BERLIN — Chancellor Friedrich Merz is mounting an unusually assertive effort to project German leadership at the heart of the EU, positioning himself as the defender not only of Ukraine but, by his own account, of Europe as a whole. This represents a stark shift in Germany’s approach to world affairs. Merz’s predecessors, Olaf Scholz and Angela Merkel, were reluctant to put the country in such an outspoken lead role internationally or within the EU. Rather, Germany tended to hang back and avoid undue risk. Germans even coined a slang verb — “to Merkel,” or Merkeln — to connote dithering. Merz has taken a far more active stance inside the EU — assuming a role more traditionally played by France’s now weakened President Emmanuel Macron. He has placed himself as Europe’s most visible advocate of a risk-laden EU plan to replenish Ukraine’s war chest with a €210 billion loan backed by Russian frozen assets. Earlier this month he visited Belgium’s prime minister, Bart De Wever, who has rejected the plan, along with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in an effort to convince the Belgian to drop his opposition. “When it comes to managing European issues, Merz is truly the polar opposite of Merkel,” an Italian diplomat said of that effort. Outside of EU affairs, the Trump administration’s wavering on military aid for Ukraine and the erosion of the transatlantic alliance have compelled Merz to push Germany beyond long familiar limits when it comes to foreign policy. Given this seismic realignment, Merz has repeatedly vowed that Germany will play a “leading role” internationally. “Ukraine’s fate is the fate of all of Europe,” Merz said on Monday alongside Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. “And in this respect, it is a key task, and I have taken it upon myself to closely support Ukraine in the negotiations that are currently taking place here in Berlin.” IS EUROPE CAPABLE OF ‘STANDING TOGETHER?’ Merz’s attempt to make good on the promise to lead has been on full display this week. While praising Donald Trump for pressing for a peace deal, the chancellor has in many ways set himself in direct opposition to the U.S. president, working to ensure that Washington doesn’t impose an unfavorable deal. The Trump administration has also opposed the EU proposal on Russia’s frozen reserves, hoping instead to turn a profit on those assets as part of a potential peace agreement. “Washington is now exerting tremendous pressure here, which is why it is also a question of asserting ourselves against Washington,” Norbert Röttgen, a senior German lawmaker belonging to Merz’s conservatives, told POLITICO.  Ahead of a key meeting of European leaders on Thursday, Merz is depicting the looming decision on whether to leverage frozen Russian central bank assets in the EU as a test of whether Europe can still stand up for itself. “Let us not deceive ourselves. If we do not succeed in this, the European Union’s ability to act will be severely damaged for years, if not for a longer period,” Merz said on Monday. “And we will show the world that, at such a crucial moment in our history, we are incapable of standing together and acting to defend our own political order on this European continent.”  Friedrich Merz’s predecessors, Olaf Scholz and Angela Merkel, were reluctant to put the country in such an outspoken lead role internationally or within the EU. | Maja Hitij/Getty Images In a reflection of his government’s new assertiveness, Merz has made Berlin a nexus of diplomacy over a potential peace deal. On Sunday and Monday he hosted Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and U.S. special envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. On Monday evening, many of Europe’s most powerful leaders converged over dinner in Berlin to discuss the outlines of a possible deal. “Berlin is now at the center of very important diplomatic talks and decisions,” Zelenskyy said Monday. “These talks are always complex, never easy, but they were very productive.” Merz, too, standing alongside the Ukrainian leader, appeared to play up the role Germany has assumed in recent negotiations. “We have seen great diplomatic momentum — perhaps the greatest since the start of the war,” he said. “We now have the chance for a genuine peace process for Ukraine. This seedling is still small, but the opportunity is real.” MERZ OVERSTEPS But Merz’s efforts to put Germany forward as a key EU leader on Ukraine and other matters, from defense to trade, are also replete with risk. European leaders have largely welcomed Merz’s willingness to take on a greater leadership role — particularly the chancellor’s decision, even before he took office, to unlock hundreds of billions of euros in borrowing to bolster Germany’s military. But as Europe’s biggest economy, Germany’s exercise of power within a union of 27 countries requires a delicate balancing act, and at times of late, Merz has appeared to overstep. After the Trump administration released its National Security Strategy, which depicted the EU as a transnational body that “undermines political liberty and sovereignty,” Merz condemned the document as “unacceptable.” At the same time he offered Trump a workaround that seemed to undermine the EU even more: “If you can’t get on board with Europe, then at least make Germany your partner.” Merz has tried to assert German interests in EU trade negotiations as well as on the issue of the EU’s proposed combustion engine ban, successfully watering it down. However, the greater risk for Merz lies in whether his latest efforts succeed or fail. By depicting European leaders’ looming decisions on Russian assets this week as a make-or-break moment for the EU and for Ukraine, Merz may be setting himself up for embarrassment given Belgian and Italian opposition to the plan. “It is a very active role that [Merz] is playing,” Röttgen told POLITICO. “Not because there is great competition for a leadership role, but because, in my view, Germany is currently best suited to take this initiative.” “This also has something to do with the fiscal possibilities that exist in Germany. We are by far the biggest supporter of Ukraine at the moment. But this should not take the form of national support, but rather European support. It needs to be organized, and in my view, that is a task for Merz.” Gerardo Fortuna contributed to this report from Brussels.

BRUSSELS — The EU aims to seal a free-trade agreement with India by late January instead of the end of the year as initially envisaged, Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič told POLITICO. “The plan is that, most probably in the second week of January, that [Indian Commerce Minister] Piyush Goyal would come here” for another round of negotiations, Šefčovič said in an interview on Monday. “There is a common determination that we should do our utmost to get to the [free-trade agreement] and use every possible day until the Indian national day,” he added. India celebrates its annual Republic Day on Jan. 26, and both Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Council President António Costa have been invited as guests of honor. Von der Leyen and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi pledged in February to clinch the free-trade agreement (FTA) by the end of the year — something even they recognized would be a steep target. But a number of issues keep gumming up the works, Šefčovič said, including that India is linking its objections to the EU’s planned carbon border tax and its steel safeguard measures with the EU’s own demand to reduce its tariffs on cars. Šefčovič traveled again to New Delhi last week in an effort to clear major hurdles to conclude the EU’s negotiations with the world’s most populous country. “The ideal scenario would be — like we announced with Indonesia — that we completed the political negotiations on the FTA,” Šefčovič said. “That would be my ideal scenario, but we are not there yet.” The EU and Indonesia concluded their agreement in September. “It’s extremely, extremely challenging,” he said, adding: “The political ambition of our president and the prime minister to get this done this year was absolutely crucial for us to make progress.”

BRUSSELS — The European Commission has done everything in its power to accommodate the concerns of member countries over the EU’s trade deal with the Latin American Mercosur bloc and get it over the finish line, Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič told POLITICO. “I hope we will pass the test this week because we really went to unprecedented lengths to address the concerns which have been presented to us,” Šefčovič said in an interview on Monday.  “Now it’s a matter of credibility, and it’s a matter of being strategic,” he stressed, explaining that the huge trade deal is vital for the European Union at a time of increasingly assertive behavior by China and the United States. “Mercosur very much reflects our ambition to play a strategic role in trade, to confirm that we are the biggest trader on this planet.” The commissioner’s remarks come as time is running short to hold a vote among member countries that would allow Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to fly to Brazil on Dec. 20 for a signing ceremony with the Mercosur countries — Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. “The last miles are always the most difficult,” Šefčovič added. “But I really hope that we can do it this week because I understand the anxiety on the side of our Latin American partners.”  The vote in the Council of the EU, the bloc’s intergovernmental branch, has still to be scheduled. To pass, it would need to win the support of a qualified majority of 15 member countries representing 65 percent of the bloc’s population. It’s not clear whether France — the EU country most strongly opposed to the deal — can muster a blocking minority. If Paris loses, it would be the first time the EU has concluded a big trade deal against the wishes of a major founding member. France, on Sunday evening, called for the vote to be postponed, widening a rift within the bloc over the controversial pact that has been under negotiation for more than 25 years. Several pro-deal countries warn that the holdup risks killing the trade deal, concerned that further stalling it could embolden opposition in the European Parliament or complicate next steps when Paraguay, which is skeptical toward the agreement, takes over the presidency of the Mercosur bloc from current holder Brazil. Asked whether Brussels had a Plan B if the vote does not take place on time, Šefčovič declined to speculate. He instead put the focus on a separate vote on Tuesday in the European Parliament on additional farm market safeguards proposed by the Commission to address French concerns. “There are still expectations on how much we can advance with some of the measures which are not yet approved, particularly in the European Parliament,” he stressed.  “If you look at the safeguard regulation, we never did anything like this before. It’s the first [time] ever. It’s, I would say, very, very far reaching.” 

Europe’s chemical industry has reached a breaking point. The warning lights are no longer blinking — they are blazing. Unless Europe changes course immediately, we risk watching an entire industrial backbone, with the countless jobs it supports, slowly hollow out before our eyes. Consider the energy situation: this year European gas prices have stood at 2.9 times higher than in the United States. What began as a temporary shock is now a structural disadvantage. High energy costs are becoming Europe’s new normal, with no sign of relief. This is not sustainable for an energy-intensive sector that competes globally every day. Without effective infrastructure and targeted energy-cost relief — including direct support, tax credits and compensation for indirect costs from the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) — we are effectively asking European companies and their workers to compete with their hands tied behind their backs. > Unless Europe changes course immediately, we risk watching an entire > industrial backbone, with the countless jobs it supports, slowly hollow out > before our eyes. The impact is already visible. This year, EU27 chemical production fell by a further 2.5 percent, and the sector is now operating 9.5 percent below pre-crisis capacity. These are not just numbers, they are factories scaling down, investments postponed and skilled workers leaving sites. This is what industrial decline looks like in real time. We are losing track of the number of closures and job losses across Europe, and this is accelerating at an alarming pace. And the world is not standing still. In the first eight months of 2025, EU27 chemicals exports dropped by €3.5 billion, while imports rose by €3.2 billion. The volume trends mirror this: exports are down, imports are up. Our trade surplus shrank to €25 billion, losing €6.6 billion in just one year. Meanwhile, global distortions are intensifying. Imports, especially from China, continue to increase, and new tariff policies from the United States are likely to divert even more products toward Europe, while making EU exports less competitive. Yet again, in 2025, most EU trade defense cases involved chemical products. In this challenging environment, EU trade policy needs to step up: we need fast, decisive action against unfair practices to protect European production against international trade distortions. And we need more free trade agreements to access growth market and secure input materials. “Open but not naïve” must become more than a slogan. It must shape policy. > Our producers comply with the strictest safety and environmental standards in > the world. Yet resource-constrained authorities cannot ensure that imported > products meet those same standards. Europe is also struggling to enforce its own rules at the borders and online. Our producers comply with the strictest safety and environmental standards in the world. Yet resource-constrained authorities cannot ensure that imported products meet those same standards. This weak enforcement undermines competitiveness and safety, while allowing products that would fail EU scrutiny to enter the single market unchecked. If Europe wants global leadership on climate, biodiversity and international chemicals management, credibility starts at home. Regulatory uncertainty adds to the pressure. The Chemical Industry Action Plan recognizes what industry has long stressed: clarity, coherence and predictability are essential for investment. Clear, harmonized rules are not a luxury — they are prerequisites for maintaining any industrial presence in Europe. This is where REACH must be seen for what it is: the world’s most comprehensive piece of legislation governing chemicals. Yet the real issues lie in implementation. We therefore call on policymakers to focus on smarter, more efficient implementation without reopening the legal text. Industry is facing too many headwinds already. Simplification can be achieved without weakening standards, but this requires a clear political choice. We call on European policymakers to restore the investment and profitability of our industry for Europe. Only then will the transition to climate neutrality, circularity, and safe and sustainable chemicals be possible, while keeping our industrial base in Europe. > Our industry is an enabler of the transition to a climate-neutral and circular > future, but we need support for technologies that will define that future. In this context, the ETS must urgently evolve. With enabling conditions still missing, like a market for low-carbon products, energy and carbon infrastructures, access to cost-competitive low-carbon energy sources, ETS costs risk incentivizing closures rather than investment in decarbonization. This may reduce emissions inside the EU, but it does not decarbonize European consumption because production shifts abroad. This is what is known as carbon leakage, and this is not how EU climate policy intends to reach climate neutrality. The system needs urgent repair to avoid serious consequences for Europe’s industrial fabric and strategic autonomy, with no climate benefit. These shortcomings must be addressed well before 2030, including a way to neutralize ETS costs while industry works toward decarbonization. Our industry is an enabler of the transition to a climate-neutral and circular future, but we need support for technologies that will define that future. Europe must ensure that chemical recycling, carbon capture and utilization, and bio-based feedstocks are not only invented here, but also fully scaled here. Complex permitting, fragmented rules and insufficient funding are slowing us down while other regions race ahead. Decarbonization cannot be built on imported technology — it must be built on a strong EU industrial presence. Critically, we must stimulate markets for sustainable products that come with an unavoidable ‘green premium’. If Europe wants low-carbon and circular materials, then fiscal, financial and regulatory policy recipes must support their uptake — with minimum recycled or bio-based content, new value chain mobilizing schemes and the right dose of ‘European preference’. If we create these markets but fail to ensure that European producers capture a fair share, we will simply create new opportunities for imports rather than European jobs. > If Europe wants a strong, innovative resilient chemical industry in 2030 and > beyond, the decisions must be made today. The window is closing fast. The Critical Chemicals Alliance offers a path forward. Its primary goal will be to tackle key issues facing the chemical sector, such as risks of closures and trade challenges, and to support modernization and investments in critical productions. It will ultimately enable the chemical industry to remain resilient in the face of geopolitical threats, reinforcing Europe’s strategic autonomy. But let us be honest: time is no longer on our side. Europe’s chemical industry is the foundation of countless supply chains — from clean energy to semiconductors, from health to mobility. If we allow this foundation to erode, every other strategic ambition becomes more fragile. If you weren’t already alarmed — you should be. This is a wake-up call. Not for tomorrow, for now. Energy support, enforceable rules, smart regulation, strategic trade policies and demand-driven sustainability are not optional. They are the conditions for survival. If Europe wants a strong, innovative resilient chemical industry in 2030 and beyond, the decisions must be made today. The window is closing fast. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is CEFIC- The European Chemical Industry Council  * The ultimate controlling entity is CEFIC- The European Chemical Industry Council  More information here.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is BMW Group * The advertisement is linked to policy advocacy around the Draghi report, the Union of Skills, the EU Green Deal, the Life Cycle Assessment, the Critical Raw Materials Act, the Net-Zero Industry Act and the CBAM. More information here

BRUSSELS — The French government called on Sunday to postpone a crucial vote by countries on the EU-Mercosur trade agreement, widening a rift within the bloc over the controversial pact. “France is asking for the December deadlines to be pushed back so we can keep working and get the legitimate protections our European agriculture needs,” the office of Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu said Sunday evening. The statement confirmed a POLITICO report on Thursday that Paris was pushing for a delay. It comes within sight of the finish line for the European Union to finally close the agreement with Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay that has been in negotiations for over 25 years and would create a common market of over 700 million people. Denmark, which holds the presidency of the Council of the EU, has vowed to hold the vote in time for European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to fly to Brazil on Dec. 20 to sign the deal. Several countries warn that the holdup risks ultimately killing the trade deal, concerned that further stalling it could embolden opposition in the European Parliament or complicate next steps when Paraguay, which is skeptical toward the agreement, takes over the presidency of the Mercosur bloc from current holder Brazil. Pro-deal countries, including Germany, Sweden and Spain, argue that France’s concerns have already been accommodated, pointing to proposed additional safeguards designed to protect European farmers in the event of a surge in Latin American beef or poultry imports. But with those safeguards still not finalized, France says it still can’t back the deal, wary that it could enrage the country’s politically powerful farming community. Brussels also announced this month it was planning to strengthen its border controls on food, animal and plant imports. “These advances are still incomplete and must be finalized and implemented in an operational, robust and effective manner in order to produce and appreciate their full effects,” Lecornu’s office said. Denmark, which holds the presidency of the Council of the EU, has vowed to hold the vote in time for European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to fly to Brazil on Dec. 20 to sign the deal. | Wagner Meier/Getty Images Despite Denmark’s resolve to hold the vote in time, final talks among EU member countries may not be wrapped up before a summit of European leaders on Thursday and Friday this week. A big farmers’ protest is planned in Brussels on Thursday. The Commission declined to comment.

President Donald Trump promised that a wave of emergency tariffs on nearly every nation would restore “fair” trade and jump-start the economy. Eight months later, half of U.S. imports are avoiding those tariffs. “To all of the foreign presidents, prime ministers, kings, queens, ambassadors, and everyone else who will soon be calling to ask for exemptions from these tariffs,” Trump said in April when he rolled out global tariffs based on the United States’ trade deficits with other countries, “I say, terminate your own tariffs, drop your barriers, don’t manipulate your currencies.” But in the time since the president gave that Rose Garden speech announcing the highest tariffs in a century, enormous holes have appeared. Carveouts for specific products, trade deals with major allies and conflicting import duties have let more than half of all imports escape his sweeping emergency tariffs. Some $1.6 trillion in annual imports are subject to the tariffs, while at least $1.7 trillion are excluded, either because they are duty-free or subject to another tariff, according to a POLITICO analysis based on last year’s import data. The exemptions on thousands of goods could undercut Trump’s effort to protect American manufacturing, shrink the trade deficit and raise new revenue to fund his domestic agenda. In September, the White House exempted hundreds of goods, including critical minerals and industrial materials, totaling nearly $280 billion worth of annual imports. Then in November, the administration exempted $252 billion worth of mostly agricultural imports like beef, coffee and bananas, some of which are not widely produced in the U.S. — just after cost-of-living issues became a major talking point out of Democratic electoral victories — on top of the hundreds of other carveouts. “The administration, for most of this year, spent a lot of time saying tariffs are a way to offload taxes onto foreigners,” said Ed Gresser, a former assistant U.S. trade representative under Democratic and Republican administrations, including Trump’s first term, who now works at the Progressive Policy Institute, a D.C.-based think tank. “I think that becomes very hard to continue arguing when you then say, ‘But we are going to get rid of tariffs on coffee and beef, and that will bring prices down.’ … It’s a big retreat in principle.” The Trump administration has argued that higher tariffs would rebalance the United States’ trade deficits with many of its major trading partners, which Trump blames for the “hollowing out” of U.S. manufacturing in what he evoked as a “national emergency.” Before the Supreme Court, the administration is defending the president’s use of the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act to enact the tariffs, and Trump has said that a potential court-ordered end to the emergency tariffs would be “country-threatening.” In an interview with POLITICO on Monday, Trump said he was open to adding even more exemptions to tariffs. He downplayed the existing carveouts as “very small” and “not a big deal,” and said he plans to pair them with tariff increases elsewhere. Responding to POLITICO’s analysis, White House spokesperson Kush Desai said, “The Trump administration is implementing a nuanced and nimble tariff agenda to address our historic trade deficit and safeguard our national security. This agenda has already resulted in trillions in investments to make and hire in America along with over a dozen trade deals with some of America’s most important trade partners.” To date, the majority of exemptions to the “reciprocal” tariffs — the minimum 10 percent levies on most countries — have been for reasons other than new trade deals, according to POLITICO’s analysis. The White House also pushed back against the notion that November’s cuts were made in an effort to reduce food prices, saying that the exemptions were first outlined in the September order. The U.S. granted subsequent blanket exemptions, regardless of the status of countries’ trade negotiations with the Trump administration, after announcing several trade deals. Following the exemptions on agricultural tariffs, Trump announced on Monday a $12 billion relief aid package for farmers hurt by tariffs and rising production costs. The money will come from an Agriculture Department fund, though the president said it was paid for by revenue from tariffs (by law, Congress would need to approve spending the money that tariffs bring in). In addition to the exemptions from Trump’s reciprocal tariffs, more than $300 billion of imports are also exempted as part of trade deals the administration has negotiated in recent months, including with the European Union, the United Kingdom, Japan and more recently, Malaysia, Cambodia and Brazil. The deal with Brazil removed a range of products from a cumulative tariff of 50 percent, making two-thirds of imports from the country free from emergency tariffs. For Canadian and Mexican goods, Trump imposed tariffs under a separate emergency justification over fentanyl trafficking and undocumented migrants. But about half of imports from Mexico and nearly 40 percent of those from Canada will not face tariffs because of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada free trade agreement that Trump negotiated in his first term. Last year, importers claimed USMCA exemptions on $405 billion in goods; that value is expected to increase, given that the two countries are facing high tariffs for the first time in several years. The Trump administration has also exempted several products — including autos, steel and aluminum — from the emergency reciprocal tariffs because they already face duties under Section 232 of the U.S. Trade Expansion Act of 1962. The imports covered by those tariffs could total up to $900 billion annually, some of which may also be exempt under USMCA. The White House is considering using the law to justify further tariffs on pharmaceuticals, semiconductors and several other industries. For now, the emergency tariffs remain in place as the Supreme Court weighs whether Trump exceeded his authority in imposing them. In May, the U.S. Court of International Trade ruled that Trump’s use of emergency authority was unlawful — a decision the U.S. Court of Appeals upheld in August. During oral arguments on Nov. 5, several Supreme Court justices expressed skepticism that the emergency statute authorizes a president to levy tariffs, a power constitutionally assigned to Congress. As the rates of tariffs and their subsequent exemptions are quickly added and amended, businesses are struggling to keep pace, said Sabine Altendorf, an economist with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. “When there’s uncertainty and rapid changes, it makes operations very difficult,” Altendorf said. “Especially for agricultural products where growing times and planting times are involved, it’s very important for market actors to be able to plan ahead.” ABOUT THE DATA Trump’s trade policy is not a straightforward, one-size-fits-all approach, despite the blanket tariffs on most countries of the world. POLITICO used 2024 import data to estimate the value of goods subject to each tariff, accounting for the stacking rules outlined below. Under Trump’s current system, some tariffs can “stack” — meaning a product can face more than one tariff if multiple trade actions apply to it. Section 232 tariffs cover automobiles, automobile parts, products made of steel and aluminum, copper and lumber — and are applied in that order of priority. Section 232 tariffs as a whole then take priority over other emergency tariffs. We applied this stacking priority order to all imports to ensure no double-counting. To calculate the total exclusions, we did not count the value of products containing steel, aluminum and copper, since the tariff would apply only to the known portion of the import’s metal contentand not the total import value of all products containing them. This makes the $1.7 trillion in exclusions a minimum estimate. Goods from Canada and Mexico imported under USMCA face no tariffs. Some of these products fall under a Section 232 category and may be charged applicable tariffs for the non-USMCA portion of the import. To claim exemptions under USMCA, importers must indicate the percentage of the product made or assembled in Canada or Mexico. Because detailed commodity-level data on which imports qualify for USMCA is not available, POLITICO’s analysis estimated the amount that would be excluded from tariffs on Mexican and Canadian imports by applying each country’s USMCA-exempt share to its non-Section 232 import value. For instance, 38 percent of Canada’s total imports qualified for USMCA. The non-Section 232 imports from Canada totaled around $320 billion, so we used only $121 billion towards our calculation of total goods excluded from Trump’s emergency tariffs. Exemptions from trade deals included those with the European Union, the United Kingdom, Japan, Brazil, Cambodia and Malaysia. They do not include “frameworks” for agreements announced by the administration. Exemptions were calculated in chronological order of when the deals were announced. Imports already exempted in previous orders were not counted again, even if they appeared on subsequent exemption lists.

Mathias Döpfner is chair and CEO of Axel Springer, POLITICO’s parent company. America and Europe have been transmitting on different wavelengths for some time now. And that is dangerous — especially for Europe. The European reactions to the new U.S. National Security Strategy paper and to Donald Trump’s recent criticism of the Old Continent were, once again, reflexively offended and incapable of accepting criticism: How dare he, what an improper intrusion! But such reactions do not help; they do harm. Two points are lost in these sour responses. First: Most Americans criticize Europe because the continent matters to them. Many of those challenging Europe — even JD Vance or Trump, even Elon Musk or Sam Altman — emphasize this repeatedly. The new U.S. National Security Strategy, scandalized above all by those who have not read it, states explicitly: “Our goal should be to help Europe correct its current trajectory. We will need a strong Europe to help us successfully compete, and to work in concert with us to prevent any adversary from dominating Europe.” And Trump says repeatedly, literally or in essence, in his interview with POLITICO: “I want to see a strong Europe.” The transatlantic drift is also a rupture of political language. Trump very often simply says what he thinks — sharply contrasting with many European politicians who are increasingly afraid to say what they believe is right. People sense the castration of thought through a language of evasions. And they turn away. Or toward the rabble-rousers. My impression is that our difficult American friends genuinely want exactly what they say they want: a strong Europe, a reliable and effective partner. But we do not hear it — or refuse to hear it. We hear only the criticism and dismiss it. Criticism is almost always a sign of involvement, of passion. We should worry far more if no criticism arrived. That would signal indifference — and therefore irrelevance. (By the way: Whether we like the critics is of secondary importance.) Responding with hauteur is simply not in our interest. It would be wiser — as Kaja Kallas rightly emphasized — to conduct a dialogue that includes self-criticism, a conversation about strengths, weaknesses and shared interests, and to back words with action on both sides. Which brings us to the second point: Unfortunately, much of the criticism is accurate. Anyone who sees politics as more than a self-absorbed administration of the status quo must concede that for decades Europe has delivered far too little — or nothing at all. Not in terms of above-average growth and prosperity, nor in terms of affordable energy. Europe does not deliver on deregulation or debureaucratization; it does not deliver on digitalization or innovation driven by artificial intelligence. And above all: Europe does not deliver on a responsible and successful migration policy. The world that wishes Europe well looked to the new German government with great hope. Capital flows on the scale of trillions waited for the first positive signals to invest in Germany and Europe. For it seemed almost certain that the world’s third-largest economy would, under a sensible, business-minded and transatlantic chancellor, finally steer a faltering Europe back onto the right path. The disappointment was all the more painful. Aside from the interior minister, the digital minister and the economics minister, the new government delivers in most areas the opposite of what had been promised before the election. The chancellor likes to blame the vice chancellor. The vice chancellor blames his own party. And all together they prefer to blame the Americans and their president. Instead of a European fresh start, we see continued agony and decline. Germany still suffers from its National Socialist trauma and believes that if it remains pleasantly average and certainly not excellent, everyone will love it. France is now paying the price for its colonial legacy in Africa and finds itself — all the way up to a president driven by political opportunism — in the chokehold of Islamist and antisemitic networks. In Britain, the prime minister is pursuing a similar course of cultural and economic submission. And Spain is governed by socialist fantasists who seem to take real pleasure in self-enfeeblement and whose “genocide in Gaza” rhetoric mainly mobilizes bored, well-heeled daughters of the upper middle class. Hope comes from Finland and Denmark, from the Baltic states and Poland, and — surprisingly — from Italy. There, the anti-democratic threats from Russia, China and Iran are assessed more realistically. Above all, there is a healthy drive to be better and more successful than others. From a far weaker starting point, there is an ambition for excellence. What Europe needs is less wounded pride and more patriotism defined by achievement. Unity and decisive action in defending Ukraine would be an obvious example — not merely talking about European sovereignty but demonstrating it, even in friendly dissent with the Americans. (And who knows, that might ultimately prompt a surprising shift in Washington’s Russia policy.) That, coupled with economic growth through real and far-reaching reforms, would be a start. After which Europe must tackle the most important task: a fundamental reversal of a migration policy rooted in cultural self-hatred that tolerates far too many newcomers who want a different society, who hold different values, and who do not respect our legal order. If all of this fails, American criticism will be vindicated by history. The excuses for why a European renewal is supposedly impossible or unnecessary are merely signs of weak leadership. The converse is also true: where there is political will, there is a way. And this way begins in Europe — with the spirit of renewal of a well-understood “Europe First” (what else?) — and leads to America. Europe needs America. America needs Europe. And perhaps both needed the deep crisis in the transatlantic relationship to recognize this with full clarity. As surprising as it may sound, at this very moment there is a real opportunity for a renaissance of a transatlantic community of shared interests. Precisely because the situation is so deadlocked. And precisely because pressure is rising on both sides of the Atlantic to do things differently. A trade war between Europe and America strengthens our shared adversaries. The opposite would be sensible: a New Deal between the EU and the U.S. Tariff-free trade as a stimulus for growth in the world’s largest and third-largest economies — and as the foundation for a shared policy of interests and, inevitably, a joint security policy of the free world. This is the historic opportunity that Friedrich Merz could now negotiate with Donald Trump. As Churchill said: “Never waste a good crisis!”

BRUSSELS — Denmark is holding the line and pressing ahead with plans to schedule a crucial vote of EU ambassadors on the EU-Mercosur trade deal next week, in a tug-of-war splitting countries across the bloc. “In the planning of the Danish presidency, the intention is to have the vote on the Mercosur agreement next week to enable the Commission President to sign the agreement in Brazil on Dec. 20,” an official with the Danish presidency of the Council of the EU told POLITICO. This is the first official confirmation from Copenhagen that it will go ahead with scheduling the vote over the deal with the Latin American countries in the coming days, despite warnings from France, Poland and Italy that the texts as they stand would not garner their support.  This risks leaving the Danish presidency of the Council short of the supermajority needed to get the deal over the line. Under EU rules, this would require the support of a “qualified” majority of EU member countries — meaning 15 of the bloc’s 27 members representing 65 percent of its population. The outcome of the vote will determine whether European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen can fly, as is now planned, to Brazil on Dec. 20 for a signing ceremony with her Mercosur counterparts. France however has been playing for time in an effort to delay its approval of the accord, which has been more than 25 years in the making — a strategy several diplomats warn could ultimately kill the trade deal.  They cite fears that further stalling could embolden opposition in the European Parliament or complicate the next steps when Paraguay, which is more skeptical of the agreement, takes over the presidency of the Mercosur bloc. “If we can’t agree on Mercosur, we don’t need to talk about European sovereignty anymore. We will make ourselves geopolitically irrelevant,” said a senior EU diplomat. European leaders, including French President Emmanuel Macron, are expected to descend on Brussels on Thursday for a high-stakes EU summit. While not formally on the agenda, the trade deal with Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay is expected to loom large. A farmers demonstration is also expected in Brussels on the same day.  Countries backing the deal, including Germany and Sweden, argue that France has already been accommodated, pointing to proposed additional safeguards designed to protect European farmers in the event of a surge in Latin American beef or poultry imports. The instrument, which still requires validation by EU institutions, was a proposal from the Commission to placate Poland and France, whose influential farming constituencies worry they would be undercut by Latin American beef or poultry.  The texts submitted for the upcoming vote were published last week and include a temporary strengthened safeguard, committing to closely monitor market disruptions — one of the key conditions for Paris to back the deal.

THE TRUMP EFFECT: HOW ONE MAN’S POLITICS REWIRED EUROPE From defense to trade to climate policy, Trump’s second term has shaken Europe’s foundations and forced leaders across the continent to adapt to a new transatlantic reality. By POLITICO Illustration by Jiyeun Kang for POLITICO Even with an ocean apart, there isn’t an industry in Europe that hasn’t been impacted by President Donald Trump’s actions.   Businesses and consumers alike are reeling from Trump’s tariffs. Climate advocates are reeling from the U.S. pulling out of major treaties, including the Paris Agreement. National budgets are being strained by Trump’s demand for more defense spending from European countries, while militaries are rebuilding their ranks and rethinking their strategies. Politicians are seizing the opportunity to stand out in this moment of crisis — some as protectors against Trump’s rampage and others as acolytes of MAGA-style populism.   It’s difficult to even track the impact of Trump 2.0 due to its scope, which is why POLITICO Magazine reached out to eight different thought leaders in Europe and the U.S. and asked: What’s the biggest way Trump has changed Europe? Answers varied from the demise of NATO to changing political identities to setbacks in climate action. A common sentiment, however, is that this is a sink-or-swim moment for Europe.   Here’s what they said.   ‘THE STRATEGIC HOLIDAY FOR EUROPE IS OVER’   Attila Demkó is a security policy analyst and writer based in Hungary.  Trump shattered the illusion that what many believe to be “common values” in Europe are, indeed, common. As it turns out, some of these mostly liberal, left and far-left values are not shared by all. The emphasis on multiculturalism, Wilkommenskultur (the German term for a welcoming culture, especially toward refugees), excessive focus on political correctness and gender issues has created a rift, and the deep divide is not only between Europe and the U.S., but also within Europe itself. While smaller European countries (such as Hungary or Slovakia) and non-mainstream parties (such as France’s National Rally, Poland’s PiS and Germany’s AfD) that oppose Wilkommenskultur, European federalism, and propose a Europe of nations, could be ignored and quarantined as fringe, Trump and the American right cannot be ignored. The rift is real and goes through right in the middle of most Western societies.  Trump also made it clear that the strategic holiday for Europe is over. The continent must pay full price for its own defense, and almost full price for the support for Ukraine. So far, in both cases, the bloc has talked the talk but hasn’t walked the walk. Trump may finally teach Europe to walk — or if it can’t walk, at least get it to stop dreaming and preaching.  ‘TRUMP MAY BE DOING EUROPE A FAVOR’  Kay Bailey Hutchison is a former U.S. Ambassador to NATO.  By challenging Europe to do more in its own defense, President Trump may be doing Europe a favor. If Europeans can adopt a plan to work together to provide military equipment and technology, they will emerge stronger. Increasing defense capabilities, with each country contributing, will also enable significant economic benefits.  Since World War II, Europe has depended on the U.S. for many security guarantees. Like previous American presidents — Republican and Democrat — President Trump has said it is time to make security responsibility more evenly divided among our allies. For maximum results, a more equal share of security must also produce interoperable assets. Organized by NATO, all willing allies and trusted partners could share in building and manufacturing equipment and hardware, while military training and increased exercises could prepare all NATO countries and trusted partners for joint defense when there are attacks of varying severity.   If Europe wisely uses the 5 percent of GDP it promised for defense priorities and works in concert with the U.S. and trusted allies, the world will be safer for those who seek freedom — and Europe will be regarded as a significant and reliable global leader.  ‘ONE OF THE STRONGEST ALLIANCES IN MODERN TIMES HAS WEAKENED’  Manfred Elsig is professor of international relations at the World Trade Institute of the University of Bern.   From an international relations perspective, the biggest way Trump has changed Europe is by destabilizing the U.S.–European partnership. Over the course of Trump’s two presidencies, the bloc has come to realize that the U.S. is no longer a reliable and close partner. Trump has eroded the most important political capital in the transatlantic cooperation: trust — the bedrock of the post-World War II partnership between the U.S. and Europe. The transregional security pact, with NATO at its core, has been badly weakened, denting Karl Deutsch’s infamous “security community” built on a shared sense of values and “we-ness.” And as a result, Europe must quickly rethink its security architecture and take more independent action.  Andrew Harnik/Getty Images Another area where we’re witnessing negative effects of the Trump presidency is the transatlantic marketplace. Primarily, the “trade community” is no longer a model of relatively free, fair and stable trade, and investment relations are leading to less growth and innovation. The secondary effects are trade diversion and growing pressures to protect markets from foreign competition. As a result, Europe will look elsewhere for trade partners that believe in a rules-based system in an attempt to de-risk and secure its supply chains. Economic security considerations will be increasingly mainstreamed into Europe’s international economic agenda, and more stimulus for bloc-building can be expected as well.   Finally, Europe’s investments in climate diplomacy and development cooperation are suffering a setback due to the U.S. “withdrawal doctrine” that started in 2016. The U.S. is either bypassing or selectively instrumentalizing international law, eroding global solidarity and sidelining the ambitious policies the planet urgently needs. As a result, Europe will struggle to find partners at the global level, and will continue on its path to act unilaterally on both climate and development policies.  ‘EUROPE NEEDS TO FACE THE REALITY OF BEING A RESOURCE-POOR CONTINENT’  Heather Grabbe is a senior fellow at Bruegel, a Brussels-based economic think tank.   When it comes to climate and the environment, Trump has distracted Europe from addressing its long-term resource vulnerabilities by creating panic over defense and trade. By creating crises around U.S. military support against Russian aggression and tariffs that hit the trade-dependent European economy, Trump has Europe’s leaders on the defensive and has forced them to focus on short-term security. Of course, these are important issues, but they divert political attention and public budgets away from measures that would bring longer-term security from climate impacts, volatile commodity markets and fragile supply chains by investing in climate resilience and enhancing resource productivity. Russian President Vladimir Putin may or may not invade Europe, and Trump may or may not help protect us, but climate change and resource insecurity will certainly damage the European economy.  Europe needs to face the reality of being a resource-poor continent, not only in fossil fuels but also in many other raw materials. And while Trump is trying to maintain Europe’s dependence on U.S. LNG as a replacement for Russian gas, that is the most expensive way of fuelling the economy it also slows down our transition to true energy security. Fossil fuel subsidies of more than €100 billion a year keep Europe vulnerable to the U.S. and other exporters, rather than spending taxpayers’ money on electrification, enlarging renewable energy production and building the grids and interconnectors that would bring us independence.  ‘THE TURBULENCE THE U.S. HAS UNLEASHED GLOBALLY HAS FORCED MANY EUROPEANS TO GROW UP’   Aliona Hlivco is founder and CEO of St. James’s Foreign Policy Group and a former Ukrainian politician.   The turbulence the U.S. has unleashed globally has forced many Europeans to grow up. They have finally realized they can no longer rest in the comfort of predictable trade deals or rely on the continent’s famously slow but steady regulatory machinery to keep things ticking along. Europe has woken up to the fact that it must shift from the pace and mentality of an aircraft carrier — vast, heavy and resourceful, lumbering toward a destination set out years in advance — to that of a maritime drone: fast, agile, nimble and capable of striking with precision at exactly the right place and time.   This new agility is felt unevenly across the continent but is unmistakably emerging. Germany is finally, and understandably, overcoming its post-World War II paralysis, reclaiming its role as an economic power as well as the “Eastern flank of NATO,” as one Bundeswehr official put it to me earlier this year. France, long a champion of “strategic autonomy,” has at last found the space to act on it. The Northern European nations — Scandinavia and the Baltics — are leading Europe’s defence innovation, rearmament and the next generation of deterrence, including by taking the lead in supporting Ukraine. They also built a sustainable and crucial bridge with the U.K. through the Joint Expeditionary Force — keeping Europe’s only nuclear power other than France closely tied to the continent after Brexit. Military strength may well become the decisive factor determining who leads Europe in the next 50 years, and in that regard, Poland is rapidly emerging as one of the EU’s most powerful members.   Europe is changing. It can no longer afford inertia or the illusion that statements can substitute for action. While Brussels continues to grapple with Washington’s unpredictability — possibly beyond Trump’s second term — European countries are seizing the moment. In an era of uncertain geopolitical multilateralism, they are playing their best cards, hoping to secure the breakthroughs that redefine Europe’s future.  ‘TRUMP’S PRESIDENCY HAS HAD A PROFOUND AND CONTRADICTORY EFFECT ON EUROPEAN POLITICAL IDENTITY’  Aleksandra Sojka is an associate professor of European politics at the University Carlos III in Madrid.   Trump’s biggest impact on Europe has been forcing the bloc to confront its strategic dependence on the U.S. His second presidency has fundamentally shaken the transatlantic alliance, exposing Europe’s critical weakness: the absence of genuine defense and security capabilities independent of American support. Trump’s wavering commitment to NATO and inconsistent support for Ukraine have made European rearmament an urgent necessity, shifting public opinion beyond the political elite. And this pressure has created remarkable convergence among European leaders, enabling decisions that were previously politically impossible — such as excluding defense spending from budget deficit calculations and allocating funds for coordinated European military procurement and shared defense initiatives. While disagreements remain over specific strategies, this fundamental shift is undeniable.  Kay Nietfeld/picture alliance via Getty Images Beyond defense, I consider Trump’s presidency has had a profound and contradictory effect on European political identity. His administration’s divergence from traditional European support for multilateralism as well as the EU’s positions on climate, trade and democratic norms have energized both sides of Europe’s political conflict. On the one hand, it has emboldened Euroskeptic and populist parties, providing external validation for their narratives on issues like national sovereignty and migration. On the other hand, it has triggered a sort of rally-around-the-flag effect with Europeans who increasingly value the achievements of integration and the protections of their democracies. Trust in EU institutions has recovered to pre-crisis levels, and support for bloc-wide policies stands at an historic high. In essence, Trump could inadvertently become a catalyst for European unity and self-reliance, even as he amplifies divisions within European societies.  ‘GIVING US A DIFFERENT DYSTOPIAN VISION OF ONE OF OUR POSSIBLE FUTURES’   Sunder Katwala is director of British Future.    Trump may have changed Europe most by giving us a different dystopian vision of one of our possible futures. Our leaders and the public alike lack a mental map or language for this unfamiliar world in which an American government appears to present a new threat from the West to our peace, prosperity and democracy. While that persists, it means hard work rethinking our assumptions across foreign policy and defense, trade and economics, technology and democracy.  The most significant impact may be political. The Trump administration’s effort to export this particular vision of conflict and polarization has turned America’s traditional soft power to attract into a deterrent, as it is a form of populism unpopular enough to create a boomerang effect. By reframing the choices on offer in our domestic politics, the challenge has catalyzed the search for antidotes among the anti-Trump majorities of our societies, and an appetite among citizens to coalesce around the most viable anti-Trumpist choices when choosing our own governments in these fragmented times.  ‘TRUMP’S ERA HAS HIGHLIGHTED THE EU’S SOVEREIGNTY CRISIS’   Thiemo Fetzer is an economist and professor at the University of Warwick and the University of Bonn.   Trump’s era has highlighted the EU’s sovereignty crisis, most visible in the digital and financial domains. Now is the time for Europe to choose how it will build out its economic future: Will it align with the U.S. or China, or is it capable of reimagining an even more ambitious but autonomous path forward?   By controlling key digital platforms and payment systems, the U.S. holds enormous power over global data and finance, being able to grant or deny access to entire countries or industries. This U.S. economic model — built on services, financialization, and energies like natural gas and crude oil — has powered innovation but also created deep inequality and social dysfunction. For Europe, aligning with this model promises access to capital and technology but risks dependence and division, as the U.S. may pit member states against one another. China offers an alternative model rooted in data sovereignty and a strong industrial base. Its strategy to electrify everything is an added bonus to addressing the shared climate crisis. Yet following Beijing’s path could weaken Europe’s manufacturing.   There is a third path, though: Europe can build its own economic and technological independence instead of choosing between Washington and Beijing. That would mean completing the single market so that goods, capital and digital services can move freely across borders — creating scale, cutting red tape and helping homegrown tech companies compete globally. A truly borderless European business environment would keep talent and investment within Europe, rather than letting it flow to the U.S. or Asia. Pooling defense resources could also make Europe stronger and more efficient, freeing up money and industrial capacity for new sectors such as clean energy and advanced manufacturing. Expanding the euro’s international role would also make Europe less dependent on the dollar and strengthen its financial influence abroad.   This path would tie Europe’s growth to its core values — dignity, privacy, data protection, accountability, and the rule of law — embedding them into its digital and economic systems. In doing so, Europe can continue work pragmatically with the U.S., China and others to set global rules. It is for Europeans to shape their own destiny.