ROME — Italian right-wing Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s crushing defeat in Monday’s referendum on judicial reform has shattered her aura of political invincibility, and her opponents now reckon she can be toppled in a general election expected next year. The failed referendum is the the first major misstep of her premiership, and comes just as she seemed in complete control in Rome and Brussels, leading Italy’s most stable administration in years. Her loss is immediately energizing Italy’s fragmented opposition, making the country’s torpid politics suddenly look competitive again. Meloni’s bid to overhaul the judiciary — which she accused of being politicized and of left-wing bias — was roundly rejected, with 54 percent voting “no” to her reforms. An unexpectedly high turnout of 59 percent is also likely to alarm Meloni, underscoring how the vote snowballed into a broader vote of confidence in her and her government. She lost heavily in Italy’s three biggest cities: In the provinces of Rome, the “no” vote was 57 percent, Milan 54 percent and Naples 71 percent. In Naples, about 50 prosecutors and judges gathered to open champagne and sing Bella Ciao, the World War II anti-fascist partisan anthem. Activists, students and trade unionists spontaneously marched to Rome’s Piazza del Popolo chanting “resign, resign.”  In a video posted on social media, Meloni put a brave face on the result. “The Italians have decided and we will respect that decision,” she said. She admitted feeling some “bitterness for the lost opportunity … but we will go on as we always have with responsibility, determination and respect for Italy and its people.” In truth, however, the referendum will be widely viewed as a sign that she is politically vulnerable, after all. It knocks her off course just as she was setting her sights on major electoral reforms that would further cement her grip on power. One of her main goals has been to shift to a fixed-term prime ministership, which would be elected by direct suffrage rather than being hostage to rotating governments. Those ambitions look far more fragile now. The opposition groups that have struggled to dent Meloni’s dominance immediately scented blood. After months on the defensive, they pointed to Monday’s result as proof that the prime minister can be beaten and that a coordinated campaign can mobilize voters against her. Matteo Renzi, former prime minister and leader of the centrist Italia Viva party, predicted Meloni would now be a “lame duck,” telling reporters that “even her own followers will now start to doubt her.” When he lost a referendum in 2016 he resigned as prime minister. “Let’s see what Meloni will do after this clamorous defeat,” he said.  Elly Schlein, leader of the opposition Democratic Party, said: “We will beat [Meloni] in the next general election, I’m sure of that. I think that from today’s vote, from this extraordinary democratic participation, an unexpected participation in some ways, a clear political message is being sent to Meloni and this government, who must now listen to the country and its real priorities.”  Former Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte, leader of the populist 5Star Movement heralded “a new spring and a new political season.” Angelo Bonelli , leader of the Greens and Left Alliance, told reporters the result was “an important signal for us because it shows that there is a majority in the country opposed to the government.” ‘PARALLEL MAFIA’ The referendum itself centered on changes to how judges and prosecutors are governed and disciplined, including separating their career paths and reshaping their oversight bodies. The government framed the reforms as a long-overdue opportunity to fix a system where politicized legal “factions” impede the government’s ability to implement core policies on issues such as migration and security. Justice Minister Carlo Nordio called prosecutors a “parallel mafia,” while his chief of staff compared parts of the judiciary to “an execution squad.”   A voter is given a ballot at a polling station in Rome, Italy, on March 22, 2026. | Riccardo De Luca/Anadolu via Getty Images Meloni’s opponents viewed the defeated reforms differently, casting them as an attempt to weaken a fiercely independent judiciary and concentrate power. That framing helped turn a technical vote into a broader political contest, one that opposition parties were able to rally around. It was a clash with a long and bitter political history. The Mani Pulite (Clean Hands) investigations of the 1990s, which wiped out an entire political class, left a legacy of mistrust between politicians and the judiciary. The right, in particular, accused judges of running a left-wing vendetta against them. Under Meloni’s rule that tension has repeatedly resurfaced, with her government clashing with courts, saying judges are thwarting initiatives to fight migration and criminality. Meloni herself stepped late into the campaign, after initially keeping some distance, betting that her personal involvement could shift the outcome. She called the referendum an “historic opportunity to change Italy.” In combative form this month, she had called on Italians not squander their opportunity to shake up the judges. If they let things continue as they are now, she warned: “We will find ourselves with even more powerful factions, even more negligent judges, even more surreal sentences, immigrants, rapists, pedophiles, drug dealers being freed and putting your security at risk.” It was to no avail, and Meloni was hardly helped by the timing of the vote. Her ally U.S. President Donald Trump is highly unpopular in Italy and the war in Iran has triggered intense fears among Italians that they will have to pay more for power and fuel. The main upshot is that Italy’s political clock is ticking again. REGAINING THE INITIATIVE For Meloni, the temptation will be to regain the initiative quickly. That could even mean trying to press for early elections before economic pressures mount and key EU recovery funds wind down later this year. The logic of holding elections before economic conditions deteriorate further would be to prevent a slow bleeding away of support, said Roberto D’Alimonte, professor of political science at the Luiss University in Rome. But Italy’s President Sergio Mattarella has the ultimate say about when to dissolve parliament and parliamentarians, whose pensions depend on the legislature lasting until February, could help him prevent elections by forming alternative majorities. D’Alimonte said Meloni’s “standing is now damaged.” “There is no doubt she comes out of this much weaker. The defeat changes the perception of her. She has lost her clout with voters and to some extent in Europe. Until now she was a winner and now she has shown she can lose,” he added. She must now weigh whether to identify scapegoats who can take the fall — potentially Justice Minister Nordio, a technocrat with no political support base of his own.  Meloni is expected to move quickly to regain control of the agenda. She is due to travel to Algeria on Wednesday to advance energy cooperation, a trip that may also serve to pivot the political conversation back to economic and foreign policy aims. But the immediate impact of the vote is clear: A prime minister who entered the referendum from a position of strength but now faces a more uncertain political landscape, against an opposition newly convinced she can be beaten.

BRUSSELS — The U.S. under Donald Trump is pushing NATO to slash many of its foreign activities including ending a key alliance mission in Iraq, four NATO diplomats told POLITICO. The U.S. has also in recent months lobbied to scale down NATO’s peacekeeping operation in Kosovo and keep Ukraine and Indo-Pacific allies from formally participating in the alliance’s July annual summit in Ankara. The effort reflects a White House drive to treat NATO as a strictly Euroatlantic defense pact and roll back decades of expansion into crisis management, global partnerships and values-driven initiatives that have long irritated the U.S. president and his MAGA base. Under the drive from Washington, NATO would curtail so-called “out-of-area activities” that are beyond the alliance’s core tasks of defense and deterrence. The push has become known internally as a “return to factory settings,” the four diplomats said, all of whom were granted anonymity to speak freely on the sensitive internal matter. The effort could see a rapid scale back of NATO’s activities in former war zones, as well as shutting out capitals including Kyiv and Canberra from formal discussions this summer. The White House declined to comment publicly on NATO’s partnership programs and global operations when contacted by POLITICO. The fresh details come after U.S. deputy Pentagon chief Elbridge Colby recently spelled out the administration’s thinking behind what he called “NATO 3.0.” “Not every mission can be the top priority. Not every capability can be gold-plated,” Colby told alliance defense ministers last week, while reiterating that the U.S. was still committed to European security. “The measure of seriousness is whether European forces can fight, sustain, and prevail in the scenarios that matter most for the defense of the alliance.” The U.S. campaign is prompting blowback from some allies. Dropping the alliance’s overseas initiatives is “not the right approach,” said one of the four diplomats. “Partnerships are crucial to deterrence and defense.” Since Trump returned to the White House last year, he has slashed U.S. commitments abroad, pulled troops and NATO personnel out of Europe and handed some of the alliance’s top commands to Europeans as he seeks to refocus his foreign policy around “core national security.” OUT OF IRAQ NATO maintains an advisory mission aimed at strengthening Iraq’s security institutions like its police and stymying the return of the Islamic State group. The operation was set up under Trump’s first term in 2018 and repeatedly expanded since 2021, at Baghdad’s request. Washington has asked allies to end the mission as early as September, the first diplomat quoted above and a second diplomat said. Separately, the U.S. is also set to withdraw around 2,500 soldiers from Iraq under a 2024 deal with the Iraqi government, something a U.S. administration official told POLITICO is part of Trump’s “commitment to ending forever wars,” while stressing that the move is happening in “close coordination” with Baghdad. Tamer Badawi, an Iraq expert and associate fellow with the Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient think tank, said the NATO mission itself is not “crucial” for the country’s security. But scrapping it alongside a U.S. pullback could empower militia groups, he said, and be “destabilizing” for the northern Kurdistan Regional Government. The U.S. request is also facing pushback inside the alliance. “It’s not the moment to get out of Iraq … the government wants us there,” said the first diplomat.  The second diplomat said “the majority” of allies agree the Iraq mission should be scaled back but over a longer timeframe, while keeping a smaller operation in place. KOSOVO DRAWDOWN The U.S. has also signaled it wants to wind down the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR), according to the four diplomats, which is even more concerning for European allies, even if discussions on that remain at a very early stage. The U.N.-authorized international peacekeeping mission, which debuted in 1999 after the Yugoslav wars, currently includes around 4,500 troops. Engjellushe Morina, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, said the mission remains “indispensable” for regional security. If NATO pulls out, it could embolden Serbian separatists in northern Kosovo, she said, creating a copycat effect among ethnic Serbs in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska region. “We’re quite concerned” about attempts to wind down the mission, said a fifth senior NATO diplomat, since “things in the western Balkans can escalate quickly.” Contacted by POLITICO, a NATO official speaking on behalf of the organization said there is “no timeline associated with NATO Mission Iraq … or with KFOR,” adding: “These missions are based on need, undergo periodic review, and are adjusted as circumstances evolve.” For now, no decision has been taken on ending either operation. All 32 allies must approve the start and end of missions, a process that typically involves jockeying and pressure campaigns from multiple allies and not just the U.S. NO EXTRA ALLIES The U.S. is also pressing allies not to invite Ukraine and the alliance’s four official Indo-Pacific partners — Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea — to the formal meetings at NATO’s July summit in Ankara, the four diplomats said.  The countries could still be invited to side events, they added, with the request partly justified as reducing the number of summit meetings. Keeping NATO partner countries on the sidelines of the summit “would send a signal that perhaps the focus is much more on core NATO issues,” said Oana Lungescu, a former NATO spokesperson and a senior fellow at London’s Royal United Services Institute. The official speaking for NATO said the alliance would “communicate on participation of partners at the summit in due course.” Meanwhile, NATO staff have also proposed cutting a public forum from this year’s gathering, a side-event hosting country leaders, defense experts and government officials on various discussion panels that typically boost the visibility of the yearly summit.  The NATO official said: “NATO has chosen not to organize a Public Forum this year but will host a NATO Summit Defence Industry Forum in the margins of the Ankara Summit.” NATO civil servants have told capitals the move is designed to cut costs amid a lack of resources. But the first and second diplomats said they believe it could also be driven indirectly by U.S. pressure, given Washington’s broader crusade to slash funding for international organizations. Lungescu said scrapping the forum was in line with the “downgrading of the public diplomacy division,” under NATO chief Mark Rutte, who has sought to slim down and restructure the department since taking office in late 2024. But at a time when the alliance is trying to persuade the wider public of the merits of its activities and increased defense spending, that’s “very harmful,” said a third diplomat.  “NATO has to communicate what’s happening — and what it’s going to do,” they said.

ALDEN BIESEN, Belgium — The European Union should open up more to its trade partners in public procurement and curb Chinese investment in sectors like green tech, according to a new draft of a landmark industry act obtained by POLITICO on Thursday. Free-trade partners like the United Kingdom and Japan will breathe a sigh of relief as the draft Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA) foresees a definition of “Made in EU” that includes “trusted partners.” Brussels wants to throw up a higher barrier to investment from China by imposing a cap on foreign direct investment by countries that dominate a given global industry. The leak of the bill came as EU leaders held a retreat at a Belgian castle to wargame ways to reverse the bloc’s industrial decline in the face of China’s export dominance and America’s tech supremacy. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen is trying to find a balance between France’s protectionist instincts and calls for more openness led by Germany, Italy and the EU’s Nordic contingent. Leaders played down differences as they gathered at the Alden Biesen estate, with Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni saying her views on industrial strategy converged with those of German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, and brushing off suggestions the duo were trying to isolate French President Emmanuel Macron. “It is not something that we do against someone else, by excluding someone else,” she told reporters. Leaders reached a form of consensus on areas including the concept of a European preference, where there was openness to examining what it may mean and where it may be needed, according to a person briefed on the talks. The meeting kicked off an intense month of politicking on restoring EU competitiveness and its single market project, with the IAA due out on Feb. 25 and leaders to reconvene for a full-blown summit on March 19-20. The draft drew a swift and strong rebuke from Chinese business. “The latest version of the Industrial Accelerator Act is likely to undermine the investment confidence of leading Chinese companies,” the Chinese Chamber of Commerce to the EU said. “Beyond the political signaling, many of the proposed measures raise serious practical concerns, including the feasibility of mandatory local partnership requirements, which in many cases may simply not be commercially or technologically viable.” A big question mark over the industry push, which is being led by Industry Commissioner Stéphane Séjourné, is whether it can be sufficiently decisive to turn the economic tide. “Whatever new FDI rules will be enacted will be ineffective,” said Yanmei Xie, a senior associate fellow at the Mercator Institute for China Studies. Each EU member country has a different agenda and building a united front against Chinese dominance is a near impossibility. “Whoever is the lowest denominator becomes the de facto gatekeeper.” TRUSTED PARTNERS The latest draft of the IAA, which runs to 96 pages, broadens the definition of a European preference as it would apply to public procurement and other taxpayer-funded programs in energy-intensive industries, net-zero technologies and the automotive sector. In so doing it should allay fears among friendly trading nations of a “Fortress Europe” scenario.  The scope of Made in EU should include content originating from the EU and the European Economic Area, which spans Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. The draft also leaves the door open to “trusted partners” whose manufacturing “should be deemed equivalent to Union origin content.” Earlier on Thursday, Séjourné dismissed the notion that the Made in EU push would exclude trade partners. His cabinet said there was broad support, both politically and in industry for the work of the Commission, although “opinions diverge on the conditions and modalities of its implementation.” A broader Made in EU concept will be welcome in the U.K. after the country’s finance minister, Rachel Reeves, said on Wednesday that Britain needed to be part of the Made in EU club. “I actually support the idea of some sort of ‘Made in Europe’ or ‘Made in countries that share each other’s values,’” she told an event. Japan, a major auto exporter, will also welcome the shift. The country “very much meets the definition of a Trusted Partner of the EU,” Patrick Keating, Honda Europe’s head of government affairs, told POLITICO.  GETTING TOUGHER The EU executive doubled down on its efforts to curb foreign direct investments from China in its latest draft.  Should the current form hold, the IAA would limit investments by companies based in countries that control more than 40 percent of global manufacturing capacity across four sectors: batteries, electric vehicles, solar technologies, and the processing and recycling of critical raw materials. “The sectors indicated — those in which Beijing is a leader — as well as the reference to the 40 percent manufacturing capacity, highlight how the increasingly clear target of these measures are Chinese foreign direct investments,”said Luca Picotti, a lawyer at Italy’s Osservatorio Golden Power. The Commission’s proposal, which effectively mirrors Beijing’s 1980s forced joint venture policy, remains in the new draft. Chinese automakers that could be forced to give up some of their technology to their European competitors are pushing back on that strategy. BYD CEO Stella Li has called the model “outdated.” “It’s not efficient: We take decisions in a second, a joint venture takes months. It’s a model of the past,” she told Italian daily Corriere della Sera at the Davos World Economic Forum last month. Governments would also be compelled under the IAA to buy more climate-friendly materials, though the scope of the requirement remains elusive in the latest draft of the upcoming industry booster. The act also proposes introducing voluntary green steel labels.  The scale of the Commission’s intervention remains unclear in the draft, which is missing a section devoted to specific materials as well as a set of annexes, though hints are sprinkled throughout the document. “Public procurement is a powerful lever,” von der Leyen told industry representatives at an event in Antwerp on Wednesday, noting it amounts to 15 percent of EU GDP. “This is massive financial firepower controlled by European governments. But too often, we see that our public buyers have to take the subsidized foreign products instead of the high-quality European alternatives. That is homegrown value that we are leaving on the table.”  Aude van den Hove reported from Alden Biesen, Francesca Micheletti, Jordyn Dahl and Sebastian Starcevic from Brussels, and Zia Weise from Antwerp.

BRUSSELS — For once, Europe’s heavy industry is lobbying to save a climate law.  Manufacturers are worried the European Commission is undermining the bloc’s new carbon tariff regime, a key pillar of EU climate policy, with a plan to give itself discretionary powers to suspend parts of the new measure. They warn the move is throwing investment plans into disarray and threatening much-needed decarbonization projects. The EU executive wants to grant itself the power to exempt goods from the just-launched carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), which requires importers of certain products to pay for planet-warming pollution emitted during the production process.  This levy is designed to protect European manufacturers — which are obliged by EU law to pay for each ton of CO2 they emit — from being out-competed by cheaper, dirtier imports. Importers of Chinese steel, for example, now pay the difference between Beijing’s carbon price and the bloc’s, ensuring it bears the same pollution costs as made-in-EU steel.  The prospect of having that protection yanked away by the Commission has spooked European manufacturers — particularly after a dozen EU governments immediately started campaigning to apply the exemption to fertilizers in an effort to protect farmers from higher import costs.  CBAM “is linked to investment, but it’s also linked to survival, actually, of some members,” said Antoine Hoxha, director of industry association Fertilizers Europe. “We can compete with anyone on a level playing field. But we need that level playing field.”  Fertilizer producers aren’t the only ones worried. Most major industry bodies representing CBAM-covered sectors in Brussels — which, aside from fertilizers, include steel, iron, aluminum, cement, hydrogen and electricity — told POLITICO they and their members had concerns about the Commission’s plans.  They warn that the new exemption clause, besides opening EU companies to unfair competition, risks undermining CBAM’s other goal of encouraging the bloc’s trading partners to switch to cleaner production methods, as it creates uncertainty over the level of EU demand for low-carbon imports.  “We see this as some kind of sword of Damocles. If it remains like this, it’s going to send a really discouraging signal to European and international investors, and that will seriously slow down industrial decarbonization,” said Laurent Donceel, industrial policy director at Hydrogen Europe. “We would urge lawmakers to reconsider this, because we feel it undermines the entirety of CBAM.”   Lawmakers in the European Parliament, worried about a domino effect if the Commission gives in to demands to exempt fertilizers, appear to be listening. In an environment committee meeting last week, MEPs from the far left to the center right criticized the EU executive’s proposed clause.  The changes still need the approval of MEPs and EU governments before they can come into effect, and “it is unlikely there is a majority to do so in the Parliament,” said Pascal Canfin, a French MEP and environmental coordinator of the centrist Renew group. “Precisely because it would trigger other requests and empty [out] the CBAM.”  VAGUE WORDING The Commission proposed the suspension clause, known as Article 27a, in mid-December as part of a host of other changes to CBAM. The clause initially flew under the radar before governments seized on it to demand the exemption of fertilizers in early January.  The new article gives the EU executive the power to remove goods from the mechanism in the event of “severe harm to the Union internal market due to serious and unforeseen circumstances related to the impact on the prices of goods.” The exemption remains in effect “until those serious and unforeseeable circumstances have passed.”  Industry representatives warn that this wording is so exceedingly vague — setting no time limit or trigger threshold — that it leaves CBAM vulnerable to political pressure campaigns.  Case in point: Fertilizers. A group of 12 governments has argued that CBAM has pushed up costs for farmers, and should trigger a suspension. But analysts and manufacturers dispute the idea that the new levy is to blame for high fertilizer costs, while also noting that increasing import prices due to CBAM are anything but unforeseen.  Farmers “are caught in between high energy prices that lead to high fertilizer prices on one side, and on the other side agriculture commodities prices have gone down, so they are in a squeeze and they need a real solution,” said Hoxha from Fertilizers Europe. “But it’s not this.” After a meeting with agriculture ministers in January, the Commission also clarified that any exemption under Article 27a would apply retroactively — causing “shock” among industry, Hoxha said. Exempting goods from CBAM also weakens the EU’s carbon market, the Emissions Trading System (ETS), which obliges companies to buy permits to cover their pollution.  Before the levy came into effect, the bloc shielded its manufacturers from cheaper foreign competition by granting them a certain amount of ETS permits for free — a practice that has been criticized for undermining the case for decarbonization. With CBAM launched, those pollution subsidies will be phased out.  But the Commission confirmed to POLITICO that if a product is exempted from CBAM, the affected companies would continue receiving free pollution permits: “The … reduction of the free allocations for the relevant period would not apply,” a Commission spokesperson said.  CROSS-INDUSTRY CONCERN The proposed clause has sent shockwaves through industry beyond the fertilizer sector.  “Such emergency procedures create legal uncertainty with regards to a cornerstone of the EU’s climate policy,” steel producer association Eurofer said in a statement, noting that increasing import prices are an intentional feature of the system, not an unforeseen bug. Cement Europe is “concerned that Article 27a would introduce major legal uncertainty into CBAM. An open‑ended exemption for ‘unforeseen circumstances,’ potentially even applied retroactively, risks undermining the predictability industry needs,” the association’s public affairs director Cliona Cunningham said.   At Eurelectric, which represents Europe’s electricity industry, “some of our members have expressed concern about the way Article 27a has been introduced,” the association said in a statement, also stressing the need for predictability.  “If there is a perception that CBAM obligations can be lifted for political or undefined unforeseen reasons, this may weaken incentives to invest in local decarbonisation and low-carbon production both within the EU and beyond,” Eurelectric warned.  Hydrogen Europe’s Donceel said that for producers of fertilizer, including hydrogen-derived ammonia, “this is becoming a huge issue … even before it gets adopted or comes into force — already, the possibility of an exemption is wrecking the business case for a lot of our members and a lot of key companies in these sectors. So this Article 27a definitively came as a shock.”  Only some metals producers supported the Commission’s proposal.  Given that CBAM is a new and complex policy, a suspension clause “is just realistic and good policymaking,” European Metals director James Watson said in a statement. “No regulatory system is flawless from the outset; an emergency brake, activated in certain conditions, is a matter of common sense.” His association represents producers of metals other than iron and steel. European Aluminium, which considers CBAM insufficient to protect their sector from unfair competition, wants to see Article 27a more clearly defined. But in general, “we see it basically as an emergency clause that our sector always wanted,” said Emanuele Manigrassi, the association’s climate director.  MIFFED CLIMATE CHAMPIONS In response to questions, a Commission spokesperson sought to reassure industry that CBAM “is not being cancelled for any of the sectors in scope” and that it was committed to providing “regulatory certainty for companies to move forward with their investments, especially for projects aiming to produce low-carbon products and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.”  Yet the proposal has especially rankled companies that see themselves as frontrunners in decarbonizing their industries, taking on the risk of early upfront investments. “You need to have a strong and predictable framework on carbon pricing, especially to back up industry frontrunners,” said Joren Verschaeve, who manages the Alliance for Low-Carbon Cement and Concrete. “The risk with a provision as proposed like Article 27a is that you inject uncertainty in this whole market … I think this is the last thing we need right now.”  The carbon border tax is also meant to encourage other countries’ industries to switch to cleaner production, as low-carbon imports are subject to lower CBAM fees.  But for companies already planning to ramp up climate-friendly manufacturing outside the EU in response to CBAM, the Commission’s move has also raised questions about whether there will be sufficient demand for their low-carbon imports to warrant the investment.  Norwegian fertilizer giant Yara International recently warned it would have to rethink a multi-billion low-carbon project if the mechanism was suspended. “It’s a huge concern to us, and the uncertainty grows every day. We want to reduce our emissions, but we will not do it purely out of goodwill. We need a clear business case, and CBAM is a key enabler here,” said Tiffanie Stephani, vice president for government relations at Yara.  “Any suspension would undermine the very companies that are taking concrete steps to decarbonize,” she added. 

High energy prices, risks on CBAM enforcement and promotion of lead markets, as well as increasing carbon costs are hampering domestic and export competitiveness with non-EU producers. The cement industry is fundamental to Europe’s construction value chain, which represents about 9 percent of the EU’s GDP. Its hard-to-abate production processes are also currently responsible for 4 percent of EU emissions, and it is investing heavily in measures aimed at achieving full climate neutrality by 2050, in line with the European Green Deal. Marcel Cobuz, CEO, TITAN Group  “We should take a longer view and ensure that the cement industry in EU stays competitive domestically and its export market shares are maintained.” However, the industry’s efforts to comply with EU environmental regulations, along with other factors, make it less competitive than more carbon-intensive producers from outside Europe. Industry body Cement Europe recently stated that, “without a competitive business model, the very viability of the cement industry and its prospects for industrial decarbonization are at risk.” Marcel Cobuz, member of the Board of the Global Cement and Concrete Association and CEO of TITAN Group, one of Europe’s leading producers, spoke with POLITICO Studio about the vital need for a clear policy partnership with Brussels to establish a predictable regulatory and financing framework to match the industry’s decarbonization ambitions and investment efforts to stay competitive in the long-term. POLITICO Studio: Why is the cement industry important to the EU economy?  Marcel Cobuz: Just look around and you will see how important it is. Cement helped to build the homes that we live in and the hospitals that care for us. It’s critical for our transport and energy infrastructure, for defense and increasingly for the physical assets supporting the digital economy. There are more than 200 cement plants across Europe, supporting nearby communities with high-quality jobs. The cement industry is also key to the wider construction industry, which employs 14.5 million people across the EU. At the same time, cement manufacturers from nine countries compete in the international export markets. PS: What differentiates Titan within the industry?  MC: We have very strong European roots, with a presence in 10 European countries. Sustainability is very much part of our DNA, so decarbonizing profitably is a key objective for us. We’ve reduced our CO2 footprint by nearly 25 percent since 1990, and we recently announced that we are targeting a similar reduction by 2030 compared to 2020. We are picking up pace in reducing emissions both by using conventional methods, like the use of alternative sources of low-carbon energy and raw materials, and advanced technologies. TITAN/photo© Nikos Daniilidis We have a large plant in Europe where we are exploring building one of the largest carbon capture projects on the continent, with support from the Innovation Fund, capturing close to two million tons of CO2 and producing close to three million tons of zero-carbon cement for the benefit of all European markets. On top of that, we have a corporate venture capital fund, which partners with startups from Europe to produce the materials of tomorrow with  very low or zero carbon. That will help not only TITAN but the whole industry to accelerate its way towards the use of new high-performance materials with a smaller carbon footprint. PS: What are the main challenges for the EU cement industry today?  MC: Several factors are making us less competitive than companies from outside the EU. Firstly, Europe is an expensive place when it comes to energy prices. Since 2021, prices have risen by close to 65 percent, and this has a huge impact on cement producers, 60 percent of whose costs are energy-related. And this level of costs is two to three times higher than those of our neighbors. We also face regulatory complexity compared to our outside competitors, and the cost of compliance is high. The EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) cost for the cement sector is estimated at €97 billion to €162 billion between 2023 and 2034. Then there is the need for low-carbon products to be promoted ― uptake is still at a very low level, which leads to an investment risk around new decarbonization technologies. > We should take a longer view and ensure that the cement industry in the EU > stays competitive domestically and its export market shares are maintained.” All in all, the playing field is far from level. Imports of cement into the EU have increased by 500 percent since 2016. Exports have halved ― a loss of value of one billion euros. The industry is reducing its cost to manufacture and to replace fossil fuels, using the waste of other industries, digitalizing its operations, and premiumizing its offers. But this is not always enough. Friendly policies and the predictability of a regulatory framework should accompany the effort. PS: In January 2026, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism will be fully implemented, aimed at ensuring that importers pay the same carbon price as domestic producers. Will this not help to level the playing field? MC: This move is crucial, and it can help in dealing with the increasing carbon cost. However, I believe we already see a couple of challenges regarding the CBAM. One is around self-declaration: importers declare the carbon footprint of their materials, so how do we avoid errors or misrepresentations? In time there should be audits of the importers’ industrial installations and co-operation with the authorities at source to ensure the data flow is accurate and constant. It really needs to be watertight, and the authorities need to be fully mobilized to make sure the real cost of carbon is charged to the importers. Also, and very importantly, we need to ensure that CBAM does not apply to exports from the EU to third countries, as carbon costs are increasingly a major factor making us uncompetitive outside the EU, in markets where we were present for more than 20 years. > CBAM really needs to be watertight, and the authorities need to be fully > mobilized to make sure the real cost of carbon is charged to the importers.” PS: In what ways can the EU support the European cement industry and help it to be more competitive? MC: By simplifying legislation and making it more predictable so we can plan our investments for the long term. More specifically, I’m talking about the revamping of the ETS, which in its current form implies a phase-down of CO2 rights over the next decade. First, we should take a longer view and ensure that the cement industry stays competitive and its export market shares are maintained, so a policy of more for longer should accompany the new ETS. > In export markets, the policy needs to ensure a level playing field for > European suppliers competing in international destination markets, through a > system of free allowances or CBAM certificates, which will enable exports to > continue.” We should look at it as a way of funding decarbonization. We could front-load part of ETS revenues in a fund that would support the development of technologies such as low-carbon materials development and CCS. The roll-out of Infrastructure for carbon capture projects such as transport or storage should also be accelerated, and the uptake of low-carbon products should be incentivized. More specifically on export markets, the policy needs to ensure a level playing field for European suppliers competing in international destination markets, through a system of free allowances or CBAM certificates, which will enable exports to continue. PS: Are you optimistic about the future of your industry in Europe?  MC: I think with the current system of phasing out CO2 rights, and if the CBAM is not watertight, and if energy prices remain several times higher than in neighboring countries, and if investment costs, particularly for innovating new technologies, are not going to be financed through ETS revenues, then there is an existential risk for at least part of the industry. Having said that, I’m optimistic that, working together with the European Commission we can identify the right policy making solutions to ensure our viability as a strategic industry for Europe. And if we are successful, it will benefit everyone in Europe, not least by guaranteeing more high-quality jobs and affordable and more energy-efficient materials for housing ― and a more sustainable and durable infrastructure in the decades ahead. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is Titan Group * The advertisement is linked to policy advocacy around industrial competitiveness, carbon pricing, and decarbonization in the EU cement and construction sectors, including the EU’s CBAM legislation, the Green Deal, and the proposed revision of the ETS. More information here.

BRUSSELS — Europe’s most energy-intensive industries are worried the European Union’s carbon border tax will go too soft on heavily polluting goods imported from China, Brazil and the United States — undermining the whole purpose of the measure. From the start of next year, Brussels will charge a fee on goods like cement, iron, steel, aluminum and fertilizer imported from countries with weaker emissions standards than the EU’s. The point of the law, known as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, is to make sure dirtier imports don’t have an unfair advantage over EU-made products, which are charged around €80 for every ton of carbon dioxide they emit. One of the main conundrums for the EU is how to calculate the carbon footprint of imports when the producers don’t give precise emissions data. According to draft EU laws obtained by POLITICO, the European Commission is considering using default formulas that EU companies say are far too generous. Two documents in particular have raised eyebrows. One contains draft benchmarks to assess the carbon footprint of imported CBAM goods, while the second — an Excel sheet seen by POLITICO — shows default CO2 emissions values for the production of these products in foreign countries. These documents are still subject to change. National experts from EU countries discussed the controversial texts last Wednesday during a closed-door meeting, and asked the Commission to rework them before they can be adopted. That’s expected to happen over the next few weeks, according to two people with knowledge of the talks. Multiple industry representatives told POLITICO that the proposed estimated carbon footprint values are too low for a number of countries, which risks undermining the efficiency of the CBAM. For example, some steel products from China, Brazil and the United States have much lower assumed emissions than equivalent products made in the EU, according to the tables. Ola Hansén, public affairs director of the green steel manufacturer Stegra, said he had been “surprised” by the draft default values that have been circulating, because they suggest that CO2 emissions for some steel production routes in the EU were higher than in China, which seemed “odd.” “Our recommendation would be [to] adjust the values, but go ahead with the [CBAM] framework and then improve it over time,” he said. Antoine Hoxha, director general of industry association Fertilizers Europe, also said he found the proposed default values “quite low” for certain elements, like urea, used to manufacture fertilizers. “The result is not exactly what we would have thought,” he said, adding there is “room for improvement.” But he also noted that the Commission is trying “to do a good job but they are extremely overwhelmed … It’s a lot of work in a very short period of time.” Multiple industry representatives told POLITICO that the proposed estimated carbon footprint values are too low for a number of countries, which risks undermining the efficiency of the CBAM. | Photo by VCG via Getty Images While a weak CBAM would be bad for many emissions-intensive, trade-exposed industries in the EU, it’s likely to please sectors relying on cheap imports of CBAM goods — such as European farmers that import fertilizer — as well as EU trade partners that have complained the measure is a barrier to global free trade. The European Commission declined to comment. DEFAULT VERSUS REAL EMISSIONS Getting this data right is crucial to ensure the mechanism works and encourages companies to lower their emissions to pay a lower CBAM fee. “Inconsistencies in the figures of default values and benchmarks would dilute the incentive for cleaner production processes and allow high-emission imports to enter the EU market with insufficient carbon costs,” said one CBAM industry representative, granted anonymity to discuss the sensitive talks. “This could result in a CBAM that is not only significantly less effective but most likely counterproductive.” The default values for CO2 emissions are like a stick. When the legislation was designed, they were expected to be set quite high to “punish importers that are not providing real emission data,” and encourage companies to report their actual emissions to pay a lower CBAM fee, said Leon de Graaf, acting president of the Business for CBAM Coalition. But if these default values are too low then importers no longer have any incentive to provide their real emissions data. They risk making the CBAM less effective because it allows imported goods to appear cleaner than they really are, he said. The Commission is under pressure to adopt these EU acts quickly as they’re needed to set the last technical details for the implementation of the CBAM, which applies from Jan. 1. However, de Graaf warned against rushing that process. On the one hand, importers “needed clarity yesterday” because they are currently agreeing import deals for next year and at the moment “cannot calculate what their CBAM cost will be,” he said. But European importers are worried too, because once adopted the default emission values will apply for the next two years, the draft documents suggest. The CBAM regulation states that the default values “shall be revised periodically.” “It means that if they are wrong now … they will hurt certain EU producers for at least two years,” de Graaf said.

By ALEX PERRY in Paris Illustrations by Julius Maxim for POLITICO This article is also available in French When Patrick Pouyanné decided to spend billions on a giant natural gas field in a faraway warzone, he made the call alone, over a single dinner, with the head of a rival energy company. Pouyanné, the chairman and CEO of what was then called Total, was dining with Vicki Hollub, CEO of Houston-based Occidental Petroleum. It was late April 2019, and Hollub was in a David and Goliath battle with the American energy behemoth Chevron to buy Anadarko, like Occidental a mid-sized Texan oil and gas explorer. The American investor Warren Buffett was set to back Hollub with $10 billion, but it wasn’t enough. So Hollub flew to Paris to meet Pouyanné. Hollub’s proposal: Pouyanné would pitch in $8.8 billion in exchange for Anadarko’s four African gas fields, including a vast deep-sea reserve off northern Mozambique, an area in the grip of an Islamist insurgency. The Frenchman, who had previously approached Anadarko about the same assets, said yes in a matter of minutes. Advertisement “What are the strengths of Total?” Pouyanné explained to an Atlantic Council event in Washington a few weeks later. “LNG,” he went on, and the “Middle East and Africa,” regions where the company has operated since its origin in the colonial era. “So it’s just fitting exactly and perfectly.” Total, “a large corporation,” could be “so agile,” he said, because of the efficacy of his decision-making, and the clarity of his vision to shift from oil to lower-emission gas, extracted from lightly regulated foreign lands. In the end, “it [was] just a matter of sending an email to my colleague [Hollub],” he added. “This is the way to make good deals.” Six years later, it’s fair to ask if Pouyanné was a little hasty. On Nov. 17, a European human rights NGO filed a criminal complaint with the national counterterrorism prosecutor’s office in Paris accusing TotalEnergies of complicity in war crimes, torture and enforced disappearances, all in northern Mozambique. The allegations turn on a massacre, first reported by POLITICO last year, in which Mozambican soldiers crammed about 200 men into shipping containers at the gatehouse of a massive gas liquefaction plant TotalEnergies is building in the country, then killed most of them over the next three months. The complaint, submitted by the nonprofit European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR), alleges that TotalEnergies became an accomplice in the “so-called ‘container massacre’” because it “directly financed and materially supported” the Mozambican soldiers who carried out the executions, which took place between June and September 2021. “TotalEnergies knew that the Mozambican armed forces had been accused of systematic human rights violations, yet continued to support them with the only objective to secure its facility,” said Clara Gonzales, co-director of the business and human rights program at ECCHR, a Berlin-based group specializing in international law that has spent the past year corroborating the atrocity. In response to the complaint, a company spokesperson in Paris said in a written statement: “TotalEnergies takes these allegations very seriously” and would “comply with the lawful investigation prerogatives of the French authorities.” Last year, in response to questions by POLITICO, the company — through its subsidiary Mozambique LNG — said it had no knowledge of the container killings, adding that its “extensive research” had “not identified any information nor evidence that would corroborate the allegations of severe abuses and torture.” This week, the spokesperson repeated that position. Advertisement Asked in May in the French National Assembly about the killings, Pouyanné dismissed “these false allegations” and demanded the company’s accusers “put their evidence on the table.” Questioned about the complaint on French television this week, he again rejected the allegations and described them as a “smear campaign” motivated by the fact that TotalEnergies produces fossil fuels. The war crimes complaint is based on POLITICO’s reporting and other open-source evidence. In the last year, the container killings have been confirmed by the French newspaper Le Monde and the British journalism nonprofit Source Material. The British Mozambique expert Professor Joseph Hanlon also said the atrocity was “well known locally,” and an investigation carried out by UK Export Finance (UKEF) — the British state lender, which is currently weighing delivery of a $1.15 billion loan to Total’s project — has heard evidence from its survivors.  The massacre was an apparent reprisal for a devastating attack three months earlier by ISIS-affiliated rebels on the nearby town of Palma, just south of the border with Tanzania, which killed 1,354 civilians, including 55 of Total’s workforce, according to a house-to-house survey carried out by POLITICO. Of those ISIS murdered, it beheaded 330. TotalEnergies has previously noted that Mozambique has yet to issue an official toll for the Palma massacre. In March, a French magistrate began investigating TotalEnergies for involuntary manslaughter over allegations that it abandoned its contractors to the onslaught.  After the jihadis left the area in late June, Mozambican commandos based at Total’s gas concession rounded up 500 villagers and accused them of backing the rebels. They separated men from women and children, raped several of the women, then forced the 180-250 men into two metal windowless shipping containers that formed a rudimentary fortified entrance to Total’s plant. There, the soldiers kept their prisoners in 30-degree-Celsius heat for three months. According to eleven survivors and two witnesses, some men suffocated. Fed handfuls of rice and bottle caps of water, others starved or died of thirst. The soldiers beat and tortured many of the rest. Finally, they began taking them away in groups and executing them. Only 26 men survived, saved when a Rwandan intervention force, deployed to fight ISIS, discovered the operation. A second house-to-house survey conducted by POLITICO later identified by name 97 of those killed or disappeared. Along with the new ECCHR complaint and the British inquiry, the killings are the subject of three other separate investigations: by the Mozambican Attorney General, the Mozambican National Human Rights Commission, and the Dutch government, which is probing $1.2 billion in Dutch state financing for TotalEnergies’ project. This week’s complaint was lodged with the offices of the French National Anti-Terrorism Prosecutor, whose remit includes war crimes. The prosecutor will decide whether to open a formal inquiry and appoint an investigating magistrate.  Should the case move ahead, TotalEnergies will face the prospect of a war crimes trial.  Such an eventuality would represent a spectacular fall from grace for a business that once held a central place in French national identity and a CEO whose hard-nosed resolve made him an icon of global business. Should a French court eventually find the company or its executives liable in the container killings, the penalties could include fines and, possibly, jail terms for anybody indicted. How did TotalEnergies get here? How did Patrick Pouyanné? ‘POUYANNÉ PETROLEUM’ Born in Normandy in 1963, the son of a provincial customs official and a post office worker, Pouyanné elevated himself to the French elite by winning selection to the École Polytechnique, the country’s foremost engineering university, and then the École des Mines, where France’s future captains of industry are made. Following a few years in politics as a minister’s aide, he joined the French state petroleum company Elf as an exploration manager in Angola in 1996. After moving to Qatar in 1999 as Elf merged with Total, Pouyanné ascended to the top job at Total in 2014 after his predecessor, Christophe de Margerie, was killed in a plane crash in Moscow. Pouyanné led by reason, and force of will. “To be number one in a group like Total … is to find yourself alone,” he said in 2020. “When I say ‘I don’t agree,’ sometimes the walls shake. I realize this.” A decade at the top has seen Pouyanné, 62, transform a company of 100,000 employees in 130 countries into a one-man show — “Pouyanné Petroleum,” as the industry quip goes. His frequent public appearances, and his unapologetically firm hand, have made him a celebrated figure in international business. “Patrick Pouyanné has done an extraordinary job leading TotalEnergies in a complex environment, delivering outstanding financial results and engaging the company in the energy transition quicker and stronger than its peers,” Jacques Aschenbroich, the company’s lead independent director, said in 2023. Advertisement Marc-Antoine Eyl-Mazzega, director of energy and climate at the French Institute of International Relations, agreed. “His involvement is his strength,” he said. “He’s able to take a decision quickly, in a much more agile and rapid way.” Still, Eyl-Mazzega said, “I’m not sure everyone is happy to work with him. You have to keep up the pace. There are often departures. He’s quite direct and frank.”  Among employees, Pouyanné’s lumbering frame and overbearing manner has earned him a nickname: The Bulldozer. The moniker isn’t always affectionate. A former Total executive who dealt regularly with him recalled him as unpleasantly aggressive, “banging fists on the table.” The effect, the executive said, has been to disempower the staff: “The structure of Total is trying to guess what Pouyanné wants to do. You can’t make any decisions unless it goes to the CEO.” In a statement to POLITICO, TotalEnergies called such depictions “misplaced and baseless.” ‘DON’T ASK US TO TAKE THE MORAL HIGH GROUND’ What’s not in dispute is how Pouyanné has used his authority to shape Total’s answer to the big 21st-century oil and gas puzzle: how to square demand for fossil fuels with simultaneous demands from politicians and climate campaigners to eliminate them. His response has been diversification, moving the company away from high-emission fuels towards becoming a broad-based, ethical energy supplier, centered on low-carbon gas, solar and wind, and pledging to reach net-zero emissions by 2050. The change was symbolized by Pouyanné’s renaming of the company TotalEnergies in 2021. A second, more unsung element of Pouyanné’s strategy has been moving much of his remaining fossil fuel operation beyond Western regulation.  Speaking to an audience at Chatham House in London in 2017, he said the catalyst for his move to favor reserves in poorer, less tightly policed parts of the planet was the penalties imposed on the British energy giant BP in the United States following the 2010 Deepwater Horizon blowout, in which 11 men died and an oil slick devastated the Gulf of Mexico coast. Pouyanné declared that the fines — between $62 billion and $142 billion, depending on the calculation used — represented an excessive “legal risk” to oil and gas development in the West. While other, more troubled territories came with their share of dangers, Pouyanné put the cost of failure of any project outside the West at a more manageable $2 to $3 billion, according to his Chatham House remarks. As a way of assessing risk, it was efficient. “Other players would spend a lot of money on consultancies and write 70 reports to conclude that a project is risky,” Eyl-Mazzega said. “Pouyanné, on the other hand, is prepared to take risks.” Asked by the French Senate in 2024 how he chose where to invest, however, Pouyanné admitted that his math was strictly about the bottom line. “Don’t ask us to take the moral high ground,” he said. ‘A COLLAPSE WILL NOT PUT TOTAL IN DANGER’ The first oil and gas prospectors arrived in northern Mozambique in 2006 as part of a Western effort to broaden supply beyond the Middle East. When Anadarko found gas 25 miles out to sea in 2010, the talk was of Mozambique as the new Qatar. At 2.6 million acres, or about a third of the size of Belgium, Rovuma Basin Area 1 was a monster, thought to hold 75 trillion cubic feet of gas, or 1 percent of all global reserves. An adjacent field, Area 4, quickly snapped up by ExxonMobil, was thought to hold even more. To cope with the volume of production, Anadarko’s Area 1 consortium drew up a plan for a $20 billion onshore liquefaction plant. Together with ExxonMobil’s field, the cost of developing Mozambique’s gas was estimated at $50 billion, which would make it the biggest private investment ever made in Africa. But in 2017, an ISIS insurgency emerged to threaten those ambitions.  By the time Pouyanné was preparing to buy Anadarko’s 26.5 percent share in Area 1 two years later, what had begun as a ragtag revolt against government corruption in the northern province of Cabo Delgado had become a full-scale Islamist rebellion.  Insurgents were taking ever more territory, displacing hundreds of thousands of people and regularly staging mass beheadings. Even under construction, the gas plant was a regular target. It was run by Europeans and Americans, intending to make money for companies thousands of miles away while displacing 2,733 villagers to build their concession and banning fishermen from waters around their drill sites. After several attacks on plant traffic to and from the facility, in February 2019, the militants killed two project workers in a village attack and dismembered a contract driver in the road.  A further risk had its origins in a ban on foreigners carrying guns. That made the plant reliant for security on the Mozambican army and police, both of which had a well-documented record of criminality and repression. Initially, Pouyanné seemed unconcerned. The gas field was outside international law, as Mozambique had not ratified the Rome Statute setting up the International Criminal Court. And Pouyanné appeared to see the pursuit of high-risk, high-reward projects almost as an obligation for a deep-pocketed corporation, telling the Atlantic Council in May 2019, soon after he agreed the Mozambique deal, that Total was so big, it didn’t need to care — at least, not in the way of other, lesser companies or countries. “We love risk, so we have decided to embark on the Mozambique story,” he said. “Even if there is a collapse, [it] will [not] put Total in danger.” Advertisement In September 2019, when Total’s purchase was formally completed, the company declared in a press release: “The Mozambique LNG project is largely derisked.” In one of several statements to POLITICO, TotalEnergies explained the term echoed the boss’s focus on “the project’s commercial and financial fundamentals. To infer this was a dismissal of security concerns amounts to a fundamental misunderstanding of the way the sector operates.” Still, for workers at the project, it was an arresting statement, given that a Mozambique LNG worker had recently been chopped to pieces. Around the same time, the project managers at Anadarko, many of whom were now working for Total, tried to warn their new CEO of the danger posed by the insurgency. It was when they met Pouyanné, however, that “things then all started to unwind,” said one. Pouyanné regaled the team who had worked on the Mozambique project for years with a speech “on how brilliant Total was, and how brilliantly Total was going to run this project,” a second executive added. Pouyanné added he had “a French hero” running the company’s security: Denis Favier who, as a police commander, led a team of police commandos as they stormed a hijacked plane on the tarmac at Marseille in 1994, and in 2015, as France’s most senior policeman, commanded the operation to hunt and kill the Islamist brothers who shot dead 12 staff at the Charlie Hebdo newspaper in Paris. “This is easy for him,” Pouyanné said. Asked about the transition from Anadarko to Total, the company maintained it was responsive to all concerns expressed by former Anadarko workers. “We are not aware of any such dismissal of security concerns by TotalEnergies or its senior management,” the company said. “It is incorrect to state that advice from the ground was not listened to.” Still, after meeting Pouyanné, the old Anadarko team called their Mozambique staff together to brief them on their new boss. “Well, holy shit,” one manager began, according to a person present. “We’ve got a problem.” ‘VERY VULNERABLE’ A third former Anadarko staffer who stayed on to work for Total said that on taking over, the company also put on hold a decision to move most contractors and staff from hotels and compounds in Palma to inside its fortified camp — a costly move that Anadarko was planning in response to deteriorating security. “This was a danger I had worked so hard to eliminate,” the staffer said. “Palma was very vulnerable. Almost nobody was supposed to be [there]. But Total wouldn’t listen to me.” Other measures, such as grouping traffic to and from the plant in convoys and flanking them with drones, also ended. One project contractor who regularly made the run through rebel territory described the difference between Anadarko and Total as “night and day.” Then in June 2020, the rebels captured Mocimboa da Praia, the regional hub, and killed at least eight subcontractors. In late December that year, they staged another advance that brought them to Total’s gates. At that, Pouyanné reversed course and assumed personal oversight of the security operation, the first Anadarko manager said. Despite no expertise in security, “[he] had to get into every little last possible detail.” The second executive concurred. “It went from, ‘I don’t care, we’ve got the best security people in the business to run this’ to ‘Oh my God, this is a disaster, let me micromanage it and control it,’” he said. The company was “not aware of any … criticism that Mr. Pouyanné lacks the necessary expertise,” TotalEnergies said, adding the CEO had “first-hand experience of emergency evacuation … [from] when Total had to evacuate its staff from Yemen in 2015.” The insurgents’ advance prompted Pouyanné to order the evacuation of all TotalEnergies staff. By contrast, many contractors and subcontractors, some of them behind schedule because of Covid, were told to keep working, according to email exchanges among contractors seen by POLITICO. “Mozambique LNG did not differentiate between its own employees, its contractors or subcontractors when giving these instructions,” the company said, but added that it was not responsible for the decisions of its contractors. Advertisement Then, in February 2021, Pouyanné flew to Maputo, the Mozambican capital, to negotiate a new security deal with then Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi. Afterward, the two men announced the creation of the Joint Task Force, a 1,000-man unit of soldiers and armed police to be stationed inside the compound.  The deal envisaged that the new force would protect a 25-kilometer radius around the gas plant, including Palma and several villages. In practice, by concentrating so many soldiers and police inside the wire, it left Palma comparatively exposed. “It is incorrect to allege that Palma was left poorly defended,” the company said. “However, it is a fact that these security forces were overwhelmed by the magnitude and violence of the terrorist attacks in March 2021.” TotalEnergies added it is not correct to say that “Mr. Pouyanné personally managed the security deal setting up the Joint Task Force.” ‘TRAIN WRECK’ By this time, the company’s own human rights advisers were warning that by helping to create the Joint Task Force — to which the company agreed to pay what it described as “hardship payments” via a third party, as well as to equip it and accommodate it on its compound — Pouyanné was effectively making TotalEnergies a party to the conflict, and implicating it in any human rights abuses the soldiers carried out. Just as worrying was TotalEnergies’ insistence — according to a plant security manager, and confirmed by minutes of a Total presentation on security released under a Dutch freedom of information request — that all major security decisions be handled by a 20-man security team 5,000 miles away in Paris. That centralization seemed to help explain how, when the Islamists finally descended on Palma on March 24, 2021, Total was among the last to know. One Western security contractor told POLITICO he had pulled his people out 10 days before the assault, based on intelligence he had on guns and young men being pre-positioned in town. In the days immediately preceding the attack, villagers around Palma warned friends and relatives in town that they had seen the Islamists advancing. WhatsApp messages seen by POLITICO indicate contractors reported the same advance to plant security on March 22 and March 23. Advertisement Nonetheless, at 9 a.m. on March 24, TotalEnergies in Paris announced that it was safe for its staff to return. Hours later, the Islamists attacked. “Neither Mozambique LNG nor TotalEnergies received any specific ‘advance warnings’ of an impending attack prior to March 24,” the company said. Faced with a three-pronged advance by several hundred militants, the plant security manager said TotalEnergies’ hierarchical management pyramid was unable to cope. Ground staff could not respond to evolving events, paralyzed by the need to seek approval for decisions from Paris. Total’s country office in Maputo was also in limbo, according to the security manager, neither able to follow what was happening in real-time, nor authorized to respond.  ‘WHO CAN HELP US?!’ Two decisions, taken as the attack unfolded, compounded the havoc wreaked by the Islamists. The first was Total’s refusal to supply aviation fuel to the Dyck Advisory Group (DAG), a small, South African private military contractor working with the Mozambican police. With the police and army overrun, DAG’s small helicopters represented the only functional military force in Palma and the only unit undertaking humanitarian rescues. But DAG’s choppers were limited by low supplies of jet fuel, forcing them to fly an hour away to refuel, and to ground their fleet intermittently. Total, as one of the world’s biggest makers of aviation fuel, with ample stocks at the gas plant, was in a position to help. But when DAG asked Total in Paris for assistance, it refused. “Word came down from the mountain,” DAG executive Max Dyck said, “and that was the way it was going to be.” Total has conceded that it refused fuel to DAG — out of concern for the rescuers’ human rights record, the company said — but made fuel available to the Mozambican security services. DAG later hired an independent lawyer to investigate its record, who exonerated the company. Advertisement A second problematic order was an edict, handed down by Pouyanné’s executives in Paris in the months before the massacre, according to the plant security manager, that should the rebels attack, gate security guards at the gas plant were to let no one in. It was an instruction that could only have been drawn up by someone ignorant of the area’s geography, the man said.  If the Islamists blocked the three roads in and out of Palma, as conventional tactics would prescribe, the only remaining ways out for the population of 60,000 would be by sea or air — both routes that went through TotalEnergies’s facility, with its port and airport. By barring the civilians’ way, the company would be exposing them. So it proved. TotalEnergies soon had 25,000 fleeing civilians at its gates, according to an internal company report obtained under a freedom of information request by an Italian NGO, Recommon. Among the crowd were hundreds of project subcontractors and workers. Witnesses described to POLITICO how families begged TotalEnergies’ guards to let them in. Mothers were passing their babies forward to be laid in front of the gates. But TotalEnergies in Paris refused to allow its guards on the ground to open up. On March 28, the fifth day of the attack, Paris authorized a ferry to evacuate 1,250 staff and workers from the gas plant, and make a single return trip to pick up 1,250 civilians, who had sneaked inside the perimeter. That still left tens of thousands stranded at its gates. On March 29, a TotalEnergies community relations manager in Paris made a panicked call to Caroline Brodeur, a contact at Oxfam America. “He’s like, ‘There’s this huge security situation in Mozambique!’” Brodeur said. “An escalation of violence! We will need to evacuate people! Who can help us? Which NGO can support us with logistics?’” Thirty minutes later, the man called back. “Wait,” he told Brodeur. “Don’t do anything.” TotalEnergies’ senior managers had overruled him, the man said. No outsiders were to be involved. “I think he was trying to do the right thing,” Brodeur said in an interview with POLITICO. “But after that, Total went silent.” Over the next two months, the jihadis killed hundreds of civilians in and around Palma and the gas plant before the Rwandan intervention force pushed them out. The second former Anadarko and Total executive said the rebels might have attacked Palma, whoever was in charge at the gas project. But Total’s distant, centralized management made a “train wreck … inevitable.” Advertisement TotalEnergies said its response to the attack “mitigated as much as was reasonably possible the consequences.” Confirming the phone call to Oxfam, it added: “There was no effort by whoever within TotalEnergies to shut any possibility for external assistance down.” The company was especially adamant that Pouyanné was not at fault.  “The allegation that Mr. Pouyanné’s management of TotalEnergies exacerbated the devastation caused by the attacks in Mozambique is entirely unsubstantiated,” it said. “Mr. Pouyanné takes the safety and security of the staff extremely seriously.” In his television appearance this week, Pouyanné defended the company’s performance. “We completely evacuated the site,” he said. “We were not present at that time.” He said he considered that TotalEnergies, whose security teams had helped “more than 2,000 civilians evacuate the area,” “had carried out heroic actions.” ‘AN ALMOST PERFECT DINNER PARTY’  TotalEnergies’ troubles in Mozambique have come amid a wider slump in the country’s fortunes and reputation. Years of climate protests outside the company’s annual general meetings in central Paris peaked in 2023 when police dispersed activists with batons and tear gas. For the last two years, TotalEnergies has retreated behind a line of security checks and riot police at its offices in Défense, in the western part of Paris. Though the company intended 2024, its centenary year, as a celebration, the company succeeded mostly in looking past its prime. When Pouyanné took over in 2014, Total was France’s biggest company, and 37th in the world. Today, it is France’s seventh largest and not even in the global top 100.  Several French media houses chose the occasion of TotalEnergies’ 100th birthday to declare open season on the company, portraying it as a serial offender on pollution, corruption, worker safety, and climate change. Pouyanné has also presided over a rift with the French establishment. Last year, when he suggested listing in New York to boost the stock, French President Emmanuel Macron berated him in public. Advertisement The division grew wider a few weeks later when the French Senate concluded a six-month inquiry into the company with a recommendation that the formerly state-owned enterprise be partly taken back into public ownership.  The company has faced five separate lawsuits, civil and criminal, claiming it is breaking French law on climate protection and corporate conduct.  In a sixth case, brought by environmentalists in Paris last month, a judge ordered TotalEnergies to remove advertising from its website claiming it was part of the solution to climate change. Given the company’s ongoing investments in fossil fuels, that was misleading, the judge said, decreeing that TotalEnergies take down its messaging and upload the court’s ruling instead. The Swedish activist Greta Thunberg has also led protests against TotalEnergies’ East Africa Crude Oil Pipeline. That project, intended to pump oil 1,000 miles from Uganda across Tanzania to the Indian Ocean, is similarly embroiled in accusations of human rights abuses, drawing criticism from the European Parliament plus 28 banks and 29 insurance companies who have refused to finance it. Pouyanné has also taken hits to his personal brand. A low point came in 2022 when he chose the moment his countrymen were recovering from Covid and struggling with soaring fuel prices to defend his salary of €5,944,129 a year. He was “tired” of the accusation that he had received a 52 percent rise, he wrote on Twitter. His pay, he added, had merely been restored to pre-pandemic levels.  Overnight, the CEO became the unacceptable face of French capitalism. “Pouyanné lives in another galaxy, far, far away,” said one TV host. Under a picture of the CEO, an MP from the leftist France Unbowed movement wrote: “A name, a face. The obstacle in the way of a nation.” So heated and widely held is the contempt that in 2023 the company produced a guide for its French employees on how to handle it. Titled “An Almost Perfect Dinner Party,” the booklet lays out arguments and data that staff might use to defend themselves at social occasions. “Have you ever been questioned, during a dinner with family or friends, about a controversy concerning the Company?” it asked. “Did you have the factual elements to answer your guests?” ‘FALSE ALLEGATIONS’ The war crimes case lodged this week against TotalEnergies was filed in France, despite the alleged crimes occurring in Mozambique, because, it argues, TotalEnergies’ nationality establishes jurisdiction.  The case represents a dramatic example of the extension of international justice — the prosecution in one country of crimes committed in another. A movement forged in Nuremberg and Tokyo in the wake of World War II, the principles of international justice have been used more recently by national and international courts to bring warlords and dictators to trial — and by national courts to prosecute citizens or companies implicated in abuses abroad where local justice systems are weak. U.S. courts have ordered ExxonMobil and banana giant Chiquita to stand trial for complicity in atrocities committed in the late 1990s and early 2000s by soldiers or militias paid to protect their premises in Indonesia and Colombia, respectively. Exxon settled a week before the case opened in 2023. A Florida court ordered Chiquita to pay $38 million to the families of eight murdered Colombian men in June 2024; Chiquita’s appeal was denied that October.  In Sweden, two executives from Lundin Oil are currently on trial for complicity in war crimes after Sudanese troops and government militias killed an estimated 12,000 people between 1999 and 2003 as they cleared the area around a company drill site. The executives deny the accusations against them. Advertisement ECCHR has initiated several international justice cases. Most notably, in 2016, it and another legal non-profit, Sherpa, filed a criminal complaint in Paris against the French cement maker Lafarge, accusing its Syrian plant of paying millions of dollars in protection money to ISIS. Earlier this month, Lafarge and eight executives went on trial in Paris, accused of funding terrorism and breaking international sanctions — charges they deny. The war crimes complaint against TotalEnergies cites internal documents, obtained under freedom of information requests in Italy and the Netherlands, that show staff at the site knew the soldiers routinely committed human rights abuses against civilians while working for the company.  There were “regular community allegations of JTF [Joint Task Force] human rights violations,” read one, including “physical violence, and arrests/disappearances.” The report also referred to “troops who were allegedly involved in a [human rights] case in August [2021].” These were deemed so serious that TotalEnergies suspended pay to all 1,000 Joint Task Force soldiers and the army expelled 200 from the region, according to the internal document. The ECCHR complaint accuses TotalEnergies and “X”, a designation leaving open the possibility for the names of unspecified company executives to be added. Among those named in the document’s 56 pages are Pouyanné and five other TotalEnergies executives and employees. Favier, the company’s security chief, is not among them. TotalEnergies declined to make any of its executives or security managers available for interviews. In April 2024, when Pouyanné was questioned about his company’s Mozambique operation by the French Senate, he stated that while the government was responsible for the security of Cabo Delgado, “I can ensure the security of whichever industrial premises on which I might operate.” Asked about the container executions before the National Assembly this May, Pouyanné reaffirmed his faith in the Mozambican state, saying: “I think we help these countries progress if we trust their institutions and don’t spend our time lecturing them.” Apparently forgetting how he helped negotiate a security deal to place Mozambican soldiers on Total’s premises, however, he then qualified this statement, saying: “I can confirm that TotalEnergies has nothing to do with the Mozambican army.” A company spokesperson clarified this week: “TotalEnergies is not involved in the operations, command or conduct of the Mozambican armed forces.” In addition to the war crimes complaint, TotalEnergies’ Mozambique operation is already the subject of a criminal investigation opened in March by French state prosecutors. The allegation against the company is that it committed involuntary manslaughter by failing to protect or rescue workers left in Palma when ISIS carried out its massacre. Though POLITICO’s previous reporting found that 55 project workers were killed, TotalEnergies — through its subsidiary, Mozambique LNG — initially claimed it lost no one. “All the employees of Mozambique LNG, its contractors and subcontractors were safely evacuated from the Mozambique LNG Project site,” Maxime Rabilloud, Mozambique LNG’s managing director, told POLITICO last year. Advertisement That assertion notwithstanding, the death of at least one British subcontractor, Philip Mawer, is the subject of a formal inquest in the U.K.  In December 2024, the company’s Paris press office adjusted its position on the Palma attack. “TotalEnergies has never denied the tragedy that occurred in Palma and has always acknowledged the tragic loss of civilian lives,” it told POLITICO. For the first time, it also admitted “a small number” of project workers had been stationed outside its secure compound during the attack and exposed to the bloodbath.  A resolution to the French manslaughter investigation will take years. A decision on whether to open a formal investigation into the new claims against TotalEnergies for complicity in war crimes, let alone to bring the case to trial, is not expected until 2026, at the earliest. Should anyone eventually be tried for involuntary manslaughter, a conviction would carry a penalty of three years in prison and a €45,000 fine in France, escalating to five years and €75,000 for “a manifestly deliberate violation of a particular obligation of prudence or safety.” For complicity in war crimes, the sentence is five years to life. ‘CAN YOU ACTUALLY LOOK AT YOURSELF IN THE MIRROR?’ The war crimes accusation adds new uncertainty to the 20-year effort to develop Mozambique’s gas fields. In the aftermath of the 2021 Palma massacre, TotalEnergies declared a state of “force majeure,” a legal measure suspending all contracted work due to exceptional events. The following four and a half years of shutdown have cost TotalEnergies $4.5 billion, in addition to the $3.9 billion that Pouyanné originally paid Anadarko for the Mozambique operation. Billions more in costs can be expected before the plant finally pumps gas, which Total now predicts will happen in 2029. The manslaughter case and the war crimes complaint have the potential to cause further holdups by triggering due diligence obligations from TotalEnergies’ lenders, preventing them from delivering loans of $14.9 billion — without which Pouyanné has said his star project will collapse. Total also faces a Friends of the Earth legal challenge to a $4.7 billion U.S. government loan to the project. A TotalEnergies spokesperson said this week that the project was able to “meet due diligence requirements by lenders.” Advertisement All this comes as the situation on the ground remains unstable. After a successful Rwandan counter-attack from 2021 to 2023, the insurgency has returned, with the Islamists staging raids across Cabo Delgado, including Palma and the regional hub of Mocimboa da Praia. The International Organization for Migration says 112,185 people fled the violence between September 22 and October 13. Among those killed in the last few months were two gas project workers — a caterer, murdered in Palma, and a security guard, beheaded in a village south of town. TotalEnergies has consistently said that neither recent legal developments nor the upsurge in ISIS attacks will affect its plans to formally reopen its Mozambique operation by the end of the year. “This new complaint has no connection with the advancement of the Mozambique LNG project,” a spokesperson said this week. Pouyanné himself has spent much of this year insisting the project is “back on track” and its financing in place. In October, in a move to restart the project, the company lifted the force majeure.  Still, in a letter seen by POLITICO, Pouyanné also wrote to Mozambican President Daniel Chapo asking for 10 more years on its drilling license and $4.5 billion from the country to cover its cost overruns.  Mozambique, whose 2024 GDP was $22.42 billion — around a tenth of TotalEnergies’ revenues for the year of $195.61 billion — has yet to respond. A final issue for TotalEnergies’ CEO is whether a formal accusation of war crimes will fuel opposition to his leadership among shareholders. At 2024’s annual general meeting, a fifth of stockholders rejected the company’s climate transition strategy as too slow, and a quarter declined to support Pouyanné for a fourth three-year term. In 2025, several institutional investors expressed their opposition to Pouyanné by voting against his remuneration. In the statement, the TotalEnergies spokesperson pointed to the 2023 comments by Aschenbroich, the independent board member: “The Board unanimously looks forward to his continued leadership and his strategic vision to continue TotalEnergies’ transition.” Yet, there seems little prospect that his popularity will improve, inside or outside the company. “Patrick Pouyanné is everyone’s best enemy,” says Olivier Gantois, president of the French oil and gas lobby group UFIP-EM, “the scapegoat we love to beat up on.” Recently, the 62-year-old Pouyanné has begun to sound uncharacteristically plaintive. At TotalEnergies’ 2022 shareholder meeting, he grumbled that the dissidents might not like CO2 emissions, “but they sure like dividends.” At last year’s, he complained that TotalEnergies was in an impossible position. “We are trying to find a balance between today’s life and tomorrow’s,” he said. “It’s not because TotalEnergies stops producing hydrocarbons that demand for them will disappear.” Advertisement TotalEnergies’ articles of association require Pouyanné to retire before he reaches 67, in 2030, around the time that TotalEnergies currently forecasts gas production to begin in Mozambique. Henri Thulliez, the lawyer who filed both criminal complaints against TotalEnergies in Paris, predicts Pouyanné’s successors will be less attached to the project — for the simple reason that Mozambique turned out to be bad business. “You invest billions in the project, and the project has been completely suspended for four years now,” Thulliez says. “All your funders are hesitating. You’re facing two potential litigations in France, maybe at some point elsewhere, too. You have to ask: what’s the point of all of this?” As for Pouyanné, two questions will haunt his final years at TotalEnergies, he suggests. First, “Can shareholders afford to keep you in your job?” Second, “Can you actually look at yourself in the mirror?” Aude Le Gentil and Alexandre Léchenet contributed to this report.

LONDON — Officials in Brussels have stalled new Brexit reset talks after EU countries clashed over the issue of British payments to the bloc.  Ambassadors from the bloc’s 27 member states on Friday failed to give the green light for negotiations on linking U.K. and EU emissions trading systems (ETS), as well as talks on an agri-food deal. Talks are set to resume on Tuesday.  The U.K. and EU agreed in principle to negotiate on the two topics at a summit in May. But only once member states give their approval can talks truly begin. The delay is a setback for British negotiators, who had hoped to get an ETS deal in place before the EU implements its new carbon border tax regime in the New Year. Without a deal in place by the end of December, British firms exporting carbon-intensive goods to the EU such as steel and cement will be hit by the taxes from Jan. 1. One EU diplomat with knowledge of Friday’s talks confirmed there was disagreement over the issue of how much the U.K. should pay to participate in the EU’s single market. A second official confirmed there was “political sensitivity” on the issue, with specific concerns over when the U.K. would be expected to pay.  “[Should it be] on the occasion of the next electricity trading agreement, as the majority of member states suggest? Or after that, as some member states still claim,” they said.  The same official added that there was also “frustration that other talks are lagging behind” on the more contentious issue of youth mobility. Both officials were granted anonymity in order to speak freely about the ongoing talks.  CARBON TAX HIT Adam Berman, director of policy and advocacy at Energy UK, said it was now “not realistic” that a linkage negotiation would be completed by the end of the year. This will be “problematic” for British firms, Berman said, which will suddenly be subject to the new tax from Jan. 1, with the energy sector likely to be hit the hardest. But it could also harm the EU, which could see emissions increase as it seeks to replace relatively “cleaner” U.K. imports. Meanwhile, the U.K.’s EU Relations Minister Nick Thomas-Symonds has said he wants a Sanitary and Phytosanitary deal — which would see the U.K. align with EU agri-food standards — up and running by 2027. | Stefan Rousseau/PA Images via Getty Images Another headache for both sides is the fact the new regime will apply in Northern Ireland, which has no hard border with the EU, meaning the region could become a backdoor into the EU market for high-carbon goods. Berman said there was speculation of a time-limited exemption from CBAM while the U.K. was in linkage negotiations with the EU. “The big question is — Can both sides have an honest conversation about what the implications might be if there isn’t an exemption from the beginning of next year?” he said. Nevertheless, Berman is hopeful of an eventual agreement, pointing out that the issue of ETS was “not highly politicized” like other, more contentious aspects of the reset like youth mobility. “There is a pretty high level of alignment between these two policy mechanisms in the U.K. and the EU and high levels of environmental ambition on both sides. So really there are more technical questions to resolve than there are political questions, which bodes well for the likelihood of an eventual positive outcome.” AGRI-FOODS DEAL Meanwhile, the U.K.’s EU Relations Minister Nick Thomas-Symonds has said he wants a Sanitary and Phytosanitary deal — which would see the U.K. align with EU agri-food standards — up and running by 2027. To meet this timeline, talks with the EU would need to be wrapped up sometime in 2026 so parliament has time to enact legislation.   The U.K. is also racing to negotiate a deal to join the EU’s €150 billion rearmament scheme by “mid-November.” EU member countries have until the end of November to submit their own plans detailing how they would spend their allotted shares of the €150 billion in loans.  London fears that, if the U.K. isn’t in the room when that happens, it could end up losing out. The issue of Britain offering financial payments to the bloc is also politically sensitive for the U.K. Responding to the reports, a spokesperson for Britain’s right-wing Conservative Party said the government’s post-Brexit reset had “turned out to be an outrageous hit job on British taxpayers, with demands from the EU for billions of pounds from our country.” “Starmer doesn’t have the backbone to stand up to Brussels, with their attempt to extort cash from us as a punishment for having the foresight to leave the EU,” they added.

PARIS — Emmanuel Macron was on a plane to Egypt when France faced the most serious crisis of his time in office. So why did the French president leave the country early Monday morning while there was such uncertainty at home? The answer, according to several current and former French officials, was to ensure his legacy. With fewer than 20 months left in the Elysée Palace, Macron is laser-focused on cementing his place in the history books — and believes he’s earned that distinction for his work in the Middle East, they said. The French president wasn’t going to miss his chance to be there for Monday’s peace summit in the Egyptian resort of Sharm el-Sheik, even with his house on fire and irrespective of it forcing his twice hand-picked prime minister, Sébastien Lecornu, to push back presenting his draft budget by a day, nearly missing the deadline. French officials in recent days have been working hard to craft a narrative that the Gaza peace plan pushed by U.S. President Donald Trump was triggered by Macron’s own proposal and his lead role in pushing for recognition of Palestinian statehood at the United Nations General Assembly last month.  That’s why Macron really wanted to make it to the summit in Egypt, said a government adviser who, like others quoted in this piece, was granted anonymity to speak candidly. An ally of Lecornu said the president was “very, very focused” on Gaza.  The French political system is designed so that the president can represent the country on the world stage while the prime minister looks after matters at home. But these are exceptional circumstances in France, with Lecornu resigning after just 14 hours before being reappointed and some politicians even speculating that Macron might not even see out his time in office. At first sight, Macron appears to be following in the footsteps of former presidents, such as François Mitterrand and Jacques Chirac, who pivoted to the international stage in the later years of their terms after losing their parliamentary majorities.   But Macron hasn’t let go of domestic policy. Unlike his predecessors, he isn’t adopting a “hands-off attitude,” said an early Macron backer.      “Macron has become very attentive to his European and international visibility,” said a former French official. “It’s what he’s got left to give himself the impression that he still has influence.” At first sight, Macron appears to be following in the footsteps of former presidents. | Joel Saget/AFP via Getty Images CHARM IN SHARM The Elysée last week went into lobbying mode, ramping up briefings with academics and journalists to drive home that Macron had been key to the success of Trump’s peace plan. “The Elysée’s priority was to spread the idea that their plan was very useful,” said a former diplomat, referencing the Franco-Saudi roadmap to end the war in Gaza. At the U.N. General Assembly last month, Macron risked drawing U.S. and Israeli ire with his push for Palestinian statehood, which was followed by close to a dozen Western states doing the same. His speech on the U.N. stage drew comparisons in Paris with other occasions when France stood up to Washington, in particular former Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin’s landmark 2003 address rejecting Washington’s march to war in Iraq. While in Egypt, Macron played carefully with the optics of power, of which he is an astute reader, to avoid being seen as playing second fiddle to Trump. He chose not to stand on the podium behind the U.S. president, instead sitting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Middle Eastern leaders, a move that was noted by Trump. Talking to reporters on the sidelines of the summit, Macron spoke about the efforts needed to keep the ceasefire in Gaza alive and the contribution France could make. Asked about national politics, he presented himself as “the guarantor of French institutions,” but could not help but lash out at opposition parties for trying to destabilize his prime minister. WINNING THE BATTLE, LOSING THE WAR Many officials say the French president is trying to remain above the fray. But there are several explanations as to why he’s doing so that go beyond the legacy argument. Some attribute it to the Jupiterian strategy of shrouding his office in mystique, communicating in grand gestures, and refusing to sully himself with the mudslinging of domestic politics.  One government official said Macron is “probably letting tensions dial down” and he is remaining silent to protect the institutional checks and balances of the French state.  Macron has cycled through centrist and center-right prime ministers in the past year. | Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images Others say the silence is strategic, even magnanimous. They say the president recognizes just how unpopular he is — a recent poll put his approval rating at 14 percent — and is trying to prevent his allies from being tarnished by his political toxicity.  But Macron never really lets go of anything. In his meeting with opposition parties last week, Macron made it very clear who calls the shots when, according to a presidential aide, he offered to partially delay his flagship pension law, which pushed back the age of retirement to 64 from 62 for most workers.  Macron has cycled through centrist and center-right prime ministers in the past year to fend off challenges to that law and other achievements such as his tax cuts. Many saw his decision to reappoint the loyal Lecornu, just days after he resigned in the aftermath of his 14-hour government, as the sharpest example of his dogged refusal to hand over power despite his camp losing last summer’s snap election.   Macron ended up being forced to sell off the crown jewel he had jealously been guarding, the pensions reform, at least for now. Lecornu announced Tuesday that he would freeze the law raising the retirement age until 2027, in order to secure support from the Socialist Party and survive a no-confidence vote on Thursday.  Macron might yet save his pensions reform as there are doubts swirling that the suspension might not pass through parliament.  But fighting tooth and nail to ensure his legacy might also destroy it if Macron can’t secure the future of his centrist movement and his potential successors, such as former prime ministers and likely presidential candidates Edouard Philippe and Gabriel Attal.   Macron’s handling of the current crisis will almost certainly affect the campaign of any centrist trying to stop Marine Le Pen, or someone else from the far-right National Rally, from winning the presidency.  “What image are we projecting? We’re in favor of pension reform, and then we give up. It’s not clear,” said the Lecornu ally quoted above. “The only one who appears to know what she represents is Marine Le Pen,” they said. “She has a populist message, but it’s simple and consistent: This circus must stop.” Pauline de Saint Remy and Giorgio Leali contributed reporting.

Chinese President Xi Jinping on Sunday rolled out the red carpet for Russia’s Vladimir Putin, India’s Narendra Modi and about 20 other national leaders arriving for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit. The Eurasian political and security summit — held in Tianjin this year — is a gathering designed to cement Beijing’s clout and champion its vision of a “multipolar world order.” Set up in 2001, it began with China, Russia and four Central Asian countries, as a counterweight to Western alliances such as NATO. It now boasts 10 members and 16 dialogue partners and observers. This year the summit will focus largely on U.S. President Donald Trump’s trade war. Trump has slapped 50 percent tariffs on Indian goods over New Delhi’s continued purchases of Russian oil. Putin meanwhile is facing fresh Western sanctions tied to his ongoing war in Ukraine. “How in the hell did Trump so alienate Modi that he’s now attending a summit with autocrats, Xi and Putin?” Michael McFaul, a Hoover Senior Fellow at Stanford University and former U.S. Ambassador to Russia, wrote on X. “Just last year, China and India were at war with each other!” he added. Both Xi and Modi appear to be seeking a reset in a relationship long strained by mistrust and unresolved border disputes. Analysts warn the stakes go far beyond Asia. As Chatham House’s Chietigj Bajpaee and Yu Jie put it: “What happens in this relationship matters to the rest of the world.”  “If Western countries — particularly the U.S. — are serious about supporting India as a bulwark against a rising China, they need to develop more realistic expectations of what India can deliver,” they wrote in a recent analysis paper. “India was never going to be the bulwark against China that the West (and the United States in particular) thought it was. … Modi’s China visit marks a potential turning point,” they wrote. Putin will be in China through Wednesday, when Xi is hosting a military parade to commemorate the end of World War II, following Japan’s formal surrender. Alongside Putin and North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, Slovakia’s Prime Minister Robert Fico will attend the parade, as well as Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić.