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Rising ovarian cancer burden in Europe demands action now
Developed and funded by AbbVie in collaboration with the World Ovarian Cancer Coalition (the Coalition) and based on an interview with Christel Paganoni-Bruijns, chief executive officer of the Coalition, and Frances Reid, programme director of the Coalition -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Late diagnoses, burdensome treatments and disease recurrence are realities for many women with ovarian cancer.1,2,3,4,5 Their stories are evidence of systemic challenges impacting care that policymakers have the power to combat. The World Ovarian Cancer Coalition (the Coalition), the only global ovarian cancer patient advocacy organization, is driving evidence generation to inform tangible policy reforms that could reduce the socioeconomic burden of this disease on individuals and wider societies.6 Ovarian cancer is one of the deadliest cancers affecting women in Europe, yet it remains overlooked.7,8 While other areas of women’s health benefit from policy frameworks and public awareness, ovarian cancer continues to sit in the margins, creating real human consequences. In 2022, Europe recorded the highest rates of ovarian cancer incidence and mortality worldwide.8 Only 40 percent of women in Europe remain alive five years after being diagnosed with ovarian cancer, with advanced-stage diagnoses often having poorer outcomes.8 Despite this, ovarian cancer remains absent from many national cancer plans and there is still no unified European policy framework to address it.  In partnership with European patient groups, the Coalition is convening a series of workshops for ovarian cancer survivors to share their experiences. Alongside leading clinicians and advocates, the Coalition is leveraging these testimonies to develop policy recommendations to inform national and European cancer strategies. Christel Paganoni-Bruijns, the Coalition’s chief executive officer, and Frances Reid, programme director and Every Woman Study lead, share their insights into the challenges women with ovarian cancer face and how policy changes can offer improved support. The hidden emotional and physical cost  There are education and awareness gaps that can impede diagnosis and prioritization. Many women believe that cervical cancer screening (otherwise known as the Pap smear) can detect ovarian cancer.9 Another widespread misconception is that ovarian cancer has no symptoms until very advanced stages.10 However, the Coalition’s Every Woman Study (2021) found that nine in 10 women do experience symptoms, even during the early stages.11  “These misconceptions cause real harm. They delay diagnosis, they delay action and they stop women from being heard,” Reid comments.  The ovarian cancer journey can be distressingly complex. Women frequently undergo major surgery, multiple rounds of treatment and long recovery periods.4,12,13 Even after treatment ends, the fear of recurrence can cast a shadow over daily life.  Ovarian cancer often strikes when many women are still working, caring for children, supporting aging parents and contributing to their communities in a variety of ways. 14,15 When they fall ill, the consequences ripple outwards. Some partners have to reduce their working hours or leave employment entirely to care for their loved ones.16 Families may take on emotional strain and financial pressure that can carry lasting impacts.17,18  Reid says: “These women are mothers, daughters, employees, carers, community anchors. When they are affected, the impact is not only personal — it is economic, social and predictable.” The Coalition’s socioeconomic burden study explored the cost to health services, the impact of informal caregiving, productive time lost by patients traveling to and receiving care, and longer-term productivity impacts.17 It found that the majority of the socioeconomic impact of ovarian cancer does not come from health service costs, but from the value of lives lost.17 Across the 11 countries examined, ill-health from ovarian cancer led to lost labor productivity equivalent to 2.5 million days of work.17 In the U.K. alone, productivity losses amounted to over US$52 million per year.17 In 2026, the Coalition will look further into the socioeconomic impact across high-income countries across Europe. Despite this measurable burden, ovarian cancer remains under-prioritized in health planning and funding decisions. Why women still struggle to get the care they need  Across Europe, many women face delays at various stages along their journey, some due to policy and system design choices. For example, without screening methods for early detection, diagnosis relies heavily on recognizing symptoms and receiving timely referrals.1,19,20 Yet many women often struggle to access specialists or face long waits for investigations.2,11,21   While Europe benefits from world-class innovation in ovarian cancer research, access to that innovation can be inconsistent. Recently published data from the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) found that average time to availability for oncology products in Europe continues to increase, with 2024 data showing time from approval to access was 33 days slower than in 2023 and 66 days slower than in 2022.22 In 2024, it took an average of 586 days — or ~19 months — for patients to access new therapies after approval, with significant variation between countries.22 Delays in treatment impact prognosis and survival for patients with ovarian cancer.23 The challenges in care also extend to psychological and emotional support. The Every Woman Study found that only 28 percent of women were offered mental health support, despite the known vulnerabilities throughout treatment, recovery and recurrence.12   Paganoni-Bruijns and Reid reinforce that through the Coalition’s work, they have often found that “women feel unseen and unheard. They see progress in other cancers and ask: why not us?” What a better future looks like A better future starts with addressing ovarian cancer as part of a holistic vision and plan for women’s health. Europe has the foundational frameworks, infrastructure and clinical expertise to lead the way. What is needed now is political attention and policy alignment that includes ovarian cancer as part of these broader programs.  Paganoni-Bruijns comments: “We cannot keep treating gynecological cancers as if they exist in separate boxes. Women experience their health as one reality, so policies must reflect that.”  Existing structures in breast and cervical cancer offer valuable lessons. Across Europe, millions of women already move through screening programs, health promotion initiatives and established diagnostic pathways.24 These systems could be used to increase awareness of ovarian cancer symptoms, improve referral routes and access to specialist care, and support earlier detection. Increased investment in genetic and biomarker testing, as well as emerging early detection research, can be accelerated by aligning with these established programs. The Coalition is partnering with global experts to translate these lessons into the first-ever evidence-based framework for ovarian cancer mortality rate reduction, however, policy action at the regional and national level must keep pace.  The EU-funded DISARM project is a promising example of the progress underway to help Europe ‘disarm’ the threat of ovarian cancer. DISARM is a coordinated, multi-country effort to strengthen ovarian cancer risk assessment, validate affordable early-detection tools and understand how these innovations can be implemented within real-world health systems. Crucially, it is designed both to generate evidence and to address feasibility, uptake and system readiness, the factors that, together, determine whether innovation actually reaches patients.   As Paganoni-Bruijns explains, “DISARM shows what progress looks like when science, policy and patient experience are designed to work together. It is not about a single breakthrough or ‘quick fix’, but about building the conditions for earlier detection — through better risk assessment, validated tools and systems that are ready to use them.”  Yet projects like DISARM, while essential, cannot carry the burden alone. Without a cohesive European or global World Health Organization framework for ovarian cancer, progress remains fragmented, uneven and vulnerable to delay. Europe has often set the pace for global cancer policy and ovarian cancer should be no exception. By recognizing ovarian cancer as a priority within European women’s health, policymakers can be part of setting the global standard for a new era of coordinated and patient-centered care. Paganoni-Bruijns shares the Coalition’s call-to-action: “The systems exist. The evidence exists. We know that we need to include ovarian cancer in national cancer plans, improve diagnostic pathways, strengthen genetic testing and commit to EU-level monitoring. What is missing is prioritization. With leadership and accountability, ovarian cancer does not have to remain one of Europe’s deadliest cancers.” The stakes are rising and the window for meaningful action is narrowing. But with focused leadership, Europe can change the trajectory of ovarian cancer. Women across the continent deserve earlier diagnoses, access to innovation and the chance to live not just longer, but better. To understand why action on ovarian cancer cannot wait, listen to the Coalition’s Changing the Ovarian Cancer Story podcast series, or visit the Coalition’s website. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- References 1 Rampes S, et al. Early diagnosis of symptomatic ovarian cancer in primary care in the UK: opportunities and challenges. Prim Health Care Res Dev. 2022;23:e52. 2 Funston G, et al. Detecting ovarian cancer in primary care: can we do better? Br J Gen Pract. 2022;72:312-313.  3 Tookman L, et al. Diagnosis, treatment and burden in advanced ovarian cancer: a UK real-world survey of healthcare professionals and patients. Future Oncol. 2024;20:1657-1673.  4 National Cancer Institute. Ovarian Epithelial, Fallopian Tube, and Primary Peritoneal Cancer Treatment (PDQ) – Health Professional Version. Available at: https://www.cancer.gov/types/ovarian/hp/ovarian-epithelial-treatment-pdq [Last accessed: January 2026]. 5 Beesley et al. Evaluating patient-reported symptoms and late adverse effects following completion of first-line chemotherapy for ovarian cancer using the MOST (Measure of Ovarian Symptoms and Treatment concerns). Gynecologic Oncology 164 (2022):437-445.  6 World Ovarian Cancer Coalition. About the World Ovarian Cancer Coalition. Available at: https://worldovariancancercoalition.org/about-us/ [Last accessed: January 2026]. 7 Manzano A, Košir U, Hofmarcher T. Bridging the gap in women’s cancers care: a global policy report on disparities, innovations and solutions. IHE Report 2025:12. The Swedish Institute for Health Economics (IHE); 2025. 8 ENGAGe. Ovarian Cancer. Available at: https://engage.esgo.org/gynaecological-cancers/ovarian-cancer/ [Last accessed: January 2026].  9 Target Ovarian Cancer. Driving change through knowledge – updated NHS cervical screening guide. Available at: https://targetovariancancer.org.uk/news/driving-change-through-knowledge-updated-nhs-cervical-screening-guide [Last accessed: January 2026]. 10 Goff BA, et al. Frequency of Symptoms of Ovarian Cancer in Women Presenting to Primary Care Clinics. JAMA. 2004;291(22):2705–2712.  11 Reid F, et al. The World Ovarian Cancer Coalition Every Woman Study: identifying challenges and opportunities to improve survival and quality of life. Int J Gynecol Cancer. 2021;31:238-244.  12 National Health Service (NHS). Ovarian cancer. Treatment. Available at: https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/ovarian-cancer/treatment/ [Last accessed: January 2026].  13 Cancer Research UK. Recovering from ovarian cancer surgery. Available at: https://www.cancerresearchuk.org/about-cancer/ovarian-cancer/treatment/surgery/recovering-from-surgery [Last accessed: January 2026]. 14 National Health Service (NHS). Ovarian cancer. Causes. Available at: https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/ovarian-cancer/causes/ [Last accessed: January 2026].  15 American Cancer Society. Ovarian Cancer Risk Factors. Available at: https://www.cancer.org/cancer/types/ovarian-cancer/causes-risks-prevention/risk-factors.html [Last accessed: January 2026].  16 Shukla S, et al. VOCAL (Views of Ovarian Cancer Patients and Their Caregivers – How Maintenance Therapy Affects Their Lives) Study: Cancer-Related Burden and Quality of Life of Caregivers [Poster]. Presented at: International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR) Europe; 2022 Nov 6–9; Vienna, Austria. 17 Hutchinson B, et al. Socioeconomic Burden of Ovarian Cancer in 11 Countries. JCO Glob Oncol. 2025;11:e2400313. 18 Petricone-Westwood D, et al.An Investigation of the Effect of Attachment on Distress among Partners of Patients with Ovarian Cancer and Their Relationship with the Cancer Care Providers. Current Oncology. 2021;28(4):2950–2960.  19 World Ovarian Cancer Coalition. Ovarian Cancer Testing & Detection. Available at: http://worldovariancancercoalition.org/about-ovarian-cancer/detection-testing/ [Last accessed: January 2026]. 20 National Institute for Health and Care Excellence. Suspected cancer: recognition and referral. Available at: https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ng12/resources/suspected-cancer-recognition-and-referral-pdf-1837268071621 [Last accessed: January 2026]. 21 Menon U, et al. Diagnostic routes and time intervals for ovarian cancer in nine international jurisdictions; findings from the International Cancer Benchmarking Partnership (ICBP). Br J Cancer. 2022;127:844-854.  22 European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA). New data shows no shift in access to medicines for millions of Europeans. Available at: https://www.efpia.eu/news-events/the-efpia-view/statements-press-releases/new-data-shows-no-shift-in-access-to-medicines-for-millions-of-europeans/ [Last accessed: January 2026].  23 Zhao J, et al. Impact of Treatment Delay on the Prognosis of Patients with Ovarian Cancer: A Population-based Study Using the Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results Database. J Cancer. 2024;15:473-483.  24 European Commission. Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan: Communication from the commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Available at: https://health.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-02/eu_cancer-plan_en_0.pdf [Last accessed: January 2026].  -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ALL-ONCOC-250039 v1.0  February 2026 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is AbbVie * The ultimate controlling entity is AbbVie More information here.
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Salvini’s far-right League party is ripping apart
ROME — Italian Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini faces a battle to save his far-right League party from electoral oblivion. The party’s internal crisis exploded into public view last week after Salvini’s maverick deputy, Roberto Vannacci, an ex-general and defender of fascist dictator Benito Mussolini, threatened to form a splinter party to the right of the League called National Future. Salvini seeks to play down the split with his No. 2, but Vannacci’s move revealed starkly how the League — a key part of Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s right-wing ruling coalition — risks disintegrating as a political force before next year’s elections. Current and former party members told POLITICO that Salvini’s rift with Vannacci had exposed a deeper and potentially devastating factional struggle at the heart of the party — between moderates and extremists, and over whether the League should return to its roots ad seek northern autonomy from Rome. In the short term, weakness in the League could bring some relief to the Atlanticist, pro-NATO Meloni, who is prone to irritation at the anti-Ukrainian, Kremlin-aligned outbursts of Salvini and Vannacci, who are supposed to be her allies. In the longer term, however, the party’s full implosion would potentially make it harder for her to build coalitions and to maintain Italy’s unusually stable government. PUBLIC FEUD The tensions between Salvini and Vannacci became impossible to disguise last month. On Jan. 24 Vannacci registered a trademark for his new National Future party. He later distanced himself from an Instagram account announcing the party’s launch, but hinted on X that he could still turn to social media to launch a party when the time was ripe. “If I decide to open such channels, I will be sure to inform you,” he said. By Jan. 29 Salvini was in full firefighting mode. Speaking before the stately tapestries of the Sala della Regina in Italy’s parliament, he insisted there was “no problem.” “There is space for different sensibilities in the League … we want to build and grow, not fight,” he added, vowing to hold a meeting with Vannacci to set the relationship back on course. Many in the League are more hostile to Vannacci, however, particularly those alarmed by the former paratrooper’s placatory language about Mussolini and Russian leader Vladimir Putin. A powerful bloc in the League that is more socially moderate — and deeply committed to northern autonomy — is pressing for Salvini to take the initiative and fire Vannacci, according to two people involved in the party discussions. Daniele Albertazzi, a politics professor and expert on populism at the University of Surrey, said a schism looked imminent. “[Vannacci] is not going to spend years building someone else’s party,” Albertazzi said. “It’s clear he doesn’t want to play second fiddle to Salvini.” FROM ASSET TO LIABILITY Vannacci emerged from obscurity in 2023 with a self-published bestseller “The World Back to Front.” It espoused the Great Replacement Theory — a conspiracy that white populations are being deliberately replaced by non-whites — and branded gay people “not normal.” More recently he has stated he prefers Putin to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Vannacci emerged from obscurity in 2023, with a self-published bestseller “The World Back to Front.” | Nicola Ciancaglini/Ciancaphoto Studio/Getty Images Albertazzi said Vannacci was positioning himself on the extreme right. “You can see it even in the typography of his symbol [for National Future], which evokes the fascist era,” he said. Salvini originally identified the military veteran as a lifeline who could reverse the League’s flagging fortunes. Salvini had early success in transforming the League from a regional party “of the north” into a national force, and it won a record 34 percent of the Italian vote in the 2019 European elections. But by 2022 things were souring, and support collapsed to about 8 percent in the general election. Vannacci was brought in to broaden the party’s appeal and shore up his own leadership. The gamble initially paid off. In the 2024 European elections, Vannacci personally received more than 500,000 preference votes — roughly 1.5 percent of the national total —validating Salvini’s strategy. But Vannacci has since become a liability. He was responsible for a failed regional campaign in his native Tuscany in October and has flouted party discipline, building his own internal group, opening local branches and organizing rallies outside the League’s control, operating as “a party within a party.” In recent interviews Vannacci has increasingly flirted with the idea of going solo with his own party. For the traditional northern separatist camp in the League, Vannacci has gone too far. Luca Zaia, head of the Veneto regional assembly, a towering figure in northern politics, and three other major northern leaders are now demanding privately that he be expelled, according to two League insiders.  “His ideas are nationalist and fascist, and have never been compatible with the League,” said a party member, who was granted anonymity to discuss sensitive internal disputes. “The writing is on the page. Since the first provocation it has been clear that it is only a matter of when, not if, he starts his own party.”  An elected League official added: “Now if he gets votes it’s Salvini’s fault for giving him a ton of publicity. No one had heard of him before. He basically won the lottery.” Attilio Fontana, a senior League official who is president of the Lombardy region, said Vannacci’s actions raised questions for Salvini. “I think that if inside the party there are differences, that can enrich the party. But creating local branches, holding demonstrations outside the party, registering a new logo and website, this is an anomaly … these are issues that [Salvini] will be looking at,” he told reporters in Milan on Friday.  EVERY VOTE COUNTS There’s no guarantee any party Vannacci launches will be a success. Three leaders in his “World Back to Front” movement — seen as a precursor to his National Future party — quit on Friday, issuing a statement that described a lack of leadership and “permanent chaos.” But his party could upset the political landscape, even if he only peels off relatively minor support from the League. Meloni will have a close eye on the arithmetic of potential alliances in the run-up to next year’s election, particularly if left-wing parties team up against her. Giorgia Meloni will have a close eye on the arithmetic of potential alliances in the run-up to next year’s election. | Simona Granati/Corbis via Getty Images Polling expert Lorenzo Pregliasco of You Trend, which is canvassing a potential new party led by Vannacci, said it had a potential electorate on the right of the coalition of about 2 per cent,  among voters who had supported [Meloni’s] Brothers of Italy, League voters and non-voters with an anti immigrant, anti-political correctness stance, who are attracted by Vannacci’s outspokenness.  The potential party “poses some risks for Meloni and the coalition … It’s not a huge electorate but in national elections two points could make the difference between winning and not winning, or winning but with a very narrow majority that could mean you were not able to form a government.”  Vannacci “has been clever in putting himself forward as a provocative opinion leader and converted this into electoral success … He has the potential to be a strong media presence and central to political debate.” The northern separatist Pact for the North movement, led by former League MP Paolo Grimoldi, said Salvini’s reputation was now damaged because of the faith he put in Vannacci. While Salvini could resign and support an alternative figure such Zaia as League leader, this was extremely unlikely, Grimoldi told POLITICO. “If not, there aren’t tools to get rid of him before the next election,” he added.  “The result will be political irrelevance and electoral defeat [for the League].”
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Europe begins its slow retreat from US dependence
BRUSSELS ― European governments and corporations are racing to reduce their exposure to U.S. technology, military hardware and energy resources as transatlantic relations sour.  For decades, the EU relied on NATO guarantees to ensure security in the bloc, and on American technology to power its business. Donald Trump’s threats to take over Greenland, and aggressive comments about Europe by members of his administration, have given fresh impetus to European leaders’ call for “independence.” “If we want to be taken seriously again, we will have to learn the language of power politics,” German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said last week. From orders banning civil servants from using U.S.-based videoconferencing tools to trade deals with countries like India to a push to diversify Europe’s energy suppliers, efforts to minimize European dependence on the U.S. are gathering pace. EU leaders warn that transatlantic relations are unlikely to return to the pre-Trump status quo. EU officials stress that such measures amount to “de-risking” Europe’s relationship with the U.S., rather than “decoupling” — a term that implies a clean break in economic and strategic ties. Until recently, both expressions were mainly applied to European efforts to reduce dependence on China. Now, they are coming up in relation to the U.S., Europe’s main trade partner and security benefactor. The decoupling drive is in its infancy. The U.S. remains by far the largest trading partner for Europe, and it will take years for the bloc to wean itself off American tech and military support, according to Jean-Luc Demarty, who was in charge of the European Commission’s trade department under the body’s former president, Jean-Claude Juncker. Donald Trump’s threats to take over Greenland, and aggressive comments about Europe by members of his administration, have given fresh impetus to European leaders’ call for “independence.” | Kristian Tuxen Ladegaard Berg/NurPhoto via Getty Images “In terms of trade, they [the U.S.] represent a significant share of our exports,” said Demarty. “So it’s a lot, but it’s not a matter of life and death.” The push to diversify away from the U.S. has seen Brussels strike trade deals with the Mercosur bloc of Latin American countries, India and Indonesia in recent months. The Commission also revamped its deal with Mexico, and revived stalled negotiations with Australia. DEFENDING EUROPE: FROM NATO TO THE EU Since the continent emerged from the ashes of World War II, Europe has relied for its security on NATO — which the U.S. contributes the bulk of funding to. At a weekend retreat in Zagreb, Croatia, conservative European leaders including Merz said it was time for the bloc to beef up its homegrown mutual-defense clause, which binds EU countries to an agreement to defend any EU country that comes under attack. While it has existed since 2009, the EU’s Article 42.7 mutual defense clause was rarely seen as necessary because NATO’s Article 5 served a similar purpose. But Europe’s governments have started to doubt whether the U.S. really would come to Europe’s rescue. In Zagreb, the leaders embraced the EU’s new role as a security actor, tasking two leaders, as yet unnamed, with rapidly cooking up plans to turn the EU clause from words to an ironclad security guarantee. “For decades, some countries said ‘We have NATO, why should we have parallel structures?’” said a senior EU diplomat who was granted anonymity to talk about confidential summit preparations. After Trump’s Greenland saber-rattling, “we are faced with the necessity, we have to set up military command structures within the EU.” At a weekend retreat in Zagreb, Croatia, conservative European leaders including Merz said it was time for the bloc to beef up its homegrown mutual-defense clause, which binds EU countries to an agreement to defend any EU country that comes under attack. | Marko Perkov/AFP via Getty Images In comments to EU lawmakers last week, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte said that anyone who believes Europe can defend itself without the U.S. should “keep on dreaming.” Europe remains heavily reliant on U.S. military capabilities, most notably in its support for Ukraine’s fight against Russia. But some Europeans are now openly talking about the price of reducing exposure to the U.S. — and saying it’s manageable. TECHNOLOGY: TEAMS OUT, VISIO IN The mood shift is clearest when it comes to technology, where European reliance on platforms such as X, Meta and Google has long troubled EU voters, as evidenced by broad support for the bloc’s tech legislation. French President Emmanuel Macron’s government is planning to ban officials from using U.S.-based videoconferencing tools. Other countries like Germany are contemplating similar moves. “It’s very clear that Europe is having our independence moment,” EU tech czar Henna Virkkunen told a POLITICO conference last week. “During the last year, everybody has really realized how important it is that we are not dependent on one country or one company when it comes to some very critical technologies.” France is moving to ban public officials from using American platforms including Google Meet, Zoom and Teams, a government spokesperson told POLITICO. Officials will soon make the switch to Visio, a videoconferencing tool that runs on infrastructure provided by French firm Outscale. In the European Parliament, lawmakers are urging its president, Roberta Metsola, to ditch U.S. software and hardware, as well as a U.S.-based travel booking tool. In Germany, politicians want a potential German or European substitute for software made by U.S. data analysis firm Palantir. “Such dependencies on key technologies are naturally a major problem,” Sebastian Fiedler, an SPD lawmaker and expert on policing, told POLITICO. Even in the Netherlands, among Europe’s more pro-American countries, there are growing calls from lawmakers and voters to ring-fence sensitive technologies from U.S. influence. Dutch lawmakers are reviewing a petition signed by 140,000 people calling on the state to block the acquisition of a state identity verification tool by a U.S. company. At the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in late January, German entrepreneur Anna Zeiter announced the launch of a Europe-based social media platform called W that could rival Elon Musk’s X, which has faced fines for breaching the EU’s content moderation rules. W plans to host its data on “European servers owned by European companies” and limits its investors to Europeans, Zeiter told Euronews. So far, Brussels has yet to codify any such moves into law. But upcoming legislation on cloud and AI services are expected to send signals about the need to Europeanize the bloc’s tech offerings. ENERGY: TIME TO DIVERSIFY On energy, the same trend is apparent. The United States provides more than a quarter of the EU’s gas, a share set to rise further as a full ban on Russian imports takes effect. But EU officials warn about the risk of increasing Europe’s dependency on the U.S. in yet another area. Trump’s claims on Greenland were a “clear wake-up call” for the EU, showing that energy can no longer be seen in isolation from geopolitical trends, EU Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen said last Wednesday. The Greenland crisis reinforced concerns that the bloc risks “replacing one dependency with another,” said Jørgensen, adding that as a result, Brussels is stepping up efforts to diversify, deepening talks with alternative suppliers including Canada, Qatar and North African countries such as Algeria. FINANCE: MOVING TO EUROPEAN PAYMENTS Payment systems are also drawing scrutiny, with lawmakers warning about over-reliance on U.S. payment systems such as Mastercard and Visa. The digital euro, a digital version of cash that the European Central Bank is preparing to issue in 2029, aims to cut these dependencies and provide a pan-European sovereign means of payment. “With the digital euro, Europeans would remain in control of their money, their choices and their future,” ECB President Christine Lagarde said last year. In Germany, some politicians are sounding the alarm about 1,236 tons of gold reserves that Germany keeps in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. “In a time of growing global uncertainty and under President Trump’s unpredictable U.S. policy, it’s no longer acceptable” to have that much in gold reserves in the U.S., Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, the German politician from the liberal Free Democratic Party, who chairs the Parliament’s defense committee, told Der Spiegel. Several European countries are pushing the EU to privilege European manufacturers when it comes to spending EU public money via “Buy European” clauses. Until a few years ago, countries like Poland, the Netherlands or the Baltic states would never have agreed on such “Buy European” clauses. But even those countries are now backing calls to prioritize purchases from EU-based companies. MILITARY INVESTMENT: BOOSTING OWN CAPACITY A €150 billion EU program to help countries boost their defense investments, finalized in May of last year, states that no more than 35 percent of the components in a given purchase, by cost, should originate from outside the EU and partner states like Norway and Ukraine. The U.S. is not considered a partner country under the scheme. For now, European countries rely heavily on the U.S. for military enablers including surveillance and reconnaissance, intelligence, strategic lift, missile defense and space-based assets. But the powerful conservative umbrella group, the European People Party, says these are precisely the areas where Europe needs to ramp up its own capacities. When EU leaders from the EPP agreed on their 2026 roadmap in Zagreb, they stated that the “Buy European” principle should apply to an upcoming Commission proposal on joint procurement. The title of the EPP’s 2026 roadmap? “Time for independence.” Camille Gijs, Jacopo Barigazzi, Mathieu Pollet, Giovanna Faggionato, Eliza Gkritsi, Elena Giordano, Ben Munster and Sam Clark contributed reporting from Brussels. James Angelos contributed reporting from Berlin.
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Draghi: Europe needs to integrate faster if it wants to matter on world stage
BRUSSELS — EU countries shouldn’t be afraid of integrating at different speeds if that’s what it takes to gain crucial leverage on the world stage, Mario Draghi said Monday. “We must take the steps that are currently possible, with the partners who are actually willing, in the domains where progress can currently be made,” said the former European Central Bank president and ex-prime minister of Italy during a ceremony at the University of Leuven in Belgium, where he was awarded an honorary doctorate. “Power requires Europe to move from confederation to federation,” said Draghi, stressing that only in domains where EU countries have pooled their competences has the bloc gained clout on the global stage.  “Where Europe has federated, [such as] on trade, on competition, on the single market, on monetary policy, we are respected as a power and negotiate as one,” he said, citing trade agreements recently negotiated with India and Latin America. Draghi’s call comes as Europe struggles to keep pace with the U.S. and China, and is facing Russian aggression in Ukraine plus a transatlantic ally that no longer acknowledges the benefits of its historic European ties. “This is a future in which Europe risks becoming subordinated, divided and de-industrialized at once, and a Europe that cannot defend its interests will not preserve its values for longer,” Draghi warned. In the face of those challenges, areas of weakness are those where EU capitals continue to maintain a grip, such as defense, industrial policy or foreign affairs, Draghi said. In these, he added, “we are treated as a loose assembly of middle-sized states to be divided and dealt with accordingly.” The former top official praised the bloc’s recent stance on Greenland, where it decided to resist rather than accommodate threats coming from the U.S. “By standing together in the face of direct threat, Europeans discovered the solidarity that had previously seemed out of reach,” he said.  Draghi will take part in an informal gathering of European leaders next week aimed at discussing the direction for the bloc’s competitiveness, together with another former Italian prime minister, Enrico Letta. Both have laid out their economic visions in reports that form the building blocks of President Ursula von der Leyen’s second term atop the European Commission.
Defense
Trade
Trade Agreements
Financial Services
Competition
How the EU’s internal resistance on Iran finally cracked
BRUSSELS — The EU’s move to designate Iran’s feared paramilitary force as a terrorist organization was the product of a recalculation by several governments, in which the need to respond to Tehran’s brutal crackdown outweighed the diplomatic risks. For weeks, a group of influential EU capitals — led by France and, until recently, Italy and Spain — warned that a terror listing would close off what little diplomatic leverage Europe still had with Iran, risking reprisals against European nationals and complicating nuclear talks. That argument began to unravel as the regime’s internet blackout lifted and video footage circulated of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ violence against protesters. By Wednesday afternoon, the capitals championing the designation, among them Berlin, had managed to peel away Italy and Spain from France — with Paris loath to be out on its own. While “there was an internet ban everything was not clear,” said EU chief diplomat Kaja Kallas when asked by POLITICO on Thursday what had changed capitals’ minds. But “when the atrocities were clear, then also it was clear there has to be a very strong response from the European side.” European Parliament President Roberta Metsola told POLITICO that after “seeing the appalling images emerging from Iran of the continued brutality of the regime … it was necessary for Europe to act.” French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot said Paris had revised its view due to the “unwavering courage of the Iranians, who have been the target of this violence.” As other capitals got on board, “the pressure [on France] became too much,” a European Parliament official said. “They didn’t want to stand there like the only ones blocking this decision and supporting that regime … The shame of being the one to block this, the cost became too big.” DOMINOES FALLING Dutch Foreign Minister David van Weel told POLITICO that the emergence of new video evidence of killings and violence from regime forces had crossed a “big line” for many EU countries. The Netherlands has been one of the key proponents of designating the Revolutionary Guard. Italy was the first to publicly declare it had changed camps, with Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani on Monday saying “the losses suffered by the civilian population during the protests require a clear response.” One EU diplomat from a country that had pushed for the listing in the lead-up to Thursday’s meeting of foreign ministers in Brussels said footage of parents looking for their children in body bags had been particularly “horrific” and “motivating,” along with reports of deaths in the tens of thousands. Early on Wednesday afternoon, Spain signaled its position had also shifted, with the foreign ministry telling POLITICO it supported the designation, which puts the Revolutionary Guard in the same category as al Qaeda, Hamas and Daesh. Paris was the last holdout. U.S. President Donald Trump warned on Wednesday that “time is running out” for the regime. | Laurent Gillieron/EPA French officials had argued such a massive terror listing — the group has more than 100,000 personnel — would limit opportunities to talk about nuclear nonproliferation and other matters due to the fact that many of Europe’s interlocutors are tied to the sprawling Revolutionary Guards.  France, along with the U.K. and Germany, is also a member of the E3 group of nations that are holding nuclear talks with Iran. While the E3 recently activated snapback sanctions on Tehran over its failure to cooperate with inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency, Paris was still hoping for a diplomatic solution. For France, keeping the Revolutionary Guard off the EU terror list “maintained the possibility that the E3 could play a role if the negotiations on the nuclear program started again,” said a European diplomat.  But there was another reason preventing Paris from coming aboard. While French officials had avoided making the link between France’s stance and Iran’s use of hostage diplomacy, weighing on them were the fates of two of their nationals — Cécile Kohler and Jacques Paris — who had recently been released from the notorious Evin Prison and are under house arrest at the French Embassy in Tehran. But lacking support from its allies to continue to resist the move, Paris dropped its opposition. France’s Barrot said the deaths of thousands of protesters could not “happen in vain.” The United States, which designated the Revolutionary Guard as a terror group in 2019, has also been pressing the EU to follow suit, with a French presidency official saying Paris had had “a very large number of exchanges with the Americans” on Iran.  U.S. President Donald Trump warned on Wednesday that “time is running out” for the regime and that a “massive Armada” was “moving quickly, with great power, enthusiasm, and purpose” toward the country. Clea Caulcutt, Victor Goury-Laffont, Gabriel Gavin and Tim Ross contributed reporting.
Foreign Affairs
Parliament
Rights
Human rights
Buildings
Xi Jinping won’t want Keir Starmer to mention these awkward topics
LONDON — U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer is braced for a meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping — and there’ll be more than a few elephants in the room. Though Britain has improved its relationship with China following the more combative approach of previous Conservative administrations, a litany of concerns over national security and human rights continues to dog Labour’s attempted refresh. Starmer, who will meet the Chinese president in Beijing Thursday morning, told reporters engaging with China means he can discuss “issues where we disagree.”   “You know that in the past, on all the trips I’ve done, I’ve always raised issues that need to be raised,” he said during a huddle with journalists on the British Airways flight to China on Tuesday evening. In a sign of how hard it can be to engage on more tricky subjects, Chinese officials bundled the British press out of the room when Starmer tried to bring up undesirable topics the last time the pair met. From hacking and spying to China’s foreign policy aims, POLITICO has a handy guide to all the ways Starmer could rile up the Chinese president. 1) STATE-SPONSORED HACKING China is one of the biggest offenders in cyberspace and is regarded by the U.K.’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) — part of Britain’s GCHQ intelligence agency — as a “highly sophisticated threat actor.” The Electoral Commission said it has taken three years to recover from a Chinese hack of its systems. The Chinese state, and private companies linked directly or obliquely to its cyber and espionage agencies, have been directly accused by the British government, its intelligence agencies and allies. As recently as last month, the U.K. government sanctioned two Chinese companies — both named by the U.S. as linked to Chinese intelligence — for hacking Britain and its allies. 2) ACTIONS AGAINST BRITISH PARLIAMENTARIANS Politicians in Britain who have spoken out against Chinese human rights abuses and hostile activity have been censured by Beijing in recent years. This includes the sanctioning of 5 British MPs in 2021, including the former security minister Tom Tugendhat, who has been banned from entering the country. Last year, Liberal Democrat MP Wera Hobhouse was refused entry to Hong Kong while attempting to visit her grandson, and was turned back by officials. The government said that the case was raised with Chinese authorities during a visit to China by Douglas Alexander, who was trade minister at the time. 3) JIMMY LAI In 2020, the British-Hong Kong businessman and democracy campaigner Jimmy Lai was arrested under national security laws imposed by Beijing and accused of colluding with a foreign state. Lai — who is in his late 70s — has remained in prison ever since. Last month, a Hong Kong court convicted Lai of three offenses following what his supporters decried as a 156-day show trial. He is currently awaiting the final decisions relating to sentencing — with bodies including the EU parliament warning that a life imprisonment could have severe consequences for Europe’s relationship with China if he is not released. Lai’s son last year called for the U.K. government to make his father’s release a precondition of closer relations with Beijing.  4) REPRESSION OF DISSIDENTS China, like Iran, is involved in the active monitoring and intimidation of those it considers dissidents on foreign soil — known as trans-national repression. China and Hong Kong law enforcement agencies have repeatedly issued arrest warrants for nationals living in Britain and other Western countries.  British police in 2022 were forced to investigate an assault on a protester outside the Chinese consulate in Manchester. The man was beaten by several men after being dragged inside the grounds of the diplomatic building during a demonstration against Xi Jinping. China removed six officials from Britain before they could be questioned. 5) CHINESE SPY SCANDALS Westminster was last year rocked by a major Chinese spying scandal involving two British men accused of monitoring British parliamentarians and passing information back to Beijing. Though the case against the two men collapsed, the MI5 intelligence agency still issued an alert to MPs, peers and their staff, warning Chinese intelligence officers were “attempting to recruit people with access to sensitive information about the British state.” It is not the only China spy allegation to embroil the upper echelons of British society. Yang Tengbo, who in 2024 outed himself as an alleged spy banned from entering the U.K., was a business associate of Andrew Windsor , the` disgraced brother of King Charles. Christine Lee, a lawyer who donated hundreds of thousands of pounds to a Labour MP, was the subject of a security alert from British intelligence. In October, Ken McCallum, the head of MI5, said that his officers had “intervened operationally” against China that month. 6) EMBASSY DING DONG This month — after a protracted political and planning battle — the government approved the construction of a Chinese “super-embassy” in London. This came after a litany of security concerns were raised by MPs and in the media, including the building’s proximity to sensitive cables, which it is alleged could be used to aid Chinese spying. Britain has its own embassy headache in China. Attempts to upgrade the U.K. mission in Beijing were reportedly blocked while China’s own London embassy plan was in limbo. 7) SANCTIONS EVASION China has long been accused of helping facilitate sanctions evasion for countries such as Russia and Iran. Opaque customs and trade arrangements have allegedly allowed prohibited shipments of oil and dual-use technology to flow into countries that are sanctioned by Britain and its allies. Britain has already sanctioned some Chinese companies accused of aiding Russia’s war in Ukraine. China has called for Britain to stop making “groundless accusations” about its involvement in Russia’s war efforts. 8) HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND GREEN ENERGY U.K. ministers are under pressure from MPs and human rights organizations to get tougher on China over reported human rights abuses in the country’s Xinjiang region — where many of the world’s solar components are sourced. In a meeting with China’s Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang last March, Energy Secretary Ed Miliband raised the issue of forced labor in supply chains, according to a government readout of the meeting. But he also stressed the need for deeper collaboration with China as the U.K.’s lofty clean power goal looms. British academic Laura Murphy — who was researching the risk of forced labor in supply chains — had her work halted by Sheffield Hallam University amid claims of pressure from China. “I know that there are other researchers who don’t feel safe speaking out in public, who are experiencing similar things, although often more subtly,” Murphy said last year. 9) THE FUTURE OF TAIWAN China continues to assert that “Taiwan is a province of China” amid reports it is stepping up preparations for military intervention in the region. In October, the Telegraph newspaper published an op-ed from the Chinese ambassador to Britain, which said: “Taiwan has never been a country. There is but one China, and both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to one and the same China.” In a sign of just how sensitive the matter is, Beijing officials reportedly threatened to cancel high-level trade talks between China and the U.K. after Alexander, then a trade minister, travelled to Taipei last June. 10) CHINA POOTLING AROUND THE ARCTIC Britain is pushing for greater European and NATO involvement in the Arctic amid concern that both China and Russia are becoming more active in the strategically important area. There is even more pressure to act, with U.S. President Donald Trump making clear his Greenland aspirations. In October, a Chinese container ship completed a pioneering journey through the Arctic to a U.K. port — halving the usual time it takes to transport electric cars and solar panels destined for Europe.
Energy
Intelligence
Military
Security
Parliament
Marseille’s drug war reshapes France’s political battlefield
MARSEILLE, France — Violence at a drug trafficking hotspot in the social housing complex next to Orange’s headquarters in Marseille forced the telecoms giant to lock its forest-green gates and order its thousands of employees to work from home. The disruption to such a recognizable company — one that gives its name to the city’s iconic football venue — became a fresh symbol of how drug trafficking and insecurity are reshaping politics ahead of municipal elections. In a recent poll, security ranked among voters’ top concerns, forcing candidates across the spectrum to pitch competing responses to the drug trade. “The number one theme is security,” center-right candidate Martine Vassal told POLITICO. “In the field, what I hear most often are people who tell me that they no longer travel in the heart of the city for that reason.” French political parties are watching the contest closely for clues about the broader battles building toward the 2027 presidential race. In many ways, Marseille is a microcosm of France as a whole, reflecting the country’s wider demographics and its biggest political battles. The city is diverse. Multicultural and low-income neighborhoods that tend to support the hard left abut conservative suburbs that have swung to the far right in recent years. As in much of France, support for the political center in Marseille is wobbling.  The left-wing incumbent Benoît Payan remains a slight favorite in the March contest, but Franck Allisio, the candidate for the far-right National Rally, is just behind, with both men polling at around 30 percent. The issues at play strike at the heart of Marseille’s identity: its notorious drug trade, entrenched poverty and failure to seize on the competitive advantages of a young, sun-drenched city strategically perched on the Mediterranean. Whichever candidate can articulate a platform that speaks to Marseille’s local realities while addressing anxieties shared across France will be well positioned to take city hall — and to provide their party with a potential blueprint for the 2027 presidential campaign.  SECOND CITY  Marseille has always had something of a little-brother complex with Paris, a resentment that goes beyond the football rivalry of Paris Saint-Germain and Olympique de Marseille. Many in the city regard the French capital as a distant power center that tries to impose its own solutions on Marseille without sufficiently consulting local experts.   People in Marseilles pay tribute to murdered Mehdi Kessaci. 20, whose brother is a prominent anti drug trafficking campaigner, and protest against trafficking, Nov. 22, 2025. | Clement Mahoudeau/AFP via Getty Images “Paris treats Marseille almost like a colony,” said Allisio. “A place you visit, make promises to — without any guarantee the money will ever be spent.”  When it comes to drug trafficking and security, leaders across the political spectrum agree that Paris is prescribing medicine that treats the symptoms of the crisis, not the cause.  Violence associated with the drug trade was thrust back in the spotlight in November with the killing of 20-year-old Mehdi Kessaci. Authorities are investigating the crime as an act of intimidation. Mehdi’s brother Amine Kessaci is one of the city’s most prominent anti-trafficking campaigners, rising to prominence after their half-brother — who was involved in the trade — was killed several years earlier.  President Emmanuel Macron, Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez and Justice Minister Gérald Darmanin all visited Marseille in the wake of Kessaci’s killing, outlining a tough-on-crime agenda to stop the violence and flow of drugs.  Locals stress that law-and-order investments must be matched with funding for public services. Unless authorities improve the sluggish economy that has encouraged jobless youths to turn to the drug trade, the problem will continue.  “Repression alone is not efficient,” said Kaouther Ben Mohamed, a former social worker turned activist. “If that was the case, the drug trade wouldn’t have flourished like it did.” Housing is another issue, with many impoverished residents living in dangerous, dilapidated buildings. “We live in a shit city,” said Mahboubi Tir, a tall, broad-shouldered young man with a rugby player’s physique. “We’re not safe here.”   Tir spent a month in a coma and several more in a hospital last April after he was assaulted during a parking dispute. His face was still swollen and distorted when he spoke to POLITICO in December about how the incident reshaped his relationship with the city he grew up in.  “I almost died, and I was angry at the city,” said Tir, who suffers from memory loss and has only a vague recollection of what led to the assault, as he sipped coffee in the backroom office of a tiny, left-leaning grassroots political party where he volunteers, Citizen Ambition.  SECURITY PROBLEM To what extent Marseille’s activist groups can bring about change in a city whose struggles have lasted for decades remains to be seen, but the four leading candidates for mayor share a similar diagnosis. They all believe the lurid crime stories making national headlines are a byproduct of a lack of jobs and neglected public services — and that the French state’s responses miss the mark. Rather than relying on harsher punishments as a deterrent, they argue the state should prioritize local policing and public investment. When Payan announced his candidacy for reelection, he pledged free meals for 15,000 students to get them back in school and to double the number of local cops as part of a push for more community policing. Allisio’s platform puts the emphasis on security-related spending: increased video surveillance, more vehicles for local police and the creation of “specialized units to combat burglary and public disorder.” Vassal — the center-right backed by the conservative Les Républicains and parties aligned with Macron — has similarly put forward a proposal to arm fare enforcers in public transport. Both Allisio and Vassal are calling for unspecified spending cuts while preserving basic services provided at the local level like schools, public transportation and parks and recreation. Vassal, who is polling third, said she would make public transportation free for residents younger 26 to travel across the spread-out city. She accuses the current administration of having delivered an insufficient number of building permits, slowing the development of new housing and office buildings and thus the revitalization of Marseille’s most embattled areas — a trend she pledged to reverse. Both Vassal and Allisio are advocating for less local taxes on property to boost small businesses and create new jobs. Allisio has also put forward a proposal to make parking for less 30 minutes free to facilitate deliveries and quick stops to buy products. The outlier — at least when it comes to public safety — is Sébastien Delogu, a disciple of three-time hard-left presidential candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon. Though Delogu is polling fourth at 14 percent, he can’t be counted out, given that Mélenchon won Marseille in the first round of the last two presidential elections. Though Delogu acknowledges that crime is a problem, he doesn’t want to spend more money on policing. He instead proposes putting money that other candidates want to spend on security toward poverty reduction, housing supply and the local public health sector. Whoever wins, however, will have to grapple with an uncomfortable truth. Aside from local police responsible for public tranquility and health, policing and criminal justice matters are largely managed at the national level. The solution to Marseille’s problems will depend, to no small extent, on the outcome of what happens next year in Paris.
Media
Security
Far right
Rights
Trade
Starmer finally goes to China — and tries not to trigger Trump
LONDON — Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney left Beijing and promptly declared the U.S.-led “world order” broken. Don’t expect his British counterpart to do the same. Keir Starmer will land in the Chinese capital Wednesday for the first visit by a U.K. prime minister since 2018. By meeting President Xi Jinping, he will end what he has called an “ice age” under the previous Conservative administration, and try to win deals that he can sell to voters as a boost to Britain’s sputtering economy. Starmer is one of a queue of leaders flocking to the world’s second-largest economy, including France’s Emmanuel Macron in December and Germany’s Friedrich Merz next month. Like Carney did in Davos last week, the British PM has warned the world is the most unstable it has been for a generation. Yet unlike Carney, Starmer is desperate not to paint this as a rupture from the U.S. — and to avoid the criticism Trump unleashed on Carney in recent days over his dealings with China. The U.K. PM is trying to ride three horses at once, staying friendly — or at least engaging — with Washington D.C., Brussels and Beijing.  It is his “three-body problem,” joked a senior Westminster figure who has long worked on British-China relations. POLITICO spoke to 22 current and former officials, MPs, diplomats, industry figures and China experts, most of whom were granted anonymity to speak frankly. They painted a picture of a leader walking the same tightrope he always has surrounded by grim choices — from tricky post-Brexit negotiations with the EU, to Donald Trump taking potshots at British policies and freezing talks on a U.K.-U.S. tech deal. Starmer wants his (long-planned) visit to China to secure growth, but be cautious enough not to compromise national security or enrage Trump. He appears neither to have ramped up engagement with Beijing in response to Trump, nor reduced it amid criticism of China’s espionage and human rights record. In short, he doesn’t want any drama. “Starmer is more managerial. He wants to keep the U.K.’s relationships with big powers steady,” said one person familiar with planning for the trip. “You can’t really imagine him doing a Carney or a Macron and using the trip to set out a big geopolitical vision.” An official in 10 Downing Street added: “He’s clear that it is in the U.K.’s interests to have a relationship with the world’s second biggest economy. While the U.S. is our closest ally, he rejects the suggestion that means you can’t have pragmatic dealings with China.” He will be hoping Trump — whose own China visit is planned for April — sees it that way too. BRING OUT THE CAVALRY Starmer has one word in his mind for this trip — growth, which was just 0.1 percent in the three months to September. The prime minister will be flanked by executives from City giants HSBC, Standard Chartered, Schroders and the London Stock Exchange Group; pharmaceutical company AstraZeneca; car manufacturer Jaguar Land Rover; energy provider Octopus; and Brompton, the folding bicycle manufacturer. The priority in Downing Street will be bringing back “a sellable headline,” said the person familiar with trip planning quoted above. The economy is the overwhelming focus. While officials discussed trying to secure a political win, such as China lifting sanctions it imposed on British parliamentarians in 2021, one U.K. official said they now believe this to be unlikely. Between them, five people familiar with the trip’s planning predicted a large number of deals, dialogues and memorandums of understanding — but largely in areas with the fewest national security concerns. These are likely to include joint work on medical, health and life sciences, cooperation on climate science, and work to highlight Mandarin language schemes, the people said.  Officials are also working on the mutual recognition of professional qualifications and visa-free travel for short stays, while firms have been pushing for more expansive banking and insurance licences for British companies operating in China. The U.K. is meanwhile likely to try to persuade Beijing to lower import tariffs on Scotch whisky, which doubled in February 2025. A former U.K. official who was involved in Britain’s last prime ministerial visit to China, by Theresa May in 2018, predicted all deals will already be “either 100 or 99 percent agreed, in the system, and No. 10 will already have a firm number in its head that it can announce.” THREADING THE NEEDLE Yet all five people agreed there is unlikely to be a deal on heavy energy infrastructure, including wind turbine technology, that could leave Britain vulnerable to China. The U.K. has still not decided whether to let Ming Yang, a Chinese firm, invest £1.5 billion in a wind farm off the coast of Scotland. And while Carney agreed to ease tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles (EVs), three of the five people familiar with the trip’s planning said that any deep co-operation on EV technology is likely to be off the table. One of them predicted: “This won’t be another Canada moment. I don’t see us opening the floodgates on EVs.” Britain is trying to stick to “amber and green areas” for any deals, said the first person familiar with the planning. The second of the five people said: “I think they‘re going for the soft, slightly lovey stuff.” Britain has good reason to be reluctant, as Chinese-affiliated groups have long been accused of hacking and espionage, including against MPs and Britain’s Electoral Commission. Westminster was gripped by headlines in December about a collapsed case against two men who had been accused of spying for China. Chinese firm Huawei was banned from helping build the U.K.’s 5G phone network in 2020 after pressure from Trump. Even now, Britain’s security agencies are working on mitigations to telecommunications cables near the Tower of London. They pass close to the boundary of China’s proposed embassy, which won planning approval last week. Andrew Small, director of the Asia Programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations, a think tank working on foreign and security policy, said: “The current debate about how to ‘safely’ increase China’s role in U.K. green energy supplies — especially through wind power — has serious echoes of 5G all over again, and is a bigger concern on the U.S. side than the embassy decision.”  Starmer and his team also “don’t want to antagonize the Americans” ahead of Trump’s own visit in April, said the third of the five people familiar with trip planning. “They’re on eggshells … if they announce a new dialogue on United Nations policy or whatever bullshit they can come up with, any of those could be interpreted as a broadside to the Trump administration.” All these factors mean Starmer’s path to a “win” is narrow. Tahlia Peterson, a fellow working on China at Chatham House, the international affairs think tank, said: “Starmer isn’t going to ‘reset’ the relationship in one visit or unlock large-scale Chinese investment into Britain’s core infrastructure.” Small said foreign firms are being squeezed out of the Chinese market and Xi is “weaponizing” the dependency on Chinese supply chains. He added: “Beijing will likely offer extremely minor concessions in areas such as financial services, [amounting to] no more than a rounding error in economic scale.” Chancellor Rachel Reeves knows the pain of this. Britain’s top finance minister was mocked when she returned with just £600 million of agreements from her visit to China a year ago. One former Tory minister said the figure was a “deliberate insult” by China. Even once the big win is in the bag, there is the danger of it falling apart on arrival. Carney announced Canada and China would expand visa-free travel, only for Beijing’s ambassador to Ottawa to say that the move was not yet official. Despite this, businesses have been keen on Starmer’s re-engagement.  Rain Newton-Smith, director-general of the Confederation of British Industry, said firms are concerned about the dependence on Chinese rare earths but added: “If you map supply chains from anywhere, the idea that you can decouple from China is impossible. It’s about how that trade can be facilitated in the best way.” EMBASSY ROW Even if Starmer gets his wins, this visit will bring controversies that (critics say) show the asymmetry in Britain’s relationship with China. A tale of two embassies serves as a good metaphor.  Britain finally approved plans last week for China’s new outpost in London, despite a long row over national security. China held off formally confirming Starmer’s visit until the London embassy decision was finalized, the first person familiar with planning for the trip said. (Others point out Starmer would not want to go until the issue was resolved.) The result was a scramble in which executives were only formally invited a week before take-off. And Britain has not yet received approval to renovate its own embassy in Beijing. Officials privately refer to the building as “falling down,” while one person who has visited said construction materials were piled up against walls. It is “crumbling,” added another U.K. official: “The walls have got cracks on them, the wallpaper’s peeling off, it’s got damp patches.” British officials refused to give any impression of a “quid pro quo” for the two projects under the U.K.’s semi-judicial planning system. But that means much of Whitehall still does not know if Britain’s embassy revamp in Beijing will be approved, or held back until China’s project in London undergoes a further review in the courts. U.K. officials are privately pressing their Chinese counterparts to give the green light. One of the people keenest on a breakthrough will be Britain’s new ambassador to Beijing Peter Wilson, a career diplomat described by people who have met him as “outstanding,” “super smart” and “very friendly.”  For Wilson, hosting Starmer will be one of his trickiest jobs yet. The everyday precautions when doing business in China have made preparations for this trip more intense. Government officials and corporate executives are bringing secure devices and will have been briefed on the risk of eavesdropping and honeytraps. One member of Theresa May’s 2018 delegation to China recalled opening the door of what they thought was their vehicle, only to see several people with headsets on, listening carefully and typing. They compared it to a scene in a spy film. Activists and MPs will put Starmer under pressure to raise human rights issues — including what campaigners say is a genocide against the Uyghur people in Xinjiang province — on a trip governed by strict protocol where one stray word can derail a deal.  Pro-democracy publisher Jimmy Lai, who has British nationality, is facing sentencing in Hong Kong imminently for national security offenses. During the PM’s last meeting with Xi in 2024, Chinese officials bundled British journalists out of the room when he raised the case. Campaigners had thought Lai’s sentencing could take place this week. All these factors mean tension in the British state — which has faced a tussle between “securocrats” and departments pushing for growth — has been high ahead of the trip. Government comments on China are workshopped carefully before publication. Earlier this month, Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper told POLITICO her work on Beijing involves looking at “transnational repression” and “espionage threats.” But when Chancellor Rachel Reeves met China’s Finance Minister He Lifeng in Davos last week to tee up Starmer’s visit, the U.K. Treasury did not publicize the meeting — beyond a little-noticed photo on its Flickr account. SLOW BOAT TO CHINA Whatever the controversies, Labour’s China stance has been steadily taking shape since before Starmer took office in 2024. Labour drew inspiration from its sister party in Australia and the U.S. Democrats, both of which had regular meetings with Beijing. Party aides argued that after a brief “golden era” under Conservative PM David Cameron, Britain engaged less with China than with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The result of Labour’s thinking was the policy of “three Cs” — “challenge, compete, and cooperate.” A procession of visits to Beijing followed, most notably Reeves last year, culminating in Starmer’s trip. His National Security Adviser Jonathan Powell was involved in planning across much of 2025, even travelling to meet China’s top diplomat, Wang Yi, in November. Starmer teed up this week’s visit with a December speech arguing the “binary” view of China had persisted for too long. He promised to engage with Beijing carefully while taking a “more transactional approach to pretty well everything.”  The result was that this visit has long been locked in; just as Labour aides argue the London embassy decision was set in train in 2018, when the Tory government gave diplomatic consent for the site. Labour ministers “just want to normalize” the fact of dealing with China, said the senior Westminster figure quoted above. Newton-Smith added: “I think the view is that the government’s engagement with eyes wide open is the right strategy. And under the previous government, we did lose out.” But for each person who praises the re-engagement, there are others who say it has left Britain vulnerable while begging for scraps at China’s table. Hawks argue the hard details behind the “three Cs” were long nebulous, while Labour’s long-awaited “audit” of U.K.-China relations was delayed before being folded briefly into a wider security document. “Every single bad decision now can be traced back to the first six months,” argued the third person familiar with planning quoted above. “They were absolutely ill-prepared and made a series of decisions that have boxed them into a corner.” They added: “The government lacks the killer instinct to deal with China. It’s not in their DNA.” Luke de Pulford, a human rights campaigner and director of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, argued the Tories had engaged with China — Foreign Secretary James Cleverly visited in 2023 — and Labour was simply going much further. “China is pursuing an enterprise to reshape the global order in its own image, and to that end, to change our institutions and way of life to the extent that they’re an obstacle to it,” he said. “That’s what they’re up to — and we keep falling for it.” END OF THE OLD ORDER? His language may be less dramatic, but Starmer’s visit to China does have some parallels with Canada. Carney’s trip was the first by a Canadian PM since 2017, and he and Xi agreed a “new strategic partnership.” Later at Davos, the Canadian PM talked of “the end of a pleasant fiction” and warned multilateral institutions such as the United Nations are under threat. One British industry figure who attended Davos said of Carney’s speech: “It was great. Everyone was talking about it. Someone said to me that was the best and most poignant speech they’d ever seen at the World Economic Forum. That may be a little overblown, but I guess most of the speeches at the WEF are quite dull.” The language used by Starmer, a former human rights lawyer devoted to multilateralism, has not been totally dissimilar. Britain could no longer “look only to international institutions to uphold our values and interests,” he said in December. “We must do it ourselves through deals and alliances.” But while some in the U.K. government privately agree with Carney’s point, the real difference is the two men’s approach to Trump. Starmer will temper his messaging carefully to avoid upsetting either his Chinese hosts or the U.S., even as Trump throws semi-regular rocks at Britain. To Peterson, this is unavoidable. “China, the U.S. and the EU are likely to continue to dominate global economic growth for the foreseeable future,” she said. “Starmer’s choice is not whether to engage, but how.” Esther Webber contributed reporting.
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UK must decide future of deal with firm linked to Russia’s gas
LONDON — Keir Starmer’s government has a crunch decision to make: Whether to keep heating much of the British state via a firm linked to Russian fossil fuels. Under an existing public sector deal, TotalEnergies Gas & Power — a U.K. subsidiary of French energy giant TotalEnergies — supplies the gas used to heat No. 10 Downing Street, the Treasury, and other parts of Whitehall.  That agreement, worth up to £8 billion, expires early next year. Officials are preparing a public tendering process for its replacement, which will be awarded later this year and will run from 2027 to 2030.  But TotalEnergies retains ties to fossil fuel trade with Vladimir Putin’s Russia. Now, pro-Ukrainian campaigners and parliamentarians — including the Labour chair of the all-party parliamentary group (APPG) on Ukraine — want ministers to rule out its subsidiary from winning the new contract.  In a letter to Cabinet Office Minister Nick Thomas-Symonds, who oversees government procurement body the Crown Commercial Service, they warn that “continuing a contract with companies involved with Russia’s energy sector is inconsistent” with the U.K.’s repeatedly-touted goal of undermining Russia’s fossil fuel revenues, which are used to finance its war on Ukraine.    “In view of escalating Russian hybrid attacks against the U.K., and ongoing brutal attacks across Ukraine, public sector procurement must align not only with sanctions but also with government foreign policy, including efforts to deter and disrupt Russian aggression,” they write.  The letter — co-ordinated by campaign groups Razom We Stand and B4 Ukraine —  is co-signed by Labour MP Alex Sobel, who chairs the Ukraine APPG, as well as Green MPs Carla Denyer and Siân Berry, both former party co-leaders. Sobel, who has visited Ukraine seven times since the full-scale invasion, last month called for “maximum pressure on Russia.” OUT IN THE COLD Svitlana Romanko, executive director of Razom We Stand, said that “brutal Russian attacks on our energy systems” had knocked out “energy and heating systems across Ukraine in -20C weather.”  “We implore the U.K. government to end their contract with TotalEnergies,” she said.  Under the existing gas deal, public buildings in Whitehall, and other public sector buildings around the U.K. including NHS hospitals, are supplied with gas for heating and cooking by TotalEnergies Gas & Power.   While the contract itself complies with the U.K.’s ban on Russian gas imports, it has been condemned by Ukrainian campaign groups and Labour MPs because of TotalEnergies’ continued ties to Russian fossil fuels.    The firm holds a 20 percent stake in the Yamal liquefied natural gas facility in Siberia, from where it continues to import Russian gas to Europe under long-term contracts which it says it cannot break.  A TotalEnergies spokesperson said the firm “condemned Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine.” The firm “operates legally within the framework of the energy policy and sanctions policy defined by the authorities of the European Union and its member states,” they added.  TotalEnergies has been the gas supplier of choice for the U.K. public sector since 2019, under the two successive CCS procurement contracts.   The new contract — known as Supply of Energy 3 — is now being prepared. A tender notice is expected to be published in June and a contract awarded in December.  A Cabinet Office spokesperson declined to comment on a live procurement process.
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Europe’s AI ambitions require more investment
It seems impossible to have a conversation today without artificial intelligence (AI) playing some role, demonstrating the massive power of the technology. It has the potential to impact every part of business, and European policymakers are on board. In February 2025, Ursula von der Leyen, the European Commission president, said, “We want Europe to be one of the leading AI continents … AI can help us boost our competitiveness, protect our security, shore up public health, and make access to knowledge and information more democratic.” Research from Nokia suggests that businesses share this enthusiasm and ambition: 84 percent of more than 1,000 respondents said AI features in the growth strategy of their organization, while 62 percent are directing at least 20 percent of ICT capex budgets toward the technology. However, the equation is not yet balanced. Three-quarters of survey respondents state that current telecom infrastructure limits the ability to deliver on those ambitions. Meanwhile, 45 percent suggest these limitations would delay, constrain or entirely limit investments. There is clearly a disconnect between the ambition and the ability to deliver. At present, Europe lags the United States and parts of Asia in areas such as network deployment, related investment levels and scale. > If AI does not reach its full potential, EU competitiveness will suffer, > economic growth will have a ceiling, the creation of new jobs will have a > limit and consumers will not see the benefits. What we must remember primarily is that AI does not happen without advanced, trusted and future-proofed networks. Infrastructure is not a ‘nice to have’ it is a fundamental part. Simply put, today’s networks in Europe require more investments to power the AI dream we all have. If AI does not reach its full potential, EU competitiveness will suffer, economic growth will have a ceiling, the creation of new jobs will have a limit and consumers will not see the benefits. When we asked businesses about the challenge of meeting AI demands during our research, the lack of adequate connectivity infrastructure was the fourth common answer out of 15 potential options. Our telecom connectivity regulatory approach must be more closely aligned with the goal of fostering AI. That means progressing toward a genuine telecom single market, adopting a novel approach to competition policy to allow market consolidation to lead to more investments, and ensuring connectivity is always secure and trusted. Supporting more investments in next-generation networks through consolidation AI places heavy demands on networks. It requires low latency, high bandwidth and reliability, and efficient traffic management. To deliver this, Europe needs to accelerate investment in 5G standalone, fiber to enterprises, edge data centers and IP-optical backbone networks optimized for AI. > As industry voices such as Nokia have emphasized, the networks that power AI > must themselves make greater use of automation and AI. Consolidation (i.e. reducing the number of telecom operators within the national telecom markets of EU member states) is part of the solution. Consolidation will allow operators to achieve economies of scale and improve operating efficiency, therefore encouraging investment and catalyzing innovation. As industry voices such as Nokia have emphasized, the networks that power AI must themselves make greater use of automation and AI. Policy support should therefore extend to both network innovation and deployment. Trust: A precondition for AI adoption Intellectual property (IP) theft is a threat to Europe’s industrial future and only trusted technology should be used in core functions, systems and sectors (such as energy, transport and defense). In this context, the underlying connectivity should always be secure and trusted. The 5G Security Toolbox, restricting untrusted technology, should therefore be extended to all telecom technologies (including fiber, optics and IP) and made compulsory in all EU member states. European governments must make protecting their industries and citizens a high priority. Completing the digital single market Although the single market is one of Europe’s defining projects, the reality in telecoms — a key part of the digital single market — is still fragmented. As an example, different spectrum policies create barriers across borders and can limit network roll outs. Levers on top of advanced connectivity To enable the AI ecosystem in Europe, there are several different enabling levers European policymakers should advance on top of fostering advanced and trusted connectivity: * The availability of compute infrastructure. The AI Continent Action Plan, as well as the IPCEI Compute Infrastructure Continuum, and the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking should facilitate building AI data centers in Europe.   * Leadership in edge computing. There should also be clear support for securing Europe’s access to and leadership in edge solutions and building out edge capacity. Edge solutions increase processing speeds and are important for enabling AI adoption, while also creating a catalyst for economic growth. With the right data center capacity and edge compute capabilities available, European businesses can meet the new requirements of AI use cases.  * Harmonization of rules. There are currently implications for AI in several policy areas, including the AI Act, GDPR, Data Act, cybersecurity laws and sector-specific regulations. This creates confusion, whereas AI requires clarity. Simplification and harmonization of these regulations should be pursued.  * AI Act implementation and simplification. There are concerns about the implementation of the AI Act. The standards for high-risk AI may not be available before the obligations of the AI act enter into force, hampering business ambitions due to legal uncertainty. The application date of the AI Act’s provisions on high-risk AI should be postponed by two years to align with the development of standards. There needs to be greater clarity on definitions and simplification measures should be pursued across the entire ecosystem. Policies must be simple enough to follow, otherwise adoption may falter. Policy needs to act as an enabler, not a barrier to innovation.  * Upskilling and new skills. AI will require new skills of employees and users, as well as creating entirely new career paths. Europe needs to prepare for this new world.  If Europe can deliver on these priorities, the benefits will be tangible: improved services, stronger industries, increased competitiveness and higher economic growth. AI will deliver to those who best prepare themselves. We must act now with the urgency and consistency that the moment demands. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Author biography: Marc Vancoppenolle is leading the geopolitical and government relations EU and Europe function at Nokia. He and his team are working with institutions and stakeholders in Europe to create a favorable political and regulatory environment fostering broadband investments and cross sectoral digitalization at large. Vancoppenolle has over 30 years of experience in the telecommunication industry. He joined Alcatel in 1991, and then Alcatel-Lucent, where he took various international and worldwide technical, commercial, marketing, communication and government affairs leadership roles. Vancoppenolle is a Belgian and French national. He holds a Master of Science, with a specialization in telecommunication, from the University of Leuven complemented with marketing studies from the University of Antwerp. He is a member of the DIGITALEUROPE Executive Board, Associate to Nokia’s CEO at the ERT (European Round Table for Industry), and advisor to FITCE Belgium (Forum for ICT & Media professionals). He has been vice-chair of the BUSINESSEUROPE Digital Economy Taskforce as well as a member of the board of IICB (Innovation & Incubation Center Brussels).
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