MARSEILLE, France — Violence at a drug trafficking hotspot in the social housing complex next to Orange’s headquarters in Marseille forced the telecoms giant to lock its forest-green gates and order its thousands of employees to work from home. The disruption to such a recognizable company — one that gives its name to the city’s iconic football venue — became a fresh symbol of how drug trafficking and insecurity are reshaping politics ahead of municipal elections. In a recent poll, security ranked among voters’ top concerns, forcing candidates across the spectrum to pitch competing responses to the drug trade. “The number one theme is security,” center-right candidate Martine Vassal told POLITICO. “In the field, what I hear most often are people who tell me that they no longer travel in the heart of the city for that reason.” French political parties are watching the contest closely for clues about the broader battles building toward the 2027 presidential race. In many ways, Marseille is a microcosm of France as a whole, reflecting the country’s wider demographics and its biggest political battles. The city is diverse. Multicultural and low-income neighborhoods that tend to support the hard left abut conservative suburbs that have swung to the far right in recent years. As in much of France, support for the political center in Marseille is wobbling.  The left-wing incumbent Benoît Payan remains a slight favorite in the March contest, but Franck Allisio, the candidate for the far-right National Rally, is just behind, with both men polling at around 30 percent. The issues at play strike at the heart of Marseille’s identity: its notorious drug trade, entrenched poverty and failure to seize on the competitive advantages of a young, sun-drenched city strategically perched on the Mediterranean. Whichever candidate can articulate a platform that speaks to Marseille’s local realities while addressing anxieties shared across France will be well positioned to take city hall — and to provide their party with a potential blueprint for the 2027 presidential campaign.  SECOND CITY  Marseille has always had something of a little-brother complex with Paris, a resentment that goes beyond the football rivalry of Paris Saint-Germain and Olympique de Marseille. Many in the city regard the French capital as a distant power center that tries to impose its own solutions on Marseille without sufficiently consulting local experts.   People in Marseilles pay tribute to murdered Mehdi Kessaci. 20, whose brother is a prominent anti drug trafficking campaigner, and protest against trafficking, Nov. 22, 2025. | Clement Mahoudeau/AFP via Getty Images “Paris treats Marseille almost like a colony,” said Allisio. “A place you visit, make promises to — without any guarantee the money will ever be spent.”  When it comes to drug trafficking and security, leaders across the political spectrum agree that Paris is prescribing medicine that treats the symptoms of the crisis, not the cause.  Violence associated with the drug trade was thrust back in the spotlight in November with the killing of 20-year-old Mehdi Kessaci. Authorities are investigating the crime as an act of intimidation. Mehdi’s brother Amine Kessaci is one of the city’s most prominent anti-trafficking campaigners, rising to prominence after their half-brother — who was involved in the trade — was killed several years earlier.  President Emmanuel Macron, Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez and Justice Minister Gérald Darmanin all visited Marseille in the wake of Kessaci’s killing, outlining a tough-on-crime agenda to stop the violence and flow of drugs.  Locals stress that law-and-order investments must be matched with funding for public services. Unless authorities improve the sluggish economy that has encouraged jobless youths to turn to the drug trade, the problem will continue.  “Repression alone is not efficient,” said Kaouther Ben Mohamed, a former social worker turned activist. “If that was the case, the drug trade wouldn’t have flourished like it did.” Housing is another issue, with many impoverished residents living in dangerous, dilapidated buildings. “We live in a shit city,” said Mahboubi Tir, a tall, broad-shouldered young man with a rugby player’s physique. “We’re not safe here.”   Tir spent a month in a coma and several more in a hospital last April after he was assaulted during a parking dispute. His face was still swollen and distorted when he spoke to POLITICO in December about how the incident reshaped his relationship with the city he grew up in.  “I almost died, and I was angry at the city,” said Tir, who suffers from memory loss and has only a vague recollection of what led to the assault, as he sipped coffee in the backroom office of a tiny, left-leaning grassroots political party where he volunteers, Citizen Ambition.  SECURITY PROBLEM To what extent Marseille’s activist groups can bring about change in a city whose struggles have lasted for decades remains to be seen, but the four leading candidates for mayor share a similar diagnosis. They all believe the lurid crime stories making national headlines are a byproduct of a lack of jobs and neglected public services — and that the French state’s responses miss the mark. Rather than relying on harsher punishments as a deterrent, they argue the state should prioritize local policing and public investment. When Payan announced his candidacy for reelection, he pledged free meals for 15,000 students to get them back in school and to double the number of local cops as part of a push for more community policing. Allisio’s platform puts the emphasis on security-related spending: increased video surveillance, more vehicles for local police and the creation of “specialized units to combat burglary and public disorder.” Vassal — the center-right backed by the conservative Les Républicains and parties aligned with Macron — has similarly put forward a proposal to arm fare enforcers in public transport. Both Allisio and Vassal are calling for unspecified spending cuts while preserving basic services provided at the local level like schools, public transportation and parks and recreation. Vassal, who is polling third, said she would make public transportation free for residents younger 26 to travel across the spread-out city. She accuses the current administration of having delivered an insufficient number of building permits, slowing the development of new housing and office buildings and thus the revitalization of Marseille’s most embattled areas — a trend she pledged to reverse. Both Vassal and Allisio are advocating for less local taxes on property to boost small businesses and create new jobs. Allisio has also put forward a proposal to make parking for less 30 minutes free to facilitate deliveries and quick stops to buy products. The outlier — at least when it comes to public safety — is Sébastien Delogu, a disciple of three-time hard-left presidential candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon. Though Delogu is polling fourth at 14 percent, he can’t be counted out, given that Mélenchon won Marseille in the first round of the last two presidential elections. Though Delogu acknowledges that crime is a problem, he doesn’t want to spend more money on policing. He instead proposes putting money that other candidates want to spend on security toward poverty reduction, housing supply and the local public health sector. Whoever wins, however, will have to grapple with an uncomfortable truth. Aside from local police responsible for public tranquility and health, policing and criminal justice matters are largely managed at the national level. The solution to Marseille’s problems will depend, to no small extent, on the outcome of what happens next year in Paris.

It seems impossible to have a conversation today without artificial intelligence (AI) playing some role, demonstrating the massive power of the technology. It has the potential to impact every part of business, and European policymakers are on board. In February 2025, Ursula von der Leyen, the European Commission president, said, “We want Europe to be one of the leading AI continents … AI can help us boost our competitiveness, protect our security, shore up public health, and make access to knowledge and information more democratic.” Research from Nokia suggests that businesses share this enthusiasm and ambition: 84 percent of more than 1,000 respondents said AI features in the growth strategy of their organization, while 62 percent are directing at least 20 percent of ICT capex budgets toward the technology. However, the equation is not yet balanced. Three-quarters of survey respondents state that current telecom infrastructure limits the ability to deliver on those ambitions. Meanwhile, 45 percent suggest these limitations would delay, constrain or entirely limit investments. There is clearly a disconnect between the ambition and the ability to deliver. At present, Europe lags the United States and parts of Asia in areas such as network deployment, related investment levels and scale. > If AI does not reach its full potential, EU competitiveness will suffer, > economic growth will have a ceiling, the creation of new jobs will have a > limit and consumers will not see the benefits. What we must remember primarily is that AI does not happen without advanced, trusted and future-proofed networks. Infrastructure is not a ‘nice to have’ it is a fundamental part. Simply put, today’s networks in Europe require more investments to power the AI dream we all have. If AI does not reach its full potential, EU competitiveness will suffer, economic growth will have a ceiling, the creation of new jobs will have a limit and consumers will not see the benefits. When we asked businesses about the challenge of meeting AI demands during our research, the lack of adequate connectivity infrastructure was the fourth common answer out of 15 potential options. Our telecom connectivity regulatory approach must be more closely aligned with the goal of fostering AI. That means progressing toward a genuine telecom single market, adopting a novel approach to competition policy to allow market consolidation to lead to more investments, and ensuring connectivity is always secure and trusted. Supporting more investments in next-generation networks through consolidation AI places heavy demands on networks. It requires low latency, high bandwidth and reliability, and efficient traffic management. To deliver this, Europe needs to accelerate investment in 5G standalone, fiber to enterprises, edge data centers and IP-optical backbone networks optimized for AI. > As industry voices such as Nokia have emphasized, the networks that power AI > must themselves make greater use of automation and AI. Consolidation (i.e. reducing the number of telecom operators within the national telecom markets of EU member states) is part of the solution. Consolidation will allow operators to achieve economies of scale and improve operating efficiency, therefore encouraging investment and catalyzing innovation. As industry voices such as Nokia have emphasized, the networks that power AI must themselves make greater use of automation and AI. Policy support should therefore extend to both network innovation and deployment. Trust: A precondition for AI adoption Intellectual property (IP) theft is a threat to Europe’s industrial future and only trusted technology should be used in core functions, systems and sectors (such as energy, transport and defense). In this context, the underlying connectivity should always be secure and trusted. The 5G Security Toolbox, restricting untrusted technology, should therefore be extended to all telecom technologies (including fiber, optics and IP) and made compulsory in all EU member states. European governments must make protecting their industries and citizens a high priority. Completing the digital single market Although the single market is one of Europe’s defining projects, the reality in telecoms — a key part of the digital single market — is still fragmented. As an example, different spectrum policies create barriers across borders and can limit network roll outs. Levers on top of advanced connectivity To enable the AI ecosystem in Europe, there are several different enabling levers European policymakers should advance on top of fostering advanced and trusted connectivity: * The availability of compute infrastructure. The AI Continent Action Plan, as well as the IPCEI Compute Infrastructure Continuum, and the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking should facilitate building AI data centers in Europe.   * Leadership in edge computing. There should also be clear support for securing Europe’s access to and leadership in edge solutions and building out edge capacity. Edge solutions increase processing speeds and are important for enabling AI adoption, while also creating a catalyst for economic growth. With the right data center capacity and edge compute capabilities available, European businesses can meet the new requirements of AI use cases.  * Harmonization of rules. There are currently implications for AI in several policy areas, including the AI Act, GDPR, Data Act, cybersecurity laws and sector-specific regulations. This creates confusion, whereas AI requires clarity. Simplification and harmonization of these regulations should be pursued.  * AI Act implementation and simplification. There are concerns about the implementation of the AI Act. The standards for high-risk AI may not be available before the obligations of the AI act enter into force, hampering business ambitions due to legal uncertainty. The application date of the AI Act’s provisions on high-risk AI should be postponed by two years to align with the development of standards. There needs to be greater clarity on definitions and simplification measures should be pursued across the entire ecosystem. Policies must be simple enough to follow, otherwise adoption may falter. Policy needs to act as an enabler, not a barrier to innovation.  * Upskilling and new skills. AI will require new skills of employees and users, as well as creating entirely new career paths. Europe needs to prepare for this new world.  If Europe can deliver on these priorities, the benefits will be tangible: improved services, stronger industries, increased competitiveness and higher economic growth. AI will deliver to those who best prepare themselves. We must act now with the urgency and consistency that the moment demands. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Author biography: Marc Vancoppenolle is leading the geopolitical and government relations EU and Europe function at Nokia. He and his team are working with institutions and stakeholders in Europe to create a favorable political and regulatory environment fostering broadband investments and cross sectoral digitalization at large. Vancoppenolle has over 30 years of experience in the telecommunication industry. He joined Alcatel in 1991, and then Alcatel-Lucent, where he took various international and worldwide technical, commercial, marketing, communication and government affairs leadership roles. Vancoppenolle is a Belgian and French national. He holds a Master of Science, with a specialization in telecommunication, from the University of Leuven complemented with marketing studies from the University of Antwerp. He is a member of the DIGITALEUROPE Executive Board, Associate to Nokia’s CEO at the ERT (European Round Table for Industry), and advisor to FITCE Belgium (Forum for ICT & Media professionals). He has been vice-chair of the BUSINESSEUROPE Digital Economy Taskforce as well as a member of the board of IICB (Innovation & Incubation Center Brussels).

LONDON — British ministers have been laying the ground for Keir Starmer’s handshake with Xi Jinping in Beijing this week ever since Labour came to power. In a series of behind-closed-door speeches in China and London, obtained by POLITICO, ministers have sought to persuade Chinese and British officials, academics and businesses that rebuilding the trade and investment relationship is essential — even as economic security threats loom. After a “Golden Era” in relations trumpeted by Tory Prime Minister David Cameron, Britain’s once-close ties to the Asian superpower began to unravel in the late 2010s. By 2019, Boris Johnson had frozen trade and investment talks after a Beijing-led crackdown on Hong Kong’s democracy movement. At Donald Trump’s insistence, Britain stripped Chinese telecoms giant Huawei from its telecoms infrastructure over security concerns. Starmer — who is expected to meet Xi on a high-stakes trip to Beijing this week — set out to revive an economic relationship that had hit the rocks. The extent of the reset undertaken by the PM’s cabinet is revealed in the series of speeches by ministers instrumental to his China policy over the past year, including Chancellor Rachel Reeves, then-Foreign Secretary David Lammy, Energy Secretary Ed Miliband, and former Indo-Pacific, investment, city and trade ministers. Months before security officials completed an audit of Britain’s exposure to Chinese interference last June, ministers were pushing for closer collaboration between the two nations on energy and financial systems, and the eight sectors of Labour’s industrial strategy. “Six of those eight sectors have national security implications,” said a senior industry representative, granted anonymity to speak freely about their interactions with government. “When you speak to [the trade department] they frame China as an opportunity. When you speak to the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, it’s a national security risk.”  While Starmer’s reset with China isn’t misguided, “I think we’ve got to be much more hard headed about where we permit Chinese investment into the economy in the future,” said Labour MP Liam Byrne, chair of the House of Commons Business and Trade Committee. Lawmakers on his committee are “just not convinced that the investment strategy that is unfolding between the U.K. and China is strong enough for the future and increased coercion risks,” he said. As Trump’s tariffs bite, Beijing’s trade surplus is booming and “we’ve got to be realistic that China is likely to double down on its Made in China approach and target its export surplus at the U.K.,” Byrne said. China is the U.K.’s fifth-largest trade partner, and data to June of last year show U.K. exports to China dropping 10.4 percent year-on-year while imports rose 4.3 percent. “That’s got the real potential to flood our markets with goods that are full of Chinese subsidies, but it’s also got the potential to imperil key sectors of our economy, in particular the energy system,” Byrne warned. A U.K. government spokesperson said: “Since the election, the Government has been consistently transparent about our approach to China – which we are clear will be grounded in strength, clarity and sober realism. “We will cooperate where we can and challenge where we must, never compromising on our national security. We reject the old ‘hot and cold’ diplomacy that failed to protect our interests or support our growth.” While Zheng Zeguang’s speech was released online, the Foreign Office refused to provide Catherine West’s own address when requested at the time. | Jordan Pettitt/PA Images via Getty Images CATHERINE WEST, INDO-PACIFIC MINISTER, SEPTEMBER 2024 Starmer’s ministers began resetting relations in earnest on the evening of Sept. 25, 2024 at the luxury Peninsula Hotel in London’s Belgravia, where rooms go for £800 a night. Some 400 guests, including a combination of businesses, British government and Chinese embassy officials, gathered to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China — a milestone for Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule. “I am honored to be invited to join your celebration this evening,” then Indo-Pacific Minister Catherine West told the room, kicking off her keynote following a speech by China’s ambassador to the U.K., Zheng Zeguang.  “Over the last 75 years, China’s growth has been exponential; in fields like infrastructure, technology and innovation which have reverberated across the globe,” West said, according to a Foreign Office briefing containing the speech obtained through freedom of information law. “Both our countries have seen the benefits of deepening our trade and economic ties.”  While London and Beijing won’t always see eye-to-eye, “the U.K. will cooperate with China where we can. We recognise we will also compete in other areas — and challenge where we need to,” West told the room, including 10 journalists from Chinese media, including Xinhua, CGTN and China Daily. While Zheng’s speech was released online, the Foreign Office refused to provide West’s own address when requested at the time. Freedom of information officers later provided a redacted briefing “to protect information that would be likely to prejudice relations.” DAVID LAMMY, FOREIGN SECRETARY, OCTOBER 2024 As foreign secretary, David Lammy made his first official overseas visit in the job with a two-day trip to Beijing and Shanghai. He met Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Beijing on Oct. 18, a few weeks before U.S. President Donald Trump’s re-election. Britain and China’s top diplomats discussed climate change, trade and global foreign policy challenges. “I met with Director Wang Yi yesterday and raised market access issues with him directly,” Lammy told a roundtable of British businesses at Shanghai’s Regent On The Bund hotel the following morning, noting that he hoped greater dialogue between the two nations would break down trade barriers. “At the same time, I remain committed to protecting the U.K.’s national security,” Lammy said. “In most sectors of the economy, China brings opportunities through trade and investment, and this is where continued collaboration is of great importance to me,” he told firms. Freedom of information officers redacted portions of Lammy’s speech so it wouldn’t “prejudice relations” with China.  Later that evening, the then-foreign secretary gave a speech at the Jean Nouvel-designed Pudong Museum of Art to 200 business, education, arts and culture representatives. China is “the world’s biggest emitter” of CO2, Lammy told them in his prepared remarks obtained by freedom of information law. “But also the world’s biggest producer of renewable energy. This is a prime example of why I was keen to visit China this week. And why this government is committed to a long-term, strategic approach to relations.” Shanghai continues “to play a key role in trade and investment links with the rest of the world as well,” he said, pointing to the “single biggest” ever British investment in China: INEOS Group’s $800 million plastics plant in Zhejiang. “We welcome Chinese investment for clear mutual benefit the other way too,” Lammy said. “This is particularly the case in clean energy, where we are both already offshore wind powerhouses and the costs of rolling out more clean energy are falling rapidly.” “We welcome Chinese investment for clear mutual benefit the other way too,” David Lammy said. | Adam Vaughan/EPA POPPY GUSTAFSSON, INVESTMENT MINISTER, NOVEMBER 2024 Just days after Starmer and President Xi met for the first time at the G20 that November, Poppy Gustafsson, then the British investment minister, told a U.K.-China trade event at a luxury hotel on Mayfair’s Park Lane that “we want to open the door to more investment in our banking and insurance industries.” The event, co-hosted by the Bank of China UK and attended by Chinese Ambassador Zheng Zeguang and 400 guests, including the U.K. heads of several major China business and financial institutions, is considered the “main forum for U.K.-China business discussion,” according to a briefing package prepared for Gustafsson. “We want to see more green initiatives like Red Rock Renewables who are unlocking hundreds of megawatts in new capacity at wind farms off the coast of Scotland — boosting this Government’s mission to become a clean energy superpower by 2030,” Gustafsson told attendees, pointing to the project owned by China’s State Development and Investment Group. The number one objective for her speech, officials instructed the minister, was to “affirm the importance of engaging with China on trade and investment and cooperating on shared multilateral interests.” And she was told to “welcome Chinese investment which supports U.K. growth and the domestic industry through increased exports and wider investment across the economy and in the Industrial Strategy priority sectors.” The Chinese government published a readout of Gustafsson and Zheng’s remarks. RACHEL REEVES, CHANCELLOR, JANUARY 2025 By Jan. 11 last year, Chancellor Rachel Reeves was in Beijing with British financial and professional services giants like Abrdn, Standard Chartered, KPMG, the London Stock Exchange, Barclays and Bank of England boss Andrew Bailey in tow. She was there to meet with China’s Vice-Premier He Lifeng to reopen one of the key financial and investment talks with Beijing Boris Johnson froze in 2019. Before Reeves and He sat down for the China-U.K. Economic and Financial Dialogue, Britain’s chancellor delivered an address alongside the vice-premier to kick off a parallel summit for British and Chinese financial services firms, according to an agenda for the summit shared with POLITICO. Reeves was also due to attend a dinner the evening of the EFD and then joined a business delegation travelling to Shanghai where she held a series of roundtables. Releasing any of her remarks from these events through freedom of information law “would be likely to prejudice” relations with China, the Treasury said. “It is crucial that HM Treasury does not compromise the U.K.’s interests in China.” Reeves’ visit to China paved the way for the revival of a long-dormant series of high-level talks to line up trade and investment wins, including the China-U.K. Energy Dialogue in March and U.K.-China Joint Economic and Trade Commission (JETCO) last September. EMMA REYNOLDS, CITY MINISTER, MARCH 2025 “Growth is the U.K. government’s number one mission. It is the foundation of everything else we hope to achieve in the years ahead. We recognise that China will play a very important part in this,” Starmer’s then-City Minister Emma Reynolds told the closed-door U.K.-China Business Forum in central London early last March. Reeves’ restart of trade and investment talks “agreed a series of commitments that will deliver £600 million for British businesses,” Reynolds told the gathering, which included Chinese electric vehicle firm BYD, HSBC, Standard Chartered, KPMG and others. This would be achieved by “enhancing links between our financial markets,” she said. “As the world’s most connected international financial center and home to world-leading financial services firms, the City of London is the gateway of choice for Chinese financial institutions looking to expand their global reach,” Reynolds said. Ed Miliband traveled to Beijing in mid-March for the first China-U.K. Energy Dialogue since 2019. | Tolga Akmen/EPA ED MILIBAND, ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE SECRETARY, MARCH 2025 With Starmer’s Chinese reset in full swing, Energy Secretary Ed Miliband traveled to Beijing in mid-March for the first China-U.K. Energy Dialogue since 2019. Britain’s energy chief wouldn’t gloss over reports of human rights violations in China’s solar supply chain — on which the U.K. is deeply reliant for delivering its lofty renewables goals — when he met with China’s Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang, a British government official said at the time. “We maybe agree to disagree on some things,” they said. But the U.K. faces “a clean energy imperative,” Miliband told students and professors during a lecture at Beijing’s elite Tsinghua University, which counts Xi Jinping and former Chinese President Hu Jintao as alumni. “The demands of energy security, affordability and sustainability now all point in the same direction: investing in clean energy at speed and at scale,” Miliband said, stressing the need for deeper U.K.-China collaboration as the U.K. government reaches towards “delivering a clean power system by 2030.”  “In the eight months since our government came to office we have been speeding ahead on offshore wind, onshore wind, solar, nuclear, hydrogen and [Carbon Capture, Usage, and Storage],” Britain’s energy chief said. “Renewables are now the cheapest form of power to build and operate — and of course, much of this reflects technological developments driven by what is happening here in China.”  “The U.K. and China share a recognition of the urgency of acting on the climate crisis in our own countries and accelerating this transition around the world — and we must work together to do so,” Miliband said, in his remarks obtained through freedom of information law. DOUGLAS ALEXANDER, ECONOMIC SECURITY MINISTER, APRIL 2025 During a trip to China in April last year, then-Trade Minister Douglas Alexander met his counterpart to prepare to relaunch key trade and investment talks. The trip wasn’t publicized by the U.K. side. According to a Chinese government readout, the China-UK Joint Economic and Trade Commission would promote “cooperation in trade and investment, and industrial and supply chains” between Britain’s trade secretary and his Chinese equivalent. After meeting Vice Minister and Deputy China International Trade Representative Ling Ji, Minister Alexander gave a speech at China’s largest consumer goods expo near the country’s southernmost point on the island province of Hainan. Alexander extended his “sincere thanks” to China’s Ministry of Commerce and the Hainan Provincial Government “for inviting the U.K. to be the country of honour at this year’s expo.” “We must speak often and candidly about areas of cooperation and, yes, of contention too, where there are issues on which we disagree,” the trade policy and economic security minister said, according to a redacted copy of his speech obtained under freedom of information law. “We are seeing joint ventures and collaboration between Chinese and U.K. firms on a whole host of different areas … in renewable energy, in consumer goods, and in banking and finance,” Alexander later told some of the 27 globally renowned British retailers, including Wedgwood, in another speech during the U.K. pavilion opening ceremony. “We are optimistic about the potential for deeper trade and investment cooperation — about the benefits this will bring to the businesses showcasing here, and those operating throughout China’s expansive market.”

China’s foreign ministry on Wednesday said a new European Commission proposal to restrict high-risk tech vendors from critical supply chains amounted to “blatant protectionism,” warning European officials that Beijing will take “necessary measures” to protect Chinese firms. Beijing has “serious concerns” over the bill, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun told reporters, according to state news agencies’ reports. “Using non-technical standards to forcibly restrict or even prohibit companies from participating in the market, without any factual evidence, seriously violates market principles and fair competition rules,” Guo said. The European Commission on Tuesday unveiled its proposal to revamp the bloc’s Cybersecurity Act. The bill seeks to crack down on risky technology vendors in critical supply chains ranging across energy, transport, health care and other sectors. Though the legislation itself does not name any specific countries or companies, it is widely seen as being targeted at China. 5G suppliers Huawei and ZTE are in the EU’s immediate crosshairs, while other Chinese vendors are expected to be hit at a later stage. European Commission spokesperson Thomas Regnier responded to the Chinese foreign ministry, saying Europe has allowed high-risk vendors from outside the EU in strategic sectors for “far too long.” “We are indeed radically changing this. Because we cannot be naive anymore,” Regnier said in a statement. The exclusion of high-risk suppliers will always be based on “strong risk assessments” and in coordination with EU member countries, he said. China “urges the EU to avoid going further down the wrong path of protectionism,” the Chinese foreign ministry’s Guo told reporters. He added the EU bill would “not only fail to achieve so-called security but will also incur huge costs,” saying some restrictions on using Huawei had already “caused enormous economic losses” in Europe in past years. European telecom operators warned Tuesday that the law would impose multi-billion euro costs on the industry if restrictions on using Huawei and ZTE were to become mandatory across Europe. A Huawei spokesperson said in a statement that laws to block suppliers based on their country of origin violate the EU’s “basic legal principles of fairness, non-discrimination, and proportionality,” as well as its World Trade Organization obligations. The company “reserve[s] all rights to safeguard our legitimate interests,” the spokesperson said. ZTE did not respond to requests for comment on the EU’s plans.

A cargo ship that sailed from Russia was detained in the Gulf of Finland on Wednesday following damage to an underwater data cable linking Finland and Estonia. “A ship that was in the area at the time of the cable damage between Helsinki and Tallinn has been diverted to Finnish waters,” Prime Minister Petteri Orpo posted on X. “The government is closely monitoring the situation.” The Fitburg, which was under the flag of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, had departed St. Petersburg, Russia on Dec. 30 and was en route to Israel with crew from Russia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Kazakhstan. Telecoms provider Elisa notified authorities at 5 a.m. of a cable break in Estonia’s exclusive economic zone, which extends 200 nautical miles from its coast. Hours later a Finnish patrol vessel caught the Fitburg with its anchor in the water in Finland’s exclusive economic zone, the country’s coast guard reported. “At the moment we suspect aggravated disruption of telecommunications and also aggravated sabotage and attempted aggravated sabotage,” Helsinki police chief Jari Liukku told media. “Finland is prepared for security challenges of various kinds, and we respond to them as necessary,” President Alexander Stubb said on X. Earlier this year the NATO military alliance launched its “Baltic Sentry” program to stop attacks against subsea energy and data cables in the Baltic Sea that have multiplied following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The sabotage has included the severing of an internet cable between Finland and Germany in November 2024 and another between Finland and Sweden the following month. A July study by the University of Washington found that 10 subsea cables in the Baltic Sea had been cut since 2022. “A majority of these incidents have raised suspicions of sabotage by state actors, specifically Russia and China, who have been particularly active in the region,” the study noted.

Elisabeth Braw is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, the author of the award-winning “Goodbye Globalization” and a regular columnist for POLITICO. It was hardly the kind of peace and cheer one hopes to see leading up to Christmas. But on Dec. 7, the second Sunday of Advent, a collection of telecoms masts in Sweden were the site of a strange scene, as a foreign citizen turned up and began taking photographs. The case became widely known two days later, when the CEO of Teracom, a state-owned Swedish telecom and data services provider, posted an unusual update on LinkedIn: Company employees and contracted security had helped detain a foreign citizen, CEO Johan Petersson reported. They had spotted the foreigner taking pictures of a group of Teracom masts, which are sensitive installations clearly marked with “no trespassing” signs. After being alerted by the employees, police had arrested the intruder. “Fast, resolute and completely in line with the operative capabilities required to protect Sweden’s critical infrastructure,” Petersson wrote. But his post didn’t end there: “Teracom continually experiences similar events,” he noted. “We don’t just deliver robust nets — we take full responsibility for keeping them secure and accessible around the clock. This is total defense in practice.” That’s a lot of troubling news in one message: a foreign citizen intruding into an area closed to the public to take photos of crucial communications masts, and the fact that this isn’t a unique occurrence. Indeed, earlier this year, Swedish authorities announced they had discovered a string of some 30 cases of sabotage against telecoms and data masts in the country. How many more potential saboteurs haven’t been caught? It’s a frightening question and, naturally, one we don’t have an answer to. It’s not just communications masts that are being targeted. In the past couple years, there have been fires set in shopping malls and warehouses in big cities. There have been suspicious drone sightings near defense manufacturing sites and, infamously, airports. Between January and Nov. 19 of this year, there were more than 1,072 incidents involving 1,955 drones in Europe, and as a group of German journalism students have established, some of those drones were launched from Russian-linked ships. And of course, there has been suspicious damage to undersea cables and pipelines in the Baltic Sea and off the coast of Taiwan. I’ve written before in this publication that Russia’s goal with such subversive operations may be to bleed our companies dry, and that China seems to be pursuing the same objective vis-à-vis certain countries. But when it comes to critical national infrastructure — in which I could include institutions like supermarkets — we need them to work no matter what. Imagine going a day or two or three without being able to buy food, and you’ll see what I mean. The upside to Teracom’s most recent scare was that the company was prepared and ultimately lost no money. Because its staff and security guards were alert, the company prevented any damage to their masts and operations. In fact, with the perpetrator arrested — whether prosecutors will decide to charge him remains to be seen — Teracom’s staff may well have averted possible damage to other businesses too. Moving forward, companies would do well to train their staff to be similarly alert when it comes to saboteurs and reconnaissance operators in different guises. We can’t know exactly what kind of subversive activities will be directed against our societies, but companies can teach their employees what to look for. If someone suddenly starts taking pictures of something only a saboteur would be interested in, that’s a red flag. Indeed, boards could also start requiring company staff to become more vigilant. If alertness can make the difference between relatively smooth sailing and considerable losses — or intense tangling with insurers — in these geopolitically turbulent times, few boards would ignore it. And being able to demonstrate such preparedness is something companies could highlight in speeches, media interviews and, naturally, their annual reports. Insurers, in turn, could start requiring such training for these very reasons. After serious cyberattacks first took off, insurers paid out on their policies for a long time, until they realized they should start obliging the organizations they insure to demonstrate serious protections in order to qualify for insurance. Insurers may soon decide to introduce such conditions for coverage of physical attacks too. Even without pressure from boards or insurers, considering the risk of sabotage directed at companies, it would be positively negligent not to train one’s staff accordingly. Meanwhile, some governments have understandably introduced resilience requirements for companies that operate crucial national infrastructure. Under Finland’s CER Act, for instance, “critical entities must carry out a risk assessment, draw up a resilience plan and take any necessary measures.” The social contract in liberal democracies is that we willingly give up some of our power to those we elect to govern us. These representatives are ultimately in charge of the state apparatus, and in exchange, we pay taxes and obey the law. But that social contract doesn’t completely absolve us from our responsibility toward the greater good. That’s why an increasing number of European countries are obliging 19-year-olds to do military service. When crises approach, we all still have a part to play. Helping spot incidents and alerting the authorities is everyone’s responsibility. Because the current geopolitical turbulence has followed such a long period of harmony, it’s hard to crank up the gears of societal responsibility again. And truthfully, in some countries, those gears never worked particularly well to begin with. But for companies, however, stepping up to the plate isn’t just a matter of doing the right thing — it’s a matter of helping themselves. Back in the day, the saying went that what was good for Volvo was good for Sweden, and what was good for General Motors was good for the U.S. Today, when companies do the right thing for their home countries, they similarly benefit too. Now, let’s get those alertness courses going.

BRUSSELS — European banks and other finance firms should decrease their reliance on American tech companies for digital services, a top national supervisor has said. In an interview with POLITICO, Steven Maijoor, the Dutch central bank’s chair of supervision, said the “small number of suppliers” providing digital services to many European finance companies can pose a “concentration risk.” “If one of those suppliers is not able to supply, you can have major operational problems,” Maijoor said. The intervention comes as Europe’s politicians and industries grapple with the continent’s near-total dependence on U.S. technology for digital services ranging from cloud computing to software. The dominance of American companies has come into sharp focus following a decline in transatlantic relations under U.S. President Donald Trump. While the market for European tech services isn’t nearly as developed as in the U.S. — making it difficult for banks to switch — the continent “should start to try to develop this European environment” for financial stability and the sake of its economic success, Maijoor said. European banks being locked in to contracts with U.S. providers “will ultimately also affect their competitiveness,” Maijoor said. Dutch supervisors recently authored a report on the systemic risks posed by tech dependence in finance. Dutch lender Amsterdam Trade Bank collapsed in 2023 after its parent company was placed on the U.S. sanctions list and its American IT provider withdrew online data storage services, in one of the sharpest examples of the impact on companies that see their tech withdrawn. Similarly a 2024 outage of American cybersecurity company CrowdStrike highlighted the European finance sector’s vulnerabilities to operational risks from tech providers, the EU’s banking watchdog said in a post-mortem on the outage. In his intervention, Maijoor pointed to an EU law governing the operational reliability of banks — the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) — as one factor that may be worsening the problem. Those rules govern finance firms’ outsourcing of IT functions such as cloud provision, and designate a list of “critical” tech service providers subject to extra oversight, including Amazon Web Services, Google Cloud, Microsoft and Oracle. DORA, and other EU financial regulation, may be “inadvertently nudging financial institutions towards the largest digital service suppliers,” which wouldn’t be European, Maijoor said. “If you simply look at quality, reliability, security … there’s a very big chance that you will end up with the largest digital service suppliers from outside Europe,” he said. The bloc could reassess the regulatory approach to beat the risks, Maijoor said. “DORA currently is an oversight approach, which is not as strong in terms of requirements and enforcement options as regular supervision,” he said. The Dutch supervisors are pushing for changes, writing that they are examining whether financial regulation and supervision in the EU creates barriers to choosing European IT providers, and that identified issues “may prompt policy initiatives in the European context.” They are asking EU governments and supervisors “to evaluate whether DORA sufficiently enhances resilience to geopolitical risks and, if not, to consider issuing further guidance,” adding they “see opportunities to strengthen DORA as needed,” including through more enforcement and more explicit requirements around managing geopolitical risks. Europe could also set up a cloud watchdog across industries to mitigate the risks of dependence on U.S. tech service providers, which are “also very important for other parts of the economy like energy and telecoms,” Maijoor said. “Wouldn’t there be a case for supervision more generally of these hyperscalers, cloud service providers, as they are so important for major parts of the economy?” The European Commission declined to respond.

Europe’s security does not depend solely on our physical borders and their defense. It rests on something far less visible, and far more sensitive: the digital networks that keep our societies, economies and democracies functioning every second of the day. > Without resilient networks, the daily workings of Europe would grind to a > halt, and so too would any attempt to build meaningful defense readiness. A recent study by Copenhagen Economics confirms that telecom operators have become the first line of defense in Europe’s security architecture. Their networks power essential services ranging from emergency communications and cross-border healthcare to energy systems, financial markets, transport and, increasingly, Europe’s defense capabilities. Without resilient networks, the daily workings of Europe would grind to a halt, and so too would any attempt to build meaningful defense readiness. This reality forces us to confront an uncomfortable truth: Europe cannot build credible defense capabilities on top of an economically strained, structurally fragmented telecom sector. Yet this is precisely the risk today. A threat landscape outpacing Europe’s defenses The challenges facing Europe are evolving faster than our political and regulatory systems can respond. In 2023 alone, ENISA recorded 188 major incidents, causing 1.7 billion lost user-hours, the equivalent of taking entire cities offline. While operators have strengthened their systems and outage times fell by more than half in 2024 compared with the previous year, despite a growing number of incidents, the direction of travel remains clear: cyberattacks are more sophisticated, supply chains more vulnerable and climate-related physical disruptions more frequent. Hybrid threats increasingly target civilian digital infrastructure as a way to weaken states. Telecom networks, once considered as technical utilities, have become a strategic asset essential to Europe’s stability. > Europe cannot deploy cross-border defense capabilities without resilient, > pan-European digital infrastructure. Nor can it guarantee NATO > interoperability with 27 national markets, divergent rules and dozens of > sub-scale operators unable to invest at continental scale. Our allies recognize this. NATO recently encouraged members to spend up to 1.5 percent of their GDP on protecting critical infrastructure. Secretary General Mark Rutte also urged investment in cyber defense, AI, and cloud technologies, highlighting the military benefits of cloud scalability and edge computing – all of which rely on high-quality, resilient networks. This is a clear political signal that telecom security is not merely an operational matter but a geopolitical priority. The link between telecoms and defense is deeper than many realize. As also explained in the recent Arel report, Much More than a Network, modern defense capabilities rely largely on civilian telecom networks. Strong fiber backbones, advanced 5G and future 6G systems, resilient cloud and edge computing, satellite connectivity, and data centers form the nervous system of military logistics, intelligence and surveillance. Europe cannot deploy cross-border defense capabilities without resilient, pan-European digital infrastructure. Nor can it guarantee NATO interoperability with 27 national markets, divergent rules and dozens of sub-scale operators unable to invest at continental scale. Fragmentation has become one of Europe’s greatest strategic vulnerabilities. The reform Europe needs: An investment boost for digital networks At the same time, Europe expects networks to become more resilient, more redundant, less dependent on foreign technology and more capable of supporting defense-grade applications. Security and resilience are not side tasks for telecom operators, they are baked into everything they do. From procurement and infrastructure design to daily operations, operators treat these efforts as core principles shaping how networks are built, run and protected. Therefore, as the Copenhagen Economics study shows, the level of protection Europe now requires will demand substantial additional capital. > It is unrealistic to expect world-class, defense-ready infrastructure to > emerge from a model that has become structurally unsustainable. This is the right ambition, but the economic model underpinning the sector does not match these expectations. Due to fragmentation and over-regulation, Europe’s telecom market invests less per capita than global peers, generates roughly half the return on capital of operators in the United States and faces rising costs linked to expanding security obligations. It is unrealistic to expect world-class, defense-ready infrastructure to emerge from a model that has become structurally unsustainable. A shift in policy priorities is therefore essential. Europe must place investment in security and resilience at the center of its political agenda. Policy must allow this reality to be reflected in merger assessments, reduce overlapping security rules and provide public support where the public interest exceeds commercial considerations. This is not state aid; it is strategic social responsibility. Completing the single market for telecommunications is central to this agenda. A fragmented market cannot produce the secure, interoperable, large-scale solutions required for modern defense. The Digital Networks Act must simplify and harmonize rules across the EU, supported by a streamlined governance that distinguishes between domestic matters and cross-border strategic issues. Spectrum policy must also move beyond national silos, allowing Europe to avoid conflicts with NATO over key bands and enabling coherent next-generation deployments. Telecom policy nowadays is also defense policy. When we measure investment gaps in digital network deployment, we still tend to measure simple access to 5G and fiber. However, we should start considering that — if security, resilience and defense-readiness are to be taken into account — the investment gap is much higher that the €200 billion already estimated by the European Commission. Europe’s strategic choice The momentum for stronger European defense is real — but momentum fades if it is not seized. If Europe fails to modernize and secure its telecom infrastructure now, it risks entering the next decade with a weakened industrial base, chronic underinvestment, dependence on non-EU technologies and networks unable to support advanced defense applications. In that scenario, Europe’s democratic resilience would erode in parallel with its economic competitiveness, leaving the continent more exposed to geopolitical pressure and technological dependency. > If Europe fails to modernize and secure its telecom infrastructure now, it > risks entering the next decade with a weakened industrial base, chronic > underinvestment, dependence on non-EU technologies and networks unable to > support advanced defense applications. Europe still has time to change course and put telecoms at the center of its agenda — not as a technical afterthought, but as a core pillar of its defense strategy. The time for incremental steps has passed. Europe must choose to build the network foundations of its security now or accept that its strategic ambitions will remain permanently out of reach. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is Connect Europe AISBL * The ultimate controlling entity is Connect Europe AISBL * The political advertisement is linked to advocacy on EU digital, telecom and industrial policy, including initiatives such as the Digital Networks Act, Digital Omnibus, and connectivity, cybersecurity, and defence frameworks aimed at strengthening Europe’s digital competitiveness. More information here.

The German government is set to get new powers to bar risky Chinese technology suppliers from its critical infrastructure. Lawmakers in the federal Bundestag parliament on Thursday approved legislation that would give new tools to the Interior Ministry to ban the use of components from specific manufacturers in critical sectors over cybersecurity risks. The measures resemble what European countries have done in the telecom sector, but the new German bill applies to a much wider range of sectors, including energy, transport and health care. The law comes as German Chancellor Friedrich Merz on Thursday signaled a tougher stance against Chinese tech giant Huawei, telling a business conference in Berlin that he “won’t allow any components from China in the 6G network.” Merz is set to discuss the issue at a major digital sovereignty summit co-hosted by Germany and France next week. The fresh scrutiny for supply chain security in the EU’s largest economy — a manufacturing powerhouse with a complex relationship with China — comes at a time when the European Union is considering how best to tackle cyber risks in supply chains dominated by Chinese firms. Governments are looking beyond the telecom sector, pushing for action in areas such as solar power and connected cars. European cybersecurity officials are finalizing an ICT Supply Chain Toolbox to help governments mitigate the risks, and the European Commission is preparing an overhaul of its Cybersecurity Act to address the issue, expected in January. The German legislation implements the EU’s NIS2 Directive, a critical infrastructure cybersecurity law. The Bundesrat, Germany’s upper legislative chamber, still has to sign off on the bill, which is expected next Friday. The key question is whether Germany is willing to use its powers, said Noah Barkin, a senior advisor at Rhodium Group, a think tank. On telecoms, “this helps lay the groundwork for pushing Huawei out of the 5G network, but it doesn’t guarantee that the political will will be there to take that decision,” he said.  The Interior Ministry could already block telecom operators from using particular components under an existing German IT security law. The law’s 2021 revision was widely seen as an attempt to get Chinese firms like Huawei and ZTE out of telecom network due to fears of cybersecurity and security risks. The Interior Ministry intervened in 2024, but it has never formally blocked the use of specific components under that law. For its new cyber law, the government originally proposed to extend the measures applying to the telecom industry to the electricity sector as well. But parliament’s version now applies to all critical sectors, which under the EU’s NIS2 law includes areas such as transport, health care and digital infrastructure.  German center-left lawmaker Johannes Schätzl, the digital policy spokesperson for the SPD, said this is a “logical step, because cyber and hybrid threats do not stop at sectoral boundaries.” The Interior Ministry will be required to consult with other arms of government when considering bans or blocks of certain suppliers, the bill said. In the past, some ministries like the digital and economy departments have been more reluctant to banning Chinese components, in part due to fears of economic retaliation from Beijing. Industry, too, could resist the new measures. German technology trade association Bitkom on Thursday said that the new rules could be unpredictable and therefore “detrimental.”

ROME — The conservative think tank behind Donald Trump’s Project 2025 roadmap is looking for new friends across the Atlantic.  The Heritage Foundation, the intellectual engine behind the 922-page blueprint that has become the key policy manual for Trump’s second term, is partnering with a constellation of European nationalist far-right movements to export its playbook for countering progressive policies.  That included a conference in late October at the frescoed former home of late premier Silvio Berlusconi in Rome focused on Europe’s demographic crisis and the idea that falling birthrates pose a threat to Western civilization. Speakers included Roger Severino, Heritage’s vice president of domestic policy and the architect of the group’s campaign to roll back abortion access in the U.S., as well as Italy’s pro-life family minister Eugenia Roccella, the deputy speaker of the Senate, and members of Italian right-wing think tanks.  Severino and the Heritage Foundation’s president, Kevin Roberts, have also been speaking guests at summits and assemblies of far-right groups such as Patriots for Europe, which includes Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National and Italy’s League, under a Make Europe Great Again banner.  Meanwhile Heritage representatives have held private meetings in Washington and Brussels with lawmakers from far-right parties in Hungary, Czechia, Spain, France and Germany. Just in the past 12 months, the group held seven meetings with members of the European Parliament, compared to just one in the five years prior, according to Parliament records. And they’ve had additional meetings with MEPs that weren’t formally reported, including with three members from Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy party. Severino told POLITICO that meetings with the European right serve to exchange ideas. But the meetings signal more than pleasantries. For European politicians, they’re a way to get access to people in Trump’s orbit. For Heritage, they’re a way to extend influence beyond Washington and achieve its ideological goals, which under Roberts have grown increasingly aligned with Trump’s MAGA approach.  Mike Gonzalez, a senior fellow at Heritage, said he meets with conservative parties to share experience in dealing with common challenges — “comparing notes, that kind of thing.” He said his interlocutors are “very interested” in policies on abortion, gender theory, defense and China, adding that parts of Project 2025 such as a section he wrote on defunding public broadcasters, are “very transferable” to Europe.  The foundation has been active in Europe for years, he points out, but demand has increased since Trump’s return to office. European right-wing leaders, Gonzalez said, “see Trump and what he is doing and say, ‘I want to get me some of that.’”  BETTER THE SECOND TIME It’s not the first time MAGA has attempted to galvanize the European right. Trump’s former strategist Steve Bannon unsuccessfully tried to unite populist nationalist parties under the Movement think tank in 2019, hamstrung by a lack of buy-in from the parties themselves.  Some observers are doubtful this renewed push will go differently. “I’m skeptical that it will amount to much,” said EJ Fagan, an associate politics professor at the University of Illinois and author of The Thinkers, a book on partisan think tanks. “The European right have their own resources that produce policies, so there’s not a lot Heritage can provide to European parties.”  That is especially an issue, Fagan noted, when it comes to finessing legislation, since Heritage doesn’t have a deep bench of “people who have a fine understanding of laws and treaties” in Europe.  But the Heritage Foundation’s European mission comes as far-right groups gain ground across Europe by tapping public frustration over issues such as immigration, climate policy and sovereignty and pushing policies that are similar to those laid out in the group’s Project 2025 agenda.  Heritage Foundation’s president, Kevin Roberts, have also been speaking guests at summits and assemblies of far-right groups such as Patriots for Europe. | Jim Lo Scalzo/EPA In Italy, two MPs have proposed legislation granting fetal personhood, which would make abortion impossible. The regional government in Lazio is preparing to approve a law that would guarantee protection of the fetus “from conception,” echoing a similar push in the US. And Rocella, Meloni’s family minister who appeared last month with Heritage’s Severino, is attempting to block a regional law banning conscientious objectors from roles in clinics providing abortions.  It’s not just reproductive rights. Meloni’s government has pulled out of a memorandum of understanding on the Belt and Road Initiative, the Chinese government’s ambitious program that aims to finance over $1 trillion in infrastructure investments. It effectively blocked Chinese telecoms giant Huawei from being a part in telecommunications development.  Lucio Malan, an MP in Meloni’s Brothers of Italy party and a panelist at two conferences organized with the Heritage Foundation, attempted to reverse a ban on homophobic and sexist advertisements — though he told POLITICO he took part in the events on the invitation of the center-right FareFuturo think tank, which co-organized the events with Heritage.   Heritage and its allies in the Trump administration have everything to gain from stronger nationalist parties in Europe, which are also pushing for delays in climate and agriculture regulations and sided with the US and Big Tech on digital regulation. Earlier this year, Heritage hosted the presentation of proposals by two far-right European think tanks, Hungary’s Mathias Corvinus Collegium (MCC) and Poland’s Ordo Iuris Institute for Legal Culture, to overhaul and hollow out the EU, undermining the commission and the European Court of Justice. And Heritage’s activity in Europe comes as the organization faces a swirl of controversy back home after Roberts sided with right-wing political commentator Tucker Carlson over criticism for interviewing a white nationalist. The incident triggered an open revolt against Roberts, who subsequently apologized. The unexpectedly swift and wide-ranging implementation of Project 2025 in the U.S. has boosted Heritage’s credentials in Europe, said Kenneth Haar of Corporate Europe Observatory, a non-profit that monitors lobbying in the EU. “Trump’s wholesale adoption of their agenda has given them unparalleled status,” he said. Now, Haar added, Heritage “is not just a think tank from the U.S., it is a representative of the MAGA coalition. It is not an exaggeration to say they are carrying out foreign policy on behalf of the president.” But the Heritage Foundation’s European mission comes as far-right groups gain ground across Europe by tapping public frustration over issues such as immigration, climate policy and sovereignty and pushing policies that are similar to those laid out in the group’s Project 2025 agenda. | Shawn Thew/EPA For Heritage, there’s good reason to focus on Europe in particular: It has become a focal point for the group’s donors and activists in the U.S., who fret about perceived Islamicization and leftist politics on the continent.  “We have an existential interest in having Europe be sovereign and free and strong,” Gonzalez told POLITICO. A RALLYING POINT Historically, Europe’s right has struggled to cooperate, with different factions representing conflicting national interests. But the machinery underpinning Trump’s reelection, and his ability to move national policy in European capitals, has shifted those dynamics, making Heritage “a factor in uniting the European right,” Haar said.  “MAGA has become a rallying point, the European right is meeting more frequently,” he added. Trump’s support for their policies also gives them more “clout” in Europe, he said, as Europe’s leaders seek favor from Trump and his allies across a range of issues, including tariffs.  Transparency activists said that they’re seeing a notable uptick in activity that suggests Heritage is gaining traction beyond symposiums and events.  Raphaël Kergueno, Senior Policy Officer at Transparency International, a NGO advocating against undue political influence, said the group’s activities — including those undeclared meetings with MEPs, which may put those members in breach of the European Parliament’s code of conduct — underscores the weakness of European rules on lobbying and advocacy.  Kenneth Haar added, Heritage “is not just a think tank from the U.S., it is a representative of the MAGA coalition. It is not an exaggeration to say they are carrying out foreign policy on behalf of the president.” | Shawn Thew/EPA “The Heritage Foundation has pushed blatantly anti-democratic projects, and is now free to court MEPs without disclosing its goals or funding,” he said. “If the EU does not clean up its act, it will allow hostile actors to import authoritarianism through the backdoor.” But Nicola Procaccini, an MEP in Meloni’s party who has held several meetings with Heritage, dismissed the idea that Heritage presents a danger to the rule of law or to European politics. He said he has not read Project 2025, and pointed to the group’s long history as an economic policy powerhouse — though that has changed in the Trump era, as the group’s new head Roberts has pivoted closer to Trump.  Nevertheless, he said, “You can share or not share their views … but Heritage is certainly an authoritative voice.”