A minimum tax on the EU’s richest individuals will not discourage innovators and start-up founders from investing in the bloc, prominent economist Gabriel Zucman told POLITICO. “Innovation does not depend on just a tiny number of wealthy individuals paying zero tax,” Zucman said in an interview at this year’s POLITICO 28 event. The young economist has become a household name in France thanks to his proposal to have households worth more than €100 million paying an annual tax of at least 2 percent of the value of all their assets. Critics of the tax warned about the risk of scaring investors out of the EU and that tech entrepreneurs could leave the bloc as they would be forced to pay a tax based on the market value of shares they own in their companies without necessarily having the liquidity to do so. But Zucman rejected “the notion that someone […] would be discouraged to create a start-up, to innovate in AI because of the possibility that once that person is a billionaire, he or she will have to pay a tiny amount of tax” “Who can believe in that?” he scoffed. The “Zucman tax” was one of the key demands by left-wing parties for France’s budget for next year. But the measure has been ignored by all France’s short-lived prime ministers, and rejected by the French parliament during ongoing budget debates. But Zucman is not giving up and still promotes the measure, including at the EU level. “This would generate about €65 billion in tax revenue for the EU as whole,” Zucman insisted.

The European Central Bank is hatching a plan to boost the use of the euro around the world, hoping to turn the world’s faltering confidence in U.S. political and financial leadership to Europe’s advantage. Liquidity lines — agreements to lend at short notice to other central banks — have long been a standard part of the crisis-fighting toolkits of central banks, but the ECB is now thinking of repurposing them to further Europe’s political aims, four central bank officials told POLITICO. One aim of the plan is to absorb any shocks if the U.S. — which has backstopped the global financial system with dollars for decades — suddenly decides not to, or attaches unacceptable conditions to its support. The other goal is to underpin its foreign trade more actively and, ultimately, grab some of the benefits that the U.S. has historically enjoyed from controlling the world’s reserve currency. Officials were granted anonymity because the discussions are private. Bruegel fellow Francesco Papadia, who was previously director-general for the ECB’s market operations, told POLITICO that such efforts are sensible and reflect an increasing willingness among European authorities to see the euro used more widely around the world. WHAT’S A LIQUIDITY LINE? Central banks typically use two types of facilities to lend to each other: either by swapping one currency for another (swap lines) or by providing funds against collateral denominated in the lender’s currency (repo lines). The ECB currently maintains standing, unlimited swap lines with the U.S. Federal Reserve, the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the Swiss National Bank, and the Bank of Japan, as well as standing but capped lines with the Danish and Swedish central banks. It also operates a facility with the People’s Bank of China, capped in both volume and duration. Other central banks seeking euro liquidity must rely on repo lines known as EUREP, under which they can borrow limited amounts of euros for a limited period against high-quality euro-denominated collateral. At present, only Hungary, Romania, Albania, Andorra, San Marino, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Kosovo have such lines in place. But these active lines have sat untouched since Jan. 2, 2024 — and even at the height of the Covid crisis, their use peaked at a mere €3.6 billion. For the eurozone’s international partners, the knowledge that they can access the euro in times of stress is valuable in itself, helping to pre-empt self-fulfilling fears of financial instability. But some say that if structured generously enough, the facilities can also reduce concerns about exchange rate fluctuations or liquidity shortages. Such details may sound academic, but the availability of liquidity lines has real impacts on business: A Romanian carmaker whose bank has trouble securing euros may fail to make payments to a supplier in Germany, disrupting its production and raising its costs.  “The knowledge that foreign commercial banks can borrow in euros while being assured that they have access to euro liquidity [as a backstop] encourages the use of the euro,” one ECB rate-setter explained.  French central bank chief François Villeroy de Galhau suggested that Europe could at least take a leaf out of China’s book, noting that the Eurosystem “can make euro invoicing more attractive” by expanding the provision of euro liquidity lines. | Kirill Kudryavtsev/Getty Images “Liquidity lines, in particular EUREP, should be flexible, simple and easy to activate,” he argued. One option, he said, would be to extend them to more countries. Another could be to make EUREP a standing facility — removing any doubts about whether, and under what conditions, euro access would be granted. Papadia added that the ECB could also ease access to EUREP by cutting its cost, boosting available volumes or extending the timeframe for use. NOT JUST AN ACADEMIC QUESTION French central bank chief François Villeroy de Galhau suggested in a recent speech that Europe could at least take a leaf out of China’s book, noting that the Eurosystem “can make euro invoicing more attractive” by expanding the provision of euro liquidity lines. China has established around 40 swap lines with trading partners worldwide to underpin its burgeoning foreign trade, especially with poorer and less stable countries. By contrast, the ECB — a historically cautious animal — “is not marketing the euro to the same extent that the Chinese market the renminbi,” according to Papadia.  Another policymaker told POLITICO that while there is a broad consensus that liquidity lines should be made more widely available, the Governing Council had not yet hashed out the details. Austrian National Bank Governor Martin Kocher told POLITICO in a recent interview that there has been “no deeper discussion” on the Council, adding that he sees no reason to promote euro liquidity lines actively. “I’m not arguing that you should incentivize or create a demand. Rather, if there is demand, we should be prepared for it,” he said, acknowledging that “preparation is very important.” He noted that erratic U.S. policies could force the euro “to take on a stronger role in the international sphere” — both as a reserve currency and in transactions. According to a Reuters report earlier this month, similar concerns among central banks worldwide have sparked a debate over creating an alternative to Federal Reserve funding backstops by pooling their own dollar reserves. The ECB declined to comment for this article. RISK AVERSION AND OTHER OBSTACLES  However, swap lines in particular don’t come without risks. “The main risk is that the country would use a swap and then would not be able to return the drawn euros,” said Papadia. “And then you will be left with foreign currency you don’t really know what to do with.” That is exactly the kind of trap some economists warn the U.S. is stumbling into with its $20 billion swap line to Argentina. “The United States doesn’t really want Argentina’s currency,” the Council on Foreign Relations’ Brad Setser wrote in a blog post. “It expects to be repaid in dollars, so it would be a massive failure if the swap was never unwound and the U.S. Treasury was left holding a slug of pesos.” Austrian National Bank Governor Martin Kocher said there has been “no deeper discussion” on the Council, adding that he sees no reason to promote euro liquidity lines actively. | Heinz-Peter Bader/Getty Images Such thinking, another central bank official said, will incline the ECB to focus first on reforming the EUREP lines, which have always been its preferred tool. The trouble with that, however, is that EUREP use may be limited by a lack of safe assets denominated in euros to serve as collateral. Papadia noted that the Fed’s network of liquidity lines works because “the Fed has the U.S.  Treasury as a kind of partner in granting these swaps.” So long as Europe fails to create a joint debt instrument, this may put a natural cap on such lines.  Even with a safe asset, focusing on liquidity lines first could be putting the cart before the horse, said Gianluca Benigno, professor of economics at the University of Lausanne and former head of the New York Fed’s international research department. Europe’s diminishing geopolitical relevance means that the ECB is unlikely to see much demand — deliberately engineered or not — for its liquidity outside Europe without much broader changes, Benigno told POLITICO. Liquidity lines can be used to advance your goals if you already have power — but they can’t create it. For that, he argued, Europe first needs a clear political vision for its role in the global economy, alongside a Capital Markets Union and the creation of a common European safe asset — issues that only politicians can address.

Nearly two years ago, Argentina’s newly appointed punk-haired President Javier Milei stood up on a podium in front of global elites in Davos and accused them of letting their societies drift into socialism and poverty. He went on to argue that the “main leaders of the Western world have abandoned the model of freedom for different versions of what we call collectivism,” and that all market failures were by-products of state intervention. This week, however, Davos had the last laugh: U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent threw Milei a $20 billion lifeline to help Argentina defend a currency that is collapsing despite nearly two years of shock therapy programs that had had supply-side economists and investors in raptures. “Argentina faces a moment of acute illiquidity,” Bessent posted on X. “The international community — including the IMF — is unified behind Argentina and its prudent fiscal strategy, but only the United States can act swiftly. And act we will.” The rescue act, which many have described as a country-to-country bailout, is an abrupt departure from the usual playbook of international financial diplomacy, an unusually direct intervention in a sphere normally reserved for multilateral institutions. In a strong signal that this was the result of political will, rather than financial apparatchiks just trying to keep the system stable, the money will be directly extended by the Treasury, rather than by the Federal Reserve, in the form of a currency swap. It stands to entangle the fate of the U.S. economy intimately with that of resource-rich Argentina, and tie the Trump administration directly to Milei’s shock therapy programs. At the same time, it reasserts U.S. influence in a region that China has increasingly penetrated through growing trade ties. For Europe, the corollary is that access to dollar liquidity, the essential backstop of the world financial system for nearly a century, is being politicized, and may increasingly depend on how closely its policies align with those of the U.S. “Europe should be concerned about the politicization of the swaps,” one former New York Federal Reserve official told POLITICO. The episode “underscores the need for the rest of the world to prepare for dealing with a dollar crunch without the Fed[to turn to],” added the official, who was granted anonymity to speak freely. CHAINSAW ECONOMIC MASSACRE Milei was explicitly elected in 2023 on the promise that he would take a chainsaw to Argentine government excesses. Positioning himself as the defender of freedom, once in office, he initiated a bold economic agenda focused on radical deregulation, welfare cuts, and liberalization. Within months, the country’s welfare bill had been slashed by nearly half, with the government balancing the books (before interest payments) for the first time since 2008. But it was Milei’s initial move in December 2023 to devalue the official peso exchange rate by nearly 50 percent that rocked markets the most. The hope was to better align the peso with its black market (i.e., real) rate before slowly introducing a floating exchange rate, with sliding bands. Throughout, the International Monetary Fund, the world’s lender of last resort for countries, championed Milei’s policies, which allowed Argentina to return to capital markets earlier than expected. “The agreed ambitious stabilization plan is centered on the establishment of a strong fiscal anchor that ends all central bank financing of the government,” the lender cooed in January 2024. EGG ON THE IMF’S FACE? Except things didn’t go exactly as planned. Rather than stabilize, the peso just kept depreciating, especially after Trump’s tariff announcement in April destabilized global markets. The declines threatened to make imports more expensive for ordinary Argentinians just as Milei’s disinflationary successes were beginning to become entrenched. The road to that point evolved predictably enough. In the immediate aftermath of Milei’s great devaluation, inflation hit 25.5 percent, spiking to 276 percent by February 2025. But, as social welfare cuts began to bite, inflation predictably turned into disinflation. By June 2024, monthly price rises had slowed to 5 percent, and by July-August, inflation had hit single digits for the first time in years. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and independent observers were quick to credit Milei’s strict fiscal surplus, monetary tightening, and peso stabilization. But by April, the peso’s soft float was proving increasingly challenging to defend. Trump’s “Liberation Day” tariffs, which set a baseline rate of 10 percent for all countries, had hit Argentina’s export-dependent economy hard. Capital started to flow out amid fears that a global slowdown would crush demand for its agricultural and mineral exports. The Argentinian central bank moved to defend the peso, burning through scarce dollar reserves. Markets began to doubt that Milei’s agenda would survive, fearing that a sharp, uncontrolled depreciation would rekindle inflation just as prices were calming down. To avert a currency crisis, Argentina turned to the IMF and was granted $20 billion through the agency’s Extended Fund Facility (EFF). But despite an initial positive impact on the peso, the depreciation picked up speed again. From the perspective of both the IMF and the U.S., the failure of Milei’s reforms stood not just to unravel Argentina once again, but to delegitimize the ideological foundations of the free-market system he had touted as infallible if deployed correctly. PROXY ECONOMIC WAR WITH CHINA As confidence in Milei’s program faltered, focus shifted to whether the U.S. would make dollar support conditional on the cancellation of a pre-existing $18 billion swap line with Beijing. U.S. Special Envoy for Latin America Mauricio Claver-Carone publicly dubbed the facility “extortionate.” In September, Bessent confirmed negotiations between the U.S. and Argentina for a direct dollar swap line, reinforcing speculation that the U.S. was trying to supplant Chinese influence in the region. The news had an immediate positive effect on the peso, breaking its fall. After peaking at over 1,475 pesos, the dollar was back at 1,421 by late Friday in Europe, helped by news that a dollar-support package from Washington was imminent. How long-lasting that effect will be is yet to be determined. For now, Bessent and the IMF appear resolute that it’s just a matter of time until Milei’s policies will deliver the stability they’ve been promising. Rather than framing the U.S. swapline as a bailout, Bessent is treating the intervention as a trading play. “This is not a bailout at all, there’s no money being transferred,” he told Fox News on Thursday. Under a swap line, two parties agree to exchange up to a certain amount of their currencies, on the understanding that it will be reversed at some time in the future. “The ESF has never lost money, it’s not going to lose money here,” Bessent went on, arguing that the peso is “undervalued”. He added that Milei remains a great U.S. ally who is committed to getting China out of Latin America, and said the U.S. was going “to use Argentina as an example.” Not everyone is convinced that Milei’s policies will deliver the goods. “They’ve done this over and over and over again,” said Steve Hanke, a professor at Johns Hopkins University and a veteran of various currency reform and stabilization packages. He argued that the package will provide “a little bit of a temporary band aid, but it won’t last very long.”

Germany’s two banking supervisory agencies have drafted a plan to ease the burden of regulation on Europe’s smaller banks and are now seeing if it will fly. An informal discussion paper drafted by the Deutsche Bundesbank and Bafin — which share responsibility for supervising German banks — proposes freeing banks across the EU of the need to report capital ratios based on complex calculations of the riskiness of their assets, as well as liberating them from various other obligations. The proposals are the first concrete result of a drive to simplify regulation that began earlier this year and are the clearest sign yet that the EU is — belatedly — ready to undo some of the stifling financial regulation it introduced over a decade ago. Regulation is currently based on the global Basel III accords that were agreed by regulators in 2010, two years after reckless lending by U.S. and European banks caused the biggest financial crisis in nearly 80 years and a wrenching recession across most of the world. Basel III drastically increased the amount of capital and liquidity that banks have to hold to protect themselves against a possible repeat. But the accords were aimed primarily at big international institutions whose operations were capable of destabilizing the global financial system; as the impact of the 2008-2009 disaster has faded, regulators have grudgingly come to accept that their response went too far. The U.S., Switzerland and the U.K. have already implemented less intrusive regimes for smaller banks with simpler business models. “With the proposal for an EU small banks regime, we have provided important impetus to the discussions on simplifying the regulatory framework,” Michael Theurer, the Bundesbank’s head of banking supervision, said in emailed comments, stressing that the proposal “does not represent a departure from the Basel framework.” The framework would be open to banks with less than €10 billion in assets and with a mainly domestic focus (at least 75 per cent of their business should be in the European Economic Area). Banks using it would not be allowed to hold any cryptocurrency assets such as Bitcoin, and would be allowed to hold only minimal amounts of derivatives or assets for trading purposes. They would also have to prove that their vulnerability to changes in interest rates is acceptably low. ‘PARADIGM SHIFT’ Under the Capital Requirements Regulation, which applies Basel III in the EU, banks are generally required to report two capital ratios — one adjusted for risk, and one unadjusted. The latter, known as the leverage ratio, was originally intended as a backstop to prevent larger banks from gaming the system by understating the risks on their books under internal models allowed by the accords The German proposals suggest that smaller banks would merely have to report a leverage ratio, albeit a “significantly higher” one than the present 3 percent. By comparison, U.S. community banks must keep their leverage ratios above 9 percent, which means they must hold at least $9 of capital for every $100 in assets. Theurer said the Bundesbank had deliberately refrained from suggesting a specific ratio at this time. This idea “is more than a technical detail,” Daniel Quinten, a member of the board at Germany’s Federal Association of Cooperative Banks, said in a post on social media. “It would be a paradigm shift — and a chance for more proportionality, more efficiency and less bureaucracy in regulation.” The proposals — and the feedback they get — are to be incorporated in a report that a high-level European Central Bank task force will recommend to the European Commission at the end of the year. | Florian Wiegand/EPA The proposals also simplify demands on liquidity coverage. They would exempt banks from the Basel III Net Stable Funding Ratio — a complex formula for guaranteeing liquidity over a one-year timeframe — and would replace it with a new requirement that would limit their lending to only 90 percent of their deposit base. Banks would also have to keep at least 10 percent of their assets in highly liquid form, such as cash, central bank reserves or short-term government debt. This, the discussion paper said, “would achieve similar potential outcomes with dramatically reduced complexity.” The proposals — and the feedback they get — are to be incorporated in a report that a high-level European Central Bank task force will recommend to the European Commission at the end of the year. Additional reporting by Carlo Boffa.

VATICAN CITY — The new American pope is looking to his MAGA compatriots to shore up the Vatican’s finances after decades of scandal and mismanagement. The conclave that brought Pope Leo to power was overshadowed by painful divisions within the Church, a war between modernity and tradition, and bitter reflections over his predecessor’s complex legacy. But more prosaically it was also plagued by angst over a serious fiscal squeeze that is forcing the spiritual leader of the world’s 1.4 billion Catholics to moonlight as a fundraiser. Despite the Vatican’s vaults of priceless masterpieces, Leo has ascended to the papal throne amid a steepening liquidity crisis aggravated by a major downturn in donations from the U.S., making it increasingly difficult for the city state to function. Leo needs to fix it — but to do so he needs to keep traditionalist U.S. Catholics on side. Insiders say that Leo was elected in part because as an American he exuded an Anglo-Saxon financial seriousness. He was also seen as well positioned to bring back donations that have dried up thanks to persistent scandal and the hemorrhaging of support from powerful American Catholic conservatives.  Already, the gambit seems to be working. “Talking to some of the biggest donors in the country, they’re absolutely thrilled,” said one conservative Catholic leader in the U.S., granted anonymity to speak candidly. “I don’t know that they’re already writing their checks. I don’t see that necessarily yet. But as far as their optimism and excitement, it’s a 10 out of 10 — absolutely.” A boost to donations is desperately needed. According to Reuters, the latest internal figures show the Vatican ran a deficit of €83 million in 2024, more than double the €38 million reported in its last-published financial report in 2022.  The annual shortfall adds to liabilities including half-a-billion in pension obligations to the Vatican’s superannuated beneficiaries and past losses from the Institute for the Works of Religion (IOR), the Holy See’s scandal-riddled investment vehicle, also known as the Vatican Bank. The Vatican’s income is mainly derived from property assets and donations including from bishops and Peter’s Pence, the annual June collection by churches for the pope’s “mission” and charitable works. But donation revenue has fallen with increasing secularism and financial scandals. Donors from the U.S., the number one contributing country, were put off by Francis’ more liberal teachings on LGBTQ+ and marriage as well as corruption scandals including a botched investment by the Vatican’s top financial institution in London real estate, said John Yep, president of Catholics for Catholics, a conservative NGO.   ‘VERY EQUILIBRATED’ The momentum behind Leo as a bridge-builder emerged in pre-conclave lobbying sessions, when cardinals began to envisage that Leo’s alignment on hot-button conservative issues would help appease U.S. Catholics. Leo went on to secure more than 100 votes in the conclave, two well-placed insiders say, indicating that his support was broad and included right-leaning clerics.  A man holds a US flag in St. Peter’s Square, Vatican City, 08 May 2025. | Angelo Carconi/EPA-EFE Pope Leo “is a very equilibrated person, and he can give something to the right, without shifting the pontificate to the right,” one cardinal told POLITICO.  According to the cardinal quoted above, his constituency even included several of the die-hard Francis critics led by the arch-traditionalist American cardinal Raymond Burke. Burke himself reportedly received Leo — then Cardinal Robert Prevost — in his Vatican-owned apartment before the conclave, and spoke with him again after, according to one person familiar with the matter. Burke’s office could not reached for comment. In turn, Leo has signaled a willingness to address traditionalist priorities, drawing particular praise for his decision to move back to the original papal residence from his predecessor’s basic lodgings, as well as for his penchant for singing in Latin. This year’s conclave also happened to coincide with an annual Vatican fundraising jamboree known as “America Week,” a week of lavish Rome parties, that saw €1 billion committed to the Vatican should the “right pope” be elected.  The upshot is — theoretically — more money from across the pond. “American philanthropists want to see that so they will open up their coffers again,” said Yep. Electing Leo “was a very smart choice because they absolutely need the American money. The church is in a terrible position financially,” said the Catholic leader in the U.S. quoted above. “They need the American money. And they were able to pick an American who’s not that American. It was kind of a perfect pick.” LEGACY OF CORRUPTION But restoring confidence will also require a credible overhaul of the Vatican’s financial plumbing and accounting after years of scandal that also tainted the Church’s international image. Insiders often blame the shoddy financial situation on the Vatican Bank’s alleged links to a sprawling money-laundering scandal in the 1970s that reportedly involved Italian freemasonry, the mafia, the CIA, anticommunist militias in Latin America and a Milanese banker who was found hanging dead under London’s Blackfriars Bridge in 1982. Creative accounting persisted over the years, and the shock resignation of Francis’ predecessor, Benedict XVI, was partly driven by a raft of financial scandals leaked to the Italian press. Under a transparency drive, Francis hired former Deloitte accountant Libero Milone to audit the Holy See’s finances. Milone’s first task was to draw up accounting for the various dicasteries that make up the Curia, the Vatican City government. What he found stunned him. “They created a proper framework to bring Vatican financial reporting into the 21st century,” Milone told POLITICO. “But when I was brought in to do the audit work, we were still operating in the previous century.” Newly elected Pope Leo XIV smiles from the central loggia of Saint Peter’s Basilica, Vatican City, 08 May 2025. | Ettore Ferrari/EPA-EFE Financial accounts were written in pencil by nuns on “pieces of paper” and stashed in drawers, Milone said. Theologians with rudimentary financial knowledge massively underestimated the future costs of the microstate’s pension obligations, he said. When Milone began to notice discrepancies in various ministerial budgets, he was accused of being a spy. He was eventually brought in for questioning and compelled to resign — then found that a resignation letter had already been prepared a month prior. Francis didn’t sit on his hands. The Vatican Bank is profitable again, after he ended some of its shadier practices, and he also presided over the conviction of Cardinal Giovanni Angelo Becciu, a powerful secretary involved in a €200 million scandal involving a botched London property investment in 2014. As well as a hiring freeze and salary cuts, Francis set up a new fundraising commission and centralized the Vatican’s budgeting.  But the broader reform effort was seriously derailed by the departure of Milone, as well as Cardinal George Pell, an Australian who had been brought in to head a new Secretariat for the Economy but was called back to Australia to face charges relating to the clerical abuse scandal. Officials describe an enduring lack of transparency as well as internal resistance to the slow-going reform efforts from entrenched interests in the Curia, with staffers complaining about the effort to mediate spending. Representatives for the IOR and the Holy See’s Secretariat for the Economy declined POLITICO’s requests for interviews. So far, Leo has hinted that he will prioritize fundraising over austerity, announcing a €500 bonus to curial staffers. He has also signalled that he wants to distance the Vatican from scandals of the past, sanctioning a new investigation into a key witness against Cardinal Becciu’s conviction which could help overturn his conviction at the appeal this fall. On top of that, he will look into ways to boost profits in the Holy See’s vast real estate portfolio, after prelates complained about underinvestment, said the cardinal quoted above.  How all this pans out will depend on not only American largesse but whether Leo can empower the growing caucus of Church pragmatists who recognize that even the Holy See must occasionally lower itself to earthly responsibilities like basic financial planning. For others, the divine mission still trumps all — whatever the cost. “There will always be a way to get money, just like there will always be the poor,” said one prelate in St. Peter’s Square last month. “Right now, my concern is lunch.”