By Anna Wiederkehr and Erin Doherty Many Americans give their country positive reviews. Some of the United States’ closest allies give far less flattering ratings. The POLITICO Poll, conducted across five countries, reveals a stark disconnect between how Americans see their country and how several top allies do. As the Trump administration’s aggressive posture abroad disrupts the longstanding world order, the United States’ global reputation appears far worse than Americans realize. In the U.S., the divergence is especially sharp along partisan lines. Americans who voted for President Donald Trump in 2024 overwhelmingly give the country high marks on the world stage. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- This article is part of an ongoing project from POLITICO and Public First, an independent polling company headquartered in London, to measure public opinion across a broad range of policy areas. You can find new surveys and analysis each month at politico.com/poll. Have questions or comments? Ideas for future surveys? Email us at poll@politico.com. Those who backed former Vice President Kamala Harris, however, offer negative assessments far closer to America’s allies. The results paint a lopsided picture, with Americans — driven by the president’s own supporters — increasingly on an island in how they view the country. It’s not just The POLITICO Poll that reveals this growing mismatch. Leaders across Europe and Canada are increasingly voicing their concern about Trump’s efforts to upend longtime alliances. The poll was conducted Feb. 6 to Feb. 9 in the United States, Canada and the three largest economies in Europe: France, Germany and the United Kingdom. We’ve turned the results from several key questions into ratings, comparing answers across countries. Here’s America, reviewed: “THE US PROTECTS DEMOCRACY” U.S. 4.9/10 About half of Americans, 49 percent, said the U.S. protects democracy, including three in four who backed Trump in 2024. On the contrary, just 35 percent of voters who backed Harris agreed. Featured review GERMANY 1.8/10 “I see no need for the Americans to now want to save democracy in Europe. If it would need to be saved, we would manage on our own.” —German Chancellor Friedrich Merz Dec. 9, 2025 Other reviews U.K. 3.4/10 CANADA 2.5/10 FRANCE 2.1/10 Question: “Thinking about the US, do you agree or disagree with the following? The US protects democracy.” The U.S. has long seen itself as a defender of democracy — both at home and abroad. But that reputation may be fraying amid growing unease among longtime allies about whether the U.S. still protects the democratic principles it once championed. When U.S. forces captured Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro earlier this year, Trump pointed to Maduro’s disputed election as part of the rationale for the operation, even as some allies and international experts questioned the legality of Washington’s intervention. “THE US IS MOSTLY A FORCE FOR STABILITY IN THE WORLD” U.S. 3.6/10 A 36 percent plurality of Americans said the U.S. is mostly a force for stability — more than double the share of adults in the other countries who said the same. Featured review FRANCE 1.5/10 “We have the Chinese tsunami on the trade front, and we have minute-by-minute instability on the American side. These two crises amount to a profound shock — a rupture for Europeans.” — French President Emmanuel Macron February, 2026 Other reviews U.K. 1.8/10 CANADA 1.4/10 GERMANY 1.3/10 Question: “Which of the following comes closest to your view on the US’s role in the world?” Options: The US is “mostly a force for stability in the world”, “sometimes a force for stability, sometimes a threat,” “mostly a threat to global stability,” “not very important to global stability either way,” or “don’t know.” The surveyed nations have been among the hardest hit by Trump’s sweeping trade agenda, resulting in strained economic and diplomatic relationships. The steep levies — and Trump’s repeated broadsides against U.S. allies — have left them doubting Washington’s reliability as both a partner and a stabilizing force. It’s not just that allies no longer see the United States as a force for stability. Sizable shares, including a 43 percent plurality in Canada, say the country is mostly a threat to global stability. At the Munich Security Conference last month, a number of global leaders openly questioned the United States’ standing in the international order. “THE US CAN BE DEPENDED UPON IN A CRISIS” U.S. 5.7/10 A 57 percent majority of Americans said the U.S. can be depended on in a crisis, more than double the share of adults in Canada, Germany and France who agree. Featured review CANADA 2.7/10 “It is clear that the United States is no longer a reliable partner. It is possible that, with comprehensive negotiations, we will be able to restore some trust, but there will be no turning back.” —Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney March 28, 2025 Other reviews U.K. 3.8/10 FRANCE 2.7/10 GERMANY 2.5/10 Question: “How would you rate The US on the following scales? Can be depended upon in a crisis | Can not be depended upon in a crisis” with the option to choose two levels of agreement on either side or a middle point between the two. The ratings displayed are a sum of the agreement of the levels on either side. The most common view among the close allies surveyed, in fact, was that the U.S. cannot be depended on in a crisis. That’s the opinion of a 57 percent majority in Canada, 51 percent majority in Germany, and pluralities in France (47 percent) and the U.K. (42 percent). Their concerns come as the Trump administration has clashed with allies over defense spending, trade and the scope of collective security agreements. Trump has repeatedly cast doubt over America’s commitments in Europe, fueling questions about whether Washington can be relied upon. “HAS THE MOST ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY” U.S. 5.3/10 Most Americans — 53 percent — said their country has the most advanced technology in comparison to the European Union and China. But top NATO allies disagree. Featured review U.K. 3.5/10 “China is a vital player on the global stage, and it’s vital that we build a more sophisticated relationship. … “Our international partnerships help us deliver the security and prosperity the British people deserve, and that is why I’ve long been clear that the UK and China need a long term, consistent, and comprehensive strategic partnership.” — UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer January, 2026 Other reviews CANADA 3.7/10 FRANCE 3.6/10 GERMANY 3/10 Question: “Comparing China, the EU, and The US, if you had to choose, which would you say…: Has the most advanced technology” with the option to choose China, the EU or the U.S. Trump sees the U.S. in close competition with China on technological advancements, repeatedly touting America as the global leader in artificial intelligence and chip production. But a majority of respondents in the other countries said China, not the United States or the European Union, has the most advanced technology: 54 percent in Canada, 55 percent in Germany, 53 percent in the U.K. and 50 percent in France. That perception gap could have real-world consequences. If longtime allies view Beijing as the technological leader, it could complicate Trump’s ability to rally partners around policies to try to curb China’s growth. ABOUT THE SURVEY The POLITICO Poll was conducted by Public First from Feb. 6 to 9, surveying 10,289 adults online, with at least 2,000 respondents each from the U.S., Canada, U.K., France and Germany. Results for each country were weighted to be representative on dimensions including age, gender and geography. The overall margin of sampling error is ±2 percentage points for each country. Smaller subgroups have higher margins of error.

BUDAPEST — Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is facing the toughest election of his 16-year rule, and U.S. President Donald Trump and his MAGA movement are mobilizing to help him. Polls suggest the Hungarian leader is currently trailing his former ally-turned-challenger Péter Magyar, who has capitalized on voter frustration over record inflation, economic malaise and a string of political scandals. With Orbán’s dominance suddenly in question, Trump’s administration and leading MAGA figures have moved to bolster the man they regard as their most dependable ideological ally in Europe. For MAGA luminaries, Orbán isn’t merely a partner — he’s an inspiration. His hardline stance on migration, his battles against universities and “woke” cultural institutions, his hostility toward Brussels and skepticism toward Ukraine have long been held up as a governance model by American conservatives. “We were Trump before Trump,” boasts the website of the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in Budapest. And in June 2024, U.S. Vice President JD Vance openly tipped his hat to Orbán, saying the Hungarian prime minister had “made smart decisions that we could learn from in the U.S.” And learn they have. “We have entered the policy-writing system of Trump’s team. We have deep involvement there,” bragged Orbán at a rally in Hungary during the 2024 White House race. Hungarian government and pro-Orbán think tanks, such as the Századvég Foundation and the Danube Institute, have also had a long ongoing relationship with Trump-aligned think tanks like the Heritage Foundation, sharing research, ideas and scholars. Above all, the U.S. president’s allies praise Orbán not just for his policies but for his steadfastness in contrast to other MAGA-friendly politicians — like Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, whom they dismiss for supporting Ukraine and for her willingness to work with former President Joe Biden between Trump’s two terms. “Orbán went out of his way to remain loyal to Donald Trump when he was out of power and written off politically,” said Benjamin Harnwell, the right-hand man of former Trump strategist Steve Bannon. And in June 2024, U.S. Vice President JD Vance openly tipped his hat to Orbán, saying the Hungarian prime minister had “made smart decisions that we could learn from in the U.S.” | Pool photo by Matt Rourke/Getty Images And now MAGA is returning the favor by pulling out the stops for the man Trump once described in a lengthy social media post as “a truly strong and powerful Leader … delivering phenomenal results” for Hungary. On a recent visit to Budapest, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio further underlined Trump’s endorsement, saying U.S. ties with Hungary were entering a “golden era” and promising financial support for the country if needed — but only if Orbán remains in power. “President Trump is deeply committed to your success, because your success is our success,” Rubio said. This visit from Washington’s top diplomat shows just how seriously the administration is taking Hungary’s April election. “For MAGA, the two most important elections this year are those in Hungary and the midterms in the United States,” said Timothy Ash of Britain’s Chatham House. And John McLaughlin, a veteran Republican strategist who worked on all three of Trump’s presidential campaigns, has been polling for Orbán. This is all because a defeat for the Hungarian prime minister would be a blow to the global populist movement, even as Washington ramps up support for other like-minded political actors across Europe. “It would be seen as an ideological or intellectual setback if he lost,” said Frank Furedi, an Orbán ally who heads the Brussels branch of the Hungarian government-backed Mathias Corvinus Collegium (MCC). “You have to remember that Orbán plays a disproportionately influential role in terms of the outlook of many of these parties and their leaders, who have a strong affection for him,” he added. “I think a defeat would have an impact at least in the short term, in terms of influencing continent-wide political dynamics.” TRUMP CARD Three weeks before the election, MAGA luminaries and national conservative and populist stars from across Europe are all set to gather in the Hungarian capital for a CPAC conference organized by the American Conservative Union — the fifth one since 2022. On a recent visit to Budapest, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio further underlined Trump’s endorsement. | János Kummer/Getty Images Orbán is hoping the U.S. president will be in attendance. Trump has a standing invitation to the event, and the Hungarian leader has made no secret he’d like nothing more. But while Trump teased a visit in January, he has so far remained noncommittal. Shortly before heading to Washington for last month’s inaugural meeting of Trump’s Board of Peace, Orbán reminded Hungarian radio the U.S. president “owes him” a visit. Though, he acknowledged, “things are changing so rapidly that we can’t plan even two weeks ahead.”  The U.S.-Israel war with Iran has only added to the uncertainty. Orbán has so far discreetly endeavored to distance himself from the Middle East war, delicately noting at a recent campaign rally that the president had sought his opinion ahead of the bombing of Iran, “given we [Hungary] have relations with Iran and friendly relations with Israel.”  He said that what’s happening isn’t what he’d advised, but added that the U.S. leader and Chinese President Xi Jinping will discuss serious measures to “stabilize the world’s state” when Trump visits Beijing, as he is expected to do later this month. Still, it’s unclear just how much MAGA’s support has actually aided the Hungarian prime minister. There’s no evidence that Rubio’s visit shifted opinion polls, noted Chatham House’s Ash. In fact, a subsequent poll published after his visit suggested Hungary’s center-right opposition widened its lead in February. Shortly before heading to Washington for last month’s inaugural meeting of Trump’s Board of Peace, Orbán reminded Hungarian radio the U.S. president “owes him” a visit. | Harun Ozalp/Anadolu via Getty Images Meanwhile, as Orbán has sought to portray the election as a referendum on the war in Ukraine and paint his challenger as a Brussels stooge, Magyar has successfully shifted the conversation to bread-and-butter issues.  His Tisza party currently enjoys a nine-point lead over Orbán’s Fidesz party, according to POLITICO’s Poll of Polls, and it has done this by channeling anger over inflation and economic mismanagement. Long vulnerable to external shocks, the Hungarian forint has come under renewed pressure following the recent geopolitical turmoil in the Middle East, and this has raised fears of higher energy prices and another inflationary spike, just as price growth had begun to cool. There’s also little agreement among commentators as to what extent further MAGA reinforcement — or even a visit from Trump — could rally support for Orbán. “I think it will fire up his supporters and firm up his existing voter base. Whether it makes any difference to anybody else or convinces people to vote one way or the other is an open question,” Furedi said. Trump isn’t in the habit of investing political capital in causes he believes are doomed. So, if Hungary’s polls continue to point toward an Orbán defeat, and the prime minister fails to regain momentum in his campaign’s final stretch, he may discover there are limits to how far — and how long — the U.S. president is prepared to go, even for a one of MAGA’s most celebrated international allies.

BRUSSELS — A top Democratic lawmaker has issued a formal apology to Mette Frederiksen after Republican Senator Lindsey Graham lashed out at the Danish prime minister in Munich earlier this month, according to a letter obtained by POLITICO. “I am writing today to extend my apologies for my role on the … delegation of U.S. senators and to register my strong disagreement with the remarks made during our meeting with you,” Senator Elissa Slotkin (D-Mich.) wrote in the missive, dated Feb. 24. “The conduct of our delegation did not represent my views regarding our alliance.” Graham, a staunch ally of Donald Trump, sparked outrage by berating Frederiksen during a closed-door meeting between Danish officials and U.S. lawmakers on the margins of the Feb. 13-15 Munich Security Conference. The dustup followed repeated threats by the U.S. president to annex Greenland in January. The South Carolina senator began the meeting by repeatedly cursing, according to a Congressional aide briefed on the matter, who recounted how he told Frederiksen: “Who gives a fuck who owns Greenland?”  Graham then reportedly branded the Danish premier a “little lady.” The exchange was enough to prompt Slotkin to walk out of the meeting within the first 10 minutes, said the Congressional aide, who was granted anonymity to speak freely. It was “appalling” and “wildly inappropriate,” the aide added. Details of the meeting were first reported by Puck. In response to the letter, Graham doubled down, telling POLITICO: “I’ll say again, I don’t give a crap who owns Greenland.” “The main point for me about Greenland is that President Trump would like to fortify the island to make NATO’s arctic defenses stronger,” he said. “In my view, the response from European countries and officials in Greenland have missed the big picture.” The remarks underscore the persisting deep tensions between Washington and Copenhagen even after Trump formally withdrew his territorial claim to Greenland late last month. The letter also reflects just how much internal pushback the U.S. president faced in his campaign for the self-ruling Arctic territory — a factor widely assumed to have played a part in his subsequent backpedaling. “The threats of using military force to take over … Greenland, and indeed the tone taken with you in our meeting, do not reflect the views of the majority of Americans,” Slotkin wrote. “Threats to invade sovereign territory are unnecessary and fundamentally counterproductive to Americans’ safety and security.” But the Democratic lawmaker acknowledged that the transatlantic relationship has fundamentally shifted since Trump’s push to grab the self-ruling Danish territory — a view shared by many European capitals. “I know that the events of the last few months have rattled Europeans — and potentially changed our relationship for the foreseeable future,” she said. “Nonetheless I still believe that our countries … are bound together by more than just occasional shared interest, but by shared values.” Frederiksen’s office didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment by POLITICO. Felicia Schwartz contributed reporting from Washington.

PARIS — With only 14 months left in power, President Emmanuel Macron is now in a race against the clock to chart how France can wield the full force of its nuclear arsenal to guarantee Europe’s security more widely. Much will boil down to whether he makes concrete commitments in a landmark speech on France’s atomic strategy on Monday, to be delivered from the Atlantic peninsula where the country’s nuclear submarines are based. After decades sheltering under the American nuclear umbrella, European governments — particularly in Berlin and Warsaw — are increasingly warming to the idea that Paris could use Western Europe’s largest atomic arsenal to play a bigger role in safeguarding the continent’s security. They will be paying close attention to how far Macron goes in Monday’s speech. With the war in Ukraine entering its fifth year and fears about U.S. President Donald Trump’s reliability as an ally, they will want pledges of action rather than the president’s traditional rhetoric. Their big question, however, will be how much of a new European atomic architecture Macron can realistically lock in, with the NATO-skeptic, far-right opposition National Rally party of Marine Le Pen leading in early polls ahead of the 2027 presidential election. European officials, military officers and diplomats who spoke to POLITICO for this article said they hoped he proposes something substantive. One senior EU government official said they had “great hopes,” while a European military officer expected “a major change.” The speech will lay out whether Macron is willing to do something that the National Rally will find hard to unwind. Only the most far-reaching moves — deploying nuclear-capable Rafale fighter jets in European nations, for example, or stationing French nuclear warheads outside the country — would prove difficult for the next French president to reverse without weakening France’s credibility. “It would appear that the president has a genuine desire to commit France to something that the National Rally would not be able to overturn if it came to power,” said Florian Galleri, a researcher at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who specializes in nuclear deterrence. However, he conceded, “under political or economic constraints, the speech may be much more cautious, even deliberately vague.”  France has long suggested its roughly 300 warheads could play a bigger role in a wider European security strategy, but Germany, with more developed transatlantic instincts, has traditionally been warier. That’s changing, though, and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz earlier this month opened the door to German forces operating with French and British nuclear weapons. There are also concerns that some countries could decide to go it alone: Polish President Karol Nawrocki said earlier this month that his country should start developing nuclear defenses to face the threat from Moscow. FRENCH-LED EUROPEAN DETERRENT Elysée officials declined to predict what Macron would say, but options include an increase in France’s nuclear warheads, and the participation of European countries in France’s flagship Poker exercise that simulates a nuclear raid. European lawmakers have told POLITICO they would like to see French nuclear-capable fighter jets stationed in other countries.  The expectation is that Macron “will confirm nuclear deterrence is and will remain one of France’s priorities, and also that France is continuing to invest” in its arsenal, Estonia’s Undersecretary for Defence Policy Tuuli Duneton told POLITICO.  Alongside the U.K., France is one of two Western European nuclear powers. Its arsenal is both airborne and seaborne, with at least one submarine patrolling the seas at all times. | Alexis Rosenfeld/Getty Images However, French officials have one clear red line: Any decision to launch a nuclear strike would remain in Paris. “At the end of the day, who would be able to push the button? Only France. That’s also what makes the conversation complicated,” said a second European military officer.   Alongside the U.K., France is one of two Western European nuclear powers. Its arsenal is both airborne and seaborne, with at least one submarine patrolling the seas at all times. Unlike the U.K., Paris is not part of NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group, although French presidents have always stressed that France’s vital national interests have a European dimension.  Paris’ push to discuss how French nuclear weapons could contribute to the continent’s security wasn’t always welcome among European leaders — but Trump’s return to the White House has changed that calculus, including in countries such as Poland and Sweden.  Germany’s about-face has been the most striking. Berlin was once among the capitals most opposed to such talks, and is now openly confirming discussions with France. But there are definite difficulties if the umbrella is expanded on a country-by-country basis. A senior German official told POLITICO that Berlin would not foot the bill for an arsenal fully controlled by the French.  A NATO official also cautioned that limiting France’s defensive circle to specific EU countries could send the wrong signal to Russian President Vladimir Putin and expose the rest — a concern Merz himself raised at the Munich Security Conference earlier this month. “We … will not allow zones of differing security levels to develop in Europe,” he said. SHADOW OF 2027 Crucially, Macron’s nuclear speech comes just 14 months before he leaves office. “We need to understand how sustainable France’s commitment is,” a European defense official stressed.  All eyes are on the National Rally. The far-right party’s leaders have openly spoken against Macron’s nuclear dialogue with European allies. The party is internally divided over its stance toward Russia, and believes in pulling out of NATO’s integrated command structure. While Le Pen has stressed that “nuclear power belongs to the French,” her protégé Jordan Bardella — the current favorite for the presidency after Macron — has struck a more open tone, insisting that the defense of French interests “does not stop at [French] borders.” He has not, however, endorsed Macron’s outreach on the nuclear umbrella.  European governments — particularly in Berlin and Warsaw — are increasingly warming to the idea that Paris could use Western Europe’s largest atomic arsenal to play a bigger role in safeguarding the continent’s security. | Ludovic Marin/AFP via Getty Images The prospect of a National Rally win next year is creating “a credibility problem for the French offer,” a European diplomat conceded.  Some European capitals, along with some EU officials in Brussels, are already factoring that in. That’s especially true in Germany, where some German officials and lawmakers are already working under the assumption that the next French president will be Le Pen or Bardella, several French and European officials told POLITICO.  Jacopo Barigazzi reported from Brussels. Victor Jack contributed to this report.

Europe enters a more contested decade than any since the end of the Cold War. Yet the frontline shaping its security is no longer limited to land, sea, air or even space.   It runs directly through the digital backbone that powers modern life: the networks, data infrastructures and connectivity systems on which governments, economies and armed forces depend.  But Europe will not be secure until it takes this digital backbone’s security seriously, and governs its openness through risk-based, verifiable sovereignty rather than isolationism or complacency.  >  Europe will not be secure until it takes this digital backbone’s security > seriously, and governs its openness through risk-based, verifiable sovereignty A digital frontline that remains dangerously exposed  Hybrid threats no longer sit at the margins of European security. In reality, they cut straight through its core systems. Hospitals, energy grids, transport networks, financial markets and military command-and-control all rely on constant, resilient connectivity.   Via Vodafone. Joakim Reiter, group chief external and corporate affairs officer, Vodafone. And when those systems falter, nations falter. Recent blackouts in Portugal and Spain revealed what this means in practice. A ‘digital failure’ is not an IT incident. It is a national security event.   Adversaries have already drawn the lesson. Subsea cables carrying 95 percent of the world’s internet traffic face mounting sabotage risks. Satellites have become open theatres of geopolitical competition. And cyberattacks now routinely target both critical national infrastructure and the commercial networks that underpin defense readiness.   Despite this, much of Europe’s digital backbone is still approached as a utility, not a strategic asset. Market forces, on their own, cannot deliver the resilience, redundancy and diversity that modern deterrence requires. Piecemeal upgrades and fragmented responsibilities across civil, military and regulatory silos leave avoidable gaps that adversaries will inevitably exploit.  > A ‘digital failure’ is not an IT incident. It is a national security event.   Europe must therefore elevate secure connectivity to the level of defense preparedness — politically, financially and operationally. It requires moving beyond incrementalism to a coordinated framework that fosters and defends critical digital infrastructure — one that enables governments and operators to plan, train and respond together before, not during, the next crisis.  Sovereignty is about control, not isolation  Connectivity alone is not the issue. Europe’s strategic vulnerability also stems from how it governs the technologies on which its digital backbone depends.  And while digital sovereignty is one pillar of Europe’s wider resilience agenda — spanning critical value chains such as defense, automotive, chemicals and energy — it is the pillar without which none of the others can function.  Europe cannot attain digital sovereignty by continuing excessive dependence on a small number of non-European providers. But it also cannot achieve it by walling itself off from global innovation. Both extremes weaken resilience.  That’s why sovereignty done right means governing openness on Europe’s terms. Europe must keep critical operations in trusted European hands while maintaining access to the scale, performance and innovation that global platforms can provide.   This approach starts with understanding sovereignty across three dimensions:  — Data sovereignty: who has lawful access to information.  — Operational sovereignty: who runs and can intervene in critical systems.  — Technological sovereignty: which capabilities Europe must own or control.  The false choice between ‘ban foreign tech’ and ‘do nothing’ is a trap. The real path forward is risk-based, proportionate and verifiable. We must define what truly requires European control and work with like-minded international partners to build a trusted technology ecosystem. Sovereignty needs to be demonstrated in practice, not merely asserted in policy.  This approach would also enable Europe to pool industrial capacity with trusted partners such as Japan, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom and South Korea. This is cooperation that strengthens Europe rather than diluting control.   From principles to verifiable control  Europe should reject blanket bans based on EU borders that raise costs, slow next-generation deployment and fail to deliver true control. Instead, sovereignty must be translated into concrete, auditable mechanisms that strengthen resilience.   To deliver it, Europe should follow four core principles:   1. Harden the backbone: Europe must create a much better business case for investing in resilient fiber, advanced 5G technologies and future networks built with defense-grade security. And it must fortify subsea cables, satellite systems and cross-border infrastructure against hybrid threats. This is defense spending by another name.  2. Engineer sovereignty into operations: ensure Europe retains verifiable control over access to sensitive systems and require European oversight of critical operations. Authorities must be able to verify who operates critical systems, where data is processed and which legal jurisdiction applies.  3. Certify ‘Trusted European Operators’: establish an EU-wide certification enabling European-anchored providers to manage access to global platforms within EU-governed environments. Make interoperability and portability mandatory to prevent lock-in and ensure resilience.  4. End ‘sovereignty washing’: providers claiming sovereign capabilities must prove it. Europe must require auditable disclosures and rigorous, risk-based assessments. If claims cannot be verified, they should not determine Europe’s critical infrastructure decisions.  In parallel, Europe should adopt a single EU framework defining practical levels across the data, operational and technological dimensions. This would give CIOs, regulators and public bodies clarity and consistency.   From doctrine to delivery  As the dust settles on the annual Munich Security Conference, Europe faces a defining choice. It can carry on treating its digital backbone as regulatory plumbing and watch vulnerabilities compound. Or it can recognise this backbone for what it is — a core line of defence.  > The real test of seriousness is whether governments and operators can plan > together, train together and respond together when systems are stressed.  The real test of seriousness is whether governments and operators can plan together, train together and respond together when systems are stressed. And this depends on whether investment, procurement and certification systems finally move at the speed security demands.  The way forward lies neither in dependence nor in fantasies of self-sufficiency. It must be grounded in risk-based sovereignty, delivered through verifiable control, modernized infrastructure and deeper public–private cooperation, aligned with trustworthy allies.  Ultimately, Europe cannot defend what it cannot connect, and it cannot compete if it closes itself off. Europe will fail this critical strategic test if the regulatory agenda for connectivity — the Digital Networks Act, Cybersecurity Act and merger guidelines revisions — does little to strengthen the very networks its security depends on.  If Europe gets this right, it can build a digital backbone capable of deterring adversaries, supporting allies, protecting citizens and powering innovation for decades to come.  -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is Vodafone Group plc * The ultimate controlling entity is Vodafone Group plc * The political advertisement is linked to EU-level security and digital policy with particular focus on the Digital Networks Act, Cybersecurity Act, merger guidelines and broader digital sovereignty strategy. More information here.

LONDON — Russian air and missile defenses may soon be able to intercept British and French nuclear weapons, according to new analysis by the U.K.-based defense think tank RUSI. Russia has been strengthening the shield around its air space, the report found, in a move which could challenge the ability of Europe’s two nuclear powers to retaliate against Moscow in the next decade. Unlike the United States, which fields a more diverse nuclear arsenal, Britain and France rely predominantly on small numbers of warheads deployed at sea. Meanwhile, missile defense systems of the type being developed by Russia are becoming more capable. In 2024, Israel and the U.S. reportedly intercepted roughly 90 percent of two large Iranian missile barrages, each involving around 200 ballistic missiles.  The RUSI report found that if such a rate of interception could be replicated by a system protecting Moscow, then a modest British or French strike might not be able to achieve its intended effect. Sidharth Kaushal, author of the research, warned that the ability to strike Moscow “underpins the credibility of Europe’s independent nuclear deterrents,” and said this will be increasingly tested as the extended deterrence provided by the U.S. is “stretched” under pressure from China. Europe’s nuclear arsenal has been under renewed scrutiny in recent years, with several countries arguing for talks on a homegrown deterrent to complement American weapons. Although NATO is still overwhelmingly seen as the cornerstone of nuclear deterrence, countries such as France, Germany and Sweden have shown an increasing willingness to discuss Europe’s role amid concerns over whether U.S. would repel a Russian attack. The U.K. has so far been cagey on the subject, but Keir Starmer referred to “enhanced nuclear cooperation with France” in his Munich Security Conference speech. France’s deterrent has always been separate from that of the U.S. and NATO while Britain’s force is independent of Washington, but relies on U.S. technology. The prospect of a new European nuclear network has risen up the agenda with the expiry of the New START nuclear weapons treaty between the U.S. and Russia. Russia and China are meanwhile expanding their strategic arsenals — while the Kremlin has threatened to use nuclear weapons on Ukraine.

LONDON — British Defence Minister Al Carns described the failure to agree U.K. entry into the EU’s SAFE program as “self-defeating” for European security. Speaking at a Chatham House event, Carns said the U.K. `is “absolutely essential to European security… so to not allow it into a European defense fund is actually self-defeating if we’re talking about a threat potentially materializing.” Talks between Brussels and London on the bloc’s €150 billion Security Action for Europe loans-for-weapons plan collapsed in November after the two sides hit an impasse over Britain’s entry fee. Without an agreement, the U.K. can still take part in joint procurement projects in which a maximum of 35 percent of the value of a weapons system is paid for by the scheme. The U.K. had been negotiating for a higher percentage, which would benefit the country’s large arms industry. The armed forces minister predicted: “You’re going to see more work on that. I think you’re going to see far greater collaborations.” Keir Starmer talked up his desire for deeper EU-U.K. collaboration on defense financing at the Munich Security Conference, as did Chancellor Rachel Reeves in a recent speech. However, it is not yet clear what form this will take. The Commission has not so far indicated it is moving towards a second round of the SAFE initiative, while the U.K. Treasury remains downbeat about the prospect of joining a global defense bank. London is currently lobbying Brussels over new EU procurement rules which could impact British manufacturers, although it is not yet known if the “Made in Europe” plan will include the defense sector. Caroline Hug contributed reporting.

German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius has taken a pointed swipe at Donald Trump, accusing the U.S. president of sending the wrong signals to Vladimir Putin and weakening Ukraine’s position in the war. Speaking to Deutschlandfunk Radio on the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the Social Democrat — Germany’s most popular politician in recent surveys — said Trump had boosted the Kremlin leader’s confidence through overly warm engagement. “Unfortunately, the American president influenced the course of the war and Putin’s self-confidence when he rolled out the red carpet and greeted him like a buddy in Alaska, while at the same time completely withdrawing from supporting Ukraine militarily,” Pistorius said. Trump met with Putin in Alaska in August 2025 without any European participation, fueling concern on the continent that Washington was trying to end the war without any input from Ukraine or Europe. Trump has repeatedly shifted his tone on the conflict and did not issue a public statement in support of Ukraine on the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Pistorius also faulted the White House for taking Ukraine’s NATO membership off the table too early in negotiations. “The American president unfortunately and unnecessarily took NATO membership off the table very early. That would have been one issue one could have used to negotiate about other things,” he said. It’s not the first time Pistorius has criticized Trump’s handling of the war in Ukraine. Speaking to Deutschlandfunk Radio last year, he said the president had “misjudged” his influence with Putin in ceasefire negotiations. His latest comments come days before German Chancellor Friedrich Merz heads to Washington, where he said in an interview that he plans to present a “common European position” on trade after Trump moved to raise global tariffs to 15 percent.

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has decided a showdown with Brussels is exactly what his flagging election campaign needs.  Orbán is on the back foot at home — trailing his rival Péter Magyar by some 8 percentage points in polls ahead of the April 12 election. So he’s gone on the attack against two of his favorite bogeymen abroad: Brussels and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.  In doing so he’s trying to set a trap for Magyar, the 44-year-old member of the European Parliament who is on track to beat him.   Magyar has built his poll lead through a laser-focus on the corruption, mismanagement and cronyism that he says has defined Orbán’s 15 years in power. The last thing he wants is an election race in which he is typecast as the pro-EU or pro-Ukrainian candidate.   But that’s exactly where Orbán is now trying to shift the campaign. On the international stage, Orbán’s government has taken the highly confrontational step of blocking the EU’s €90 billion financial lifeline to Ukraine — agreed at a European Council meeting in December — accusing Kyiv of slow-walking repairs to the Druzhba pipeline that supplies oil to Hungary.  The timing of Orbán’s move is hardly coincidental, given his troubles in the election race. Having engineered a conflagration with Brussels over Ukraine, he upped the ante this week by accusing Magyar’s Tisza party of being traitors, of taking the side of the EU and Zelenskyy in the standoff.   ORBÁN ON THE ATTACK It’s Orbán himself who is leading the offensive. He is styling his clash with Brussels and Kyiv as one and the same as his fight with the Tisza party, which he accused of remaining “shamefully silent” about the problems with the oil supply from Ukraine.  “In line with Brussels and Kyiv, instead of a national government, they [Tisza] want to bring a pro-Ukrainian government to power in Hungary. That is why they are not standing up for the interests of Hungarian people and Hungary,” Orbán argued in a Facebook post on Monday.  He followed up with another post saying Tisza would wreck the country’s energy sector, and insisted his ruling Fidesz party was “the safe choice in April.”  “[The opposition’s] goal is chaos, fuel shortages, and gasoline price increases before the elections. That is why they have sided with Zelenskyy, against the Hungarian people,” Orbán said.   Sidestepping the trap, Magyar hit back against Orbán’s accusations — not by defending the EU or Zelenskyy, but by claiming economic mismanagement by the prime minister was stoking the high prices and insisting fuel was cheaper in Poland, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria.  Péter Magyar has built his poll lead through a laser-focus on the corruption, mismanagement and cronyism that he says has defined Orbán’s 15 years in power. | Bállint Szentgallay/NurPhoto via Getty Images “Orbán does not govern effectively and shows no interest in the continuously deteriorating situation of Hungarian citizens or businesses. Instead, he chooses to lie, incite hatred, and burden the country with some of the highest taxes in Europe,” Magyar said. Tisza declined to comment.   HOW PRO-EU IS MAGYAR, REALLY? For the EU, the big concern is how long Orbán, the EU leader closest to the Kremlin, will drag out this fight. Kyiv desperately needs the now-blocked €90 billion cash injection, and six weeks of uncertainty due to the Hungarian election would inflame geopolitical tensions over the war in Ukraine.   While much of Brussels is holding out for a Magyar win — largely to end Budapest’s obstructionism on Ukraine — the irony of Orbán’s attacks is that Magyar is hardly an unalloyed pro-EU politician, and far less a pro-Ukrainian one. Indeed, he is outdoing Orbán with his some of his more nationalist campaigning. Tisza, for example, voted against the €90 billion loan to Ukraine in the European Parliament and Magyar has strongly opposed plans for Kyiv’s accelerated membership in the European Union.   In an interview with POLITICO in 2024, Magyar said Tisza was pro-EU but was candid about the EU’s shortcomings. He expressed opposition to a European “superstate” and said he didn’t have “friends” in the European Parliament. That followed his first press conference in the Parliament, in which he opposed sending weapons to Ukraine. Earlier this year, Orbán’s Fidesz party sought to corner Magyar over the EU’s giant Mercosur trade deal with South America, which it opposes on the grounds it would harm Hungarian farmers. In Budapest, Orbán accused Magyar of backing the agreement and undermining farmers because Tisza sits with the center-right European People’s Party grouping in the European Parliament, which supported the trade pact.  So Orbán’s gone on the attack against two of his favorite bogeymen abroad: Brussels and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. | Ukrinform/NurPhoto via Getty Images Ultimately, however, Tisza voted in January to freeze ratification of the EU-Mercosur accord, breaking with the EPP line — a move that triggered a “shitstorm” against the Hungarian delegation at a subsequent group meeting, according to an official who was present. CALIBRATED MESSAGING Magyar’s awkward relationship with Brussels was on full display at the Munich Security Conference this month. He used the event to initiate a tentative outreach to European heavyweights including Germany’s Chancellor Friedrich Merz and Vice Chancellor Lars Klingbeil, as well as Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, Croatia’s Prime Minister Andrej Plenković, and Finnish President Alexander Stubb.  The messaging was cautiously calibrated. Magyar said he wanted to undo the damage Orbán had done to democratic and judicial norms, but with the chief goal of restoring Hungary’s access to EU funds and standing up “for Hungarian interests.” His language on Ukraine was far cooler.   “The top priority of a future Tisza government will be to secure the EU funds Hungary is entitled to. To achieve this, we will immediately introduce strict anti-corruption measures, restore judicial independence, and safeguard the freedom of the press and higher education,” he said on X after meeting with Merz Feb. 14. While that was music to EU mainstream ears, Magyar also said he had used his talk with Poland’s Tusk to stress he didn’t support a fast-track EU membership for Kyiv.  Conspicuously, Magyar did not meet with any leader of the EU institutions. The optics would admittedly have been hard to navigate given that the Fidesz camp has flooded the streets of Budapest with AI photos of Magyar conspiring against Hungary with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. MYSTERY MAN All in all, Magyar remains an enigma to observers in both the EU and Ukraine. An MEP from the liberal Renew group in the European Parliament said: “We feel anything is better than Orbán but, honestly, I’m not sure what they are, content wise, what are the things they concretely want to do, for example in Europe and geopolitically.” While that was music to EU mainstream ears, Magyar also said he had used his talk with Poland’s Donald Tusk to stress he didn’t support a fast-track EU membership for Kyiv. | Thomas Kienzle/AFP via Getty Images Even inside the ranks of Magyar’s center-right EPP grouping, the jury remains out. “We need to see, if Magyar wins, how he will organize the government and distribute power,” said an EPP official. “But once you are in power the question is whether he will have the strength to overcome temptations or fall [to them] as Orbán did.” On Ukraine, it’s already clear that a Magyar victory would not signal an overnight thaw in ties with Kyiv. But the hope among diplomats from the EU and Kyiv is that he won’t deliberately wreck EU efforts, as Orbán has done.  “We don’t know the consequences [of the election] so we have to be careful,” said a Ukrainian government adviser, who noted they were communicating with Magyar’s team. “But by following his public speeches, it seems he is a little bit more flexible and we will expect this.”  Swedish European Affairs Minister Jessica Rosencrantz told POLITICO she was still holding out hope for a more emphatic change in Budapest’s position.  “I hope for a shift in the Hungarian approach toward Ukraine because we need to stand united for European security. Given Hungary’s own history I think it’s unbelievable that they did not show solidarity,” she said.  Ketrin Jochecová contributed to this report.

Jamie Dettmer is opinion editor and a foreign affairs columnist at POLITICO Europe. Charles Dickens’ character Wilkins Micawber and Vladimir Putin are an unlikely pairing.  For all of his fecklessness, the fictional Micawber is a rather jolly type; the Russian leader is a man of brooding ill humor, who even when he actually cracks jokes or admits a public chuckle does so to demean and humiliate. But they do share one thing in common: faith that “something will turn up.” Four years after he launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Putin’s war looks militarily to be unwinnable. At a colossal price in lives lost and bodies maimed, his forces have failed even to capture all of the Donbas region of Ukraine. Before he sent his tanks crashing over the border, Russia occupied around seven percent of Ukraine. A month into the war it was roughy 27 percent. But since that peak, Russia has been stuck at around 18 percent to 19 percent, according to Harvard’s Belfer Center.  Admittedly in the past year Russian forces have grindingly pressed forward and seized 4,700 square kilometers of territory — around twice the size of Moscow — but they’ve been unable to puncture a fortress belt the Ukrainians have established running 50 kilometers in western Donetsk, according to analysts at the U.S.-based Institute for the Study of War.  And in neighboring Zaporizhzhia, the Russians have been forced to retreat. Even when Putin’s forces have managed breakthroughs here and there — for example in the summer with an offensive near the eastern town of Pokrovsk and on nearby Kostyantynivka as the Ukrainians were tactically outmatched — they’ve been unable to punch ahead thanks to a lack of men and materiel. And, of course, because of the difficulty in amassing sufficient strength for a heave without attracting devastating attacks from Ukrainian drones. In the north, the Russians have struggled to advance on the city of Kupyansk and to push Ukrainian forces back further from the Russian region of Belgorod on the border. But Putin persists. Why? He has to show a major victory to justify the massive costs of the war to his people and to unwind his war economy holds out serious political risks for the Russian leader, according to Russian analyst Ella Paneyakh. There will be winners and losers. And how to re-purpose all of the veterans?  And that’s where the Micawber Principle kicks in. Despite the strains on manpower, Russia likely has the capacity to wage war for some time. “For now, the Russian military machine — reassembled following the defeats of 2022 — is functioning decently: The authorities are able to cover current losses in personnel and equipment,” reckons exiled Russian journalist Dmitri Kuznets, writing for Carnegie’s Russia Eurasia Center. “But there is no capacity to significantly increase the volume of resources being deployed,” Kuznets argues. In the meantime, Ukraine’s manpower challenge is of a higher order — as this column has persistently reported since early 2024. Around two million Ukrainians are wanted for military registration violations, the new Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov disclosed last month. In November, Ukraine’s Office of the Prosecutor General revealed there are 310,000 criminal cases outstanding for unauthorized absences and desertion with the bulk occurring in 2025. Simply put, the Ukrainian armed forces (AFU) are recruiting insufficient numbers to compensate for losses — and desertions.  Mobilization is unpopular and there’s a growing reluctance to serve. “The main factors responsible for the AFU’s continuing manpower shortage are Ukrainian institutional weakness and corruption, social fatigue and mental exhaustion, deficiencies in military training and leadership, demographic and economic constraints, and the impact of Russian propaganda,” noted a study by the Stockholm Center for Eastern European Studies. Much is written about the missile math gap between Ukraine and Russia with the massive drone and missile strikes unleashed on the country exhausting Ukraine’s supplies of the means for defense, including Patriot air-defense missiles. Much less coverage is focused on the manpower math, which doesn’t favor Ukraine, if Putin can prolong his war of attrition unconstrained as he is by any sense of compassion for the loss of life.  Ukrainian opposition politicians note that the reluctance to serve is fueled by an increasing perception that the West is ready to fight this war to the last Ukrainian. | Roman Pilipey/AFP via Getty Images For all the drones and AI, boots on the ground still matter, as the battle for Pokrovsk demonstrated. There the lack of manpower allowed Russia to employ what Ukraine’s commander-in-chief, Oleksandr Syrskiy, dubbed “total infiltration” tactics with small infantry units getting behind Ukrainian lines thanks to a lack of Ukrainian manpower to prevent them. Ukrainian opposition politicians note that the reluctance to serve is fueled by an increasing perception that the West is ready to fight this war to the last Ukrainian, despite the fact that Ukrainian survival as an independent and pro-West nation is crucial for Europe’s own security. That phrase “to the last Ukrainian” could be heard uttered more and more in conversation with ordinary Ukrainians as last year unfolded. And it is freighted with increasing bitterness towards Donald Trump’s America for its seeming embrace of Moscow narratives and the shutting down of direct U.S. government donations of military equipment, as well as towards EU naysayer Hungary, which this week sought to block an agreed €90 billion EU loan for Ukraine aimed at stabilizing the war-torn country’s finances. Does this mean Ukraine is about to crack? Putin may indeed hope so. His relentless winter bombing campaign on the country’s energy infrastructure is surely geared to exhaust war-weary Ukrainians and break their will.  Former President Petro Poroshenko, Ukraine’s first elected president after the 2013-14 Euromaidan uprising that toppled Moscow-backed Viktor Yanukovych, doesn’t think so, but in an exclusive interview with POLITICO on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference, he talked about Ukraine’s current fragility. Poroshenko worries that his successor, and bitter political foe, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, has made a tactical mistake by shifting away from the simple demand of an immediate ceasefire and by getting sucked into negotiations that risk adding to gathering political turmoil in Ukraine in the wake of a slew of corruption scandals that are wearing down the country’s unity.  The territorial concessions Putin is demanding are part and parcel of a Russian scenario “to try to destabilize the internal political situation in Ukraine,” Poroshenko argued. If a deal is struck it would have to go to a referendum and there would be a lot of opposition to any ceding of territory the Russians have been unable to capture. It isn’t hard to envisage a debate about a land surrender quickly spinning out of control and sparking turmoil — or worse. Many patriots who fought in the war would see it as a stab in the back. “I don’t see the parliament ever passing anything like that,” opposition lawmaker Oleksandra Ustinova told POLITICO recently. “It would be seen as a capitulation,” she added.  That may be why Russian negotiators seemed more serious in the second round of trilateral peace negotiations, and why the military and intelligence discussions about a demilitarized zone last week also seemed more practical.  Putin may be caught in a dilemma — his war is unwinnable on the battlefield in the sense that he doesn’t have the strength to conquer Ukraine — but he’s waiting for something to turn up. Meanwhile, Ukraine has to try to keep going: it can’t win on the battlefield either and recapture all the land it has lost, but it has to survive, hoping eventually Russia tires forcing Putin to get serious about negotiations.