Laura Thornton is the senior director for democracy programs at the McCain Institute. She spent more than two decades in Asia and the former Soviet Union with the National Democratic Institute. Earlier this month, I spoke at a conference in Bucharest for Eastern Europe’s democracy activists and leaders. I was discussing foreign malign influence operations, particularly around elections, highlighting Russia’s hybrid war in Moldova, when a Hungarian participant pointed out that U.S. President Donald Trump had offered Hungary’s illiberal strongman Viktor Orbán a one-year reprieve for complying with U.S. sanctions for using Russian oil and gas. With Hungarian elections around the corner and this respite being a direct relief to Orbán’s economy, “Is that not election interference?” she asked. The next day, while at the Moldova Security Forum in Chișinău, a Polish government official expressed his deep concern about sharing intelligence with the current U.S. administration. While he had great respect for the embassy in Warsaw, he noted a lack of trust in some leaders in Washington and his worry that intelligence would get leaked, in the worst case to Russia — as had happened during Trump’s first term. My week came to an end at a two-day workshop for democracy activists, all who described the catastrophic impact that the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) elimination had on their work, whether that be protecting free and fair elections, combating disinformation campaigns or supporting independent media. “It’s not just about the money. It’s the loss of the U.S. as a democratic partner,” said one Georgian participant. Others then described how this withdrawal had been an extraordinary gift to Russia, China and other autocratic regimes, becoming a main focus of their disinformation campaigns. According to one Moldovan participant, “The U.S. has abandoned Moldova” was now a common Russian narrative, while Chinese messaging in the global south was also capitalizing on the end of USAID to paint Washington as an unreliable ally. Having spent a good deal of my career tracking malign foreign actors who undermine democracy around the world and coming up with strategies to defend against them, this was a rude reality check. I had to ask myself: “Wait, are we the bad guys?” It would be naive to suggest that the U.S. has always been a good faith actor, defending global democracy throughout its history. After all, America has meddled in many countries’ internal struggles, supporting leaders who didn’t have their people’s well-being or freedom in mind. But while it has fallen short in the past, there was always broad bipartisan agreement over what the U.S. should be: a reliable ally; a country that supports those less fortunate, stands up against tyranny worldwide and is a beacon of freedom for human rights defenders. America’s values and interests were viewed as intertwined — particularly the belief that a world with more free and open democracies would benefit the U.S. As the late Senator John McCain famously said: “Our interests are our values, and our values are our interests.” At the Moldova Security Forum in Chișinău, a Polish government official expressed his deep concern about sharing intelligence with the current U.S. administration. | Artur Widak/Getty Images I have proudly seen this born out in my work. I’ve lived in several countries that have had little to offer the U.S. with regards to trade, extractive industries or influence, and yet we supported their health, education and agriculture programs. We also stood up for defenders of democracy and freedom fighters around the world, with little material benefit to ourselves. I’ve worked with hundreds of foreign aid and NGO workers in my life, and I can say not one of them was in it for a “good trade deal” or to colonize resources. But today’s U.S. foreign policy has broken from this approach. It has abandoned the post-World War II consensus on allies and the value of defending freedom, instead revolving around transactions and deal-making, wielding tariffs to punish or reward, and defining allies based on financial benefit rather than shared democratic values. There are new ideological connections taking place as well — they’re just not the democratic alliances of the past. At the Munich Security Forum earlier this year, U.S. Vice President JD Vance chose to meet with the far-right Alternative for Germany party rather than then-Chancellor Olaf Scholz. The Conservative Political Action Committee has also served as a transatlantic bridge to connect far-right movements in Europe to those in the U.S., providing a platform to strongmen like Orbán. The recently released U.S. National Security Strategy explicitly embraces this pivot away from values toward more transactional alliances, as well as a fondness for “patriotic European parties” and a call to “resist” the region’s “current trajectory” — a clear reference to the illiberal, far-right movements in Europe. Meanwhile, according to Harvard University’s school of public health, USAID’s closure has tragically caused hundreds of thousands of deaths, while simultaneously kneecapping the work of those fighting for freedom, human rights and democracy. And according to Moldovan organizations I’ve spoken with, while the EU and others continue to assist them in their fight against Russia’s hybrid attacks ahead of this year’s September elections, the American withdrawal is de facto helping the Kremlin’s efforts. It should have come as no surprise to me that our partners are worried and wondering whose side the U.S. is really on. But I also believe that while a country’s foreign policy often reflects the priorities and values of that nation as a whole, Americans can still find a way to shift this perception. Alliances aren’t only built nation-to-nation — they can take place at the subnational level, creating bonds between democratic cities or states in the U.S. with like-minded local governments elsewhere. Just like Budapest doesn’t reflect its anti-democratic national leadership, we can find connections and share lessons learned. Moreover, partnerships can be forged at the civil society level too. Many American democracy and civic organizations, journalists and foundations firmly believe in a pro-democracy U.S. foreign policy, and they want to build communities with democratic actors globally. At a meeting in Prague last month, a former German government official banged their hand on the table, emphatically stating: “The transatlantic relationship is dead!” And I get it. I understand that the democratic world may well be tempted to cut the U.S. off as an ally and partner. But to them I’d like to say that it’s not our democracy organizations, funding organizations and broader government that abandoned them when national leadership changed. Relationships can take on many shapes, layers and connections, and on both sides of the Atlantic, those in support of democracy must now find new creative avenues of cooperation and support. I hope our friends don’t give up on us so easily.

PARIS — Far-right presidential hopeful Marine Le Pen has criticized France’s participation in European defense programs, arguing they’re a waste of money that should be spent on the country’s military instead. “[French President Emmanuel] Macron has consistently encouraged European institutions to interfere in our defense policy,” she told French lawmakers on Wednesday. Slamming the European Defence Fund and the European Peace Facility — two EU-level defense funding and coordination initiatives — and industrial defense projects between France and Germany, she said: “A great deal of public money has been wasted and precious years have been lost, for our manufacturers, for our armed forces and for the French people.” Le Pen was speaking in the National Assembly during a debate about boosting France’s defense budget. Some 411 MPs of the 522 lawmakers present voted in favor of increasing military expenditures — although the Greens and the Socialists warned they won’t let social spending suffer as a result. The far-right National Rally has an anti-EU agenda and is wary of defense industrial cooperation with Germany. Le Pen criticized Macron’s proposal this past summer to enter into a strategic dialogue with European countries on how France’s nuclear deterrent could contribute to Europe’s security. She also slammed the Future Air Combat System, a project to build a next-generation fighter jet with Germany and Spain, describing it as a “blatant failure.” She hinted she would axe the program if she won power in France’s next presidential elections, scheduled for 2027, along with another initiative to manufacture a next-generation battle tank with Berlin, known as the Main Ground Combat System. Le Pen claimed that France’s military planning law was contributing to EU funds that were, in turn, being spent on foreign defense contractors. “Cutting national defense budgets to create a European defense system actually means financing American, Korean or Israeli defense companies,” she said. Marine Le Pen criticized Emmanuel Macron’s proposal this past summer to enter into a strategic dialogue with European countries on how France’s nuclear deterrent could contribute to Europe’s security. | Pool Photo by Sebastien Bozon via Getty Images The French government has long pushed for Buy European clauses to be attached to the use of EU money, with mixed results. “[European Commission President Ursula] von der Leyen did not hear you, or perhaps did not listen to you, promising to purchase large quantities of American weapons in the unfair trade agreement with President [Donald] Trump,” Le Pen declared. In reality, the EU-U.S. trade deal agreed earlier this year contains no legally binding obligation to buy U.S. arms.

BRUSSELS — Britain’s top Europe minister defended a decision to keep the U.K. out of the EU’s customs union — despite sounding bullish on a speedy reset of ties with the bloc in the first half of 2026. Speaking to POLITICO in Brussels where he was attending talks with Maroš Šefčovič, the EU trade commissioner, Nick Thomas-Symonds said a non-binding British parliamentary vote on Tuesday on rejoining the tariff-free union — pushed by the Liberal Democrats, but supported by more than a dozen Labour MPs — risked reviving bitter arguments about Brexit. Thomas-Symonds described the gambit by the Lib Dems — which had the backing of one of Labour’s most senior backbenchers, Meg Hillier — as “Brexit Redux.” And he accused Ed Davey, the Lib Dem leader, of wanting “to go back to the arguments of the past.” The Lib Dems have drawn support from disillusioned Labour voters, partly inspired by the party’s more forthright position on moving closer to the EU. But Thomas-Symonds defended Labour’s manifesto commitment to remain outside the single market and the customs union. “The strategy that I and the government have been pursuing is based on our mandate from the general election of 2024, that we would not go back to freedom of movement, we would not go back to the customs union or the single market,” the British minister for European Union relations said. Thomas-Symonds said this remained a “forward-looking, ruthlessly pragmatic approach” that is “rooted in the challenges that Britain has in the mid 2020s.” He pointed out that post-Brexit Britain outside of the customs union has signed trade deals with India and the United States, demonstrating the “advantages of the negotiating freedoms Britain has outside the EU.” ‘GET ON WITH IT’ Speaking to POLITICO’s Anne McElvoy for the “Politics at Sam and Anne’s” podcast, out on Thursday, Thomas-Symonds was optimistic that a grand “reset” of U.K.-EU relations would progress more quickly in the new year. The two sides are trying to make headway on a host of areas including a youth mobility scheme and easing post-Brexit restrictions on food and drink exports. “I think if you look at the balance of the package and what I’m talking about in terms of the objective on the food and drink agreement, I think you can see a general timetable across this whole package,” he said. Pressed on whether this could happen in the first half of 2026,  the U.K. minister sounded upbeat: “I think the message from both of us to our teams will be to get on with it.”  The Brussels visit comes after talks over Britain’s potential entry into a major EU defense program known as SAFE broke down amid disagreement over how much money the U.K. would pay for access to the loans-for-arms scheme. The program is aimed at re-arming Europe more speedily to face the threat from Russia. Asked if the collapse of those talks showed the U.K. had miscalculated its ability to gain support in a crucial area of re-connection, Thomas-Symonds replied: “We do always impose a very strict value for money. What we would not do is contribute at a level that isn’t in our national interest.” The issued had “not affected the forward momentum in terms of the rest of the negotiation,” he stressed. YOUTH MOBILITY STANDOFF Thomas-Symonds is a close ally of Prime Minister Keir Starmer and has emboldened the under-fire British leader to foreground his pro-Europe credentials. The minister for European relations suggested his own elevation in the British government — he will now attend Cabinet on a permanent basis — was a sign of Starmer’s intent to focus on closer relations with Europe and tap into regret over a post-Brexit loss of business opportunities to the U.K. Fleshing out the details of a “youth mobility” scheme — which would allow young people from the EU and the U.K. to spend time studying, traveling, or working in each other’s countries — has been an insistent demand of EU countries, notably Germany and the Netherlands. Yet progress has foundered over how to prevent the scheme being regarded  as a back-door for immigration to the U.K. — and how exactly any restrictions on numbers might be set and implemented. Speaking to POLITICO, Thomas-Symonds hinted at British impatience to proceed with the program, while stressing: “It has to be capped, time-limited, and  it’ll be a visa-operated scheme. “Those are really important features, but I sometimes think on this you can end up having very dry discussion about the design when actually this is a real opportunity for young Brits and for young Europeans to live, work, study, enjoy other cultures.” The British government is sensitive to the charge that the main beneficiaries of the scheme will be students or better-off youngsters. “I’m actually really excited about this,” Thomas-Symonds said, citing his own working-class background and adding that he would have benefited from a chance to spend time abroad as a young man “And the thing that strikes me as well is making sure this is accessible to people from all different backgrounds,” he said. Details however still appear contentious: The EU’s position remains that the scheme should not be capped but should have a break clause in the event of a surge in numbers. Berlin in particular has been reluctant to accept the Starmer government’s worries that the arrangement might be seen as adding to U.K. immigration figures, arguing that British students who are outside many previous exchange programs would also be net beneficiaries.  Thomas-Symonds did not deny a stand-off, saying: “When there are ongoing talks about particular issues, I very much respect the confidentiality and trust on the ongoing talks.”  Britain’s most senior foreign minister, Yvette Cooper, on Wednesday backed a hard cap on the number of people coming in under a youth mobility scheme. She told POLITICO in a separate interview that such a scheme needs to be “balanced.” “The UK-EU relationship is really important and is being reset, and we’re seeing cooperation around a whole series of different things,” she said. We also, at the same time, need to make sure that issues around migration are always properly managed and controlled.” A U.K. official later clarified that Cooper is keen to see an overall cap on numbers. BOOZY GIFT As negotiations move from the technical to the political level this week, Thomas-Symonds sketched out plans for a fresh Britain-EU summit in Brussels when the time is right. “In terms of the date, I just want to make sure that we have made sufficient progress, to demonstrate that progress in a summit,” Nick Thomas-Symonds said. “I think that the original [post-Brexit] Trade and Cooperation Agreement did not cover services in the way that it should have done,” he added. “We want to move forward on things like mutual recognition of professional qualifications.” Thomas-Symonds, one of the government’s most ardent pro-Europeans, meanwhile told POLITICO he had forged a good relationship with “Maroš” (Šefčovič) – and had even brought him a Christmas present of a bottle of House of Commons whisky. “So there’s no doubt that there is that trajectory of closer U.K.-EU cooperation,” he quipped. Dan Bloom and Esther Webber contributed reporting.

Iris Ferguson is a global adviser to Loom and a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for Arctic and global resilience. Ann Mettler is a distinguished visiting fellow at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy and a former director general of the European Commission. After much pressure, European leaders delayed a decision this week amid division on whether to tighten market access through a “Made in Europe” mandate and redouble efforts to reduce the bloc’s strategic dependencies — particularly on China. This decision may appear technocratic, but the hold-up signals its importance and reflects a larger strategic reality shared across the Atlantic. Security, industry and energy have all fused into a single race to control the systems that power modern economies and militaries. And increasingly, success will hinge on whether the U.S. and Europe can confront this reality together, starting with the one domain that’s shaping every other: energy. While traditional defense spending still grabs headlines, today’s battlefield is being reshaped just as profoundly by energy flows and critical inputs. Advanced batteries for drones, portable power for forward-deployed units and mineral supply chains for next-generation platforms — these all point to the simple truth that technological and operational superiority increasingly depends on who controls the next generation of energy systems. But as Europe and the U.S. look to maintain their edge, they must rethink not just how they produce and move energy, but how to secure the industrial base behind it. Energy sovereignty now sits at the center of our shared security, and in a world where adversaries can weaponize supply chains just as easily as airspace or sea lanes, the future will belong to those who build energy systems that are resilient and interoperable by design. The Pentagon already understands this. It has tested distributed power to shorten vulnerable fuel lines in war games across the Indo-Pacific; it has watched closely how mobile generation units keep the grid alive under Russian attack in Ukraine; and it is exploring ways to deliver energy without relying on exposed logistics via new research on solar power beaming. Each of these cases clearly demonstrates that strategic endurance now depends on energy agility and security. But currently, many of these systems depend on materials and manufacturing chains that are dominated by a strategic rival: From batteries and magnets to rare earth processing, China controls our critical inputs. This isn’t just an economic liability, it’s a national security vulnerability for both Europe and the U.S. We’re essentially building the infrastructure of the future with components that could be withheld, surveilled or compromised. That risk isn’t theoretical. China’s recent export controls on key minerals are already disrupting defense and energy manufacturers — a sharp reminder of how supply chain leverage can be a form of coercion, and of our reliance on a fragile ecosystem for the very technologies meant to make us more independent. So, how do we modernize our energy systems without deepening these unnecessary dependencies and build trusted interdependence among allies instead? The solution starts with a shift in mindset that must then translate into decisive policy action. Simply put, as a matter of urgency, energy and tech resilience must be treated as shared infrastructure, cutting across agencies, sectors and alliances. Defense procurement can be a catalyst here. For example, investing in dual-use technologies like advanced batteries, hardened micro-grids and distributed generation would serve both military needs and broader resilience. These aren’t just “green” tools — they’re strategic assets that improve mission effectiveness, while also insulating us from coercion. And done right, such investment can strengthen defense, accelerate innovation and also help drive down costs. Next, we need to build new coalitions for critical minerals, batteries, trusted manufacturing and cyber-secure infrastructure. Just as NATO was built for collective defense, we now need economic and technological alliances that ensure shared strategic autonomy. Both the upcoming White House initiative to strengthen the supply chain for artificial intelligence technology and the recently announced RESourceEU initiative to secure raw materials illustrate how partners are already beginning to rewire systems for resilience. Germany gave the bloc one such example by moving to reduce its reliance on Chinese-made wind components in favor of European suppliers. | Tan Kexing/Getty Images Finally, we must also address existing dependencies strategically and head-on. This means rethinking how and where we source key materials, including building out domestic and allied capacity in areas long neglected. Germany recently gave the bloc one such example by moving to reduce its reliance on Chinese-made wind components in favor of European suppliers. Moving forward, measures like this need EU-wide adoption. By contrast, in the U.S., strong bipartisan support for reducing reliance on China sits alongside proposals to halt domestic battery and renewable incentives, undercutting the very industries that enhance resilience and competitiveness. This is the crux of the matter. Ultimately, if Europe and the U.S. move in parallel rather than together, none of these efforts will succeed — and both will be strategically weaker as a result. The EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas recently warned that we must “act united” or risk being affected by Beijing’s actions — and she’s right. With a laser focus on interoperability and cost sharing, we could build systems that operate together in a shared market of close to 800 million people. The real challenge isn’t technological, it’s organizational. Whether it be Bretton Woods, NATO or the Marshall Plan, the West has strategically built together before, anchoring economic resilience with national defense. The difference today is that the lines between economic security, energy access and defense capability are fully blurred. Sustainable, agile energy is now part of deterrence, and long-term security depends on whether the U.S. and Europe can build energy systems that reinforce and secure one another. This is a generational opportunity for transatlantic alignment; a mutually reinforcing way to safeguard economic interests in the face of systemic competition. And to lead in this new era, we must design for it — together and intentionally. Or we risk forfeiting the very advantages our alliance was built to protect.

President Donald Trump’s pursuit of an end to the war between Russia and Ukraine is increasingly being driven by his own impatience — with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and European leaders who Trump believes are standing in the way of both peace and future economic cooperation between Washington and Moscow. Trump, who has called for Russia’s return to the G7 and spoken repeatedly about his eagerness to bring Russia back into the economic fold, laid bare his frustrations Monday at the White House with POLITICO’s Dasha Burns for a special episode of “The Conversation.” He derided European leaders as talkers who “don’t produce” and declared that Zelenskyy has “to play ball” given that, in his view, “Russia has the upper hand.” Zelenskyy, who Trump grumbled hadn’t read the latest peace proposal, spent Monday working with the leaders of France, Germany and Britain on a revision of the Americans’ 28-point proposal that he said has been shaved down to 20 points. “We took out openly anti-Ukrainian points,” Zelenskyy told a group of reporters in Kyiv, emphasizing that Ukraine still needs stronger security guarantees and that he isn’t ready to give Russia more land in the Donbas than its military currently holds. With Russia unlikely to budge from its demands, the White House-driven peace talks appear stalled. And as Trump’s irritation deepens, pressure is mounting on the Europeans backing Zelenskyy to prove Trump wrong. “He says we don’t produce, and I hate to say it, but there’s been some truth to that,” said a European official, one of three interviewed for this report who were granted anonymity because they were not authorized to speak publicly. “We are doing it now, but we have been slow to realize we are the solution to our problem.” The official pointed to NATO’s increased defense spending commitments and the PURL initiative, through which NATO allies are buying U.S. weapons to send to Ukraine, as evidence that things have started to shift. But in the near term, the European Union is struggling to convince Belgium to support a nearly $200 billion loan to Ukraine funded with seized Russian assets. “If we fail on this one, we’re in trouble,” said a second European official. Trump’s mounting pressure on Ukraine makes clear that months of careful management of the president through private texts, public flattery and general deference has gotten Europe very little. But Liana Fix, a senior fellow for Europe at the Council on Foreign Relations, said that the leaders on the other side of the Atlantic “know very well that they can’t just stand up to Trump and tell him courageously that, you know, this is not how you treat Europe, because [of] the existential dependence that is still there between Europe and the United States.” Still, some in Europe continue to express shock and revulsion over Trump’s lopsided diplomacy in favor of Russia, disputing the president’s assessment during his POLITICO interview that Putin’s army has the upper hand despite its slow advance across the Donbas, more than half of which is now in Russian control. “Our view is not that Ukraine is losing. If Russia was so powerful they would have been able to finish the war within 24 hours,” a third European diplomat said. “If you think that Russia is winning, what does that mean — you give them everything? That’s not a sustainable peace. You’ll reward the Russians for their aggression and they will look for more – not only in Ukraine but also in Europe.” Trump has refused to approve additional defense aid to Ukraine, while blasting his predecessor for sending billions in aid — approved by Democrats and many Republicans in Congress — to help the country defend itself following Russia’s Feb. 2022 invasion. Jake Sullivan, President Joe Biden’s national security adviser, said Trump’s brief that Russia is prevailing on the battlefield doesn’t match the reality. “Russia has not achieved its strategic objectives in Ukraine. It has completely failed in its initial objective to take Kyiv and subjugate the country, and it has even failed in its more limited objective in taking all of the Donbas and neutering Ukraine from a security perspective,” Sullivan said, adding that he thinks Ukraine could prevail militarily with stronger U.S. support. “But if the United States throws Ukraine under the bus and essentially takes Russia’s side functionally, then things, of course, are much more difficult for Ukraine, and that seems to be the direction of travel this administration is taking.” The White House did not respond to a request for additional comment. Clearly eager to normalize relations with Moscow, Trump appears to be motivated more by the prospect of cutting deals with Putin than maintaining a transatlantic alliance built on shared democratic principles. Fiona Hill, a Russia expert who served on Trump’s national security council in his first term, noted that the U.S.-Russia diplomacy involves three people with business backgrounds and investment portfolios: special envoy Steve Witkoff and Trump son-in-law Jared Kushner on the U.S. side and Russia’s Kirill Dmitriev, the head of Russia’s sovereign investment fund. “Putin’s always thinking about what’s the angle here? How do I approach somebody? He’s got the number of President Trump,” Hill said Monday on a Brookings Institution podcast. “He knows he wants to make a deal, and he’s emphasizing this, and all the context is business, not really as diplomacy.” Additionally, Trump is eager to end Europe’s decades-long dependence on the U.S., which he believes has been saddled with the burden of its continental security for far too long. Ending the war with a deal that largely favors Putin would not only burnish Trump’s own self-conception as a global peacemaker — it would serve final notice to Europe that many of America’s oldest and most steadfast allies are truly on their own. Trump’s new national security strategy, released last week, made that point explicit, devoting more words to the threat of Europe’s civilizational decline — castigating the entire continent over its immigration and economic policies — than to threats posed by China, Russia or North Korea. Asked by POLITICO if European countries would continue to be U.S. allies, Trump demurred: “It depends,” he said, harshly criticizing immigration policies. “They want to be politically correct, and it makes them weak.” Europe, despite years of warnings from Trump and their own growing awareness about the need for what French President Emanuel Macron has called “strategic autonomy,” has been slow to mobilize its defenses to be able to defend the continent — and Ukraine — on its own. At Trump’s behest, NATO members agreed in June to increase defense spending to 5 percent of GDP over the coming decade. And NATO is now purchasing U.S. weapons to send to Ukraine through a new NATO initiative. But it may be too little, too late as the war grinds into a fourth winter with Ukraine’s military low on ammunition, weapons and morale. “That is why they will continue to engage this administration despite the strategy,” Fix said. And while Trump sees Ukraine and European stubbornness as the primary impediment to peace, many longtime diplomats believe that it’s his own unwillingness to ratchet up pressure on Moscow — Trump imposed new sanctions on Russian oil last month, only to pull some of them back — that is rendering his peacemaking efforts so fruitless. “It’s not enough to want peace. You’ve got to create a context in which the protagonists are willing to compromise either enthusiastically or reluctantly,” said Richard Haass, the former president of the Council on Foreign Relations who served as a senior adviser to Secretary of State Colin Powell in the George W. Bush administration. “The president has totally failed to do that, so it’s not a question of wordsmithing. In order to succeed at the table, you have to succeed away from the table. And they have failed to do that.” Veronika Melkozerova, Ari Hawkins and Daniella Cheslow contributed to this report.

Europe’s far-right firebrands are rushing to hitch their fortunes to Washington’s new crusade against Brussels. Senior U.S. government officials, including Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, have launched a raft of criticism against what they call EU “censorship” and an “attack” of U.S. tech companies following a €120 million fine from the European Commission on social media platform X. The fine is for breaching EU transparency obligations under the Digital Services Act, the bloc’s content moderation rule book. “The Commission’s attack on X says it all,” Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán said on X on Saturday. “When the Brusselian overlords cannot win the debate, they reach for the fines. Europe needs free speech, not unelected bureaucrats deciding what we can read or say,” he said. “Hats off to Elon Musk for holding the line,” Orbán added. Tech mogul Musk said his response to the penalty would target the EU officials who imposed it.  “The European Commission appreciates censorship & chat control of its citizens. They want to silence critical voices by restricting freedom of speech,” echoed far-right Alternative for Germany leader Alice Weidel. Three right-wing to far-right parties in the EU are pushing to stop and backtrack the integration process of European countries — the European Conservatives and Reformists, the Patriots for Europe, and the Europe of Sovereign Nations. Together they hold 191 out of 720 seats in the European Parliament. The parties’ lawmakers are calling for a range of proposals — from shifting competences from the European to the national level, to dismantling the EU altogether. They defend the primacy of national interests over common European cooperation. Since Donald Trump’s reelection, they have portrayed themselves as the key transatlantic link, mirroring the U.S. president’s political campaigning in Europe, such as pushing for a “Make Europe Great Again” movement. The fresh U.S. criticism of EU institutions has come in handy to amplify their political agendas. “Patriots for Europe will fight to dismantle this censorship regime,” the party said on X. The ECR group — political home to Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni — issued a statement questioning the enforcement of the DSA following the U.S. criticism. “A digital law that lacks legal certainty risks becoming an instrument of political discretion,” ECR co-chairman Nicola Procaccini said on Saturday after the U.S. backlash. The group supported the DSA when it passed through the Parliament, having said in the past the law would “protect freedom of expression, increase trust in online services and contribute to an open digital economy in Europe.”

Soccer may be the world’s most popular pastime, but much about Friday’s lottery draw setting the match schedule for next summer’s World Cup has been programmed with just one fan in mind. Never before has the sports governing body given out a peace prize to a politician eager for one, or booked the Village People and Andrea Bocelli to play alongside. President Donald Trump’s appearance on the Kennedy Center stage will be at least his seventh encounter this year with FIFA President Gianni Infantino, who has logged more face time with Trump this year than any world leader. Infantino’s savvy navigation of the American political scene has helped FIFA build institutional support for a tournament facing unprecedented logistical complications. But that success is beginning to weaken Infantino, as the third-term FIFA president faces newfound internal opposition for his over-the-top courtship of Trump. Our interviews with six international soccer officials across three continents reveal widespread frustration with Infantino’s decision to side with Trump even as White House policies cause chaos for World Cup-bound teams, fans and local organizers, clashing with Infantino’s promise to have a tournament that welcomes the world. “[FIFA] has always promoted a very cozy, close relationship with politicians and political actors in a variety of ways, including by having them in their bodies or running the National Football Associations, for example,” said Miguel Maduro, the chairman of FIFA’s governance and review committee between 2016 and 2017. “This said, the extent of this cozy relationship that we’ve seen and and the public character that has been assumed between Mr. Infantino and Mr. Trump is different even from what we saw in the past,” said Maduro. “It’s not that things like that didn’t happen in the past, but it didn’t happen so obviously and so emphatically as they do now.” Our reporting found that Infantino did not inform his 37-member FIFA Council before creating the FIFA Peace Prize this year, three people familiar with the matter told POLITICO. Over the past year, at least three of FIFA’s eight vice presidents have publicly or privately expressed their concerns about the lengths Infantino is willing to go to please Trump. While Infantino has won his last two terms unopposed, when he stands next for reelection in 2027 he will likely have to answer to FIFA’s 211 member federations for his willing entanglement in the controversies of American politics. Infantino’s allies say that those opposed to many of his soccer-related initiatives — focused on growing the game in emerging markets and expanding FIFA’s flagship tournaments — are using his Trump ties to exploit differences on unrelated issues. “If a challenger to Gianni for the 2027 election emerges, it will be in the next six to eight months and the World Cup will be a litmus test,” said a person involved with World Cup planning granted anonymity to characterize private conversations with top soccer officials. “If something goes off the rails or somebody decides they want to make a run against him, they’re going to use his relationship with Trump to exploit the cracks.” THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENTS Infantino launched his first campaign for FIFA’s presidency as an underdog. A corruption scandal had toppled much of FIFA’s leadership in 2015, forcing a so-called “extraordinary congress” the next year in which members would vote to decide who would complete the unfinished term vacated by the newly suspended president Sepp Blatter. FIFA, comprised of national soccer federations, picks its president through a secret ballot of those members — one nation, one vote. To win in a multi-candidate field, one must capture two-thirds of the total ballots cast, with rounds of voting until a single candidate locks in a two-way majority. The favorite to succeed Blatter was Sheik Salman Bin Ebrahim Al Khalifa, a Bahraini royal who headed the Asian Football Confederation and appeared to have stitched together a coalition of Asian and African nations. Infantino, a polyglot Swiss-Italian lawyer who had spent seven years as secretary general of European confederation UEFA, pitched himself as someone who could disperse the organization’s wealth back to member countries. “The money of FIFA is your money,” Infantino said in a speech shortly before the vote. “It is not the money of the FIFA president. It’s your money.” Infantino and Al Khalifa ran neck-in-neck in the first round. With a clear two-person race, the United States — which had been supporting Prince Ali bin Al-Hussein of Jordan, who finished a distant third — switched its vote to Infantino in the second round, triggering a rush of support from the Western Hemisphere that gave Infantino a conclusive 115-vote total. A fourth candidate, former French diplomat Jérome Champagne, credited Infantino’s victory to “a strong alliance between Europe and North America and the Anglo-Saxon world.” “Prepare yourself well but be vigilant,” Blatter warned Infantino upon his election in a public letter. “While everyone supports you and tells you nice words, know that once you are the president, friends become rare.” Once in office, Infantino’s initiatives were focused on expanding FIFA’s most valuable properties. He converted a ten-day, exhibition-like competition among seven regional club champions into the month-long FIFA Club World Cup. He also pushed, with mixed success, to grow the size and scope of the World Cup and increase its frequency. In 2017, Infantino announced that the first World Cup under an expanded format — up from 32 countries participating to 48, adding a week of matches to the schedule — would take place in the United States, Canada and Mexico. Facing the first tournament in which hosting responsibilities would be shared by three countries, Infantino visited Trump to secure assurances of government support. Infantino went on to win subsequent terms in 2019 and 2023, and when Trump returned to the White House for his second, in 2025, their political trajectories became permanently intertwined. Infantino set out to raise his profile in American life and his relationships with the country’s political class, including through a campaign-style tour through many of the American cities hosting matches for the inaugural Club World Cup in 2025 and the World Cup the following summer. Infantino sat next to Trump at the tournament’s final, held at New Jersey’s MetLife Stadium in July, dragging him onto the winners’ platform as Infantino went to award a trophy and medals to champions Chelsea. Trump lingered awkwardly on stage to the befuddlement of Chelsea’s players, who had not expected they would share the moment with an American politician. Other appearances with Trump placed Infantino squarely between a president intent on solving overseas conflicts and punishing foes, while closing American borders to visitors and trade, and FIFA member nations who may hold starkly different views, or worse. Infantino stood quietly in the Oval Office as he said he would not rule out strikes against fellow World Cup co-host Mexico to target drug cartels, and joined Trump’s entourage on a trip designed to cultivate investment opportunities in the Persian Gulf. When FIFA had to delay the opening of its annual congress in Asuncion, Paraguay, to accommodate Infantino’s travel from a Saudi-U.S. Investment Forum in Riyadh, two FIFA vice presidents were among those who joined English Football Association chairwoman Debbie Hewitt and other federation heads exiting in protest. European confederation UEFA — with 55 member nations, FIFA’s largest — attacked him with unusually pointed language. “To have the timetable changed at the last minute for what appears to be simply to accommodate private political interests,” UEFA wrote in its statement, “does the game no service and appears to put its interests second.” GIANNI ON THE SPOT In September, Trump said he would try to move scheduled World Cup matches out of Democratic-run jurisdictions that are “even a little bit dangerous.” Infantino, whose organization had spent years vetting and preparing those cities for the tournament, said nothing. But a potential rival to Infantino’s leadership took issue with both the American president’s threat — since repeated but not acted upon — and the FIFA president’s silence. “It’s FIFA’s tournament, FIFA’s jurisdiction, FIFA makes those decisions,” FIFA vice president Victor Montagliani, the organization’s leading figure from North America, said at a sports-business conference in London six days later. While president of the Canadian Soccer Association, Montagliani helped to secure his country’s participation in the three-way so-called “United Bid” for next summer’s World Cup. (The Vancouver insurance executive also helped bring the Women’s World Cup to Canada in 2015.) He now serves as president of CONCACAF, the 41-member regional federation encompassing the 41 nations of North America, Central America and the Caribbean. Close to Prime Minister Mark Carney, Montagliani has come to believe Infantino has catered too much to Trump for a tournament realized through the cooperation of three nations, according to three of the people familiar with the dynamics of FIFA’s leadership. (Montagliani declined an interview request.) The leaders of the United States, Mexico and Canada will all participate in a ceremonial ball draw in today’s draw. “With all due respect to current world leaders, football is bigger than them and football will survive their regime and their government and their slogans,” Montagliani told an interviewer at the London conference in late September. “That’s the beauty of our game, is that it is bigger than any individual and bigger than any country.” Montagliani’s “FIFA’s jurisdiction” remarks did not land well with Infantino’s inner sanctum. “It is ultimately the government’s responsibility to decide what’s in the best interest of public safety,” FIFA said in a statement to POLITICO in October after Trump’s next round of threats to relocate matches. The relationship between Infantino and Montagliani has further soured in recent months as Trump reignited tensions between Washington and Ottawa over an anti-tariff ad taking aim at U.S. trade policy, according to a person close to Montagliani granted anonymity to candidly characterize his thinking. Montagliani has his own thoughts on how far relationships with government figures should go but respects Infantino’s perspective, that person said, maintaining the two men had a good relationship despite occasional differences. Others around FIFA have their own parochial concerns with Trump. Despite being among the first teams to qualify for the tournament, Iran threatened to boycott Friday’s draw because some members of its delegation were denied visas for travel to Washington. According to a FIFA official, Iran ultimately reversed course and sent Iranian head coach Ardeshir Ghalenoy after FIFA worked closely with the U.S. government and Iran’s soccer federation. Another qualifying team, Haiti, is also covered by the 19-country travel ban that Trump signed in June. The State Department said that while the policy has a specific carveout for World Cup competitors and their families, the exception will not be applied to fans or spectators. The president of the Japanese Football Association, Tsuneyasu Miyamoto, told POLITICO in an interview last month that he was worried that Trump’s immigration policies could subject Japanese travelers to “deportations happening unnecessarily.” Infantino has stopped short of pressuring Trump to make exceptions to immigration policy for the sake of soccer. FIFA officials have said that when it chooses a tournament location it does not expect that country to significantly alter its immigration laws or vetting standards for the tournament, although many past hosts have chosen to relax visa requirements for World Cup ticketholders. Many European countries’ soccer federations, led by Ireland and Norway, have pushed to ban Israel from international soccer due to its military invasion of Gaza. The movement received an apparent boost from UEFA President Aleksander Čeferin, who supported unfurling a banner that read “Stop Killing Children; Stop Killing Civilians” on the field before a UEFA Super Cup match in August. “If such a big thing is going on, such a terrible thing that doesn’t allow me to sleep — not me, all my colleagues,” — nobody in this organization said we shouldn’t do it. No one,” Čeferin told POLITICO in August. “Then you have to do what is the right thing to do.” European countries were set on a collision with Trump, whose State Department indicated it would work to “fully stop any effort to attempt to ban Israel’s national soccer team from the World Cup.” UEFA pulled back on a planned vote over Israel’s place as a Trump-negotiated peace agreement took hold. Infantino joined Trump and other heads of state in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, for a summit to implement the agreement’s first phase. Nothing threatens to awaken opposition to Infantino as much as his decision to invent a FIFA Peace Prize just as Trump began to complain in October about being passed over for one from the Norwegian Nobel Committee. According to a draft run-of-show for Friday’s draw, Trump is scheduled to speak for two minutes today after receiving the Peace Prize. “He is just implementing what he said he would do,” Infantino said at an American Business Forum in Miami, also attended by Trump, on the day news of the prize was made public. “So I think we should all support what he’s doing because I think it’s looking pretty good.” According to FIFA rules, the organization’s president needs sign-off from the 37-member FIFA council on certain items like the international match calendar, host designations for upcoming FIFA tournaments, and financial matters. FIFA’s charter does not contemplate the creation of a new prize specifically to award a world leader, but those familiar with the organization’s governance say it may violate an ethics policy that requires officers “remain politically neutral.” (In 2019, FIFA honored Argentina’s President Mauricio Macri, who previously led venerable club Boca Juniors, with its first-ever Living Football Award.) “Giving this award to someone that is an active political actor, by itself, is, at least in my opinion, likely a violation of the principle of political neutrality,” said Maduro, a Portuguese legal scholar appointed to oversee FIFA’s governance in the wake of the corruption scandal that helped bring Infantino to office. “We need to know two things: how the award was created and who then took the decision to whom the award was to be given. Both of these decisions should not be taken by the president himself.” Infantino fully bypassed the FIFA Council in deciding to create and award the prize to Trump, according to three people familiar with conversations between Infantino and the council’s members. Even the vice presidents who were given a heads-up ahead of time say they were simply being told after the decision was made. FOUR MORE YEARS? Infantino, a quintessential European first elected with support from his home continent, now sees his strongest base of support in Asia, Africa, and the Gulf countries. He won his last two terms by acclamation, after delivering on his promises to disperse the $11 billion FIFA takes in each World Cup cycle. The FIFA Forward program, launched in 2016, sent $2.8 billion back to member federations and regional confederations in its first six years, funding everything from the development of Papua New Guinea’s women’s squad to an air dome for winter training in Mongolia. But Infantino’s political choices may be costing him in Europe, where the sport is more established and national federations are less dependent on FIFA’s largesse. Infantino’s defenders say that European soccer officials, including Čeferin, have turned against him because they see his attempts to expand the World Cup and institute the Club World Cup as a threat to the primacy of their regional competitions. Many in international soccer see Montagliani as the most viable potential challenger, although a person close to him says he has no intention of seeking FIFA’s presidency in 2027 and instead plans to seek reelection that year to what would have to be his final term as CONCACAF’s president. But he fits the profile of someone best positioned to dethrone the incumbent, ironically by stitching together the type of trans-Atlantic alliance that lifted Infantino to his first victory. “Mexico is not happy. Canada is not happy, and that’s because they’re politically not happy with Trump,” said a senior national-federation official, granted anonymity to candidly discuss dynamics within CONCACAF. “There’s that direct tension.”

BRUSSELS — Ursula von der Leyen is separating herself from the corruption allegations engulfing the EU’s diplomatic service, with staffers saying it is a non-issue for the Commission chief. After Belgian authorities conducted dawn raids on Tuesday and detained the EU’s former top diplomat Federica Mogherini and ex-European External Action Service Secretary-General Stefano Sannino, Commission officials dismissed it as an EEAS problem — noting that while Sannino took on a top job at the Commission earlier this year, the probe dates back to his previous role. “It’s not the Commission distancing itself, it’s a different institution that’s being investigated,” an EU official said. Helpfully for von der Leyen, Sannino fell on his sword Wednesday, with the Commission announcing he was gone from the helm of its Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf department (DG MENA). Three Commission officials forcefully argued the investigation launched Tuesday — into allegations the EEAS fraudulently awarded a tender to run a training academy for future EU diplomats to the College of Europe in Bruges — had nothing to do with von der Leyen, given the diplomatic service is a separate institution from the Commission. An EU official characterized attacks on the Commission chief as unfair and unwise, coming at a sensitive time when von der Leyen is attempting to shore up support for Ukraine ahead of a crunch December summit of EU leaders. The events take place against the backdrop of tensions between von der Leyen and the current boss of the EEAS, Kaja Kallas. Kallas, who was not in office at the time of the alleged corruption, has also sought to distance herself from the probe. On Wednesday, the former Estonian prime minister sought to drive home the idea that she had been working to clean up the EEAS since her appointment as the EU’s high representative in December 2024. In a letter to EEAS staff seen by POLITICO, the top EU diplomat wrote that she found the allegations against Mogherini and Sannino “deeply shocking,” but that these had predated her time at the EEAS. In the months since then, her team had launched internal reforms including setting up an “Anti-Fraud Strategy” and building stronger cooperation with the EU’s anti-fraud agency, OLAF, and the EPPO, she said. But at issue is who knew what in relation to the claims against Sannino. According to four EEAS employees, speaking to POLITICO in interviews prior to Tuesday’s raids, wider questions were raised about the way Sannino handled appointments for coveted diplomatic posts during his time at the service, including allegations that he had awarded them to favorites. Officials from OLAF visited the secretary-general’s offices prior to his departure from the EEAS, according to two people familiar with the matter. Kaja Kallas, who was not in office at the time of the alleged corruption, has also sought to distance herself from the probe. | Dursun Aydemir/Getty Images But an EU official said the Commission was not aware of prior complaints about Sannino when he was hired to be the head of a new department covering the Middle East and North Africa. In its statement announcing Tuesday’s raids, the EPPO said it had requested that authorities lift the immunity ― typically given to diplomats, protecting them from legal action ― of “several suspects” prior to the probe, and that this was granted. It did not specify which bodies it had made the requests to. The EU official mentioned above said the EPPO had directed a request to lift Sannino’s immunity to the EEAS in September, and that the Commission had not been made aware of it. An EEAS official did not respond directly to a question about whether such a request had been received. The official said the EEAS would have followed the law in such circumstances. The allegations are not proven and Mogherini, Sannino and the other individual who was detained are presumed innocent until deemed guilty by a court. Sannino did not immediately respond to a request for comment via his European Commission office. Tuesday’s events could also aggravate tensions between EU politicians and Belgian authorities. Two officials questioned the quality of the Belgian justice system, noting that authorities had held flashy press conference and detained suspects but then failed to advance cases in the 2022 “Qatargate” scandal and this year’s bribery probe into Chinese tech giant Huawei’s lobbying activities.

BERLIN — German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s conservative-led coalition received an unsolicited political lifeline from an unlikely place — but it comes at a cost. Germany’s far-left Die Linke ― The Left ― party on Wednesday announced that its lawmakers will abstain from a vote on a pension package set for Friday, a move that effectively assures the package will pass and potentially saves Merz from a humiliation that would have further undermined his already-weak coalition government. The announcement from far-left leaders came as Merz was attempting to quell a rebellion by 18 young lawmakers inside his own conservative bloc who argue that current pension benefits aren’t sustainable. Because Merz’s coalition has a narrow parliamentary majority of only 12 votes, passage of the pension package had remained in doubt. The Left’s leaders said they were acting not to help the coalition, but rather to protect pensioners from cuts. Conservatives “have been playing power games at the expense of millions of pensioners across the country,” The Left’s parliamentary group leader Heidi Reichinnek said in a statement. “It is absolutely disgraceful that the conservative bloc does not even allow pensioners to have butter on their bread.” The Left’s decision to abstain bails Merz out of an immediate political mess that casted doubt on the ability of his coalition — an ideologically divergent alliance between Merz’s conservatives and the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD) — to pass key legislation just several months after taking office. Johannes Winkel, a young conservative lawmaker, said in an online post that he intended to vote against the pension package on Friday. | John Macdougal/Getty Images At the same time, The Left’s unsolicited help is an embarrassment of its own kind, creating the politically damaging impression that Merz’s coalition required the support of far-left foes his party views as too radical to work with. Should The Left’s 64 lawmakers follow through on the vow to abstain in the Bundestag on Friday, it will bring down overall number of votes coalition lawmakers need to pass the pension legislation, providing indirect help. In a kind of face-saving measure, conservative leaders continue to try to secure support of the young conservative rebels for the pension package. Yet, on Wednesday, it was still unclear whether the effort would bear fruit. Coalition leaders last Friday announced a compromise on pensions — agreeing to weigh far more sweeping reforms as early as next year — that they had hoped would assuage the concerns of young conservatives. But many continue to reject the immediate pension package. Johannes Winkel, a young conservative lawmaker, said in an online post that he intended to vote against the pension package on Friday. “Germany urgently needs reforms because demographic change will have an unprecedented impact on public finances,” he said. “Intergenerational justice finally requires practical decisions instead of symbolic politics.” Rasmus Buchsteiner contributed reporting.

The EU is adding Russia to its blacklist of countries at high risk of money laundering and financing terrorism, according to two EU officials and a document seen by POLITICO. The global watchdog Financial Action Task Force (FATF) suspended Russia as a member after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but failed to blacklist it, despite evidence presented by the Ukrainian government, because of opposition from countries in the BRICS group of emerging economies, which includes Brazil, India, China, and South Africa. EU lawmakers called on the Commission many times to do what FATF was not able to. The Commission committed to complete a review by the end of 2025 to get their support to remove the United Arab Emirates and Gibraltar from the list earlier this year. POLITICO saw a draft of the Russia decision, which will be an annex to the list. In other internal documents, the Commission had said that the assessment was complicated by the lack of information-sharing with Moscow. The EU already has a wide range of sanctions heavily limiting access to EU financial services for Russian firms. The blacklisting is landing as the EU executive is trying to end Belgium’s resistance to using the revenues from Moscow’s frozen assets to fund Ukraine. The move will oblige financial institutions to strengthen due diligence on all transactions and force banks that have not already acted to further de-risk. The EU has usually aligned itself with FATF decisions, but from this year, it has its own Anti-Money Laundering Authority. AMLA will contribute to drafting the blacklist from July 2027. Dutch top official Hennie Verbeek-Kusters, a former chair of the financial intelligence cooperation body Egmont Group, is set to join the AMLA authority executive board after a positive hearing with lawmakers held behind closed doors, one of the EU officials said. A vote on the appointment is due on Dec. 15, said a third official.