BRUSSELS — The EU is limiting the flow of confidential material to Hungary and leaders are meeting in smaller groups — as Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk warned of long-standing suspicions Viktor Orbán’s government is sharing information with Russia. But there will not be any formal EU response to a fresh set of allegations because of the possible impact on the Hungarian election on April 12, according to five European diplomats and officials who told POLITICO they were concerned about the risk of Budapest leaking sensitive information to the Kremlin. “The news that Orbán’s people inform Moscow about EU Council meetings in every detail shouldn’t come as a surprise to anyone,” Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who has backed Hungarian opposition leader Péter Magyar in the election, wrote on X on Sunday. “We’ve had our suspicions about that for a long time. That’s one reason why I take the floor only when strictly necessary and say just as much as necessary.” In a report on Saturday the Washington Post said that Orbán’s government maintained close contacts with Moscow throughout the war in Ukraine, and Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó used breaks during meetings with other member countries to update his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov. Worries about Hungary sending information directly to Moscow were behind the rise of breakout formats with like-minded leaders, instead of holding meetings with all 27 EU members, said one of the European government officials, who, like others in this article, was granted anonymity to speak freely about sensitive matters. “Overall the less-than-loyal member states are the main reason why most of relevant European diplomacy is now happening in different smaller formats — E3, E4, E7, E8, Weimar, NB8, JEF, etc,” the official said.  The numerals refer to the number of European leaders in the group. The Weimar alliance comprises France, Germany and Poland. NB8 is the eight countries in the Nordics and Baltics. JEF is the Joint Expeditionary Force of 10 northern European nations. ‘FAKE NEWS’ Former Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis, who frequently attended Council meetings where Szijjártó was present, told POLITICO he was warned as early as 2024 that the Hungarian side could be passing on information to Russia, and that he and his counterparts had limited the information they shared when he was present. Even ahead of a critical NATO summit in Vilnius in 2023, envoys moved to cut Budapest’s delegation out of sensitive talks, Landsbergis said. “We would only speak in formal terms, later breaking out to speak without Hungary about the achievables of the summit,” he said.  The Bucharest Group of Nine, a club of countries on the military alliance’s Eastern Flank, reportedly contemplated kicking Budapest out of the format the following year over failures to agree on support for Ukraine. Hungary’s Europe Minister János Bóka told POLITICO the reports over the weekend were “fake news” designed as “a desperate reaction to [Orban’s party] Fidesz gaining momentum in the election campaign. But the Hungarian people won’t be deceived.” János Bóka, Hungary’s EU affairs minister, is pictured at a General Affairs Council in Brussels, Belgium on Jan. 28, 2025. | Martin Bertrand/Hans Lucas/AFP via Getty Images For his part, Szijjártó rejected the content of the Washington Post article and accused the media of putting forward “conspiracy theories that are more preposterous than anything seen before.” More information could be held back in light of the fresh allegations, one of the diplomats said.  “There is an argument to be made for classification of info and documents on the EU side,” the diplomat said. While using the classified designation “isn’t a silver bullet,” it could “serve as a deterrent against leaks and the passing of sensitive info to third parties. It would also make investigations more automatic.” NO SURPRISES The five diplomats said they were unsurprised by the news, but that any formal response would depend on whether Orbán is re-elected in April. Despite lagging behind Magyar’s Tisza in the polls, the Hungarian prime minister told POLITICO on Friday he could “certainly” secure another term. “It undermines trust, cooperation, and the integrity of the European Union,” said a second diplomat of the allegations. “It’s a deplorable situation. If he stays after [the] election, I think the EU need to find ways to deal with this in another manner.” Another cautioned that whatever the EU and its leaders do, Orbán will use it in his favor in the campaign. “I don’t think anybody is eager to do anything that would add oil to fire before April 12,” they said. Despite widespread agreement on the threat posed by Russia, a fourth diplomat pointed out that the content of discussions among leaders and foreign ministers are routinely reported in the press and frequently take place in an unrestricted format, meaning leaders don’t leave their phones outside to minimize the risk of surveillance. But the optics of an EU government working so closely with a hostile state remains politically explosive. “The fact that the Hungarian foreign minister, a close friend of [Russian Foreign Minister] Sergey Lavrov, has been reporting to the Russians practically minute by minute from every EU meeting is outright treason,” Magyar said at a campaign rally over the weekend. “This man has not only betrayed his own country, but Europe as well.” The allegations come as Orbán’s foreign supporters set course for Budapest to help him campaign in the final stretch of the elections. Polish President Karol Nawrocki — a political rival of Tusk’s — will attend events on Monday, while U.S. Vice President JD Vance will jet in ahead of the vote next month.  Orbán refused to sign off on €90 billion in much-needed loans for Ukraine at Friday’s European Council, sparking a furious reaction from fellow leaders. “It wouldn’t be surprising if this proves true,” said a fifth EU diplomat of the allegations. “Hungary has long been [Russian President Vladimir] Putin’s ally within the EU and continues to sabotage European security. The blocked €90 billion is simply the latest example of that pattern.”

Washington has harshly criticized the Czech Republic for not spending enough on defense after Czech lawmakers passed a budget for 2026 that allocates only 1.7 percent of GDP to military expenditures. “All allies must bear their share of responsibility and uphold The Hague commitment on defense,” the U.S. embassy in Prague posted on X Thursday. “These numbers are not arbitrary. It is about responding to the current situation — and that situation requires 5 percent to be the standard. No excuses, no exceptions.” NATO allies agreed a new defense spending target at last year’s alliance summit in The Hague. The new goal was set at 3.5 percent of GDP for purely military expenditures and 1.5 percent for related outlays such as on cybersecurity. The 1.7 percent figure for 2026 places Prague among NATO’s lowest defense spenders. Nationalist-populist Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš may have built a reputation as the “Czech Donald Trump,” but that isn’t shielding him from Washington’s wrath. U.S. Ambassador to NATO Matthew Whitaker added a stern message on X, reminding Prague that “all Allies must pull their weight.” Czech President Petr Pavel, a retired army general and former top NATO official, also criticized the overall cuts in the 2026 budget. But while he has been at odds with Babiš over defense policy, he has pledged not to veto the budget proposal. Spain also refused last summer to endorse NATO’s new 5-percent-of-GDP defense spending goal, but on the other hand has pledged to meet the alliance’s so-called capability targets, which define the amount of military equipment each country needs to have.

BRUSSELS — The U.S. under Donald Trump is pushing NATO to slash many of its foreign activities including ending a key alliance mission in Iraq, four NATO diplomats told POLITICO. The U.S. has also in recent months lobbied to scale down NATO’s peacekeeping operation in Kosovo and keep Ukraine and Indo-Pacific allies from formally participating in the alliance’s July annual summit in Ankara. The effort reflects a White House drive to treat NATO as a strictly Euroatlantic defense pact and roll back decades of expansion into crisis management, global partnerships and values-driven initiatives that have long irritated the U.S. president and his MAGA base. Under the drive from Washington, NATO would curtail so-called “out-of-area activities” that are beyond the alliance’s core tasks of defense and deterrence. The push has become known internally as a “return to factory settings,” the four diplomats said, all of whom were granted anonymity to speak freely on the sensitive internal matter. The effort could see a rapid scale back of NATO’s activities in former war zones, as well as shutting out capitals including Kyiv and Canberra from formal discussions this summer. The White House declined to comment publicly on NATO’s partnership programs and global operations when contacted by POLITICO. The fresh details come after U.S. deputy Pentagon chief Elbridge Colby recently spelled out the administration’s thinking behind what he called “NATO 3.0.” “Not every mission can be the top priority. Not every capability can be gold-plated,” Colby told alliance defense ministers last week, while reiterating that the U.S. was still committed to European security. “The measure of seriousness is whether European forces can fight, sustain, and prevail in the scenarios that matter most for the defense of the alliance.” The U.S. campaign is prompting blowback from some allies. Dropping the alliance’s overseas initiatives is “not the right approach,” said one of the four diplomats. “Partnerships are crucial to deterrence and defense.” Since Trump returned to the White House last year, he has slashed U.S. commitments abroad, pulled troops and NATO personnel out of Europe and handed some of the alliance’s top commands to Europeans as he seeks to refocus his foreign policy around “core national security.” OUT OF IRAQ NATO maintains an advisory mission aimed at strengthening Iraq’s security institutions like its police and stymying the return of the Islamic State group. The operation was set up under Trump’s first term in 2018 and repeatedly expanded since 2021, at Baghdad’s request. Washington has asked allies to end the mission as early as September, the first diplomat quoted above and a second diplomat said. Separately, the U.S. is also set to withdraw around 2,500 soldiers from Iraq under a 2024 deal with the Iraqi government, something a U.S. administration official told POLITICO is part of Trump’s “commitment to ending forever wars,” while stressing that the move is happening in “close coordination” with Baghdad. Tamer Badawi, an Iraq expert and associate fellow with the Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient think tank, said the NATO mission itself is not “crucial” for the country’s security. But scrapping it alongside a U.S. pullback could empower militia groups, he said, and be “destabilizing” for the northern Kurdistan Regional Government. The U.S. request is also facing pushback inside the alliance. “It’s not the moment to get out of Iraq … the government wants us there,” said the first diplomat.  The second diplomat said “the majority” of allies agree the Iraq mission should be scaled back but over a longer timeframe, while keeping a smaller operation in place. KOSOVO DRAWDOWN The U.S. has also signaled it wants to wind down the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR), according to the four diplomats, which is even more concerning for European allies, even if discussions on that remain at a very early stage. The U.N.-authorized international peacekeeping mission, which debuted in 1999 after the Yugoslav wars, currently includes around 4,500 troops. Engjellushe Morina, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, said the mission remains “indispensable” for regional security. If NATO pulls out, it could embolden Serbian separatists in northern Kosovo, she said, creating a copycat effect among ethnic Serbs in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska region. “We’re quite concerned” about attempts to wind down the mission, said a fifth senior NATO diplomat, since “things in the western Balkans can escalate quickly.” Contacted by POLITICO, a NATO official speaking on behalf of the organization said there is “no timeline associated with NATO Mission Iraq … or with KFOR,” adding: “These missions are based on need, undergo periodic review, and are adjusted as circumstances evolve.” For now, no decision has been taken on ending either operation. All 32 allies must approve the start and end of missions, a process that typically involves jockeying and pressure campaigns from multiple allies and not just the U.S. NO EXTRA ALLIES The U.S. is also pressing allies not to invite Ukraine and the alliance’s four official Indo-Pacific partners — Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea — to the formal meetings at NATO’s July summit in Ankara, the four diplomats said.  The countries could still be invited to side events, they added, with the request partly justified as reducing the number of summit meetings. Keeping NATO partner countries on the sidelines of the summit “would send a signal that perhaps the focus is much more on core NATO issues,” said Oana Lungescu, a former NATO spokesperson and a senior fellow at London’s Royal United Services Institute. The official speaking for NATO said the alliance would “communicate on participation of partners at the summit in due course.” Meanwhile, NATO staff have also proposed cutting a public forum from this year’s gathering, a side-event hosting country leaders, defense experts and government officials on various discussion panels that typically boost the visibility of the yearly summit.  The NATO official said: “NATO has chosen not to organize a Public Forum this year but will host a NATO Summit Defence Industry Forum in the margins of the Ankara Summit.” NATO civil servants have told capitals the move is designed to cut costs amid a lack of resources. But the first and second diplomats said they believe it could also be driven indirectly by U.S. pressure, given Washington’s broader crusade to slash funding for international organizations. Lungescu said scrapping the forum was in line with the “downgrading of the public diplomacy division,” under NATO chief Mark Rutte, who has sought to slim down and restructure the department since taking office in late 2024. But at a time when the alliance is trying to persuade the wider public of the merits of its activities and increased defense spending, that’s “very harmful,” said a third diplomat.  “NATO has to communicate what’s happening — and what it’s going to do,” they said.

CRISIS-HIT STARMER SEEKS SOLACE ON THE WORLD STAGE The British leader’s allies believe his clout on the world stage can shore him up — but his own side will take some convincing. By ESTHER WEBBER and SASCHA O’SULLIVAN in London Illustration by Natália Delgado/POLITICO After the week Keir Starmer’s had, talks about the teetering global order should be a welcome relief. The British PM arrives in Bavaria Friday for the Munich Security Conference having seen two of his closest aides walk out, his top man in Scotland urge him to quit, and continued rage from Labour MPs over the decision to appoint Jeffrey Epstein associate Peter Mandelson as Britain’s ambassador to the U.S. Having staved off his immediate ouster, Starmer is now making another outing on the international stage, where his allies argue he carries genuine clout. He has so far been keen to emphasize the links he’s built with foreign leaders, including his relationship with Donald Trump and his efforts at a “reset” with the EU, as a marker of the renewed British influence that would be at risk were he challenged. But Labour’s restive troops will take some serious convincing of this argument — and doubts remain about some of the key overseas achievements touted by the embattled prime minister. “Starmer would’ve been a really good diplomat … He isn’t such a political actor,” Olivia O’Sullivan of foreign policy think tank Chatham House told the latest episode of POLITICO’s Westminster Insider podcast. TUG OF WAR All leaders face a tug of war between their lives as statesmen and their domestic agendas, but Starmer’s has proved especially strenuous. He came to power promising to fix Britain’s failing public services and lower the cost of living, as counseled by his then-top aide Morgan McSweeney. When Starmer entered Downing Street, however, he defied McSweeney’s wishes by telling advisers he wanted to divide his time 50/50 between foreign and domestic affairs, unable to resist a slew of foreign visits after taking the reins. During his first 17 months, he visited 44 countries on 37 trips out of the U.K. That included a flurry of bilateral meetings and international summits in destinations including Washington D.C., Berlin, Brussels, Rio de Janeiro, New York, Samoa, Budapest, Canada and Azerbaijan. He followed up with high-profile visits to India and China — seen by most in his team as successful. His allies have consistently defended this approach, stressing that representing Britain in the world is one of Starmer’s most important duties and that he has made a success of it. The prime minister has sought to project maturity by building a steady relationship with the unpredictable Trump at the same time as he seeks closer ties with Europe post-Brexit. O’Sullivan, director of the U.K. in the World program at Chatham House, said Britain is now walking “a pretty difficult tightrope” of “flattering Trump, of offering concessions where we can, but figuring out how we defend particular economic interests, but also the interests of our allies, and particularly Ukraine.” U.S. President Donald Trump and U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer at Chequers, England, Sept. 18, 2025. | Leon Neal/Getty Images Peter Ricketts, former head of the U.K.’s diplomatic service, said the shift towards “a hyper-personalized world” demands Starmer’s presence. “Unless you are in the room with Donald Trump, you’re not influencing him,” Ricketts added. CONNECTING THE DOTS Eighteen months on from the Labour landslide of 2024, however, Starmer’s premiership has flown into more severe difficulties at home. And it’s forcing a rethink. An especially embarrassing climbdown over proposals to cut disability benefits partly unfolded as Starmer flew to the Hague for last year’s NATO summit. the prime minister appeared to admit he had been distracted from the issue, saying afterwards: “I was heavily focused on what was happening with NATO and the Middle East all weekend.” There has been an effort to redraw Starmer’s priorities since the start of the year, with one adviser saying he now wants to spend 20 percent of his time on international matters and 80 percent on domestic concerns. The opening weeks of 2026 showed just how hard this will be to achieve. His plans to talk about cutting the cost of living were immediately upended by Trump’s intervention in Venezuela and threats to Greenland. Unable to separate himself from global affairs, Starmer has instead attempted to send a message that his missions abroad will help improve Britain’s economy and quality of life. On recent trips to Brazil, South Africa and China he has been at pains to stress that “tackling the cost of living today also means engagement beyond our borders.” Ricketts said: “I understand the frustrations on the domestic sphere where he’s not around enough. But, heavens — the world is in a more turbulent place than I can ever remember it, and I’m glad my prime minister’s out there batting for Britain.” One Labour MP with a trade role, granted anonymity like others in this article to discuss internal party thinking, argued that the prime minister had delivered “lots of wins” which go down well among the party faithful. They cited Trump’s softening on NATO and carveout for the U.K. on tariffs.  Key British allies overseas also say Starmer’s support for Kyiv has made a genuine difference in advocating for peace in Ukraine. With his premiership in crisis this week, his supporters have pushed harder on that argument. “We need his leadership not just at home but on the global stage, and we need to keep our focus where it matters, on keeping our country safe,” Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper posted amid a threat to his leadership this week. In his first public appearance since Monday’s public challenge to him, Starmer trumpeted the need to “stand tall” on the international stage. Starmer delivers a speech at a community center in Hertfordshire, England, the day after Monday’s challenge to his leadership. | Pool picture by Suzanne Plunkett/AFP via Getty Images) “Delivering for Britain means acting at home and abroad — not choosing between them,” a Downing Street spokesperson said in a statement to POLITICO. “The record speaks for itself: world‑first trade deals, major migration agreements, and defense contracts supporting thousands of UK jobs – real results for the British people.” LEAST-WORST SCENARIOS For all the boosting of Starmer’s achievements, however, some of his supposed negotiating triumphs have diminished with time. The U.K.’s deal with the U.S. on tariffs has been hard to nail down, and Starmer’s much-hyped trip to China was followed by Hong Kong pro-democracy campaigner Jimmy Lai’s sentencing to 20 years in jail. Substantive deals with the EU on youth mobility, food standards and even the low-hanging fruit of defense cooperation have also proved elusive. As O’Sullivan put it, Starmer has “managed to land us in the least-worst scenario on some of these issues.” A former No.10 official said: “I baulk at the idea that Britain is back on the international stage. All this becomes thin pretty soon — you can position well but the substance of it isn’t that different.” There is a downside to Starmer’s foreign diplomacy when it comes to his standing with his own restive party and the country at large, too.  The PM has long faced accusations that he is distant, both literally and figuratively, when it comes to his colleagues. Labour figures warn that he simply does not have the political space to make an argument about the link between statesmanship and living standards to angry voters. “Part of the reason he’s getting this criticism is because he’s doing so badly in polls… but the justification he’s using is not a good one,” says a second former adviser. “It’s retrofitting, because he wanted to spend a lot of time abroad. People aren’t going to believe spending time with Trump will help the cost of living.”

DAVOS, Switzerland — Be careful sliding into the Donald’s DMs. The world might learn something about Trump — but more about you. The U.S. president’s affinity for screenshotting his texts with presidents and prime ministers instead of sharing  the standard sanitized readouts of such leader-to-leader conversations offers an extraordinary level of insight into how power players are trying to woo Trump. Take the message Trump shared early Tuesday from French President Emmanuel Macron, which the Elysée Palace says is authentic. In it, Macron says he doesn’t understand the American strategy with respect to Greenland, which Trump is threatening to take over at the expense of transatlantic relations. The French president also offers to set up a G7 meeting in Paris — after Trump leaves Davos, where he is attending this year’s edition of the World Economic Forum — with several other major players on the margins, including the Russians. Macron then invites Trump to dinner in Paris on Thursday. The note seems straightforward enough, but Macron’s appeal to Trump’s ego and ambition speaks to a deeper subtext about the state of the geopolitical order. FRIENDSHIP WHAT HE SAID “My friend” WHAT HE MEANT The French president is calling President Trump “his friend,” as he has done publicly. And some meetings between the leaders have gone well. But the two enjoy a mercurial relationship at best, amid knuckle-crunching encounters and Trump’s jibes over Macron’s diplomatic endeavors and energy. On Monday evening, the U.S. president didn’t display much affection for Macron after he refused to join Washington’s “Board of Peace” for the Gaza transition. “Well, nobody wants him because he’s going to be out of office very soon,” Trump told reporters. Then he threatened to hit French wines and Champagnes with 200 percent tariffs. SYRIA WHAT HE SAID “We are totally in line on Syria“ WHAT HE MEANT Syria is, undoubtedly, an area of agreement for the duo. Both support the former Al-Qaeda member Ahmed al-Sharaa as Syria’s leader, despite ongoing issues over reconciling the country’s different communities. Highlighting Syria seems to be a good way to paper over other Trump and Macron’s myriad other disagreements: Washington’s support for far-right movements in Europe, the French president’s desire to impose stricter regulation on tech giants, the Israel-Gaza war, climate change and the role of the United Nations, to name just a few. IRAN WHAT HE SAID “We can do great things on Iran” WHAT HE MEANT Another thing Paris and Washington agree on … to a certain extent. The G7 nations have threatened Iran with sanctions if the bloody crackdown on protesters in Tehran continues and the EU is also considering additional sanctions. There are some quite substantial differences, however. The French do not support bombing Iran, something Trump has threatened to do. Don’t forget, Paris helped forge the nuclear deal with Iran that Trump pulled out of during his first term. GREENLAND WHAT HE SAID “I do not understand what you are doing on Greenland” WHAT HE MEANT This is Macron using his most euphemistic language during his direct conversation with Trump, about the subject roiling the global order right now. France has publicly been much more forceful in response to the U.S. president’s threats to tariff European allies who do not support his designs on Greenland. Macron has pushed for the EU to unleash its Anti-Coercion Instrument, the the so-called trade bazooka, while other leaders like German Chancellor Friedrich Merz want to give a chance to diplomacy. France has also sent a small contingent of troops to Greenland and is planning to deploy land, sea and air forces, though the details remain unspecified. SUMMITS WHAT HE SAID “I can set up a g7 meeting after Davos in Paris on thursday afternoon.” WHAT HE MEANT Timing is everything. If Macron sent that message Monday (Trump’s screenshot in what appears to be their Signal chat says “Today” and is timestamped 5:01 p.m., but he could have taken the screenshot earlier), he would have been proposing a meeting that directly clashes with an emergency EU leaders’ summit Thursday evening in Brussels, which may project a sense of disunity in the bloc. Macron’s invitation also underlines the issue of where to go when the transatlantic relationship hits the rocks. The EU is the main format for responding to Trump’s tariffs threat, but it doesn’t include the U.K., which is playing a key role on security guarantees for Ukraine and discussions on Greenland security. France is likely proposing the G7 format as it holds the rotating presidency of the group and includes major Arctic stakeholders like the U.K. and Canada. NATO is typically the privileged forum to discuss European defense and security. But it’s not really built to handle one member threatening another. OTHER LEADERS WHAT HE SAID “I can invite the ukrainians, the danish, the syrians and the russians in the margins.” WHAT HE MEANT Macron’s apparent willingness to invite the Russians to a G7 meeting in Paris alongside the Ukrainians and the Danes is likely to raise concerns among Europeans. The French president has repeatedly said Europeans should resume dialogue with Russian President Vladimir Putin in the wake of peace talks between the U.S., Ukraine and Russia. However, Europeans have been divided over who should lead those talks and whether a European special envoy role should be created, as Moscow’s bombardment of Ukraine continues unabated. Inviting the Russians, even on the margins of a G7 meeting in Paris, could be read as rehabilitating Moscow before Putin has offered any indication it takes peace talks seriously. It’s a risky bet. DINNER DATE WHAT HE SAID “Let us have a dinner together in Paris on thursday before you go back to the us” WHAT HE MEANT A good dinner in Paris might be a way to Trump’s heart. Europeans have noted that pomp and ceremony puts the U.S. president in a good mood. The NATO summit in The Hague last year was considered a successful example of Trump-cajoling, with lots of flattery and hobnobbing with royalty. Macron has also developed a knack for “dinner diplomacy,” having invited Hungary’s Viktor Orbán several times for dinners in Paris, in a bid to iron out differences. The results, however, are mixed.

Ed Arnold is a senior research fellow for European security at the Royal United Services Institute. Early in 2025, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy had a severe diplomatic dustup with U.S. President Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance in the Oval Office. Since then, relations between Washington and Kyiv have swung up and down and back again. Europe, for its part, reacted to the diplomatic incident with increased efforts to support Ukraine and keep the U.S. onside. In March, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and French President Emmanuel Macron announced the launch of a 34-nation “coalition of the willing” to strengthen Europe’s role in ensuring Ukraine’s future sovereignty and security. And in September, Macron announced that 26 countries committed to deploying troops on the ground as part of a Multi-National Force Ukraine “the day after the ceasefire or peace.” However, regardless of Europe’s efforts to support Ukraine, the only thing that really matters is America’s security guarantees, which Zelenskyy must now secure — even if it means concessions elsewhere. As much as Europe may like to think otherwise, Washington’s guarantees are the only viable path to peace for Ukraine. Europe can’t even deploy its multinational force without U.S. logistical support. And as 2025 draws to a close, the question of Washington’s commitment remains a fundamental factor in efforts to move Russia’s war toward its next phase and, hopefully, a durable peace. Yet, everything suggests real power lies in Russia’s hands. Ukraine’s collective memory of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum’s failures — security guarantees that were provided by the U.S., Russia and U.K. so that Ukraine would surrender its Soviet-era nuclear weapons — cast a long shadow over current negotiations. And at this truly perilous moment, Zelenskyy has several points to consider: First, the Ukrainian president is reportedly prepared to drop Ukraine’s quest for NATO membership — something the alliance had described as “irreversible” at last year’s NATO Summit — in exchange for robust security guarantees, and there are signs these could be forthcoming. So far, the U.S. has offered Ukraine “platinum standard” security guarantees, alongside the caveat that they “will not be on the table forever,” pushing Zelenskyy toward accepting the deal currently on the table. In addition, there are hopes that these guarantees would include the provision of Tomahawk cruise missiles with a range of 1,000 kilometers — only four U.S. allies have ever been granted Tomahawks in the past. These would allow Ukraine to strike Russia’s political and military centers, thus potentially deterring the Kremlin from resuming hostilities. But while this additional capability would certainly complicate Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision-making, it’s no silver bullet. Apart from the guarantee’s technical details, Zelenskyy rightly hopes that unlike the Budapest Memorandum, which was an executive agreement, any commitment would be legally binding, requiring ratification by the U.S. House and Senate — both of which are broadly supportive of Ukraine — and then approval by the president. Such formal ratification would put Ukraine’s guarantees on similar footing to other U.S. bilateral security treaties with countries like Japan and South Korea. Alternative vehicles like a presidential executive action, which was used for both the Paris Climate accords and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to limit Iran’s uranium enrichment, are non-binding political commitments, meaning a future president wouldn’t be bound by them. So, if formal ratification is on the table, Zelenskyy will be hoping it provides Ukraine future opportunities to influence Congress and ensure support remains strong and united. However, regardless of Europe’s efforts to support Ukraine, the only thing that really matters is America’s security guarantees, which Volodymyr Zelenskyy must now secure — even if it means concessions elsewhere. | Leszek Szymanski/EPA But even then, there are risks. While Zelenskyy has said the security guarantees “correspond to Article 5,” this core alliance commitment is fragile. On the plane to the NATO Summit in the Hague this summer, Trump mentioned: “There are numerous definitions of Article 5” — and he was right. Article 5 is open to interpretation, and was deliberately worded as such in 1949 to prevent the U.S. from being automatically pulled into a third major war on the European continent. Therefore, it isn’t just a question of the letter of the treaty but also its spirit. Of course, NATO is far more than just Article 5. Founded on the ashes of World War II, it’s also an alliance built on economic collaboration (Article 2), as well as an individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack (Article 3) . But if Article 5 was easily replicable, then alliances with similar strength would be established all over the world. In reality, mutual security guarantees backed by credible military force are rare. So it’s questionable whether the U.S. would, in fact, choose to offer a guarantee that could force it to directly intervene in Ukraine, especially considering it’s provided measured support since 2014, consistently blocked the country’s path to NATO since 2022, and made it a priority to avoid getting directly involved in the war. Finally, it is a maxim of war that “the enemy gets a vote.” So, as bilateral engagements between the U.S. and Russia continue in parallel with European and Ukrainian negotiations, Putin’s position will be important, whether one likes it or not. Russia wants a far more expansive deal with the U.S. on European security — something it clearly demonstrated with its initial 28-point peace plan. And with Putin refusing to concede on his maximalist demands to date, it remains unclear what Russia will accept. Ultimately, regardless of how strong Zelenskyy believes America’s security guarantee is, its durability may still be based on Putin’s interpretation.

Senior officials inside NATO and the Spanish government are not too concerned with President Donald Trump’s threats to punish the country for its perceived inadequate spending on defense. “The threat is not being taken seriously at the military level,” said a senior NATO officer at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Brussels. “Spaniards are reacting calmly.” The officer was granted anonymity to discuss internal thinking. The relative shrug comes as Trump’s rhetoric has grown increasingly hostile in recent weeks, criticizing Spain over its low spending amid the administration’s push to make European countries less reliant on the United States’ military umbrella. “You’re going to have to talk to Spain,” Trump told NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on Wednesday. “Spain is not a team player.” Trump has pushed NATO members to spend at least 5 percent of their GDP on national defense. At a NATO summit in The Hague in June, most members agreed to a spending target of 5 percent of GDP — 3.5 percent on core military expenditure and 1.5 percent in defense-related areas such as military mobility by 2035. But not Spain, which asked for a carveout. Madrid has the lowest military spending of any NATO member country, allocating just 1.3 percent of its GDP to defense in 2024. And its refusal to commit to more has irked Trump, who this month said NATO should consider throwing Spain out of the alliance. The president’s anger further strains an already complex transatlantic relationship in which he has upended trade relationships, imposed new tariffs and lectured leaders on migration and climate change. European leaders, meanwhile, have worked hard to maintain a positive relationship with Trump as they hope to influence him on a range of issues, especially the war in Ukraine. Trump also suggested he’d impose new tariffs Spain, which is a member of the European Union. It’s not clear how Spain could be singled out but, for now, the Spanish don’t seem too concerned. What matters—and we should say it with pride—is that Spain is a reliable and responsible ally, that it has been in the Atlantic Alliance for 40 years, that it has paid a very high price with the lives of Spanish service members, that it is willing to take part in every mission assigned to it, and that it is making a very important effort in the Spanish and European defense industry, creating jobs and honoring commitments,” said Margarita Robles, Spain’s defense minister told reporters last week. “So, even if some do not acknowledge it, Spain is a country that delivers, and an ally respected by the other members of the Alliance.” Robles added that 2035 is a long way off and the alliance’s priority should be what is happening in Ukraine. But Trump remains focused on Spain’s refusal and is still “considering economic consequences,” said Anna Kelly, spokesperson for the White House. “President Trump always means what he says, and his actions speak for themselves,” she said. “While every other NATO ally agreed to increase its defense spending to five percent, Spain was the only country that refused.”

LONDON — Ukraine’s allies are trying everything they can to keep Donald Trump onside. This week, that includes deploying the king of England.  Joined by first lady Melania Trump, he’ll be the first-ever U.S. president to be formally welcomed to Windsor Castle, another unprecedented element of an already paradigm-breaking second state visit for a leader who loves being singular. They will be lauded with the finest pomp and pageantry Britain has to offer, replete with banqueting, honor escorts and a ceremonial flypast of the sort Trump has been impressed by before — and which serves as a reminder of the long history of military cooperation between Britain and the U.S.  The hope is that the royal charm offensive will lay the groundwork for Prime Minister Keir Starmer and his senior aides to make fresh efforts to persuade Trump he should apply more pressure to Russian President Vladimir Putin in the quest for peace in Ukraine. While it may not appear on any program for the visit, political and royal aides expect it will be raised behind the scenes.  A senior defense official, granted anonymity like others in this piece to speak candidly, said the king is “very close” to the detail of ceasefire negotiations and to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy himself.  British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky meet British and Ukrainian troops from Operation Interflex. | Pool photo by Jaimi Joy/WPA via Getty Images That gives the prime minister a weapon many other European leaders don’t have: a sympathetic monarch who has quietly yet consistently demonstrated his support for Kyiv — and is willing to do his part to push back on U.S. skepticism toward the cause.  A ROYAL ALLY  The U.S. president, who so often discards other conventions, has a deep respect and affection for the royal family, which the state visit is intended to capitalize on. As he departed for Britain, he hailed Charles as “such an elegant gentleman” and described his second visit as a “great honor.” He has been far less reverent toward Zelenskyy, to put it mildly, suggesting at various points that he bears responsibility for Russia’s invasion of his country and humiliating him at their infamous meeting in the Oval Office earlier this year.  At a time of highly uncertain American support, the Ukrainian leader has found a champion in the king.  Charles unexpectedly welcomed Zelenskyy for tea at Sandringham in the aftermath of the Oval Office debacle, and then for lunch at Windsor Castle just ahead of June’s NATO summit. King Charles III at an audience with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at Windsor Castle. | Pool photo by Jonathan Brady/WPA via Getty Images Orysia Lutsevych, head of the Ukraine program at Chatham House, said the king’s show of support sent a message “of solidarity and a reminder of who is the victim and who is the aggressor” amid “distortion and disinformation” by Putin.  A former senior U.K. diplomat said that while the king does not speak publicly about matters of government, he is “adept at finding other ways of showing his views.” And he will have plenty of time to do so: The president will stay overnight at Windsor Castle, where he will be treated to a carriage procession through the estate and lunch in the state dining room before the main event of the white-tie state banquet. “It wouldn’t be surprising if he took the opportunity privately to encourage the president to support Ukraine more effectively,” the same former diplomat said.  A royal aide acknowledged the king’s interest in Ukraine, noting that he called for a “just and lasting peace” in Ukraine in a message of solidarity to mark the country’s independence day last month. The king may nod to Ukraine during his speech at the state banquet, as he did during French leader Emmanuel Macron’s recent visit, but otherwise his diplomacy is likely to take place behind closed doors, bolstered by symbolism throughout the trip designed to highlight the two countries’ history as wartime allies. THE HARD SELL  The trickier question is whether the king’s overtures will make a difference.  One government adviser pointed to Trump’s royal reception by King Willem-Alexander and Queen Máxima of the Netherlands, arguing it helped pave the way for a successful NATO summit, at which he recommitted to the alliance.  Trump will be joined on the trip by Secretary of State Marco Rubio and envoy Steve Witkoff, meaning there will also be the chance to influence his top diplomats. During Vice President JD Vance’s visit to the U.K. in the summer, insiders reported that both Rubio and Vance had become increasingly engaged with Kyiv’s point of view.  Charles’ biographer Robert Hardman previously told POLITICO: “In soft power terms, other world leaders, other countries are far more interested in the monarchy than they are in Downing Street.” This contrast — together with the continuity represented by the monarch — may be at an even higher premium as Starmer faces questions over his future following weeks of turmoil inside No. 10.  At the same time, spurring Trump toward stronger action in support of Ukraine remains a tough sell. While the president appears to have edged toward a more skeptical view of Putin, that has not yet translated into a decisive move to punish him. U.S. President Donald Trump boards Marine One as he departs the White House en route to London. | Kevin Dietsch/Getty Images The president made clear in a Truth Social post that he expects NATO allies to stop purchasing Russian oil and place significant tariffs on China for its support of Russia’s war before the U.S. enacts any additional costs on Russia.  Torrey Taussig, director of the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council think tank, said that coupled with Trump’s muted response to the Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace, “this latest positioning does not give Starmer much room to maneuver.” Taussig added that while Trump’s affinity for the royals “may lend weight” to an appeal from the king on Ukraine, she was “unconvinced” the president would change course.  If the U.K.’s main job so far has been attempting to keep Trump in the room for talks about Ukraine, then the king will at least contribute to that effort — with grander gestures than most. Annabelle Dickson contributed to this report.

HOW DONALD TRUMP BECAME PRESIDENT OF EUROPE The U.S. president describes himself as the European Union’s de facto leader. Is he wrong? By NICHOLAS VINOCUR Illustration by Justin Metz for POLITICO European federalists, rejoice! The European Union finally has a bona fide president. The only problem: He lives at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington, D.C., aka the White House. U.S. President Donald Trump claimed the title during one of his recent off-the-cuff Oval Office banter sessions, asserting that EU leaders refer to him as “the president of Europe.”  The comment provoked knowing snickers in Brussels, where officials assured POLITICO that nobody they knew ever referred to Trump that way. But it also captured an embarrassing reality: EU leaders have effectively offered POTUS a seat at the head of their table. From the NATO summit in June, when Trump revealed a text message in which NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte called him “daddy,” to the EU-U.S. trade accord signed in Scotland where EU leaders consented to a deal so lopsided in Washington’s favor it resembled a surrender, it looks like Trump has a point. Never since the creation of the EU has a U.S. president wielded such direct influence over European affairs. And never have the leaders of the EU’s 27 countries appeared so willing — desperate even — to hold up a U.S. president as a figure of authority to be praised, cajoled, lobbied, courted, but never openly contradicted. In off-the-record briefings, EU officials frame their deference to Trump as a necessary ploy to keep him engaged in European security and Ukraine’s future. But there’s no indication that, having supposedly done what it takes to keep the U.S. on side, Europe’s leaders are now trying to reassert their authority. On the contrary, EU leaders now appear to be offering Trump a role in their affairs even when he hasn’t asked for it. A case in point: When a group of leaders traveled to Washington this summer to urge Trump to apply pressure to Russian President Vladimir Putin (he ignored them), they also asked him to prevail on his “friend,” Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, to lift his block on Ukraine’s eventual membership to the EU, per a Bloomberg report. Trump duly picked up the phone. And while there’s no suggestion Orbán changed his tune on Ukraine, the fact that EU leaders felt compelled to ask the U.S. president to unstick one of their internal conflicts only further secured his status as a de facto European powerbroker. “He may never be Europe’s president, but he can be its godfather,” said one EU diplomat who, like others in this piece, was granted anonymity to speak candidly. “The appropriate analogy is more criminal. We’re dealing with a mafia boss exerting extortionate influence over the businesses he purports to protect.” “BRUSSELS EFFECT” It was not long ago that the EU could describe itself credibly as a trade behemoth and a “regulatory superpower” able to command respect thanks to its vast consumer market and legal reach. EU leaders boasted of a “Brussels effect” that bent the behavior of corporations or foreign governments to European legal standards, even if they weren’t members of the bloc. Anthony Gardner, a former U.S. ambassador to the EU, recalls that when Washington was negotiating a trade deal with the EU known as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership in the 2010s, the U.S. considered Europe to be an equal peer. “Since the founding of the EEC [European Economic Community], America’s position was that we want a strong Europe,” said Gardner. “And we had lots of disagreements with the EU, particularly on trade. But the way to deal with those is not through bullying.” One sign of the EU’s confidence was its willingness to take on the U.S.’s biggest companies, as it did in 2001 when the European Commission blocked a planned $42 billion acquisition of Honeywell by General Electric. That was the beginning of more than a decade of assertive competition policy, with the bloc’s heavyweight officials like former antitrust czar Margrethe Vestager grandstanding in front of the world’s press and threatening to break up Google on antitrust grounds, or forcing Apple to pay back an eye-watering €13 billion over its tax arrangements in Ireland. Compare that to last week, when the Commission was expected to fine Google for its search advertising practices. The decision was at first delayed at the request of EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič, then quietly publicized via a press release and an explanatory video on Friday afternoon that did not feature the commissioner in charge, Teresa Ribera. (Neither move prevented Trump from announcing in a Truth Social post that his “Administration will NOT allow these discriminatory actions to stand.”) “I’ve never seen anything like this in my entire career at the Commission,” said a senior Commission official. “Trump is inside the machine at this point.” Since Trump’s reelection, EU leaders have been exceptionally careful in how they speak about the U.S. president, with two options seemingly available: Silence, or praise. “At this moment, Estonia and many European countries support what Trump is doing,” Estonian President Alar Karis said in a recent POLITICO interview, referring to the U.S. president’s efforts to push Putin toward a peace with Ukraine. Never mind the fact that the Pentagon recently axed security funding for countries like his and is expected to follow up by reducing U.S. troop numbers there too. It became fashionable among the cognoscenti ahead of the NATO summit in June to claim that the U.S. president had done Europe a favor by casting doubt on his commitment to the military alliance. Only by Trump’s cold kiss, the thinking went, would this Sleeping Beauty of a continent ever “wake up.” As for Mark Rutte’s “Daddy” comment — humiliatingly leaked from a private text message exchange by Trump himself — it was a clever ploy to appeal to the U.S. president’s ego. Unfortunately for EU leaders, the pretense that Trump somehow has Europe’s interests in mind and was merely doling out “tough love” was dispelled just a few months later when European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen signed the EU-U.S. trade deal in Turnberry, Scotland. This time, there was no disguising the true nature of what had transpired between Europe and the U.S.  The wolfish grins of Trump White House bigwigs Stephen Miller and Howard Lutnick on the official signing photograph told the whole story: Trump had laid down brutal, humiliating terms. Europe had effectively surrendered. Many in Brussels interpreted the deal in the same way.  “You won’t hear me use that word [negotiation]” to describe what transpired between Europe and the U.S., veteran EU trade negotiator Sabine Weyand told a recent panel. BLAME GAME As EU officials settle in for la rentrée, the shock of these past few months has led to finger-pointing: Does the blame for this double whammy of subjugation lie with the European Commission, or with the EU’s 27 heads of state and government? It’s tempting to point to the Commission, which, after all, has an exclusive mandate to negotiate trade deals on behalf of all EU countries. In the days leading up to Turnberry, von der Leyen and her top trade official, Šefčovič, could theoretically have taken a page from China’s playbook and struck back at the U.S. threat of 15 percent tariffs with tariffs of their own. Indeed, the EU’s trade arsenal is fully stocked with the means to do so, not least via the Anti-Coercion Instrument designed for precisely such situations. But to heap all the blame on the doorstep of the Berlaymont isn’t fair, argues Gardner, the former U.S. ambassador to the EU. The real architects of Europe’s summer of humiliation are the leaders who prevailed on the Commission to go along with Trump’s demands, whatever the cost. “What I am saying is that the member states have shown a lack of solidarity at a crucial moment,” said Gardner. The consequences of this collective failure, he warns, may reverberate for years, if not decades: “The first message here is that the most effective way for big trading blocs to win over Europe is to ruthlessly use leverage to divide the European Union. The second message, which maybe wasn’t fully taken into account: Member states may be asking themselves: What is the EU good for if it can’t provide a shield on trade?” The same goes for regulation: Trump’s repeated threates of tariffs if the bloc dares to test his patience reveal the limits of EU sovereignty when it comes to the so-called “Brussels effect.” And that leaves the bloc in desperate need of a new narrative about its role on the world stage. The reasons why EU leaders decided to fold, rather than fight, are plain to see. They were laid bare in a recent speech by António Costa, who as president of the European Council convenes the EU leaders in their summits. “Escalating tensions with a key ally over tariffs, while our eastern border is under threat, would have been an imprudent risk,” Costa said. But none of this answers the question: What now?  If Europe has already ceded so much to Trump, is the entire bloc condemned to vassalhood or, as some commentators have prophesied, a “century of humiliation” on par with the fate of the Qing dynasty following China’s Opium Wars with Britain? Possibly — though a century seems like a long time.  Among the steaming heaps of garbage, there are a few green shoots. To wit: The fact that polls indicate that the average European wants a tougher, more sovereign Europe and blames leaders rather than “the EU” for failing to deliver faster on benchmarks like a “European Defense Union.” Europe’s current leaders (with a few exceptions, such as Denmark’s Mette Frederiksen) may be united in their embrace of Trump as Europe’s Godfather. But there is one Cassandra-like figure who refuses to let them off the hook for failing to deliver a more sovereign EU — former Italian prime minister and European Central Bank chief Mario Draghi. Author of the “Draghi Report,” a tome of recommendations on how Europe can pull itself back up by the bootstraps, the 78-year-old is refusing to go quietly into retirement. On the contrary, in one speech after another, he’s reminding EU leaders that they were the ones to ask for the report they are now ignoring. Speaking in Rimini, Italy, last month, Europe’s Cassandra summed up the challenge facing the Old World: In the past, he said, “the EU could act primarily as a regulator and arbiter, avoiding the harder question of political integration.” “To face today’s challenges, the European Union must transform itself from a spectator — or at best a supporting actor — into a protagonist.”

BERLIN — German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said he is mentally preparing for a long war in Ukraine — but wouldn’t be drawn on whether Berlin will deploy peacekeeping troops should there be a ceasefire. In a televised interview on Sunday he also said that if he hadn’t decided to alter Germany’s debt rules to allow it to massively invest in defense, the NATO alliance would probably have disintegrated in June. “I’m mentally preparing myself for the fact that this war could drag on for a long time,” he told ZDF when asked if he was hopeful that a ceasefire could be reached next year. “We’re trying to end it as quickly as possible, but certainly not at the price of Ukraine’s capitulation.” Last week Merz had expressed skepticism that U.S. President Donald Trump’s ongoing peace push with Russian President Vladimir Putin would yield results. “I would like the United States of America to work with us to solve this problem for as long as possible,” Merz said. “Diplomacy isn’t about flipping a switch overnight and then everything will be fine again. It’s a lengthy process.” Asked about security guarantees — intended to protect Ukraine from another Russian attack in case of a peace agreement — Merz said: “The number one priority is supporting the Ukrainian army so that they can defend this country in the long term. That is the absolute priority, and we will begin doing that now.” When pressed as to whether Germany would be ready to send troops to Ukraine in the event of a ceasefire, Merz stressed that every foreign troop deployment required Bundestag approval. He did not specify what a German deployment could look like or whether he supported such a step. Despite a huge expansion in military spending, Germany has struggled to recruit and train battle-ready soldiers, with troop levels flatlining at around 182,000 despite significant efforts to grow the force. Germany has struggled to recruit and train battle-ready soldiers. | Pool Photo by Daniel Bockwoldt via EPA During Sunday’s interview Merz defended his coalition’s historic decision to loosen the debt brake on defense spending — made possible by an unexpected U-turn by Merz’s conservatives right after the election — and even went so far as to link it to NATO’s survival. “We were essentially able to preserve NATO with our decision,” he said. “I was at the NATO summit in The Hague [June 24-25]. If we hadn’t changed the constitution and we hadn’t been willing to allow the Federal Republic of Germany to spend 3.5 percent on defense plus 1.5 percent on the necessary infrastructure, then NATO would probably have disintegrated that day. We prevented that.”