Domènec Ruiz Devesa is a senior researcher at Barcelona Centre for International Affairs and a former member of the European Parliament. Emiliano Alessandri is an affiliated researcher at Austrian Institute for International Affairs. When NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte told the European Parliament the continent can’t defend itself without the U.S., and that those who think otherwise should “keep dreaming,” he did more than just describe Europe’s military dependence — he turned that dependence into a political doctrine. He also positioned himself not so much as the head of an alliance of would-be equals but as the spokesperson of Europe’s strategic resignation. Rutte’s view of European defense follows a familiar but increasingly untenable logic: Nuclear deterrence equals U.S. protection; U.S. protection equals European security; therefore, European strategic sovereignty is an illusion. But this chain of reasoning is far more fragile than it sounds. First of all, even though Europe’s overall strategic stability does depend on nuclear deterrence, most real-world security challenges in the Euro-Atlantic space — from hybrid operations to limited conventional scenarios — have and will continue to develop well below the nuclear threshold. This is something NATO’s own deterrence posture recognizes. And overstating the nuclear dimension risks overlooking the decisive importance of conventional mass, resilience, logistics, high-quality intelligence, air defense and industrial depth — areas where Europe is weak by political choice. Moreover, the nuclear debate in Europe isn’t binary. The continent isn’t condemned to choose between total dependence on the U.S. umbrella and total vulnerability. A serious discussion regarding the role of the French and British deterrents within a European framework — politically complex, yes, but strategically conceivable — is no longer taboo. And by pointing at the prohibitively high cost of developing a European nuclear force from scratch, Rutte’s sweeping dismissal of Europe’s strategic agency in the nuclear field sidesteps this evolution instead of engaging with it. Plus, the NATO chief is being too hasty in his dismissal of the increasingly accepted notion of a “European pillar” within NATO. Sure, the EU added value is, at present, best exemplified in the creation of a more integrated and dynamic European defense market, which the European Commission is actively fostering. But Rutte is underestimating existing European military capabilities. European countries already collectively field advanced air forces, world-class submarines, significant naval power, cutting-edge missile and air-defense systems, cyber expertise, space assets and one of the largest defense-industrial bases in the world. And when it comes to the defense of Ukraine, European allies — including France — have significantly expanded their intelligence contributions. The problem, therefore, isn’t so much scarcity but national and industrial fragmentation, coupled with the risk of technological stagnation and insufficient investment in key enablers like munitions production, military mobility, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, satellites, air-to-air refueling and integrated command structures. As demonstrated by satellite projects like the EU’s Governmental Satellite Communications and IRIS² Satellite Constellation, these are areas that can be improved in the space of months and years rather than decades. But telling Europeans that sovereignty is a fantasy can easily kill the political momentum needed to fix them. Regardless of what one may think of Trump and his disruptive politics, the direction of travel in U.S. foreign policy is unmistakable. | Mandel Ngan/AFP via Getty Images Finally, Rutte’s message is oddly out of sync with Washington too. U.S. presidents have long demanded Europe take far greater responsibility for its own defense, and in his second term, U.S. President Donald Trump has taken this message to new heights, from burden-sharing to burden-shifting. But to simultaneously tell Europe it must take care of itself, provided it continues purchasing U.S.-manufactured weapons, and that it can never truly succeed isn’t strategic clarity, it’s cognitive dissonance. Europe can no longer ignore political reality. Regardless of what one may think of Trump and his disruptive politics, the direction of travel in U.S. foreign policy is unmistakable: Europe is no longer a priority. The center of U.S. strategic gravity now lies in the Indo-Pacific, and U.S. dominance in the Western hemisphere ranks higher than Europe’s defense. In this mutated context, placing all of Europe’s security eggs in the U.S. basket isn’t sensible. However, none of this means Europe abandoning NATO or actively severing transatlantic ties. Rather, it means recognizing that alliances between equals are stronger than those built on dependence. A Europe that can militarily, industrially and politically rely on itself makes a more credible and valuable ally. And the 80-year transatlantic alliance will only endure if the U.S. and Europe strike a new bargain. So, as transatlantic allies grapple with a less straightforward alignment of interests and values, Rutte needs to be promoting a more balanced NATO with a strong European pillar — not undermining it.

BRUSSELS — U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth will send his deputy to a meeting of NATO defense ministers next month, according to a U.S. official and a European diplomat, a decision likely to raise further questions about Washington’s dedication to the transatlantic alliance. NATO’s 32 defense chiefs will gather Feb. 12 for the first ministerial-level meeting since U.S. President Donald Trump brought the alliance to the brink of implosion by repeatedly suggesting he could seize Greenland from Denmark by force.  But Hegseth, who prompted outrage at the same meeting last year by delivering a blistering attack on Europeans for not spending enough on their defense, is not expected to participate, said the two officials, both of whom were granted anonymity to speak freely.  Instead, Elbridge Colby, the undersecretary for defense policy, is set to attend in his place, the diplomat and official said, a decision that is still subject to change. Colby is the third-highest-ranking civilian defense official at the Pentagon and a close ally of U.S. Vice President JD Vance. The U.S. Department of Defense didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment by POLITICO. Colby, nicknamed “Bridge,” is seen as a hardliner on Europe inside the Pentagon and is a staunch supporter of an isolationist U.S. foreign policy that advocates a less active American role — especially militarily — worldwide. He is also responsible for drafting plans on an expected drawdown of U.S. troops from Europe, which has faced repeated delays.  Colby was responsible for crafting the new American defense strategy, published last week, which downgraded Europe and said Washington would instead “prioritize” defending the U.S. homeland and China. Before publication, the document underwent deep revisions by U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, who pushed for changes to the China section in light of trade talks between Beijing and Washington. Bessent’s input also toned down the China language in the White House’s National Security Strategy, released late last year.   The defense strategy also makes clear that in Europe “allies will take the lead” against threats that are “less severe” for the United States — a euphemism for Russia. It’s not the first time Hegseth has skipped a NATO meeting. But it marks the second time in a row a top U.S. official has missed a high-level gathering after Secretary of State Marco Rubio similarly dispatched his deputy to a meeting of NATO foreign ministers last month. Oana Lungescu, a former NATO spokesperson, said the move “risks sending a further signal that the U.S. isn’t listening as closely as it should to the concerns of its allies, especially after Marco Rubio skipped the last meeting.” “Having said that, there is also an upside,” said Lungescu, who now works as a senior fellow at the Royal United Services Institute think tank, “in that Elbridge Colby … is best placed to explain [the new U.S. defense strategy’s] intent and implications, and to hear the views of allies.” 

Switzerland will raise its value-added tax rate for a decade to boost defense spending, its government announced today. “In view of the deteriorating geopolitical situation, the Federal Council wants to substantially strengthen Switzerland’s security and defense capabilities,” the statement reads. “To this end, additional resources in the order of 31 billion Swiss francs [€33 billion] are required.” The Council plans to temporarily raise VAT by 0.8 percent from the current 8.1 percent for 10 years, as of 2028. The additional revenues will be allocated to an armament fund that will also have borrowing capacity. However, raising the VAT requires a change in the constitution and a public consultation will open in the spring. Switzerland has been rethinking its defense stance since Russia’s attack on Ukraine almost four years ago. It is looking for more military cooperation with European nations and ramping up its rearmament, although it still has no intention of joining NATO. Switzerland spends about 0.7 percent of its GDP on defense, one of the lowest rates in Europe. The current goal of boosting that to 1 percent by 2032 is now out of date, the Federal Council said. “Due to the savings made in recent decades, the armed forces are also insufficiently equipped, particularly to effectively repel the most likely threats, namely long-range attacks and hybrid conflicts,” the statement added. Priorities for the country’s armament push include short- and medium-range air defense systems, cybersecurity and electromagnetic capabilities.

BRUSSELS — Europe must build its own military power to survive a more dangerous world and a less reliable U.S., top EU officials warned on Wednesday, sharpening a public split with NATO chief Mark Rutte over the continent’s security future. “We live now in a world where might is right,” European Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius said at a conference marking the European Defence Agency’s 21st anniversary. “Our answer to deal with this dangerous world … European independence. European autonomy. More European responsibility for our own defense,” he said, calling for building a “European pillar in NATO.” He was echoed by the EU’s top diplomat and EDA boss Kaja Kallas, who warned that what is happening with the U.S. marks “a structural, not temporary” shift. “NATO needs to become more European to maintain its strength,” she said. That’s a direct challenge to Rutte, who on Monday branded a European arm of NATO an “empty word” given his immediate focus is keeping the U.S. inside the alliance. “If anyone thinks here … that the European Union or Europe as a whole can defend itself without the U.S., keep on dreaming,” Rutte told the European Parliament. But the EU’s top officials are hammering home a very different message: The United States is no longer the lynchpin of European security and the continent has to build its own military potential using its own resources. That’s part of the EDA’s job — to better coordinate the bloc’s military potential. Neither Kallas nor Kubilius mentioned Donald Trump, but it’s clear that the U.S. president’s challenge to the status quo by demanding the annexation of Greenland — a Danish territory — and undercutting NATO’s common defense provisions, are top-of-mind in Brussels. “The biggest change in the fundamental reorientation is going on across the Atlantic: a rethinking that has shaken the transatlantic relationship to its foundation,” Kallas said, adding: “These developments put a severe strain on the international norms, rules and institutions enforcing them that we have built over 80 years. The risk of a full-blown return to coercive power politics, spheres of influence and a world where might makes right, is very real.” She did underline that “The U.S. will remain Europe’s partner and ally,” but added: “Europe needs to adapt to the new realities. Europe is no longer Washington’s primary center of gravity.” That’s why the EU has signed defense cooperation deals with nine countries — the most recent being with India this week. The bloc “must also turbocharge our collaboration with the selected like-minded partners,” Kallas said. The EU also has to respond by revamping its structures to make coordinated action easier; currently a lot of security action needs unanimous consent, giving pro-Kremlin countries like Hungary a veto. “It cannot be that the one country’s veto defines the policy for others,” Kallas said. EU countries will also have to spend more on defense and better coordinate their procurement to avoid wasting money, Kubilius warned. He called the recently approved €150 billion loans-for-weapons Security Action for Europe program a “big bang,” but noted that the bulk of defense spending remains with national capitals. “Most new money for defense will be national, so the temptation will be to spend only national. That would be a big mistake. That would only increase fragmentation,” Kubilius said, warning that without such an effort, EU countries would continue to undermine their defense potential by buying arms from outside the bloc. The U.S. is Europe’s largest weapons supplier, but there is a concerted push to keep more defense spending at home, especially for projects financed by EU money. André Denk, a German military official who is the EDA’s chief executive, warned that the EU “cannot forever rely on U.S intelligence, on their logistic support, on their strategic enablers.” Kallas and Kubilius also underlined that the bloc’s own defense industries need to step up and produce more weapons faster. “Show us your lean and mean side,” said Kallas. The challenges posed by the U.S., Russia and China mean that Europe has to learn to stand up for itself, Kubilius said. “In a world of giants, we too must become giants. A gentle giant that promotes international law and cooperation. But a strong giant all the same.”

BRUSSELS — Mark Rutte has one overriding mission as NATO secretary-general: Stop Donald Trump from blowing up the alliance. That focus is now putting the former Dutch prime minister on a collision course with the very European capitals he once worked alongside — and has left NATO bruised even after he successfully talked Trump down from his threats to annex Greenland. The strain was on full display Monday in the European Parliament, where Rutte bluntly defended the superpower’s primacy in the alliance. “If anyone thinks here … that the European Union or Europe as a whole can defend itself without the U.S., keep on dreaming,” he told lawmakers. “You can’t.” The reaction was swift — and angry. “No, dear Mark Rutte,” France’s Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot shot back on X. “Europeans can and must take charge of their own security. This is the European pillar of NATO.” “It was a disgraceful moment,” said Nathalie Loiseau, a former French Europe minister and now an MEP. “We don’t need a Trump zealot. NATO needs to rebalance between U.S. and European efforts.” Spain’s Nacho Sánchez Amor was even more direct. “Are you the [U.S.] ambassador to [NATO],” the Socialist MEP asked Rutte in a heated exchange, “or the secretary-general representing the alliance and its members?” The clash is also exposing a growing fault line inside NATO: Rutte’s conviction that keeping Trump onside is the only way to keep the alliance intact — and Europe’s rising alarm that this strategy is hollowing it out. As the secretary-general strains to keep the Americans as close as possible, those efforts are opening up a rift with his EU counterparts who are increasingly calling for European security bodies and a continental army beyond NATO.  POLITICO spoke to more than a dozen NATO insiders, diplomats and current and former Rutte colleagues, many of whom were granted anonymity to speak candidly. They described a leader admired as a skilled crisis manager who recently pulled off a win on Greenland, but at the cost of deepening European unease about NATO’s long-term future. But Rutte’s defenders say he has delivered on keeping the alliance together, a task so difficult he cannot always ensure all 32 members of the alliance are satisfied. Officials familiar with how he works also insist he talks more frankly to Trump in private. Still, the Greenland standoff “did a lot of damage,” said one NATO diplomat. Rutte’s approach is a “band-aid” that has “alienated allies,” they added. “We’re an alliance of 32, not a U.S.-plus-31 club.” MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS Although Rutte insists that he represents all NATO allies, it’s clear that his overriding priority is to keep the United States under Trump from walking away from Europe. That’s opening him to criticism that the focus is now overshadowing the rest of his job. Even the secretary-general’s successful effort in helping to get Trump to back off his Greenland threats at the Jan. 19-23 Davos summit in Switzerland is raising questions about whether it’s just a temporary reprieve and if the U.S. will still attempt to take control of parts of the Arctic island. “What supposed deal have you made with President Trump?” Greens MEP and former Danish Foreign Minister Villy Søvndal asked on Monday. “Did you have a mandate as a secretary-general to negotiate on behalf of Greenland and Denmark?” Rutte denied he went outside his remit. “Of course, I have no mandate to negotiate on behalf of Denmark, so I didn’t and I will not,” he said in Parliament. Lionizing Trump also risks creating a credibility problem for the alliance. Last year, NATO agreed to dramatically step up military spending to 5 percent of GDP by 2035 — a result many in the alliance also see as helping Europe stand on its own two feet. | Pool photo by Nicolas Tucat/EPA NATO is well known for its collective defense commitment — Article 5 — but the alliance is also bound by Articles 2 and 3, which ask countries to promote economic cooperation and mutual rearmament. With his threats to impose tariffs on Europe and seize Greenland, Trump has violated both, the same NATO diplomat said. Adding to that unease, Trump has previously cast doubt on his support for Article 5, and belittled the military commitments of other allies, falsely claiming last week that Europeans had stayed “a little off the front lines” in the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan. Responding to the criticism, a NATO official said: “As secretaries-general before him, NATO Secretary-General Rutte is convinced that our collective security is best served by Europe and North America working together through NATO.” TRUMP CARD AT THE READY Despite that, Rutte has been sticking firmly to his strategy of buttering up Trump in public, insisting he is a positive for the alliance. Last year, NATO agreed to dramatically step up military spending to 5 percent of GDP by 2035 — a result many in the alliance also see as helping Europe stand on its own two feet. The secretary-general on Monday said there was “no way” that would have happened without pressure from the U.S. president. The White House is in full agreement with that characterization. “President Trump has done more for NATO than anyone,” White House Deputy Press Secretary Anna Kelly told POLITICO. “America’s contributions to NATO dwarf that of other countries, and his success in delivering a five percent spending pledge from NATO allies is helping Europe take greater responsibility for its own defense.” Kelly said that Trump has “a great relationship” with Rutte, and then added: “The United States is the only NATO partner who can protect Greenland, and the President is advancing NATO interests in doing so.” His hard-nosed approach is honed by 14 years of managing often fractious coalitions as the Netherlands’ longest-serving prime minister. “He’s anything but an idealist,” said a former colleague. “He’s pragmatic.” Immediately striking up a good rapport with Trump during his first term in the White House, Rutte realized that public flattery was the key to keeping the U.S. president onside. “He can make himself very small and humble to reach his goal,” said Petra de Koning, who wrote a 2020 biography on Rutte. That’s often taken to extremes: The Dutchman described Trump as “daddy” during last year’s NATO summit in The Hague, and lavished praise on him in messages leaked by the U.S. president. But in private, he is more forthright with Trump, according to a person familiar with Rutte’s thinking. “The relationship is trustful,” they said, but “if pushed, he will be direct.” Meanwhile, keeping all 32 NATO members aligned with every decision is “nearly impossible,” the person insisted. Although the deal to get Trump to back off his Greenland threats may have left a bad taste in Europe, NATO wasn’t destroyed. “The reality is, Rutte is delivering,” said a senior NATO diplomat. “Unlike some other leaders, he never doubted the alliance — I chalk it up to experience,” added a second senior alliance diplomat. But keeping Trump sweet risks emboldening the U.S. president to be still bolder in future. “Politicians around the world and in this country ignore Trump’s ego at their peril,” said Stephen Farnsworth, a political scientist at Virginia’s University of Mary Washington. That could also create issues for the alliance down the line. “For the benefit of the alliance, [he’s] sucking up” to Trump, the first NATO diplomat said. “But the question is, where does it end?” Esther Webber and Laura Kayali contributed to this report.

PARIS — The French government responded curtly to Mark Rutte after the NATO secretary-general said Europe could not defend itself without the U.S. “No, dear Mark Rutte. Europeans can and must take charge of their own security. Even the United States agrees. This is the European pillar of NATO,” said French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot. On Monday, answering a question from French far-right MEP Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Rutte told the European Parliament that the continent cannot defend itself without American support. He also pushed back against the idea of a European army — a concept revived recently by EU Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius — and said a “European pillar [of NATO] is a bit of an empty word.” Since U.S. President Donald Trump returned to power, however, his administration has insisted that Washington will be less involved in Europe’s security. A new U.S. National Defense Strategy published Friday evening said Europeans would have to take the lead against threats, arguing that Europe is economically and militarily capable of defending itself against Russia. Last year, Trump managed to convince European countries to boost their defense spending to 5 percent of GDP. Barrot wasn’t alone in France in pushing back against Rutte’s comments. Muriel Domenach, France’s former ambassador to NATO, posted on X that “with all due respect to the NATO Secretary General, this is not: the right question … the right answer: brandishing European weakness to secure the U.S. guarantee is an outdated approach and sends the wrong message to Russia.” Without mentioning Rutte specifically, French Armed Forces Minister Catherine Vautrin told French radio that “what we see today is the necessity of NATO’s European pillar.” The idea of making Europeans collectively stronger within the military alliance, first pitched by France a few years ago, is now endorsed by other countries including Germany. Rutte’s comments also contradicted the assessment of Finnish President Alexander Stubb, who said at Davos last week that Europeans could defend themselves.

BRUSSELS — Europe is incapable of defending itself without America, NATO chief Mark Rutte said on Monday, speaking just days after Donald Trump’s repeated threats to seize Greenland pushed the alliance to the brink of collapse. “If anyone thinks here … that the European Union or Europe as a whole can defend itself without the U.S., keep on dreaming,” he told lawmakers on the European Parliament’s defense and foreign affairs committees. “You can’t.” A “European pillar [of NATO] is a bit of an empty word,” Rutte said, arguing a European army would create “a lot of duplication” with the alliance. Moreover, Russian President Vladimir “Putin will love it,” he added. Rutte went on to insist that the EU allow Ukraine to spend part of the bloc’s upcoming €90 billion loan to Kyiv on weapons from the United States, despite a push by some member countries like France to spend the money on the bloc’s own military suppliers. The comments form part of a broader pattern in which Rutte has insisted that Europe has to keep channels open to the United States, and that the U.S. president remains loyal to the alliance. Washington still has a “total commitment” to the alliance’s collective defense, he said. “The U.S. needs NATO.” He also credited Trump for getting all NATO countries to boost their defense spending to at least 2 percent of GDP as of last year. “Do you really think that Spain and Italy and Belgium and Canada would have decided to move from 1.5 to 2 percent … without Trump. No way,” Rutte said. Without the U.S., defending Europe would cost a fortune, he added. “For Europe, if you really want to go it alone … forget that you can ever get there with 5 percent,” Rutte said, referencing a pledge by NATO allies to ramp up their defense spending to 5 percent of GDP by 2035. “It will be 10 percent,” he argued, and cost “billions and billions of euros” to replace America’s nuclear deterrent. The secretary-general’s reassurances that Trump is committed to NATO follow weeks of threats from the U.S. president suggesting he could take Greenland by force, and that he would levy fresh tariffs against European countries for deploying limited troops to the self-ruling Danish territory. Last week, Trump finally ruled out using force and U-turned on the tariffs after setting out a deal he said would give the U.S. more control over the giant Arctic island — although both Denmark and Greenland insist they will not compromise on sovereignty. Rutte, whom Trump credited with helping broker the alleged agreement, admitted he had “no mandate to negotiate” on behalf of Denmark. He also dismissed the idea that the talks on Greenland were linked to ensuring U.S. security guarantees for Ukraine. Mark Rutte warned that restricting Kyiv’s ability to make spending decisions would hamper its military efforts. | Maria Senovilla/EPA The EU should also not exclude U.S. weapons firms from the €90 billion loan for Ukraine, the former long-serving Dutch prime minister said. The “loan package … will make a massive difference to Ukraine’s security” Rutte told lawmakers. “But here I would really strongly urge you to ensure flexibility in how these funds can be spent and not to be overly restrictive with ‘buy EU’ caveats.” Under its proposal published this month, the European Commission said two-thirds of that cash would go toward Ukrainian military expenditures, with EU arms-makers prioritized as suppliers.  As a result, Kyiv can only tap the loan to buy non-European weapons if it has an “urgent need for a product and where no alternative [exists],” and if it has obtained approval from the EU executive and the bloc’s capitals. That came after France, backed by Greece and Cyprus, lobbied to bar non-EU countries like the U.S. from winning contracts financed with that money — a move opposed by countries like Germany and the Netherlands. Rutte warned that restricting Kyiv’s ability to make spending decisions would hamper its military efforts. “Europe is now building its defense industry … but it cannot at the moment provide … nearly enough of what Ukraine needs to defend itself today,” he said. “So as you take this loan forward, please I encourage you to keep Ukraine’s needs first in focus.” The Parliament last week agreed to fast-track the loan, designed to last until 2027, while EU capitals are in talks to broker a compromise on the legal proposal. Gregorio Sorgi contributed reporting.

The negotiations over Greenland’s future center around building up a larger NATO presence, thwarting adversaries and giving the United States sovereign claim to bits of the island —- a deal remarkably similar to an agreement that already exists. The hurried, initial plan — discussed this week between President Donald Trump and NATO officials at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland — has helped pull Trump back from his threat to either buy the Danish territory or take it by force. While neither Denmark nor Greenland has signed off on any proposal, it could represent the early contours of a deal, according to two European officials who were granted anonymity to discuss internal deliberations. But officials and allies question what has changed. The U.S. and Denmark already have a framework for Greenland: a 1951 treaty that permits some of what the new deal would likely include. That defense agreement allows the Pentagon to establish bases and send as many troops as it needs to the island after Copenhagen approves — which it has almost always done. “The treaty gives an enormous amount of flexibility to the United States to identify the security interests it thinks are necessary and to have a green light to go execute upon them,” said Iris Ferguson, who served as the Pentagon’s deputy assistant secretary for Arctic and global resilience under the Biden administration. “So on paper, the authorities are there.” The U.S. military based more than 10,000 troops in Greenland at the height of the Cold War. The world’s largest island served as a critical radar hub at the time, tracking Soviet missiles coming via the Atlantic. It also functioned as a site to test military outposts that could survive a nuclear strike. While the U.S. maintains a Space Force installation and powerful radar systems in Greenland, any expanded troop presence would require expensive upgrades to old facilities, as well as new housing and logistics facilities that would have to be built during a few brief months of warmer weather. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers this month announced it was undertaking a modernization of the runway at Pituffik Space Base that could cost as much as $25 million, an indication of the expense of building out new facilities in the harsh Arctic climate. And it’s not clear how NATO’s role would really shift. The alliance’s military chief said he only found out about the talks from news reports. Trump’s ambitions still seemed to stretch further. He called for the U.S. to have “total access” to the world’s largest island on Thursday at Davos — with no end date. Yet the legal standing of U.S. troops at Pittufik Space Base on the island’s northwest coast is already well-established under another treaty, NATO’s 1955 status of forces agreement. That pact allows American forces to pass in and out of Greenland freely, even if it doesn’t legally make the land U.S. soil. Since the late 1980s, the American presence at the base has been miniscule. Around 100 troops are there to focus on early warning and missile defense. “A lot of it is old wine in a new bottle,” said Jim Townsend, a former deputy assistant secretary of defense for NATO and Europe. “At all of our bases around the world, we negotiate sovereignty. It’s not something that we’re getting uniquely free from Greenland.” Denmark’s prime minister, Mette Frederiksen, is expected to meet with Rutte on Friday to discuss his meetings with Trump. But, as always, the wild card in the process remains the American president. Just as he quickly climbed down from threats to invade Greenland this week, he could just as easily turn back to those threats, allies conceded. They are bracing for more surprises. But allies are also past the point of playing down their frustration. Bjorn Soder, a Swedish parliamentarian who serves on the Swedish Defence Committee, said that while NATO has legitimate security concerns in the Arctic, the aggressive U.S. opening gambit is damaging relations within the alliance. “The United States is making a huge mistake by raising this Greenland topic,” he said. “We are very pro-America in our region, and what’s happening now is that voices that usually speak very [highly] of America are now changing position.” Danish political leaders have also pushed back on the early talks between NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and Trump, particularly since they left the Danes and Greenlanders out. “Only Denmark and Greenland themselves can make decisions on issues concerning Denmark and Greenland,” Denmark’s Frederiksen said Thursday in a statement. “We can negotiate on everything political; security, investments, economy. But we cannot negotiate on our sovereignty,” about Greenland. But some heads of state, including French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, expressed relief on Thursday at Davos that the temperature had cooled down. Frederiksen said that Copenhagen remained open to building on the 1951 agreement, although it wasn’t immediately clear what the next steps would be.

Mario Monti is a former prime minister of Italy and EU commissioner. Sylvie Goulard is vice president of the Institute for European Policymaking at Bocconi University and a former member of the European Parliament. In just the last few days, U.S. President Donald Trump has reiterated his determination to take over Greenland, announced a 10 percent tariff on NATO allies who disagree with his will and threatened a 200 percent tariff on French wine because French President Emmanuel Macron refused a seat on his “Board of Peace” meant to oversee Gaza’s reconstruction. But for once, the EU isn’t chasing behind events. Indeed, the Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI) that the EU may use in response to Trump’s repeated threats over Greenland is ready. Introduced in 2023 with the support of all 27 member countries, the ACI — although nicknamed the “bazooka” — is a framework for negotiation in situations where a third country seeks to pressure the EU or a member country into a particular choice by applying — or threatening to apply — measures affecting trade or investment. It enables the EU to deter coercion and, if necessary, respond to it. Before any action is implemented, the EU will first engage in consultations with the coercing third country — in this case, the U.S. And at any rate, whatever steps the bloc may eventually introduce will be compatible with international law. So, nothing as abrupt, unpredictable and arbitrary as some decisions the current U.S. administration has taken in relation to Europe. It is unlikely that when crafting this instrument, EU legislators had such a variety of coercion cases in mind — or that they would come from the American president. It is worth noting, however, that Trump’s actions and threats meet all five of the conditions set out in the ACI to determine if economic coercion is taking place. And having for once been prescient in endowing itself with a policy instrument in line with the times, it would be irresponsible and cowardly if the EU were to give up just because the coercion at hand is heavy and, unexpectedly, comes from the most powerful third country in the world — whether friend or foe, only history will tell. In line with the ACI, the countermeasures the EU may decide to take after consultations could involve tariffs — including suspending the ratification of last July’s trade agreement — restrictions on trade in services and certain aspects of intellectual property rights, or restrictions on foreign direct investment and public procurement. In view of the potential impact of current U.S. financial policy, it would also make sense for the bloc’s financial institutions to review their resilience with respect to  developments that might intervene in the U.S. financial landscape as a result of current economic policies and the relaxation of supervisory rules. The fact of the matter is, if the EU sidesteps the ACI and genuflects, Trump will feel encouraged to be even more disrespectful toward Europe than he already is. | Jacek Boczarski/Anadolu via Getty Images The regulation has another interesting feature: It can create links between the EU and other countries affected by the same or similar coercion. The idea being that when a dominant power tends to follow the principle of divide et impera, it may be wise for its designated prey, both within and outside the EU, to seek a coordinated response. The fact of the matter is, if the EU sidesteps the ACI and genuflects, Trump will feel encouraged to be even more disrespectful toward Europe than he already is; the EU will lose all credibility as a moderate but forceful player in a world of autocrats; and European citizens will be even more disillusioned with European institutions unwilling to protect them and their dignity. It could also make them more likely to seek protection from nationalist parties and governments — those that may well be against triggering the ACI in the first place, devout as they are to Trump’s hostility toward the EU. Many in Europe are, indeed, adopting an attitude of subordinate acceptance when it comes to Trump’s wishes, either because of ideological affinities or because they feel more comfortable being close to those in power — as political theorist Etienne de La Boétie stated in the 16th century, servitude is generally based on the “voluntary” acceptance of domination. Then there are those who are ready to align with Trump invoking Realpolitik — a group that seems to have forgotten that 80 years of peace since World War II provide a clear reading of reality in which peace and prosperity are better safeguarded through cooperation than the use of force. History’s judgement on that is clear. Finally, there are also EU leaders who, when siding with the U.S. over European interests, are driven by the intention of preserving the West’s or NATO’s unity. But while this may be a laudable intention, they’re falling blind to the fact that, in the last year, most of the breaches of this unity have come from the American side. To be sure, much of Europe’s reluctance to engage with Trump in a less subordinate manner has a lot to do with the continent’s weakness in defense and security. The U.S. is right in asking Europe to bear a higher proportion of that burden, and Europe does need to step up its preparedness. But the readiness of many to accept virtually any demand, or coercion, because the U.S. may otherwise withdraw its security umbrella from Ukraine or EU countries is no longer convincing. Much is made of the NATO Treaty’s Article 5 providing a collective security guarantee. However, the credibility of this guarantee relies on shared values and mutual respect. And with Trump constantly displaying his adversarial and contemptuous feelings toward Europe — seemingly more aligned with Russian President Vladimir Putin — how much can the continent really count on the U.S. umbrella in case of Russian intervention? What price should the EU be ready to pay, in terms of foregone sovereignty, to hold onto a guarantee that may no longer exist? Moreover, a Europe less acquiescent to Trump’s requests would be a strong signal to the many Americans who still believe in rule of law and the multilateral order. When Alexis de Tocqueville traveled to the U.S. in the 1830s to study the young democracy, he was impressed by the strength of its civil society and institutions — at the same time, he feared “the tyranny of the majority.” And one might wonder whether a system where the winner of an election can govern with no respect for the country’s institutions, violating the independence of its judicial system and central bank, is still a model of democracy. After World War II, the U.S. contributed generously to the relaunch of the European economy. It also massively influenced new democratic institutions in Germany and the nascent European Community. Maybe now it’s Europe’s turn to give something back and defend these values — and that means taking action. This is, after all, what the ACI was meant for.

It’s a good thing Donald Trump was reelected as U.S. president as NATO allies wouldn’t have boosted defense spending without him, the military alliance’s Secretary-General Mark Rutte said Wednesday. Rutte’s remarks in Davos come as Trump steps up his threats to seize Greenland from Denmark, in a move that would undermine the decades-long transatlantic alliance — perhaps fatally. “I’m not popular with you now because I’m defending Donald Trump, but I really believe you can be happy that he is there because he has forced us in Europe to step up, to face the consequences that we have to take care of more of our own defense,” Rutte said at a panel discussion titled “Can Europe defend itself?” at the World Economic Forum. According to Rutte, the big economies in Europe — including Spain, Italy and France — would have never agreed to allocate 2 percent of their GDP to defense if Trump had not become the U.S. president again. “No way, without Donald Trump this would never have happened. They’re all on 2 percent now,” Rutte said. “I’m absolutely convinced without Donald Trump you would not have taken those decisions and they are crucial, particularly for the European and the Canadian side of NATO to really grow up in the post-Cold War world.” Rutte’s own country, the Netherlands, which he led as prime minister for 14 years from 2010 to 2024, has been accused of underspending on defense on his watch. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has forced European countries to ramp up defense spending, while also preparing for a potential drawdown of American troops on the continent as Trump shifts America’s military priorities. “The Americans still have over 80,000 soldiers in Europe … including in Poland and Germany and so they are still heavily invested in European defense. And yes, they have to pivot more towards Asia. So it is only logical for them to expect us, Europe, to step up over time,” Rutte continued, adding that the nuclear umbrella is the ultimate guarantee. NATO allies reached a deal last summer on setting a new defense spending target of 5 percent of GDP by 2035. That demand was originally raised by Trump, who has repeatedly worried allies that he might walk away from the military alliance that underpins European security.