Europe’s chemical industry has reached a breaking point. The warning lights are no longer blinking — they are blazing. Unless Europe changes course immediately, we risk watching an entire industrial backbone, with the countless jobs it supports, slowly hollow out before our eyes. Consider the energy situation: this year European gas prices have stood at 2.9 times higher than in the United States. What began as a temporary shock is now a structural disadvantage. High energy costs are becoming Europe’s new normal, with no sign of relief. This is not sustainable for an energy-intensive sector that competes globally every day. Without effective infrastructure and targeted energy-cost relief — including direct support, tax credits and compensation for indirect costs from the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) — we are effectively asking European companies and their workers to compete with their hands tied behind their backs. > Unless Europe changes course immediately, we risk watching an entire > industrial backbone, with the countless jobs it supports, slowly hollow out > before our eyes. The impact is already visible. This year, EU27 chemical production fell by a further 2.5 percent, and the sector is now operating 9.5 percent below pre-crisis capacity. These are not just numbers, they are factories scaling down, investments postponed and skilled workers leaving sites. This is what industrial decline looks like in real time. We are losing track of the number of closures and job losses across Europe, and this is accelerating at an alarming pace. And the world is not standing still. In the first eight months of 2025, EU27 chemicals exports dropped by €3.5 billion, while imports rose by €3.2 billion. The volume trends mirror this: exports are down, imports are up. Our trade surplus shrank to €25 billion, losing €6.6 billion in just one year. Meanwhile, global distortions are intensifying. Imports, especially from China, continue to increase, and new tariff policies from the United States are likely to divert even more products toward Europe, while making EU exports less competitive. Yet again, in 2025, most EU trade defense cases involved chemical products. In this challenging environment, EU trade policy needs to step up: we need fast, decisive action against unfair practices to protect European production against international trade distortions. And we need more free trade agreements to access growth market and secure input materials. “Open but not naïve” must become more than a slogan. It must shape policy. > Our producers comply with the strictest safety and environmental standards in > the world. Yet resource-constrained authorities cannot ensure that imported > products meet those same standards. Europe is also struggling to enforce its own rules at the borders and online. Our producers comply with the strictest safety and environmental standards in the world. Yet resource-constrained authorities cannot ensure that imported products meet those same standards. This weak enforcement undermines competitiveness and safety, while allowing products that would fail EU scrutiny to enter the single market unchecked. If Europe wants global leadership on climate, biodiversity and international chemicals management, credibility starts at home. Regulatory uncertainty adds to the pressure. The Chemical Industry Action Plan recognizes what industry has long stressed: clarity, coherence and predictability are essential for investment. Clear, harmonized rules are not a luxury — they are prerequisites for maintaining any industrial presence in Europe. This is where REACH must be seen for what it is: the world’s most comprehensive piece of legislation governing chemicals. Yet the real issues lie in implementation. We therefore call on policymakers to focus on smarter, more efficient implementation without reopening the legal text. Industry is facing too many headwinds already. Simplification can be achieved without weakening standards, but this requires a clear political choice. We call on European policymakers to restore the investment and profitability of our industry for Europe. Only then will the transition to climate neutrality, circularity, and safe and sustainable chemicals be possible, while keeping our industrial base in Europe. > Our industry is an enabler of the transition to a climate-neutral and circular > future, but we need support for technologies that will define that future. In this context, the ETS must urgently evolve. With enabling conditions still missing, like a market for low-carbon products, energy and carbon infrastructures, access to cost-competitive low-carbon energy sources, ETS costs risk incentivizing closures rather than investment in decarbonization. This may reduce emissions inside the EU, but it does not decarbonize European consumption because production shifts abroad. This is what is known as carbon leakage, and this is not how EU climate policy intends to reach climate neutrality. The system needs urgent repair to avoid serious consequences for Europe’s industrial fabric and strategic autonomy, with no climate benefit. These shortcomings must be addressed well before 2030, including a way to neutralize ETS costs while industry works toward decarbonization. Our industry is an enabler of the transition to a climate-neutral and circular future, but we need support for technologies that will define that future. Europe must ensure that chemical recycling, carbon capture and utilization, and bio-based feedstocks are not only invented here, but also fully scaled here. Complex permitting, fragmented rules and insufficient funding are slowing us down while other regions race ahead. Decarbonization cannot be built on imported technology — it must be built on a strong EU industrial presence. Critically, we must stimulate markets for sustainable products that come with an unavoidable ‘green premium’. If Europe wants low-carbon and circular materials, then fiscal, financial and regulatory policy recipes must support their uptake — with minimum recycled or bio-based content, new value chain mobilizing schemes and the right dose of ‘European preference’. If we create these markets but fail to ensure that European producers capture a fair share, we will simply create new opportunities for imports rather than European jobs. > If Europe wants a strong, innovative resilient chemical industry in 2030 and > beyond, the decisions must be made today. The window is closing fast. The Critical Chemicals Alliance offers a path forward. Its primary goal will be to tackle key issues facing the chemical sector, such as risks of closures and trade challenges, and to support modernization and investments in critical productions. It will ultimately enable the chemical industry to remain resilient in the face of geopolitical threats, reinforcing Europe’s strategic autonomy. But let us be honest: time is no longer on our side. Europe’s chemical industry is the foundation of countless supply chains — from clean energy to semiconductors, from health to mobility. If we allow this foundation to erode, every other strategic ambition becomes more fragile. If you weren’t already alarmed — you should be. This is a wake-up call. Not for tomorrow, for now. Energy support, enforceable rules, smart regulation, strategic trade policies and demand-driven sustainability are not optional. They are the conditions for survival. If Europe wants a strong, innovative resilient chemical industry in 2030 and beyond, the decisions must be made today. The window is closing fast. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is CEFIC- The European Chemical Industry Council  * The ultimate controlling entity is CEFIC- The European Chemical Industry Council  More information here.

Iris Ferguson is a global adviser to Loom and a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for Arctic and global resilience. Ann Mettler is a distinguished visiting fellow at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy and a former director general of the European Commission. After much pressure, European leaders delayed a decision this week amid division on whether to tighten market access through a “Made in Europe” mandate and redouble efforts to reduce the bloc’s strategic dependencies — particularly on China. This decision may appear technocratic, but the hold-up signals its importance and reflects a larger strategic reality shared across the Atlantic. Security, industry and energy have all fused into a single race to control the systems that power modern economies and militaries. And increasingly, success will hinge on whether the U.S. and Europe can confront this reality together, starting with the one domain that’s shaping every other: energy. While traditional defense spending still grabs headlines, today’s battlefield is being reshaped just as profoundly by energy flows and critical inputs. Advanced batteries for drones, portable power for forward-deployed units and mineral supply chains for next-generation platforms — these all point to the simple truth that technological and operational superiority increasingly depends on who controls the next generation of energy systems. But as Europe and the U.S. look to maintain their edge, they must rethink not just how they produce and move energy, but how to secure the industrial base behind it. Energy sovereignty now sits at the center of our shared security, and in a world where adversaries can weaponize supply chains just as easily as airspace or sea lanes, the future will belong to those who build energy systems that are resilient and interoperable by design. The Pentagon already understands this. It has tested distributed power to shorten vulnerable fuel lines in war games across the Indo-Pacific; it has watched closely how mobile generation units keep the grid alive under Russian attack in Ukraine; and it is exploring ways to deliver energy without relying on exposed logistics via new research on solar power beaming. Each of these cases clearly demonstrates that strategic endurance now depends on energy agility and security. But currently, many of these systems depend on materials and manufacturing chains that are dominated by a strategic rival: From batteries and magnets to rare earth processing, China controls our critical inputs. This isn’t just an economic liability, it’s a national security vulnerability for both Europe and the U.S. We’re essentially building the infrastructure of the future with components that could be withheld, surveilled or compromised. That risk isn’t theoretical. China’s recent export controls on key minerals are already disrupting defense and energy manufacturers — a sharp reminder of how supply chain leverage can be a form of coercion, and of our reliance on a fragile ecosystem for the very technologies meant to make us more independent. So, how do we modernize our energy systems without deepening these unnecessary dependencies and build trusted interdependence among allies instead? The solution starts with a shift in mindset that must then translate into decisive policy action. Simply put, as a matter of urgency, energy and tech resilience must be treated as shared infrastructure, cutting across agencies, sectors and alliances. Defense procurement can be a catalyst here. For example, investing in dual-use technologies like advanced batteries, hardened micro-grids and distributed generation would serve both military needs and broader resilience. These aren’t just “green” tools — they’re strategic assets that improve mission effectiveness, while also insulating us from coercion. And done right, such investment can strengthen defense, accelerate innovation and also help drive down costs. Next, we need to build new coalitions for critical minerals, batteries, trusted manufacturing and cyber-secure infrastructure. Just as NATO was built for collective defense, we now need economic and technological alliances that ensure shared strategic autonomy. Both the upcoming White House initiative to strengthen the supply chain for artificial intelligence technology and the recently announced RESourceEU initiative to secure raw materials illustrate how partners are already beginning to rewire systems for resilience. Germany gave the bloc one such example by moving to reduce its reliance on Chinese-made wind components in favor of European suppliers. | Tan Kexing/Getty Images Finally, we must also address existing dependencies strategically and head-on. This means rethinking how and where we source key materials, including building out domestic and allied capacity in areas long neglected. Germany recently gave the bloc one such example by moving to reduce its reliance on Chinese-made wind components in favor of European suppliers. Moving forward, measures like this need EU-wide adoption. By contrast, in the U.S., strong bipartisan support for reducing reliance on China sits alongside proposals to halt domestic battery and renewable incentives, undercutting the very industries that enhance resilience and competitiveness. This is the crux of the matter. Ultimately, if Europe and the U.S. move in parallel rather than together, none of these efforts will succeed — and both will be strategically weaker as a result. The EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas recently warned that we must “act united” or risk being affected by Beijing’s actions — and she’s right. With a laser focus on interoperability and cost sharing, we could build systems that operate together in a shared market of close to 800 million people. The real challenge isn’t technological, it’s organizational. Whether it be Bretton Woods, NATO or the Marshall Plan, the West has strategically built together before, anchoring economic resilience with national defense. The difference today is that the lines between economic security, energy access and defense capability are fully blurred. Sustainable, agile energy is now part of deterrence, and long-term security depends on whether the U.S. and Europe can build energy systems that reinforce and secure one another. This is a generational opportunity for transatlantic alignment; a mutually reinforcing way to safeguard economic interests in the face of systemic competition. And to lead in this new era, we must design for it — together and intentionally. Or we risk forfeiting the very advantages our alliance was built to protect.

BRUSSELS — More than 80 percent of Europe’s companies will be freed from environmental-reporting obligations after EU institutions reached a deal on a proposal to cut green rules on Monday.   The deal is a major legislative victory for European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in her push cut red tape for business, one of the defining missions of her second term in office. However, that victory came at a political cost: The file pushed the coalition that got her re-elected to the brink of collapse and led her own political family, the center-right European People’s Party (EPP), to team up with the far right to get the deal over the line. The new law, the first of many so-called omnibus simplification bills, will massively reduce the scope of corporate sustainability disclosure rules introduced in the last political term. The aim of the red tape cuts is to boost the competitiveness of European businesses and drive economic growth. The deal concludes a year of intense negotiations between EU decision-makers, investors, businesses and civil society, who argued over how much to reduce reporting obligations for companies on the environmental impacts of their business and supply chains — all while the effects of climate change in Europe were getting worse. “This is an important step towards our common goal to create a more favourable business environment to help our companies grow and innovate,” said Marie Bjerre, Danish minister for European affairs. Denmark, which holds the presidency of the Council of the EU until the end of the year, led the negotiations on behalf of EU governments. Marie Bjerre, Den|mark’s Minister for European affairs, who said the agreement was an important step for a more favourable business environment. | Philipp von Ditfurth/picture alliance via Getty Images Proposed by the Commission last February, the omnibus is designed to address businesses’ concerns that the paperwork needed to comply with EU laws is costly and unfair. Many companies have been blaming Europe’s overzealous green lawmaking and the restrictions it places on doing business in the region for low economic growth and job losses, preventing them from competing with U.S. and Chinese rivals.   But Green and civil society groups — and some businesses too — argued this backtracking would put environmental and human health at risk. That disagreement reverberated through Brussels, disturbing the balance of power in Parliament as the EPP broke the so-called cordon sanitaire — an unwritten rule that forbids mainstream parties from collaborating with the far right — to pass major cuts to green rules. It set a precedent for future lawmaking in Europe as the bloc grapples with the at-times conflicting priorities of boosting economic growth and advancing on its green transition. The word “omnibus” has since become a mainstay of the Brussels bubble vernacular with the Commission putting forward at least 10 more simplification bills on topics like data protection, finance, chemical use, agriculture and defense. LESS PAPERWORK   The deal struck by negotiators from the European Parliament, EU Council and the Commission includes changes to two key pieces of legislation in the EU’s arsenal of green rules: The Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) and the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD).  The rules originally required businesses large and small to collect and publish data on their greenhouse gas emissions, how much water they use, the impact of rising temperatures on working conditions, chemical leakages and whether their suppliers — which are often spread across the globe — respect human rights and labor laws.    Now the reporting rules will only apply to companies with more than 1,000 employees and €450 million in net turnover, while only the largest companies — with 5,000 employees and at least €1.5 billion in net turnover — are covered by supply chain due diligence obligations. They also don’t have to adopt transition plans, with details on how they intend to adapt their business model to reach targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.   Importantly the decision-makers got rid of an EU-level legal framework that allowed civilians to hold businesses accountable for the impact of their supply chains on human rights or local ecosystems. MEPs have another say on whether the deal goes through or not, with a final vote on the file slated for Dec. 16. It means that lawmakers have a chance to reject what the co-legislators have agreed to if they consider it to be too far from their original position.

BRUSSELS — The European Union’s drive to cut red tape is creating uncertainty for business and chaos in the EU’s institutions, Executive Vice President Teresa Ribera said on Thursday, in comments that put her squarely at odds with her boss Ursula von der Leyen. “In too many occasions we have this sense that it is not simplification but [a] messy combination of things that end in uncertainty,” Ribera said in Brussels. The Commission’s dealings with EU member countries and lawmakers have degenerated into “a terrible political spectacle,” she added. The remarks by the Spanish socialist represent the most serious pushback by a top EU official since von der Leyen launched a massive effort to simplify the bloc’s regulatory rulebook after being confirmed for a second term a year ago. This has taken the form of a series of “omnibus” packages — on issues ranging from business supply chains to agriculture funding and migration — that have emerged from the EU’s policy machinery with little or no consultation. The EU ombudsman has slammed the Commission for procedural shortcomings in proposing the measures, saying they amounted to “maladministration.” Ribera, who ranks second at the EU executive behind its German president, acknowledged in a keynote speech that it was important to avoid duplication, align procedures, move faster and provide greater clarity to businesses. But this should not go too far. “Deregulation eliminates safeguards, it puts costs onto citizens and taxpayers, creates uncertainty, discourages investment,” she said at an event hosted by think tank Bruegel. “It’s a kind of Trumpist approach against being stable, reliable and predictable. It weakens our standards. It lowers the credibility of the single market, it enlarges inequalities and distortions.” Von der Leyen made the case for deregulation in a speech last month in Copenhagen. “When we look at simplification, we all agree we need simplification, we need deregulation,” she said. But Ribera cautioned against that on Thursday. “Simplifying rules is not the same as weakening protections or giving up on regulation,” she said. Lawmakers in the European Parliament earlier this month agreed to exempt more companies from green reporting rules after the center-right, right-wing and far-right groups allied to pass the EU’s first omnibus simplification package. Louise Guillot contributed reporting.

LONDON — The U.K. will break China’s stranglehold over crucial net zero supply chains, Energy Minister Chris McDonald has pledged. McDonald, a joint minister at the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero and the Department for Business and Trade, told POLITICO he is determined to bolster domestic access to critical minerals. Critical minerals like lithium and copper are used in essential net-zero technologies such as electric vehicles and batteries, as well as defense assets like F35 fighter jets. China currently controls 90 percent of rare earth refining, according to a government critical minerals strategy published last week. McDonald said China’s dominance of mineral processing risks driving up prices for the net zero transition.  The U.K. has made a legally-binding pledge to reduce planet-damaging emissions to net zero by 2050. McDonald fears China has become a “monopoly provider” of critical minerals and that its dominant role in processing allowed China to control the costs for buyers. “We want to capture this supply chain in the U.K. as part of our industrial strategy. To do that … means, ultimately, we’re going to have to wrest control of critical minerals back into a broad group of countries, not just China,” he said. The government’s critical minerals strategy includes a target that no more than 60 percent of U.K. annual demand for critical minerals in aggregate is supplied by any one country by 2035 — including China. “So, if there is an investment from China that helps with that, then that’s great. And if it doesn’t help with that, or it sort of compounds that issue that isn’t consistent with our strategy, then we judge it on that basis ultimately,” McDonald said. Additional reporting by Graham Lanktree.

BRUSSELS — The military should get involved in the green transition to ensure that Russia doesn’t exploit new vulnerabilities brought about by the move to renewable energy sources, a top EU body said in a document obtained by POLITICO. The bloc has made efforts in recent years to end dependence on Russian fuels and move toward cleaner technology, and is set to ban Russian gas imports entirely under its broader REPowerEU roadmap. However, a letter drafted by the Danish presidency of the Council of the EU and sent on Nov. 28 to EU ambassadors argued that the transition also introduces “new layers of complexity” as Europe’s old energy architecture — including petrol stations, pipelines, refineries and other infrastructure — is phased out. That complicates supply chains on which militaries depend, requiring “enhanced energy independence and engagement in the green transition” by the transatlantic military alliance NATO. The letter, first reported on by Contexte, also calls for stronger coordination between NATO and the EU on energy policy. In particular, officials ought to look at how to protect Europe’s energy infrastructure amid an increase in “physical sabotage and cyberattacks targeting pipelines, cables, ports, and power grids,” it said. The digitization of many energy sources, it added, also requires “strong security measures throughout all phases of infrastructure planning, design, and operation.” The initiative will be discussed by energy ministers on Dec. 15.

Europe’s security does not depend solely on our physical borders and their defense. It rests on something far less visible, and far more sensitive: the digital networks that keep our societies, economies and democracies functioning every second of the day. > Without resilient networks, the daily workings of Europe would grind to a > halt, and so too would any attempt to build meaningful defense readiness. A recent study by Copenhagen Economics confirms that telecom operators have become the first line of defense in Europe’s security architecture. Their networks power essential services ranging from emergency communications and cross-border healthcare to energy systems, financial markets, transport and, increasingly, Europe’s defense capabilities. Without resilient networks, the daily workings of Europe would grind to a halt, and so too would any attempt to build meaningful defense readiness. This reality forces us to confront an uncomfortable truth: Europe cannot build credible defense capabilities on top of an economically strained, structurally fragmented telecom sector. Yet this is precisely the risk today. A threat landscape outpacing Europe’s defenses The challenges facing Europe are evolving faster than our political and regulatory systems can respond. In 2023 alone, ENISA recorded 188 major incidents, causing 1.7 billion lost user-hours, the equivalent of taking entire cities offline. While operators have strengthened their systems and outage times fell by more than half in 2024 compared with the previous year, despite a growing number of incidents, the direction of travel remains clear: cyberattacks are more sophisticated, supply chains more vulnerable and climate-related physical disruptions more frequent. Hybrid threats increasingly target civilian digital infrastructure as a way to weaken states. Telecom networks, once considered as technical utilities, have become a strategic asset essential to Europe’s stability. > Europe cannot deploy cross-border defense capabilities without resilient, > pan-European digital infrastructure. Nor can it guarantee NATO > interoperability with 27 national markets, divergent rules and dozens of > sub-scale operators unable to invest at continental scale. Our allies recognize this. NATO recently encouraged members to spend up to 1.5 percent of their GDP on protecting critical infrastructure. Secretary General Mark Rutte also urged investment in cyber defense, AI, and cloud technologies, highlighting the military benefits of cloud scalability and edge computing – all of which rely on high-quality, resilient networks. This is a clear political signal that telecom security is not merely an operational matter but a geopolitical priority. The link between telecoms and defense is deeper than many realize. As also explained in the recent Arel report, Much More than a Network, modern defense capabilities rely largely on civilian telecom networks. Strong fiber backbones, advanced 5G and future 6G systems, resilient cloud and edge computing, satellite connectivity, and data centers form the nervous system of military logistics, intelligence and surveillance. Europe cannot deploy cross-border defense capabilities without resilient, pan-European digital infrastructure. Nor can it guarantee NATO interoperability with 27 national markets, divergent rules and dozens of sub-scale operators unable to invest at continental scale. Fragmentation has become one of Europe’s greatest strategic vulnerabilities. The reform Europe needs: An investment boost for digital networks At the same time, Europe expects networks to become more resilient, more redundant, less dependent on foreign technology and more capable of supporting defense-grade applications. Security and resilience are not side tasks for telecom operators, they are baked into everything they do. From procurement and infrastructure design to daily operations, operators treat these efforts as core principles shaping how networks are built, run and protected. Therefore, as the Copenhagen Economics study shows, the level of protection Europe now requires will demand substantial additional capital. > It is unrealistic to expect world-class, defense-ready infrastructure to > emerge from a model that has become structurally unsustainable. This is the right ambition, but the economic model underpinning the sector does not match these expectations. Due to fragmentation and over-regulation, Europe’s telecom market invests less per capita than global peers, generates roughly half the return on capital of operators in the United States and faces rising costs linked to expanding security obligations. It is unrealistic to expect world-class, defense-ready infrastructure to emerge from a model that has become structurally unsustainable. A shift in policy priorities is therefore essential. Europe must place investment in security and resilience at the center of its political agenda. Policy must allow this reality to be reflected in merger assessments, reduce overlapping security rules and provide public support where the public interest exceeds commercial considerations. This is not state aid; it is strategic social responsibility. Completing the single market for telecommunications is central to this agenda. A fragmented market cannot produce the secure, interoperable, large-scale solutions required for modern defense. The Digital Networks Act must simplify and harmonize rules across the EU, supported by a streamlined governance that distinguishes between domestic matters and cross-border strategic issues. Spectrum policy must also move beyond national silos, allowing Europe to avoid conflicts with NATO over key bands and enabling coherent next-generation deployments. Telecom policy nowadays is also defense policy. When we measure investment gaps in digital network deployment, we still tend to measure simple access to 5G and fiber. However, we should start considering that — if security, resilience and defense-readiness are to be taken into account — the investment gap is much higher that the €200 billion already estimated by the European Commission. Europe’s strategic choice The momentum for stronger European defense is real — but momentum fades if it is not seized. If Europe fails to modernize and secure its telecom infrastructure now, it risks entering the next decade with a weakened industrial base, chronic underinvestment, dependence on non-EU technologies and networks unable to support advanced defense applications. In that scenario, Europe’s democratic resilience would erode in parallel with its economic competitiveness, leaving the continent more exposed to geopolitical pressure and technological dependency. > If Europe fails to modernize and secure its telecom infrastructure now, it > risks entering the next decade with a weakened industrial base, chronic > underinvestment, dependence on non-EU technologies and networks unable to > support advanced defense applications. Europe still has time to change course and put telecoms at the center of its agenda — not as a technical afterthought, but as a core pillar of its defense strategy. The time for incremental steps has passed. Europe must choose to build the network foundations of its security now or accept that its strategic ambitions will remain permanently out of reach. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is Connect Europe AISBL * The ultimate controlling entity is Connect Europe AISBL * The political advertisement is linked to advocacy on EU digital, telecom and industrial policy, including initiatives such as the Digital Networks Act, Digital Omnibus, and connectivity, cybersecurity, and defence frameworks aimed at strengthening Europe’s digital competitiveness. More information here.

Heidi Kingstone is a journalist and author covering human rights issues, conflict and politics. Her most recent book is “Genocide: Personal Stories, Big Questions.” Slavery is alive and thriving, and it’s wrapped inside shiny chocolate bars that promise to be “fair trade,” “child-labor free” and “sustainable.” In West Africa, which produces more than 60 percent of the world’s cocoa, over 1.5 million children still work under hazardous conditions. Kids, some as young as five, use machetes to crack pods open in their hands, carry loads that weigh more than they do and spray toxic pesticides without protection. Meanwhile, of the roughly 2 million metric tons of cocoa the Ivory Coast produces each year, between 20 percent and 30 percent is grown illegally in protected forests. And satellite data from Global Forest Watch shows an increase in deforestation across key cocoa-growing regions as farmers, desperate for income, push deeper into forest reserves. The bitter truth is that despite decades of pledges, certification schemes and packaging glowing with virtue — of forests saved, farmers empowered and consciences soothed — most chocolate companies have failed to eradicate exploitation from their supply chains. Today, many cocoa farmers in the Ivory Coast and Ghana still earn less than a dollar a day, well below the poverty line. According to a 2024 report by the International Cocoa Initiative, the average farmer earns only 40 percent of a living wage. Put starkly, as the global chocolate market swells close to a $150 billion a year in 2025, the average farmer now receives less than 6 percent of the value of a single chocolate bar, whereas in the 1970s they received more than 50 percent. Then there’s the use of child labor, which is essentially woven into the fabric of this economy, where we have been sold the illusion of progress. From the 2001 Harkin-Engel Protocol — a voluntary agreement to end child labor by the world’s chocolate giants — to today’s glossy environmental, social and governance (ESG) reports, every initiative has promised progress and delivered delay. In 2007, the industry quietly redefined “public certification,” shifting it from a commitment to consumer labeling to a vague pledge to compile statistics on labor conditions. It missed the original 2010 deadline to eliminate child labor, as well as a new target to reduce it by 70 percent by 2020. And that year, a study by the University of Chicago’s National Opinion Research Center found that hazardous child labor in cocoa production increased from 2008 to 2019. “We covered a story about a ship carrying trafficked children,” recalled journalist Humphrey Hawksley, who first exposed the issue in the BBC documentary called Slavery: A Global Investigation. “The chocolate companies refused to comment and spoke as one industry. That was their rule. Even now, none of them is slave-free,” he added. As it stands, many of the more than 1.5 million West African children working in cocoa production are trafficked from neighboring Burkina Faso and Mali. Traffickers lure them with false promises or outright abduction, offering children as young as 10 either bicycles or small sums to travel to the Ivory Coast. There, they are sold to farmers for as little as $34 each. And once on these farms, they are trapped. They work up to 14 hours a day, sleep in windowless sheds with no clean water or toilets, and most never see the inside of a classroom. Last but not least, we come to deforestation: Since its independence, more than 90 percent of the Ivory Coast’s forests have disappeared due to cocoa farming. In 2024, deforestation accelerated despite corporate commitments to halt it by 2025, as declining soil fertility and stagnant prices pushed farmers farther into the forest to plant new cocoa trees. But as Reuters Correspondent for West and Central Africa Ange Aboa described them, such labels are “the biggest scam of the century!” | Lena Klimkeit/Picture Alliance via Getty Images Certification labels like “Rainforest Alliance” and “Fairtrade” are supposed to prevent this. But as Reuters Correspondent for West and Central Africa Ange Aboa described them, such labels are “the biggest scam of the century!” Complicit in all of this are the financiers and investors who profit. For example, Norway’s sovereign wealth fund is the world’s largest investor, and Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM) is a shareholder in 9,000 corporations, including Nestlé, Mondelez, Hershey, Barry Callebaut and Lindt — all part of the direct chocolate cluster. NBIM also has shares in McDonald’s, Starbucks, Unilever, the Dunkin’ parent company and Tim Hortons — the indirect high-volume buyer cluster. “The richest families in cocoa — the Marses, the Ferreros, the Cargills, the Jacobs — are billionaires thanks to the exploitation of the poorest children on earth,” said journalist and human rights campaigner Fernando Morales-de la Cruz, the founder of Cacao for Change. “And countries like Norway, which claim to be ethical, profit from slavery and child labor.” The problem is, few are asking who picks the cocoa. And though the EU’s Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive, which was adopted last year, requires large companies to address human rights and environmental abuses in their supply chains, critics say the directive’s weaknesses, loopholes, and delayed enforcement will blunt its impact. However, all of this could still be fixed. Currently, a metric ton of cocoa sells for about $5,000 on world markets, but Morales-de la Cruz estimates that a fair farm-gate price would be around $7,500 per metric ton. To that end, he advocates for binding international trade standards that enforce living incomes and transparent pricing, modeled on the World Trade Organization’s compliance mechanisms. “Human rights should be as binding in trade as tariffs,” he insisted. The solution isn’t to buy more “ethical” bars but to demand accountability and support legislation that makes exploitation unprofitable. “We can’t shop our way to justice,” he said. So, as the trees in the Ivory Coast’s forests fall, the profits in Europe and North America continue to soar. And two decades after the industry vowed to end child labor, the cocoa supply chain remains one of the world’s most exploitative and least accountable. Moreover, the European Parliament’s vote on the Omnibus simplification package last month laid bare the corporate control and moral blindness still present in EU policymaking, all behind talk of “cutting red tape.” “Yet Europe’s media and EU-funded NGOs stay silent, talking of competitiveness and green transitions, while ignoring the children who harvest its cocoa, coffee and cotton,” said Morales-de la Cruz. “Europe cannot claim to defend human rights while profiting from exploitation.” However, until the industry pays a fair price and governments enforce real accountability, every bar of chocolate remains an unpaid moral debt.

The European Commission did not follow the proper lawmaking procedure when it drafted a plan to cut red tape, the European Ombudsman office said in a damaging assessment released Thursday. The administrative watchdog — which has no enforcement powers — found “a number of procedural shortcomings” which “amount to maladministration” in how the Commission prepared several proposals to review EU rules on supply chain transparency, agricultural funding, and migration. It comes as the EU executive attempts to quickly pass a long list of legislative amendments to simplify rules for business and boost the bloc’s global competitiveness. The findings conclude three separate investigations launched by the Ombudsman, following complaints from civil society that the Commission was bypassing its own “Better Regulation” rules, which outline what steps the EU needs to take when drafting legislative proposals. “The Commission must be able to respond urgently to different situations, particularly in the current geopolitical context,” European Ombudswoman Teresa Anjinho said in a statement. “However, it needs to ensure that accountability and transparency continue to be part of its legislative processes and that its actions are clearly explained to citizens.” The Commission did not provide enough evidence to “justify the ‘urgency’ of the legislative proposals towards the public,” the Ombudsman conclusions state. It recommends that the EU executive be more transparent, evidenced-based and inclusive in its future lawmaking. The Ombudsman Office monitors whether the institutions are upholding transparency norms investigates complaints of poor administration by EU institutions.

LONDON — In the corridors of Whitehall, armies of officials are working out how best to spend billions of pounds earmarked for defense equipment. However, they have yet to inform the people it concerns the most: Britain’s arms industry. Many in the sector now fear that they’ve wasted their own money developing cutting-edge gear, as the government drags its feet on awarding contracts. U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s Labour Party has made a lot of noise on defense since entering government last year, plundering the aid budget to get defense spending to reach 2.6 percent of GDP by 2027 and a promise of 3.5 percent by 2035.  Alongside the funding boost, Starmer asked George Robertson, a Labour Party politician who is a former NATO secretary-general, to lead a major inquiry into how the U.K. would meet geopolitical threats, known as the Strategic Defence Review (SDR). The SDR was well received across the defense industry and viewed as a statement of intent from the government to devote effort and resources to building up the sector, with an emphasis on resilience and innovation.  Those good intentions were supposed to be followed by a series of complementary announcements — including a defense industrial strategy, the appointment of a new national armaments director, and a defense investment plan.  The industrial strategy and armaments director both arrived late, while the defense investment plan is still missing in action. It is now expected after this week’s fall budget.  Six months since the SDR, many in the industry complain that they haven’t received the certainty they need about where the British government — in many cases, their sole buyer —plans to invest.  Business owners say this is limiting their ability to make long-term plans and risks skilled workers departing for other jobs.  One representative of a mid-sized arms manufacturer — granted anonymity like others in this piece in order not to damage commercial prospects — said the problem was that the “big, bold” prescription of the SDR has given way to “repeated deferral, which always happens with delivery plans of this complexity.” INNOVATING IN THE DARK The war in Ukraine has radically reshaped other countries’ understanding of what’s needed on the battlefield, and the SDR set out a clear expectation that innovation would be rewarded. At September’s DSEI — an industry jamboree held in London — it was plain to see that private companies had stepped up to deliver prototypes for novel weaponry and other equipment, from modular robots that can deliver materiel to a battlefield and can also serve as stretchers, to AI that can read and predict threats on the ground in real time.  Defence Minister Luke Pollard said:  “We need to move to war-fighting readiness, and the SDR gave industry a very clear direction of how an increasing defense budget will be spent on new technologies and looking after our people better.” | John Keeble/Getty Images Much of that research and development was done by companies drawing on their own budgets or taking out loans as they wait for news of any specific government contracts.  For small suppliers in particular, the lag could prove existential.  One small manufacturer based in England said: “We are ready to go; we have built factories that could start making equipment tomorrow. But we can’t until an order is placed.” Armored vehicle maker Supacat has said that while its business is stable, suppliers will suffer without a predictable path ahead. “This is about the wider industry and our partners in the supply chain that have been contributing,” Toby Cox, the company’s head of sales, told POLITICO. “Our assumption is we don’t get more [orders], some of these companies will have a downturn in their orders.” KEEPING PRODUCTION LINES WARM Andrew Kinniburgh, defense director general of manufacturers association Make UK, echoed those concerns. While the industry “warmly welcomed” the Defence Ministry’s commitment to boost SME spending, he said, “the MOD must give companies certainty of long-term demand signals and purchase orders, allowing businesses to make the private investments needed in people, capital, and infrastructure.” Mike Armstrong, U.K. managing director of German defense firm Stark, which has recently opened a plant in Britain, added: “Giving the industry a clear view of future requirements is the fastest way to ensure the U.K. and its allies stay ahead.” Even some bigger companies that deal with the government on components for aircraft and submarines have privately complained about putting money into research and development without knowing what the end result will be.  An engineer working at one of Britain’s largest defense firms said: “We have multi-use items that could be for both military and civilian purposes, but cannot invest until we know what government strategy is. If it’s bad for us, it must be so hard for SMEs.” Mike Armstrong, U.K. managing director of German defense firm Stark, added: “Giving the industry a clear view of future requirements is the fastest way to ensure the U.K. and its allies stay ahead.” | Andrew Matthews/Getty Images The issue is not only one of investment, but also of skills. Supacat’s Cox said that keeping production lines warm matters because the workforce behind complex fabrications is fragile. “The U.K. has a skill shortage, particularly around engineering fabrication. If we’ve got an employee in that sector, we absolutely don’t want to lose them in another sector,” he said.  NOT LONG TO GO The Ministry of Defence said it appreciates the need for clarity. Defence Minister Luke Pollard, speaking to POLITICO at DSEI, said:  “We need to move to war-fighting readiness, and the SDR gave industry a very clear direction of how an increasing defense budget will be spent on new technologies and looking after our people better.” He argued there was “a neat synergy” between the “duty of government to keep the country safe and the first mission of this Labour government to grow the economy.” An MOD spokesperson said the defense investment plan would “offer clear, long-term capability requirements that enable industry to plan and unlocking private investment.” They pointed out that £250 million had already been allocated for “defense growth deals” alongside a £182 million skills package, and that the MOD had placed £31.7 billion in orders with U.K. industry in the last financial year. A government official rejected claims that ministers were moving too slowly, pointing to Defence Secretary John Healey’s recent announcement on new munitions factories as exactly the kind of demand signal that industry is looking for.  The director of a large U.K. defense producer said the signs from the government were “encouraging,” specifying that Chancellor Rachel Reeves, having agreed to more money for defense, “wants to see a return on investment.” While most of the country will be braced for Reeves’s big moment on Wednesday when she announces the national budget, one sector will have to hold its breath a little longer. Luke McGee contributed to this report.