BERLIN — Chancellor Friedrich Merz is mounting an unusually assertive effort to project German leadership at the heart of the EU, positioning himself as the defender not only of Ukraine but, by his own account, of Europe as a whole. This represents a stark shift in Germany’s approach to world affairs. Merz’s predecessors, Olaf Scholz and Angela Merkel, were reluctant to put the country in such an outspoken lead role internationally or within the EU. Rather, Germany tended to hang back and avoid undue risk. Germans even coined a slang verb — “to Merkel,” or Merkeln — to connote dithering. Merz has taken a far more active stance inside the EU — assuming a role more traditionally played by France’s now weakened President Emmanuel Macron. He has placed himself as Europe’s most visible advocate of a risk-laden EU plan to replenish Ukraine’s war chest with a €210 billion loan backed by Russian frozen assets. Earlier this month he visited Belgium’s prime minister, Bart De Wever, who has rejected the plan, along with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in an effort to convince the Belgian to drop his opposition. “When it comes to managing European issues, Merz is truly the polar opposite of Merkel,” an Italian diplomat said of that effort. Outside of EU affairs, the Trump administration’s wavering on military aid for Ukraine and the erosion of the transatlantic alliance have compelled Merz to push Germany beyond long familiar limits when it comes to foreign policy. Given this seismic realignment, Merz has repeatedly vowed that Germany will play a “leading role” internationally. “Ukraine’s fate is the fate of all of Europe,” Merz said on Monday alongside Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. “And in this respect, it is a key task, and I have taken it upon myself to closely support Ukraine in the negotiations that are currently taking place here in Berlin.” IS EUROPE CAPABLE OF ‘STANDING TOGETHER?’ Merz’s attempt to make good on the promise to lead has been on full display this week. While praising Donald Trump for pressing for a peace deal, the chancellor has in many ways set himself in direct opposition to the U.S. president, working to ensure that Washington doesn’t impose an unfavorable deal. The Trump administration has also opposed the EU proposal on Russia’s frozen reserves, hoping instead to turn a profit on those assets as part of a potential peace agreement. “Washington is now exerting tremendous pressure here, which is why it is also a question of asserting ourselves against Washington,” Norbert Röttgen, a senior German lawmaker belonging to Merz’s conservatives, told POLITICO.  Ahead of a key meeting of European leaders on Thursday, Merz is depicting the looming decision on whether to leverage frozen Russian central bank assets in the EU as a test of whether Europe can still stand up for itself. “Let us not deceive ourselves. If we do not succeed in this, the European Union’s ability to act will be severely damaged for years, if not for a longer period,” Merz said on Monday. “And we will show the world that, at such a crucial moment in our history, we are incapable of standing together and acting to defend our own political order on this European continent.”  Friedrich Merz’s predecessors, Olaf Scholz and Angela Merkel, were reluctant to put the country in such an outspoken lead role internationally or within the EU. | Maja Hitij/Getty Images In a reflection of his government’s new assertiveness, Merz has made Berlin a nexus of diplomacy over a potential peace deal. On Sunday and Monday he hosted Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and U.S. special envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. On Monday evening, many of Europe’s most powerful leaders converged over dinner in Berlin to discuss the outlines of a possible deal. “Berlin is now at the center of very important diplomatic talks and decisions,” Zelenskyy said Monday. “These talks are always complex, never easy, but they were very productive.” Merz, too, standing alongside the Ukrainian leader, appeared to play up the role Germany has assumed in recent negotiations. “We have seen great diplomatic momentum — perhaps the greatest since the start of the war,” he said. “We now have the chance for a genuine peace process for Ukraine. This seedling is still small, but the opportunity is real.” MERZ OVERSTEPS But Merz’s efforts to put Germany forward as a key EU leader on Ukraine and other matters, from defense to trade, are also replete with risk. European leaders have largely welcomed Merz’s willingness to take on a greater leadership role — particularly the chancellor’s decision, even before he took office, to unlock hundreds of billions of euros in borrowing to bolster Germany’s military. But as Europe’s biggest economy, Germany’s exercise of power within a union of 27 countries requires a delicate balancing act, and at times of late, Merz has appeared to overstep. After the Trump administration released its National Security Strategy, which depicted the EU as a transnational body that “undermines political liberty and sovereignty,” Merz condemned the document as “unacceptable.” At the same time he offered Trump a workaround that seemed to undermine the EU even more: “If you can’t get on board with Europe, then at least make Germany your partner.” Merz has tried to assert German interests in EU trade negotiations as well as on the issue of the EU’s proposed combustion engine ban, successfully watering it down. However, the greater risk for Merz lies in whether his latest efforts succeed or fail. By depicting European leaders’ looming decisions on Russian assets this week as a make-or-break moment for the EU and for Ukraine, Merz may be setting himself up for embarrassment given Belgian and Italian opposition to the plan. “It is a very active role that [Merz] is playing,” Röttgen told POLITICO. “Not because there is great competition for a leadership role, but because, in my view, Germany is currently best suited to take this initiative.” “This also has something to do with the fiscal possibilities that exist in Germany. We are by far the biggest supporter of Ukraine at the moment. But this should not take the form of national support, but rather European support. It needs to be organized, and in my view, that is a task for Merz.” Gerardo Fortuna contributed to this report from Brussels.

Jamie Dettmer is opinion editor and a foreign affairs columnist at POLITICO Europe. Over the past few days, Ukraine has been hitting Russia back as hard as it can with long-range drone strikes, and it has three objectives in mind: lifting Ukrainian spirits as the country suffers blackouts from Russia’s relentless air attacks; demonstrating to Western allies that it has plenty of fight left; and, finally, cajoling Moscow into being serious about peace negotiations and offering concessions. However, the latter is likely to be a forlorn endeavor. And at any rate, amid the ongoing diplomatic chaos, which negotiations are they aiming for? U.S. President Donald Trump’s negotiators have been talking up the prospects of a peace deal — or at least being closer to one than at any time since Russia’s invasion began nearly four years ago. But few in either Kyiv or Europe’s other capitals are persuaded the Kremlin is negotiating in good faith and wants a peace deal that will stick. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz certainly doesn’t think so. Last week, he argued that Russian President Vladimir Putin is just spinning things out, “clearly playing for time.” Many Ukrainian politicians are also of a similar mind, including Yehor Cherniev, deputy chairman of the Committee on National Security, Defense and Intelligence of Ukraine’s Rada: “We see all the signals they’re preparing to continue the war, increasing arms production, intensifying their strikes on our energy infrastructure,” he told POLITICO.  “When it comes to the talks, I think the Russians are doing as much as they can to avoid irritating Donald Trump, so he won’t impose more sanctions on them,” he added. Indeed, according to fresh calculations by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs’ Janis Kluge, Russia has increased its military spending by another 30 percent year-on-year, reaching a record $149 billion in the first nine months of 2025. The war effort is now eating up about 44 percent of all Russian federal tax revenue — a record high. And as social programs are gutted to keep up, some Western optimists believe that Russia’s anemic growing economy and the staggering cost of war mean Putin soon won’t have any realistic option but to strike an agreement. But predictions of economic ruin forcing Putin’s hand have been made before. And arguably, Russia’s war economy abruptly unwinding may pose greater political and social risks to his regime than continuing his war of attrition, as Russian beneficiaries — including major business groups, security services and military combatants — would suffer a serious loss of income while seeking to adapt to a postwar economy. The war also has the added bonus of justifying domestic political repression. War isn’t only a means but an end in itself for Putin, and patriotism can be a helpful tool in undermining dissent. Nonetheless, the introduction of Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner as a key negotiator is significant — he is “Trump’s closer” after all, and his full engagement suggests Washington does think it can clinch a deal with one last heave. Earlier this month, U.S. Special Envoy Gen. Keith Kellogg had indicated a deal was “really close,” with a final resolution hanging on just two key issues: the future of the Donbas and the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. The negotiations are in the “last 10 meters,” he said. But again, which negotiations? Those between Washington and Moscow? Or those between Washington and Kyiv and the leaders of Europe’s coalition of the willing? Either way, both have work to do if there is to be an end to the war. Putin has refused to negotiate with Kyiv and Europe directly, in effect dispatching Trump to wring out concessions from them. And no movement Trump’s negotiators secure seems to satisfy a Kremlin that’s adept at dangling the carrot — namely, a possible deal to burnish the U.S. president’s self-cherished reputation as a great dealmaker, getting him ever closer to that coveted Nobel Peace Prize. Of course, for Putin, it all has the added benefit of straining the Western alliance, exploiting the rifts between Washington and Europe and widening them. All the frenzied diplomacy underway now seems more about appeasing Trump and avoiding the blame for failed negotiations or for striking a deal that doesn’t stick — like the Minsk agreements. For example, longtime Putin opponent Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s New Eurasian Strategies Center believes the Russian president remains “convinced that Russia retains an advantage on the battlefield,” and therefore “sees no need to offer concessions.” “He prefers a combination of military action and diplomatic pressure — a tactic that, in the Kremlin’s view, the West is no longer able to resist. At the same time, any peace agreement that meets Russia’s conditions would set the stage for a renewed conflict. Ukraine’s ability to defend itself would be weakened as a result of the inevitable political crisis triggered by territorial concessions, and the transatlantic security system would be undermined. This would create an environment that is less predictable and more conducive to further Russian pressure,” they conclude. Indeed, the only deal that might satisfy Putin would be one that, in effect, represents Ukrainian capitulation — no NATO membership, a cap on the size of Ukraine’s postwar armed forces, the loss of all of the Donbas, recognition of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and no binding security guarantees. But this isn’t a deal Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy can ink — or if he did, it would throw Ukraine into existential political turmoil. “I don’t see the Parliament ever passing anything like that,” opposition lawmaker Oleksandra Ustinova told POLITICO. And if it did, “it might lead to a civil war” with many patriots who have fought, seeing it as a great betrayal, she added. “Everybody understands, and everybody supports Zelenskyy in doing what he’s doing in these negotiations because we understand if he gives up, we’re done for.” Not that she thinks he will. So, don’t expect any breakthroughs in the so-called peace talks this week. Putin will maintain his maximalist demands while sorrowfully suggesting a deal could be struck if only Zelenskyy would be realistic, while the Ukrainian leader and his European backers will do their best to counter. And they will all be performing to try and stay in Trump’s good books.  

BRUSSELS — The European Union faces a critical week as it seeks to shield Ukraine from a humiliating peace deal carved out by the U.S. and Russia while attempting to salvage an agreement to fund a multi-billion euro loan to keep Kyiv afloat. After a series of stinging attacks from Washington ― including Donald Trump telling POLITICO that European leaders are “weak” ― the coming days will be a real test of their mettle. On Monday leaders will attempt to build bridges and use their powers of persuasion over the peace agreement when they meet Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and U.S. officials in Berlin. At the same time in Brussels, EU foreign ministers and diplomats will battle to win over a growing number of European governments that oppose the loan plan. By Thursday, when all 27 leaders gather in the Belgian capital for what promises to be one of the most pivotal summits in years, they’ll hope to have more clarity on whether the intense diplomacy has paid off. With Trump’s stinging put-downs ― Europe’s leaders “talk, but they don’t produce” ― and NATO chief Mark Rutte’s stark warnings about the the threat from Russia ringing in their ears, they’re taking nothing for granted. “We are Russia’s next target, and we are already in harm’s way,” Rutte said last week. “Russia has brought war back to Europe and we must be prepared for the scale of war our grandparents and great grandparents endured.” Little wonder then that European officials are casting the next few days as existential. The latest shot of 11th-hour diplomacy will see the leaders of the U.K., Germany and possibly France, potentially with Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner and his special envoy Steve Witkoff, meeting with Zelenskyy in Berlin. As if to underscore the significance of the meeting, “numerous European heads of state and government, as well as the leaders of the EU and NATO, will join the talks” after the initial discussion, said Stefan Kornelius, spokesperson for German Chancellor Friedrich Merz. French President Emmanuel Macron hasn’t confirmed his attendance but spoke to Zelenskyy by telephone on Sunday. The discussion will represent Europe’s attempt to influence the final settlement, weeks after a 28-point peace plan drafted by Witkoff  — reportedly with the aid of several Kremlin officials — provoked a furious backlash in both Kyiv and European capitals. They’ve since scrambled to put together an alternative. Further European disunity this week would send a “disastrous signal to Ukraine,” said one EU official. That outcome wouldn’t just be a hammer blow to the war-struck nation, the official added: “It’s also fair to say that Europe will then fail as well.” EMPTYING TERRITORIES This time the focus will be on a 20-point amendment to the plan drafted by Kyiv and its European allies and submitted to Washington for review last week. The contents remain unclear, and nothing is decided, but the fate of the Ukrainian territories under Russian occupation is particularly thorny. Trump has pitched emptying out the territories of Ukrainian and Russian troops and establishing a demilitarized “free economic zone” where U.S. business interests could operate. Ukraine has rejected that proposal, according to a French official, who was granted anonymity because of the sensitivity of the negotiations. The U.S. has insisted on territorial concessions despite fierce European objections, the official added, creating friction with the Trump administration. Leaders will attempt to build bridges and use their powers of persuasion over the peace agreement when they meet Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and U.S. officials in Berlin. | Antonio Masiello/Getty Images Europe’s leaders insist there can be no progress on territory before Ukraine is offered security guarantees. In a sign of movement toward some kind of deal, Zelenskyy said over the weekend he was willing to “compromise” and not demand NATO membership for Ukraine. Instead, the country should be afforded an ad-hoc collective defense arrangement, he told journalists in a WhatsApp conversation. “The bilateral security guarantees between Ukraine and the United States … and the security guarantees from our European colleagues for us, as well as from other countries such as Canada and Japan ― these security guarantees for us provide an opportunity to prevent another outbreak of Russian aggression,” he said. REPEATED SETBACKS Europe will have further opportunities to discuss the way forward after Monday. EU affairs ministers will continue on Tuesday in Brussels to thrash out plans for Thursday’s summit. In between, Wednesday will see the leaders of Europe’s “Eastern flank” ― with countries including the Baltics and Poland represented ― huddle in Helsinki. The EU has been trying for months to convince Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever to consent to a plan to use the cash value of the €185 billion in Russian state assets held in Brussels-based depository Euroclear to fund and arm Ukraine. (The remainder of the total €210 billion financial package would include €25 billion in frozen Russian assets held across the bloc.) In a sign the chances of a deal at Thursday’s summit are worsening rather than improving, Italy — the EU’s third-largest country — sided with Belgium’s demands to look for alternative options to finance Ukraine in a letter on Friday that was also signed by Malta and Bulgaria. Czechia’s new Prime Minister Andrej Babiš also rejected the plan on Sunday. “The more such cases we have the more likely it is that we will have to find other solutions,” an EU diplomat said. The five countries — even if joined by pro-Kremlin Hungary and Slovakia — would not be able to build a blocking minority, but their public criticism erodes the Commission’s hopes of striking a political deal this week. A meeting of EU ambassadors originally planned for Sunday evening was postponed until Monday. While the last-minute diplomatic effort has left many concerned the money might not be approved before the end of the year, with Ukraine in desperate need of the cash, three diplomats insisted they were sticking to the plan and that no alternatives were yet being considered. Belgium is engaging constructively with the draft measures, actively making suggestions and changes in the document to be considered when ambassadors meet on Monday, one of the diplomats and an EU official said. The decision on the Russian assets is “a decision on the future of Europe and will determine whether the EU is still a relevant actor,” a German official said. “There is no option B.” Bjarke Smith-Meyer, Nick Vinocur, Victor Jack and Zoya Sheftalovich in Brussels, Veronika Melkozerova in Kyiv, Clea Caulcutt and Laura Kayali in Paris and Nette Nöstlinger in Berlin contributed to this report.

As a frontline NATO heavyweight, Poland is seething at being relegated to the diplomatic sidelines on a potential peace deal in Ukraine. When leaders from the U.K., France, Germany and Ukraine gathered in London this week to align their stances on Washington’s fast-moving push for a peace deal, Poland wasn’t to be found on the guest list. It was the second snub in as many months, after Warsaw also missed an invitation to a crunch peace summit in Geneva on Nov. 23. Poland’s exclusion from the top table is a bitter blow for a country that has taken one of the EU’s most active positions on Ukraine — and the right-wing nationalist camp around President Karol Nawrocki has wasted no time in blaming liberal Prime Minister Donald Tusk for the flop. “Poland’s absence in London is yet another example of Donald Tusk’s incompetence,” Marek Pęk, a senator from the nationalist Law and Justice party, raged after the Downing Street meeting, calling Tusk “a second-tier politician in Europe.” The reasons for Polish frustration are clear. Poland not only hosts 1 million Ukrainian refugees and acts as the key supply hub for Ukraine, but Warsaw also plays a pivotal role in pressing Europe toward rearmament. Poland is NATO’s highest per capita spender on defense and wants to more than double its military — already the alliance’s third biggest — to 500,000 personnel. TUSK ON THE MARGINS Tusk has also betrayed some frustration at Poland’s exile to the diplomatic margins. After the meeting in Geneva, he asked to be added to the joint European communiqué — a face-saving request that Warsaw commentators said merely underlined Poland’s absence. Donald Tusk has betrayed some frustration at Poland’s exile to the diplomatic margins. | Halil Sagirkaya/Anadolu via Getty Images In Berlin last week, standing beside German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Tusk tried to defuse the awkwardness over the diplomatic rebuff to Poland with a touch of irony. “I don’t want to stir emotions, but let’s say this plainly: Not everyone in Washington — and certainly no one in Moscow — wants Poland to be present everywhere,” he said, before adding that he took this banishment — presumably a reflection of Poland’s dogged defense of Ukraine — “as a compliment.” The government insists nothing unusual occurred in London. The format “was proposed by Prime Minister [Keir] Starmer,” government spokesperson Adam Szłapka said, arguing that “there are dozens of such formats, and they change constantly. Not every format produces results, and Poland does not have to — and should not — participate in all of them.”  He noted that Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski had joined a call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Starmer after the meeting — proof, he said, that Poland “remains fully engaged.” Polish officials are also quick to point out there are no actual peace negotiations with Russia, at least for now. “These are snapshots, not the architecture,” one diplomat said of Warsaw’s absences. “It’s too early for hysteria.” The diplomat, like others in this story, was granted anonymity to speak freely on a topic of political sensitivity. FROM PLAYMAKER TO BYSTANDER In the early years of the war, Poland was impossible to ignore. It sent much of its arsenal to Ukraine, cajoled Berlin into sending Leopard tanks to Kyiv, and served as NATO’s indispensable logistics hub, most notably from an airbase near the city of Rzeszów. President Karol Nawrocki has been busy building up his own foreign-policy credentials. | Alexi J. Rosenfeld/Getty Images But much of that leverage has faded. Poland’s Soviet-era weapons stocks are depleted and its vast rearmament drive won’t free up anything it can spare abroad for years. Meanwhile, France, Germany and the U.K. are now promising new air-defense systems, long-range missiles and — crucially — are willing to contribute troops to any future monitoring or peacekeeping mission in Ukraine. Even if they are just that — promises — Poland has already ruled that out. In discussions now centered on cease-fire enforcement and security guarantees, past support matters less than deployable assets, and Kyiv has adjusted accordingly. Zelenskyy is now leaning heavily on capitals that can bring something new to the table. “Americans don’t want us, European leaders don’t want us, Kyiv doesn’t want us — so who does?” former Prime Minister Leszek Miller said after the London talks. “Something unpleasant is happening, and we should stop pretending otherwise.” Former President Bronisław Komorowski, a political ally of Tusk, argued that Poland’s absence reflected geopolitical realities, not diplomatic failure.  London brought together “the three strongest European countries” — politically, militarily and economically — the ones contributing the most to Ukraine’s war effort, he said. Poland, he added, “is simply weaker,” and while Europe values Warsaw’s role, it must be “in line with its real weight.” SPLIT-SCREEN DIPLOMACY Poland’s quest for diplomatic heft is hardly helped by its difficulties speaking with one voice abroad. As Tusk focuses on European coordination efforts, nationalist opposition-backed President Nawrocki has been busy building up his own foreign-policy credentials, jetting off to Washington, cultivating contacts around Donald Trump’s administration, and speaking publicly about Poland’s “independent voice.”  The two sides exchange frequent jabs. Tusk recently reminded Nawrocki that the Polish constitution entrusts foreign policy to the government, not to the presidency. Despite the theatrics, both camps share the same hard line on Russia. What they don’t share is a strategy for navigating Washington. Government officials acknowledge Nawrocki currently has more direct access to the White House.  His senior foreign policy adviser, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, puts it bluntly: “Trump will never meet Tusk. He will meet the president. Thanks to him, Poland still has a channel to Washington.” Nawrocki’s circle argues this gives him leverage Tusk can’t match. Without access to Trump, Tusk “adds nothing distinctive” to high-level Western conversations, Saryusz-Wolski told POLITICO. In his view, unless someone with the president’s standing asserts Poland’s interests at the highest level, the country will simply follow whatever compromise Paris, Berlin and London shape with Washington. Officials concede privately that a channel to Washington matters — and for now, Nawrocki has it. Still, they also warn that betting everything on a single, unpredictable U.S. president is risky, especially after the new U.S. security strategy openly signaled that Europe must take far greater responsibility for its own defense. The consequence of Nawrocki handling diplomacy with Trump while Tusk deals with Europe is that it can look like two foreign policies at once. “The problem is not Poland’s position,” said a senior Western European diplomat, referring to the country’s pro-Ukraine stance. “The problem is knowing who speaks for Poland.” If it’s any consolation to Tusk, Germany’s Merz insists that he is taking Warsaw’s position into account. “My position toward Poland is very clear: We do nothing without close coordination with Poland,” the chancellor told Tusk last week.

President Donald Trump’s pursuit of an end to the war between Russia and Ukraine is increasingly being driven by his own impatience — with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and European leaders who Trump believes are standing in the way of both peace and future economic cooperation between Washington and Moscow. Trump, who has called for Russia’s return to the G7 and spoken repeatedly about his eagerness to bring Russia back into the economic fold, laid bare his frustrations Monday at the White House with POLITICO’s Dasha Burns for a special episode of “The Conversation.” He derided European leaders as talkers who “don’t produce” and declared that Zelenskyy has “to play ball” given that, in his view, “Russia has the upper hand.” Zelenskyy, who Trump grumbled hadn’t read the latest peace proposal, spent Monday working with the leaders of France, Germany and Britain on a revision of the Americans’ 28-point proposal that he said has been shaved down to 20 points. “We took out openly anti-Ukrainian points,” Zelenskyy told a group of reporters in Kyiv, emphasizing that Ukraine still needs stronger security guarantees and that he isn’t ready to give Russia more land in the Donbas than its military currently holds. With Russia unlikely to budge from its demands, the White House-driven peace talks appear stalled. And as Trump’s irritation deepens, pressure is mounting on the Europeans backing Zelenskyy to prove Trump wrong. “He says we don’t produce, and I hate to say it, but there’s been some truth to that,” said a European official, one of three interviewed for this report who were granted anonymity because they were not authorized to speak publicly. “We are doing it now, but we have been slow to realize we are the solution to our problem.” The official pointed to NATO’s increased defense spending commitments and the PURL initiative, through which NATO allies are buying U.S. weapons to send to Ukraine, as evidence that things have started to shift. But in the near term, the European Union is struggling to convince Belgium to support a nearly $200 billion loan to Ukraine funded with seized Russian assets. “If we fail on this one, we’re in trouble,” said a second European official. Trump’s mounting pressure on Ukraine makes clear that months of careful management of the president through private texts, public flattery and general deference has gotten Europe very little. But Liana Fix, a senior fellow for Europe at the Council on Foreign Relations, said that the leaders on the other side of the Atlantic “know very well that they can’t just stand up to Trump and tell him courageously that, you know, this is not how you treat Europe, because [of] the existential dependence that is still there between Europe and the United States.” Still, some in Europe continue to express shock and revulsion over Trump’s lopsided diplomacy in favor of Russia, disputing the president’s assessment during his POLITICO interview that Putin’s army has the upper hand despite its slow advance across the Donbas, more than half of which is now in Russian control. “Our view is not that Ukraine is losing. If Russia was so powerful they would have been able to finish the war within 24 hours,” a third European diplomat said. “If you think that Russia is winning, what does that mean — you give them everything? That’s not a sustainable peace. You’ll reward the Russians for their aggression and they will look for more – not only in Ukraine but also in Europe.” Trump has refused to approve additional defense aid to Ukraine, while blasting his predecessor for sending billions in aid — approved by Democrats and many Republicans in Congress — to help the country defend itself following Russia’s Feb. 2022 invasion. Jake Sullivan, President Joe Biden’s national security adviser, said Trump’s brief that Russia is prevailing on the battlefield doesn’t match the reality. “Russia has not achieved its strategic objectives in Ukraine. It has completely failed in its initial objective to take Kyiv and subjugate the country, and it has even failed in its more limited objective in taking all of the Donbas and neutering Ukraine from a security perspective,” Sullivan said, adding that he thinks Ukraine could prevail militarily with stronger U.S. support. “But if the United States throws Ukraine under the bus and essentially takes Russia’s side functionally, then things, of course, are much more difficult for Ukraine, and that seems to be the direction of travel this administration is taking.” The White House did not respond to a request for additional comment. Clearly eager to normalize relations with Moscow, Trump appears to be motivated more by the prospect of cutting deals with Putin than maintaining a transatlantic alliance built on shared democratic principles. Fiona Hill, a Russia expert who served on Trump’s national security council in his first term, noted that the U.S.-Russia diplomacy involves three people with business backgrounds and investment portfolios: special envoy Steve Witkoff and Trump son-in-law Jared Kushner on the U.S. side and Russia’s Kirill Dmitriev, the head of Russia’s sovereign investment fund. “Putin’s always thinking about what’s the angle here? How do I approach somebody? He’s got the number of President Trump,” Hill said Monday on a Brookings Institution podcast. “He knows he wants to make a deal, and he’s emphasizing this, and all the context is business, not really as diplomacy.” Additionally, Trump is eager to end Europe’s decades-long dependence on the U.S., which he believes has been saddled with the burden of its continental security for far too long. Ending the war with a deal that largely favors Putin would not only burnish Trump’s own self-conception as a global peacemaker — it would serve final notice to Europe that many of America’s oldest and most steadfast allies are truly on their own. Trump’s new national security strategy, released last week, made that point explicit, devoting more words to the threat of Europe’s civilizational decline — castigating the entire continent over its immigration and economic policies — than to threats posed by China, Russia or North Korea. Asked by POLITICO if European countries would continue to be U.S. allies, Trump demurred: “It depends,” he said, harshly criticizing immigration policies. “They want to be politically correct, and it makes them weak.” Europe, despite years of warnings from Trump and their own growing awareness about the need for what French President Emanuel Macron has called “strategic autonomy,” has been slow to mobilize its defenses to be able to defend the continent — and Ukraine — on its own. At Trump’s behest, NATO members agreed in June to increase defense spending to 5 percent of GDP over the coming decade. And NATO is now purchasing U.S. weapons to send to Ukraine through a new NATO initiative. But it may be too little, too late as the war grinds into a fourth winter with Ukraine’s military low on ammunition, weapons and morale. “That is why they will continue to engage this administration despite the strategy,” Fix said. And while Trump sees Ukraine and European stubbornness as the primary impediment to peace, many longtime diplomats believe that it’s his own unwillingness to ratchet up pressure on Moscow — Trump imposed new sanctions on Russian oil last month, only to pull some of them back — that is rendering his peacemaking efforts so fruitless. “It’s not enough to want peace. You’ve got to create a context in which the protagonists are willing to compromise either enthusiastically or reluctantly,” said Richard Haass, the former president of the Council on Foreign Relations who served as a senior adviser to Secretary of State Colin Powell in the George W. Bush administration. “The president has totally failed to do that, so it’s not a question of wordsmithing. In order to succeed at the table, you have to succeed away from the table. And they have failed to do that.” Veronika Melkozerova, Ari Hawkins and Daniella Cheslow contributed to this report.

DOHA, Qatar — Inside the U.S., President Donald Trump is dogged by rising consumer prices, the Epstein files debacle, and Republicans’ newfound willingness to defy him. But go 100 miles, 1,000 miles, or, as I recently did, 7,000 miles past U.S. borders, and Trump’s domestic challenges — and the sinking poll numbers that accompany them — matter little. The U.S. president remains a behemoth in the eyes of the rest of the world. A person who could wreck another country. Or perhaps the only one who can fix another country’s problems. That’s the sense I got this weekend from talking to foreign officials and global elites at this year’s Doha Forum, a major international gathering focused on diplomacy and geopolitics. Over sweets, caffeine and the buzz of nearby conversations, some members of the jet set wondered if Trump’s domestic struggles will lead him to take more risks abroad — and some hope he does. This comes as Trump faces criticism from key MAGA players who say he’s already too focused on foreign policy. “He doesn’t need Capitol Hill to get work done from a foreign policy standpoint,” an Arab official said of Trump, who, let’s face it, has made it abundantly clear he cares little about Congress. Vuk Jeremic, a former Serbian foreign minister, told me that whether people like Trump or not, “I don’t think that there is any doubt that he is a very, very consequential global actor.” He wasn’t the only one who used the term “consequential.” The word doesn’t carry a moral judgment. A person can be consequential whether they save the world or destroy it. What the word does indicate in this context is the power of the U.S. presidency. The weakest U.S. president is still stronger than the strongest leader of most other countries. America’s wealth, weapons and global reach ensure that. U.S. presidents have long had more latitude and ability to take direct action on foreign policy than domestic policy. They also often turn to the global stage when their national influence fades in their final years in office, when they don’t have to worry about reelection. There’s a reason Barack Obama waited until his final two years in office to restore diplomatic ties with Cuba. In the first year of his second term, Trump has stunned the world repeatedly, on everything from gutting U.S. foreign aid to bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities. He remains as capricious as ever, shifting sides on everything from Russia’s war on Ukraine to whether he wants to expel Palestinians from Gaza. He seeks a Nobel Peace Prize but is threatening a potential war with Venezuela. Trump managed to jolt the gathering at the glitzy Sheraton resort in Doha by unveiling his National Security Strategy — which astonished foreign onlookers on many levels — in the run-up to the event. The part that left jaws on the floor was its attack on America’s allies in Europe, which it claimed faces “civilizational erasure.” The strategy’s release led one panel moderator to ask the European Union’s top diplomat, Kaja Kallas, whether Trump sees Europe as “the enemy.” Yet, some foreign officials praised Trump’s disruptive moves and said they hope he will keep shaking up a calcified international order that has left many countries behind. Several African leaders in particular said they wanted Trump to get more involved in ending conflicts on their continent, especially Sudan. They don’t care about the many nasty things Trump has said about Africa, waving that off as irrelevant political rhetoric. Trump claims to have already ended seven or eight wars. It’s a wild assertion, not least because some of the conflicts he’s referring to weren’t wars and some of the truces he’s brokered are shaky. When I pointed this out, foreign officials told me to lower my bar. Peace is a process, they stressed. If Trump can get that process going or rolling faster, it’s a win. Maybe there are still clashes between Rwanda and Congo. But at least Trump is forcing the two sides to talk and agree to framework deals, they suggested. “You should be proud of your president,” one African official said. (I granted him and several others anonymity to candidly discuss sensitive diplomatic issues involving the U.S.) Likewise, there’s an appreciation in many diplomatic corners about the economic lens Trump imposes on the world. Wealthy Arab states, such as Qatar, already are benefiting from such commercial diplomacy. Others want in, too. “He’s been very clear that his Africa policy should focus on doing business with Africa, and to me, that’s very progressive,” said Mthuli Ncube, Zimbabwe’s finance minister. He added that one question in the global diplomatic community is whether the next U.S. president — Democrat or Republican — will adopt Trump’s “creativity.” The diplomats and others gathered in Doha were well-aware that Trump appreciates praise but also sometimes respects those who stand up to him. So one has to tread carefully. Kallas, for instance, downplayed the Trump team’s broadsides against Europe in the National Security Strategy. Intentionally or not, her choice reflected the power differential between the U.S. and the EU. “The U.S. is still our biggest ally,” Kallas insisted. Privately, another European official I spoke to was fuming. The strategy’s accusations were “very disturbing,” they said. The official agreed, nonetheless, that Trump is too powerful for European countries to do much beyond stage some symbolic diplomatic protests. Few Trump administration officials attended the Doha Forum. The top names were Matt Whitaker, the U.S. ambassador to NATO, and Tom Barrack, the U.S. ambassador to Turkey. Donald Trump Jr. — not a U.S. official, but certainly influential — also made an appearance. Several foreign diplomats expressed optimism that Trump’s quest for a Nobel Peace Prize will guide him to take actions on the global stage that will ultimately bring more stability in the world — even if it is a rocky ride. A British diplomat said they were struck by Trump’s musings about gaining entry to heaven. Maybe a nervousness about the afterlife could induce Trump to, say, avoid a conflagration with Venezuela? “He’s thinking about his legacy,” the diplomat said. Even Hillary Clinton, the former secretary of State whom Trump defeated in the 2016 presidential race, was measured in her critiques. Clinton said “there’s something to be said for the dramatic and bold action” Trump takes. But she warned that the Trump team doesn’t do enough to ensure his efforts, including peace deals, have lasting effect. “There has to be so much follow-up,” she said during one forum event. “And there is an aversion within the administration to the kind of work that is done by Foreign Service officers, diplomats, others who are on the front lines trying to fulfill these national security objectives.” Up until the final minute of his presidency, Trump will have extraordinary power that reaches far past America’s shores. That’s likely to be the case even if the entire Republican Party has turned on him. At the moment, he has more than three years to go. Perhaps he will end immigration to the U.S., abandon Ukraine to Russia’s aggression or strike a nuclear deal with Iran. After all, Trump is, as Zimbabwe’s Ncube put it, not lacking in “creativity.”

John Kampfner is a British author, broadcaster and commentator. His latest book “In Search of Berlin” is published by Atlantic. He is a regular POLITICO columnist. When it comes to the war in Ukraine, predictions don’t last long. One minute U.S. President Donald Trump’s acting like his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin’s emissary, the next he’s giving Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy a reasonable hearing, and then it’s back again to the Kremlin camp. With the U.S. administration increasingly taking on the role of unreliable broker over a staunch ally, Europe is in a parlous position. And what has struck me most during a series of security briefings and conferences I’ve attended in Berlin and elsewhere this autumn, is the extent of the alarm. Yet, much of the time, this remains hidden behind closed doors. One of the few crumbs of comfort is that the E3 nations of Germany, France and Britain are seeking to confront this cold reality in unison. After the trauma of Brexit, and all the bickering between former German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and French President Emmanuel Macron in recent years, the mood has changed — because it had to. If Europe is to survive a future attack by Russia — and that is the kind of language being used — its big players must behave in a way they haven’t done before. They must be joined at the hip. As more than a dozen officials have made clear in a series of discussions, the cost of inaction would be far greater than the cost of supporting Ukraine has been so far. Not only would Putin be emboldened to go even further, Europe would also be engulfed by a wave of Ukrainian refugees far greater than anything experienced before. And this realignment was visible amid the pomp and circumstance of German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s state visit to the U.K. last week, as both he and King Charles affirmed what they described as a deep bond between the two countries — one that’s been reinforced by the shared threat of Russian expansionism. Meanwhile, the real business taking place at the government level is intense. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz have developed a genuine affinity, stemming from a shared view of current foreign-policy perils and their domestic-policy troubles. A British prime minister of the center-left and German chancellor of the center-right are finding common cause in their double adversity. The loss of the U.S. as a friend in need is what’s forcing this realignment for both countries. Of course, neither publicly dares admit the situation is as bad as it is, but the optics say everything that needs to be said. Just compare Trump’s state visit in September — with its high security, taut smiles and desperate obsequies by his hosts – and the relaxed conviviality of Steinmeier’s. And dominating everything is security — though it’s less a “coalition of the willing” and more a “coalition of the surrounded.” Or, as one German security official, granted anonymity to speak freely, explained: “If the Americans are now acting as mediators between Russia and Europe, they no longer see themselves as partners within NATO.” In practical terms, the U.S. is still the driving force behind the alliance, notionally at least. As another German military figure, also granted anonymity to express their views, put it: “The harsh truth is that Europe’s readiness level to combat any Russian aggression doesn’t yet exist. Until that time, we are reliant on the U.S. to act as a backstop.” But that penny should have dropped last February, when U.S. Vice President JD Vance dropped his various bombshells at the Munich Security Conference, attacking European democracies, praising the far-right Alternative for Germany party and serving notice that the U.S. no longer felt beholden to past allegiances. The real surprise is that anyone’s been surprised by the Trump administration’s actions since then. Even now, some are continuing to cling to the hope that this isn’t the united view in Washington, and that others within the administration still wield a certain influence. This isn’t how security planners in Germany or the U.K. see things, but it seems many politicians — and much of the public — are yet to be convinced of just how serious the situation has become. One minute U.S. President Donald Trump’s acting like his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin’s emissary, the next he’s giving Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy a reasonable hearing. | Pool Photo by Will Oliver via EPA Their alarm will have been reinforced by the second Trump administration’s first National Security Strategy. Published only a few days ago, it condemns many of the liberal values underpinning European democracy, while praising the nativist, nationalist rhetoric of the far-right — and implicitly of Putin.  Previously, the dominant narrative around Europe was about German reluctance, whether brought about by postwar guilt and pacificism or complacency. But while that has been replaced by a new determination, exactly how deeply is it entrenched? The commitment across NATO to increase defense spending to 5 percent of national GDP — 1.5 percent of which can be spent on “critical infrastructure” — certainly allows for much budgetary dexterity. But Berlin’s borrowing power gives it a freedom its neighbors can only envy. Britain’s financial travails are considerably more acute, and for all his tough talk, several defense contractors suspect Starmer is going slow on defense orders. As it stands, Germany is expected to spend €153 billion a year on defense by 2029. France, by comparison, plans to reach about €80 billion by 2030, and the U.K. currently spends £60 billion — a figure set to rise to £87 billion by 2030 — but looking at current predictions, will only hit its 3.5 percent target in 2035. For the governments in London and Paris, budgets are so tight and public service spending requirements so great — not to mention debt interest payments — the push-and-pull with security needs will only become more intense. And while opinion polls vary from country to country and depending on how questions are phrased, the growing concern among many defense officials is that if Ukraine is pressured enough to accept some form of Trump-Putin dirty deal, public support for military spending will decrease. “Job done” will be the sentiment — except, of course, it won’t be. For Putin, it can’t be. The Russian leader has tied his political survival, his power infrastructure and his country’s economy to the notion of an encircling Western “threat.” Hence his recent remarks about Russia being “ready” for war if Europe wants to start one — he simply can’t afford to stop invoking threats. But the original 28-point plan for Ukraine — which the U.S. initially denied came directly from the Kremlin — represents Europe’s worst nightmare. And if a spurious “peace” is imposed by any deal approximating that one, Germany, the U.K., France and their other European allies, including Poland, Finland, the Baltics, Nordics and (more cautiously) Italy, will know they’re out on their own. It would mark the return of big-power politics, a Yalta 2.0. It would enshrine NATO’s de-Americanization, a structural incapacity for Ukraine to defend itself, and confirm that, as far as the U.S. is concerned, Russia enjoys a veto on European security. “We say it’s existential, but we don’t yet act as if it is,” said one British defense official, speaking on condition of anonymity. The task for Merz, Starmer and Macron is then to accept — and admit to their publics — that they only have each other to rely on.

President Donald Trump intends for the U.S. to keep a bigger military presence in the Western Hemisphere going forward to battle migration, drugs and the rise of adversarial powers in the region, according to his new National Security Strategy. The 33-page document is a rare formal explanation of Trump’s foreign policy worldview by his administration. Such strategies, which presidents typically release once each term, can help shape how parts of the U.S. government allocate budgets and set policy priorities. The Trump National Security Strategy, which the White House quietly released Thursday, has some brutal words for Europe, suggesting it is in civilizational decline, and pays relatively little attention to the Middle East and Africa. It has an unusually heavy focus on the Western Hemisphere that it casts as largely about protecting the U.S. homeland. It says “border security is the primary element of national security” and makes veiled references to China’s efforts to gain footholds in America’s backyard. “The United States must be preeminent in the Western Hemisphere as a condition of our security and prosperity — a condition that allows us to assert ourselves confidently where and when we need to in the region,” the document states. “The terms of our alliances, and the terms upon which we provide any kind of aid, must be contingent on winding down adversarial outside influence — from control of military installations, ports, and key infrastructure to the purchase of strategic assets broadly defined.” The document describes such plans as part of a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. The latter is the notion set forth by President James Monroe in 1823 that the U.S. will not tolerate malign foreign interference in its own hemisphere. Trump’s paper, as well as a partner document known as the National Defense Strategy, have faced delays in part because of debates in the administration over elements related to China. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent pushed for some softening of the language about Beijing, according to two people familiar with the matter who were granted anonymity to describe internal deliberations. Bessent is currently involved in sensitive U.S. trade talks with China, and Trump himself is wary of the delicate relations with Beijing. The new National Security Strategy says the U.S. has to make challenging choices in the global realm. “After the end of the Cold War, American foreign policy elites convinced themselves that permanent American domination of the entire world was in the best interests of our country. Yet the affairs of other countries are our concern only if their activities directly threaten our interests,” the document states. In an introductory note to the strategy, Trump called it a “roadmap to ensure that America remains the greatest and most successful nation in human history, and the home of freedom on earth.” But Trump is mercurial by nature, so it’s hard to predict how closely or how long he will stick to the ideas laid out in the new strategy. A surprising global event could redirect his thinking as well, as it has done for recent presidents from George W. Bush to Joe Biden. Still, the document appears in line with many of the moves he’s taken in his second term, as well as the priorities of some of his aides. That includes deploying significantly more U.S. military prowess to the Western Hemisphere, taking numerous steps to reduce migration to America, pushing for a stronger industrial base in the U.S. and promoting “Western identity,” including in Europe. The strategy even nods to so-called traditional values at times linked to the Christian right, saying the administration wants “the restoration and reinvigoration of American spiritual and cultural health” and “an America that cherishes its past glories and its heroes.” It mentions the need to have “growing numbers of strong, traditional families that raise healthy children.” As POLITICO has reported before, the strategy spends an unusual amount of space on Latin America, the Caribbean and other U.S. neighbors. That’s a break with past administrations, who tended to prioritize other regions and other topics, such as taking on major powers like Russia and China or fighting terrorism. The Trump strategy suggests the president’s military buildup in the Western Hemisphere is not a temporary phenomenon. (That buildup, which has included controversial military strikes against boats allegedly carrying drugs, has been cast by the administration as a way to fight cartels. But the administration also hopes the buildup could help pressure Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro to step down.) The strategy also specifically calls for “a more suitable Coast Guard and Navy presence to control sea lanes, to thwart illegal and other unwanted migration, to reduce human and drug trafficking, and to control key transit routes in a crisis.” The strategy says the U.S. should enhance its relationships with governments in Latin America, including working with them to identify strategic resources — an apparent reference to materials such as rare earth minerals. It also declares that the U.S. will partner more with the private sector to promote “strategic acquisition and investment opportunities for American companies in the region.” Such business-related pledges, at least on a generic level, could please many Latin American governments who have long been frustrated by the lack of U.S. attention to the region. It’s unclear how such promises square with Trump’s insistence on imposing tariffs on America’s trade partners, however. The National Security Strategy spends a fair amount of time on China, though it often doesn’t mention Beijing directly. Many U.S. lawmakers — on a bipartisan basis — consider an increasingly assertive China the gravest long-term threat to America’s global power. But while the language the Trump strategy uses is tough, it is careful and far from inflammatory. The administration promises to “rebalance America’s economic relationship with China, prioritizing reciprocity and fairness to restore American economic independence.” But it also says “trade with China should be balanced and focused on non-sensitive factors” and even calls for “maintaining a genuinely mutually advantageous economic relationship with Beijing.” The strategy says the U.S. wants to prevent war in the Indo-Pacific — a nod to growing tensions in the region, including between China and U.S. allies such as Japan and the Philippines. “We will also maintain our longstanding declaratory policy on Taiwan, meaning that the United States does not support any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait,” it states. That may come as a relief to Asia watchers who worry Trump will back away from U.S. support for Taiwan as it faces ongoing threats from China. The document states that “it is a core interest of the United States to negotiate an expeditious cessation of hostilities in Ukraine,” and to mitigate the risk of Russian confrontation with other countries in Europe. But overall it pulls punches when it comes to Russia — there’s very little criticism of Moscow. Instead, it reserves some of its harshest remarks for U.S.-allied nations in Europe. In particular, the administration, in somewhat veiled terms, knocks European efforts to rein in far-right parties, calling such moves political censorship. “The Trump administration finds itself at odds with European officials who hold unrealistic expectations for the [Ukraine] war perched in unstable minority governments, many of which trample on basic principles of democracy to suppress opposition,” the strategy states. The strategy also appears to suggest that migration will fundamentally change European identity to a degree that could hurt U.S. alliances. “Over the long term, it is more than plausible that within a few decades at the latest, certain NATO members will become majority non-European,” it states. “As such, it is an open question whether they will view their place in the world, or their alliance with the United States, in the same way as those who signed the NATO charter.” Still, the document acknowledges Europe’s economic and other strengths, as well as how America’s partnership with much of the continent has helped the U.S. “Not only can we not afford to write Europe off — doing so would be self-defeating for what this strategy aims to achieve,” it says. “Our goal should be to help Europe correct its current trajectory,” it says. Trump’s first-term National Security Strategy focused significantly on the U.S. competition with Russia and China, but the president frequently undercut it by trying to gain favor with the leaders of those nuclear powers. If this new strategy proves a better reflection of what Trump himself actually believes, it could help other parts of the U.S. government adjust, not to mention foreign governments. As Trump administration documents often do, the strategy devotes significant space to praising the commander-in-chief. It describes him as the “President of Peace” while favorably stating that he “uses unconventional diplomacy.” The strategy struggles at times to tamp down what seem like inconsistencies. It says the U.S. should have a high bar for foreign intervention, but it also says it wants to “prevent the emergence of dominant adversaries.” It also essentially dismisses the ambitions of many smaller countries. “The outsized influence of larger, richer, and stronger nations is a timeless truth of international relations,” the strategy states. The National Security Strategy is the first of several important defense and foreign policy papers the Trump administration is due to release. They include the National Defense Strategy, whose basic thrust is expected to be similar. Presidents’ early visions for what the National Security Strategy should mention have at times had to be discarded due to events. After the 9/11 attacks, George W. Bush’s first-term strategy ended up focusing heavily on battling Islamist terrorism. Biden’s team spent much of its first year working on a strategy that had to be rewritten after Russia moved toward a full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

LONDON — In February Britain’s cash-strapped Labour government cut international development spending — and barely anyone made a noise. The center-left party announced it would slice the country’s spending on aid down to only 0.3 percent of gross domestic income — from 0.5 percent — in order to fund a hike in defense spending. MPs, aid experts and officials have told POLITICO that the scale of the cuts is on a par with — or even exceeding — those of both the previous center-right Conservative government or the United States under Donald Trump. This leaves Britain’s development arm, once globally envied as a vehicle for poverty alleviation, a shadow of its former self. The move — prompted by U.S. demands to up its NATO spending, and mirroring the Trump administration’s move to gut its own USAID development budget — shocked Labour’s progressive MPs, supporters and backers in the aid sector. But unlike attempted cuts to British welfare spending, the real-world backlash was muted, with the resignation of Britain’s development minister prompting little further dissent or change in policy. There was no mutiny in parliament, and only limited domestic and international condemnation outside of an aid sector torn between making their voices heard — and keeping in Whitehall’s good books over slices of the shrinking pie. Some fear a return grab over the aid budget could still be on the cards — but that the government will find that there is little left to cut. Gideon Rabinowitz, director of policy and advocacy at Bond, the U.K. network for NGOs, warned that, instead of “reversing the cuts by the previous Conservative government, Labour has compounded them, and lives will be lost as a result.” “These cuts will further tarnish the U.K.’s reputation as it continues to be known as an unreliable global partner, breaking Labour’s manifesto commitment,” he warned. “The Conservatives started the fire, but instead of putting it out, this Labour government threw petrol on it.” ‘IT WAS THE PERFECT TIME TO DO IT’ When Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced the cut to international aid — a bid to save over £6 billion by 2027 — Labour MPs, including those who worked in the sector before being elected, were notably silent. The move followed a 2021 Conservative cut to aid spending — from 0.7 percent in the Tory brand-rebuilding David Cameron years down to 0.5 percent. At the time, Labour MPs had met that Tory cut with howls of outrage. This time it was different. Some were genuinely shocked, while others feared retribution from a Downing Street that had flexed its muscles at MPs who rebelled on what they saw as points of conscience. “No one was expecting it, so there was no opportunity to campaign around it,” said one Labour MP. “Literally none of us had any idea it was coming.” Remaining spending is largely mandatory contributions to organizations such as the World Bank. | Daniel Slim/AFP via Getty Images The same MP noted that there are around 50 Labour MPs from the new 2024 intake who had some form of development background before coming into parliament. Yet they were put “completely under the cosh” by Downing Street and government whips. “It was the perfect time to do it,” the MP said. A number of MPs who might have been vocal have since been made parliamentary private secretaries — the most junior government role. “They have basically gagged the people who would be most likely to be outspoken on it,” the MP above said. The department’s ministerial team is now more likely to be loyal to the Starmer project. “I just felt hurt, and wounded. We were stunned. None of us saw it coming,” said one MP from the 2024 cohort, adding: “They priced in that backlash wouldn’t come.” But they added: “If we were culpable so were NGOs, too inward-looking and focused on peripheral issues.” The lack of outcry from MPs would, however, seem to put them largely in step with the wider British public. Polling and focus groups from think tank More in Common suggest that despite the majority of voters thinking spending on international aid is the right thing to do in a variety of circumstances, only around 20 percent of the public think the budget was cut too much.  The second new-intake Labour MP quoted above said the policy was therefore an “easy thing to sell on the doorstep,” and “in my area, there’s not going to be shouting from the rooftops to spend more money on aid.” DIMINISHED AND DEMORALIZED The cuts to aid come at a time when Britain’s Foreign Office is undergoing a radical overhaul. While the department describes its plans as “more agile,” staff, programs and entire areas of focus are all ripe for cuts to save money. The department is looking to make redundancies for around 25 percent of staff based in the U.K. MPs have voiced concern that development staff will be among the first to make the jump due to the government’s shift away from aid. The department insists that no final decisions have been taken over the size and shape of the organization. Major cuts are expected across work on education, conflict, and WASH (Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene.) The government’s Integrated Security Fund — which funds key counter-terror programs abroad — is also looking to scale back work abroad which does not have a clear link to Britain’s national security. The British Council — a key soft-power organization viewed as helping combat Chinese and Russian reach across the world — told MPs it is in “real financial peril” and would be cutting its presence in 35 of the 97 countries it operates. The BBC’s World Service is seeing similar cuts to its global reach. The Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI), the watchdog for aid spending, is also not safe from the ax as the government continues its bonfire of regulators. The FCDO did not refute the expected pathway of cuts. Published breakdowns of spending allocations for the next three years are due to be published in the coming months, an official said. A review of Britain’s development and diplomacy policies conducted by economist Minouche Shafik — who has since been moved into Downing Street — sits discarded in the department. The government refuses to publish its findings. Aid spending was spared a repeat visit by Chancellor Rachel Reeves in her government-wide budget last month — but that hasn’t stopped MPs worrying about a second bite. | Pool Photo by Adrian Dennis via Getty Images The second 2024 intake MP quoted earlier in the piece said that following the U.S. decisions on aid and foreign policy “there was an expectation that the U.K., as a responsible international partner, as a leader on a lot of this stuff, would fill the gap to some extent, and then take more of a leadership role on it, and we’ve done the opposite.” NOTHING LEFT TO CUT Aid spending was spared a repeat visit by Chancellor Rachel Reeves in her government-wide budget last month — but that hasn’t stopped MPs worrying about a second bite. While few MPs or those in the aid sector feel Britain will ever return to the lofty heights of its 0.7 percent commitment, they predict there will be harder resistance if the government comes back for more. “I don’t think they’re going to try and do it again, as there’s no money left,” the second 2024 intake MP said. But they pointed out that a large portion of the remaining aid budget is spent on in-country costs such as accommodation for asylum seekers. Savings identified from the asylum budget would be sent back to the Treasury, rather than put back into the aid budget, they noted. Remaining spending is largely mandatory contributions to organizations such as the World Bank or the United Nations and would, they warned, involve “getting rid of international agreements and chopping up longstanding influence at big international institutions that we are one of the leading people in.” The United Nations is already facing its own funding crisis as it struggles to adjust to the global downturn in aid spending. British diplomat Tom Fletcher — who leads the UN’s humanitarian response — said earlier this year that the organization has been “forced into a triage of human survival,” adding: “The math is cruel, and the consequences are heartbreaking.” The government still has a commitment to returning to 0.7 percent of GNI “as soon as the fiscal circumstances allow.” The tests for this ramp back up were set out four years ago. Britain must not be borrowing for day-to-day spending and underlying debt must be falling. The last two budgets have forecast that the government will not meet these tests in this parliament. FARAGE CIRCLES In the meantime, Labour’s opponents feel emboldened to go further. Both the Conservatives and Reform UK have said that they would further cut the aid budget. The Tories have vowed to slice it down to 0.1 percent of GNI, while Nigel Farage’s Reform UK is eyeing fresh cuts of at least by £7-8 billion a year. A third 2024 Labour MP said that there was a degree of pressure among some colleagues to match the Conservatives’ 0.1 percent pledge. Though no country has gone as far as Uganda’s Idi Amin in setting up a “save Britain fund” for its “former colonial masters,” Britain’s departure on international aid gives space for other countries wanting to step up to further their own foreign policy aims. The space vacated by Britain and America has prompted warnings that China will step in, while countries newer to international development such as Gulf states could try and fill the void. Many of these nations are unlikely to ever fund the same projects as the U.K. and the U.S., forcing NGOs to look to alternate donors such as philanthropists to fund their work. “There’ll be a big, big gap, and it won’t be completely filled,” the second new intake MP said. An FCDO spokesperson said the department was undergoing “an unprecedented transformation,” and added: “We remain resolutely committed to international development and have been clear we must modernize our approach to development to reflect the changing global context. We will bring U.K. expertise and investment to where it is needed most, including global health solutions and humanitarian support.”

Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music * Amazon Music Brussels was jolted this week by dawn raids and an alleged fraud probe involving current and former senior EU diplomats. Host Sarah Wheaton speaks with Zoya Sheftalovich — a longtime Brussels Playbook editor who has just returned from Australia to begin her new role as POLITICO’s chief EU correspondent — and with Max Griera, our European Parliament reporter, to unpack what we know so far, what’s at stake for Ursula von der Leyen, and where the investigation may head next. Then, with Zoya staying in the studio, we’re joined by Senior Climate Correspondent Karl Mathiesen, Trade and Competition Editor Doug Busvine and Defense Editor Jan Cienski to take stock of the Commission’s first year — marked by this very bumpy week. We look at competitiveness, climate, defense and the fast-shifting global landscape — and our panel delivers its score for von der Leyen’s team.