THE TRUMP EFFECT: HOW ONE MAN’S POLITICS REWIRED EUROPE From defense to trade to climate policy, Trump’s second term has shaken Europe’s foundations and forced leaders across the continent to adapt to a new transatlantic reality. By POLITICO Illustration by Jiyeun Kang for POLITICO Even with an ocean apart, there isn’t an industry in Europe that hasn’t been impacted by President Donald Trump’s actions.   Businesses and consumers alike are reeling from Trump’s tariffs. Climate advocates are reeling from the U.S. pulling out of major treaties, including the Paris Agreement. National budgets are being strained by Trump’s demand for more defense spending from European countries, while militaries are rebuilding their ranks and rethinking their strategies. Politicians are seizing the opportunity to stand out in this moment of crisis — some as protectors against Trump’s rampage and others as acolytes of MAGA-style populism.   It’s difficult to even track the impact of Trump 2.0 due to its scope, which is why POLITICO Magazine reached out to eight different thought leaders in Europe and the U.S. and asked: What’s the biggest way Trump has changed Europe? Answers varied from the demise of NATO to changing political identities to setbacks in climate action. A common sentiment, however, is that this is a sink-or-swim moment for Europe.   Here’s what they said.   ‘THE STRATEGIC HOLIDAY FOR EUROPE IS OVER’   Attila Demkó is a security policy analyst and writer based in Hungary.  Trump shattered the illusion that what many believe to be “common values” in Europe are, indeed, common. As it turns out, some of these mostly liberal, left and far-left values are not shared by all. The emphasis on multiculturalism, Wilkommenskultur (the German term for a welcoming culture, especially toward refugees), excessive focus on political correctness and gender issues has created a rift, and the deep divide is not only between Europe and the U.S., but also within Europe itself. While smaller European countries (such as Hungary or Slovakia) and non-mainstream parties (such as France’s National Rally, Poland’s PiS and Germany’s AfD) that oppose Wilkommenskultur, European federalism, and propose a Europe of nations, could be ignored and quarantined as fringe, Trump and the American right cannot be ignored. The rift is real and goes through right in the middle of most Western societies.  Trump also made it clear that the strategic holiday for Europe is over. The continent must pay full price for its own defense, and almost full price for the support for Ukraine. So far, in both cases, the bloc has talked the talk but hasn’t walked the walk. Trump may finally teach Europe to walk — or if it can’t walk, at least get it to stop dreaming and preaching.  ‘TRUMP MAY BE DOING EUROPE A FAVOR’  Kay Bailey Hutchison is a former U.S. Ambassador to NATO.  By challenging Europe to do more in its own defense, President Trump may be doing Europe a favor. If Europeans can adopt a plan to work together to provide military equipment and technology, they will emerge stronger. Increasing defense capabilities, with each country contributing, will also enable significant economic benefits.  Since World War II, Europe has depended on the U.S. for many security guarantees. Like previous American presidents — Republican and Democrat — President Trump has said it is time to make security responsibility more evenly divided among our allies. For maximum results, a more equal share of security must also produce interoperable assets. Organized by NATO, all willing allies and trusted partners could share in building and manufacturing equipment and hardware, while military training and increased exercises could prepare all NATO countries and trusted partners for joint defense when there are attacks of varying severity.   If Europe wisely uses the 5 percent of GDP it promised for defense priorities and works in concert with the U.S. and trusted allies, the world will be safer for those who seek freedom — and Europe will be regarded as a significant and reliable global leader.  ‘ONE OF THE STRONGEST ALLIANCES IN MODERN TIMES HAS WEAKENED’  Manfred Elsig is professor of international relations at the World Trade Institute of the University of Bern.   From an international relations perspective, the biggest way Trump has changed Europe is by destabilizing the U.S.–European partnership. Over the course of Trump’s two presidencies, the bloc has come to realize that the U.S. is no longer a reliable and close partner. Trump has eroded the most important political capital in the transatlantic cooperation: trust — the bedrock of the post-World War II partnership between the U.S. and Europe. The transregional security pact, with NATO at its core, has been badly weakened, denting Karl Deutsch’s infamous “security community” built on a shared sense of values and “we-ness.” And as a result, Europe must quickly rethink its security architecture and take more independent action.  Andrew Harnik/Getty Images Another area where we’re witnessing negative effects of the Trump presidency is the transatlantic marketplace. Primarily, the “trade community” is no longer a model of relatively free, fair and stable trade, and investment relations are leading to less growth and innovation. The secondary effects are trade diversion and growing pressures to protect markets from foreign competition. As a result, Europe will look elsewhere for trade partners that believe in a rules-based system in an attempt to de-risk and secure its supply chains. Economic security considerations will be increasingly mainstreamed into Europe’s international economic agenda, and more stimulus for bloc-building can be expected as well.   Finally, Europe’s investments in climate diplomacy and development cooperation are suffering a setback due to the U.S. “withdrawal doctrine” that started in 2016. The U.S. is either bypassing or selectively instrumentalizing international law, eroding global solidarity and sidelining the ambitious policies the planet urgently needs. As a result, Europe will struggle to find partners at the global level, and will continue on its path to act unilaterally on both climate and development policies.  ‘EUROPE NEEDS TO FACE THE REALITY OF BEING A RESOURCE-POOR CONTINENT’  Heather Grabbe is a senior fellow at Bruegel, a Brussels-based economic think tank.   When it comes to climate and the environment, Trump has distracted Europe from addressing its long-term resource vulnerabilities by creating panic over defense and trade. By creating crises around U.S. military support against Russian aggression and tariffs that hit the trade-dependent European economy, Trump has Europe’s leaders on the defensive and has forced them to focus on short-term security. Of course, these are important issues, but they divert political attention and public budgets away from measures that would bring longer-term security from climate impacts, volatile commodity markets and fragile supply chains by investing in climate resilience and enhancing resource productivity. Russian President Vladimir Putin may or may not invade Europe, and Trump may or may not help protect us, but climate change and resource insecurity will certainly damage the European economy.  Europe needs to face the reality of being a resource-poor continent, not only in fossil fuels but also in many other raw materials. And while Trump is trying to maintain Europe’s dependence on U.S. LNG as a replacement for Russian gas, that is the most expensive way of fuelling the economy it also slows down our transition to true energy security. Fossil fuel subsidies of more than €100 billion a year keep Europe vulnerable to the U.S. and other exporters, rather than spending taxpayers’ money on electrification, enlarging renewable energy production and building the grids and interconnectors that would bring us independence.  ‘THE TURBULENCE THE U.S. HAS UNLEASHED GLOBALLY HAS FORCED MANY EUROPEANS TO GROW UP’   Aliona Hlivco is founder and CEO of St. James’s Foreign Policy Group and a former Ukrainian politician.   The turbulence the U.S. has unleashed globally has forced many Europeans to grow up. They have finally realized they can no longer rest in the comfort of predictable trade deals or rely on the continent’s famously slow but steady regulatory machinery to keep things ticking along. Europe has woken up to the fact that it must shift from the pace and mentality of an aircraft carrier — vast, heavy and resourceful, lumbering toward a destination set out years in advance — to that of a maritime drone: fast, agile, nimble and capable of striking with precision at exactly the right place and time.   This new agility is felt unevenly across the continent but is unmistakably emerging. Germany is finally, and understandably, overcoming its post-World War II paralysis, reclaiming its role as an economic power as well as the “Eastern flank of NATO,” as one Bundeswehr official put it to me earlier this year. France, long a champion of “strategic autonomy,” has at last found the space to act on it. The Northern European nations — Scandinavia and the Baltics — are leading Europe’s defence innovation, rearmament and the next generation of deterrence, including by taking the lead in supporting Ukraine. They also built a sustainable and crucial bridge with the U.K. through the Joint Expeditionary Force — keeping Europe’s only nuclear power other than France closely tied to the continent after Brexit. Military strength may well become the decisive factor determining who leads Europe in the next 50 years, and in that regard, Poland is rapidly emerging as one of the EU’s most powerful members.   Europe is changing. It can no longer afford inertia or the illusion that statements can substitute for action. While Brussels continues to grapple with Washington’s unpredictability — possibly beyond Trump’s second term — European countries are seizing the moment. In an era of uncertain geopolitical multilateralism, they are playing their best cards, hoping to secure the breakthroughs that redefine Europe’s future.  ‘TRUMP’S PRESIDENCY HAS HAD A PROFOUND AND CONTRADICTORY EFFECT ON EUROPEAN POLITICAL IDENTITY’  Aleksandra Sojka is an associate professor of European politics at the University Carlos III in Madrid.   Trump’s biggest impact on Europe has been forcing the bloc to confront its strategic dependence on the U.S. His second presidency has fundamentally shaken the transatlantic alliance, exposing Europe’s critical weakness: the absence of genuine defense and security capabilities independent of American support. Trump’s wavering commitment to NATO and inconsistent support for Ukraine have made European rearmament an urgent necessity, shifting public opinion beyond the political elite. And this pressure has created remarkable convergence among European leaders, enabling decisions that were previously politically impossible — such as excluding defense spending from budget deficit calculations and allocating funds for coordinated European military procurement and shared defense initiatives. While disagreements remain over specific strategies, this fundamental shift is undeniable.  Kay Nietfeld/picture alliance via Getty Images Beyond defense, I consider Trump’s presidency has had a profound and contradictory effect on European political identity. His administration’s divergence from traditional European support for multilateralism as well as the EU’s positions on climate, trade and democratic norms have energized both sides of Europe’s political conflict. On the one hand, it has emboldened Euroskeptic and populist parties, providing external validation for their narratives on issues like national sovereignty and migration. On the other hand, it has triggered a sort of rally-around-the-flag effect with Europeans who increasingly value the achievements of integration and the protections of their democracies. Trust in EU institutions has recovered to pre-crisis levels, and support for bloc-wide policies stands at an historic high. In essence, Trump could inadvertently become a catalyst for European unity and self-reliance, even as he amplifies divisions within European societies.  ‘GIVING US A DIFFERENT DYSTOPIAN VISION OF ONE OF OUR POSSIBLE FUTURES’   Sunder Katwala is director of British Future.    Trump may have changed Europe most by giving us a different dystopian vision of one of our possible futures. Our leaders and the public alike lack a mental map or language for this unfamiliar world in which an American government appears to present a new threat from the West to our peace, prosperity and democracy. While that persists, it means hard work rethinking our assumptions across foreign policy and defense, trade and economics, technology and democracy.  The most significant impact may be political. The Trump administration’s effort to export this particular vision of conflict and polarization has turned America’s traditional soft power to attract into a deterrent, as it is a form of populism unpopular enough to create a boomerang effect. By reframing the choices on offer in our domestic politics, the challenge has catalyzed the search for antidotes among the anti-Trump majorities of our societies, and an appetite among citizens to coalesce around the most viable anti-Trumpist choices when choosing our own governments in these fragmented times.  ‘TRUMP’S ERA HAS HIGHLIGHTED THE EU’S SOVEREIGNTY CRISIS’   Thiemo Fetzer is an economist and professor at the University of Warwick and the University of Bonn.   Trump’s era has highlighted the EU’s sovereignty crisis, most visible in the digital and financial domains. Now is the time for Europe to choose how it will build out its economic future: Will it align with the U.S. or China, or is it capable of reimagining an even more ambitious but autonomous path forward?   By controlling key digital platforms and payment systems, the U.S. holds enormous power over global data and finance, being able to grant or deny access to entire countries or industries. This U.S. economic model — built on services, financialization, and energies like natural gas and crude oil — has powered innovation but also created deep inequality and social dysfunction. For Europe, aligning with this model promises access to capital and technology but risks dependence and division, as the U.S. may pit member states against one another. China offers an alternative model rooted in data sovereignty and a strong industrial base. Its strategy to electrify everything is an added bonus to addressing the shared climate crisis. Yet following Beijing’s path could weaken Europe’s manufacturing.   There is a third path, though: Europe can build its own economic and technological independence instead of choosing between Washington and Beijing. That would mean completing the single market so that goods, capital and digital services can move freely across borders — creating scale, cutting red tape and helping homegrown tech companies compete globally. A truly borderless European business environment would keep talent and investment within Europe, rather than letting it flow to the U.S. or Asia. Pooling defense resources could also make Europe stronger and more efficient, freeing up money and industrial capacity for new sectors such as clean energy and advanced manufacturing. Expanding the euro’s international role would also make Europe less dependent on the dollar and strengthen its financial influence abroad.   This path would tie Europe’s growth to its core values — dignity, privacy, data protection, accountability, and the rule of law — embedding them into its digital and economic systems. In doing so, Europe can continue work pragmatically with the U.S., China and others to set global rules. It is for Europeans to shape their own destiny. 

National Rally leader Jordan Bardella is insisting he doesn’t need help from U.S. President Donald Trump to shape France’s political future as his far-right party guns for the presidency in 2027. “I’m French, so I’m not happy with vassalage, and I don’t need a big brother like Trump to consider the fate of my country,” he said in an interview with The Telegraph published late Tuesday. Concern over potential U.S. involvement in European far-right politics has spiked since last week’s publication of America’s National Security Strategy, in which Washington advocates “cultivating resistance” to boost the nationalist surge in Europe. That puts Bardella in a tricky spot. Broadly he agrees with Trump’s anti-migrant vision, as mapped out in the strategy, but is wary of direct U.S. involvement in a country where polling suggests Trump is very unpopular. The National Rally is not directly embracing U.S. Republicans, as the Alternative for Germany (AfD) is doing. Bardella said he “shared [Trump’s] assessment for the most part” in an interview with the BBC’s Political Thinking podcast. “It is true that mass immigration and the laxity of our leaders … are today disrupting the power balance of European societies,” Bardella said. Bardella’s interview came during a trip to London in which he met Reform UK leader Nigel Farage, who once tied Bardella’s party to “prejudice and anti-Semitism.” “I think that Farage will be the next prime minister,” Bardella told the Telegraph, praising “a great patriot who has always defended the interests of Britain and the British people.”

Iris Ferguson is a global adviser to Loom and a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for Arctic and global resilience. Ann Mettler is a distinguished visiting fellow at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy and a former director general of the European Commission. After much pressure, European leaders delayed a decision this week amid division on whether to tighten market access through a “Made in Europe” mandate and redouble efforts to reduce the bloc’s strategic dependencies — particularly on China. This decision may appear technocratic, but the hold-up signals its importance and reflects a larger strategic reality shared across the Atlantic. Security, industry and energy have all fused into a single race to control the systems that power modern economies and militaries. And increasingly, success will hinge on whether the U.S. and Europe can confront this reality together, starting with the one domain that’s shaping every other: energy. While traditional defense spending still grabs headlines, today’s battlefield is being reshaped just as profoundly by energy flows and critical inputs. Advanced batteries for drones, portable power for forward-deployed units and mineral supply chains for next-generation platforms — these all point to the simple truth that technological and operational superiority increasingly depends on who controls the next generation of energy systems. But as Europe and the U.S. look to maintain their edge, they must rethink not just how they produce and move energy, but how to secure the industrial base behind it. Energy sovereignty now sits at the center of our shared security, and in a world where adversaries can weaponize supply chains just as easily as airspace or sea lanes, the future will belong to those who build energy systems that are resilient and interoperable by design. The Pentagon already understands this. It has tested distributed power to shorten vulnerable fuel lines in war games across the Indo-Pacific; it has watched closely how mobile generation units keep the grid alive under Russian attack in Ukraine; and it is exploring ways to deliver energy without relying on exposed logistics via new research on solar power beaming. Each of these cases clearly demonstrates that strategic endurance now depends on energy agility and security. But currently, many of these systems depend on materials and manufacturing chains that are dominated by a strategic rival: From batteries and magnets to rare earth processing, China controls our critical inputs. This isn’t just an economic liability, it’s a national security vulnerability for both Europe and the U.S. We’re essentially building the infrastructure of the future with components that could be withheld, surveilled or compromised. That risk isn’t theoretical. China’s recent export controls on key minerals are already disrupting defense and energy manufacturers — a sharp reminder of how supply chain leverage can be a form of coercion, and of our reliance on a fragile ecosystem for the very technologies meant to make us more independent. So, how do we modernize our energy systems without deepening these unnecessary dependencies and build trusted interdependence among allies instead? The solution starts with a shift in mindset that must then translate into decisive policy action. Simply put, as a matter of urgency, energy and tech resilience must be treated as shared infrastructure, cutting across agencies, sectors and alliances. Defense procurement can be a catalyst here. For example, investing in dual-use technologies like advanced batteries, hardened micro-grids and distributed generation would serve both military needs and broader resilience. These aren’t just “green” tools — they’re strategic assets that improve mission effectiveness, while also insulating us from coercion. And done right, such investment can strengthen defense, accelerate innovation and also help drive down costs. Next, we need to build new coalitions for critical minerals, batteries, trusted manufacturing and cyber-secure infrastructure. Just as NATO was built for collective defense, we now need economic and technological alliances that ensure shared strategic autonomy. Both the upcoming White House initiative to strengthen the supply chain for artificial intelligence technology and the recently announced RESourceEU initiative to secure raw materials illustrate how partners are already beginning to rewire systems for resilience. Germany gave the bloc one such example by moving to reduce its reliance on Chinese-made wind components in favor of European suppliers. | Tan Kexing/Getty Images Finally, we must also address existing dependencies strategically and head-on. This means rethinking how and where we source key materials, including building out domestic and allied capacity in areas long neglected. Germany recently gave the bloc one such example by moving to reduce its reliance on Chinese-made wind components in favor of European suppliers. Moving forward, measures like this need EU-wide adoption. By contrast, in the U.S., strong bipartisan support for reducing reliance on China sits alongside proposals to halt domestic battery and renewable incentives, undercutting the very industries that enhance resilience and competitiveness. This is the crux of the matter. Ultimately, if Europe and the U.S. move in parallel rather than together, none of these efforts will succeed — and both will be strategically weaker as a result. The EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas recently warned that we must “act united” or risk being affected by Beijing’s actions — and she’s right. With a laser focus on interoperability and cost sharing, we could build systems that operate together in a shared market of close to 800 million people. The real challenge isn’t technological, it’s organizational. Whether it be Bretton Woods, NATO or the Marshall Plan, the West has strategically built together before, anchoring economic resilience with national defense. The difference today is that the lines between economic security, energy access and defense capability are fully blurred. Sustainable, agile energy is now part of deterrence, and long-term security depends on whether the U.S. and Europe can build energy systems that reinforce and secure one another. This is a generational opportunity for transatlantic alignment; a mutually reinforcing way to safeguard economic interests in the face of systemic competition. And to lead in this new era, we must design for it — together and intentionally. Or we risk forfeiting the very advantages our alliance was built to protect.

Jamie Dettmer is opinion editor and a foreign affairs columnist at POLITICO Europe. “It must be a policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure,” said former U.S. President Harry Truman during a speech to Congress in 1947. The Truman Doctrine, as this approach became known, saw the defense of democracy abroad as of vital interest to the U.S. — but that’s not a view shared by President Donald Trump and his acolytes. If anyone had any doubts about this — or harbored any lingering hopes that Vice President JD Vance was speaking out of turn when he launched a blistering attack on Europe at the Munich Security Conference earlier this this year — then Washington’s new National Security Strategy (NSS) should settle the matter. All U.S. presidents release such a strategy early in their terms to outline their foreign policy thinking and priorities, which in turn shapes how the Pentagon’s budget is allocated. And with all 33 pages of this NSS, the world’s despots have much to celebrate, while democrats have plenty to be anxious about — especially in Europe. Fleshing out what the Trump administration means by “America First,” the new security strategy represents an emphatic break with Truman and the post-1945 order shaped by successive U.S. presidents. It is all about gaining a mercantilist advantage, and its guiding principle is might is right. Moving forward, Trump’s foreign policy won’t be “grounded in traditional, political ideology” but guided by “what works for America.” And apparently what works for America is to go easy on autocrats, whether theocratic or secular, and to turn on traditional allies in a startling familial betrayal. Of course, the hostility this NSS displays toward Europe shouldn’t come as a surprise — Trump’s top aides have barely disguised their contempt for the EU, while the president has said he believes the bloc was formed to “screw” the U.S. But that doesn’t dull the sting. Over the weekend, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas sought to present a brave face despite the excoriating language the NSS reserves for European allies, telling international leaders at the Doha Forum: “We haven’t always seen eye-to-eye on different topics. But the overall principle is still there: We are the biggest allies, and we should stick together.” But other seasoned European hands recognize that this NSS marks a significant departure from what has come before. “The only part of the world where the new security strategy sees any threat to democracy seems to be Europe. Bizarre,” said former Swedish Prime Minister and European Council on Foreign Relations co-chair Carl Bildt. He’s right. As Bildt noted, the NSS includes no mention, let alone criticism, of the authoritarian behavior of the “axis of autocracy” — China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. It also rejects interventionist approaches to autocracies or cajoling them to adopt “democratic or other social change that differs widely from their traditions and histories.” For example, the 2017 NSS framed China as a systemic global challenger in very hostile terms. “A geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order is taking place in the Indo-Pacific region,” that document noted. But the latest version contains no such language amid clear signs that Trump wants to deescalate tensions; the new paramount objective is to secure a “mutually advantageous economic relationship.” All should be well as long as China stays away from the Western Hemisphere, which is the preserve of the U.S. — although it must also ditch any idea of invading Taiwan. “Deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority” the NSS reads. Likewise, much to Moscow’s evident satisfaction, the document doesn’t even cast Russia as an adversary — in stark contrast with the 2017 strategy, which described it as a chief geopolitical rival. No wonder Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov welcomed the NSS as a “positive step” and “largely consistent” with Russia’s vision. “Overall, these messages certainly contrast with the approaches of previous administrations,” he purred. While Beijing and Moscow appear delighted with the NSS, the document reserves its harshest language and sharpest barbs for America’s traditional allies in Europe. “The core problem of the European continent, according to the NSS, is a neglect of ‘Western’ values (understood as nationalist conservative values) and a ‘loss of national identities’ due to immigration and ‘cratering birthrates,’” noted Liana Fix of the Council on Foreign Relations. “The alleged result is economic stagnation, military weakness and civilizational erasure.” The new strategy also lambasts America’s European allies for their alleged “anti-democratic” practices,accusing them of censorship and suppressing political opposition in a dilation of Vance’s Munich criticism. Ominously, the NSS talks about cultivating resistance within European nations by endorsing “patriotic” parties — a threat that caused much consternation when Vance made it, but is now laid out as the administration’s official policy. Regime change for Europe but not for autocracies is cause for great alarm. So how will Europe react? Flatter Trump as “daddy,” like NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte did in June? Pretend the U.S. administration isn’t serious, and muddle through while overlooking slights? Take the punishment and button up as it did over higher tariffs? Or toughen up, and get serious about strategic autonomy? Europe has once again been put on the spot to make some fundamental choices — and quickly. But doing anything quickly isn’t Europe’s strong point. Admittedly, that’s no easy task for a bloc that makes decisions by consensus in a process designed to be agonizingly slow. Nor will it be an easy road at the national level, with all 27 countries facing critical economic challenges and profound political divisions that Washington has been seeking to roil. With the assistance of Trump’s ideological bedfellows like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Slovakia’s Robert Fico, the impasse will only intensify in the coming months. Trump 2.0 is clearly a disorienting step change from the president’s first term — far more triumphalist, confident, uncompromisingly mercantilist; and determined to ignore guardrails; and more revolutionary in how it implements its “America First” agenda. The NSS just makes this clearer, and the howls of disapproval from critics will merely embolden an administration that sees protest as evidence it’s on the right track. Europe’s leaders have had plenty of warnings, but apart from eye-rolling, hand-wringing and wishful thinking they failed to agree on a plan. However, trying to ride things out isn’t going to work this time around — and efforts to foist a very unfavorable “peace” deal on Ukraine may finally the trigger the great unraveling of the Western alliance. The bloc’s options are stark, to be sure. Whether it kowtows or pushes back, it’s going to cost Europe one way or another.

John Kampfner is a British author, broadcaster and commentator. His latest book “In Search of Berlin” is published by Atlantic. He is a regular POLITICO columnist. When it comes to the war in Ukraine, predictions don’t last long. One minute U.S. President Donald Trump’s acting like his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin’s emissary, the next he’s giving Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy a reasonable hearing, and then it’s back again to the Kremlin camp. With the U.S. administration increasingly taking on the role of unreliable broker over a staunch ally, Europe is in a parlous position. And what has struck me most during a series of security briefings and conferences I’ve attended in Berlin and elsewhere this autumn, is the extent of the alarm. Yet, much of the time, this remains hidden behind closed doors. One of the few crumbs of comfort is that the E3 nations of Germany, France and Britain are seeking to confront this cold reality in unison. After the trauma of Brexit, and all the bickering between former German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and French President Emmanuel Macron in recent years, the mood has changed — because it had to. If Europe is to survive a future attack by Russia — and that is the kind of language being used — its big players must behave in a way they haven’t done before. They must be joined at the hip. As more than a dozen officials have made clear in a series of discussions, the cost of inaction would be far greater than the cost of supporting Ukraine has been so far. Not only would Putin be emboldened to go even further, Europe would also be engulfed by a wave of Ukrainian refugees far greater than anything experienced before. And this realignment was visible amid the pomp and circumstance of German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s state visit to the U.K. last week, as both he and King Charles affirmed what they described as a deep bond between the two countries — one that’s been reinforced by the shared threat of Russian expansionism. Meanwhile, the real business taking place at the government level is intense. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz have developed a genuine affinity, stemming from a shared view of current foreign-policy perils and their domestic-policy troubles. A British prime minister of the center-left and German chancellor of the center-right are finding common cause in their double adversity. The loss of the U.S. as a friend in need is what’s forcing this realignment for both countries. Of course, neither publicly dares admit the situation is as bad as it is, but the optics say everything that needs to be said. Just compare Trump’s state visit in September — with its high security, taut smiles and desperate obsequies by his hosts – and the relaxed conviviality of Steinmeier’s. And dominating everything is security — though it’s less a “coalition of the willing” and more a “coalition of the surrounded.” Or, as one German security official, granted anonymity to speak freely, explained: “If the Americans are now acting as mediators between Russia and Europe, they no longer see themselves as partners within NATO.” In practical terms, the U.S. is still the driving force behind the alliance, notionally at least. As another German military figure, also granted anonymity to express their views, put it: “The harsh truth is that Europe’s readiness level to combat any Russian aggression doesn’t yet exist. Until that time, we are reliant on the U.S. to act as a backstop.” But that penny should have dropped last February, when U.S. Vice President JD Vance dropped his various bombshells at the Munich Security Conference, attacking European democracies, praising the far-right Alternative for Germany party and serving notice that the U.S. no longer felt beholden to past allegiances. The real surprise is that anyone’s been surprised by the Trump administration’s actions since then. Even now, some are continuing to cling to the hope that this isn’t the united view in Washington, and that others within the administration still wield a certain influence. This isn’t how security planners in Germany or the U.K. see things, but it seems many politicians — and much of the public — are yet to be convinced of just how serious the situation has become. One minute U.S. President Donald Trump’s acting like his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin’s emissary, the next he’s giving Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy a reasonable hearing. | Pool Photo by Will Oliver via EPA Their alarm will have been reinforced by the second Trump administration’s first National Security Strategy. Published only a few days ago, it condemns many of the liberal values underpinning European democracy, while praising the nativist, nationalist rhetoric of the far-right — and implicitly of Putin.  Previously, the dominant narrative around Europe was about German reluctance, whether brought about by postwar guilt and pacificism or complacency. But while that has been replaced by a new determination, exactly how deeply is it entrenched? The commitment across NATO to increase defense spending to 5 percent of national GDP — 1.5 percent of which can be spent on “critical infrastructure” — certainly allows for much budgetary dexterity. But Berlin’s borrowing power gives it a freedom its neighbors can only envy. Britain’s financial travails are considerably more acute, and for all his tough talk, several defense contractors suspect Starmer is going slow on defense orders. As it stands, Germany is expected to spend €153 billion a year on defense by 2029. France, by comparison, plans to reach about €80 billion by 2030, and the U.K. currently spends £60 billion — a figure set to rise to £87 billion by 2030 — but looking at current predictions, will only hit its 3.5 percent target in 2035. For the governments in London and Paris, budgets are so tight and public service spending requirements so great — not to mention debt interest payments — the push-and-pull with security needs will only become more intense. And while opinion polls vary from country to country and depending on how questions are phrased, the growing concern among many defense officials is that if Ukraine is pressured enough to accept some form of Trump-Putin dirty deal, public support for military spending will decrease. “Job done” will be the sentiment — except, of course, it won’t be. For Putin, it can’t be. The Russian leader has tied his political survival, his power infrastructure and his country’s economy to the notion of an encircling Western “threat.” Hence his recent remarks about Russia being “ready” for war if Europe wants to start one — he simply can’t afford to stop invoking threats. But the original 28-point plan for Ukraine — which the U.S. initially denied came directly from the Kremlin — represents Europe’s worst nightmare. And if a spurious “peace” is imposed by any deal approximating that one, Germany, the U.K., France and their other European allies, including Poland, Finland, the Baltics, Nordics and (more cautiously) Italy, will know they’re out on their own. It would mark the return of big-power politics, a Yalta 2.0. It would enshrine NATO’s de-Americanization, a structural incapacity for Ukraine to defend itself, and confirm that, as far as the U.S. is concerned, Russia enjoys a veto on European security. “We say it’s existential, but we don’t yet act as if it is,” said one British defense official, speaking on condition of anonymity. The task for Merz, Starmer and Macron is then to accept — and admit to their publics — that they only have each other to rely on.

Europe’s far-right firebrands are rushing to hitch their fortunes to Washington’s new crusade against Brussels. Senior U.S. government officials, including Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, have launched a raft of criticism against what they call EU “censorship” and an “attack” of U.S. tech companies following a €120 million fine from the European Commission on social media platform X. The fine is for breaching EU transparency obligations under the Digital Services Act, the bloc’s content moderation rule book. “The Commission’s attack on X says it all,” Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán said on X on Saturday. “When the Brusselian overlords cannot win the debate, they reach for the fines. Europe needs free speech, not unelected bureaucrats deciding what we can read or say,” he said. “Hats off to Elon Musk for holding the line,” Orbán added. Tech mogul Musk said his response to the penalty would target the EU officials who imposed it.  “The European Commission appreciates censorship & chat control of its citizens. They want to silence critical voices by restricting freedom of speech,” echoed far-right Alternative for Germany leader Alice Weidel. Three right-wing to far-right parties in the EU are pushing to stop and backtrack the integration process of European countries — the European Conservatives and Reformists, the Patriots for Europe, and the Europe of Sovereign Nations. Together they hold 191 out of 720 seats in the European Parliament. The parties’ lawmakers are calling for a range of proposals — from shifting competences from the European to the national level, to dismantling the EU altogether. They defend the primacy of national interests over common European cooperation. Since Donald Trump’s reelection, they have portrayed themselves as the key transatlantic link, mirroring the U.S. president’s political campaigning in Europe, such as pushing for a “Make Europe Great Again” movement. The fresh U.S. criticism of EU institutions has come in handy to amplify their political agendas. “Patriots for Europe will fight to dismantle this censorship regime,” the party said on X. The ECR group — political home to Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni — issued a statement questioning the enforcement of the DSA following the U.S. criticism. “A digital law that lacks legal certainty risks becoming an instrument of political discretion,” ECR co-chairman Nicola Procaccini said on Saturday after the U.S. backlash. The group supported the DSA when it passed through the Parliament, having said in the past the law would “protect freedom of expression, increase trust in online services and contribute to an open digital economy in Europe.”

LISBON — Ursula von der Leyen’s European Commission should continue to enforce its digital rules with an iron fist despite the outcry from U.S. officials and big tech moguls, co-chair of the Greens in the European Parliament Bas Eickhout told POLITICO. As Green politicians from across Europe gather in the Portuguese capital for their annual congress, U.S. top officials are blasting the EU for imposing a penalty on social media platform X for breaching its transparency obligations under the EU’s Digital Services Act, the bloc’s content moderation rule book. “They should just implement the law, which means they need to be tougher,” Eickhout told POLITICO on the sidelines of the event. He argued that the fine of €120 million is “nothing” for billionaire Elon Musk and that the EU executive should go further. The Commission needs to “make clear that we should be proud of our policies … we are the only ones fighting American Big Tech,” he said, adding that tech companies are “killing freedom of speech in Europe.” The Greens have in the past denounced Meta and X over their content moderation policies, arguing these platforms amplify “disinformation” and “extremism” and interfere in European electoral processes. Meta and X did not reply to a request for comment by the time of publication. Meta has “introduced changes to our content reporting options, appeals process and data access tools since the DSA came into force and are confident that these solutions match what is required under the law in the EU,” a Meta spokesperson said at the end of October. Tech mogul Musk said his response to the penalty would target the EU officials who imposed it. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the fine is “an attack on all American tech platforms and the American people by foreign governments,” and accused the move of “censorship.” “It’s not good when our former allies in Washington are now working hand in glove with Big Tech,” blasted European Green Party chair Ciarán Cuffe at the opening of the congress in Lisbon. Eickhout, whose party GreenLeft-Labor alliance is in negotiations to enter government in the Netherlands, said “we should pick on this battle and stand strong.” The Commission’s decision to fine X under the EU’s Digital Services Act is over transparency concerns. The Commission said the design of X’s blue checkmark is “deceptive,” after it was changed from user verification into a paid feature. The EU’s executive also said X’s advertising library lacks transparency and that it fails to provide access to public data for researchers as required by the law.  Eickhout lamented that European governments are slow in condemning the U.S. moves against the EU, and argued that with its recent national security strategy, the Americans have made clear their objective is to divide Europe from within by fueling far-right parties. “Some of the leaders like [French President Emmanuel] Macron are still desperately trying to say that that the United States are our ally,” Eickhout said. “I want to see urgency on how Europe is going to take its own path and not rely on the U.S. anymore, because it’s clear we cannot.”

Steven Everts is the director of the EU Institute for Security Studies The intense diplomatic maneuvering to shape an endgame to the war in Ukraine has revealed a troubling reality: Even when it comes to its own security, the EU struggles to be a central player. The ongoing negotiations over Ukraine’s future — a conflict European leaders routinely describe as “existential” — are proceeding with minimal input from the bloc. And while others set the tone and direction, Europe remains reactive: managing the fallout, limiting the damage and hoping to recuperate its influence. This marginalization isn’t the result of a single decision or down to one person — no matter how consequential U.S. President Donald Trump may be. Rather, it reflects a deeper vulnerability and an unsettling pattern. Anyone looking at Europe’s choices in recent months can see a psychology of weakness. It paints the picture of a continent lacking courage, unable to take decisive action even when it comes to its core interests and when policy alternatives are within reach. Europe is losing confidence, sinking into fatalism and justifying its passivity with the soothing thought that it has no real choice, as its cards are weak. Besides, in the long run, things will work out. Just wait for the U.S. midterms. But will they? And can Europe afford to wait? Ukraine certainly cannot. Simply commenting on others’ peace plan drafts in some form of “track-changes diplomacy” isn’t enough. Decisions are needed, and they’re needed now. Europe is a continent of rich countries with ample capabilities. But while its leaders insist Ukraine’s security and success are essential to Europe’s own security and survival, its actual military assistance to Kyiv has declined in recent months. On the financial end, Europe is flunking the test it set for itself. Ukraine requires approximately €70 billion annually — and yes, this is a large sum, but it amounts to only 0.35 percent of the EU’s GDP. This is within Europe’s collective capacity. Yet for months now, member countries have been unable to agree on the mechanisms for using frozen Russian assets or suitable alternatives that could keep Ukraine afloat. Instead, we’ve seen dithering and the triumph of small thinking. It’s also rather telling that the U.S. attempt to simply impose how these assets are to be used, with 50 percent of the profits going to Washington instead of Kyiv, is finally jolting Europe into action. Regrettably, Europe’s psychology of weakness is equally visible in the economic domain, as the EU-U.S. trade agreement struck this July was a classic case of how frailty can masquerade as “pragmatism.” Brussels had the tools to respond to Washington’s tariffs and coercive measures, including counter-tariffs and its anti-coercion instrument. But under pressure from member countries fearful of broader U.S. disengagement from European security and Ukraine, it chose not to use them. The result was a one-sided “deal” with a 15 percent unilateral tariff, which breaks the World Trade Organization’s rules and obliges Europe to make energy purchases and investments in the U.S. worth hundreds of billions of dollars. Even worse, the deal didn’t produce the stability advertised as its main benefit. Washington has since designated Europe’s energy transition measures and tech regulations as “trade barriers” and “taxes on U.S. companies,” signaling that further retaliatory steps may follow. Just last week, the U.S. upped the pressure once more, when its trade representatives met EU ministers and openly challenged existing EU rules on tech. Regrettably, Europe’s psychology of weakness is equally visible in the economic domain, as the EU-U.S. trade agreement struck this July was a classic case of how frailty can masquerade as “pragmatism.”. | Thierry Monasse/Getty Images More than on defense, the EU is meant to be an economic and regulatory superpower. But despite decades of leveraging its economic weight for political purposes, the EU is now adrift, faced with a widening transatlantic power play over trade and technology. Similar patterns of retreat mark the EU’s actions in other areas as well. As Russia escalates its hybrid warfare operations against the bloc’s critical infrastructure, Europe’s response remains hesitant. As China dramatically weaponizes its export controls on critical mineral exports, Europe continues to respond late and without clear coordination. And in the Middle East, despite being one of the leading donors to Gaza, Europe is peripheral in shaping any ceasefire and reconstruction plans. In crisis after crisis, Europe’s role is not only small but shrinking still. The question is, when will Europeans decide they’ve had enough of this weakness and irrelevance? This is, above all, a matter of psychology, of believing in one’s capabilities, including the capacity to say “no.” But this is only possible if Europe invests in its ability to take major decisions together — through joint political authority and financial resources. There is no way out of this without investing in a stronger EU. This basic argument has been made a hundred times before. But while insisting on “more political will” among member countries is, indeed, right, it’s also too simplistic. We have to acknowledge that building a stronger EU also means having to give somethings up. But in return we will gain something essential: The ability to stand firm in a world of Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping. This is both necessary and priceless.

KYIV — After a week of pressure on Ukraine to agree to the U.S.’s contentious proposal to end Russia’s war on the country, Washington and Kyiv said talks in Geneva generated an “updated and refined peace framework” for additional negotiations. The original 28-point plan from the Trump administration alarmed Ukraine and its European allies, as did the aggressive deadline set by the White House. Sunday’s discussions in Switzerland eased some of those concerns, but more work is needed, both sides said. “Much is changing,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in a statement late Sunday. “It is important that we have dialogue with American representatives, and there are signals that President Trump’s team is hearing us,” he added. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio was also optimistic about the Geneva discussions and the prospects going forward. “I don’t want to declare victory or finality here. There’s still some work to be done,” Rubio told reporters after Sunday’s meeting. “But we are much further ahead today than we were when we began this morning and where we were a week ago for certain.” U.S. President Donald Trump, who once again Sunday decried what he called “zero gratitude” from Ukraine, was pleased with the progress made in Geneva, Rubio said. “The discussions showed meaningful progress toward aligning positions and identifying clear next steps,” Washington and Kyiv said in a joint statement, which noted that Ukraine “reaffirmed its gratitude” to the U.S. and Trump. “They reaffirmed that any future agreement must fully uphold Ukraine’s sovereignty and deliver a sustainable and just peace.” European Council President António Costa on Sunday called a special meeting of EU leaders about Ukraine on the sidelines of an EU-Africa Summit that starts Monday in Angola.  Even though Trump’s team said the plan was developed with input from both Ukraine and Russia, Kyiv was shown the plan only once its initial framework was set. Trump also set a deadline of this Thursday for Ukraine to agree, threatening to cut off aid and intelligence to Kyiv. The EU was sidelined from the initial development of the peace plan, which featured Europe giving $100 billion of Russia’s frozen assets toward Ukraine’s restoration, with the territories most in need of restoration remaining under Russia’s de facto rule. The plan also foresees the U.S. getting 50 percent of profits from the reconstruction efforts. Neither side gave details of how the framework changed as a result of Sunday’s talks. “There were items that we were discussing as part of the original 28, or it evolved,” Rubio said, calling the plan “a living, breathing document.” “Every day with input it changes,” Rubio said. “You get a pretty good sense of what the priorities and the red lines and the important issues are for both sides.” WHAT’S NEXT Ukraine and the U.S. agreed to continue intensive work on proposals in the coming days, in close contact with their European partners as the process advances. “It is crucial that every joint action with our partners is throughly thought out,” Zelenskyy said in a post on X. “We are coordinating very well and I appreciate the advice and perspectives we are sharing,” he said. “The negotiations were a step forward, but there are still major issues which remain to be resolved,” Finnish President Alexander Stubb said in a post on X on Monday, after talking with Zelenskyy. “Any decision falling in the remit of the EU or NATO will be discussed and decided by the EU and NATO members in a separate track,” Stubb added. Washington still wants to get the peace plan finalized as soon as possible, but is less firm about a Thanksgiving deadline. “Obviously, we’d love it to be Thursday,” Rubio said, adding: “Whether it’s Thursday, whether it’s Friday, whether it’s Wednesday, whether it’s Monday of the following week, we want it to be soon.” “Our goal is to end this war as soon as possible, but we need a little more time,” Rubio said. Work continues on technical levels, with the U.S. expecting a handful of answers and suggestions from Kyiv in the next 24 hours. “Diplomacy has been activated, and that’s good,” Zelenskyy said. “First priority is a lasting peace, guaranteed security, respect for all who gave up their lives to protect Ukraine from Russia,” he said, adding that Monday will be an active day for negotiators. “We are protecting Ukraine’s interests,” Zelenskyy said.

U.S. President Donald Trump appeared to back away Saturday evening from demanding that Kyiv accept a controversial proposal that would see Ukraine give up territory to Russia, slash its military and give the United States a major cut of reconstruction profits. Speaking to reporters outside the White House, Trump was asked whether the 28-point blueprint developed by special envoy Steve Witkoff was the administration’s final offer for Kyiv. “No — not my final offer,” Trump replied. “I’d like to get to peace; it should have happened a long time ago … one way or another we have to get it ended.” If Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who has expressed grave concerns over the U.S. proposals, does not accept it, “then he can continue to fight his little heart out,” Trump said. The American president had previously given Kyiv until Thanksgiving — this Thursday — to agree. European allies held crisis talks the same day after details of the plan first came to light, amid fears it could constitute another ultimatum from the U.S. administration and was developed bilaterally with Russia rather than in partnership with European capitals or Ukraine. After discussions on the sidelines of a G20 meeting of major economies in South Africa on Saturday, European Council President António Costa welcomed American efforts to secure peace but said it “is a basis which will require additional work.” An EU official, granted anonymity to speak freely, underlined that “the U.S. draft of the 28-point plan includes important elements that will be essential for a just and lasting peace. We are ready to engage on that basis in order to ensure that a future peace is sustainable. But further work is required.” Costa’s chief of staff, Pedro Lourtie, and top European Commission official Bjoern Seibert are expected to take part in talks brokered by the Americans in the coming days for further negotiations and the bloc has reiterated its continued support for Ukraine. Only one EU leader — Hungary’s Kremlin-friendly Prime Minister Viktor Orbán — has unconditionally backed Witkoff’s plan, which critics say makes disproportionate concessions to Russia. Privately, other diplomats cautioned that the message from the White House was prone to changing suddenly, given Trump has frequently cycled between threatening to cut support for Ukraine and imposing hefty new sanctions on Russia to help end the war. “Ultimately, each time, our support for Ukraine has continued,” said one envoy.