HOUSTON — Oil companies and the world’s largest energy consumers face a significant challenge to rebuild global petroleum supply chains and inventories once the critical Strait of Hormuz bottleneck opens, Chevron CEO Mike Wirth said Monday. “We’ve got a lot of oil and gas now that is not flowing into the market,” Wirth said at the CERAWeek by S&P Global conference in Houston. “Physical supply chains don’t respond immediately, so even if the strait opens at some point, it will take time to rebuild inventories of the right grades of crude and the right types of fuel.” Wirth cautioned that Iran’s attacks on oil tankers and the broader damage of the Middle East war did greater damage to oil and gas markets than the Russia-Ukraine war. Asian nations are running low on diesel and jet fuel. The war has held up deliveries of LNG, fertilizer and other products. Part of the challenge, Wirth said, will be taking a read of the damage. It’s unclear how much production has been shut in, Wirth said, and how badly some facilities were damaged. At the same event, Energy Secretary Chris Wright reiterated to oil executives that he anticipated the global disruption to oil and gas flows would be “short-term,” but he encouraged companies to ramp up production. “Markets do what markets do,” Wright said. “Prices went up to send signals to everyone that can produce more: ‘Please, produce more.’”

Many describe our geopolitical moment as one of instability, but that word feels too weak for what we are living through. Some, like Mark Carney, argue that we are facing a rupture: a break with assumptions that anchored the global economic and political order for decades. Others, like Christine Lagarde, see a profound transition, a shift toward a new configuration of power, technology and societal expectations. Whichever perception we adopt, the implication is clear: leaders can no longer rely on yesterday’s mental models, institutional routines or governance templates. Johanna Mair is the Director of the Florence School of Transnational Governance at the European University Institute in Florence, where she leads education, training and research on governance beyond the nation state. Security, for example, is no longer a discrete policy field. It now reaches deeply into energy systems, artificial intelligence, cyber governance, financial stability and democratic resilience, all under conditions of strategic competition and mistrust. At the same time, competitiveness cannot be reduced to productivity metrics or short-term growth rates. It is about a society’s capacity to innovate, regulate effectively and mobilize investment toward long-term objectives — from the green and digital transitions to social cohesion. This dense web of interdependence is where transnational governance is practiced every day. The European Union illustrates this reality vividly. No single member state can build the capacity to manage these transformations on its own. EU institutions and other regional bodies shape regulatory frameworks and collective responses; corporations influence infrastructure and supply chains; financial institutions direct capital flows; and civic actors respond to social fragmentation and governance gaps. Effective leadership has become a systemic endeavour: it requires coordination across these levels, while sustaining public legitimacy and defending liberal democratic principles. > Our mission is to teach and train current and future leaders, equipping them > with the knowledge, skills and networks to tackle global challenges in ways > that are both innovative and grounded in democratic values. The Florence School of Transnational Governance (STG) at the European University Institute was created precisely to respond to this need. Located in Florence and embedded in a European institution founded by EU member states, the STG is a hub where policymakers, business leaders, civil society, media and academia meet to work on governance beyond national borders. Our mission is to teach and train current and future leaders, equipping them with the knowledge, skills and networks to tackle global challenges in ways that are both innovative and grounded in democratic values. What makes this mission distinctive is not only the topics we address, but also how and with whom we address them. We see leadership development as a practice embedded in real institutions, not a purely classroom-based exercise. People do not come to Florence to observe transnational governance from a distance; they come to practice it, test hypotheses and co-create solutions with peers who work on the frontlines of policy and politics. This philosophy underpins our portfolio of programs, from degree offerings to executive education. With early career professionals, we focus on helping them understand and shape governance beyond the state, whether in international organizations, national administrations, the private sector or civil society. We encourage them to see institutions not as static structures, but as arrangements that can and must be strengthened and reformed to support a liberal, rules-based order under stress. At the same time, we devote significant attention to practitioners already in positions of responsibility. Our Global Executive Master (GEM) is designed for experienced professionals who cannot pause their careers, but recognize that the governance landscape in which they operate has changed fundamentally. Developed by the STG, the GEM convenes participants from EU institutions, national administrations, international organizations, business and civil society — professionals from a wide range of nationalities and institutional backgrounds, reflecting the coalitions required to address complex problems. The program is structured to fit the reality of leadership today. Delivered part time over two years, it combines online learning with residential periods in Florence and executive study visits in key policy centres. This blended format allows participants to remain in full-time roles while advancing their qualifications and networks, and it ensures that learning is continuously tested against institutional realities rather than remaining an abstract exercise. Participants specialize in tracks such as geopolitics and security, tech and governance, economy and finance, or energy and climate. Alongside this subject depth, they build capabilities more commonly associated with top executive programs than traditional public policy degrees: change management, negotiations, strategic communication, foresight and leadership under uncertainty. These skills are essential for bridging policy design and implementation — a gap that is increasingly visible as governments struggle to deliver on ambitious agendas. Executive study visits are a core element of this practice-oriented approach. In a recent Brussels visit, GEM participants engaged with high-level speakers from the European Commission, the European External Action Service, the Council, the European Parliament, NATO, Business Europe, Fleishman Hillard and POLITICO itself. Over several days, they discussed foreign and security policy, industrial strategy, strategic foresight and the governance of emerging technologies. These encounters do more than illustrate theory; they give participants a chance to stress-test their assumptions, understand the constraints facing decision-makers and build relationships across institutional boundaries. via EUI Throughout the program, each participant develops a capstone project that addresses a strategic challenge connected to a policy organization, often their own employer. This ensures that executive education translates into institutional impact: projects range from new regulatory approaches and partnership models to internal reforms aimed at making organizations more agile and resilient. At the same time, they help weave a durable transnational network of practitioners who can work together beyond the programme. Across our activities at the STG, a common thread runs through our work: a commitment to defending and renewing the liberal order through concrete practice. Addressing the rupture or transition we are living through requires more than technical fixes. It demands leaders who can think systemically, act across borders and design governance solutions that are both unconventional and democratically legitimate. > Across our activities at the STG, a common thread runs through our work: a > commitment to defending and renewing the liberal order through concrete > practice. In a period defined by systemic risk and strategic competition, leadership development cannot remain sectoral or reactive. It must be interdisciplinary, practice-oriented and anchored in real policy environments. At the Florence School of Transnational Governance, we aim to create precisely this kind of learning community — one where students, fellows and executives work side by side to reimagine how institutions can respond to global challenges. For policymakers and professionals who recognize themselves in this moment of rupture, our programs — including the GEM — offer a space to step back, learn with peers and return to their institutions better equipped to lead change. The task is urgent, but it is also an opportunity: by investing in transnational governance education today, we can help lay the foundations for a more resilient and inclusive order tomorrow.

BERLIN — German Defense Minister Boris Pistorus will spend next week touring the Indo-Pacific with a passel of corporate chiefs in tow to make deals across the region. It’s part of an effort to mark a greater impact in an area where Berlin’s presence has been minor, but whose importance is growing as Germany looks to build up access to natural resources, technology and allies in a fracturing world. “If you look at the Indo-Pacific, Germany is essentially starting from scratch,” said Bastian Ernst, a defense lawmaker from Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s Christian Democrats. “We don’t have an established role yet, we’re only just beginning to figure out what that should be.” Pistorius leaves Friday on an eight-day tour to Japan, Singapore and Australia where he’ll be aiming to build relations with other like-minded middle powers — mirroring countries from France to Canada as they scramble to figure out new relationships in a world destabilized by Russia, China and a United States led by Donald Trump. “Germany recognizes this principle of interconnected theaters,” said Elli-Katharina Pohlkamp, visiting fellow of the Asia Programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations. Berlin, she said, “increasingly sees Europe’s focus on Russia and Asia’s focus on China and North Korea as security issues that are linked.” The military and defense emphasis of next week’s trip marks a departure from Berlin’s 2020 Indo-Pacific guidelines, which laid a much heavier focus on trade and diplomacy. Pistorius’ outreach will be especially important as Germany rapidly ramps up military spending at home. Berlin is on track to boost its defense budget to around €150 billion a year by the end of the decade and is preparing tens of billions in new procurement contracts. But not everything Germany needs can be sourced in Europe. Australia is one of the few alternatives to China in critical minerals essential to the defense industry. It’s a leading supplier of lithium and one of the only significant producers of separated rare earth materials outside China. Australia also looms over a key German defense contract. Berlin is considering whether to stick with a naval laser weapon being developed by homegrown firms Rheinmetall and MBDA, or team up with Australia’s EOS instead. That has become a more sensitive political question in Berlin. WELT, owned by POLITICO’s parent company Axel Springer, reported that lawmakers had stopped the planned contract for the German option, reflecting wider concern over whether Berlin should back a domestic system or move faster with a foreign one. That means what Pistorius sees in Australia could end up shaping a decision back in Germany. TALKING TO TOKYO Japan offers something different — not raw materials but military integration, logistics and technology.  Pohlkamp said the military side of the relationship with Japan is now “very much about interoperability and compatibility, built through joint exercises, mutual visits, closer staff work, expanded information exchange and mutual learning.” She described Japan as “a kind of yardstick for Germany,” a country that lives with “an enormous threat perception” not only militarily but also economically, because it is surrounded by pressure from China, North Korea and Russia.  The Japan-Germany Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement took effect in July 2024, giving the two militaries a framework for reciprocal supplies and services and making future port calls for naval vessels, exercises and recurring cooperation easier to sustain.  Pohlkamp said what matters most to Tokyo are not headline-grabbing deployments but “plannable, recurring contributions, which are more valuable than big, one-off shows of force.” But that ambition only goes so far if Germany’s presence remains sporadic. Bundeswehr recruits march on the market square to take their ceremonial oath in Altenburg on March 19, 2026. | Bodo Schackow/picture alliance via Getty Images Berlin has sent military assets to the region for training exercises in recent years — a frigate in 2021, combat aircraft in 2022, army participation in 2023, and a larger naval mission in 2024. But as pressure grows on Germany to beef up its military to hold off Russia, along with its growing presence in Lithuania and its effort to keep supplying Ukraine with weapons, the attention given to Asia is shrinking. The government told parliament last year it sent no frigate in 2025, plans none in 2026 and has not yet decided on 2027. Germany’s current military engagement in the Indo-Pacific consists of a single P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, sent to India in February as part of the Indo-Pacific Deployment 2026 exercises.  Germany, according to Ernst, is still “relatively blank” in the region. What it can contribute militarily remains narrow: “A bit of maritime patrol, a frigate, mine clearance.” Pohlkamp said Germany’s role in Asia is still being built “in small doses” and is largely symbolic. But what matters is whether Berlin can turn occasional visits and deployments into something steadier and more predictable. The defense ministry insists that is the point of Pistorius’s trip. Ministry spokesperson Mitko Müller said Wednesday that Europe and the Indo-Pacific are “inseparably linked,” citing the rules-based order, sea lanes, international law and the role of the two regions in global supply and value chains.  The new P-8A Poseidon reconnaissance aircraft stands in front of a technical hangar at Nordholz airbase on Nov. 20, 2025. | Christian Butt/picture alliance via Getty Images The trip is meant to focus on the regional security situation, expanding strategic dialogue, current and possible military cooperation, joint exercises including future Indo-Pacific deployments, and industrial cooperation. That explains why industry is traveling with Pistorius.  Müller said executives from Airbus, TKMS, MBDA, Quantum Systems, Diehl and Rohde & Schwarz are coming along, suggesting Berlin sees the trip as a chance to widen defense ties on the ground. But any larger German role in Asia would have to careful calibrated to avoid angering China — a key trading partner that is very wary of European powers expanding their regional presence. “That leaves Germany trying to do two things at once,” Pohlkamp said. “First, show up often enough to matter, but not so forcefully that it gets dragged into a confrontation it is neither politically nor militarily prepared to sustain.”

Hungary is pressing the European Union to suspend tariffs and extra duties on fertilizer imports from Russia and Belarus as the war in Iran threatens to drive up global food prices. Such a move would boost a key source of revenue in funding Moscow’s war of aggression against Ukraine. In a letter to European commissioners on Monday, Hungarian Agriculture Minister István Nagy warned that rising global fertilizer prices and supply uncertainty exacerbated by the war in Iran risk squeezing EU farmers and pushing up food costs. He called for the levies on Russian and Belarusian products to be temporarily reduced to zero, warning that Hungary could face lower crop yields if access to cheaper imports remains restricted. The country produces only nitrogen fertilizers domestically and relies on foreign supplies of phosphorus and potash. The EU tightened duties on fertilizers from Russia and Belarus in 2025 after imports rose in the years following Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The increase raised concern that Russia was redirecting gas exports hit by sanctions into fertilizer production to sustain export revenues. Russian shipments to the EU were still worth around €2 billion last year, but volumes fell sharply in early 2026 as the new levies began to bite. Iran’s effective blockage of the Strait of Hormuz is driving up the cost of fertilizer by tying up supplies of both the fuel and raw materials needed to produce it. Budapest is also pushing the EU to relax its ban on Russian gas to ease price pressures — an idea roundly rejected by Brussels.

The 21st century is more likely to belong to Beijing than to Washington — at least that’s the view from four key U.S. allies. Swaths of the public in Canada, Germany, France and the U.K. have soured on the U.S., driven by President Donald Trump’s foreign policy decisions, according to recent results from The POLITICO Poll. Respondents in these countries increasingly see China as a more dependable partner than the U.S. and believe the Asian economic colossus is leading on advanced technologies, including artificial intelligence. Critically, Europeans surveyed see it as possible to reduce reliance on the U.S. but harder to reduce reliance on China — suggesting newfound entanglements that could drastically tip the balance of global power away from the West. Here are five key takeaways from the poll highlighting the pivot from the U.S. to China. The POLITICO Poll — in partnership with U.K. polling firm Public First — found that respondents in those four allied countries believe it is better to depend on China than the U.S. following Trump’s turbulent return to office. That appears to be driven by Trump’s disruption, not by a newfound stability in China: In a follow-up question, a majority of respondents in both Canada and Germany agreed that any attempts to get closer to China are because the U.S. has become harder to depend on — not because China itself has become a more reliable partner. Many respondents in France (38 percent) and the U.K. (42 percent) also shared that sentiment. Under Trump’s “America First” ethos, Washington has upended the “rules-based international order” of the past with sharp-elbowed policies that have isolated the U.S. on the global stage. This includes slow-walking aid to Ukraine, threatening NATO allies with economic punishment and withdrawing from major international institutions, including the World Health Organization and the United Nations Human Rights Council. His punitive liberation day tariffs, as well as threats to annex Greenland and make Canada “the 51st state,” have only further strained relationships with top allies. Beijing has seized the moment to cultivate better business ties with European countries looking for an alternative to high U.S. tariffs on their exports. Last October, Beijing hosted a forum aimed at shoring up mutual investments with Europe. More recently, senior Chinese officials described EU-China ties as a partnership rather than a rivalry. “The administration has assisted the Chinese narrative by acting like a bully,” Mark Lambert, former deputy assistant secretary of State for China and Taiwan in the Biden administration, told POLITICO. “Everyone still recognizes the challenges China poses — but now, Washington no longer works in partnership and is only focused on itself.” These sentiments are already being translated into action. Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney declared a “rupture” between Ottawa and Washington in January and backed that rhetoric by sealing a trade deal with Beijing that same month. The U.K. inked several high-value export deals with China not long after, while both French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz have returned from recent summits in Beijing with Chinese purchase orders for European products. Respondents across all four allied countries are broadly supportive of efforts to create some distance from the U.S. — and say they’re also more dependent on China. In Canada, 48 percent said it would be possible to reduce reliance on the U.S. and believe their government should do so. In the U.K., 42 percent said reducing reliance on the U.S. sounded good in theory, but were skeptical it could happen in practice. By contrast, fewer respondents across those countries believe it would actually be possible to reduce reliance on China — a testament to Beijing’s dominance of global supply chains. Young adults may be drawn to China as an alternative to U.S. cultural hegemony. Respondents between the ages of 18 and 24 were significantly more supportive than their older peers of building a closer relationship with China. A recent study commissioned by the Institute of European Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences — a Beijing-based think tank — suggests most young Europeans get their information about China and Chinese life through social media. Nearly 70 percent of those aged 18 to 25 said they rely on social media and other short-form video platforms for information on China. And the media they consume is likely overwhelmingly supportive of China, as TikTok, one of the most popular social media platforms in the world, was built by Chinese company ByteDance and has previously been accused of suppressing content deemed negative toward China. According to Alicja Bachulska, a policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, younger generations believe the U.S. has led efforts to depict China as an authoritarian regime and a threat to democracy, while simultaneously degrading its own democratic values. The trend “pushes a narrative that ‘we’ve been lied to’ about what China is,” said Bachulska, as “social sentiment among the youth turns against the U.S.” “It’s an expression of dissatisfaction with the state of U.S. politics,” she added. There’s a clear consensus among those surveyed in Europe and Canada that China is winning the global tech race — a coveted title central to Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s grand policy vision. China is leading the U.S. and other Western nations in the development of electric batteries and robotics, while Chinese designs have also become the global standard in electric vehicles and solar panels. “There has been a real vibe shift in global perception of Chinese tech and innovation dominance,” said Sarah Beran, who served as deputy chief of mission in the U.S. embassy in Beijing during the Biden administration. This digital rat race is most apparent in the fast-paced development of artificial intelligence. China has poured billions of dollars into research initiatives, poaching top tech talent from U.S. universities and funding state-backed tech firms to advance its interests in AI. The investment appears to be paying off — a plurality of respondents from Canada, Germany, France and the U.K. believe that China is more likely to develop the first superintelligent AI. But these advancements have done little to change American minds. A majority of respondents in the U.S. still see American-made tech as superior to Chinese tech, even in the realm of AI. As Washington and its allies grow more estranged, the perception of the U.S. as the dominant world power is in retreat — though most Americans don’t see it that way. About half of all respondents in Canada, Germany, France and the U.K. believe that China is rapidly becoming a more consequential superpower. This is particularly true among those who say the U.S. is no longer a positive force for the world. By contrast, 63 percent of respondents in the U.S. believe their nation will maintain its dominance in 10 years — reflecting major disparities in beliefs about global power dynamics between the U.S. and its European allies. This view of China as the world’s power center may not have been entirely organic. The U.S. has accused Beijing of pouring billions of dollars into international information manipulation efforts, including state-backed media initiatives and the deployment of tools to stifle online criticism of China and its policies. Some fear that a misplaced belief among U.S. allies in the inevitability of China surpassing the U.S. as a global superpower could be helping accelerate Beijing’s rise. “Europe is capable of defending itself against threats from China and contesting China’s vision of a more Sinocentric, authoritarian-friendly world order,” said Henrietta Levin, former National Security Council director for China in the Biden administration. “But if Europe believes this is impossible and does not try to do so, the survey results may become a self-fulfilling prophecy.” METHOLODGY The POLITICO Poll was conducted from Feb. 6 to Feb. 9, surveying 10,289 adults online, with at least 2,000 respondents each from the U.S., Canada, U.K., France and Germany. Results for each country were weighted to be representative on dimensions including age, gender and geography, and have an overall margin of sampling error of ±2 percentage points for each country. Smaller subgroups have higher margins of error.

BRUSSELS — The European Union’s anti-deforestation law will put United States producers off exporting to the European market, harming EU competitiveness, a senior official with the U.S. Department of Agriculture told reporters in Brussels Friday. The law, also called EUDR, is “going to discourage us from looking at the European market” and from “paying attention to any European rules [linked to deforestation],” the official said. The law as it stands would affect $9 billion of U.S. trade to the EU annually, added the official, who spoke to journalists on condition that he was not named. A delegation of U.S. government representatives is finishing a tour of EU capitals — including Madrid, Rome, Paris, Berlin and Brussels — to lobby governments to simplify the EUDR ahead of an upcoming review of the rules next month. One example of a sector that could be affected is livestock farming, the official said, arguing these farmers depend on soybeans to feed their animals, and Europe does not produce enough protein feed. “It needs to import from countries that are better at it, like us,” he said, warning that the U.S. stopping that export “will drive up their costs, hurt their competitiveness.” The EU’s anti-deforestation law requires that companies police their supply chains to ensure that any commodities they use, such as palm oil, beef or coffee, have not contributed to deforestation. After complaints from industry groups and trade partners, EU institutions in December agreed to put off implementation of the law by a year — until Dec. 2026 — and mandated the Commission to present a review of the rules by April. “It’s particularly difficult for us because these [compliance] costs will be borne by our producers,” said the official. U.S. farmers also don’t want to share information on their farms with foreign governments, he said. Washington’s main qualms with the law include the fact that there’s no category of “negligible” risk in the EU’s ranking of countries by risk of deforestation. The U.S. — like all EU member countries as well as China, Canada, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Vietnam and others — has been labeled “low risk” under the EU’s deforestation classification system. Members of the European Parliament in the center-right European People’s Party have also backed the introduction of a “no risk” category, “for countries with stable or expanding forest areas.” The senior official also complained about a stipulation in the law that if the level of deforestation in any country exceeds 70,000 hectares annually, that country cannot be considered “low risk.” That standard “just doesn’t work for us,” they said. “It’s not fair.” Representatives from the European Commission are meeting with members of the delegation on Friday “at technical level” to discuss the law, a spokesperson for the European Commission confirmed to POLITICO. European Environment Commissioner Jessika Roswall told reporters in January that there would be no new legislative proposal come April, saying businesses need “predictability.” A 2024 report from the U.S. Congressional Research Service estimated that, in 2023, U.S. exports of the seven commodities under the EUDR accounted for approximately 3 percent of the value of U.S. exports to the EU, “so overall the EUDR may not significantly affect U.S. trade.” European Environment Commissioner Jessika Roswall told reporters in January that there would be no new legislative proposal come April, saying businesses need “predictability.” | Gabriel Luengas/Europa Press via Getty Images Still, the authors wrote, the law could affect U.S. producers of specific commodities covered by the law. In 2023, the highest value of covered commodities exported to the EU from the U.S. were wood and wood products ($4.5 billion), soybeans ($4 billion), rubber ($1.1 billion), and cattle, such as beef and related products ($409 million). Environmental groups are calling on EU governments and the Commission to stick by the EUDR and keep the rules intact. “Misleading and self-serving foreign pressure on the EU should not distract policy-makers from staying focused on facts,” said Anke Schulmeister-Oldenhove, manager for forests at WWF EU, in an emailed statement. “Every year the EUDR is postponed results in the loss of nearly 50 million trees and the release of 16.8 million tonnes of CO₂ into the atmosphere.”

The Trump administration believes it can withstand a brief spike in oil prices — for as many as four weeks, as one person close to the White House suggested — before the political hit does lasting damage. Administration officials’ confidence was bolstered Tuesday when oil dropped to $80 per barrel, down from $120 this weekend, reinforcing their view that the spikes are temporary and manageable. They have three to four weeks “where they can ride out what they need to” before oil prices become a more durable political problem, said the person close to the White House, who like others in this story was granted anonymity to share details of private conversations. “Assuming the economy continues to turn around once the active part of the war is concluded, you’ll have the whole summer from May through August to ride the turnaround,” the person said. A former Trump administration official added that the administration needs a “consistent, multi-week read” of oil prices before it shifts its approach. “These temporary little gyrations are not what they’re going to be basing their policy on,” the official said. Those two people, as well as a current U.S. official, said the administration never seriously considered altering its military strategy in the face of oil price hikes. Still, the administration was caught off guard by the speed and severity of the Sunday spike, a fourth person close to the White House said. “At the worst moments [Sunday] night, it was insane,” the fourth person said. “That definitely surprised me, and it absolutely surprised them.” Instead of changing course, the administration spent much of Monday trying to soothe spooked traders worried about the disruptive impact of a prolonged war on oil supply chains. Officials also tried to allay the fears of uneasy Republicans, who see the Iran war as counter to the affordability message they believe the GOP should be pushing as it battles to retain control of Congress in the midterms. More than 7 in 10 voters said they are very concerned or somewhat concerned that the war will cause oil and gas prices to rise in the United States, according to a recent Quinnipiac Poll. White House spokesperson Taylor Rodgers said that Trump has made it clear that increased oil and gas prices are “short-term disruptions.” “Ultimately, once the military objectives are completed and the Iranian terrorist regime is neutralized, oil and gas prices will drop rapidly again, potentially even lower than before the strikes begin,” Rogers said. “As a result, American families will benefit greatly in the long-term.” In the meantime, the White House is taking steps to address oil prices, such as considering lifting sanctions on Russian oil, and continuing to telegraph that the war will be a short one. “I get a sense of concern from the administration, but not panic,” said another U.S. official, familiar with energy issues. “It’s more a curiosity — ‘Why is this happening? Aren’t there ways to counteract this? Aren’t there quick fixes to deal with this?’” Still, it’s not clear that oil prices will immediately return to their prewar levels. When it comes to oil prices, there’s the market psychology and there’s reality, including how long it takes Gulf countries to restart production if problems in the Strait of Hormuz force them to shutter operations, said Ilan Goldenberg, a former Biden administration official who dealt with the Middle East. “I have very little confidence in this White House, given how little they planned for the outcome of this war, that they have mapped out all the second- and third- order effects to oil supplies and the oil markets,” Goldenberg said. U.S. intelligence has also started to see signs that Iran is preparing to deploy mines in the Strait of Hormuz, according to CBS News, which could further complicate a return to normal oil production post-war. Trump said Tuesday he has seen no official reports that Iran is doing that. While temporary spikes in oil prices aren’t making the White House balk publicly, it is grappling with a host of other pain points. The public remains skeptical about the war and uncertain about its goals, and support is likely to erode if service member casualties increase. Seven service members have died since the start of the war a little more than a week ago. That includes six Americans who were killed after an Iranian drone strike in Kuwait and a seventh who died from injuries sustained when Iran struck a Saudi military base where U.S. troops were stationed. The Pentagon said Tuesday that about 140 U.S. service members have been injured since the war started. “This war is already unpopular with the American public, but it can get even more so,” a former administration official said. “A mass casualty event, either on the battlefield or from a terror attack here at home, is a real risk. If that were to occur, coinciding with a spike in oil prices and the inflationary implications of shipping lanes being shut down, it could set off a much wider panic both on Wall Street and on Main Street. One thing that doesn’t appear to be driving White House decisionmaking on Iran: outcry over civilian casualties. The U.S. is investigating who is responsible for a Tomahawk missile that hit an Iranian elementary school, killing 175 people, many of them children. “No nation takes more precautions to ensure there’s never targeting of civilians than the United States of America,” Hegseth said during a press conference Tuesday morning. “We take things very very seriously and investigate them thoroughly.” The U.S., meanwhile, is facing pressure from its Middle East allies to soon bring the war to a close. A person familiar with Saudi Arabia’s discussions on Iran said that the Saudis want the war to end and they “are telling the U.S. to make sure the Iranian infrastructure of oil is not hit so Iranians don’t become desperate. They have to give the Iranians an off-ramp.” If the war does drag on, however, there may be little the administration can substantively do to undo the economic damage caused by spiked oil prices. “One good thing that Trump did say was, ‘We’re a strong economy. Look, a short term spike in energy prices isn’t something to panic about.’ And, yeah, I think that’s exactly right … If somehow there’s some kind of real settlement and things go back to normal, prices will gradually go down,’” said a former Treasury official. But if it doesn’t, “there’s no magic button that’s going to address high energy prices.” Eli Stokols and Jack Detsch contributed to this report.

BRUSSELS — The head of the International Energy Agency on Tuesday summoned an extraordinary meeting to decide whether to tap millions of barrels of emergency oil supplies amid soaring energy costs. The meeting, to be held at an undisclosed time on Tuesday, will “assess the current security of supply and market conditions to inform a subsequent decision on whether to make emergency stocks of IEA countries available to the market,” the agency’s chief, Fatih Birol, said in an emailed statement. The IEA’s 31 members — mostly advanced Western economies — have grown increasingly panicked as Iran and a U.S.-Israeli coalition trade airstrikes, imperilling critical supply chains and energy infrastructure across the Gulf. Merchant shipping has also abandoned the Strait of Hormuz, a chokepoint for 20 percent of the world’s energy trade, prompting fears of price spikes. The IEA’s members have yet to coordinate on measures to address the crisis, citing uncertainty over how long the war will last. Benchmark oil prices skyrocketed to over $100 a barrel in the first week of the war, before settling at $88 on Tuesday after U.S. President Donald Trump implied that the conflict was nearing a conclusion. Member countries currently hold over 1.2 billion barrels of emergency oil supplies as well as a further 600 million held under government obligation, Birol said.

When U.S., Mexican and Canadian soccer officials fanned out across the globe nearly a decade ago to sell the 2026 World Cup, they traveled in threes — one representative from each country — to underscore a simple message: North America’s three largest countries were in lockstep. “It was so embedded into everything we did that this was a united bid. Our success was tied to the joint nature of the bid. That was the anchor regarding the premise of what we were trying to do,” said John Kristick, former executive director of the 2026 United Bid Committee. The pitch worked. In 2018, FIFA members awarded the tournament to North America, marking the first time three countries would co-host a men’s World Cup. Bid strategists were delighted when The Washington Post editorial page approvingly called it ”the NAFTA World Cup.” The North American Free Trade Agreement is no more, a victim of President Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw during his first term, and the successor U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement is now teetering. At almost exactly the midway point of the 39-day tournament, trade ties that link the three countries’ economies will expire. The trilateral relationship is more frayed than it has ever been, tensions reflected in this year’s World Cup itself. Instead of one continental showcase, the 2026 World Cup increasingly resembles three distinct tournaments, with different immigration regimes, security plans and funding models, all a function of different policy choices in each host country. Soccer governing body FIFA “is the only glue that’s holding it together,” said one person intimately involved in the bid who was granted anonymity to speak candidly about the sensitive political dynamics. The “United” in the United Bid, once the anchor of the entire project, now competes with three national agendas, each running on its own track. POLITICO spoke to eight people involved in developing a World Cup whose path from conception to execution reflects the crooked arc of North American integration. “When these events are awarded, they’re concepts. They’re ideas. They feel good,” said Lee Igel, a professor of global sport at NYU who has advised the U.S. Conference of Mayors on sports policy. “But between the award and the event itself, the world changes. Politics change. Leaders change.” THE TRUMP TOURNAMENT At the start of the extravagant December event that formally set the World Cup schedule, Trump stood next to Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney to ceremonially draw the first lottery ball. FIFA officials touted the moment at the Kennedy Center as a milestone: the first time the three leaders had appeared together in person, united by soccer. The trio also met for 90 minutes off stage in a meeting — facilitated by FIFA as part of World Cup planning. That novelty was notable. While each national government has named a “sherpa” to serve as its lead, those officials — including Canadian Secretary of State for Sport Adam van Koeverden and Mexican coordinator Gabriela Cuevas — have met only a handful of times in formal trilateral settings. At a January security summit in Colorado Springs, White House FIFA Task Force director Andrew Giuliani did not mention Canada or Mexico during his remarks. Only when FIFA security officer GB Jones took the stage was the international nature of the tournament acknowledged. “We have been and continue to work very closely with officials from all three host countries on topics including safety, security, logistics, transportation and other topics related to hosting a successful FIFA World Cup,” a FIFA spokesperson wrote via email. “This is one World Cup presented across all three host countries and 16 host cities, while showcasing the uniqueness of each individual location and culture.” The soccer federations behind the United Bid have been largely sidelined, with FIFA — rather than national governments — serving as the link between them. It has brought personnel of local host-city organizing committees for quarterly workshops and other meetings, and situated nearly 1,000 of its own employees across all three countries, according to a FIFA spokesperson who says they are “working seamlessly in a united effort.” (The number will swell to more than 4,000 when the tournament is underway.) But those FIFA staff are forced to navigate wildly varied fiscal conditions depending on where they land. Mexico, which will have matches in three cities, has imposed a tax exemption to stimulate investment in the World Cup and related tourist infrastructure in its three host cities. The Canadian government has dedicated well over $300 million to tournament costs, with more than two-thirds going directly to host-city governments. “The federal government are contributing significantly to both Vancouver and Toronto in terms of funding,” said Sharon Bollenbach, the executive director of the FIFA World Cup Toronto Secretariat, which unlike American host committees is run directly out of city hall. American cities, however, have been left to secure their own funding, largely through the pursuit of commercial sponsorships and donations to local organizing committees. Congress has allocated $625 million for the federal government to reimburse host cities in security costs via a grant program. But the partial government shutdown and an attendant decision by Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem to stop approving FEMA grants is exacerbating a logjam for U.S. states and municipalities — including not only those with World Cup matches but hosting team training camps — that rely on federal funds to coordinate counterterrorism and security efforts. That has left American host cities in very different financial situations just months before the tournament starts. Houston and Dallas-area governments can count on receiving a share of state revenue from Texas’ Major Events Reimbursement Program. The small Boston suburb of Foxborough, Massachusetts, however, is refusing to approve an entertainment license for matches at Gillette Stadium because of an unresolved $7.8 million security bill. Because of the budget squeeze, American cities have cut back on “fan festival” gatherings that will run extend during the tournament’s full length in Canadian and Mexican cities. Jersey City has canceled the fan fest planned at Liberty State Park in favor of smaller community events, and Seattle’s fan fest will be scaled down into a “distributed model” spread cross four locations. The tournament has become tightly intertwined with Trump, as FIFA places an outsized emphasis on courting the man who loves to be seen as the consummate host. Public messaging from the White House has focused almost exclusively on the United States’ role, and Trump rarely mentions Canada or Mexico from the Oval Office or on Truth Social. Since returning to office, Trump has had eight in-person meetings with FIFA President Gianni Infantino — besides the lottery draw at the Kennedy Center — whereas Sheinbaum and Carney have only had one each. While taking questions from the media during a November session with Infantino in the Oval office, Trump did not rule out the use of U.S. military force, including potential land actions, within Mexico to combat drug cartels. Guadalajara, which is set to host four World Cup matches, this weekend erupted in violence after Mexican security forces killed the head of a cartel that Trump last year labeled a “foreign terrorist organization.” A White House spokesperson wrote in a social-media post that the United States provided “intelligence support” to the mission. It is part of a more significant set of conflicts than Trump had with the United States’ neighbors during his first term. In January, Trump claimed that Sheinbaum is “not running Mexico,” while Carney rose to office promising Canadians he would “stand up to President Trump.” Since then, Trump has regularly proposed annexing Canada as the 51st state, as his government offers support to an Alberta separatist movement that could split the country through an independence vote on the province’s October ballot. The July 1 renewal deadline for the five-year-old USMCA has injected urgency into relations among the three leaders. Without an extension, the largely tariff-free trade that underpins North America’s economy would come into question, and governments and businesses would begin planning for a rupture. Trump, who recently called the pact “irrelevant,” has signaled he would be content to let it lapse. Suspense around the free trade zone’s future will engulf preparations for the World Cup, potentially granting Trump related in unrelated negotiations. “In the lead-up to mega-events, geopolitical tensions tend to hover in the background,” Igel said. “Once the matches begin, the show can overwhelm everything else, unless something dramatic like a boycott intervenes. But in the months before? That’s when you see the friction.” THE ORIGINS OF THE UNITED BID It was not supposed to be this way. When North American soccer officials first decided, in 2016, to fuse three national campaigns to host the World Cup into one, they saw unity as the strategic advantage that would distinguish their bid from any competitors. Each country had considered pursuing the World Cup on its own. Canada, looking to build on its success as host of the 2015 Women’s World Cup, wanted to host the larger men’s competition. Mexico, the first country to host it twice, wanted another shot. The United States dusted off an earlier bid for the 2022 tournament, which was awarded to Qatar. Sunil Gulati, a Columbia University economist serving as the U.S. Soccer Federation’s president, envisioned an unprecedented compromise: Instead of competing with one another they would work together — with the United States using its economic primacy and geographical centrality to ensure it remained the tournament’s focal point. The three countries’ economies had been deeply intertwined for nearly a quarter-century. Their leaders signed NAFTA in 1992, lowering trade barriers and snaking supply chains across borders that had previous isolated economic activity. But the trade pact triggered a broad backlash in the United States that allied labor unions on the left and isolationists on the right. That political disquiet exploded with the candidacy of Donald Trump, who called NAFTA “the worst trade deal” and immediately moved to renegotiate it upon taking office. Gulati, meanwhile, was pitching Emilio Azcárraga Jean, CEO and chair of Mexican broadcaster Grupo Televisa, and Canada Soccer President Victor Montagliani, on his own plan for regional integration. They agreed to sketch out a tournament that would have 75 percent of the games held in the U.S. with the remainder split between Canada and Mexico. “I’d rather have a 90 percent chance of winning 75 percent of the World Cup than a 75 percent chance of, you know, winning all of it,” Gulati told the U.S. Soccer board, according to two people who heard him say it. Montagliani and Mexico Football Federation President Decio de María joined Gulati to formally announce the so-called United Bid in New York in April 2017. The three federation presidents knew that the thrust of their pitch had to be more emotional and inclusive than “we are big, rich and have tons of ready-built stadiums,” as one of the bid organizers put it. Kristick laced a theme of “community” through the 1,500-page prospectus known to insiders as a bid book. “In 2026, we can create a bold new legacy for players, for fans and for football by hosting a FIFA World Cup that is more inclusive, more universal than ever,” declared a campaign video that the United Bid showed to the organization’s voting members. “Not because of who we are as nations, but because of what we believe in as neighbors. To bid together, countries come together.” It was a sentiment increasingly out of sync with the times. The same month that Gulati had stood with his counterparts in New York announcing the joint bid, Trump was busy demanding that Congress include funding for a wall along the border with Mexico. He told then-Mexico President Enrique Peña Nieto and then-Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau that he wanted to renegotiate NAFTA, using aluminum and steel tariffs as a cudgel. Carlos Cordeiro, who displaced Gulati as U.S. Soccer president during the bid process in 2018, became the driving force of the lobbying effort to sell the idea to 211 national federations that would vote on it. In Cordeiro’s view, according to two Americans intimately involved in the bid at the time, the bid’s biggest challenge was assuring voters that the tournament would be more than a U.S. event dressed up with the flags of its neighbors. Teams fanned out across each of soccer’s six regional confederations to make their pitch, each presentation designed to paint a picture of tri-national cooperation, and returned to a temporary base in London to debrief. “It was very pragmatic. It was like Carlos, or another U.S. representative, would say this and talk about this. The Canada representative will then talk about this. The Mexico representative will talk about this. And it was very much trying to be even across the three in terms of who was speaking,” one person on the traveling team said. When the United Bid finally prevailed in June 2018, defeating a rival bid from Morocco, Trump celebrated it as an equal triumph for the three countries. “The U.S., together with Mexico and Canada, just got the World Cup,” he wrote on Twitter, now known as X. “Congratulations — a great deal of hard work!” THREE DIFFERENT TOURNAMENTS What began with a united bid is turning into parallel tournaments: with different fan bases, security procedures and off-field programs, all a function of different policy choices in each host country. Fans from Iran and Haiti are barred from entering the United States under travel restrictions imposed by Trump, while other World Cup countries are subject to elevated scrutiny that could block travel plans. (Official team delegations are exempt.) Canada and Mexico do not impose the same restrictions, creating uneven access across the tournament: fans traveling from Ivory Coast will likely find it much easier to reach Toronto for a June 20 match against Germany than one in Philadelphia five days later against Curaçao. “FIFA recognizes that immigration policy falls within the jurisdiction of sovereign governments,” read a statement provided by the FIFA spokesperson. “Engagement therefore focuses on dialogue and cooperation with host authorities to support inclusive tournament delivery, while respecting national law.” A fan who does cross borders will encounte a patchwork of security régimes depending on which government is in charge. Mexican authorities draw from deep experience policing soccer matches, with a mix of traditional crowd-control tactics and advanced technology like four-legged robots. The United States is emphasizing novel drone defenses and asked other countries for lists of its most problematic fans. Ongoing immigration enforcement actions in the U.S. have also prompted concern among the international soccer community and calls for a boycott of the tournament. The White House this month issued clarifying talking points to host cities to buttress the “shared commitment to safety, hospitality, and a successful tournament experience for all.” The document confirms that U.S. Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement “may have a presence” at the tournament to assist with non-immigration-related functions like aviation security and anti-human trafficking efforts. No where is the fragmentation more glaring among countries than on human rights. After previous World Cups were accused of “sportswashing” autocratic regimes in Qatar and Russia, the United Bid made “human rights and labor standards” a centerpiece of its proposal to FIFA. The bid stipulated that each host city by August 2025 must submit concrete plans for how the city would protect individual rights, including respect for “indigenous peoples, migrant workers and their families, national, ethnic and religious minorities, people with disabilities, women, race, LGBTQI+, journalists, and human rights defenders.” “Human rights were embedded in the bid from the beginning,” said Human Rights Watch director of global initiatives Minky Worden, who worked closely with Mary Harvey, a former U.S. goalkeeper and soccer executive who now leads the Centre for Sport and Human Rights, on the language. Harvey consulted with 70 civil-society groups across the three countries while developing the strategy. That deadline passed without a single U.S. city submitting their plan on time. Now just months before the kickoff, host cities have finally started to release their reports, creating a patchwork of approaches. While Vancouver’s report makes multiple references to respecting LGBTQ+ populations, Houston’s has no mention of sexual orientation and identity at all. The FIFA spokesperson says the organization has embedded inclusion and human rights commitments directly into agreements signed by host countries, cities and stadium operators, and that dedicated FIFA Human Rights, Safeguarding and Anti-Discrimination teams will monitor implementation and hold local organizers to account for violations. “All of these standards were supposed to be uniform across these three countries,” said Worden. “It wasn’t supposed to be the lowest common denominator with the U.S. being really low.”

American allies are watching in disbelief as the Pentagon reroutes weapon shipments to aid the Iran war, angry and scared that arms the U.S. demanded they buy will never reach them. European nations that have struggled to rebuild arsenals after sending weapons to Ukraine fear they won’t be able to ward off a Russian attack. Asian allies, startled by America’s rate of fire, question whether it could embolden China and North Korea. And even in the Middle East, countries aren’t clear if they will get air defenses from the U.S. for future priorities. Nearly a dozen officials in allied nations in Asia and Europe say they can’t win. The Trump administration has put them under extreme political pressure to raise defense budgets and buy American weapons — from air defense interceptors to guided bombs — only to quickly burn through those munitions in a war of its own. “It shouldn’t be a secret to anyone that the munitions that have been and will be fired are the ones that everybody needs to acquire in large numbers,” said one northern European official. Weapons production is a complex process that takes years of planning and runs through a supply chain riddled with bottlenecks. Trump’s reassurances that the U.S. has a “virtually unlimited supply” of munitions to fight Iran has done little to soothe allies’ fears. “It is very frustrating, the words are not matching the deeds,” said an Eastern European official, who like others interviewed, was granted anonymity to speak candidly. “It is pretty clear to everyone that the U.S. will put their own, Taiwan’s, Israel’s, and hemisphere priorities before Europe.” The joint U.S.-Israel war, officials warn, could accelerate the distancing between America and its allies when it comes to defense. The European Union already has approved rules to favor its own arms-makers over American contractors — risking tens, if not hundreds of billions in future U.S. sales. Even major companies, such as the German drone-maker Helsing are touting “European sovereignty.” Poland, a longtime American ally, has bought tanks and artillery from South Korea instead of U.S. contractors such as General Dynamics. It’s been a wake-up call for officials in Asia and Europe who once took Pentagon arms sales for granted. “The Europeans still live in a dream world in which the U.S. is a gigantic Walmart, where you buy the stuff and you get it immediately, and that is simply not true,” said Camille Grand, a former top NATO official who now heads the Brussels-based Aerospace, Security and Defence Industries Association of Europe. Allies in the Pacific — where China has built the world’s largest Navy and now has missiles that can attack American troops on Guam — are worried that the Pentagon will run out of ammunition in Iran and won’t have any left to deter a war in Asia. “It’s natural that the longer the conflict, the more urgent the supply of munitions and its inevitable for the U.S. to mobilize its foreign assets to maintain the operation,” said a Washington-based Asian diplomat, who warned it would affect “readiness” in the region. The fears of depleted weapons stockpiles extend to the U.S., where some Pentagon officials are warning about the state of the military’s munitions stockpiles, according to a congressional aide and two other people familiar with the dynamic. Defense Department officials warned Congress this week that the U.S. military was expending “an enormous amount” of munitions in the conflict, according to two of the people familiar with the conversations. The congressional aide briefed by the Pentagon said the U.S. was using precision strike missiles and cutting-edge interceptors in “scary high” numbers despite the Iranian military’s relative weakness. The weapons also include Tomahawk land-attack missiles, Patriot PAC-3 and ship-launched air defenses fired by the Navy. “The idea of doing a larger campaign with Iran was not on anyone’s mathematical bingo card as we were looking at munitions implications,” said a former defense official. “I struggle to see a way that layering on the Iran element makes the math problem get any better.” The Pentagon referred questions to the White House. Anna Kelly, a White House spokesperson, said Iran’s retaliatory ballistic missile attacks had fallen by 90 percent because of U.S. strikes. “President Trump is in close contact with our partners in Europe and the Middle East, and the terrorist Iranian regime’s attacks on its neighbors prove how imperative it was that President Trump eliminate this threat to our country and our allies,” she said. But some defense hawks in Congress are worried. Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) warned Wednesday on the Senate floor that the military is “not prepared” to deter aggression from both Russia and China at once due to the munitions shortfall. McConnell did not reply to a request for comment. Trump said in a social media post that he met with defense executives on Friday, including Boeing, Northrop Grumman, RTX, and Lockheed, who agreed to quadruple their production of “Exquisite Class” weapons. He did not explain which systems that entailed or how the U.S. planned to rapidly build factories, hire workers and increase weapons production. Some allies worried about weapons are hoping that’s more than an empty promise. “It seems that U.S. defense primes are still challenged to produce at the speed of demand,” said Giedrimas Jeglinskas, a Lithuanian member of Parliament who is also a former deputy Defense minister. “We welcome any effort by the administration to incentivize defense companies to get into war mode of production.” Others cautioned that the defense industrial base can’t be turned on with a switch to start mass producing the sophisticated missiles and air defenses that the U.S. and its allies desperately need. “There’s always this idea that there is a world in which we just have to go World War II,” said Grand, the former NATO official. “But [in] World War II, producing Sherman tanks was pretty close to producing tractor engines. Producing a Patriot is not pretty close to producing a Tesla.” Paul McLeary contributed to this report.