. forces from Europe to the Indo-Pacific. That shift has already begun, with the U.S. pulling 800 troops out of Romania last month — a decision Bucharest called on Washington to overturn. The worry about a reduction in the 85,000 U.S. troops in Europe also reflects a broader debate around Washington’s commitment to the alliance under Trump. Trump has praised the promise by NATO allies to ramp up defense spending to 5 percent of GDP by 2035 but previously questioned the alliance’s collective defense pledge, equivocated over a recent Russian drone incursion into Poland, and repeatedly pressured European allies to step up.  Earlier this year, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said: “Now [Russian President Vladimir] Putin has started making incursions into the NATO borders. The one thing I can tell you is the U.S. is not going to get involved with troops or any of that.” Alexus G. Grynkewich insisted that any political tensions related to peace talks have had “no impact … in terms of the ability to accomplish our mission from a NATO perspective.” | Wohlfart/Getty Images European leaders are privately worried about a Trump-backed effort to end the war in Ukraine that some see as currently favoring Russia, with French President Emmanuel Macron reportedly warning in a leaked call that the U.S. could be about to “betray” Ukraine. That tumultuous relationship was on display again this week after U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio skipped a meeting of NATO foreign ministers — something that has almost never happened since NATO’s founding in 1949. Meanwhile, his deputy berated allies in a closed-door meeting for prioritizing their own arms industries instead of continuing to spend on U.S. kit. Almost two-thirds of European defense spending goes to the U.S., but the EU is trying to change that with programs aimed at boosting local production. In private some European allies are worried about the U.S., but in public they insist that NATO is still a force to be reckoned with. “All the processes of NATO are functioning flawlessly,” Polish Deputy Defense Minister Paweł Zalewski told POLITICO. “In a practical sense, the Americans are fulfilling their obligations very well.” NEW NORMAL Grynkewich insisted that any political tensions related to peace talks have had “no impact … in terms of the ability to accomplish our mission from a NATO perspective.” Vows by the allies to ramp up their defense spending, he added, means NATO will “be more ready tomorrow and we’ll be more ready the day after that” to stand up to Russia and respond to any further troop withdrawals. Last month the U.S. ambassador to NATO, Matthew Whitaker, raised eyebrows when he said he “look[ed] forward to the day when Germany … says that ‘we’re ready to take over the Supreme Allied Commander position,’” in a yet another example of Washington’s push for European allies to do more while the U.S. hints it could step back.  The Trump administration reportedly mulled not appointing an American general as Supreme Allied Commander Europe earlier this year, before nominating Grynkewich. The SACEUR has always been a U.S. officer as the post commands all allied troops in Europe and oversees the American nuclear deterrent on the continent. “There’s always rebalancing amongst the positions that different nations fill across the alliance,” Grynkewich said, adding that “it’s natural that some of that will happen … over the course of the next several months [and] several years.” That tumultuous relationship was on display again this week after U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio skipped a meeting of NATO foreign ministers. | Win McNamee/Getty Images “As far as who holds the SACEUR position,” he told reporters, “I’d rather just leave it to politicians to make those judgments.” Europe’s disquiet over the reliability of its alliance with the U.S. comes as the full-scale war in Ukraine nears its fourth year, intelligence assessments warn of Russia being ready for an attack on a NATO country by the end of the decade, and Russian-linked hybrid attacks ramp up across the continent. Putin said this week he was “ready” for war with Europe. Grynkewich said he had “concern” that Russia may test NATO’s collective defense in the “near term” — as well as in the “mid term and in clearly [the] long term.”  Russia’s hybrid attacks are a “real issue,” the air force pilot said, and echoed a call by several European capitals to respond more forcefully to hybrid activities. “We also do think about being proactive,” he said, declining to give further details. “If Russia is attempting to provide dilemmas to us, then maybe there are ways that we could provide dilemmas to them.” Jan Cienski contributed reporting.

BRUSSELS — It’s time for Europeans to stop trailing behind Donald Trump and instead draw up their own peace plan for Ukraine, Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius told POLITICO. The EU “needs to be independent or at least be ready to be strong in geopolitical developments, including to have our plans on how peace in Ukraine can be brought and to discuss them with our transatlantic partners,” Kubilius said. The EU is scrambling to respond after the U.S. president’s negotiators — real estate tycoon Steve Witkoff and Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner — were in Moscow Tuesday to talk over the latest peace proposal with Russian leader Vladimir Putin. Europe was caught off guard by the 28-point peace plan drafted by Witkoff and Russia’s Kirill Dmitriev, which included a ban on Ukraine’s membership of NATO and a limit on the size of the Ukrainian army. That draft was modified after a desperate intervention by European allies and Ukraine, but there is wariness about yet another Trump-led peace effort. European countries were not represented at the Kremlin during the meeting with Putin, despite Ukraine’s future being crucial to the continent’s security. EU officials worry that even if this new Trump plan doesn’t fly, in a few months, there’ll be a new one.  “Each six months, we’re getting new plans and in some way I feel that we are waiting here to know the plans that will come from Washington this year. The plans should come also from Brussels or from Berlin,” Kubilius said. The defense commissioner argued that it is “very much needed” for Europe to craft its own plan to end the war to secure a seat at the table. “We should have the possibility to discuss two plans: one that is European and another one, maybe, prepared by our American friends,” he said. The aim would be to “find synergies between these two plans and achieve the best outcome.” DEFENSE IS A TOP PRIORITY The former Lithuanian prime minister has been the bloc’s first defense commissioner for a year — a sign of how much has changed in the EU as it wakes up to the threat posed by Russia and ramps up its rearmament efforts, all while the Trump-led U.S. pulls back from the continent. The U.S. has been the linchpin of Europe’s security since the end of World War II, and Kubilius said, “We should always count on Article 5,” referring to NATO’s common defense provision. However, he argued that America’s shift toward the Pacific “is happening.” “The question is whether we need to have some kind of additional security guarantees and institutional arrangements in order to be ready — in case Article 5 suddenly is not implemented,” he said.   He also mentioned recent comments by U.S. NATO Ambassador Matthew Whitaker that Germany might take over NATO’s top military job, rather than keeping it in the hands of an American general. That “is a signal that really Americans are asking us to take care about European defense,” not only from a military point of view but also from an institutional perspective, Kubilius said. The geopolitical shift “pushed Europe to understand that defense is a clear strategic priority, which demands action from our side,” the commissioner said, mentioning some of the EU’s key legislative actions like the €150 billion SAFE loans-for-weapons program aimed at boosting the bloc’s military production. Next year, “we are planning to spend a lot of our efforts on the development of industry,” he said, including a communication on the single market. Defense companies are currently not fully integrated into the single market as governments have an opt-out for national security interests, but that is a cause of the bloc’s fragmented defense industry and is hampering rearmament efforts. Kubilius also said he wants to open a discussion on “institutional defense readiness,” including revamping the bloc’s mutual defense provision — often overshadowed by NATO’s more muscular promise. The EU clause needs procedural language that spells out the actions member countries must take to protect each other.

HOW BELGIUM BECAME RUSSIA’S MOST VALUABLE ASSET Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever is unmoved in his opposition to a raid on Moscow’s funds held in a Brussels bank for a loan to Ukraine.  By TIM ROSS, GREGORIO SORGI, HANS VON DER BURCHARD and NICHOLAS VINOCUR in Brussels Illustration by Natália Delgado/POLITICO It became clear that something had gone wrong by the time the langoustines were served for lunch.  The European Union’s leaders arrived on Oct. 23 for a summit in rain-soaked Brussels to welcome Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy with a gift he sorely needed: a huge loan of some €140 billion backed by Russian assets frozen in a Belgian bank. It would be enough to keep his besieged country in the fight against Russia’s invading forces for at least the next two years.  The assorted prime ministers and presidents were so convinced by their plan for the loan that they were already arguing among themselves over how the money should be spent. France wanted Ukraine to buy weapons made in Europe. Finland, among others, argued that Zelenskyy should be free to procure whatever kit he needed from wherever he could find it.  But when the discussion broke up for lunch without agreement on raiding the Russian cash, reality dawned: Modest Belgium, a country of 12 million people, was not going to allow the so-called reparations loan to happen at all.  The fatal blow came from Bart De Wever. The bespectacled 54-year-old Belgian prime minister cuts an eccentric figure at the EU summit table, with his penchant for round-collared shirts, Roman history and witty one-liners. This time he was deadly serious, and dug in.  He told his peers that the risk of retaliation by the Russians for expropriating their sovereign assets was too great to contemplate. In the event that Moscow won a legal challenge against Belgium or Euroclear, the Brussels depository holding the assets, they would be on the hook to repay the entire amount, on their own. “That’s completely insane,” he said.  As afternoon stretched into evening, and dinner came and went, De Wever demanded the summit’s final conclusions be rewritten, repeatedly, to remove any mention of using Moscow’s assets to send cash to Kyiv.   Bart De Wever attends the European Council summit, in Brussels, Belgium, on Oct. 23, 2025. | Dursun Aydemir/Anadolu via Getty Images The Belgian blockade knocked the wind out of Ukraine’s European alliance at a critical moment. If the leaders had agreed to move ahead at speed with the loan plan at the October summit, it would have sent a powerful signal to Vladimir Putin about Ukraine’s long-term strength and Europe’s robust commitment to defend itself. Instead, Zelenskyy and Europe were weakened by the divisions when Donald Trump, still hoping for a Nobel Peace Prize, reopened his push for peace talks with Putin allies. The situation in Brussels remains stuck, even with the outcome of the almost-four-year-long war approaching a pivotal moment. Ukraine is sliding closer toward the financial precipice, Trump wants Zelenskyy to sign a lopsided deal with Putin — triggering alarm across Europe — and yet De Wever is still saying no. “The Russians must be having the best time,” said one EU official close to negotiations. The bloc’s leaders still aim to agree on a final plan for how to stop Ukraine running out of money when they meet for their next regular Brussels summit on Dec. 18.  But as the clock ticks down, one key problem remains: Can the EU’s most senior officials — European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and António Costa, the president of the European Council — persuade De Wever to change his mind? So far the signs are not good. “I’m not impressed yet, let me put it that way,” De Wever said in televised remarks as the Commission released its draft legal texts on Wednesday. “We are not going to put risks involving hundreds of billions … on Belgian shoulders. Not today, not tomorrow, never.” In interviews, more than 20 officials, politicians and diplomats, many speaking privately to discuss sensitive matters, described to POLITICO how European attempts to fund the defense of Ukraine descended into disarray and paralysis, snagged on political dysfunction and personality clashes at the highest levels. The potential consequences for Europe — as Trump seeks to force a peace treaty on Ukraine — could hardly be more severe. SPOOKING THE HORSES  According to several of those close to the discussions, the reparations loan proposal started to hit trouble when tension began to build between De Wever and his neighbor, the new German chancellor, Friedrich Merz. A Flemish nationalist, De Wever came to power just this past February after months of tortuous coalition negotiations — a classic scenario in Belgian politics. Three weeks later, Germany voted in a national election to hand Merz, a center-right conservative, the leadership of Europe’s most powerful economy.  Like De Wever, Merz can be impulsive in a way that is liable to unsettle allies. “He shoots from the hip,” one Western diplomat said. On the night he won, he called on Europe to work for full “independence” from the United States and warned NATO it may soon be history.  Amid delays and continuing failure to agree on a way forward, bad-tempered briefings have been aimed at Bart De Wever, and increasingly at Ursula von der Leyen, too, in recent weeks. | Nicolas Tucat/Getty Images In September, the German chancellor stuck his neck out again. It was time, he said, for Europe to raid its bank vaults in order to exploit immobilized Russian assets to help Ukraine. With his outburst, Merz apparently spooked the Belgians, who were at the time in sensitive private talks with EU officials trying to iron out their worries. Several officials said Merz went rogue in putting the policy into the public domain so forcefully and so early — before De Wever had signed up.  Five days later, von der Leyen discussed it herself, though she was careful to try to reassure anyone who might have concerns: “There is no seizing of the assets.” Instead, she argued, the assets would just be used to provide a sort of advance payment from Moscow for war reparations it would inevitably owe. The money would only be returned to Russia in the unlikely event that the Kremlin agreed to compensate Kyiv for the destruction in Ukraine.  The idea gained rapid momentum. “It’s important to move forward in the process because it’s about making sure that there is funding to meet the budgetary and military needs for Ukraine, and it’s also a moral issue about making Russia pay for the damage that it has caused,” Jessica Rosencrantz, Sweden’s EU affairs minister, told POLITICO. “In that sense, using the frozen Russian assets is the logical and moral choice to make.” THE SPIDER’S WEB  Most of the work of a European Council summit is already done long before the bloc’s leaders arrive at the futuristic “space egg” Europa building for handshakes and photos. Ambassadors from the bloc’s 27 member countries gather to discuss what the summit will achieve — and to thrash out the precise wording of the plans — during the weeks leading up to each meeting.  Ahead of the October summit, Belgium’s ambassador to the EU, Peter Moors, had been sending signals to his colleagues that making progress on plans to use Russia’s frozen assets would be fine. The problem, according to four officials familiar with the matter, was that Moors wasn’t speaking directly to De Wever, and all the decisions about Russian assets rested with the prime minister.  While others inside the Belgian government knew that the prime minister was implacably opposed to ransacking Euroclear, one of his country’s most valuable and important financial institutions, the diplomat negotiating the summit deal a few hundred meters up the road apparently did not.  That meant nobody in the EU machinery really understood just how serious De Wever’s opposition was going to be until he arrived on summit day with steam coming out of his ears.  Moors is well respected among his peers and within the Belgian government. He is seen as effective, experienced and competent, having had a long career in diplomacy and politics. Before he took on the role of ambassador to the EU, he was known as the “spider in the web” of Belgian foreign policy.  Several officials said Friedrich Merz went rogue in putting the policy into the public domain so forcefully and so early — before Bart De Wever had signed up. | Tobias Schwartz/Getty Images The trouble, it seems, may have been political. He was the chief of staff to De Wever’s rival and predecessor as prime minister, Alexander De Croo, and comes from a party that lost power in last year’s election and now serves in opposition. It’s hardly uncommon in politics for such distinctions to affect who gets left out of the loop.  The other complicating factor was Belgium’s political dysfunction. As De Wever himself put it, he had been locked in negotiations with his compatriots trying to agree a national budget for weeks with no deal in sight.  “I’ve been negotiating for weeks to find €10 billion,” De Wever said on the way into the EU summit. A scenario in which Belgium would have to repay Russia more than 10 times that amount would therefore be unthinkable, he added.  As the summit broke up with only a vague agreement for leaders to look again at financing Ukraine, officials were left scratching their heads and wondering what had gone wrong.  AMERICA FIRST   The question of what to do with hundreds of billions of dollars worth of Russian assets locked in Western accounts had been hanging over Ukraine’s allies since the funds were sanctioned at the start of the war in February 2022. Now, though, it’s not just the Europeans who have their eyes on the cash.  The American side has quietly but firmly let Brussels know they have their own plans for the funds. When EU Sanctions Envoy David O’Sullivan traveled to Washington during the summer, U.S. officials told him bluntly they wanted to hand the assets back to Russia once a peace deal was done, according to two senior diplomats.  Trump is increasingly impatient for Kyiv and Moscow to agree to a full peace treaty. True to their word, the Americans’ original 28-point blueprint for an agreement included proposals for unfreezing the Russian assets and using them for a joint Ukraine reconstruction effort, under which the U.S. would take 50 percent of the profits.  The concept provoked outrage in European capitals, where one shocked official suggested Trump’s peace envoy Steve Witkoff should see “a psychiatrist.” If nothing else, Trump’s desire for a speedy deal with Putin — and his apparent designs for the frozen assets — lit a fire under the EU’s negotiations with De Wever.  WASTED TIME   Many EU governments are sympathetic toward the Belgian leader. Officials and politicians know just how difficult it is for any government to contemplate a step like this one, which could theoretically open them up to punishingly expensive legal action. De Wever is worried the stability of the euro itself could be undermined if a raid on Euroclear forced investors to think again about placing their assets in European banks.  In recent weeks, von der Leyen’s most senior aide, Björn Seibert, among others, invested time in trying to understand Belgium’s objections and to find creative ways to overcome them. Moors and other ambassadors have discussed the issues endlessly, during their regular meetings with each other and the Commission.  But as the nights draw in, the mood is darkening. Amid delays and continuing failure to agree on a way forward, bad-tempered briefings have been aimed at De Wever, and increasingly also at von der Leyen in recent weeks. She has held off the decisive step of publishing the draft legal texts that would enable the assets to be used for the reparations loan. These documents are what all sides need to enact, alter or reject the plan. “We have wasted a lot of time,” Jonatan Vseviov, secretary-general of the Estonian foreign ministry, told POLITICO. “Our focus has been solely on the Commission president, asking her to present the proposal. Nobody else can table the proposal.” He said it would have been “better” if the Commission had produced the legal texts setting out the details of the loan earlier than Wednesday, when they were eventually released. “We have wasted a lot of time,” Jonatan Vseviov, secretary-general of the Estonian foreign ministry, told POLITICO. | Ali Balikci/Getty Images “We all have a responsibility” to speed up now, another diplomat said, while a third noted that even Belgium had been imploring the Commission to publish the legal plans in recent weeks. An EU official said everyone should calm down and noted that De Wever still needed to get off his ledge. Another diplomat said Belgium “cannot expect all their wishes to be granted in full.” WINTER IS HERE Merz is particularly agitated. He worries that it will be his country’s taxpayers who have to step in unless the assets loan goes ahead. “I see the need to do this as increasingly urgent,” the German leader told reporters on Friday. “Ukraine needs our support. Russian attacks are intensifying. Winter is approaching — or rather, we are already in winter.” De Wever, in the words of one diplomat, is still “pleading” for other options to remain in play. Two alternative ideas are in the air. The first would ask EU national governments to dig into their own coffers to send cash grants to Kyiv, a prospect most involved think is unrealistic given the parlous state of the budgets of many European nations.  The other idea is to fund a loan to Kyiv via joint EU borrowing, something frugal countries dislike because it would pile up debt to be repaid by future generations of taxpayers. “We are not keen on that,” one diplomat said. “The principle of saying Russia needs to pay for the damage is right.”  Some combination of these ideas might be inevitable, especially if the reparations loan is not finalized in time to meet Ukraine’s funding needs. In that case, a bridging loan will be required as an emergency “plan B”.  In a letter to von der Leyen on Nov. 27, De Wever underlined his opposition, describing the reparations loan proposal as “fundamentally wrong.”  “I am fully cognizant of the need to find ways to continue financial support to Ukraine,” De Wever wrote in his letter to von der Leyen. “My point has always been that there are alternative ways to put our money where our mouth is. When we talk about having skin in the game, we have to accept that it will be our skin in the game.”  “Who would advise the prime minister to write such a letter?” one exasperated diplomat said, dismayed at De Wever’s apparent insensitivity. “He talks about having ‘skin in the game.’ What about Ukraine?” RUSSIAN DRONES  Despite frustrating his allies, De Wever still has support from within his own government for the hard-line stance he’s taking. His position has been reinforced by Euroclear itself, which issued its own warnings. In a sign of how critical the subject is for Belgium, Euroclear’s bosses deal directly with De Wever’s office, bypassing the finance ministry.  Some also fear the threat to Belgium’s physical security. Mysterious drones disrupted air traffic at Brussels Airport last month and were spotted over Belgian military bases, suspected of spying on fighter jets and ammunition stores. The concern is that they may be part of Putin’s hybrid assault on Europe, and that Belgium would be at heightened risk if De Wever approved the use of Moscow’s assets.  Another major hurdle to progress on the loan is Hungary. Russia’s assets are only frozen because all the EU’s leaders — including Putin’s friend Viktor Orbán — have agreed every six months to extend the sanctions immobilizing the funds. Should Orbán change his mind, Russia could suddenly be free to lay claim to those assets again, putting Belgium in trouble.  In the end, the task may just be too big even for the Commission’s highly qualified lawyers. It’s far from certain that a legal fix even exists that could duck Hungary’s veto and Russian retaliation, keep Belgium happy, and avoid the need for European taxpayer money to be committed up front.  Mysterious drones disrupted air traffic at Brussels Airport last month and were spotted over Belgian military bases, suspected of spying on fighter jets and ammunition stores. | Nicolas Tucat/Getty Images As the next crunch European Council summit on Dec. 18 gets closer, European officials are feeling the pressure. “This is not an accounting exercise,” Estonia’s Vseviov said. “We are preparing the most consequential of all European Councils … We are trying to ensure that Europe gets a seat at the table where history is being made.” For the EU, one essential question remains — and it’s one that is always there, in every crisis that crosses the desks of the diplomats and officials working in Brussels: Can a union of 27 diverse, fractious, complex countries, each with its own domestic struggles, political rivalries and ambitious leaders, unite to meet the moment when it truly matters?  In the words of one diplomat, “It’s anyone’s guess.” Jacopo Barigazzi, Camille Gijs, Bjarke Smith-Meyer and Hanne Cokelaere contributed to this report.

BRUSSELS — U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau on Wednesday slammed European NATO allies for prioritizing their own defense industry over American arms suppliers, according to three NATO diplomats. The intervention came during Wednesday’s meeting of NATO foreign ministers — which was skipped by Landau’s boss Marco Rubio. Landau, a longtime NATO skeptic who spoke first at the closed-door meeting, told ministers not to “bully” his country’s defense firms out of participating in Europe’s rearmament. He then left the room soon after for other meetings, the diplomats said, though they noted that ministers only staying for a short time was not unusual. A U.S. State Department official said: “Deputy Secretary Landau delivered two key messages. One is the is the need for Europe to turn its defense spending commitments into capabilities. The second is that protectionist and exclusionary policies that bully American companies out of the market undermines our collective defense.” The EU has moved to scale up its historically depleted defense industry amid growing warnings by countries like Germany that Russia could attack Europe by the end of the decade. Brussels has unveiled strategies in several legal proposals seeking to encourage local industry. Those efforts include the new €150 billion loans-for-arms SAFE program, but third countries like the U.S. can only supply a maximum of 35 percent of the value of weapons systems. Landau’s broadside is the latest in a long list of blows by the current U.S. administration to its historic partners, which includes pressuring the EU into accepting a humiliating trade deal to stave off tariffs. President Donald Trump has repeatedly slammed the bloc for treating the U.S. unfairly — while the EU has said Washington’s demands on trade were tantamount to blackmail.  Landau’s comments are likely to leave a bitter taste in some capitals, coming as several European countries like Germany and Poland announced millions in new cash for a NATO-backed scheme that pays U.S. defense firms to supply critical weapons to Ukraine. In total, Europe and Canada have pledged $4 billion to the scheme, NATO chief Mark Rutte said Wednesday. Trump has in the past questioned NATO’s security guarantees even if he has largely lauded the alliance’s efforts to ramp up defense spending to 5 percent of GDP by 2035. Over the summer Landau posted a deleted social media comment stating, “NATO is still a solution in search of a problem.” Rubio’s absence marks the first time in more than two decades that Washington’s top diplomat hasn’t been present for a NATO ministerial meeting. “No one’s shocked by the U.S. line that Europe shouldn’t be protectionist,” said one NATO diplomat, while adding: “But what did you expect … tact or nuance from the U.S.?” NATO declined to comment. This article has been updated.

PARIS — Despite demands from Washington to reach a peace deal ending the war in Ukraine, French President Emmanuel Macron on Monday insisted that there’s still a lot of work to do before any agreement. “Today, there isn’t a finalized plan on territorial questions. These can only be finalized by President Zelenskyy,” Macron said at a press conference alongside his Ukrainian counterpart. The French president also said talks on frozen assets and security guarantees were still “in a preliminary phase.” The EU has been stymied in using €140 billion in frozen Russian reserves to finance a reparation loan to Ukraine, thanks to resistance from Belgium. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was in Paris in a show of support as he faces fierce pressure from the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump to make concessions to end the war. He said the peace plan put forward by the U.S., which originally included territorial concessions and limits on the size of Kyiv’s army, had “improved.” “The process is not over, the territorial question is the hardest,” he said. The original plan called for Ukraine to give up some of its key defensive positions in the east of the country; Zelenskyy has also insisted that Ukraine’s constitution doesn’t allow him to hand over chunks of the country to Russia. Zelenskyy underlined that any peace deal has to include security guarantees to protect Ukraine against another Russian attack. “Peace must become truly durable,” he said. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has said that Washington first wants a peace deal before any talk of offering Ukraine security guarantees. The original 28-point plan prepared by U.S. special envoy Steve Witkoff and Russian negotiator Kirill Dmitriev excluded allowing Ukraine to join NATO. The Macron-Zelenskyy summit took place on the eve of a Moscow meeting between Witkoff, a real estate tycoon and Trump ally, and Russian President Vladimir Putin. “I believe the visit will be very useful, as it will focus on outlining a peace settlement for Ukraine,” said Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov. PRESSURE ON KYIV Europeans are fearful that the U.S. will pressure Ukraine to sign an unfavorable peace deal with Russia at a time when Zelenskyy is politically weakened following the resignation of his top aide, Andriy Yermak, who was caught up in a wide-ranging corruption probe.  “I am afraid that all the pressure will be directed at the victim … to make concessions,” the EU’s diplomatic chief Kaja Kallas said on Monday.  Zelenskyy, Macron and U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer also held a call with Witkoff and Rustem Umerov, head of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, according to an Elysée official. They also exchanged views with other European leaders ahead of Witkoff’s meeting in Moscow. “Witkoff will bring what was discussed in Geneva and Florida,” said a European diplomat, who was granted anonymity to discuss a sensitive topic, mentioning earlier meetings that watered down some of the more pro-Russian aspects of the initial 28-point plan. “But we really have to see if he goes directly with what we discussed or will be talking about something different.” In Brussels, where EU defense ministers were meeting on Monday, several of them insisted that continued military support to Kyiv was crucial, including by using Russia’s frozen assets.  “Ministers agreed we need to agree on the funding options as a matter of urgency,” Kallas told reporters after the Foreign Affairs Council. “We need to work on the legislative proposals to work on all the risks and mitigate all the risks and share the burden regarding those risks, but we definitely need to move on.”  Ahead of the gathering, Swedish Defense Minister Pål Jonson called for more sanctions on Russia as well as the use of the Russian frozen assets to allow Ukraine to “negotiate from a position of strength.”  On the sidelines of the gathering, the Netherlands announced a €250 million contribution to the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List initiative for Ukraine — a NATO-backed scheme that has European allies paying for U.S. weapons to be sent to Ukraine. The money will be used to purchase U.S. air defense systems and ammunition for F-16 jet fighters. Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans and his Ukrainian counterpart, Denys Shmyhal, signed a deal to co-produce drones in both countries.  The European Commission also said that 15 member countries out of the 19 that had requested money under the EU’s €150 billion SAFE loans-for-weapons scheme had included support for Ukraine in their plans, involving “billions, not millions.”  “We made a decision to contribute at least 0.25 percent of GDP for aid to Ukraine and are looking at SAFE to do even more,” Latvia’s Deputy Defense Minister Liene Gātere told reporters. “We’re calling on other European countries to step up and do the same.” 

Russia has no veto over Kyiv’s bid to join NATO, alliance chief Mark Rutte said on Wednesday — rebuffing a peace deal proposal floated by Moscow and Washington that would block Ukraine from the alliance. “Russia has neither a vote nor a veto over who can be a member of NATO,” Rutte said in an interview with El País and German outlet RND. The alliance’s founding Washington Treaty “allows any country in the Euro-Atlantic area to join,” he added. Rutte’s comments follow a U.S.-led proposal to end Russia’s full-scale war, leaked last week, which included the provision that NATO agree “it will not accept Ukraine at any moment in the future.” The 28-point plan has since been modified into a 19-point one that waters down some of its most pro-Russian elements. An alternative European proposal scraps the idea of excluding Ukraine from NATO. Rutte took some of the sting out of his comment by insisting that he has positive feelings for U.S. President Donald Trump. “I like the guy,” he said. NATO allies have balked at issuing an immediate invitation for Ukraine to join the organization, but members last year agreed that Kyiv’s bid was “irreversible” — a statement Rutte has repeated since despite opposition to the country’s accession by Trump and other member countries. The NATO secretary-general acknowledged that several “allies … currently oppose Ukraine’s accession.” Rutte said the current peace plan, which came after broader diplomatic talks in Geneva on Sunday, provided a “good foundation for further discussions,” but added that any proposal will require a “separate, parallel discussion” with NATO “on certain issues.” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said on Wednesday that any decision about Ukraine’s bid to join the EU or the alliance should not be made unilaterally. “Nothing about Europe without Europe, nothing about NATO without NATO,” she told European Parliament lawmakers. Rutte also said the alliance would deliver a total of $5 billion in weapons to Ukraine as part of a NATO-led scheme that has European allies buying U.S. arms for Kyiv “by the end of this year.” Eleven countries have so far contributed to five $500 million packages as part of the so-called PURL program, with a sixth package expected in the coming days. The remaining money will come from a mixture of future packages and off-cycle payments, according to a person familiar with the matter, who was granted anonymity to speak freely on the sensitive topic. Rutte warned that Moscow will not stop jeopardizing Europe’s security even if it agrees to a peace deal. “Russia will continue to be a long-term threat for a long time,” he said.