PARIS — The military recruitment center across from the Eiffel Tower, in the posh 7th district’s historic École Militaire, is filled with promotional posters for the armed forces. In the lobby, I met 26-year-old Charlotte, who currently works in marketing for a private company but is considering joining the French army. “The geopolitical context is inspiring me to sign up and serve, using my skills,” she told me. “I’m sometimes wondering why I am doing marketing when I could be a linguist in the army or an intelligence agency.” The geopolitical context she’s referring to is obvious to everyone in France, which has been at the forefront of Europe’s efforts to cope with the changing U.S. attitude toward its NATO and EU allies. Charlotte, who I agreed to identify by her first name to protect her privacy, told me that she studied Russian and recognizes that Europeans need to become more “sovereign” because they cannot rely on U.S. President Donald Trump to defend the continent against Russia. And she’s ready to help. Trump continues to antagonize the United States’ traditional European allies, deriding them as he did in an interview with POLITICO earlier this month as “weak” and a “decaying group of nations.” And for its part, France wants to prove him wrong. Like many other European nations, France sees Russia has a growing threat to the continent. So it is preparing to defend itself against what the country’s chief of defense staff, Gen. Fabien Mandon, called a “violent test” from Russia in the next three to four years that it would need to counter without much, if any, help from Washington. To do that, France is boosting military spending, increasing weapons production and doubling the reserve forces. As of next year, France will also reintroduce voluntary military service for young adults, primarily 18- and 19-year-olds. The goal is to enroll 3,000 new recruits next summer, 10,000 in 2030 and 50,000 in 2035. These defense efforts come as most of Europe’s nations are having to rethink their security posture in the most meaningful way since the Cold War ended. The challenge is even higher as it’s becoming increasingly clear they can no longer rely on the United States as a primary security provider. Successive U.S. presidents — including Barack Obama and Joe Biden — have warned over the past decade that Washington would eventually have to focus on the Indo-Pacific region instead of Europe, but the Trump administration has already matched those words with action. That is putting the spotlight on France, the EU’s only nuclear power and a country with independent weapons makers that has long warned the continent should become more autonomous in areas such as technology and defense. According to Guillaume Lagane, an expert on defense policy and a teacher at the Sciences Po public research university, the way France and Germany, the EU’s largest countries, respond in the coming months and years will determine whether other European countries will turn to them for Europe’s defense or try to retain bilateral ties with Washington at the expense of EU and NATO unity. “If France and Germany propose credible options, European countries may hesitate, otherwise they will not,” he said. “If only the American guarantee is credible, they will do everything they can to buy it.” To come across as a credible leader, he added, France could look into stationing nuclear-capable Rafale fighter jets in Germany or Poland; compensate for the capability gaps potentially left behind by the U.S.; and replace U.S. soldiers who are leaving Europe with French troops. They are going to need a lot of Charlottes. In Paris’ corridors of power, the French elite has always known this moment would come. “We’re neither surprised, in shock or in denial,” a high-ranking French defense official told me in an interview. “Our first short-term test is Ukraine. We Europeans must organize ourselves to face this reality and adapt without being caught off guard.” For the past week, I’ve been talking to French and European officials in Paris and elsewhere to gauge how they are metabolizing the antagonism from Washington. In many cases, I agreed to withhold their names so they could speak more candidly at a moment of high tension with the United States and among European allies. France’s distrust of America dates back to 1956, when U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower forced it and Britain to back down from a military intervention to regain control of the Suez Canal from Egypt, leaving Paris feeling betrayed and humiliated. Since then, unlike most other European countries, France’s defense policy has been based on the assumption that the U.S. is not a reliable ally and that the Western European nation should be able to defend itself on its own if need be. The memory of the Suez incident contributed to former French President Charles de Gaulle’s decision to leave NATO and develop its own nuclear program. Now, European capitals — who until now have been reluctant to think about the continent’s security architecture without the U.S. — are starting to increasingly realize France might have been right all along. “There is a kind of intellectual validation of the French position, which recognizes that interests do not always converge between allies and that the U.S. involvement in European security was the result of an alignment that was not eternal,” said Élie Tenenbaum, director of the Paris-based IFRI security studies center. Since Trump came back to power in January, the clues of Washington’s disengagement from — if not disdain of — Europe have been hard to ignore. Trump’s disparaging comments about Europe earlier this month came only a few days after a U.S. National Security Strategy made thinly-veiled calls for regime change in European countries. A leaked longer version of the document openly says the U.S. should pull Austria, Hungary, Italy and Poland away from the EU. In the months leading up to the strategy’s release, the Trump administration has repeatedly cast doubt on America’s commitment to NATO’s collective defense pact, Article 5 of the NATO charter, and announced a U.S. troop reduction from frontline state Romania. Even more strikingly, the U.S. threatened to annex Greenland by force and is cozying up to Russia, including in peace talks to end the war in Ukraine. Less than one year after Trump returned to the White House, influential German voices — in one of Europe’s most transatlanticist countries — are no longer looking at Washington as an ally. Denmark’s military intelligence service has now classified the U.S. as a security risk. In this context, smaller European nations expect the larger ones to step up. “We need the bigger countries to lead the way,” a European defense official from a mid-size nation emphasized in a private briefing. “France has been consistent on that for quite some time, Germany is also important. It’s always helpful if they lead by example.” A Paris-based European diplomat echoed that call for French leadership: “We need Macron to take the initiative [on European defense], who else is going to do it if not France?” Another European official said France could become a “political and military hub,” adding that Paris is ready to lead together with other capitals such as London, Berlin, Rome and Warsaw. Since the war in Ukraine started in 2022, Paris has pivoted to Europe and reinvested in NATO. For decades, Paris had neglected the alliance — rejoining its integrated military command only in 2009 — and focused mainly on faraway lands such as the African Sahel region, from which the French military ultimately had to withdraw after a series of coups d’état. Now, France is leading a multinational NATO battlegroup in Romania, has beefed up its military footprint in Estonia and is in talks to deploy soldiers in Finland. For frontline states, having a nuclear power present on their soil remains a crucial deterrent against Russia. In a first test for Europe’s ability to think about its own security without the U.S., Paris — otherwise a laggard in terms of military aid to Kyiv — has set up alongside London a so-called coalition of the willing to plan security guarantees for post-war Ukraine. That’s a significant step in European-led defense planning and France’s leadership role has been welcomed in European capitals. However, many of them are still reluctant to deploy military assets to Ukraine without American backing. While the French elite has seen this moment coming, not everyone in France is on board, at least not yet. At this year’s Congress of France’s mayors — an influential gathering held annually in Paris — Mandon told the country’s local elected officials to ready their constituents for a potential war against Russia in the coming years. Standing on a white, round platform in front of French and EU flags, he warned them that France is in danger unless it’s prepared to sacrifice. “If our country falters because it is not prepared to accept losing its children …[or] … to suffer economically because priorities will go to defense production,” he said, “If we are not prepared for that, then we are at risk. But I think we have the moral fortitude.” About 24 hours later, that was all the country was talking about. Far-right and far-left parties alike accused Mandon of war-mongering and overstepping. It’s not up to him to speak to the mayors, they argued; his job is to follow political orders. Even in Emmanuel Macron’s camp, lawmakers privately admitted the general’s wording was ill-advised, even if the message was valid. Eventually, the French president publicly backed him. France’s moment to demonstrate leadership is arriving at a challenging time for Europe’s heavyweight. “If you’re right too early, then you’re wrong,” a high-ranking French military officer told me. Macron’s ill-fated decision to call for a snap election in 2024 has embroiled the country in a political crisis that is still unresolved, and the far-right, NATO-skeptic, EU-skeptic National Rally is on the rise and could come to power as soon as 2027. “Intellectually, we are mentally equipped to understand what is happening in terms of burden shifting, but we don’t really have the means to lead the way at the European level,” said IFRI’s Tenenbaum, adding that Germany is currently in a better position to do so. “French leadership makes sense, it is logical given our relative weight, experience, and capabilities, and European countries recognize this, but there is a mismatch between words and deeds,” he added. Even as Macron pledged more defense spending, it’s very unlikely that France’s fragmented National Assembly will pass the 2026 budget by Dec. 31. The French president said France’s military expenditures will increase by €6.7 billion next year, bringing the country’s total defense spending to more than €57.1 billion. In comparison, German lawmakers this week greenlit €50 billion in weaponry procurement — Germany’s military expenditures are expected to reach more than €82 billion next year. “There will be a new balance between France and Germany in the coming years,” said a third Paris-based European diplomat. Since Macron’s snap election in 2024, European embassies in Paris monitor France’s political situation like milk on the stove — especially in the run-up to a presidential election in 2027 where the far-right National Rally is currently leading the polls. While Germany and the U.K. could also see nationalists come to power, their next general elections aren’t scheduled before 2029. Paris-based European diplomats speaking to POLITICO have compared a presidency by National Rally leaders Marine Le Pen or Jordan Bardella to Trump’s return to the White House in terms of changes for France’s security and defense policy. Just a day after Macron pledged that France would join a multinational force to enforce peace in Ukraine if a deal is signed with Russia, Bardella, leader of the National Rally, reaffirmed his party’s opposition to sending French troops. Marine Le Pen confirmed in September she would leave NATO’s integrated command if she’s elected president. A second high-ranking French military officer downplayed that pledge, arguing top French military brass would be able to convince her otherwise. However, he conceded, the National Rally’s refusal to send boots on the ground in Ukraine would “become a problem” for the coalition of the willing. Le Pen also vowed to completely overturn Macron’s offer to have a discussion with European countries about how France’s nuclear deterrent could contribute to the bloc’s security. In a bid to show leadership, the French president is currently engaging with some nations to talk about the role French nukes could play to deter Russia beyond the French borders. Asked whether she’d be open to storing French nuclear weapons in Poland and Germany (something even Macron hasn’t suggested), she replied: “Give me a break. It’s an absolute no, because nuclear power belongs to the French.” Some European countries want to do as much as possible with Macron now, in anticipation of a potential drastic policy change in 2027. Others are concerned about France’s political future, worrying how a leadership change could affect Paris’ commitments. According to an influential French lawmaker who works on defense policy, Poland’s recent decision to award a submarine contract to Sweden instead of France was partly driven by concerns in Warsaw about France’s political future. “The instability of French political life is frightening. Poland is scared to death of Bardella,” the lawmaker said. Countries such as Romania continue to see France as a crucial security provider and would welcome more troops to compensate for the outgoing U.S. soldiers. But officials from the southeastern European country know there could be an expiration date to Paris’ involvement. “There is an election in two years’ time, Macron’s successor will be less inclined to have troops outside of France,” one of them told me. Amid the uncertainty, the French military will continue to try to strengthen the ranks of its armed forces and attract young people like Charlotte. She is still deciding whether she actually wants to join, and regardless of who’s elected president in 2027, the geopolitical environment is unlikely to improve. “It is very important that our generation is aware and knows how to serve their country,” she said.

For Russian men, war now advertises itself like any other job. Offers for front-line contracts appear on the messaging app Telegram alongside group chats and news alerts, promising signing bonuses of up to $540,000 — life-changing money in a country where average monthly wages remain below $1,000. The incentives go beyond cash, with pledges of debt relief and free child care for soldiers’ families and guaranteed university places for their children. Criminal records, illness and even HIV are no longer automatic disqualifiers. For many men with little to lose, the front has become an employer of last resort. Behind the flood of offers is a coordinated recruitment system run through Russia’s more than 80 regional governments. Pressured by the Kremlin to deliver manpower, the regions have become de facto hiring hubs, competing with one another for contract soldiers. What began as a wartime fix has hardened into a quasi-commercial headhunting industry powered by federal bonuses and local budgets. Regional authorities contract HR agencies, which in turn deploy freelance recruiters to advertise online, screen applicants and shepherd men through enlistment paperwork. Any Russian citizen can now work as a wartime recruiter, with many operating as freelance headhunters who earn commissions for delivering bodies to the front. Axel Springer Global Reporters Network, which includes POLITICO, reviewed recruitment channels across Russia and interviewed multiple recruits and recruiters for this report. This labor defense market is being closely studied in Western capitals, where the continued growth of Russia’s army — despite having around 1 million soldiers killed or severely wounded since 2022 — has stunned intelligence services and vexed diplomats, who see the increase as crucial to understanding the country’s posture in peace negotiations and the possibility of future expansion into neighboring territory. “Assuming that Putin is able to continue to fund the enormous enlistment bonuses (and death payments, too) and to find the manpower currently enticed to serve,” former CIA Director David Petraeus told POLITICO, Russia “can sustain the kind of costly, grinding campaign that has characterized the fighting in Ukraine since the last major achievements on either side in the second year of the war.” Russia’s ability to sustain manpower levels amid massive battlefield losses helps explain why, four years into the invasion, President Vladimir Putin appears more convinced than ever that he can force Ukraine to accept his terms — whether through diplomacy or a grinding war of attrition. Speaking to Russian journalists on Nov. 27, Putin made clear the war would end only if Ukrainian forces withdrew from the territories Russia claims — otherwise, he warned, Moscow would impose its terms “by armed force.” A MARKETPLACE FOR SOLDIERS When Russia invaded Ukraine in early 2022, Olga and her husband Alexander were running a small hiring operation in Moscow — placing construction workers, security guards and couriers in civilian jobs. About 18 months ago, they pivoted to something far more lucrative via Russia’s main classified ads platform: recruiting riflemen, drone operators and other soldiers for the war. “Our daughter saw a job ad on Avito looking for recruiters, and that’s how it all started,” Olga told POLITICO in a series of voice messages over WhatsApp. Her profile picture displays the Russian coat of arms. (Olga and Alexander’s surname has been withheld to protect their anonymity under fear of governmental reprisal.) As what it once expected to be a blitz has become a war of exhaustion, the Kremlin has reengineered its mobilization accordingly. In September 2022, Putin announced what he called a “partial mobilization” of 300,000 reservists, triggering a surge of public anger and emigration as hundreds of thousands fled the country to avoid being sent to fight. At the same time, the state opened its prison gates to the battlefield, luring inmates into uniform with promises of clemency and pay. The approach worked, establishing a new blueprint: less coercion, more cash. To bring in volunteers who would not qualify for the draft because of age, health or lack of prior military service, the Kremlin targeted society’s most vulnerable — from prisoners to migrant workers and indebted men — by raising wages, offering lavish signing bonuses and selling military service as a path to dignity and survival. In September 2024, Putin formalized the strategy by ordering that the armed forces grow to 1.5 million active-duty troops. The sales pitch changed, too: subpoenas and summonses were replaced by money, benefits and appeals to manhood. “These measures target a specific demographic: socially vulnerable men,” said political scientist Ekaterina Schulmann, who studies Russian government decision-making as a lecturer at the Osteuropa Institute in Berlin. “Men with debts, criminal records, little financial literacy — or those trapped by predatory microcredit. People on the margins, with no prospects.” For several months, Alexander and Olga worked for a company they found through Avito before going independent and growing their business. “Now recruiters work for us — 10 people,” Olga said. The couple do most of their headhunting on the messaging app Telegram, across a vast ecosystem of channels now devoted to wartime hiring. In one group with more than 96,000 subscribers and a profile picture labeled “WORKING,” as many as 40 recruitment ads are posted per day, advertising openings for infantrymen and drone pilots alongside detailed bonus offers from rival regions. Each post is essentially a wage bid. While wages remain generally constant, the regions typically compete for workers by bidding up the value of labor through incentives like signing bonuses. While the Kremlin last year introduced a minimum bonus benchmark of 400,000 rubles ($5,170) via presidential decree, the amounts on offer now fluctuate wildly. Recruiters steer applicants to whichever territory is currently paying best. “We help with documents and put them in touch with regional officials,” Olga explained. “And then we pray — that they come back alive and well.” The couple declined to say how much they earn per recruit. But, as with bonuses offered to volunteers, recruiter pay appears to vary widely by region. Another recruiter who spoke to POLITICO confirmed figures previously published by the independent Russian outlet Verstka, which put commissions at between $1,280 and $3,800 per signed contract. Russian regions are tapping reserve funds to maintain recruitment levels. According to a review by independent outlet iStories, just 11 regions had budgeted at least $25.5 million on recruiter payments — amounts comparable to regional spending on health care and social services. An analysis by economist Janis Kluge of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, based on data from 37 regions, shows that average signing bonuses have now climbed to roughly $25,850, including federal payments. In early 2025, increased incentives triggered a surge of volunteers. In places like Samara, bonuses rose to more than $50,000 in summer, enough to buy a two-bedroom apartment. (In some regions, bonuses have recently fallen, which likely indicates they successfully recruited an above-average number of volunteers and had already met their quotas.) For many families, military service has become one of the few routes to upward mobility. In many regions, weak local labor markets leave few alternatives. The more precarious the economic outlook, the stronger the recruitment pipeline. “This kind of money can completely transform a Russian family’s life,” said Kluge. “The program works surprisingly well, but it has become far more expensive for the Kremlin.” HOW THE WAR WAS STAFFED This recruiting machine helps to bring roughly 30,000 volunteers into the Russian armed services each month, enough to offset its heavy casualty rate and sustain long-term operations. The Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies estimated this summer that Russia had lost about 1 million killed and wounded — in line with estimates from British and Ukrainian officials. Moscow is not relying solely on volunteers to fill its ranks. A law signed several weeks ago shifts Russia’s conscription system — which drafts medically fit men aged 18 to 30 not yet serving in the reserve — from biannual cycles to year-round processing. Experts say the change effectively creates a permanent recruitment infrastructure, enabling the Defense Ministry to funnel more people into the armed forces. “They are moving forward, but they don’t care about the number of people they lose,” said Andriy Yermak, who as head of the Ukrainian Presidential Office served as the country’s lead peace negotiator before resigning on Nov. 28 amid a corruption investigation. “It’s important to understand that we are a democratic country, and we are fighting against an autocratic one. In Russia, a person’s life costs nothing.” Ukrainian units, by contrast, are stretched thin; in many places, they can barely hold the line. Ukrainian officers told POLITICO that in parts of the eastern front, there are as many as seven Russian soldiers for every one of theirs. This dynamic has been exacerbated by tens of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers who, over the past year, have left their posts without authorization or abandoned military service altogether. Russia’s personnel advantage is one reason its army now seizes Ukrainian land every month roughly equivalent in size to the city of Atlanta. As Kyiv relinquishes territory, it has worked to expand foreign recruitment, drawing volunteers from across the Americas and Europe. German security officials say Putin is well-positioned to hit a declared target of a 1.5 million–troop army next year. That rapid industrial and military buildup has rattled European policymakers, who increasingly see it as preparation for military action beyond Ukraine. “Russia is continuing to build up its army and is mobilizing on a scale that suggests a larger military confrontation with additional European states,” said German Bundestag member Roderich Kiesewetter, a security expert from Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s party. A FIGHTER BY NECESSITY Anton didn’t join the military because he believed in the war. He slipped into the army after a financial collapse. By the time the 44-year-old father of three from the Moscow region walked into a military recruitment office last year, he felt he had run out of options. He was unemployed, drowning in debt and facing a possible prison sentence over a fraud case that made finding legal work nearly impossible. (Anton’s name was changed to protect his anonymity under fear of governmental reprisal.) Opening Telegram, he also kept seeing persistent ads promising lavish bonuses. “My wife was on maternity leave, my mother is retired — the family depended on me,” Anton told POLITICO in voice messages sent over Telegram. “During one argument, my wife said: ‘It would be better if you went to war.’ A month and a half later, I signed the contract. It felt like the only way out.” In Anton’s case, no recruiter was involved — he went to the recruitment center on his own. The contract promised Anton about $2,650 a month, plus a signing bonus from the Moscow region of roughly $2,460, more than 10 times what he had earned under the table as a warehouse worker and courier. He was dispatched to the Pokrovsk sector in Ukraine’s Donetsk region, at a remove from direct combat — though, as he puts it, under “occasional shelling” — keeping his unit’s drones operational. There, said Anton, he met many men who, like him, had been unable to make ends meet in civilian life. “Some are paying alimony, some were sent by creditors to work off their debts,” Anton said. “There’s no patriotic talk here — no ‘for victory’ or ‘for Putin.’ Nobody speaks like that. Everyone is tired. Everyone just wants to go home.” In July 2025, Anton received a state decoration for his service, which may help clear his criminal record. “That was another reason I signed,” he said. “It was the only way to avoid prosecution — either die or earn a medal.” Eluding prison time remains a strong motivator for many. A relative of a missing soldier from the Moscow region described how 28-year-old Ivan, a cook, was arrested for drug trafficking in 2025. “He signed the military service declaration in custody and asked the court to replace his sentence with service,” the relative said. Within a week, he was deployed to the front. Ivan disappeared in April after less than a month in combat. His wife and 1-year-old son have heard nothing since. (Ivan’s name was changed at the family’s request, for fear of retribution.) While tens of thousands have enlisted from Russia’s wealthiest urban centers, according to official databases and analysts, most recruits come from Russia’s economically depressed regions, where life has long been defined by poverty, crime and alcoholism. “For many men, this is the last opportunity to build a life that feels meaningful,” said Alexander Baunov of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. “Instead of dying as failures in their families’ eyes, they die as heroes on the front.” For the men volunteering — often treated as expendable by their commanders — the war has become a high-risk lottery for a better life. Survival brings transformative earnings. Even severe injuries come with fixed payouts: roughly $12,000 for a broken finger and $36,000 for a shattered foot. During brief trips closer to the front to deliver equipment, Anton said he was repeatedly targeted by Ukrainian drones. On one occasion, one exploded just meters from him. Even that narrow escape wasn’t enough to make him reconsider. “My financial situation improved significantly. It may sound sad, but for me personally, signing the contract made my life better,” Anton said. “The hardest part is being far from my children. But even knowing that, I would do it all over again.”

France could draft young people with useful skills in case of war, French President Emmanuel Macron said Thursday. In regular times, however, France will set up a voluntary military service that will kick off next summer. “In the event of a major crisis, parliament may decide to call upon not only volunteers, but also those whose skills have been identified during the call-up day, in which case national service would become compulsory,” Macron said at Varces army base in the French Alps. “But apart from this exceptional case, this national service is a service of volunteers who are then selected to meet the needs of our armed forces,” he added. Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in Ukraine, several European countries have brought back voluntary — and in the case of Latvia and Croatia, mandatory — military service. There are worries that Russia could be ready to attack NATO as soon as 2028, so beefing up understaffed armed forces with trained personnel has become a key priority for many allies. France’s new voluntary scheme, which has been long in the making, will be open mostly to 18- and 19-year-olds. It will be selective — only choosing top candidates — which draws inspiration from Nordic countries including Norway, Macron said. The goal is to enroll 3,000 people next summer, 10,000 in 2030 and 50,000 in 2035. The 10-month training program will be managed entirely by the Armed Forces Ministry. The section process starts in January and the military will choose the most-motivated candidates who meet the requirements. Volunteers will be given a uniform, military equipment and compensation — although Macron didn’t say how much they would be paid. Volunteers will only serve on French soil, the president stressed, responding to concerns that youngsters participating in the scheme could be sent to NATO’s eastern flank or Ukraine. Macron pushed back against reinstating mandatory military service for everyone — an idea floated by some political parties including the far-right National Rally. Drafting an entire age group doesn’t match “the needs of our armed forces or the threats we face,” he said. An Elysée official conceded earlier this week that France simply couldn’t afford it. “We cannot return to the days of conscription, but we need mobilization: mobilization of the nation to defend itself, not against any particular enemy, but to be ready and to be respected,” Macron said.

PARIS — French President Emmanuel Macron is expected to present a new voluntary military service on Thursday — and most political parties are likely to go along with the plan. The project, which stops short of conscription, is designed to funnel trained personnel into the active armed forces or the reserves. In recent years, politicians have sometimes floated military service as a way to discipline young people or create social cohesion. Now, the main motive is to beef up the armed forces to face off the threat posed by Russia. Many other European countries are also looking to reinstate military service in different forms, as warnings grow that Russian leader Vladimir Putin could be prepared to attack a NATO country as early as 2028. “France is not alone in this reflection on mobilizing the nation beyond the military forces engaged, and this is all the more relevant now that there is a clear Russian threat,” said Hélène Conway-Mouret, a Socialist lawmaker who sits on the French Senate’s foreign affairs and defense committee. Earlier this month,  Germany’s governing parties agreed to introduce mandatory registration and medical screening for 18-year-old men — but made any move toward compulsory service dependent on a separate parliamentary decision that will only be triggered if voluntary service falls short of the military’s needs.  Poland earlier this year unveiled its goal to train every adult male for war, but also stopped short of reintroducing conscription. The French voluntary program will likely involve serious military training, but there is currently no talk of reinstating conscription, which was ended by the late President Jacques Chirac in 1997. Macron is visiting the 27th Mountain Infantry Brigade in Varces on Thursday, the Elysée Palace said Monday, where he’s expected to make the announcement. “On this occasion, the President of the Republic will reaffirm the importance of preparing the nation and its moral forces to face growing threats,” the Elysée said. Such an overhaul would require “legislative reform,” a French official stressed. The government pledged to present an updated military planning law by Dec. 21. Unlike many of Macron’s policy proposals, the idea of creating a voluntary military service has garnered widespread support across France’s otherwise polarized political spectrum. The plan is backed by the conservatives and the far right, including the chair of the Senate’s foreign affairs and defense committee, Cédric Perrin from Les Républicains, and the National Rally’s President Jordan Bardella, who called the ending of conscription “a mistake.” Bardella said military service should eventually become mandatory again, but conceded the armed forces didn’t have enough money now to train the entire French youth. On the left, Conway-Mouret doesn’t anticipate resistance either. “If it’s voluntary, I don’t see why there would be any opposition,” she said. France aims to create a 105,000-strong reserve force by 2035 — a ratio of one reservist for every two active-duty soldiers. That would mark a significant increase from the country’s nearly 44,000 reservists in 2024. Top French military brass have previously expressed concern about the decline in population and its inevitable impact on recruitment. Macron first floated the plans in July, with the French prime minister’s office hinting in September that a revamped, optional military service was on the way. Elisa Bertholomey contributed to this report.

Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music * Amazon Music Beim Koalitionsausschuss treffen Union und SPD aufeinander, um über Wirtschaft, Bürgergeld und das mögliche Aus vom Verbrenner-Aus zu beraten. Rasmus Buchsteiner ordnet ein, welche Kompromisse möglich sind und warum sich die Gespräche bis in die Nacht ziehen könnten. Im 200-Sekunden-Interview spricht Sebastian Lechner, CDU-Landeschef in Niedersachsen, über die Zukunft des Verbrennungsmotors. Er fordert eine gemeinsame Linie der Koalition und ein klares Signal nach Brüssel. Außerdem erklärt er, warum die Union auf eine kapitalgedeckte Rentensäule nach skandinavischem Vorbild drängt. Danach berichtet Hans von der Burchard über den Korruptionsskandal in der Ukraine, der Energieministerium, Justizministerium und einen Oligarchen betrifft. Die Enthüllungen gefährden den geplanten Ablauf von Gesprächen über weitere Finanzhilfen aus Europa, während die Bundesregierung eigentlich auf eine schnelle Einigung in Brüssel drängt. Zum Schluss erklärt Rixa Fürsen, wie sich Union und SPD in letzter Minute auf eine gemeinsame Linie bei der Wehrpflicht einigen konnten. Das Berlin Playbook als Podcast gibt es jeden Morgen ab 5 Uhr. Gordon Repinski und das POLITICO-Team liefern Politik zum Hören – kompakt, international, hintergründig. Für alle Hauptstadt-Profis: Der Berlin Playbook-Newsletter bietet jeden Morgen die wichtigsten Themen und Einordnungen. Jetzt kostenlos abonnieren. Mehr von Host und POLITICO Executive Editor Gordon Repinski: Instagram: @gordon.repinski | X: @GordonRepinski.

Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music * Amazon Music Im Bundestag steht ein Thema im Mittelpunkt, das eine ganze Generation betrifft: der Wehrdienst. In einer öffentlichen Anhörung des Verteidigungsausschusses im Paul-Löbe-Haus fordert Quentin Gärtner, Generalsekretär der Bundesschülerkonferenz, dass junge Menschen endlich gehört werden – nicht nur als Zielgruppe, sondern als Stimme am Tisch. Im Gespräch mit Rixa Fürsen spricht Gärtner über Mitbestimmung, psychische Gesundheit, Demokratiebildung und die Frage, was der Staat seiner Jugend schuldet, wenn er wieder über Pflichtdienste nachdenkt. Das Berlin Playbook als Podcast gibt es morgens um 5 Uhr. Gordon Repinski und das POLITICO-Team bringen euch jeden Morgen auf den neuesten Stand in Sachen Politik — kompakt, europäisch, hintergründig. Und für alle Hauptstadt-Profis: Unser Berlin Playbook-Newsletter liefert jeden Morgen die wichtigsten Themen und Einordnungen. Hier gibt es alle Informationen und das kostenlose Playbook-Abo. Mehr von Berlin Playbook-Host und Executive Editor von POLITICO in Deutschland, Gordon Repinski, gibt es auch hier:   Instagram: @gordon.repinski | X: @GordonRepinski.

BERLIN — Politicians in Germany and Poland — home to the biggest Ukrainian refugee populations within the European Union — are threatening to yank back the welcome mat amid a sharp increase in the number of young Ukrainian men entering their countries in recent weeks after Kyiv loosened exit rules. While sentiment within both countries is generally favorable toward Ukrainians, their growing presence is increasingly becoming a flashpoint wielded by far-right parties. With Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine going into its fourth winter, the debate is expected to intensify as millions risk being left without heating, water or electricity in the coming months due to ongoing attacks by the Kremlin. In Germany, members of Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s governing conservatives are warning that while the country will continue taking in Ukrainian refugees, public support for the Ukrainian cause could wane if young male emigrants are seen to be avoiding military service. “We have no interest in young Ukrainian men spending their time in Germany instead of defending their country,” Jürgen Hardt, a senior foreign policy lawmaker from Merz’s conservatives, told POLITICO on Tuesday. “Ukraine makes its own decisions, but the recent change in the law has led to a trend of emigration that we must address.” Poland’s far-right Confederation party went further, saying in a statement: “Poland cannot continue to be a refuge for thousands of men who should be defending their own country, while burdening Polish taxpayers with the costs of their desertion.”  Ukrainian arrivals in both countries have increased significantly following the relaxation of Ukrainian exit rules over the summer — a move that ironically was intended to alleviate military recruitment issues by making it easier for young men to come and go. Nearly 45,300 Ukrainian men between 18 and 22 years of age crossed the border to Poland from the beginning of 2025 until the loosening of exit restrictions at the end of August, according to numbers the Polish border guard sent to POLITICO. In the next two months that number soared to 98,500, or 1,600 per day.   And many of the newcomers appear to have kept moving west: The number of young Ukrainian men aged 18 to 22 entering Germany rose from 19 per week in mid-August to between 1,400 and 1,800 per week in October, according to German media reports citing numbers from the German interior ministry.   NEW RULES Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy loosened the exit rules for men who aren’t yet eligible for military service, which begins at 25, at the end of August. Previously, men between the ages of 18 and 60 weren’t allowed to leave the country; under the new regulations, men aged between 18 and 22 can leave and return without risking prosecution.      The change meant that young Ukrainian men already abroad were able to return without fearing they wouldn’t be allowed to leave again. The hope was they might remain and agree to be drafted when they turned 25.     A second reason was to discourage parents from moving their sons abroad at the age of 16 or 17 — a trend authorities have flagged. Announcing the rule change in the summer, Zelenskyy argued: “If we want to keep boys in Ukraine, we really need them to finish school here first and for their parents not to take them away.” He said he feared they could otherwise “lose their connection with Ukraine.”    DEBATE OVER SOCIAL BENEFITS Germany and Poland host the most Ukrainian refugees within the European Union by far. About 1.2 million people who fled Ukraine after Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 live in Germany and nearly one million in Poland — over half of all Ukrainians with protected status in the bloc, according to Eurostat data. Although Ukrainians account for over 6 percent of the Polish workforce and contribute significantly to economic growth, far-right politicians argue they’re getting too many social benefits. Nationalist President Karol Nawrocki recently vetoed legislation on helping Ukrainians, saying only those who work and pay taxes in Poland should get benefits.   Similar demands have repeatedly been made by the ascendant far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party in Germany, which is now polling in first place. Along with demanding a stop to welfare payments to Ukrainians, the party is known for its skepticism toward military aid for Ukraine — at a time when Germany is Kyiv’s largest donor after the U.S. Friedrich Merz’s coalition is working on a draft law that would deny the right to such benefits. | Magali Cohen and Hans Lucas/Getty Images Around 490,000 Ukrainian citizens of working age receive long-term unemployment benefits in Germany, according to data from the country’s employment agency. Merz’s coalition — which is under increasing budgetary pressure and generally wants to reduce welfare spending — is working on a draft law that would deny the right to such benefits. “Many people have mixed feelings about how we should deal with young Ukrainian men of military age who have fled to us and may be receiving social benefits. That is understandable,” Sebastian Fiedler, a lawmaker from the Social Democratic Party (SPD), which governs in a coalition with Merz’s conservatives, told POLITICO.   But Fiedler, who heads the SPD group in the interior committee, added that his faction doesn’t see a need to act immediately — unlike Merz’s conservatives.   “The SPD parliamentary group in the Bundestag remains committed to supporting Ukraine to the best of our ability,” he said. “Part of our dealings with Ukraine also means that we do not dictate to it when its own citizens can enter and leave the country. It is fundamentally not Germany’s job to decide which young people Ukraine sends to war and which it does not.”  WAIT AND SEE Others in Germany’s political leadership want to wait to see if arrivals numbers remain high before making any changes. Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt, a member of the conservatives, said through a spokesperson that he wanted more data. “Currently, the possibility is being considered that this is an initial phase of increased migration following the entry into force of the regulation adopted by Ukraine in the summer, and that the number of young men seeking protection may decline again,” the spokesperson said.  The ongoing debate in Germany was initiated by Bavarian Prime Minister Markus Söder, leader of the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU), which the interior minister belongs to. Söder proposed to restrict the so-called Temporary Protection Directive at the EU level if Kyiv doesn’t voluntarily reduce arrivals. The rules provide Ukrainians who entered the bloc after February 2022 with an automatic protected status.    “Our solidarity remains,” he said. “But it requires clear rules and responsibility on both sides.”    Miłka Fijałkowska contributed to this report from Berlin, Wojciech Kość contributed from Warsaw.

Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music * Amazon Music Friedrich Merz hat seine erneuerte Strategie gegen die AfD vorgelegt. Die untermauert er mit starken Worten, sie hat aber schwache Perspektiven. Im Podcast blickt Gordon Repinski auf das Szenario einer ostdeutschen Landtagswahl 2026, in der die CDU zwischen Linken und AfD steht und kein Ausweg ohne Dilemma bleibt. Im 200-Sekunden-Interview spricht Christina Stumpp, stellvertretende CDU-Generalsekretärin, über rote Linien, Tolerierung und Zusammenarbeit. Eindrücke, die aus dem Interview entstehen könnten, hat sie noch vor Veröffentlichung dementiert. Das gab’s so in unserem Podcast auch noch nicht.  Außerdem erklärt Rasmus Buchsteiner, wie der Kanzler jetzt die Dinge jetzt zur Chefsache machen will: Rente, Wehrdienst, Bürgergeld und ob das funktionieren kann. Das Berlin Playbook als Podcast gibt es jeden Morgen ab 5 Uhr. Gordon Repinski und das POLITICO-Team liefern Politik zum Hören – kompakt, international, hintergründig. Für alle Hauptstadt-Profis: Der Berlin Playbook-Newsletter bietet jeden Morgen die wichtigsten Themen und Einordnungen. Jetzt kostenlos abonnieren. Mehr von Host und POLITICO Executive Editor Gordon Repinski: Instagram: @gordon.repinski | X: @GordonRepinski.

Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music * Amazon Music Heute läuft die erste Bundestagsdebatte über das Wehrdienst-Modernisierungsgesetz, um das in dieser Woche nochmals überraschend deutlich gestritten wurde. Im Update-Spezial spricht Rixa Fürsen mit Patrick Sensburg, dem Präsidenten des Reservistenverbandes und Oberst der Reserve. Er erklärt, warum der neue Wehrdienst ein guter Tag für Deutschland und Europa ist, weshalb Freiwilligkeit allein nicht reichen wird – und warum die Wehrpflicht zurückkehren muss, wenn die Zahlen ausbleiben. Sensburg fordert eine klare Strategie: mehr Reservisten, bessere Ausstattung, verlässliche Strukturen und ein realistisches Ziel bis 2029. Ein Gespräch über Sicherheit, Personal, Pflichtgefühl und die Rückkehr einer wehrhaften Gesellschaft. Das Berlin Playbook als Podcast gibt es jeden Morgen ab 5 Uhr. Gordon Repinski und das POLITICO-Team liefern Politik zum Hören – kompakt, international, hintergründig. Für alle Hauptstadt-Profis: Der Berlin Playbook-Newsletter bietet jeden Morgen die wichtigsten Themen und Einordnungen. Jetzt kostenlos abonnieren. Mehr von Host und POLITICO Executive Editor Gordon Repinski: Instagram: @gordon.repinski | X: @GordonRepinski.

Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music * Amazon Music Neue Regierungserklärung, alte Herausforderungen: Friedrich Merz nutzt seinen Auftritt im Bundestag, um außenpolitisch Flagge zu zeigen, von der Ukraine über Verteidigung bis Bürokratieabbau. Hans von der Burchard analysiert, welche Botschaften der Kanzler vor dem EU-Gipfel kommende Woche in Brüssel richtet. Im 200-Sekunden-Interview spricht Ron Prosor, Israels Botschafter in Deutschland, über die fragile Waffenruhe mit der Hamas, über die Hoffnung auf einen neuen Friedensprozess und über die Rolle Deutschlands an Israels Seite. Innenpolitisch bröckelt der Konsens: In der CDU wird die Brandmauer zur AfD teils infrage gestellt. Pauline von Pezold erklärt, warum der Druck vor den Landtagswahlen steigt, welche Strategen an Öffnungen denken und wie die AfD das als Bestätigung feiert Das Berlin Playbook als Podcast gibt es jeden Morgen ab 5 Uhr. Gordon Repinski und das POLITICO-Team liefern Politik zum Hören – kompakt, international, hintergründig. Für alle Hauptstadt-Profis: Der Berlin Playbook-Newsletter bietet jeden Morgen die wichtigsten Themen und Einordnungen. Jetzt kostenlos abonnieren. Mehr von Host und POLITICO Executive Editor Gordon Repinski: Instagram: @gordon.repinski | X: @GordonRepinski.