Jamie Dettmer is opinion editor and a foreign affairs columnist at POLITICO Europe. Over the past few days, Ukraine has been hitting Russia back as hard as it can with long-range drone strikes, and it has three objectives in mind: lifting Ukrainian spirits as the country suffers blackouts from Russia’s relentless air attacks; demonstrating to Western allies that it has plenty of fight left; and, finally, cajoling Moscow into being serious about peace negotiations and offering concessions. However, the latter is likely to be a forlorn endeavor. And at any rate, amid the ongoing diplomatic chaos, which negotiations are they aiming for? U.S. President Donald Trump’s negotiators have been talking up the prospects of a peace deal — or at least being closer to one than at any time since Russia’s invasion began nearly four years ago. But few in either Kyiv or Europe’s other capitals are persuaded the Kremlin is negotiating in good faith and wants a peace deal that will stick. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz certainly doesn’t think so. Last week, he argued that Russian President Vladimir Putin is just spinning things out, “clearly playing for time.” Many Ukrainian politicians are also of a similar mind, including Yehor Cherniev, deputy chairman of the Committee on National Security, Defense and Intelligence of Ukraine’s Rada: “We see all the signals they’re preparing to continue the war, increasing arms production, intensifying their strikes on our energy infrastructure,” he told POLITICO.  “When it comes to the talks, I think the Russians are doing as much as they can to avoid irritating Donald Trump, so he won’t impose more sanctions on them,” he added. Indeed, according to fresh calculations by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs’ Janis Kluge, Russia has increased its military spending by another 30 percent year-on-year, reaching a record $149 billion in the first nine months of 2025. The war effort is now eating up about 44 percent of all Russian federal tax revenue — a record high. And as social programs are gutted to keep up, some Western optimists believe that Russia’s anemic growing economy and the staggering cost of war mean Putin soon won’t have any realistic option but to strike an agreement. But predictions of economic ruin forcing Putin’s hand have been made before. And arguably, Russia’s war economy abruptly unwinding may pose greater political and social risks to his regime than continuing his war of attrition, as Russian beneficiaries — including major business groups, security services and military combatants — would suffer a serious loss of income while seeking to adapt to a postwar economy. The war also has the added bonus of justifying domestic political repression. War isn’t only a means but an end in itself for Putin, and patriotism can be a helpful tool in undermining dissent. Nonetheless, the introduction of Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner as a key negotiator is significant — he is “Trump’s closer” after all, and his full engagement suggests Washington does think it can clinch a deal with one last heave. Earlier this month, U.S. Special Envoy Gen. Keith Kellogg had indicated a deal was “really close,” with a final resolution hanging on just two key issues: the future of the Donbas and the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. The negotiations are in the “last 10 meters,” he said. But again, which negotiations? Those between Washington and Moscow? Or those between Washington and Kyiv and the leaders of Europe’s coalition of the willing? Either way, both have work to do if there is to be an end to the war. Putin has refused to negotiate with Kyiv and Europe directly, in effect dispatching Trump to wring out concessions from them. And no movement Trump’s negotiators secure seems to satisfy a Kremlin that’s adept at dangling the carrot — namely, a possible deal to burnish the U.S. president’s self-cherished reputation as a great dealmaker, getting him ever closer to that coveted Nobel Peace Prize. Of course, for Putin, it all has the added benefit of straining the Western alliance, exploiting the rifts between Washington and Europe and widening them. All the frenzied diplomacy underway now seems more about appeasing Trump and avoiding the blame for failed negotiations or for striking a deal that doesn’t stick — like the Minsk agreements. For example, longtime Putin opponent Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s New Eurasian Strategies Center believes the Russian president remains “convinced that Russia retains an advantage on the battlefield,” and therefore “sees no need to offer concessions.” “He prefers a combination of military action and diplomatic pressure — a tactic that, in the Kremlin’s view, the West is no longer able to resist. At the same time, any peace agreement that meets Russia’s conditions would set the stage for a renewed conflict. Ukraine’s ability to defend itself would be weakened as a result of the inevitable political crisis triggered by territorial concessions, and the transatlantic security system would be undermined. This would create an environment that is less predictable and more conducive to further Russian pressure,” they conclude. Indeed, the only deal that might satisfy Putin would be one that, in effect, represents Ukrainian capitulation — no NATO membership, a cap on the size of Ukraine’s postwar armed forces, the loss of all of the Donbas, recognition of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and no binding security guarantees. But this isn’t a deal Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy can ink — or if he did, it would throw Ukraine into existential political turmoil. “I don’t see the Parliament ever passing anything like that,” opposition lawmaker Oleksandra Ustinova told POLITICO. And if it did, “it might lead to a civil war” with many patriots who have fought, seeing it as a great betrayal, she added. “Everybody understands, and everybody supports Zelenskyy in doing what he’s doing in these negotiations because we understand if he gives up, we’re done for.” Not that she thinks he will. So, don’t expect any breakthroughs in the so-called peace talks this week. Putin will maintain his maximalist demands while sorrowfully suggesting a deal could be struck if only Zelenskyy would be realistic, while the Ukrainian leader and his European backers will do their best to counter. And they will all be performing to try and stay in Trump’s good books.  

PARIS — Far-right presidential hopeful Marine Le Pen has criticized France’s participation in European defense programs, arguing they’re a waste of money that should be spent on the country’s military instead. “[French President Emmanuel] Macron has consistently encouraged European institutions to interfere in our defense policy,” she told French lawmakers on Wednesday. Slamming the European Defence Fund and the European Peace Facility — two EU-level defense funding and coordination initiatives — and industrial defense projects between France and Germany, she said: “A great deal of public money has been wasted and precious years have been lost, for our manufacturers, for our armed forces and for the French people.” Le Pen was speaking in the National Assembly during a debate about boosting France’s defense budget. Some 411 MPs of the 522 lawmakers present voted in favor of increasing military expenditures — although the Greens and the Socialists warned they won’t let social spending suffer as a result. The far-right National Rally has an anti-EU agenda and is wary of defense industrial cooperation with Germany. Le Pen criticized Macron’s proposal this past summer to enter into a strategic dialogue with European countries on how France’s nuclear deterrent could contribute to Europe’s security. She also slammed the Future Air Combat System, a project to build a next-generation fighter jet with Germany and Spain, describing it as a “blatant failure.” She hinted she would axe the program if she won power in France’s next presidential elections, scheduled for 2027, along with another initiative to manufacture a next-generation battle tank with Berlin, known as the Main Ground Combat System. Le Pen claimed that France’s military planning law was contributing to EU funds that were, in turn, being spent on foreign defense contractors. “Cutting national defense budgets to create a European defense system actually means financing American, Korean or Israeli defense companies,” she said. Marine Le Pen criticized Emmanuel Macron’s proposal this past summer to enter into a strategic dialogue with European countries on how France’s nuclear deterrent could contribute to Europe’s security. | Pool Photo by Sebastien Bozon via Getty Images The French government has long pushed for Buy European clauses to be attached to the use of EU money, with mixed results. “[European Commission President Ursula] von der Leyen did not hear you, or perhaps did not listen to you, promising to purchase large quantities of American weapons in the unfair trade agreement with President [Donald] Trump,” Le Pen declared. In reality, the EU-U.S. trade deal agreed earlier this year contains no legally binding obligation to buy U.S. arms.

Iris Ferguson is a global adviser to Loom and a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for Arctic and global resilience. Ann Mettler is a distinguished visiting fellow at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy and a former director general of the European Commission. After much pressure, European leaders delayed a decision this week amid division on whether to tighten market access through a “Made in Europe” mandate and redouble efforts to reduce the bloc’s strategic dependencies — particularly on China. This decision may appear technocratic, but the hold-up signals its importance and reflects a larger strategic reality shared across the Atlantic. Security, industry and energy have all fused into a single race to control the systems that power modern economies and militaries. And increasingly, success will hinge on whether the U.S. and Europe can confront this reality together, starting with the one domain that’s shaping every other: energy. While traditional defense spending still grabs headlines, today’s battlefield is being reshaped just as profoundly by energy flows and critical inputs. Advanced batteries for drones, portable power for forward-deployed units and mineral supply chains for next-generation platforms — these all point to the simple truth that technological and operational superiority increasingly depends on who controls the next generation of energy systems. But as Europe and the U.S. look to maintain their edge, they must rethink not just how they produce and move energy, but how to secure the industrial base behind it. Energy sovereignty now sits at the center of our shared security, and in a world where adversaries can weaponize supply chains just as easily as airspace or sea lanes, the future will belong to those who build energy systems that are resilient and interoperable by design. The Pentagon already understands this. It has tested distributed power to shorten vulnerable fuel lines in war games across the Indo-Pacific; it has watched closely how mobile generation units keep the grid alive under Russian attack in Ukraine; and it is exploring ways to deliver energy without relying on exposed logistics via new research on solar power beaming. Each of these cases clearly demonstrates that strategic endurance now depends on energy agility and security. But currently, many of these systems depend on materials and manufacturing chains that are dominated by a strategic rival: From batteries and magnets to rare earth processing, China controls our critical inputs. This isn’t just an economic liability, it’s a national security vulnerability for both Europe and the U.S. We’re essentially building the infrastructure of the future with components that could be withheld, surveilled or compromised. That risk isn’t theoretical. China’s recent export controls on key minerals are already disrupting defense and energy manufacturers — a sharp reminder of how supply chain leverage can be a form of coercion, and of our reliance on a fragile ecosystem for the very technologies meant to make us more independent. So, how do we modernize our energy systems without deepening these unnecessary dependencies and build trusted interdependence among allies instead? The solution starts with a shift in mindset that must then translate into decisive policy action. Simply put, as a matter of urgency, energy and tech resilience must be treated as shared infrastructure, cutting across agencies, sectors and alliances. Defense procurement can be a catalyst here. For example, investing in dual-use technologies like advanced batteries, hardened micro-grids and distributed generation would serve both military needs and broader resilience. These aren’t just “green” tools — they’re strategic assets that improve mission effectiveness, while also insulating us from coercion. And done right, such investment can strengthen defense, accelerate innovation and also help drive down costs. Next, we need to build new coalitions for critical minerals, batteries, trusted manufacturing and cyber-secure infrastructure. Just as NATO was built for collective defense, we now need economic and technological alliances that ensure shared strategic autonomy. Both the upcoming White House initiative to strengthen the supply chain for artificial intelligence technology and the recently announced RESourceEU initiative to secure raw materials illustrate how partners are already beginning to rewire systems for resilience. Germany gave the bloc one such example by moving to reduce its reliance on Chinese-made wind components in favor of European suppliers. | Tan Kexing/Getty Images Finally, we must also address existing dependencies strategically and head-on. This means rethinking how and where we source key materials, including building out domestic and allied capacity in areas long neglected. Germany recently gave the bloc one such example by moving to reduce its reliance on Chinese-made wind components in favor of European suppliers. Moving forward, measures like this need EU-wide adoption. By contrast, in the U.S., strong bipartisan support for reducing reliance on China sits alongside proposals to halt domestic battery and renewable incentives, undercutting the very industries that enhance resilience and competitiveness. This is the crux of the matter. Ultimately, if Europe and the U.S. move in parallel rather than together, none of these efforts will succeed — and both will be strategically weaker as a result. The EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas recently warned that we must “act united” or risk being affected by Beijing’s actions — and she’s right. With a laser focus on interoperability and cost sharing, we could build systems that operate together in a shared market of close to 800 million people. The real challenge isn’t technological, it’s organizational. Whether it be Bretton Woods, NATO or the Marshall Plan, the West has strategically built together before, anchoring economic resilience with national defense. The difference today is that the lines between economic security, energy access and defense capability are fully blurred. Sustainable, agile energy is now part of deterrence, and long-term security depends on whether the U.S. and Europe can build energy systems that reinforce and secure one another. This is a generational opportunity for transatlantic alignment; a mutually reinforcing way to safeguard economic interests in the face of systemic competition. And to lead in this new era, we must design for it — together and intentionally. Or we risk forfeiting the very advantages our alliance was built to protect.

Sprawling defense legislation set for a vote as soon as this week would place new restrictions on reducing troop levels in Europe, a bipartisan rebuke of Trump administration moves that lawmakers fear would limit U.S. commitments on the continent. A just-released compromise version of the National Defense Authorization Act — which puts Congress’ stamp on Pentagon programs and policy each year — has been in the works for months. The measure stands in stark contrast to President Donald Trump’s new national security strategy, which sharply criticizes European allies and suggests the continent is in cultural decline. Lawmakers also endorsed a slight increase in the Pentagon budget with a price tag that is $8 billion more than Trump requested. And it would repeal decades-old Middle East war powers, a small win for lawmakers who’ve been fighting to reclaim a sliver of Congress’ war-declaring prerogatives. The final bill is the result of weeks of negotiations between House and Senate leadership in both parties, heads of the Armed Services panels and the White House. The measure had been slowed in recent days by talks on issues unrelated to defense, including a major Senate-backed housing package and greater scrutiny of U.S. investment in China. The defense bill typically passes with broad bipartisan support. Speaker Mike Johnson will likely need to win back some Democrats who opposed the House GOP’s hard-right initial bill in September. And the speaker will have to contend with fellow Republicans upset that their priorities weren’t included. But both House and Senate-passed defense bills reflected bipartisan concerns that the Trump administration would seek to significantly reduce the U.S. military footprint in Europe. Both measures included language that imposes requirements the Pentagon must meet before trimming military personnel levels on the continent below certain thresholds. Republicans, led by Senate Armed Services Chair Roger Wicker (R-Miss.) and House Armed Services Chair Mike Rogers (R-Ala.), broke with the Trump administration, arguing that troop reductions — such as a recent decision to remove a rotational Army brigade from Romania — would invite aggression from Russia. The final bill blocks the Pentagon from reducing the number of troops permanently stationed or deployed to Europe below 76,000 for longer than 45 days until Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and the head of U.S. European Command certify to Congress that doing so is in U.S. national security interests and that NATO allies were consulted. They would also need to provide assessments of that decision’s impact. The legislation applies the same conditions to restrict the U.S. from vacating the role of NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, a role that the U.S. officer who leads European Command chief has held simultaneously for decades. Negotiators included similar limitations on reducing the number of troops on the Korean Peninsula below 28,500, a provision originally approved by the Senate. Lawmakers agreed to a slight increase to the bill’s budget topline, reflecting some momentum on Capitol Hill for more military spending. The final agreement recommends an $8 billion hike to Trump’s $893 billion flat national defense budget, for a total of roughly $901 billion for the Pentagon, nuclear weapons development and other national security programs. The House-passed defense bill matched Trump’s budget request while the Senate bill proposed a $32 billion boost. Republicans separately approved a $150 billion multi-year boost for the Pentagon through their party-line tax cut and spending megabill earlier this year. Regardless of the signal the topline budget agreement sends, the defense policy bill does not allocate any money to the Pentagon. Lawmakers must still pass annual defense spending legislation to fund Pentagon programs. House Armed Services ranking member Adam Smith (D-Wash.) described the agreement as a “placeholder” that would allow lawmakers to finish the NDAA, while congressional appropriators continue their talks on a separate full-year Pentagon funding measure. A House Republican leadership aide who, like others, was granted anonymity to discuss details of the bill ahead of its release, said the revised topline is a “fiscally responsible increase that meets our defense needs.” The bill also would repeal a pair of old laws that authorize military action in the Middle East, including 2002 legislation that preceded the invasion of Iraq and the 1991 Gulf War. Those repeals were included in both the House and Senate defense bills as bipartisan support for scrubbing the old laws — which critics contend could be abused by a president — overcame opposition from some top Republicans. Repealing those decades-old measures is a win for critics of expansive presidential war powers, who argued the measures aren’t needed anymore. They point to the potential for abuses — citing Trump’s use of the 2002 Iraq authorization to partly justify a strike that killed Iranian military commander Qasem Soleimani in Iraq in 2020. A second House GOP leadership aide said the repeal of the two Iraq authorizations won’t impact Trump’s authority as commander-in-chief. But the repeal is ultimately a minor win for lawmakers seeking to reclaim congressional power. The 2001 post-9/11 authorization that undergirds much of the U.S. counterterrorism operations around the world remains on the books. And the bill is silent on Trump’s ongoing campaign against alleged drug smuggling vessels in the Caribbean. Many lawmakers — including some Republicans — have questioned the administration’s legal justification for the lethal strikes. The final bill also doesn’t include an expansion of coverage for in-vitro fertilization and other fertility services for military families under the Tricare health system. The provision, backed by Sen. Tammy Duckworth (D-Ill.), Rep. Sara Jacobs (D-Calif.) and others, was included in both Senate and House bills before it was dropped. Johnson reportedly was seeking to remove the provision, which similarly was left out of last year’s bill.

Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music * Amazon Music Im Kanzleramt herrscht Ausnahmezustand: Friedrich Merz sagt kurzfristig seine Norwegen-Reise ab und fliegt stattdessen nach Brüssel, um den entscheidenden Durchbruch bei den 165 Milliarden Euro eingefrorener russischer Vermögen zu erzwingen. Mit Bart De Wever und Ursula von der Leyen soll am Abend ein Deal vorbereitet werden, der Belgien endlich überzeugt und Europas Glaubwürdigkeit rettet. Der Druck ist enorm: Ohne Einigung vor dem EU-Gipfel am 18. Dezember droht nicht nur ein finanzielles Vakuum für die Ukraine, sondern eine historische Blamage der EU. Gleichzeitig wächst in europäischen Hauptstädten das Misstrauen gegenüber den USA. Ein vertrauliches Telefonat mit Wolodymyr Selenskyj, Merz, Emmanuel Macron und weiteren Staats- und Regierungschefs zeigt, wie groß die Sorge ist, dass Washington und Moskau hinter Europas Rücken über die Zukunft der Ukraine verhandeln könnten. Das Berlin Playbook als Podcast gibt es jeden Morgen ab 5 Uhr. Gordon Repinski und das POLITICO-Team liefern Politik zum Hören – kompakt, international, hintergründig. Für alle Hauptstadt-Profis: Der Berlin Playbook-Newsletter bietet jeden Morgen die wichtigsten Themen und Einordnungen. Jetzt kostenlos abonnieren. Mehr von Host und POLITICO Executive Editor Gordon Repinski: Instagram: @gordon.repinski | X: @GordonRepinski. Legal Notice (Belgium) POLITICO SRL Forme sociale: Société à Responsabilité Limitée Siège social: Rue De La Loi 62, 1040 Bruxelles Numéro d’entreprise: 0526.900.436 RPM Bruxelles info@politico.eu www.politico.eu

Canada has reached a final agreement to join the EU’s €150 billion Security Action for Europe program, two EU diplomats told POLITICO, marking the first time a third country will formally participate in the bloc’s flagship joint procurement initiative. The breakthrough follows months of technically complex negotiations and was communicated directly to ministers taking part in Monday’s Foreign Affairs Council; Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius informed delegations that negotiations with Ottawa had concluded.  Canada’s accession to the loan-for-weapons SAFE scheme gives Ottawa access to jointly financed defense projects and allows Canadian companies to bid into EU-supported joint procurement projects. For Brussels, securing a G7 partner strengthens the credibility of SAFE as it seeks to coordinate long-term weapons demand and ramp up Europe’s defense industrial base. Under SAFE, third countries can account for a maximum of 35 percent of the value of a weapons system paid for by the scheme; Canada will be able to have a larger share but it will have to pay a fee “commensurate with the benefits the Partner Country and its entities are expected to derive,” factoring in GDP, industrial competitiveness and the depth of cooperation with European manufacturers. Other issues tackled in negotiations covered conditions on intellectual property control and limits on non-EU inputs for sensitive systems including drones, missile-defense assets and strategic enablers. Similar talks with the U.K. broke down on Friday. The timing aligns with a major SAFE milestone: Kubilius announced on X that all 19 participating EU countries had submitted their spending plans that will be financed by low interest SAFE loans. He added that 15 members included support for Ukraine in their plans, involving “billions, not millions” — something the Commission has been keen to encourage. This article has been updated.

Romania’s Defense Minister Ionuț Moșteanu resigned Friday over false claims on his resume, marking the second time in recent weeks that a NATO country close to Russia has had to change its defense leadership. “Romania and Europe are under attack from Russia. Our national security must be defended at all costs. I do not want discussions about my education and the mistakes I made many years ago to distract those who are now leading the country from their difficult mission,” he said. According to local media, Moșteanu wrote in his official resume that he graduated from Athenaeum University in Bucharest even though he never attended the school. He also added the Faculty of Automation at the Polytechnic University of Bucharest to his CV despite dropping out. Moșteanu’s resignation just months into the job follows the ousting of Dovilė Šakalienė as Lithuania’s defense minister over a dispute about the Baltic country’s defense budget — and as Europe mulls how to respond to intensifying Russian hybrid attacks. Romania’s Economy Minister Radu Miruță is expected to take over the defense portfolio on an interim basis, the government said. Moșteanu’s departure comes with Romania facing regular Russian drone incursions. Bucharest is also 48 hours away from a deadline for EU countries to submit a plan to the European Commission for how they will spend money from the EU’s loans-for-weapons SAFE program. Romania is set to be the second-largest beneficiary of the scheme, in line for a €16.6 billion pot of cash.

Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music * Amazon Music In der Generaldebatte zeichnet Kanzler Friedrich Merz ein Bild globaler Unsicherheit und bittet um Geduld für komplexe Lösungen. Doch die Rede zeigt einen Regierungschef, der zunehmend erklären muss, warum zentrale Konflikte seiner Koalition ungelöst bleiben. Parallel sorgen brisante Trump-Leaks International für Aufsehen. Aufzeichnungen zweier Telefonate legen nahe, dass Trumps Unterhändler Steve Witkoff mit Kreml-Berater Juri Uschakow über mögliche Bedingungen eines Ukraine-Deals spricht. Für die Europäer wird das zur Gefahr: Sie sind außen vor, aber müssen am Ende jede Vereinbarung mittragen. Entscheidend wird nun die Debatte über die russischen Frozen Assets: Nur wenn es gelingt, diese Vermögen für einen milliardenschweren Ukraine-Kredit zu nutzen, hat Europa wieder Einfluss.  Das Berlin Playbook als Podcast gibt es jeden Morgen ab 5 Uhr. Gordon Repinski und das POLITICO-Team liefern Politik zum Hören – kompakt, international, hintergründig. Für alle Hauptstadt-Profis: Der Berlin Playbook-Newsletter bietet jeden Morgen die wichtigsten Themen und Einordnungen. Jetzt kostenlos abonnieren. Mehr von Host und POLITICO Executive Editor Gordon Repinski: Instagram: @gordon.repinski | X: @GordonRepinski. Legal Notice (Belgium) POLITICO SRL Forme sociale: Société à Responsabilité Limitée Siège social: Rue De La Loi 62, 1040 Bruxelles Numéro d’entreprise: 0526.900.436 RPM Bruxelles info@politico.eu www.politico.eu

LONDON — In the corridors of Whitehall, armies of officials are working out how best to spend billions of pounds earmarked for defense equipment. However, they have yet to inform the people it concerns the most: Britain’s arms industry. Many in the sector now fear that they’ve wasted their own money developing cutting-edge gear, as the government drags its feet on awarding contracts. U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s Labour Party has made a lot of noise on defense since entering government last year, plundering the aid budget to get defense spending to reach 2.6 percent of GDP by 2027 and a promise of 3.5 percent by 2035.  Alongside the funding boost, Starmer asked George Robertson, a Labour Party politician who is a former NATO secretary-general, to lead a major inquiry into how the U.K. would meet geopolitical threats, known as the Strategic Defence Review (SDR). The SDR was well received across the defense industry and viewed as a statement of intent from the government to devote effort and resources to building up the sector, with an emphasis on resilience and innovation.  Those good intentions were supposed to be followed by a series of complementary announcements — including a defense industrial strategy, the appointment of a new national armaments director, and a defense investment plan.  The industrial strategy and armaments director both arrived late, while the defense investment plan is still missing in action. It is now expected after this week’s fall budget.  Six months since the SDR, many in the industry complain that they haven’t received the certainty they need about where the British government — in many cases, their sole buyer —plans to invest.  Business owners say this is limiting their ability to make long-term plans and risks skilled workers departing for other jobs.  One representative of a mid-sized arms manufacturer — granted anonymity like others in this piece in order not to damage commercial prospects — said the problem was that the “big, bold” prescription of the SDR has given way to “repeated deferral, which always happens with delivery plans of this complexity.” INNOVATING IN THE DARK The war in Ukraine has radically reshaped other countries’ understanding of what’s needed on the battlefield, and the SDR set out a clear expectation that innovation would be rewarded. At September’s DSEI — an industry jamboree held in London — it was plain to see that private companies had stepped up to deliver prototypes for novel weaponry and other equipment, from modular robots that can deliver materiel to a battlefield and can also serve as stretchers, to AI that can read and predict threats on the ground in real time.  Defence Minister Luke Pollard said:  “We need to move to war-fighting readiness, and the SDR gave industry a very clear direction of how an increasing defense budget will be spent on new technologies and looking after our people better.” | John Keeble/Getty Images Much of that research and development was done by companies drawing on their own budgets or taking out loans as they wait for news of any specific government contracts.  For small suppliers in particular, the lag could prove existential.  One small manufacturer based in England said: “We are ready to go; we have built factories that could start making equipment tomorrow. But we can’t until an order is placed.” Armored vehicle maker Supacat has said that while its business is stable, suppliers will suffer without a predictable path ahead. “This is about the wider industry and our partners in the supply chain that have been contributing,” Toby Cox, the company’s head of sales, told POLITICO. “Our assumption is we don’t get more [orders], some of these companies will have a downturn in their orders.” KEEPING PRODUCTION LINES WARM Andrew Kinniburgh, defense director general of manufacturers association Make UK, echoed those concerns. While the industry “warmly welcomed” the Defence Ministry’s commitment to boost SME spending, he said, “the MOD must give companies certainty of long-term demand signals and purchase orders, allowing businesses to make the private investments needed in people, capital, and infrastructure.” Mike Armstrong, U.K. managing director of German defense firm Stark, which has recently opened a plant in Britain, added: “Giving the industry a clear view of future requirements is the fastest way to ensure the U.K. and its allies stay ahead.” Even some bigger companies that deal with the government on components for aircraft and submarines have privately complained about putting money into research and development without knowing what the end result will be.  An engineer working at one of Britain’s largest defense firms said: “We have multi-use items that could be for both military and civilian purposes, but cannot invest until we know what government strategy is. If it’s bad for us, it must be so hard for SMEs.” Mike Armstrong, U.K. managing director of German defense firm Stark, added: “Giving the industry a clear view of future requirements is the fastest way to ensure the U.K. and its allies stay ahead.” | Andrew Matthews/Getty Images The issue is not only one of investment, but also of skills. Supacat’s Cox said that keeping production lines warm matters because the workforce behind complex fabrications is fragile. “The U.K. has a skill shortage, particularly around engineering fabrication. If we’ve got an employee in that sector, we absolutely don’t want to lose them in another sector,” he said.  NOT LONG TO GO The Ministry of Defence said it appreciates the need for clarity. Defence Minister Luke Pollard, speaking to POLITICO at DSEI, said:  “We need to move to war-fighting readiness, and the SDR gave industry a very clear direction of how an increasing defense budget will be spent on new technologies and looking after our people better.” He argued there was “a neat synergy” between the “duty of government to keep the country safe and the first mission of this Labour government to grow the economy.” An MOD spokesperson said the defense investment plan would “offer clear, long-term capability requirements that enable industry to plan and unlocking private investment.” They pointed out that £250 million had already been allocated for “defense growth deals” alongside a £182 million skills package, and that the MOD had placed £31.7 billion in orders with U.K. industry in the last financial year. A government official rejected claims that ministers were moving too slowly, pointing to Defence Secretary John Healey’s recent announcement on new munitions factories as exactly the kind of demand signal that industry is looking for.  The director of a large U.K. defense producer said the signs from the government were “encouraging,” specifying that Chancellor Rachel Reeves, having agreed to more money for defense, “wants to see a return on investment.” While most of the country will be braced for Reeves’s big moment on Wednesday when she announces the national budget, one sector will have to hold its breath a little longer. Luke McGee contributed to this report.

A U.S. framework aimed at ending the war in Ukraine would leave the country more vulnerable to Russian aggression in the long term if it imposes limits on Kyiv’s armed forces, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen warned on Sunday. In a statement following talks on the sidelines of a G20 summit of major economies in South Africa, von der Leyen laid out a series of red lines in response to proposals being put forward by President Donald Trump’s White House. The American blueprint suggests Ukraine should make territorial concessions to Moscow, halve the size of its military and give Washington a 50 percent cut on profits from reconstruction. “Any credible and sustainable peace plan should first and foremost stop the killing and end the war, while not sowing the seeds for a future conflict,” von der Leyen said in the statement. According to the Commission president, the EU has three key criteria for any peace deal: “First, borders cannot be changed by force. Second, as a sovereign nation there cannot be limitations on Ukraine’s armed forces that would leave the country vulnerable to future attack and thereby also undermining European security,” she said. “Third, the centrality of the European Union in securing peace for Ukraine must be fully reflected,” said von der Leyen. “Ukraine must have the freedom and sovereign right to choose its own destiny. They have chosen a European destiny.” Allies have held crisis talks during the summit in South Africa and EU leaders are due to hold further discussions on Monday during a joint visit to Angola. European Council President António Costa has welcomed U.S. efforts to end the war but warned the current proposal is merely “a basis which will require additional work.” European capitals and Ukraine say they were effectively cut out of the development of the 28-point plan, which critics say rewards Russian aggression and would leave the door open to future invasions. Trump, meanwhile, appears to have backed away from a Thursday deadline for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to accept the terms of the U.S. proposal, saying the deal is “not my final offer.”