BRUSSELS — The EU aims to seal a free-trade agreement with India by late January instead of the end of the year as initially envisaged, Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič told POLITICO. “The plan is that, most probably in the second week of January, that [Indian Commerce Minister] Piyush Goyal would come here” for another round of negotiations, Šefčovič said in an interview on Monday. “There is a common determination that we should do our utmost to get to the [free-trade agreement] and use every possible day until the Indian national day,” he added. India celebrates its annual Republic Day on Jan. 26, and both Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Council President António Costa have been invited as guests of honor. Von der Leyen and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi pledged in February to clinch the free-trade agreement (FTA) by the end of the year — something even they recognized would be a steep target. But a number of issues keep gumming up the works, Šefčovič said, including that India is linking its objections to the EU’s planned carbon border tax and its steel safeguard measures with the EU’s own demand to reduce its tariffs on cars. Šefčovič traveled again to New Delhi last week in an effort to clear major hurdles to conclude the EU’s negotiations with the world’s most populous country. “The ideal scenario would be — like we announced with Indonesia — that we completed the political negotiations on the FTA,” Šefčovič said. “That would be my ideal scenario, but we are not there yet.” The EU and Indonesia concluded their agreement in September. “It’s extremely, extremely challenging,” he said, adding: “The political ambition of our president and the prime minister to get this done this year was absolutely crucial for us to make progress.”

Europe’s chemical industry has reached a breaking point. The warning lights are no longer blinking — they are blazing. Unless Europe changes course immediately, we risk watching an entire industrial backbone, with the countless jobs it supports, slowly hollow out before our eyes. Consider the energy situation: this year European gas prices have stood at 2.9 times higher than in the United States. What began as a temporary shock is now a structural disadvantage. High energy costs are becoming Europe’s new normal, with no sign of relief. This is not sustainable for an energy-intensive sector that competes globally every day. Without effective infrastructure and targeted energy-cost relief — including direct support, tax credits and compensation for indirect costs from the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) — we are effectively asking European companies and their workers to compete with their hands tied behind their backs. > Unless Europe changes course immediately, we risk watching an entire > industrial backbone, with the countless jobs it supports, slowly hollow out > before our eyes. The impact is already visible. This year, EU27 chemical production fell by a further 2.5 percent, and the sector is now operating 9.5 percent below pre-crisis capacity. These are not just numbers, they are factories scaling down, investments postponed and skilled workers leaving sites. This is what industrial decline looks like in real time. We are losing track of the number of closures and job losses across Europe, and this is accelerating at an alarming pace. And the world is not standing still. In the first eight months of 2025, EU27 chemicals exports dropped by €3.5 billion, while imports rose by €3.2 billion. The volume trends mirror this: exports are down, imports are up. Our trade surplus shrank to €25 billion, losing €6.6 billion in just one year. Meanwhile, global distortions are intensifying. Imports, especially from China, continue to increase, and new tariff policies from the United States are likely to divert even more products toward Europe, while making EU exports less competitive. Yet again, in 2025, most EU trade defense cases involved chemical products. In this challenging environment, EU trade policy needs to step up: we need fast, decisive action against unfair practices to protect European production against international trade distortions. And we need more free trade agreements to access growth market and secure input materials. “Open but not naïve” must become more than a slogan. It must shape policy. > Our producers comply with the strictest safety and environmental standards in > the world. Yet resource-constrained authorities cannot ensure that imported > products meet those same standards. Europe is also struggling to enforce its own rules at the borders and online. Our producers comply with the strictest safety and environmental standards in the world. Yet resource-constrained authorities cannot ensure that imported products meet those same standards. This weak enforcement undermines competitiveness and safety, while allowing products that would fail EU scrutiny to enter the single market unchecked. If Europe wants global leadership on climate, biodiversity and international chemicals management, credibility starts at home. Regulatory uncertainty adds to the pressure. The Chemical Industry Action Plan recognizes what industry has long stressed: clarity, coherence and predictability are essential for investment. Clear, harmonized rules are not a luxury — they are prerequisites for maintaining any industrial presence in Europe. This is where REACH must be seen for what it is: the world’s most comprehensive piece of legislation governing chemicals. Yet the real issues lie in implementation. We therefore call on policymakers to focus on smarter, more efficient implementation without reopening the legal text. Industry is facing too many headwinds already. Simplification can be achieved without weakening standards, but this requires a clear political choice. We call on European policymakers to restore the investment and profitability of our industry for Europe. Only then will the transition to climate neutrality, circularity, and safe and sustainable chemicals be possible, while keeping our industrial base in Europe. > Our industry is an enabler of the transition to a climate-neutral and circular > future, but we need support for technologies that will define that future. In this context, the ETS must urgently evolve. With enabling conditions still missing, like a market for low-carbon products, energy and carbon infrastructures, access to cost-competitive low-carbon energy sources, ETS costs risk incentivizing closures rather than investment in decarbonization. This may reduce emissions inside the EU, but it does not decarbonize European consumption because production shifts abroad. This is what is known as carbon leakage, and this is not how EU climate policy intends to reach climate neutrality. The system needs urgent repair to avoid serious consequences for Europe’s industrial fabric and strategic autonomy, with no climate benefit. These shortcomings must be addressed well before 2030, including a way to neutralize ETS costs while industry works toward decarbonization. Our industry is an enabler of the transition to a climate-neutral and circular future, but we need support for technologies that will define that future. Europe must ensure that chemical recycling, carbon capture and utilization, and bio-based feedstocks are not only invented here, but also fully scaled here. Complex permitting, fragmented rules and insufficient funding are slowing us down while other regions race ahead. Decarbonization cannot be built on imported technology — it must be built on a strong EU industrial presence. Critically, we must stimulate markets for sustainable products that come with an unavoidable ‘green premium’. If Europe wants low-carbon and circular materials, then fiscal, financial and regulatory policy recipes must support their uptake — with minimum recycled or bio-based content, new value chain mobilizing schemes and the right dose of ‘European preference’. If we create these markets but fail to ensure that European producers capture a fair share, we will simply create new opportunities for imports rather than European jobs. > If Europe wants a strong, innovative resilient chemical industry in 2030 and > beyond, the decisions must be made today. The window is closing fast. The Critical Chemicals Alliance offers a path forward. Its primary goal will be to tackle key issues facing the chemical sector, such as risks of closures and trade challenges, and to support modernization and investments in critical productions. It will ultimately enable the chemical industry to remain resilient in the face of geopolitical threats, reinforcing Europe’s strategic autonomy. But let us be honest: time is no longer on our side. Europe’s chemical industry is the foundation of countless supply chains — from clean energy to semiconductors, from health to mobility. If we allow this foundation to erode, every other strategic ambition becomes more fragile. If you weren’t already alarmed — you should be. This is a wake-up call. Not for tomorrow, for now. Energy support, enforceable rules, smart regulation, strategic trade policies and demand-driven sustainability are not optional. They are the conditions for survival. If Europe wants a strong, innovative resilient chemical industry in 2030 and beyond, the decisions must be made today. The window is closing fast. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is CEFIC- The European Chemical Industry Council  * The ultimate controlling entity is CEFIC- The European Chemical Industry Council  More information here.

President Donald Trump promised that a wave of emergency tariffs on nearly every nation would restore “fair” trade and jump-start the economy. Eight months later, half of U.S. imports are avoiding those tariffs. “To all of the foreign presidents, prime ministers, kings, queens, ambassadors, and everyone else who will soon be calling to ask for exemptions from these tariffs,” Trump said in April when he rolled out global tariffs based on the United States’ trade deficits with other countries, “I say, terminate your own tariffs, drop your barriers, don’t manipulate your currencies.” But in the time since the president gave that Rose Garden speech announcing the highest tariffs in a century, enormous holes have appeared. Carveouts for specific products, trade deals with major allies and conflicting import duties have let more than half of all imports escape his sweeping emergency tariffs. Some $1.6 trillion in annual imports are subject to the tariffs, while at least $1.7 trillion are excluded, either because they are duty-free or subject to another tariff, according to a POLITICO analysis based on last year’s import data. The exemptions on thousands of goods could undercut Trump’s effort to protect American manufacturing, shrink the trade deficit and raise new revenue to fund his domestic agenda. In September, the White House exempted hundreds of goods, including critical minerals and industrial materials, totaling nearly $280 billion worth of annual imports. Then in November, the administration exempted $252 billion worth of mostly agricultural imports like beef, coffee and bananas, some of which are not widely produced in the U.S. — just after cost-of-living issues became a major talking point out of Democratic electoral victories — on top of the hundreds of other carveouts. “The administration, for most of this year, spent a lot of time saying tariffs are a way to offload taxes onto foreigners,” said Ed Gresser, a former assistant U.S. trade representative under Democratic and Republican administrations, including Trump’s first term, who now works at the Progressive Policy Institute, a D.C.-based think tank. “I think that becomes very hard to continue arguing when you then say, ‘But we are going to get rid of tariffs on coffee and beef, and that will bring prices down.’ … It’s a big retreat in principle.” The Trump administration has argued that higher tariffs would rebalance the United States’ trade deficits with many of its major trading partners, which Trump blames for the “hollowing out” of U.S. manufacturing in what he evoked as a “national emergency.” Before the Supreme Court, the administration is defending the president’s use of the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act to enact the tariffs, and Trump has said that a potential court-ordered end to the emergency tariffs would be “country-threatening.” In an interview with POLITICO on Monday, Trump said he was open to adding even more exemptions to tariffs. He downplayed the existing carveouts as “very small” and “not a big deal,” and said he plans to pair them with tariff increases elsewhere. Responding to POLITICO’s analysis, White House spokesperson Kush Desai said, “The Trump administration is implementing a nuanced and nimble tariff agenda to address our historic trade deficit and safeguard our national security. This agenda has already resulted in trillions in investments to make and hire in America along with over a dozen trade deals with some of America’s most important trade partners.” To date, the majority of exemptions to the “reciprocal” tariffs — the minimum 10 percent levies on most countries — have been for reasons other than new trade deals, according to POLITICO’s analysis. The White House also pushed back against the notion that November’s cuts were made in an effort to reduce food prices, saying that the exemptions were first outlined in the September order. The U.S. granted subsequent blanket exemptions, regardless of the status of countries’ trade negotiations with the Trump administration, after announcing several trade deals. Following the exemptions on agricultural tariffs, Trump announced on Monday a $12 billion relief aid package for farmers hurt by tariffs and rising production costs. The money will come from an Agriculture Department fund, though the president said it was paid for by revenue from tariffs (by law, Congress would need to approve spending the money that tariffs bring in). In addition to the exemptions from Trump’s reciprocal tariffs, more than $300 billion of imports are also exempted as part of trade deals the administration has negotiated in recent months, including with the European Union, the United Kingdom, Japan and more recently, Malaysia, Cambodia and Brazil. The deal with Brazil removed a range of products from a cumulative tariff of 50 percent, making two-thirds of imports from the country free from emergency tariffs. For Canadian and Mexican goods, Trump imposed tariffs under a separate emergency justification over fentanyl trafficking and undocumented migrants. But about half of imports from Mexico and nearly 40 percent of those from Canada will not face tariffs because of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada free trade agreement that Trump negotiated in his first term. Last year, importers claimed USMCA exemptions on $405 billion in goods; that value is expected to increase, given that the two countries are facing high tariffs for the first time in several years. The Trump administration has also exempted several products — including autos, steel and aluminum — from the emergency reciprocal tariffs because they already face duties under Section 232 of the U.S. Trade Expansion Act of 1962. The imports covered by those tariffs could total up to $900 billion annually, some of which may also be exempt under USMCA. The White House is considering using the law to justify further tariffs on pharmaceuticals, semiconductors and several other industries. For now, the emergency tariffs remain in place as the Supreme Court weighs whether Trump exceeded his authority in imposing them. In May, the U.S. Court of International Trade ruled that Trump’s use of emergency authority was unlawful — a decision the U.S. Court of Appeals upheld in August. During oral arguments on Nov. 5, several Supreme Court justices expressed skepticism that the emergency statute authorizes a president to levy tariffs, a power constitutionally assigned to Congress. As the rates of tariffs and their subsequent exemptions are quickly added and amended, businesses are struggling to keep pace, said Sabine Altendorf, an economist with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. “When there’s uncertainty and rapid changes, it makes operations very difficult,” Altendorf said. “Especially for agricultural products where growing times and planting times are involved, it’s very important for market actors to be able to plan ahead.” ABOUT THE DATA Trump’s trade policy is not a straightforward, one-size-fits-all approach, despite the blanket tariffs on most countries of the world. POLITICO used 2024 import data to estimate the value of goods subject to each tariff, accounting for the stacking rules outlined below. Under Trump’s current system, some tariffs can “stack” — meaning a product can face more than one tariff if multiple trade actions apply to it. Section 232 tariffs cover automobiles, automobile parts, products made of steel and aluminum, copper and lumber — and are applied in that order of priority. Section 232 tariffs as a whole then take priority over other emergency tariffs. We applied this stacking priority order to all imports to ensure no double-counting. To calculate the total exclusions, we did not count the value of products containing steel, aluminum and copper, since the tariff would apply only to the known portion of the import’s metal contentand not the total import value of all products containing them. This makes the $1.7 trillion in exclusions a minimum estimate. Goods from Canada and Mexico imported under USMCA face no tariffs. Some of these products fall under a Section 232 category and may be charged applicable tariffs for the non-USMCA portion of the import. To claim exemptions under USMCA, importers must indicate the percentage of the product made or assembled in Canada or Mexico. Because detailed commodity-level data on which imports qualify for USMCA is not available, POLITICO’s analysis estimated the amount that would be excluded from tariffs on Mexican and Canadian imports by applying each country’s USMCA-exempt share to its non-Section 232 import value. For instance, 38 percent of Canada’s total imports qualified for USMCA. The non-Section 232 imports from Canada totaled around $320 billion, so we used only $121 billion towards our calculation of total goods excluded from Trump’s emergency tariffs. Exemptions from trade deals included those with the European Union, the United Kingdom, Japan, Brazil, Cambodia and Malaysia. They do not include “frameworks” for agreements announced by the administration. Exemptions were calculated in chronological order of when the deals were announced. Imports already exempted in previous orders were not counted again, even if they appeared on subsequent exemption lists.

Mathias Döpfner is chair and CEO of Axel Springer, POLITICO’s parent company. America and Europe have been transmitting on different wavelengths for some time now. And that is dangerous — especially for Europe. The European reactions to the new U.S. National Security Strategy paper and to Donald Trump’s recent criticism of the Old Continent were, once again, reflexively offended and incapable of accepting criticism: How dare he, what an improper intrusion! But such reactions do not help; they do harm. Two points are lost in these sour responses. First: Most Americans criticize Europe because the continent matters to them. Many of those challenging Europe — even JD Vance or Trump, even Elon Musk or Sam Altman — emphasize this repeatedly. The new U.S. National Security Strategy, scandalized above all by those who have not read it, states explicitly: “Our goal should be to help Europe correct its current trajectory. We will need a strong Europe to help us successfully compete, and to work in concert with us to prevent any adversary from dominating Europe.” And Trump says repeatedly, literally or in essence, in his interview with POLITICO: “I want to see a strong Europe.” The transatlantic drift is also a rupture of political language. Trump very often simply says what he thinks — sharply contrasting with many European politicians who are increasingly afraid to say what they believe is right. People sense the castration of thought through a language of evasions. And they turn away. Or toward the rabble-rousers. My impression is that our difficult American friends genuinely want exactly what they say they want: a strong Europe, a reliable and effective partner. But we do not hear it — or refuse to hear it. We hear only the criticism and dismiss it. Criticism is almost always a sign of involvement, of passion. We should worry far more if no criticism arrived. That would signal indifference — and therefore irrelevance. (By the way: Whether we like the critics is of secondary importance.) Responding with hauteur is simply not in our interest. It would be wiser — as Kaja Kallas rightly emphasized — to conduct a dialogue that includes self-criticism, a conversation about strengths, weaknesses and shared interests, and to back words with action on both sides. Which brings us to the second point: Unfortunately, much of the criticism is accurate. Anyone who sees politics as more than a self-absorbed administration of the status quo must concede that for decades Europe has delivered far too little — or nothing at all. Not in terms of above-average growth and prosperity, nor in terms of affordable energy. Europe does not deliver on deregulation or debureaucratization; it does not deliver on digitalization or innovation driven by artificial intelligence. And above all: Europe does not deliver on a responsible and successful migration policy. The world that wishes Europe well looked to the new German government with great hope. Capital flows on the scale of trillions waited for the first positive signals to invest in Germany and Europe. For it seemed almost certain that the world’s third-largest economy would, under a sensible, business-minded and transatlantic chancellor, finally steer a faltering Europe back onto the right path. The disappointment was all the more painful. Aside from the interior minister, the digital minister and the economics minister, the new government delivers in most areas the opposite of what had been promised before the election. The chancellor likes to blame the vice chancellor. The vice chancellor blames his own party. And all together they prefer to blame the Americans and their president. Instead of a European fresh start, we see continued agony and decline. Germany still suffers from its National Socialist trauma and believes that if it remains pleasantly average and certainly not excellent, everyone will love it. France is now paying the price for its colonial legacy in Africa and finds itself — all the way up to a president driven by political opportunism — in the chokehold of Islamist and antisemitic networks. In Britain, the prime minister is pursuing a similar course of cultural and economic submission. And Spain is governed by socialist fantasists who seem to take real pleasure in self-enfeeblement and whose “genocide in Gaza” rhetoric mainly mobilizes bored, well-heeled daughters of the upper middle class. Hope comes from Finland and Denmark, from the Baltic states and Poland, and — surprisingly — from Italy. There, the anti-democratic threats from Russia, China and Iran are assessed more realistically. Above all, there is a healthy drive to be better and more successful than others. From a far weaker starting point, there is an ambition for excellence. What Europe needs is less wounded pride and more patriotism defined by achievement. Unity and decisive action in defending Ukraine would be an obvious example — not merely talking about European sovereignty but demonstrating it, even in friendly dissent with the Americans. (And who knows, that might ultimately prompt a surprising shift in Washington’s Russia policy.) That, coupled with economic growth through real and far-reaching reforms, would be a start. After which Europe must tackle the most important task: a fundamental reversal of a migration policy rooted in cultural self-hatred that tolerates far too many newcomers who want a different society, who hold different values, and who do not respect our legal order. If all of this fails, American criticism will be vindicated by history. The excuses for why a European renewal is supposedly impossible or unnecessary are merely signs of weak leadership. The converse is also true: where there is political will, there is a way. And this way begins in Europe — with the spirit of renewal of a well-understood “Europe First” (what else?) — and leads to America. Europe needs America. America needs Europe. And perhaps both needed the deep crisis in the transatlantic relationship to recognize this with full clarity. As surprising as it may sound, at this very moment there is a real opportunity for a renaissance of a transatlantic community of shared interests. Precisely because the situation is so deadlocked. And precisely because pressure is rising on both sides of the Atlantic to do things differently. A trade war between Europe and America strengthens our shared adversaries. The opposite would be sensible: a New Deal between the EU and the U.S. Tariff-free trade as a stimulus for growth in the world’s largest and third-largest economies — and as the foundation for a shared policy of interests and, inevitably, a joint security policy of the free world. This is the historic opportunity that Friedrich Merz could now negotiate with Donald Trump. As Churchill said: “Never waste a good crisis!”

LONDON — The British government is working to give its trade chief new powers to move faster in imposing higher tariffs on imports, as it faces pressure from Brussels and Washington to combat Chinese industrial overcapacity. Under new rules drawn up by British officials, Trade Secretary Peter Kyle will have the power to direct the Trade Remedies Authority (TRA) to launch investigations and give ministers options to set higher duty levels to protect domestic businesses. The trade watchdog will be required to set out the results of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations within a year, better monitor trade distortions and streamline processes for businesses to prompt trade probes. The U.K. is in negotiations with the U.S. and the EU to forge a steel alliance to counter Chinese overcapacity as the bloc works to introduce its own updated safeguards regime. The EU is the U.K.’s largest market and Brussels is creating a new steel protection regime that is set to slash Britain’s tariff-free export quotas and place 50 percent duties on any in excess. The government said its directive to the TRA will align the U.K. with similar powers in the EU and Australia, and follow World Trade Organization rules. It is set out in a Strategic Steer to the watchdog and will be introduced as part of the finance bill due to be wrapped up in the spring. “We are strengthening the U.K.’s system for tackling unfair trade to give our producers and manufacturers — especially SMEs who have less capacity and capability — the backing they need to grow and compete,” Business and Trade Secretary Peter Kyle said in a statement. “By streamlining processes and aligning our framework with international peers, we are ensuring U.K. industry has the tools to protect jobs, attract investment and thrive in a changing global economy,” Kyle added. These moves come after the government said on Wednesday that its Steel Strategy, which plots the future of the industry in Britain and new trade protections for the sector, will be delayed until next year. The Trump administration has been concerned about the U.K.’s steps to counter China’s steel overcapacity and refused to lower further a 25 percent tariff carve-out for Britain’s steel and aluminum exports from the White House’s 50 percent global duties on the metals. Trade Secretary Kyle discussed lowering the Trump administration’s tariffs on U.K. steel with senior U.S. Cabinet members in Washington on Wednesday.  “We are very much on the case of trying to sort out precisely where we land with the EU safeguard,” Trade Minister Chris Bryant told parliament Thursday, after meeting with EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič on Wednesday for negotiations. “We will do everything we can to make sure that we have a strong and prosperous steel sector across the whole of the U.K.,” Bryant said. The TRA has also launched a new public-facing Import Trends Monitor tool to help firms detect surges in imports that could harm their business and provide evidence that could prompt an investigation by the watchdog. “We welcome the government’s strategic steer, which marks a significant milestone in our shared goal to make the U.K.’s trade remedies regime more agile, accessible and assertive, as well as providing greater accountability,” said the TRA’s Co-Chief Executives Jessica Blakely and Carmen Suarez. Sophie Inge and Jon Stone contributed reporting.

Denmark’s military intelligence service has for the first time classified the U.S. as a security risk, a striking shift in how one of Washington’s closest European allies assesses the transatlantic relationship. In its 2025 intelligence outlook published Wednesday, the Danish Defense Intelligence Service warned that the U.S. is increasingly prioritizing its own interests and “using its economic and technological strength as a tool of power,” including toward allies and partners. “The United States uses economic power, including in the form of threats of high tariffs, to enforce its will and no longer excludes the use of military force, even against allies,” it said, in a pointed reference to Washington trying to wrest control of Greenland from Denmark. The assessment is one of the strongest warnings about the U.S. to come from a European intelligence service. In October, the Dutch spies said they had stopped sharing some intelligence with their U.S. counterparts, citing political interference and human rights concerns. The Danish warning underscores European unease as Washington leverages industrial policy more aggressively on the global stage, and highlights the widening divide between the allies, with the U.S. National Security Strategy stating that Europe will face the “prospect of civilizational erasure” within the next 20 years. The Danish report also said that “there is uncertainty about how China-U.S. relations will develop in the coming years” as Beijing’s rapid rise has eroded the U.S.’s long-held position as the undisputed global power. Washington and Beijing are now locked in a contest for influence, alliances and critical resources, which has meant the U.S. has “significantly prioritized” the geographical area around it — including the Arctic — to reduce China’s influence. “The USA’s increasingly strong focus on the Pacific Ocean is also creating uncertainty about the country’s role as the primary guarantor of security in Europe,” the report said. “The USA’s changed policy places great demands on armaments and cooperation between European countries to strengthen deterrence against Russia.” In the worst-case scenario, the Danish intelligence services predict that Western countries could find themselves in a situation in a few years where both Russia and China are ready to fight their own regional wars in the Baltic Sea region and the Taiwan Strait, respectively.

BRUSSELS — Britain’s top Europe minister defended a decision to keep the U.K. out of the EU’s customs union — despite sounding bullish on a speedy reset of ties with the bloc in the first half of 2026. Speaking to POLITICO in Brussels where he was attending talks with Maroš Šefčovič, the EU trade commissioner, Nick Thomas-Symonds said a non-binding British parliamentary vote on Tuesday on rejoining the tariff-free union — pushed by the Liberal Democrats, but supported by more than a dozen Labour MPs — risked reviving bitter arguments about Brexit. Thomas-Symonds described the gambit by the Lib Dems — which had the backing of one of Labour’s most senior backbenchers, Meg Hillier — as “Brexit Redux.” And he accused Ed Davey, the Lib Dem leader, of wanting “to go back to the arguments of the past.” The Lib Dems have drawn support from disillusioned Labour voters, partly inspired by the party’s more forthright position on moving closer to the EU. But Thomas-Symonds defended Labour’s manifesto commitment to remain outside the single market and the customs union. “The strategy that I and the government have been pursuing is based on our mandate from the general election of 2024, that we would not go back to freedom of movement, we would not go back to the customs union or the single market,” the British minister for European Union relations said. Thomas-Symonds said this remained a “forward-looking, ruthlessly pragmatic approach” that is “rooted in the challenges that Britain has in the mid 2020s.” He pointed out that post-Brexit Britain outside of the customs union has signed trade deals with India and the United States, demonstrating the “advantages of the negotiating freedoms Britain has outside the EU.” ‘GET ON WITH IT’ Speaking to POLITICO’s Anne McElvoy for the “Politics at Sam and Anne’s” podcast, out on Thursday, Thomas-Symonds was optimistic that a grand “reset” of U.K.-EU relations would progress more quickly in the new year. The two sides are trying to make headway on a host of areas including a youth mobility scheme and easing post-Brexit restrictions on food and drink exports. “I think if you look at the balance of the package and what I’m talking about in terms of the objective on the food and drink agreement, I think you can see a general timetable across this whole package,” he said. Pressed on whether this could happen in the first half of 2026,  the U.K. minister sounded upbeat: “I think the message from both of us to our teams will be to get on with it.”  The Brussels visit comes after talks over Britain’s potential entry into a major EU defense program known as SAFE broke down amid disagreement over how much money the U.K. would pay for access to the loans-for-arms scheme. The program is aimed at re-arming Europe more speedily to face the threat from Russia. Asked if the collapse of those talks showed the U.K. had miscalculated its ability to gain support in a crucial area of re-connection, Thomas-Symonds replied: “We do always impose a very strict value for money. What we would not do is contribute at a level that isn’t in our national interest.” The issued had “not affected the forward momentum in terms of the rest of the negotiation,” he stressed. YOUTH MOBILITY STANDOFF Thomas-Symonds is a close ally of Prime Minister Keir Starmer and has emboldened the under-fire British leader to foreground his pro-Europe credentials. The minister for European relations suggested his own elevation in the British government — he will now attend Cabinet on a permanent basis — was a sign of Starmer’s intent to focus on closer relations with Europe and tap into regret over a post-Brexit loss of business opportunities to the U.K. Fleshing out the details of a “youth mobility” scheme — which would allow young people from the EU and the U.K. to spend time studying, traveling, or working in each other’s countries — has been an insistent demand of EU countries, notably Germany and the Netherlands. Yet progress has foundered over how to prevent the scheme being regarded  as a back-door for immigration to the U.K. — and how exactly any restrictions on numbers might be set and implemented. Speaking to POLITICO, Thomas-Symonds hinted at British impatience to proceed with the program, while stressing: “It has to be capped, time-limited, and  it’ll be a visa-operated scheme. “Those are really important features, but I sometimes think on this you can end up having very dry discussion about the design when actually this is a real opportunity for young Brits and for young Europeans to live, work, study, enjoy other cultures.” The British government is sensitive to the charge that the main beneficiaries of the scheme will be students or better-off youngsters. “I’m actually really excited about this,” Thomas-Symonds said, citing his own working-class background and adding that he would have benefited from a chance to spend time abroad as a young man “And the thing that strikes me as well is making sure this is accessible to people from all different backgrounds,” he said. Details however still appear contentious: The EU’s position remains that the scheme should not be capped but should have a break clause in the event of a surge in numbers. Berlin in particular has been reluctant to accept the Starmer government’s worries that the arrangement might be seen as adding to U.K. immigration figures, arguing that British students who are outside many previous exchange programs would also be net beneficiaries.  Thomas-Symonds did not deny a stand-off, saying: “When there are ongoing talks about particular issues, I very much respect the confidentiality and trust on the ongoing talks.”  Britain’s most senior foreign minister, Yvette Cooper, on Wednesday backed a hard cap on the number of people coming in under a youth mobility scheme. She told POLITICO in a separate interview that such a scheme needs to be “balanced.” “The UK-EU relationship is really important and is being reset, and we’re seeing cooperation around a whole series of different things,” she said. We also, at the same time, need to make sure that issues around migration are always properly managed and controlled.” A U.K. official later clarified that Cooper is keen to see an overall cap on numbers. BOOZY GIFT As negotiations move from the technical to the political level this week, Thomas-Symonds sketched out plans for a fresh Britain-EU summit in Brussels when the time is right. “In terms of the date, I just want to make sure that we have made sufficient progress, to demonstrate that progress in a summit,” Nick Thomas-Symonds said. “I think that the original [post-Brexit] Trade and Cooperation Agreement did not cover services in the way that it should have done,” he added. “We want to move forward on things like mutual recognition of professional qualifications.” Thomas-Symonds, one of the government’s most ardent pro-Europeans, meanwhile told POLITICO he had forged a good relationship with “Maroš” (Šefčovič) – and had even brought him a Christmas present of a bottle of House of Commons whisky. “So there’s no doubt that there is that trajectory of closer U.K.-EU cooperation,” he quipped. Dan Bloom and Esther Webber contributed reporting.

This article is also available in French and German. President Donald Trump denounced Europe as a “decaying” group of nations led by “weak” people in an interview with POLITICO, belittling the traditional U.S. allies for failing to control migration and end the Russia-Ukraine war, and signaling that he would endorse European political candidates aligned with his own vision for the continent. The broadside attack against European political leadership represents the president’s most virulent denunciation to date of these Western democracies, threatening a decisive rupture with countries like France and Germany that already have deeply strained relations with the Trump administration. “I think they’re weak,” Trump said of Europe’s political leaders. “But I also think that they want to be so politically correct.” “I think they don’t know what to do,” he added. “Europe doesn’t know what to do.” Trump matched that blunt, even abrasive, candor on European affairs with a sequence of stark pronouncements on matters closer to home: He said he would make support for immediately slashing interest rates a litmus test in his choice of a new Federal Reserve chair. He said he could extend anti-drug military operations to Mexico and Colombia. And Trump urged conservative Supreme Court Justices Samuel Alito and Clarence Thomas, both in their 70s, to stay on the bench. Trump’s comments about Europe come at an especially precarious moment in the negotiations to end Russia’s war in Ukraine, as European leaders express intensifying alarm that Trump may abandon Ukraine and its continental allies to Russian aggression. In the interview, Trump offered no reassurance to Europeans on that score and declared that Russia was obviously in a stronger position than Ukraine. Trump spoke on Monday at the White House with POLITICO’s Dasha Burns for a special episode of The Conversation. POLITICO on Tuesday named Trump the most influential figure shaping European politics in the year ahead, a recognition previously conferred on leaders including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. Trump’s confident commentary on Europe presented a sharp contrast with some of his remarks on domestic matters in the interview. The president and his party have faced a series of electoral setbacks and spiraling dysfunction in Congress this fall as voters rebel against the high cost of living. Trump has struggled to deliver a message to meet that new reality: In the interview, he graded the economy’s performance as an “A-plus-plus-plus-plus-plus,” insisted that prices were falling across the board and declined to outline a specific remedy for imminent spikes in health care premiums. Even amid growing turbulence at home, however, Trump remains a singular figure in international politics. In recent days, European capitals have shuddered with dismay at the release of Trump’s new National Security Strategy document, a highly provocative manifesto that cast the Trump administration in opposition to the mainstream European political establishment and vowed to “cultivate resistance” to the European status quo on immigration and other politically volatile issues. In the interview, Trump amplified that worldview, describing cities like London and Paris as creaking under the burden of migration from the Middle East and Africa. Without a change in border policy, Trump said, some European states “will not be viable countries any longer.” Using highly incendiary language, Trump singled out London’s left-wing mayor, Sadiq Khan, the son of Pakistani immigrants and the city’s first Muslim mayor, as a “disaster” and blamed his election on immigration: “He gets elected because so many people have come in. They vote for him now.” The president of the European Council, António Costa, on Monday rebuked the Trump administration for the national security document and urged the White House to respect Europe’s sovereignty and right to self-government. “Allies do not threaten to interfere in the democratic life or the domestic political choices of these allies,” Costa said. “They respect them.” Speaking with POLITICO, Trump flouted those boundaries and said he would continue to back favorite candidates in European elections, even at the risk of offending local sensitivities. “I’d endorse,” Trump said. “I’ve endorsed people, but I’ve endorsed people that a lot of Europeans don’t like. I’ve endorsed Viktor Orbán,” the hard-right Hungarian prime minister Trump said he admired for his border-control policies. It was the Russia-Ukraine war, rather than electoral politics, that Trump appeared most immediately focused on. He claimed on Monday that he had offered a new draft of a peace plan that some Ukrainian officials liked, but that Zelenskyy himself had not reviewed yet. “It would be nice if he would read it,” Trump said. Zelenskyy met with leaders of France, Germany and the United Kingdom on Monday and continued to voice opposition to ceding Ukrainian territory to Russia as part of a peace deal. The president said he put little stock in the role of European leaders in seeking to end the war: “They talk, but they don’t produce, and the war just keeps going on and on.” In a fresh challenge to Zelenskyy, who appears politically weakened in Ukraine due to a corruption scandal, Trump renewed his call for Ukraine to hold new elections. “They haven’t had an election in a long time,” Trump said. “You know, they talk about a democracy, but it gets to a point where it’s not a democracy anymore.” Latin America Even as he said he is pursuing a peace agenda overseas, Trump said he might further broaden the military actions his administration has taken in Latin America against targets it claims are linked to the drug trade. Trump has deployed a massive military force to the Caribbean to strike alleged drug runners and pressure the authoritarian regime in Venezuela. In the interview, Trump repeatedly declined to rule out putting American troops into Venezuela as part of an effort to bring down the strongman ruler Nicolás Maduro, whom Trump blames for exporting drugs and dangerous people to the United States. Some leaders on the American right have warned Trump that a ground invasion of Venezuela would be a red line for conservatives who voted for him in part to end foreign wars. “I don’t want to rule in or out. I don’t talk about it,” Trump said of deploying ground troops, adding: “I don’t want to talk to you about military strategy.” But the president said he would consider using force against targets in other countries where the drug trade is highly active, including Mexico and Colombia. “Sure, I would,” he said. Trump scarcely defended some of his most controversial actions in Latin America, including his recent pardon of the former Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández, who was serving a decades-long sentence in an American prison after being convicted in a massive drug-trafficking conspiracy. Trump said he knew “very little” about Hernández except that he’d been told by “very good people” that the former Honduran president had been targeted unfairly by political opponents. “They asked me to do it and I said, I’ll do it,” Trump acknowledged, without naming the people who sought the pardon for Hernández. HEALTH CARE AND THE ECONOMY Asked to grade the economy under his watch, Trump rated it an overwhelming success: “A-plus-plus-plus-plus-plus.” To the extent voters are frustrated about prices, Trump said the Biden administration was at fault: “I inherited a mess. I inherited a total mess.” The president is facing a forbidding political environment because of voters’ struggles with affordability, with about half of voters overall and nearly 4 in 10 people who voted for Trump in 2024 saying in a recent POLITICO Poll that the cost of living was as bad as it had ever been in their lives. Trump said he could make additional changes to tariff policy to help lower the price of some goods, as he has already done, but he insisted overall that the trend on costs was in the right direction. “Prices are all coming down,” Trump said, adding: “Everything is coming down.” Prices rose 3 percent over the 12 months ending in September, according to the most recent Consumer Price Index. Trump’s political struggles are shadowing his upcoming decision on a nominee to chair the Federal Reserve, a post that will shape the economic environment for the balance of Trump’s term. Asked if he was making support for slashing interest rates a litmus test for his Fed nominee, Trump answered with a quick “yes.” The most immediate threat to the cost of living for many Americans is the expiration of enhanced health insurance subsidies for Obamacare exchange plans that were enacted by Democrats under former President Joe Biden and are set to expire at the end of this year. Health insurance premiums are expected to spike in 2026, and medical charities are already experiencing a marked rise in requests for aid even before subsidies expire. Trump has been largely absent from health policy negotiations in Washington, while Democrats and some Republicans supportive of a compromise on subsidies have run into a wall of opposition on the right. Reaching a deal — and marshaling support from enough Republicans to pass it — would likely require direct intervention from the president. Yet asked if he would support a temporary extension of Obamacare subsidies while he works out a large-scale plan with lawmakers, Trump was noncommittal. “I don’t know. I’m gonna have to see,” he said, pivoting to an attack on Democrats for being too generous with insurance companies in the Affordable Care Act. A cloud of uncertainty surrounds the administration’s intentions on health care policy. In late November, the White House planned to unveil a proposal to temporarily extend Obamacare subsidies only to postpone the announcement. Trump has promised on and off for years to unveil a comprehensive plan for replacing Obamacare but has never done so. That did not change in the interview. “I want to give the people better health insurance for less money,” Trump said. “The people will get the money, and they’re going to buy the health insurance that they want.” Reminded that Americans are currently buying holiday gifts and drawing up household budgets for 2026 amid uncertainty around premiums, Trump shot back: “Don’t be dramatic. Don’t be dramatic.” SUPREME COURT Large swaths of Trump’s domestic agenda currently sit before the Supreme Court, with a generally sympathetic 6-3 conservative majority that has nevertheless thrown up some obstacles to the most brazen versions of executive power Trump has attempted to wield. Trump spoke with POLITICO several days after the high court agreed to hear arguments concerning the constitutionality of birthright citizenship, the automatic conferral of citizenship on people born in the United States. Trump is attempting to roll back that right and said it would be “devastating” if the court blocked him from doing so. If the court rules in his favor, Trump said, he had not yet considered whether he would try to strip citizenship from people who were born as citizens under current law. Trump broke with some members of his party who have been hoping that the court’s two oldest conservatives, Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito, might consider retiring before the midterm elections so that Trump can nominate another conservative while Republicans are guaranteed to control the Senate. The president said he’d rather Alito, 75, and Thomas, 77, the court’s most reliable conservative jurists, remain in place: “I hope they stay,” he said, “’cause I think they’re fantastic.”

The European Commission has lost access to its control panel for buying and tracking ads on Elon Musk’s X — after fining the social media platform €120 million for violating EU transparency rules. “Your ad account has been terminated,” X’s head of product, Nikita Bier, wrote on the platform early Sunday. Bier accused the EU executive of trying to amplify its own social media post about the fine on X by trying “to take advantage of an exploit in our Ad Composer — to post a link that deceives users into thinking it’s a video and to artificially increase its reach.” The Commission fined X on Thursday for breaching the EU’s rules under the Digital Services Act (DSA), which aims to limit the spread of illegal content. The breaches included a lack of transparency around X’s advertising library and the company’s decision to change its trademark blue checkmark from a means of verification to a “deceptive” paid feature. “The irony of your announcement,” Bier said. “X believes everyone should have an equal voice on our platform. However, it seems you believe that the rules should not apply to your account.” Trump administration has criticized the DSA and the Digital Markets Act, which prevent large online platforms, such as Google, Amazon and Meta, from overextending their online empires. The White House has accused the rules of discriminating against U.S. companies, and the fine will likely amplify transatlantic trade tensions. U.S. Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick has already threatened to keep 50 percent tariffs on European exports of steel and aluminum unless the EU loosens its digital rules. U.S. Vice President JD Vance blasted Brussels’ action, describing the fine as a response for “not engaging in censorship” — a notion the Commission has dismissed. “The DSA is having not to do with censorship,” said the EU’s tech czar, Henna Virkkunen, told reporters on Thursday. “This decision is about the transparency of X.”

President Donald Trump has changed his position on more than a few things over the years, but in at least one area he’s been consistent: tariffs. The president is a tariff man, as he’s fond of saying. And the man behind the man in this instance is U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer. A longtime trade lawyer who served in the first Trump administration, Greer is now working to help revamp the global trading system at the president’s behest — and he rejects the widespread criticism that Trump’s sweeping tariff regime has been rolled out haphazardly. “Yes, there’s a strategy,” Greer said in a new interview with The Conversation. “First of all, you don’t change 70 years of trade policy overnight. And second of all, when some people say, ‘Oh, well, this is chaos. What’s your strategy?’, what they really want to know is can we go back to how it was before? And that’s not going to happen.” Much of the president’s tariff agenda is currently at risk amid a seemingly skeptical Supreme Court, though Greer professed confidence and said the White House had backup options if need be. Perhaps most worrisome for the administration is the politics of higher prices, and Greer was eager to bat down charges that tariffs were to blame. “People are worried about housing, they’re worried about healthcare — things we don’t import,” he said. This conversation has been edited for length and clarity. You have probably the most important portfolio of this administration given just how big of a priority trade has been for the president. I was at many a Trump rally when he talked about how “tariff” is his favorite word, now his fifth favorite word, “God, love, wife,” something else. Yeah, he had to moderate a little bit on that. You are a veteran trade lawyer. You served in Trump’s first term as chief of staff to then-U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer. What is different about the approach this time around? In the first Trump administration, we were charting new waters, right? We were coming into the so-called Washington consensus that tariffs were bad and we shouldn’t protect domestic industry and we shouldn’t try to make tough deals with our friends and foe alike. Now having laid the groundwork in the first term, showing we could use tariffs effectively while having a booming economy, the president was able to move to his true vision, which he’s had for many years, which is to protect the American economy with tariffs, use them as leverage where needed to get foreign market access, and otherwise use them for geopolitical issues. So where we were walking in the first term, now we can run and fly, frankly. One of the narratives around the tariffs is that the strategy is chaos, that this has been really unpredictable. I’ve heard from businesses that it’s been a challenge because they’re just not sure where all of this is going to land, plus you have all of the legal cases on top of that. So is the strategy chaos? Is there a strategy? So yes, there’s a strategy. First of all, you don’t change 70 years of trade policy overnight. And second of all, when some people say, “Oh, well, this is chaos. What’s your strategy?”, what they really want to know is can we go back to how it was before? And that’s not going to happen. A lot of people focus on April 2 Liberation Day. We announced potentially very, very high tariffs. But I would focus people more on Aug. 1, and I use that date because that is the date where the president really set the tariff rates, and where we announced a bunch of deals. And from there, the structure that has played out demonstrates the strategy that we have. If you look at the tariff setup in the world that’s come out of the president’s program, the highest tariffs are on China. Again, not because we bear China any ill will, but because we have a giant trade deficit with them and they have a lot of unfair trading practices. The next set of highest tariffs is Southeast Asia, India, these other areas that use a lot of Chinese content, Southeast Asia in particular, and we have giant trade deficits with them, Vietnam, for example. And then the next highest tariff rates, and these are usually about 15 percent, folks who are allies but with whom we have big trade issues: Korea, Japan, Europe, etc. And then the lowest tariff rates are really in the Western Hemisphere, where we want our supply chains to be, where it’s very secure. So you can really see almost like concentric rings going out from China, what the tariff rates are like. We have a couple outliers right now. India has a higher tariff for some geopolitical reasons. They buy Russian oil. Brazil has some higher tariffs. Economy & Education: U.S. trade rep. Greer and teacher’s union head Weingarten | The ConversationSharePlay Video We were close to a deal there over the summer and it got derailed. What happened there? The president wants deals but he only wants good deals. And so whenever you present a deal to the president, the question is, am I better off with just having the tariff? And the assessment of the deal in the summer with India was, well, I think we’re just better off with the tariff than with the potential deal. But that has not stopped us from continuing conversations. It’s still going quite well, I would say, with the Indians. There’s a separate issue where they were buying Russian oil. They’ve stopped doing that largely now. So I think we could see some tariff modification at some point for them. But I’m confident that we’ll get a deal with India at some point in the future, maybe the near future. It’ll be up to the president and Prime Minister Modi. Have you been involved at all in talking about a potential future trading partnership with Russia after the end of the war? Not very much. Even before the war, we didn’t have a huge trading relationship with Russia. We would get oil and steel and some fertilizer from them. We’d ship them cars and some ag products. So it was never a giant trading relationship. If the war ends then obviously there may be opportunity there. But we’re really focused on big export markets. There’s been a ton of debate about the short, medium and long term impact of these tariffs. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development just released a report saying the world economy has been surprisingly resilient in the face of Trump’s trade wars, but they added that they expect higher tariffs to gradually result in higher prices and reduce growth in household consumption and business investment. How do you respond to that assessment and are you worried about some economic pain in the short term? I just look at the data, right? They’re saying we think it’ll lead to lower growth in the future or higher prices or something, but they’ve been saying that for a long time. And the data show that last quarter was 3.8 percent [annual] growth. The Atlanta Fed is projecting 4.2 percent growth next year. We’ve seen inflation in check. We’ve seen imported goods remain relatively low-priced. Where we see prices high are things like housing and health care, because Obamacare is a disaster. The Supreme Court is weighing whether to narrow the president’s use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act — IEEPA — which is the 1970s-era law that the administration has cited for imposing many of these tariffs. How are you preparing for the possibility that one of these main tariff authorities you’ve been using could be constrained? First of all, we believe the law and the facts are on our side. This Supreme Court has talked about how important it is to simply analyze the plain text of the law. And if you look at the plain text, it says the president, if he determines there’s an emergency, he can regulate imports. And he’s determined there’s an emergency and he’s regulating imports, which is the tariff. Now, we’ve been thinking about this plan for five years or longer. Since the first term. So you can be sure that when we came to the president at the beginning of the term, we had a lot of different options. IEEPA is the most appropriate because there is an emergency with the trade deficit and the loss of manufacturing, and it has the flexibility that you need to respond to the type of emergency that there is. My message is tariffs are going to be a part of the policy landscape going forward. Are there other ways to do it? Courts during this process have actually cited those different tools. And while we certainly can use those, IEEPA is the best tool. It fits the situation, and we’re looking forward to hearing back from the Supreme Court soon. But you’re prepared for alternative measures if they do decide to constrain IEEPA? Well, I’m not going to go into too much detail about that, or else I’ll get in trouble with my general counsel. But you’ve got something in your back pocket. Of course. Regardless of how the Supreme Court rules on this, the administration’s reciprocal tariffs could be reversed by a future president. Is there any plan to go to Congress to try to codify any of this stuff? Well, if I were Congress, I would codify it. I have heard from a handful of members of Congress from all over the ideological spectrum, whether left or right or progressive or conservative, free trader or protectionist — however you want to characterize it. I’ve heard a lot of interest in this and for a lot of reasons. People have seen what I just described, which is that you can implement tariffs and have growth at the same time. You can protect your supply chains and have wages increase. You can do all of these things together, especially if you couple it with good energy policy, etc. I’ve also had members of Congress come to me, people who maybe weren’t fans of tariffs two years ago, and they said, “This is actually real money that’s coming in that can be used to pay down the debt or pay for other things or finance our reindustrialization.” Who are those members? Well, I won’t betray their confidences. You said that some members are telling you, “Hey, I’ve changed my mind on tariffs.” There are other members that have spoken privately or publicly, saying “These tariffs are hurting my constituents,” particularly people in farm states. I’m thinking GOP Sens. Chuck Grassley and Rand Paul and a number of folks that have come out and said they’re concerned. What do you say to members of Congress who feel that this is not beneficial for their folks? Well Sen. Paul is a little bit of a man on an island on this issue. Well sure, but Rep. Don Bacon — He [Paul] compared me to a Soviet commissar in some comments. All right, we’ll leave Rand Paul on the side here, but there are others like Bacon and Grassley and other folks that have voiced some concerns. I’ve talked to Sen. Grassley a lot, and he knows a lot about trade. He’s been around a long time and as a general matter, it sounds to me frequently that he is quite aligned with the president in terms of wanting to get foreign market access, particularly for his folks who are trying to sell pork and soybeans overseas. We have made sure, in addition to securing soybean purchases from China, who’s a big customer, to open markets in Southeast Asia in particular for soybeans. Markets that were never open before. Now these countries are taking down their tariff, they’re taking down their non-tariff barriers. And so on that, I think we’re aligned. There’s always concern when you’re changing what’s a 70-year trade policy to something new, and there can be frictions. But we are careful to listen to these folks again, from both sides of the aisle, find out what their concerns are and respond to them. The president did exempt some agricultural imports from tariffs amid ongoing concerns about higher prices. Why didn’t he do that from the beginning? How did that shift come about? First of all, inflation’s been in check. So let’s just clear the air on that. Secondly, in early September, the president signaled, he put out an executive order, and we made a list of all the — whether it’s agricultural goods or minerals or things that physically can’t be grown in the United States or extracted from the United States. The rocks aren’t here, or you can’t grow a banana here, on any scale. So in early September, he put out an executive order. He said, as I do deals with countries, I will release tariffs on these items. Why? Because we get them from those countries. There seems to be a real resistance in the language around tariffs to say that tariffs are causing higher prices. Nobody wants to really say that. But in making the exemptions, aren’t you basically acknowledging that tariffs do lead to higher prices on products? No. Okay. Can you explain? There’s never really a 1-to-1 with a tariff. In the first term, when we put tariffs on China, inflation actually went down. As we were putting tariffs in place, inflation went down. We’ve seen a similar effect here. When the president says, “We’re going to have deals with you folks,” you have to have leverage, right? And so you keep tariffs on folks for all kinds of things and it becomes a carrot. So it’s a lot easier for me to go to Ecuador or Indonesia or Vietnam and say, “Listen, if you do a deal with us and we’ve announced frameworks or full agreements with all these countries I just mentioned, then at a given time, we will release these things because obviously we don’t make them.” When you have a tariff, it doesn’t necessarily go through to the consumer. I don’t want to get too technical here for you, except I’m kind of nerdy about it. But sometimes does it? I mean it can, right? Like on those things that you mentioned, like coffee and bananas and all of that stuff? It depends on what the production economy is like. And when I say production economy, say bananas, if you have a hundred banana producers overseas, they’re all going to compete for market share in the U.S. because we’re the biggest consumer of a lot of these things. And so they will compete to eat the tariff. Do you see what I’m saying? I do, but when voters who don’t understand this are going to the grocery store and seeing that prices haven’t gone down, how do you tackle that with all the leverage that you’re talking about? Well, I can’t control the weather in Brazil with a tariff. Coffee prices, for example, have been going up for two years. Before there was ever a tariff on coffee for six months or whatever we had. And there are secular pricing trends in coffee and cocoa that were going on well before. And beef, these kinds of things. All that being said, we don’t have to have a tariff on these things. We don’t make them here. We can have a tariff on them for leverage, which is how the president used them. It’s how he said he was going to use it. He signaled in September, these are for leverage to finish the deals. So we were well placed two months later once we announced the rest of our deals to take the tariff off. The US-Mexico-Canada agreement — USMCA — that Trump negotiated in his first term is facing a mandatory review next year. What are the top changes that the administration is looking to make? When you think about the U.S., Canada, Mexico agreement, there are a few things we trade among us in a massive way. One of them is automobiles, another’s agriculture, another is energy. With respect to the auto trade, the goal is to make more autos in the United States of America. Mexico has been a huge beneficiary of NAFTA and then of USMCA. And so the president, earlier in his second term, imposed tariffs on autos globally, including on Mexico. So there’s an overlap between those tariffs and our agreement and USMCA. And those tariffs, which are about 25 percent, are layered over USMCA. Now all of that being said, we can look at the underlying rules of USMCA. If something comes in and gets special duty treatment or a lower tariff, there’s usually a rule of origin associated with it that says a certain amount of this widget has to come from the region. Otherwise you have to pay a higher tariff. We can change some of those rules to make them tighter, to have a higher percentage have to come from the United States. Those are the kinds of things we can do. There’s also a bunch of stuff in Mexico and Canada where maybe they discriminate against our companies. It could be telecom companies or it could be our corn exports. There are a variety of little things like that that may seem small and don’t lend themselves to sound bites, but they mean a lot for agricultural producers. Is there still a scenario where the U.S. could walk away from USMCA or is that off the table at this point? I mean that’s always a scenario, right? The president’s view is he only wants deals that are a good deal. The reason why we built a review period into USMCA was in case we needed to revise it, review it or exit it. I have heard from a lot of folks how important USMCA is. Canada and Mexico are huge export markets for us. I was in the White House yesterday, and we were talking about USMCA. What about Mexico? What about Canada? You know, the possibility that we kind of negotiate separately with them, right? Their economies are subject to it. Yeah, where’s his head at right now? Listen, our relationship with the Canadian economy is totally different than our relationship with the Mexican economy. The labor situation’s different, the stuff that’s being made is different, the export and import profile is different. It actually doesn’t make a ton of economic sense why we would marry those three together. The actual trade between Canada and Mexico is much smaller than the trade between the U.S. and Canada and U.S. and Mexico. Sometimes you’ll hear people say, “Oh, well, you know, USMCA, it’s a $31 trillion agreement.” It’s like, well, yeah, but like $29 trillion is us. So I think it makes sense to talk to them separately about that agreement. A lot of the underlying rules are helpful and you know our exporters benefit from them, but we have to make sure that we are getting the benefit of our bargain on USMCA. You were in Brussels recently, talking about deals. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick said when he was over there that the U.S. could modify its approach on steel and aluminum tariffs if the EU reconsidered its digital rules. Some European officials were a little irked by that and interpreted it as targeting the EU’s flagship tech regulations, including the Digital Markets Act. Europe’s antitrust chief, Teresa Ribera told POLITICO that Washington is using “blackmail” to strong-arm the EU. What’s your response to that? That’s a totally extreme thing to say. The problem is the Digital Markets Act and other European digital regulations and regulations outside of digital, they actually target U.S. companies. And how do we know that? First of all, when all these laws were being passed, all the European parliamentarians and all the leaders in Europe were saying, “We’re going to implement these laws to get Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon and Microsoft.” In fact, they have certain taxes over there, and they call them GAFA tax. The acronym is for American companies. And then they have these thresholds built into these laws where if you meet a certain global revenue threshold or you have a certain business model, and just magically they only capture U.S. companies. We reported last month that the European Commission was set to present a list to you of sectors that it wants to be exempted from U.S. tariffs. The list was expected to include medical devices, wine — which is very important to me — spirits, beers and pasta. Where do those deliberations stand? Well, they did not present such a list. Ah! And the reason why is because under our deal from the summer, the United States has already adjusted its tariff levels for Europe, and Europe is still adjusting its tariffs. And I don’t say this to be critical. They have a legal process they have to go through, and they’re proceeding through it as quickly as they can, I think. So it would be weird for them to come and say, “We haven’t finished making our tariff adjustments yet, and we want more from you.” Listen, if they want to come and talk about other tariff adjustments, that’ll be up to the president and that kind of thing. But it’s a sequencing issue. Like why would I give them more tariff relief before they’ve done their part of the bargain, right? That doesn’t make sense. Trump talked about tariffs on the campaign trail, but I don’t think a lot of the world, particularly our allies in Europe, were necessarily prepared for the scale, as you mentioned earlier. When you were in Brussels, for example, can you give me a little bit of a behind-the-scenes on what those conversations are like when you sit across a table? Sure. So we are eleven months into this presidency. And I would say that most of our European partners have frankly become quite pragmatic. In the first term, when we talked about tariffs and changing the global structure, there was a lot of almost religious-sounding sermonizing from the Europeans. For them, international institutions and what they believe is international law, this is like religion. It’s their religion, and they have these high priests and the European Commission, all these places. But the folks we’re dealing with right now in the European Commission, President von der Leyen, the trade commissioner, these are pragmatic folks. They understand the facts on the ground. They understand the U.S. view. They understand we have these huge trade deficits that are not sustainable. And so the conversations are constructive. We’re not fighting about policy, we’re talking about implementation. So that’s all positive. All that being said, there are two or three countries that still like to sermonize a little bit about this. The ambassador from one country came to me and said, “Well, how can you use these tariffs against us? You know, tariffs are bad, blah, blah, blah.” I said, if tariffs are so bad, then how come your tariffs on us are so high still? And he said, “Well, I’m not trying to negotiate.” But I mean, that’s my point. They come and they say, “Well, you shouldn’t have tariffs,” but European tariffs have been higher on the U.S. historically for many years. You said the conversations are productive and pragmatic now. Is that a shift from early this year? Yes. Yes, a hundred percent. So where does the EU deal stand? We had our joint statement in August. We’ve adjusted our tariffs to be a little bit lower for them. They’re in the process of adjusting theirs. We have a lot of non-tariff barriers that we face in Europe, regulatory constraints, certifications, inspection regimes, things that are duplicative, things that gum up trade between the United States and Europe. Did Brussels move that all forward? I would say so. It was less of a negotiating trip and more of taking stock of where we are, where we’re divergent and next steps. We have a small team coming over from the Europeans next week to really talk about how we can better memorialize changes in these non-tariff barriers going forward. Because even though the Europeans are taking down most of their tariffs for us, if you take down the tariff but there’s still non-tariff barriers, it’s not effective market access. So we have to do both the tariffs and the non-tariff barriers. We can’t talk about trade without talking about China. What is the administration’s endgame with China? Is it coexistence? Is it decoupling? Is it selective engagement? What is it? Well, it’s funny because Washington creates these kind of fake categories. They’ll say, “Oh, well, either you’re a China hawk or a China dove.” The way we think about it in the administration is we’re pro-American. We’re not anti-China. We’re not China doves. We’re not China hawks. We are pro-American. I think you meant to say America First. Well, yes, America First. Thank you. And sometimes you hear people saying, “For America to win, China has to lose.” I just don’t think that’s the case. I mean, the reality is we are going to do what’s right for America in terms of trade. And in some cases, it means we have to have a tariff on countries, higher tariffs on some, like China, because they’re a bigger issue with respect to trade. They have more trade cheating, they have more subsidies and that kind of thing. If China still manages to be successful? Fine. We’re not here to try to contain China. We’re here to make sure that America has a strong national security, strong economic security, that our workers have jobs that are good for them in the towns and cities where they live, that they can raise a family. That’s what we’re trying to do. If China rises or falls on that, that’s kind of up to them. We’re happy to work with them. They have their own plans. One thing I will say is people act like American policy drives Chinese reaction, that China’s just always reacting to us. And I think they want us to think that, but they’re agents unto themselves. They publish a new policy every five years. They announced this Made in China 2025 project in 2015, well before President Trump was the president. So they have their own economic plans, which are oftentimes adverse to our interests, and so we will control for that, whether through tariffs or other measures. We just saw voters in this last election in November clearly send a message that affordability, cost of living really, really matters. What can you tell the American people about what they can expect to see going into next year? How will all of this impact not the markets, but their day-to-day? What I would say is trade, it’s not a big factor in the affordability discussion. When you look at affordability, it’s really about the crazy high expenses for health care that were engendered by Obamacare, which was a disaster. It’s about housing expenses that went way up during the Biden years and are still — But some people, as they’re shopping for Christmas, are connecting prices at Walmart and at the grocery store to the affordability conversation. I’ve talked to Walmart officials, I’ve talked to all kinds of officials, and they have said that they’re not raising prices. At back-to-school time in September, they say we’re not raising prices. They’re still doing their rollback. I know that’s a press narrative, but it’s actually not a true narrative. When you talk about affordability, people are worried about it. People are worried about housing, they’re worried about healthcare — things we don’t import. But where trade comes into it is when you have a trade system in place that protects U.S. jobs, you get higher incomes. So the blue collar wages are up this year. That’s what matters. In the first term, we had real income increase, up until the pandemic, which was like this black swan event. That’s what we’re trying to do with trade. Trade is not, “Let’s manage affordability through trade.” Trade is, “Let’s make sure we have good paying jobs here, especially for that working class whose jobs went away to Mexico or Vietnam or China. And so if you have blue-collar wages going up, whatever price effects are going on from all kinds of things in the economy — as long as the real income is outpacing whatever price effects there are — that’s what we’re looking for. That’s what we’re seeing. What about those tariff dividends that the president has floated? Well, you can talk to Scott Bessent. I don’t control the money. I just put the tariffs on to make the deals.