BERLIN — U.S. envoys in Berlin signaled they are ready to give Ukraine security guarantees for a future peace deal that correspond to the same levels of protection as Article 5 in the NATO alliance, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on Monday. “We have now heard from the U.S. side that they are ready to give us security guarantees that correspond to Article 5,” Zelenskyy said in the chancellery in Berlin.

Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music * Amazon Music Friedrich Merz hat ein internationales Spitzentreffen zusammengebracht, bei dem es um einen möglichen Weg zu einem Waffenstillstand in der Ukraine geht. Wolodymyr Selenskyj ist in der Hauptstadt, ebenso die amerikanischen Unterhändler Jared Kushner und Steve Witkoff. Europa verhandelt mit, unter hohem Zeitdruck und mit offenen Fragen zu Sicherheitsgarantien und der Zukunft des amerikanischen Vorschlags für einen Frieden-Rahmen.  Gordon Repinski berichtet, warum dieser Tag zu einem Wendepunkt werden könnte, oder zu einem weiteren gescheiterten Versuch. Im 200-Sekunden-Interview spricht Andrij Melnyk, ukrainischer Botschafter bei den Vereinten Nationen und früherer Botschafter in Berlin, über die Erwartungen an die Gespräche. Er erklärt, warum Europa eine stärkere Rolle einnehmen muss, welche Garantien für die Ukraine unverzichtbar sind und wie weit sein Land bereit ist, in den Verhandlungen zu gehen, ohne seine territoriale Integrität aufzugeben. Danach richtet sich der Blick in die USA. Pauline von Pezold analysiert den Auftritt des AfD-Außenpolitikers Markus Frohnmaier beim Young Republican Club in New York. Dort wurde sichtbar, wie eng sich Teile der AfD an das Umfeld von Donald Trump anbinden und welche strategische Bedeutung dieser Schulterschluss für kommende Wahlen in Deutschland hat. Zum Schluss geht es nach Baden-Württemberg. Maximilian Stascheit berichtet vom Grünen Parteitag in Ludwigsburg. Cem Özdemir setzt im Wahlkampf auf Bekanntheit und Kontinuität, um das Staatsministerium zu verteidigen. Ein Parteitag zwischen Aufholjagd, Personalisierung und der Frage, ob dieses Konzept im Autoland aufgeht. Das Berlin Playbook als Podcast gibt es jeden Morgen ab 5 Uhr. Gordon Repinski und das POLITICO-Team liefern Politik zum Hören – kompakt, international, hintergründig. Für alle Hauptstadt-Profis: Der Berlin Playbook-Newsletter bietet jeden Morgen die wichtigsten Themen und Einordnungen. Jetzt kostenlos abonnieren. Mehr von Host und POLITICO Executive Editor Gordon Repinski: Instagram: @gordon.repinski | X: @GordonRepinski. Legal Notice (Belgium) POLITICO SRL Forme sociale: Société à Responsabilité Limitée Siège social: Rue De La Loi 62, 1040 Bruxelles Numéro d’entreprise: 0526.900.436 RPM Bruxelles info@politico.eu www.politico.eu

Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music * Amazon Music Europa muss sich sicherheitspolitisch neu sortieren. Gordon Repinski spricht mit der Politikwissenschaftlerin Florence Gaub darüber, warum die Debatten über europäische Eigenständigkeit seit Jahrzehnten immer wiederkehren und weshalb der aktuelle Moment dennoch eine andere Qualität hat. Gaub erklärt, wie sehr die Reaktionen Europas weniger von amerikanischen Entscheidungen als von einem eigenen Gefühl der Schwäche geprägt sind und warum dieser Kontinent lernen muss, strategisch zu denken und langfristig zu planen. Im Zentrum stehen grundlegende Fragen: Warum gelingt es Europa trotz wachsender Bedrohungen so schwer, den entscheidenden Schritt zu mehr Handlungsfähigkeit zu gehen. Welche politischen Entscheidungen fehlen und was braucht es, damit Gesellschaften Resilienz entwickeln. Gaub beschreibt die strukturellen Ursachen für langsame militärische Prozesse, die kulturellen Besonderheiten Deutschlands und die verbreitete Annahme, dass Konflikte Europa nicht mehr betreffen könnten. Der Podcast blickt außerdem auf konkrete Szenarien. Von Sabotage bis Cyberangriff, von Desinformation bis zur Frage, wie man überhaupt erkennt, dass ein Angriff stattfindet. Gaub macht deutlich, wie sehr Unsicherheit inzwischen Teil moderner Konflikte ist und warum Demokratien in der Defensive häufig stärker reagieren als in der Offensive. Und es geht um mögliche Wege nach vorn. Eine engere europäische Zusammenarbeit, flexible Formate jenseits des Einstimmigkeitsprinzips und eine neue Ehrlichkeit in der Frage, wofür Europa bereit ist, einzustehen. Gaub zeichnet ein Bild, das nüchtern ist, aber auch zeigt, welches Potenzial Europa hätte, wenn es bereit wäre, diese Rolle anzunehmen. Das Berlin Playbook als Podcast gibt es jeden Morgen ab 5 Uhr. Gordon Repinski und das POLITICO-Team liefern Politik zum Hören – kompakt, international, hintergründig. Für alle Hauptstadt-Profis: Der Berlin Playbook-Newsletter bietet jeden Morgen die wichtigsten Themen und Einordnungen. Jetzt kostenlos abonnieren. Mehr von Host und POLITICO Executive Editor Gordon Repinski: Instagram: @gordon.repinski | X: @GordonRepinski. Legal Notice (Belgium) POLITICO SRL Forme sociale: Société à Responsabilité Limitée Siège social: Rue De La Loi 62, 1040 Bruxelles Numéro d’entreprise: 0526.900.436 RPM Bruxelles info@politico.eu www.politico.eu

BRUSSELS — Donald Trump’s barrage of attacks on the European Union is forcing its leaders to confront the unthinkable: a future in which America is no longer their primary security guarantor and Europe has to organize its own defense far sooner than anyone imagined. In anticipation of a reduced American role, EU leaders are already road-testing a Europe-led security order. Many of the most important decisions regarding Ukraine are being hammered out in a loose “coalition of the willing,” which is led by the U.K. and France and also includes Germany.  Meanwhile, EU policymakers are exploring deeper coordination through the U.K.-led Joint Expeditionary Force or by pushing for a stronger “European pillar” inside NATO — an idea long backed by Paris and now gaining traction in Berlin. A senior defense official from a mid-sized European country said that conversations about security guarantees for Ukraine with American officials had grown “awkward.” More significantly, the official said, so had discussions about Article 5 — the clause in the NATO treaty that requires allies to come to each other’s defense if one is attacked. “The uncertainty” on how the U.S. would behave in the event of an attack on a frontline state “is just too high,” said the official. OPEN QUESTION Other current and former security officials said the key question was no longer if Europe would take over primary responsibility for its defense and security, but when. The absence of U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio at a recent meeting of NATO foreign ministers — something that has happened only a handful of times in alliance history — sparked concern among EU and former NATO officials. That grew to alarm after his deputy Christopher Landau berated EU countries for prioritizing their own defense industries instead of continuing to buy from the U.S. The efforts to carve out new forums, independent of Washington, got a new push last week with the publication of the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy.  “The days of the United States propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over,” reads the document. “Wealthy, sophisticated nations … must assume primary responsibility for their regions.” In Europe, the document argued, mass migration is “transforming the continent and creating strife.” “Should present trends continue, the continent will be unrecognizable in 20 years or less. As such, it is far from obvious whether certain European countries will have economies and militaries strong enough to remain reliable allies.” If NATO allies become majority non-European, it continued, “it is an open question whether they will view their place in the world, or their alliance with the United States, in the same way as those who signed the NATO charter.” Andrius Kubilius, a former Lithuanian prime minister, said he wants to use the coming year to flesh out provisions in the clause to spell out what actions countries would take to defend one another. | Thierry Monasse/Getty Images In an interview Monday, Trump doubled down on the idea that a Europe subjected to “mass migration” is “decaying” and aimless. The bloc’s “weak” leaders simply “don’t know what to do,” he told POLITICO’s Dasha Burns for a special episode of The Conversation.  “The people coming in have a totally different ideology,” he added. “They’ll be much weaker, and they’ll be much different.” NEW EUROPEAN ORDER In the face of relentless attacks from the Trump administration, the European Union is quietly working on establishing new security guarantees in case the NATO one proves unreliable. “The question is whether we need to have some kind of additional security guarantees and institutional arrangements in order to be ready — in case Article 5 suddenly is not implemented,” EU Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius told POLITICO at the end of November. Even so, “we should always count on Article 5,” he added.   One legal basis for such a guarantee can be found in the EU’s common defense clause, Article 42.7, which was born after the Kosovo war of the late 1990s when then-French and British leaders Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair jointly pushed for Europe to take defense into its own hands. Kubilius, a former Lithuanian prime minister, added that he wants to use the coming year to flesh out provisions in the clause to spell out what actions countries would take to defend one another. He pointed to recent comments by U.S. NATO Ambassador Matthew Whitaker suggesting that Germany should take over NATO’s top military job from an American.  The comment “is a signal that really Americans are asking us to take care about European defense.” END OF AN ERA With European military chiefs and intelligence agencies warning that an attack from Russia could come as early as 2028, traditional European attitudes toward defense — and reliance on the United States — are quickly shifting. Until recently, Germany has been unwavering in its support for a U.S.-led NATO. But under Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Berlin is now holding talks with Paris about how the French nuclear deterrent could contribute to Europe’s security. At the same time, Merz has shown a growing willingness to differ from Washington on the subject of Ukraine and Europe’s security architecture. Parts of the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy were “unacceptable,” the conservative leader said on Tuesday. The document confirmed Merz’s view that “we in Europe, and therefore in Germany, must become much more independent of the United States in security policy.” The shift reflects changing dynamics within Germany’s security establishment. In a statement, Roderich Kiesewetter, a former German army general staff officer and a conservative lawmaker in the Bundestag, called Trump’s security strategy a “slap in the face.” “Anyone who writes about partners in this way won’t defend them when it really counts,” he wrote. “What does that mean? The era of the ‘security guarantee’ is over.” CAPABILITY GAPS The challenge for Europe is how to move from rhetoric to action. The stakes are huge — not least because embracing continental defense would involve major tradeoffs on welfare spending, which in turn could topple governments. Another obstacle is institutional. Given that the United States is the biggest partner inside NATO, the alliance is not a place where allies can plan for any sort of post-American future. “That would defeat the very purpose of NATO,” said one senior alliance diplomat. Inside the alliance there is no contingency planning for a NATO without the U.S., according to three NATO diplomats. They interpret the signals from Washington not as a prelude to U.S. withdrawal from the alliance but as a powerful wakeup call for Europe as Washington refocuses on the Arctic and the Indo-Pacific. “The United States and NATO allies take our Article 5 commitments … very seriously,” Whitaker, the U.S. ambassador, said last week. “Article 5 is ironclad.” “But we have expectations,” he said at the Doha Forum in Qatar, namely “[Europeans] picking up the conventional defense of the European continent.” A third and particularly daunting task for Europeans would be to replicate or replace military capacities currently provided by the U.S. Europeans provide up to 60 percent of capabilities in some domains, said Oana Lungescu, a former NATO spokesperson who is now a fellow at the Royal United Services Institute think tank. But in others — such as intelligence, heavy airlift and deep strikes — the United States typically provides an outsized share. “It would be very hard for Europeans to fill some of those capability gaps, certainly within a year or two,” Lungescu said. Some officials pointed to the fact that even if the Trump administration wants to leave NATO, the U.S. Congress might stand in the way. Indeed, U.S. defense legislation set for a vote as soon as this week would place new restrictions on reducing troop levels in Europe, a bipartisan rebuke of the Trump administration’s strategy. Anthony Gardner, a former U.S. ambassador to the EU, said the NSS was nothing less than a “betrayal of 80 years of U.S. bipartisan policy.” For many Europeans, the message is clear. The Trump administration has laid out its position. More than ever, Europe is listening — and taking action.

John Kampfner is a British author, broadcaster and commentator. His latest book “In Search of Berlin” is published by Atlantic. He is a regular POLITICO columnist. When it comes to the war in Ukraine, predictions don’t last long. One minute U.S. President Donald Trump’s acting like his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin’s emissary, the next he’s giving Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy a reasonable hearing, and then it’s back again to the Kremlin camp. With the U.S. administration increasingly taking on the role of unreliable broker over a staunch ally, Europe is in a parlous position. And what has struck me most during a series of security briefings and conferences I’ve attended in Berlin and elsewhere this autumn, is the extent of the alarm. Yet, much of the time, this remains hidden behind closed doors. One of the few crumbs of comfort is that the E3 nations of Germany, France and Britain are seeking to confront this cold reality in unison. After the trauma of Brexit, and all the bickering between former German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and French President Emmanuel Macron in recent years, the mood has changed — because it had to. If Europe is to survive a future attack by Russia — and that is the kind of language being used — its big players must behave in a way they haven’t done before. They must be joined at the hip. As more than a dozen officials have made clear in a series of discussions, the cost of inaction would be far greater than the cost of supporting Ukraine has been so far. Not only would Putin be emboldened to go even further, Europe would also be engulfed by a wave of Ukrainian refugees far greater than anything experienced before. And this realignment was visible amid the pomp and circumstance of German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s state visit to the U.K. last week, as both he and King Charles affirmed what they described as a deep bond between the two countries — one that’s been reinforced by the shared threat of Russian expansionism. Meanwhile, the real business taking place at the government level is intense. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz have developed a genuine affinity, stemming from a shared view of current foreign-policy perils and their domestic-policy troubles. A British prime minister of the center-left and German chancellor of the center-right are finding common cause in their double adversity. The loss of the U.S. as a friend in need is what’s forcing this realignment for both countries. Of course, neither publicly dares admit the situation is as bad as it is, but the optics say everything that needs to be said. Just compare Trump’s state visit in September — with its high security, taut smiles and desperate obsequies by his hosts – and the relaxed conviviality of Steinmeier’s. And dominating everything is security — though it’s less a “coalition of the willing” and more a “coalition of the surrounded.” Or, as one German security official, granted anonymity to speak freely, explained: “If the Americans are now acting as mediators between Russia and Europe, they no longer see themselves as partners within NATO.” In practical terms, the U.S. is still the driving force behind the alliance, notionally at least. As another German military figure, also granted anonymity to express their views, put it: “The harsh truth is that Europe’s readiness level to combat any Russian aggression doesn’t yet exist. Until that time, we are reliant on the U.S. to act as a backstop.” But that penny should have dropped last February, when U.S. Vice President JD Vance dropped his various bombshells at the Munich Security Conference, attacking European democracies, praising the far-right Alternative for Germany party and serving notice that the U.S. no longer felt beholden to past allegiances. The real surprise is that anyone’s been surprised by the Trump administration’s actions since then. Even now, some are continuing to cling to the hope that this isn’t the united view in Washington, and that others within the administration still wield a certain influence. This isn’t how security planners in Germany or the U.K. see things, but it seems many politicians — and much of the public — are yet to be convinced of just how serious the situation has become. One minute U.S. President Donald Trump’s acting like his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin’s emissary, the next he’s giving Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy a reasonable hearing. | Pool Photo by Will Oliver via EPA Their alarm will have been reinforced by the second Trump administration’s first National Security Strategy. Published only a few days ago, it condemns many of the liberal values underpinning European democracy, while praising the nativist, nationalist rhetoric of the far-right — and implicitly of Putin.  Previously, the dominant narrative around Europe was about German reluctance, whether brought about by postwar guilt and pacificism or complacency. But while that has been replaced by a new determination, exactly how deeply is it entrenched? The commitment across NATO to increase defense spending to 5 percent of national GDP — 1.5 percent of which can be spent on “critical infrastructure” — certainly allows for much budgetary dexterity. But Berlin’s borrowing power gives it a freedom its neighbors can only envy. Britain’s financial travails are considerably more acute, and for all his tough talk, several defense contractors suspect Starmer is going slow on defense orders. As it stands, Germany is expected to spend €153 billion a year on defense by 2029. France, by comparison, plans to reach about €80 billion by 2030, and the U.K. currently spends £60 billion — a figure set to rise to £87 billion by 2030 — but looking at current predictions, will only hit its 3.5 percent target in 2035. For the governments in London and Paris, budgets are so tight and public service spending requirements so great — not to mention debt interest payments — the push-and-pull with security needs will only become more intense. And while opinion polls vary from country to country and depending on how questions are phrased, the growing concern among many defense officials is that if Ukraine is pressured enough to accept some form of Trump-Putin dirty deal, public support for military spending will decrease. “Job done” will be the sentiment — except, of course, it won’t be. For Putin, it can’t be. The Russian leader has tied his political survival, his power infrastructure and his country’s economy to the notion of an encircling Western “threat.” Hence his recent remarks about Russia being “ready” for war if Europe wants to start one — he simply can’t afford to stop invoking threats. But the original 28-point plan for Ukraine — which the U.S. initially denied came directly from the Kremlin — represents Europe’s worst nightmare. And if a spurious “peace” is imposed by any deal approximating that one, Germany, the U.K., France and their other European allies, including Poland, Finland, the Baltics, Nordics and (more cautiously) Italy, will know they’re out on their own. It would mark the return of big-power politics, a Yalta 2.0. It would enshrine NATO’s de-Americanization, a structural incapacity for Ukraine to defend itself, and confirm that, as far as the U.S. is concerned, Russia enjoys a veto on European security. “We say it’s existential, but we don’t yet act as if it is,” said one British defense official, speaking on condition of anonymity. The task for Merz, Starmer and Macron is then to accept — and admit to their publics — that they only have each other to rely on.

The EU’s pursuit of its green agenda and enforcement of tech rules against U.S. firms is undermining the transatlantic alliance, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State warned. “The nations of Europe cannot look to the US for their own security at the same time they affirmatively undermine the security of the US itself through the (unelected, undemocratic, and unrepresentative) EU,” Christopher Landau said on social media platform X on Saturday. Prominent U.S. officials criticized Brussels after the European Commission slapped X with a €120 million penalty for breaching EU transparency rules earlier this week. Billionaire X owner Elon Musk, a major backer of U.S. President Donald Trump and the wider MAGA movement, threatened retaliation and called to “abolish the EU.” Landau said the fine was only the “tip of the iceberg” and that the EU had continuously undermined its credibility with the U.S. with its focus on policies that he described in a separate post on Saturday as adverse to U.S. interests and a form of “civilizational suicide” — echoing comments directed toward the EU in Trump’s recent withering foreign policy blueprint. “When these countries wear their NATO hats, they insist that Transatlantic cooperation is the cornerstone of our mutual security. But when these countries wear their EU hats, they pursue all sorts of agendas that are often utterly adverse to US interests and security—including censorship, economic suicide/climate fanaticism, open borders, disdain for national sovereignty/promotion of multilateral governance and taxation, support for Communist Cuba,” he posted. “This inconsistency cannot continue,” he went on. “Either the great nations of Europe are our partners in protecting the Western civilization that we inherited from them or they are not. But we cannot pretend that we are partners while those nations allow the EU’s unelected, undemocratic, and unrepresentative bureaucracy in Brussels to pursue policies of civilizational suicide.” Landau earlier this week slammed European NATO allies for cutting the U.S. out of the bloc’s defense buildup, as POLITICO first reported.

LONDON — Donald Trump has launched a crusade to convert European politics to his cause, mobilizing the full force of American diplomacy to promote “patriotic” parties, stamp on migration, destroy “censorship” and save “civilization” from decay.  The question is whether Europe’s embattled centrists have the power, or the will, to stop him. In its newly released National Security Strategy document, the White House set out for the first time in a comprehensive form its approach to the geopolitical challenges facing the U.S. and the world. While bringing peace to Ukraine gets a mention, when it comes to Europe, America’s official stance is now that its security depends on shifting the continent’s politics decisively to the right. Over the course of three pages, the document blames the European Union, among others, for raising the risk of “civilizational erasure,” due to a surge in immigrants, slumping birth rates and the purported erosion of democratic freedoms.  “Should present trends continue, the continent will be unrecognizable in 20 years or less,” it says. “As such, it is far from obvious whether certain European countries will have economies and militaries strong enough to remain reliable allies.” With its talk of birth rates declining and immigration rising, the racial dimension to the White House rhetoric is hard to ignore. It will be familiar to voters in Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands and Germany, where far-right politicians have articulated the so-called “great replacement theory,” a racist conspiracy theory falsely asserting that elites are part of a plot to dilute the white population and diminish its influence. “We want Europe to remain European,” the document says. “Over the long term, it is more than plausible that within a few decades at the latest, certain NATO members will become majority non-European,” the document reads — making it “an open question” whether such countries will continue to view an alliance with the U.S. as desirable. The policy prescription that follows is, in essence, regime change. “Our goal should be to help Europe correct its current trajectory,” the strategy document says. That will involve “cultivating resistance” within European nations. In case there is any doubt about the political nature of the message, the White House paper celebrates “the growing influence of patriotic European parties” as a cause for American optimism. In other words: Back the far right to make Europe great again. FIGHTING SHY Since Trump returned to the White House in January, European leaders have kept up a remarkable performance of remaining calm amid his provocations, so far avoiding an open conflict that would sever transatlantic relations entirely. But for centrist leaders currently in power — like Emmanuel Macron in Paris, Keir Starmer in London and Germany’s Friedrich Merz — the new Trump doctrine poses a challenge so existential that they may be forced to confront it head-on.  “We are facing the same challenges, or versions of the same challenges, and we do talk about it,” Starmer said. | Jeff J. Mitchell/Getty Images That confrontation could come sooner rather than later, with high-stakes elections in parts of Britain and Germany next year and the possibility of a snap national vote ever-present in France. In each case, MAGA-aligned parties — Reform U.K., the Alternative for Germany and the National Rally — are poised to make gains at the expense of establishment centrists currently in power. America, it is now clear, may well intervene to help.  On current evidence, European officials whose job it is to protect their elections from foreign interference have little appetite for a fight with Trump. The European Commission recently unveiled its plans for a “democracy shield” to protect elections from disinformation and foreign interference. Michael McGrath, the commissioner responsible for the policy, told POLITICO recently that the shield should be drawn widely as Russia is “not the only actor” that may have “a vested interest” in influencing elections. “There are many actors who would like to damage the fabric of the EU, and ultimately undermine trust in its institutions,” he said.  In light of the new National Security Strategy, Trump’s America must now surely count among them.  But McGrath played the diplomat when asked, before the strategy was published, if he would rather U.S. leaders stopped campaigning in European elections and criticizing European democracy.  “They’re entitled to their views, but we have our own standards and we seek to apply our own values and the European approach to international affairs and international diplomacy,” McGrath replied. “We don’t comment or interfere on the domestic matters of a close partner like the United States.” PATHETIC FREELOADERS Even before the strategy was published, Trump administration figures had already provided ample evidence of its disdain for Europe’s political center ground. So far this year, Vice President JD Vance launched a broadside against Europe over free speech and democracy; Elon Musk intervened in the German election to back the far-right Alternative for Germany; and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth privately savaged “pathetic” Europeans for “freeloading” on security.  The difference this time is that Trump’s National Security Strategy is official. “It was one thing for them to think it and say it to each other (or in a speech in Munich),” said one EU diplomat, granted anonymity to speak candidly. “It’s something else to put it into a policy document.” What is worse for leaders like Macron, Merz and Starmer is that the Trumpian analysis — that a critical mass of voters want their own European MAGA — may, ultimately, be right.  These leaders are all under immense pressure from the populist right in their own backyards. In Britain, Nigel Farage’s Reform U.K. is on track to make major gains at next year’s regional and local elections, potentially triggering a leadership challenge in the governing Labour Party that could force Starmer out.  In Paris, Marine Le Pen’s National Rally tortures Macron’s struggling administrators in parliament, while the Alternative for Germany breathes down Merz’s neck in Berlin and pushes him to take ever harder positions on migration.  The British prime minister disclosed in an interview with The Economist this week that he spoke to Merz and Macron at a recent private dinner in Berlin about the shared threat they all face from the right. “We are facing the same challenges, or versions of the same challenges, and we do talk about it,” Starmer said.  If America makes good on Trump’s new strategy, private dinner party chats among friends may not be enough.

MONS, Belgium — Fewer American troops in Europe will not strain the continent’s defenses, said NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, brushing off unease around U.S. commitment to the alliance. “I am confident in the capabilities” of Europe and Canada, the four-star U.S. general said at the alliance’s sprawling military operational command in southern Belgium. “We’re ready today to meet any crisis or contingency.” Grynkewich’s comments come amid concerns around an anticipated pullback ofAmerican troops from Europe resulting from President Donald Trump’s upcoming defense strategy. The so-called posture review is widely expected to involve a redeployment of U.S. forces from Europe to the Indo-Pacific. That shift has already begun, with the U.S. pulling 800 troops out of Romania last month — a decision Bucharest called on Washington to overturn. The worry about a reduction in the 85,000 U.S. troops in Europe also reflects a broader debate around Washington’s commitment to the alliance under Trump. Trump has praised the promise by NATO allies to ramp up defense spending to 5 percent of GDP by 2035 but previously questioned the alliance’s collective defense pledge, equivocated over a recent Russian drone incursion into Poland, and repeatedly pressured European allies to step up.  Earlier this year, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said: “Now [Russian President Vladimir] Putin has started making incursions into the NATO borders. The one thing I can tell you is the U.S. is not going to get involved with troops or any of that.” Alexus G. Grynkewich insisted that any political tensions related to peace talks have had “no impact … in terms of the ability to accomplish our mission from a NATO perspective.” | Wohlfart/Getty Images European leaders are privately worried about a Trump-backed effort to end the war in Ukraine that some see as currently favoring Russia, with French President Emmanuel Macron reportedly warning in a leaked call that the U.S. could be about to “betray” Ukraine. That tumultuous relationship was on display again this week after U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio skipped a meeting of NATO foreign ministers — something that has almost never happened since NATO’s founding in 1949. Meanwhile, his deputy berated allies in a closed-door meeting for prioritizing their own arms industries instead of continuing to spend on U.S. kit. Almost two-thirds of European defense spending goes to the U.S., but the EU is trying to change that with programs aimed at boosting local production. In private some European allies are worried about the U.S., but in public they insist that NATO is still a force to be reckoned with. “All the processes of NATO are functioning flawlessly,” Polish Deputy Defense Minister Paweł Zalewski told POLITICO. “In a practical sense, the Americans are fulfilling their obligations very well.” NEW NORMAL Grynkewich insisted that any political tensions related to peace talks have had “no impact … in terms of the ability to accomplish our mission from a NATO perspective.” Vows by the allies to ramp up their defense spending, he added, means NATO will “be more ready tomorrow and we’ll be more ready the day after that” to stand up to Russia and respond to any further troop withdrawals. Last month the U.S. ambassador to NATO, Matthew Whitaker, raised eyebrows when he said he “look[ed] forward to the day when Germany … says that ‘we’re ready to take over the Supreme Allied Commander position,’” in a yet another example of Washington’s push for European allies to do more while the U.S. hints it could step back.  The Trump administration reportedly mulled not appointing an American general as Supreme Allied Commander Europe earlier this year, before nominating Grynkewich. The SACEUR has always been a U.S. officer as the post commands all allied troops in Europe and oversees the American nuclear deterrent on the continent. “There’s always rebalancing amongst the positions that different nations fill across the alliance,” Grynkewich said, adding that “it’s natural that some of that will happen … over the course of the next several months [and] several years.” That tumultuous relationship was on display again this week after U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio skipped a meeting of NATO foreign ministers. | Win McNamee/Getty Images “As far as who holds the SACEUR position,” he told reporters, “I’d rather just leave it to politicians to make those judgments.” Europe’s disquiet over the reliability of its alliance with the U.S. comes as the full-scale war in Ukraine nears its fourth year, intelligence assessments warn of Russia being ready for an attack on a NATO country by the end of the decade, and Russian-linked hybrid attacks ramp up across the continent. Putin said this week he was “ready” for war with Europe. Grynkewich said he had “concern” that Russia may test NATO’s collective defense in the “near term” — as well as in the “mid term and in clearly [the] long term.”  Russia’s hybrid attacks are a “real issue,” the air force pilot said, and echoed a call by several European capitals to respond more forcefully to hybrid activities. “We also do think about being proactive,” he said, declining to give further details. “If Russia is attempting to provide dilemmas to us, then maybe there are ways that we could provide dilemmas to them.” Jan Cienski contributed reporting.

BRUSSELS — It’s time for Europeans to stop trailing behind Donald Trump and instead draw up their own peace plan for Ukraine, Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius told POLITICO. The EU “needs to be independent or at least be ready to be strong in geopolitical developments, including to have our plans on how peace in Ukraine can be brought and to discuss them with our transatlantic partners,” Kubilius said. The EU is scrambling to respond after the U.S. president’s negotiators — real estate tycoon Steve Witkoff and Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner — were in Moscow Tuesday to talk over the latest peace proposal with Russian leader Vladimir Putin. Europe was caught off guard by the 28-point peace plan drafted by Witkoff and Russia’s Kirill Dmitriev, which included a ban on Ukraine’s membership of NATO and a limit on the size of the Ukrainian army. That draft was modified after a desperate intervention by European allies and Ukraine, but there is wariness about yet another Trump-led peace effort. European countries were not represented at the Kremlin during the meeting with Putin, despite Ukraine’s future being crucial to the continent’s security. EU officials worry that even if this new Trump plan doesn’t fly, in a few months, there’ll be a new one.  “Each six months, we’re getting new plans and in some way I feel that we are waiting here to know the plans that will come from Washington this year. The plans should come also from Brussels or from Berlin,” Kubilius said. The defense commissioner argued that it is “very much needed” for Europe to craft its own plan to end the war to secure a seat at the table. “We should have the possibility to discuss two plans: one that is European and another one, maybe, prepared by our American friends,” he said. The aim would be to “find synergies between these two plans and achieve the best outcome.” DEFENSE IS A TOP PRIORITY The former Lithuanian prime minister has been the bloc’s first defense commissioner for a year — a sign of how much has changed in the EU as it wakes up to the threat posed by Russia and ramps up its rearmament efforts, all while the Trump-led U.S. pulls back from the continent. The U.S. has been the linchpin of Europe’s security since the end of World War II, and Kubilius said, “We should always count on Article 5,” referring to NATO’s common defense provision. However, he argued that America’s shift toward the Pacific “is happening.” “The question is whether we need to have some kind of additional security guarantees and institutional arrangements in order to be ready — in case Article 5 suddenly is not implemented,” he said.   He also mentioned recent comments by U.S. NATO Ambassador Matthew Whitaker that Germany might take over NATO’s top military job, rather than keeping it in the hands of an American general. That “is a signal that really Americans are asking us to take care about European defense,” not only from a military point of view but also from an institutional perspective, Kubilius said. The geopolitical shift “pushed Europe to understand that defense is a clear strategic priority, which demands action from our side,” the commissioner said, mentioning some of the EU’s key legislative actions like the €150 billion SAFE loans-for-weapons program aimed at boosting the bloc’s military production. Next year, “we are planning to spend a lot of our efforts on the development of industry,” he said, including a communication on the single market. Defense companies are currently not fully integrated into the single market as governments have an opt-out for national security interests, but that is a cause of the bloc’s fragmented defense industry and is hampering rearmament efforts. Kubilius also said he wants to open a discussion on “institutional defense readiness,” including revamping the bloc’s mutual defense provision — often overshadowed by NATO’s more muscular promise. The EU clause needs procedural language that spells out the actions member countries must take to protect each other.

BRUSSELS — U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau on Wednesday slammed European NATO allies for prioritizing their own defense industry over American arms suppliers, according to three NATO diplomats. The intervention came during Wednesday’s meeting of NATO foreign ministers — which was skipped by Landau’s boss Marco Rubio. Landau, a longtime NATO skeptic who spoke first at the closed-door meeting, told ministers not to “bully” his country’s defense firms out of participating in Europe’s rearmament. He then left the room soon after for other meetings, the diplomats said, though they noted that ministers only staying for a short time was not unusual. A U.S. State Department official said: “Deputy Secretary Landau delivered two key messages. One is the is the need for Europe to turn its defense spending commitments into capabilities. The second is that protectionist and exclusionary policies that bully American companies out of the market undermines our collective defense.” The EU has moved to scale up its historically depleted defense industry amid growing warnings by countries like Germany that Russia could attack Europe by the end of the decade. Brussels has unveiled strategies in several legal proposals seeking to encourage local industry. Those efforts include the new €150 billion loans-for-arms SAFE program, but third countries like the U.S. can only supply a maximum of 35 percent of the value of weapons systems. Landau’s broadside is the latest in a long list of blows by the current U.S. administration to its historic partners, which includes pressuring the EU into accepting a humiliating trade deal to stave off tariffs. President Donald Trump has repeatedly slammed the bloc for treating the U.S. unfairly — while the EU has said Washington’s demands on trade were tantamount to blackmail.  Landau’s comments are likely to leave a bitter taste in some capitals, coming as several European countries like Germany and Poland announced millions in new cash for a NATO-backed scheme that pays U.S. defense firms to supply critical weapons to Ukraine. In total, Europe and Canada have pledged $4 billion to the scheme, NATO chief Mark Rutte said Wednesday. Trump has in the past questioned NATO’s security guarantees even if he has largely lauded the alliance’s efforts to ramp up defense spending to 5 percent of GDP by 2035. Over the summer Landau posted a deleted social media comment stating, “NATO is still a solution in search of a problem.” Rubio’s absence marks the first time in more than two decades that Washington’s top diplomat hasn’t been present for a NATO ministerial meeting. “No one’s shocked by the U.S. line that Europe shouldn’t be protectionist,” said one NATO diplomat, while adding: “But what did you expect … tact or nuance from the U.S.?” NATO declined to comment. This article has been updated.