European consumer group Euroconsumers along with Football Supporters Europe have filed a complaint with the European Commission accusing FIFA of abusing its monopoly over World Cup ticket sales to impose excessive prices and unfair conditions on fans. The complaint, obtained by POLITICO, alleges breaches of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which prohibits abuses of a dominant market position. “FIFA has a complete monopoly over World Cup ticket sales,” said Romane Armangau, a spokesperson for Euroconsumers. “They are using that power to charge prices that would not exist in a normal competitive market, while hiding information from buyers and manipulating them into rushed decisions.” The groups point to a range of alleged abusive practices, including limited transparency on ticket categories and seat allocation, a “variable pricing” system that can push prices higher over time, and the actual scarcity of tickets advertised from $60. “When you buy that ticket, you don’t actually know what you’re buying,” Armangau said. “It means attending the 2026 World Cup has become financially out of reach for most ordinary supporters,” she added, pointing to tickets to the final that now start at more than $4,000. Fans can also face additional costs, including resale fees of around 15 percent, according to the complaint. The groups further accuse FIFA of using “dark patterns” — design and marketing tactics that create artificial urgency — to pressure fans into buying tickets. The filing lands as pressure on FIFA is already building in Brussels. In an interview with POLITICO earlier this month, EU Sports Commissioner Glenn Micallef warned of the safety risks for fans travelling to the 2026 World Cup, citing concerns linked to the war in Iran. He said FIFA had yet to provide renewed assurances for supporters, stressing that “since one of the hosts of this biggest sporting event in the world is party to a war, it’s only legitimate that assurances are given.” Micallef also criticized FIFA’s partnership with U.S. President Donald Trump’s “Board of Peace,” a body widely seen in Europe as an attempt to sidestep the United Nations. The complaint to the EU leans on a December 2023 Super League court ruling, which said FIFA and UEFA can fall under EU competition law when they organize and market competitions as economic activities. The filing argues that reasoning applies here too, because FIFA is the sole seller of World Cup tickets and is allegedly abusing that dominant position. While Brussels has previously scrutinized sports governing bodies, targeting FIFA’s ticketing and pricing practices would open a new front. Euroconsumers and its partners are urging the European Commission to intervene, including by imposing price caps and forcing greater transparency over ticket sales. “We are asking the Commission to act immediately with interim measures,” Armangau said. “Once those matches are played, the harm to fans cannot be undone.”

Biotechnology is central to modern medicine and Europe’s long-term competitiveness. From cancer and cardiovascular disease to rare conditions, it is driving transformative advances for patients across Europe and beyond . 1         Yet innovation in Europe is increasingly shaped by regulatory fragmentation, procedural complexity and uneven implementation across  m ember s tates. As scientific progress accelerates, policy frameworks must evolve in parallel, supporting the full lifecycle of innovation from research and clinical development to manufacturing and patient access.  The proposed EU Biotech Act seeks to address these challenges. By streamlining regulatory procedures, strengthening coordination  and supporting scale-up and manufacturing, it aims to reinforce Europe’s position in a highly competitive global biotechnology landscape .2       Its success, however, will depend less on ambition than on delivery. Consistent implementation, proportionate oversight and continued global openness will determine whether the  a ct translates into faster patient access, sustained investment and long-term resilience.  Q: Why is biotechnology increasingly seen as a strategic pillar for Europe’s competitiveness, resilience and long-term growth?  Gilles Marrache, SVP and regional general manager, Europe, Latin America, Middle East, Africa and Canada, Amgen:  Biotechnology sits at the intersection of health, industrial policy and economic competitiveness. The sector is one of Europe’s strongest strategic assets and a leading contributor to  research and development  growth . 3    At the same time, Europe’s position is under increasing pressure. Over the past two decades, the EU has lost approximately 25  percent of its global share of pharmaceutical investment to other regions, such as the  United States  and China.   The choices made today will shape Europe’s long-term strength in the sector, influencing not only competitiveness and growth, but also how quickly patients can benefit from new treatments.  > Europe stands at a pivotal moment in biotechnology. Our life sciences legacy > is strong, but maintaining global competitiveness requires evolution .” 4   > >  Gilles Marrache, SVP and regional general manager, Europe, Latin America, > Middle East, Africa and Canada, Amgen. Q: What does the EU Biotech Act aim to do  and why is it considered an important step forward for patients and Europe’s innovation ecosystem?  Marrache: The EU Biotech Act represents a timely opportunity to better support biotechnology products from the laboratory to the market. By streamlining medicines’ pathways and improving conditions for scale-up and investment, it can help strengthen Europe’s innovation ecosystem and accelerate patient access to breakthrough therapies. These measures will help anchor biotechnology as a strategic priority for Europe’s future  —  and one that can deliver earlier patient benefit  —  so long as we can make it work in practice.  Q: How does the EU Biotech Act address regulatory fragmentation, and where will effective delivery and coordination be most decisive? Marrache: Regulatory fragmentation has long challenged biotechnology development in Europe, particularly for multinational clinical trials and innovative products. The Biotech Act introduces faster, more coordinated trials, expanded regulatory sandboxes and new investment and industrial capacity instruments.   The proposed EU Health Biotechnology Support Network and a  u nion-level regulatory status repository would strengthen transparency and predictability. Together, these measures would support earlier regulatory dialogue, help de-risk development   and promote more consistent implementation across  m ember  s tates.   They also create an opportunity to address complexities surrounding combination products  —  spanning medicines, devices and diagnostics  —  where overlapping requirements and parallel assessments have added delays.5 This builds on related efforts, such as the COMBINE programme,6 which seeks to streamline the navigation of the In Vitro Diagnostic Regulation , 7 Clinical Trials Regulation8 and the Medical Device Regulation9 through a single, coordinated assessment process. Continued clarity and coordination will be essential to reduce duplication and accelerate development timelines .10 Q: What conditions will be most critical to support biotech scale-up, manufacturing  and long-term investment in Europe?  Marrache: Europe must strike the right balance between strategic autonomy and openness to global collaboration. Any new instruments under the Biotech Act mechanisms should remain open and supportive of all types of biotech investments, recogni z ing that biotech manufacturing operates through globally integrated and highly speciali z ed value chains.   Q: How can Europe ensure faster and more predictable pathways from scientific discovery to patient access, while maintaining high standards of safety and quality?   Marrache: Faster and more predictable patient access depends on strengthening end-to-end pathways across the lifecycle.  The Biotech Act will help ensure continuity of scientific and regulatory experti z e, from clinical development through post-authori z ation. It will also support stronger alignment with downstream processes, such as health technology assessments, which  are  critical to success.   Moreover, reducing unnecessary delays or duplication in approval processes can set clearer expectations, more predictable development timelines and earlier planning for scale-up.    Gilles Marrache, SVP and regional general manager, Europe, Latin America, Middle East, Africa and Canada, Amgen. Via Amgen. Finally, embedding a limited number of practical tools (procedural, digital or governance-based) and ensuring they are integrated within existing  European Medicines Agency and EU regulatory structures can help achieve faster patient access . 11 Q: What role can stronger regulatory coordination, data use and public - private collaboration play in strengthening Europe’s global position in biotechnology?  Marrache: To unlock biotechnology’s full potential, consistent implementation is essential. Fragmented approaches to secondary data use, divergent  m ember   state interpretations and uncertainty for data holders still limit access to high-quality datasets at scale. The Biotech Act introduces key building blocks to address this.   These include Biotechnology Data Quality Accelerators to improve interoperability, trusted testing environments for advanced innovation, and alignment with the EU AI Act ,12  European Health Data Space13 and wider EU data initiatives. It also foresees AI-specific provisions and clinical trial guidance to provide greater operational clarity.  Crucially, these structures must simplify rather than add further layers of complexity.   Addressing remaining barriers will reduce legal uncertainty for AI deployment, support innovation and strengthen Europe’s competitiveness.  > These reforms will create a moderni z ed biotech ecosystem, healthier > societies, sustainable healthcare systems and faster patient access to the > latest breakthroughs in Europe .” 14 > > Gilles Marrache, SVP and regional general manager, Europe, Latin America, > Middle East, Africa and Canada, Amgen.  Q: As technologies evolve and global competition intensifies, how can policymakers ensure the Biotech Act remains flexible and future-proof?  Marrache:  To remain future-proof, the Biotech Act must be designed to evolve alongside scientific progress, market dynamics and patient needs. Clear objectives, risk-based requirements, regular review mechanisms and timely updates to guidance will enhance regulatory agility without creating unnecessary rigidity or administrative burden.  Continuous stakeholder dialogue combined with horizon scanning will be essential to sustaining innovation, resilience and timely patient access over the long term. Preserving regulatory openness and international cooperation will be critical in avoiding fragmentation and maintaining Europe’s credibility as a global biotech hub.  Q: Looking ahead, what two or three priorities should policymakers focus on to ensure the EU Biotech Act delivers meaningful impact in practice?  Marrache: Looking ahead, policymakers should focus on three priorities for the Biotech Act:    First, implementation must deliver real regulatory efficiency, predictability and coordination in practice. Second, Europe must sustain an open and investment-friendly framework that reflects the global nature of biotechnology.  And third, policymakers should ensure a clear and coherent legal framework across the lifecycle of innovative medicines, providing certainty for the use of  artificial intelligence   —  as a key driver of innovation in health biotechnology.  In practical terms, the EU Biotech Act will be judged not by the number of new instruments it creates, but by whether it reduces complexity, increases predictability and shortens the path from scientific discovery to patient benefit. An open, innovation-friendly framework that is competitive at the global level will help sustain investment, strengthen resilient supply chains and deliver better outcomes for patients across Europe and beyond. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- References 1. Amgen Europe, The EU Biotech Act Unlocking Europe’s Potential, May 2025. Retrieved from https://www.amgen.eu/media/press-releases/2025/05/The_EU_Biotech_Act_Unlocking_Europes_Potential 2. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation to establish measures to strengthen the Union’s biotechnology and biomanufacturing sectors, December 2025. Retrieved from https://health.ec.europa.eu/publications/proposal-regulation-establish-measures-strengthen-unions-biotechnology-and-biomanufacturing-sectors_en 3. EFPIA, The pharmaceutical sector: A catalyst to foster Europe’s competitiveness, February 2026. Retrieved from https://www.efpia.eu/media/zkhfr3kp/10-actions-for-competitiveness-growth-and-security.pdf 4. The Parliament, Investing in healthy societies by boosting biotech competitiveness, November 2024. Retrieved from https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/partner/article/investing-in-healthy-societies-by-boosting-biotech-competitiveness#_ftn4 5. Amgen Europe, The EU Biotech Act Unlocking Europe’s Potential, May 2025. Retrieved from https://www.amgen.eu/docs/BiotechPP_final_digital_version_May_2025.pdf   6. European Commission, combine programme, June 2023. Retrieved from https://health.ec.europa.eu/medical-devices-topics-interest/combine-programme_en  7. European Commission. Medical Devices – In Vitro Diagnostics, March 2026. Retrieved from https://health.ec.europa.eu/medical-devices-vitro-diagnostics_en 8. European Commission, Clinical trials – Regulation EU No 536/2014, January 2022. Retrieved from https://health.ec.europa.eu/medicinal-products/clinical-trials/clinical-trials-regulation-eu-no-5362014_en 9. European Commission, Simpler and more effective rules for medical devices – Commission proposal for a targeted revision of the medical devices regulations, December 2025. Retrieved from https://health.ec.europa.eu/medical-devices-sector/new-regulations_en#mdr 10. Amgen Europe, The EU Biotech Act Unlocking Europe’s Potential, May 2025. Retrieved from https://www.amgen.eu/docs/BiotechPP_final_digital_version_May_2025.pdf   11. AmCham, EU position on the Commission Proposal for an EU Biotech Act 12. European Commission, AI Act | Shaping Europe’s digital future, June 2024. Retrieved from https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/regulatory-framework-ai 13. European Commission, European Health Data Space, March 2025. Retrieved from https://health.ec.europa.eu/ehealth-digital-health-and-care/european-health-data-space-regulation-ehds_en 14. The Parliament, Why Europe needs a Biotech Act, October 2025. Retrieved from https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/partner/article/why-europe-needs-a-biotech-act -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is Amgen Inc * The ultimate controlling entity is Amgen Inc * The political advertisement is linked to advocacy on the EU Biotech Act. More information here.

BRUSSELS ― For much of the past decade, Hungary’s Viktor Orbán has succeeded in bending the EU’s agenda to his will by forcing leaders to overcome his vetoes in one high-level gathering after another. On Thursday he’s ready to do it again — possibly for the last time as he faces a tough battle for reelection against rival Péter Magyar next month. By threatening to block, at a gathering of EU leaders in Brussels, a €90 billion loan for Ukraine that he’d approved in December, Orbán has crossed a red line when it comes to opposing Brussels. In doing so he is setting himself up for a reckoning with the bloc that could come soon after the Hungarian election, five EU diplomats and one national European government cabinet minister said. While the bloc has so far shied away from a major confrontation with Hungary — it hasn’t stripped Budapest’s voting rights, for example — this cautious calculus may well change after the election. At that point, fears of feeding into Orbán’s campaign narrative will be displaced by the need to dissuade other leaders from copying the Hungarian strongman, said the same diplomats and officials, who were granted anonymity to discuss sensitive summit preparations. A reckoning was in the cards regardless of the outcome of Hungary’s April 12 election, the officials said, but would arrive much faster if Orbán is re-elected. He is currently nine percentage points behind Magyar, according to POLITICO’s Poll of Polls. “The behavior from Hungary is a new low,” Sweden’s Europe Minister Jessica Rosencrantz told POLITICO ahead of Thursday’s European Council. Asked if Stockholm would consider using legal tools against Hungary, including deploying Article 7 of the EU’s Treaty to take Budapest’s voting rights away, she said: “Absolutely, we are open.” Swedish EU Affairs Minister Jessica Rosencrantz speaks to the media in the Europa building in Brussels on March 17, 2026. | Thierry Monasse/Getty Images If Orbán is reelected, “there will be a serious conversation among a group of countries about how to handle this going into the future,” one of the diplomats said. That conversation would likely play out differently if Magyar prevails, as he “indicates that he wants to play a more constructive game,” while EU leaders would likely play a “waiting game” to see how the new government behaves. What exactly the EU would do to rein in a reelected Orbán remains an open question. So far it has proven impossible to obtain the backing of 26 out of 27 EU countries for an Article 7 proceeding against Budapest. But other legal options, such as tying EU funds to even more stringent rule-of-law conditions, are already on the table, the diplomats said, as is dragging Orbán to court over his obstruction on the loan. During a closed-door meeting of foreign ministers in Brussels earlier this week, German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul showed just how little patience the EU still has for Hungary, warning that Budapest’s obstructionism could no longer be tolerated, according to three diplomats who were briefed on Foreign Affairs Council talks. The diplomats disputed an account of the exchange by the Hungarian PM’s political adviser — who wrote in a post on X that Wadephul had threatened Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó with “very serious consequences.” The diplomats described the German minister’s remarks as “very direct,” “very clear” and “leaving no doubt that this can no longer be tolerated.” Other unnamed foreign ministers had been even more direct with Szijjártó, leaving him “taken aback,” according to one of the diplomats. “Prime Minister Orbán should understand that he is all the time testing the limits of what other member states are willing to put up with,” said a second senior EU diplomat from a mid-sized country. “This cannot continue.” A third diplomat said: “This will definitely have consequences after the elections. We are just waiting for that to happen.” Hungarian Foreign Affairs Minister Peter Szijjártó speaks to the media in Brussels on March 16, 2026. | Thierry Monasse/Getty images ROCK AND HARD PLACE What’s especially galling about Orbán’s latest standoff to many of his critics is how well he laid his trap — and how easily EU leaders walked into it. Merely blocking the EU’s 20th Russian sanctions package wasn’t a big enough spectacle for the Hungarian PM. But the Druzhba oil pipeline, which Kyiv said had been damaged in a Russian attack in January, fit the bill perfectly. Orbán seized on the halt in Russian oil deliveries to block the €90 billion loan, reneging on his own word to other EU leaders and devising an ideal Brussels-Budapest-Kyiv standoff for his campaign. And the Hungarian, who is now the longest-serving leader around the EU Council table, made the most of it by detaining an armored convoy carrying Ukrainian gold and officials, and then posting a video of himself alleging that Ukraine had threatened his family. It didn’t help that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy also escalated the situation by refusing to allow EU inspectors to examine the pipeline for weeks and then saying he had no interest in repairing Druzhba. “This was building for weeks, literally. And now here we are [in] the Council, and it’s his [Orbán’s] show again,” the third EU diplomat said. European Council President António Costa, the main EU official in charge of dealing with Orbán ahead of leaders’ summits, hinted at taking a harder stance against the Hungarian prime minister in a letter he sent Orbán on Feb. 23. The letter that warned that by reneging on his support for the loan, Orbán had broken the EU’s principle of sincere cooperation, thereby exposing himself to legal consequences. But Costa didn’t follow up on the threat, with a European Council official telling POLITICO that the idea of suing Budapest over the obstruction had been dropped because the Court of Justice would “take too much time” to act. The EU needs a short-term solution for the Ukraine loan, the official said. European Council President António Costa speaks to the media in the Justus Lipsius building in Brussels on March 18, 2026. | Thierry Monasse/Getty Images “This is hard to understand,” the third diplomat said. “They should have played hardball, at least tried it out, in the meantime put some temporary measures on him. It would have been at least something than this wobbling. But nothing came.” Now leaders face a dilemma as Orbán once again threatens to steal the show at the European Council meeting: Call his bluff by taking the loan off the table, and risk infuriating Zelenskyy, who has been invited to the the meeting — or embrace a confrontation with Orbán that will inevitably seem like the EU is giving in to blackmail. “There is clear reluctance to give Orbán the spotlight,” the same diplomat said. “We won’t give him that space at the EUCO. But if we fail on the loan, Zelenskyy will rightly be furious.” 

PARIS — Far-left firebrand Jean-Luc Mélenchon is emerging from this month’s municipal elections as France’s chief political disrupter, building momentum he hopes will turn him into the leading contender against the far right in next year’s presidential race. The nightmare scenario for France’s beleaguered center left, however, is that Mélenchon would make for a highly divisive presidential candidate, and polling suggests he could ultimately gift a win to the far-right National Rally in 2027. The 74-year-old former teacher took a highly abrasive, confrontational approach to the local elections — stoking controversy with his unapologetic response to the killing of a far-right activist, and later with comments that were condemned as antisemitic. But this pugnacious strategy — slammed by his critics as a “brutalization” of politics — seems to have paid off, with his France Unbowed party winning big in key target areas like working-class and immigrant communities in Sunday’s first round. Mélenchon has hailed his results as a “magnificent breakthrough.” France Unbowed won the poor, diverse city of Saint-Denis in the suburbs of Paris outright, and he looks well-placed to win mayoral contests in the northeastern city of Roubaix and in France’s fourth-largest city, Toulouse. DIVISIVE LEADER Mélenchon’s performance now looks set to have major consequences across France’s political landscape. He is anathema to France’s centrists, and his political rise only heightens the perception that the country’s leftist camp will be rudderless and riven by internal feuds, just as the country faces its most momentous election in years, with Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella from the far-right National Rally as the current favorites for the presidency. For now, it also looks highly improbable that such an inflammatory figure as Mélenchon can stop the far right if he qualifies for the second round of the presidential vote next year. While he describes French politics as an “us-against-them” battle on the extremes, and sees France Unbowed as the only party that can lead a “single front” against the far right, polling suggests the French electorate is extremely wary of him. If Mélenchon were to make it to a runoff in 2027, a poll in November suggested he would be smashed by Bardella. According to the survey by Odoxa, 74 percent would pick the National Rally leader for the Elysée. “It’s not at all certain that France Unbowed can widen its electorate to the [centrist] Macron-backing voters,” said Ipsos pollster Mathieu Gallard. French far-right Rassemblement National party’s President Jordan Bardella speaks after the first round of France’s 2026 municipal elections in Beaucaire, south-eastern France on March 15, 2026. | Gabriel Bouys/AFP via Getty Images “Mélenchon is a great political machine that mobilizes the left-wing electorate … but he is also a machine that scares away more moderate voters,” he said. DISARRAY ON THE LEFT Not everyone agrees that France Unbowed’s results on Sunday were as emphatic as Mélenchon is making them out to be. The center-left Socialist Party and its allies are still on track to hold onto many more cities and towns, including Marseille and Montpellier. And the hard left’s combative messaging has not been successful everywhere. “There are towns where their results are quite disappointing,” said pollster Gallard, pointing to suburbs in Paris and Lyon. But even if the hard left’s victories turn out to be less impressive on closer inspection, they are still sending shockwaves through the rest of the left. The Socialist Party, which has been hoping for a comeback after a decade of center-right politics under Macron, is the first and most obvious of Mélenchon’s victims. The moderate left very publicly condemned France Unbowed when Mélenchon refused to distance himself from the ultra-left group that was involved in the death of far-right activist Quentin Deranque. Shock then turned to horror last month when Mélenchon was accused of antisemitism after mocking the pronunciation of Jewish names and playing up the Jewishness of convicted sex offender Jeffrey Epstein. Marine Le Pen (L) and Jordan Bardella arrive at the Hotel Matignon to attend a meeting of party leaders on the conflict in Iran, hosted by French Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu, in Paris on March 11, 2026. | Bertrand Guay/AFP via Getty Images “He’s the Jean-Marie Le Pen of our times,” said Raphaël Glucksmann, a Jewish politician from the center left who was targeted by Mélenchon. Glucksmann was referring to Marine Le Pen’s father, who founded the National Front and downplayed the Holocaust. In the wake of Sunday’s results, Socialist Party leader Olivier Faure tried to hold the line against France Unbowed, pledging there would be no “national alliance.” But within hours the Socialists were striking deals at the local level, including in France’s third-largest city, Lyon.  “We’ll get attacked all week,” warned Jean-Christophe Cambadélis, a Socialist former lawmaker, who slammed the “lack of clarity” over the party’s position. “What we’ll win now, we’ll lose in the presidential election because we won’t be credible,” he said. In another sign of division, the Socialists and the Greens have also been at each other’s throats over whether to team up with France Unbowed. GAMING THE TWO-ROUND ELECTION For Mélenchon, such divisions are good news. Olivier Faure, first secretary of the Socialist Party, during a press conference in Lyon. France on March 10, 2026. | Albin Bonnard/Hans Lucas/AFP via Getty Images After blowing up France’s traditional parties, President Emmanuel Macron has left a fragmented political landscape ahead of the 2027 presidential election, along with a weakened centrist coalition. With the French president unable to run for a third consecutive term, there’s a surplus of presidential hopefuls on the starting line. This could lower the threshold of votes needed to qualify for the runoff vote against the far right. Candidates such as Mélenchon, who have a dedicated and loyal voter base, may be able to pull past more consensual candidates who could cancel each other out. “That’s his strategy,” said a Socialist Party adviser who, like others quoted in this story, was granted anonymity to discuss party politics. “We are capable of taking a dive in elections, but France Unbowed never takes a dive, they never go under 10 percent” in national elections, the adviser said. “But there isn’t a scenario in which he wins in a runoff vote against Bardella.” The difficulty for the moderate left is compounded by the fact that Mélenchon is one of the most charismatic politicians on the left. He has even drawn the reluctant admiration of Le Pen’s niece, Marion Maréchal, who called him “the most cultured” politician around. But what’s true of the left is also to some extent true of the conservatives and the center right, which are enmeshed in internal squabbling to see who can assume Macron’s mantle. “What are the political offers on the table and who is there to embody them?” asked a close ally of the French president. “I can see what the extremes are offering, but in between, it’s really not clear,” he said. That’s a gap Mélenchon is trying to exploit.

The 21st century is more likely to belong to Beijing than to Washington — at least that’s the view from four key U.S. allies. Swaths of the public in Canada, Germany, France and the U.K. have soured on the U.S., driven by President Donald Trump’s foreign policy decisions, according to recent results from The POLITICO Poll. Respondents in these countries increasingly see China as a more dependable partner than the U.S. and believe the Asian economic colossus is leading on advanced technologies, including artificial intelligence. Critically, Europeans surveyed see it as possible to reduce reliance on the U.S. but harder to reduce reliance on China — suggesting newfound entanglements that could drastically tip the balance of global power away from the West. Here are five key takeaways from the poll highlighting the pivot from the U.S. to China. The POLITICO Poll — in partnership with U.K. polling firm Public First — found that respondents in those four allied countries believe it is better to depend on China than the U.S. following Trump’s turbulent return to office. That appears to be driven by Trump’s disruption, not by a newfound stability in China: In a follow-up question, a majority of respondents in both Canada and Germany agreed that any attempts to get closer to China are because the U.S. has become harder to depend on — not because China itself has become a more reliable partner. Many respondents in France (38 percent) and the U.K. (42 percent) also shared that sentiment. Under Trump’s “America First” ethos, Washington has upended the “rules-based international order” of the past with sharp-elbowed policies that have isolated the U.S. on the global stage. This includes slow-walking aid to Ukraine, threatening NATO allies with economic punishment and withdrawing from major international institutions, including the World Health Organization and the United Nations Human Rights Council. His punitive liberation day tariffs, as well as threats to annex Greenland and make Canada “the 51st state,” have only further strained relationships with top allies. Beijing has seized the moment to cultivate better business ties with European countries looking for an alternative to high U.S. tariffs on their exports. Last October, Beijing hosted a forum aimed at shoring up mutual investments with Europe. More recently, senior Chinese officials described EU-China ties as a partnership rather than a rivalry. “The administration has assisted the Chinese narrative by acting like a bully,” Mark Lambert, former deputy assistant secretary of State for China and Taiwan in the Biden administration, told POLITICO. “Everyone still recognizes the challenges China poses — but now, Washington no longer works in partnership and is only focused on itself.” These sentiments are already being translated into action. Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney declared a “rupture” between Ottawa and Washington in January and backed that rhetoric by sealing a trade deal with Beijing that same month. The U.K. inked several high-value export deals with China not long after, while both French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz have returned from recent summits in Beijing with Chinese purchase orders for European products. Respondents across all four allied countries are broadly supportive of efforts to create some distance from the U.S. — and say they’re also more dependent on China. In Canada, 48 percent said it would be possible to reduce reliance on the U.S. and believe their government should do so. In the U.K., 42 percent said reducing reliance on the U.S. sounded good in theory, but were skeptical it could happen in practice. By contrast, fewer respondents across those countries believe it would actually be possible to reduce reliance on China — a testament to Beijing’s dominance of global supply chains. Young adults may be drawn to China as an alternative to U.S. cultural hegemony. Respondents between the ages of 18 and 24 were significantly more supportive than their older peers of building a closer relationship with China. A recent study commissioned by the Institute of European Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences — a Beijing-based think tank — suggests most young Europeans get their information about China and Chinese life through social media. Nearly 70 percent of those aged 18 to 25 said they rely on social media and other short-form video platforms for information on China. And the media they consume is likely overwhelmingly supportive of China, as TikTok, one of the most popular social media platforms in the world, was built by Chinese company ByteDance and has previously been accused of suppressing content deemed negative toward China. According to Alicja Bachulska, a policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, younger generations believe the U.S. has led efforts to depict China as an authoritarian regime and a threat to democracy, while simultaneously degrading its own democratic values. The trend “pushes a narrative that ‘we’ve been lied to’ about what China is,” said Bachulska, as “social sentiment among the youth turns against the U.S.” “It’s an expression of dissatisfaction with the state of U.S. politics,” she added. There’s a clear consensus among those surveyed in Europe and Canada that China is winning the global tech race — a coveted title central to Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s grand policy vision. China is leading the U.S. and other Western nations in the development of electric batteries and robotics, while Chinese designs have also become the global standard in electric vehicles and solar panels. “There has been a real vibe shift in global perception of Chinese tech and innovation dominance,” said Sarah Beran, who served as deputy chief of mission in the U.S. embassy in Beijing during the Biden administration. This digital rat race is most apparent in the fast-paced development of artificial intelligence. China has poured billions of dollars into research initiatives, poaching top tech talent from U.S. universities and funding state-backed tech firms to advance its interests in AI. The investment appears to be paying off — a plurality of respondents from Canada, Germany, France and the U.K. believe that China is more likely to develop the first superintelligent AI. But these advancements have done little to change American minds. A majority of respondents in the U.S. still see American-made tech as superior to Chinese tech, even in the realm of AI. As Washington and its allies grow more estranged, the perception of the U.S. as the dominant world power is in retreat — though most Americans don’t see it that way. About half of all respondents in Canada, Germany, France and the U.K. believe that China is rapidly becoming a more consequential superpower. This is particularly true among those who say the U.S. is no longer a positive force for the world. By contrast, 63 percent of respondents in the U.S. believe their nation will maintain its dominance in 10 years — reflecting major disparities in beliefs about global power dynamics between the U.S. and its European allies. This view of China as the world’s power center may not have been entirely organic. The U.S. has accused Beijing of pouring billions of dollars into international information manipulation efforts, including state-backed media initiatives and the deployment of tools to stifle online criticism of China and its policies. Some fear that a misplaced belief among U.S. allies in the inevitability of China surpassing the U.S. as a global superpower could be helping accelerate Beijing’s rise. “Europe is capable of defending itself against threats from China and contesting China’s vision of a more Sinocentric, authoritarian-friendly world order,” said Henrietta Levin, former National Security Council director for China in the Biden administration. “But if Europe believes this is impossible and does not try to do so, the survey results may become a self-fulfilling prophecy.” METHOLODGY The POLITICO Poll was conducted from Feb. 6 to Feb. 9, surveying 10,289 adults online, with at least 2,000 respondents each from the U.S., Canada, U.K., France and Germany. Results for each country were weighted to be representative on dimensions including age, gender and geography, and have an overall margin of sampling error of ±2 percentage points for each country. Smaller subgroups have higher margins of error.

A blue wave may already be cresting. Democrats have flipped 28 Republican-held seats in state legislatures across the country over the past 14 months, a sign that the GOP is indeed at risk of losing control of the House, and maybe even the Senate, in the midterms. Democratic wins have come even in deep red states, including Texas, Arkansas and Mississippi, and often by margins that make Republican leaders uneasy. “I’m ringing the alarm bell,” said Brendan Steinhauser, a Texas GOP consultant who has run campaigns for Republicans in the state, including Sen. John Cornyn and Rep. Dan Crenshaw. The results of these state-level elections reflect the immediate concerns of the electorate, provide a launching pad for the next generation of national leaders and could influence the future makeup of Congress through redistricting. They may also give both Republicans and Democrats a preview of the midterm battles to come. For Republicans, the results are a sign that they must do more to motivate low-propensity voters who helped carry President Donald Trump back to the White House, said a senior GOP campaign operative, who was granted anonymity because he didn’t have permission from the party to speak freely about the losses. “We’re the party of low propensity voters now,” said the operative. “How do we turn out these Republican voters in a midterm election?” One of the first signs that Democrats were building momentum came in August, when an Iowa Senate district swung more than 20 points to elect Democrat Catelin Drey. It was the second seat Democrats flipped in the state last year, and the moment that broke the Republican Senate supermajority in the General Assembly. Then in November, Democrats did it again: They flipped three of the six Republican-held districts in a Mississippi special election, again breaking a GOP Senate supermajority. “You are seeing people just vote for change,” said Brian Robinson, a GOP consultant in Georgia, where Republicans lost a seat in December. Robinson, an outside adviser for the state House GOP caucus, says Republicans are blamed for high prices because they’re in charge. “If it’s any one thing, it is [the] cost of living.” Robinson said, arguing that Trump will do something to reduce prices before the midterms. In recent weeks, the president has indeed taken steps, including by touting a pledge from tech companies to reduce energy costs associated with data centers and releasing 172 million barrels of oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. The Iran war, which has sent global oil prices skyrocketing, complicates that effort. After Democrats flipped 13 Virginia seats and five New Jersey seats in November, the Democratic Legislative Campaign Committee went back to reassess state races around the country. They expanded their 2026 target map to 42 chambers and invested $50 million in changing the makeup of state legislatures — the widest map and largest single-year budget DLCC has ever approved. Legislatures in Arizona and New Hampshire are now on the “flip” list, and the DLCC hopes to break or prevent GOP supermajorities in red states across the South and Midwest. Their success could give Democrats more state power over judicial nominees, protect the veto power of Democratic governors in states with GOP-led legislatures and hand Democrats greater influence over redistricting. Republicans, meanwhile, are waiting for the funding to hit. As of January, the RNC has just over $100 million and Trump’s MAGA Inc. PAC has $300 million. State Republicans say when that cash flows into midterm races, it will enable them to get low-propensity voters to vote. Turnout was a major point of discussion at an RNC conference call that Wisconsin GOP Chair Brian Schimming attended Tuesday, and he says Republicans will dedicate a lot of resources to motivate voters in November. “We’ve met with the White House more than once, and they keep track of the target states pretty closely,” said Schimming, adding he also expects Trump and Vice President JD Vance to stump in key Wisconsin congressional districts closer to the election. “They are big base motivators.” In the meantime, Democrats keep flipping state seats. The latest came Tuesday night, when Bobbi Boudman beat Republican Rep. Dale Fincher in a New Hampshire Senate seat that Trump won by 9 points. On March 24, voters will decide in a special election who represents the Florida state House seat that includes Mar-a-Lago. Democrat Emily Gregory, a small business owner who is running against Republican Jon Maples, a businessman, saw her total campaign earnings jump by nearly 75 percent between Jan. 9 and Feb. 12. In November, a national PAC connected Gregory with Drey, who flipped the Iowa seat in August. Drey advised Gregory to find the affordability issue that matters most to her district — the way energy costs resonate in New Jersey and property insurance does in Florida. “In this moment, we have all of the issues on our side. We have all of the momentum on our side,” Gregory recalled Drey telling her. “It’s just up to you as a candidate to get in front of every single voter you can and communicate that message.”

Richard Grenell is stepping down from his role as the interim head of the Kennedy Center before the iconic venue closes down for major renovations, President Donald Trump said Friday. Grenell, a former ambassador who also serves as Trump’s envoy for special missions, will be replaced at the Kenney Center by Matt Floca, vice president of facilities for the performing arts center, the president said in a social media post. Trump, whose administration has affixed his name to the venue in apparent violation of the law and taken over programming by replacing the center’s leadership, said Floca will oversee renovations scheduled to start this year. “A Complete Reconstruction of THE TRUMP KENNEDY CENTER will begin after the July 4th Celebration, with a scheduled Grand Re-Opening in approximately two years,” Trump said. “Ric Grenell has done an excellent job in helping to coordinate various elements of the Center during the transition period, and I want to thank him for the outstanding work he has done.” Trump’s hands-on role in remaking the Kennedy Center has drawn criticism from Democrats throughout his second term. His decision to put his name on the building drew a lawsuit from Ohio Democratic Rep. Joyce Beatty, and his installation of close allies to leadership posts prompted several artists to opt out of performing at the center. Last year, the president hosted the annual Kennedy Center Honors and held the FIFA World Cup draw at the center, where he was presented with the inaugural FIFA Peace Prize. The president’s personal involvement in Kennedy Center leadership has led to fundraising problems, prompting Trump to bring in a longtime supporter to shore up the center’s finances. The move sidelined a senior leadership official at the center who worked closely with Grenell and inflated fundraising estimates. After the president first announced plans to rebuild the Kennedy Center, he told reporters that the project won’t be a complete teardown of the iconic Washington landmark, but would instead be a renovation that preserved some elements of the existing building.

Anton, a 44-year-old Russian soldier who heads a workshop responsible for repairing and supplying drones, was at his kitchen table when he learned last month that Elon Musk’s SpaceX had cut off access to Starlink terminals used by Russian forces. He scrambled for alternatives, but none offered unlimited internet, data plans were restrictive, and coverage did not extend to the areas of Ukraine where his unit operated. It’s not only American tech executives who are narrowing communications options for Russians. Days later, Russian authorities began slowing down access nationwide to the messaging app Telegram, the service that frontline troops use to coordinate directly with one another and bypass slower chains of command. “All military work goes through Telegram — all communication,” Anton, whose name has been changed because he fears government reprisal, told POLITICO in voice messages sent via the app. “That would be like shooting the entire Russian army in the head.” Telegram would be joining a home screen’s worth of apps that have become useless to Russians. Kremlin policymakers have already blocked or limited access to WhatsApp, along with parent company Meta’s Facebook and Instagram, Microsoft’s LinkedIn, Google’s YouTube, Apple’s FaceTime, Snapchat and X, which like SpaceX is owned by Musk. Encrypted messaging apps Signal and Discord, as well as Japanese-owned Viber, have been inaccessible since 2024. Last month, President Vladimir Putin signed a law requiring telecom operators to block cellular and fixed internet access at the request of the Federal Security Service. Shortly after it took effect on March 3, Moscow residents reported widespread problems with mobile internet, calls and text messages across all major operators for several days, with outages affecting mobile service and Wi-Fi even inside the State Duma. Those decisions have left Russians increasingly cut off from both the outside world and one another, complicating battlefield coordination and disrupting online communities that organize volunteer aid, fundraising and discussion of the war effort. Deepening digital isolation could turn Russia into something akin to “a large, nuclear-armed North Korea and a junior partner to China,” according to Alexander Gabuev, the Berlin-based director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. In April, the Kremlin is expected to escalate its campaign against Telegram — already one of Russia’s most popular messaging platforms, but now in the absence of other social-media options, a central hub for news, business and entertainment. It may block the platform altogether. That is likely to fuel an escalating struggle between state censorship and the tools people use to evade it, with Russia’s place in the world hanging in the balance. “It’s turned into a war,” said Mikhail Klimarev, executive director of the internet Protection Society, a digital rights group that monitors Russia’s censorship infrastructure. “A guerrilla war. They hunt down the VPNs they can see, they block them — and the ‘partisans’ run, build new bunkers, and come back.” THE APP THAT RUNS THE WAR On Feb. 4, SpaceX tightened the authentication system that Starlink terminals use to connect to its satellite network, introducing stricter verification for registered devices. The change effectively blocked many terminals operated by Russian units relying on unauthorized connections, cutting Starlink traffic inside Ukraine by roughly 75 percent, according to internet traffic analysis by Doug Madory, an analyst at the U.S. network monitoring firm Kentik. The move threw Russian operations into disarray, allowing Ukraine to make battlefield gains. Russia has turned to a workaround widely used before satellite internet was an option: laying fiber-optic lines, from rear areas toward frontline battlefield positions. Until then, Starlink terminals had allowed drone operators to stream live video through platforms such as Discord, which is officially blocked in Russia but still sometimes used by the Russian military via VPNs, to commanders at multiple levels. A battalion commander could watch an assault unfold in real time and issue corrections — “enemy ahead” or “turn left” — via radio or Telegram. What once required layers of approval could now happen in minutes. Satellite-connected messaging apps became the fastest way to transmit coordinates, imagery and targeting data. But on Feb. 10, Roskomnadzor, the Russian communications regulator, began slowing down Telegram for users across Russia, citing alleged violations of Russian law. Russian news outlet RBC reported, citing two sources, that authorities plan to shut down Telegram in early April — though not on the front line. In mid-February, Digital Development Minister Maksut Shadayev said the government did not yet intend to restrict Telegram at the front but hoped servicemen would gradually transition to other platforms. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said this week the company could avoid a full ban by complying with Russian legislation and maintaining what he described as “flexible contact” with authorities. Roskomnadzor has accused Telegram of failing to protect personal data, combat fraud and prevent its use by terrorists and criminals. Similar accusations have been directed at other foreign tech platforms. In 2022, a Russian court designated Meta an “extremist organization” after the company said it would temporarily allow posts calling for violence against Russian soldiers in the context of the Ukraine war — a decision authorities used to justify blocking Facebook and Instagram in Russia and increasing pressure on the company’s other services, including WhatsApp. Telegram founder Pavel Durov, a Russian-born entrepreneur now based in the United Arab Emirates, says the throttiling is being used as a pretext to push Russians toward a government-controlled messaging app designed for surveillance and political censorship. That app is MAX, which was launched in March 2025 and has been compared to China’s WeChat in its ambition to anchor a domestic digital ecosystem. Authorities are increasingly steering Russians toward MAX through employers, neighborhood chats and the government services portal Gosuslugi — where citizens retrieve documents, pay fines and book appointments — as well as through banks and retailers. The app’s developer, VK, reports rapid user growth, though those figures are difficult to independently verify. “They didn’t just leave people to fend for themselves — you could say they led them by the hand through that adaptation by offering alternatives,” said Levada Center pollster Denis Volkov, who has studied Russian attitudes toward technology use. The strategy, he said, has been to provide a Russian or state-backed alternative for the majority, while stopping short of fully criminalizing workarounds for more technologically savvy users who do not want to switch. Elena, a 38-year-old Yekaterinburg resident whose surname has been withheld because she fears government reprisal, said her daughter’s primary school moved official communication from WhatsApp to MAX without consulting parents. She keeps MAX installed on a separate tablet that remains mostly in a drawer — a version of what some Russians call a “MAXophone,” gadgets solely for that app, without any other data being left on those phones for the (very real) fear the government could access it. “It works badly. Messages are delayed. Notifications don’t come,” she said. “I don’t trust it … And this whole situation just makes people angry.” THE VPN ARMS RACE Unlike China’s centralized “Great Firewall,” which filters traffic at the country’s digital borders, Russia’s system operates internally. Internet providers are required to route traffic through state-installed deep packet inspection equipment capable of controlling and analyzing data flows in real time. “It’s not one wall,” Klimarev said. “It’s thousands of fences. You climb one, then there’s another.” The architecture allows authorities to slow services without formally banning them — a tactic used against YouTube before its web address was removed from government-run domain-name servers last month. Russian law explicitly provides government authority for blocking websites on grounds such as extremism, terrorism, illegal content or violations of data regulations, but it does not clearly define throttling — slowing traffic rather than blocking it outright — as a formal enforcement mechanism. “The slowdown isn’t described anywhere in legislation,” Klimarev said. “It’s pressure without procedure.” In September, Russia banned advertising for virtual private network services that citizens use to bypass government-imposed restrictions on certain apps or sites. By Klimarev’s estimate, roughly half of Russian internet users now know what a VPN is, and millions pay for one. Polling last year by the Levada Center, Russia’s only major independent pollster, suggests regular use is lower, finding about one-quarter of Russians said they have used VPN services. Russian courts can treat the use of anonymization tools as an aggravating factor in certain crimes — steps that signal growing pressure on circumvention technologies without formally outlawing them. In February, the Federal Antimonopoly Service opened what appears to be the first case against a media outlet for promoting a VPN after the regional publication Serditaya Chuvashiya advertised such a service on its Telegram channel. Surveys in recent years have shown that many Russians, particularly older citizens, support tighter internet regulation, often citing fraud, extremism and online safety. That sentiment gives authorities political space to tighten controls even when the restrictions are unpopular among more technologically savvy users. Even so, the slowdown of Telegram drew criticism from unlikely quarters, including Sergei Mironov, a longtime Kremlin ally and leader of the Just Russia party. In a statement posted on his Telegram channel on Feb. 11, he blasted the regulators behind the move as “idiots,” accusing them of undermining soldiers at the front. He said troops rely on the app to communicate with relatives and organize fundraising for the war effort, warning that restricting it could cost lives. While praising the state-backed messaging app MAX, he argued that Russians should be free to choose which platforms they use. Pro-war Telegram channels frame the government’s blocking techniques as sabotage of the war effort. Ivan Philippov, who tracks Russia’s influential military bloggers, said the reaction inside that ecosystem to news about Telegram has been visceral “rage.” Unlike Starlink, whose cutoff could be blamed on a foreign company, restrictions on Telegram are viewed as self-inflicted. Bloggers accuse regulators of undermining the war effort. Telegram is used not only for battlefield coordination but also for volunteer fundraising networks that provide basic logistics the state does not reliably cover — from transport vehicles and fuel to body armor, trench materials and even evacuation equipment. Telegram serves as the primary hub for donations and reporting back to supporters. “If you break Telegram inside Russia, you break fundraising,” Philippov said. “And without fundraising, a lot of units simply don’t function.” Few in that community trust MAX, citing technical flaws and privacy concerns. Because MAX operates under Russian data-retention laws and is integrated with state services, many assume their communications would be accessible to authorities. Philippov said the app’s prominent defenders are largely figures tied to state media or the presidential administration. “Among independent military bloggers, I haven’t seen a single person who supports it,” he said. Small groups of activists attempted to organize rallies in at least 11 Russian cities, including Moscow, Irkutsk and Novosibirsk, in defense of Telegram. Authorities rejected or obstructed most of the proposed demonstrations — in some cases citing pandemic-era restrictions, weather conditions or vague security concerns — and in several cases revoked previously issued permits. In Novosibirsk, police detained around 15 people ahead of a planned rally. Although a small number of protests were formally approved, no large-scale demonstrations ultimately took place. THE POWER TO PULL THE PLUG The new law signed last month allows Russia’s Federal Security Service to order telecom operators to block cellular and fixed internet access. Peskov, the Kremlin spokesman, said subsequent shutdowns of service in Moscow were linked to security measures aimed at protecting critical infrastructure and countering drone threats, adding that such limitations would remain in place “for as long as necessary.” In practice, the disruptions rarely amount to a total communications blackout. Most target mobile internet rather than all services, while voice calls and SMS often continue to function. Some domestic websites and apps — including government portals or banking services — may remain accessible through “whitelists,” meaning authorities allow certain services to keep operating even while broader internet access is restricted. The restrictions are typically localized and temporary, affecting specific regions or parts of cities rather than the entire country. Internet disruptions have increasingly become a tool of control beyond individual platforms. Research by the independent outlet Meduza and the monitoring project Na Svyazi has documented dozens of regional internet shutdowns and mobile network restrictions across Russia, with disruptions occurring regularly since May 2025. The communications shutdown, and uncertainty around where it will go next, is affecting life for citizens of all kinds, from the elderly struggling to contact family members abroad to tech-savvy users who juggle SIM cards and secondary phones to stay connected. Demand has risen for dated communication devices — including walkie-talkies, pagers and landline phones — along with paper maps as mobile networks become less reliable, according to retailers interviewed by RBC. “It feels like we’re isolating ourselves,” said Dmitry, 35, who splits his time between Moscow and Dubai and whose surname has been withheld to protect his identity under fear of governmental reprisal. “Like building a sovereign grave.” Those who track Russian public opinion say the pattern is consistent: irritation followed by adaptation. When Instagram and YouTube were blocked or slowed in recent years, their audiences shrank rapidly as users migrated to alternative services rather than mobilizing against the restrictions. For now, Russia’s digital tightening resembles managed escalation rather than total isolation. Officials deny plans for a full shutdown, and even critics say a complete severing would cripple banking, logistics and foreign trade. “It’s possible,” Klimarev said. “But if they do that, the internet won’t be the main problem anymore.”

LONDON — Keir Starmer will never persuade Donald Trump to love windmills.  But by embracing sweeping reforms of the nuclear power system, the U.K. may finally have found an energy policy the White House likes.  Downing Street on Thursday approved the Fingleton Review, a hefty report calling on the government to speed up building new nuclear power stations by relaxing planning rules, merging regulators, and working more closely with allies itching to invest in the U.K. — including the U.S.  Energy Secretary Ed Miliband touted the report as a “landmark review.” Chancellor Rachel Reeves claimed it would usher in a “new era of global uncertainty.”   But the real winners could be Stateside. “U.S. companies are eager to invest in the U.K., especially in the energy sectors,” Trump’s Ambassador to London Warren Stephens said in a newspaper column late last year.  In the documents approving the Fingleton recommendations, Starmer’s government promised to build on existing deals with the U.S., as well as other countries, “to establish an international regulatory strategy and delivery plan by Autumn 2026.”   That sort of rhetoric gives Downing Street a way to sell itself as open for exactly the sort of U.S. investment Stephens is encouraging, some insiders believe.  “It’s something that No. 10 would probably have its eye on, [given] how much it’s been trumpeting the amount of successful U.S. investment here,” said one senior industry figure familiar with the government’s approach to U.S. nuclear investment, and granted anonymity to speak candidly. They added: “It’s something that No. 10 is very, very keen on,”   ART OF THE DEAL   Starmer’s pursuit of climate-friendly policies consistently threatens to drive a wedge between London and Washington. But the U.K. government used Trump’s state visit last September to announce a series of joint deals to build new nuclear. This includes plans for British Gas owner Centrica and U.S. developer X-Energy to collaborate building 12 nuclear reactors in Hartlepool, north-east England, while Florida-headquartered Holtec has teamed up with EDF and Tritax to develop data centers powered by small modular reactors at an old coal power station in Cottam, in England’s midlands.   Those firms will “ring up the Department of Energy, they’ll ring up [Trump’s Energy Secretary] Chris Wright … and be like: ‘This is good stuff … they put their money where their mouth is,’” said a second senior industry figure, familiar with talks involving U.S. developers and referencing Thursday’s announcement. “You might not hear Trump talk about Hartlepool … but I think you would get some good sounds in the American administration,” they said.   The U.K. government has been wooing Trump on nuclear ever since last summer. “Issues like nuclear cooperation are issues where we can work together with the U.S.,” Miliband said at the time, as an alternative to U.K. policies on fossil fuels and wind turbines, which the president openly derides.  IN HIS SITES Since then, Miliband has been opening up private routes to market for new nuclear, including reforms which relax siting rules so that new nukes, in theory, could be built anywhere in the country.   He has also hinted at selling Oldbury, a plum U.K. site owned by arms-length body Great British Energy Nuclear — with space for up to five small modular reactors, or mini nuclear plants.  Oldbury is “an absolutely prime site” for private firms to sweep in, he told MPs in February. “We have lots of companies from the U.S. working with U.K. companies on these other routes to market,” he said.  Easing planning rules to build nuclear closer to urban centers could open up another site, Heysham in north-west England, to future development. That site is owned by French energy giant EDF but it, too, has been eyed for potential U.S. development.  “If we have clear action, if the government were able to give clarity and certainty on Heysham, it certainly would be a site U.S. investors would look at,” the second industry figure said, citing technical advantages like its proximity to grid connections and local transport access.     WARMING UP WARREN AND WHITEHALL Any such moves could win over Stephens, the ambassador, who jumped on X last year to express his “extreme disappointment” when Miliband’s decision to build mini-nukes in north Wales deprived U.S. nuclear giant Westinghouse of the chance to build a full-size nuclear power plant on the same site.  There are still hurdles to clear, insiders argued, whatever the political intent behind Friday’s decision.  “The tricky thing with the Fingleton Review is not just the political acceptance of it, it’s the officials’ acceptance of it,” feared a third industry figure, citing supposed skepticism about nuclear among British civil servants.   Ministers will have to ensure the plans are not “suffocated by officials,” they said, who could “just be slow, and delay and delay and delay.”   Labour peer and long-standing nuclear advocate Jon Spellar was more optimistic. The bullish response from government to the Fingleton Review showed politicians have “made clear the direction” to Whitehall, and that fears of delay would be “much less of a problem now.”

OSLO — Norway is doubling down on its role as Europe’s energy lifeline as wars and geopolitical turmoil rattle global markets. Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre said the widening conflict in the Middle East, which has already pushed oil prices higher and reduced supply, underscores why Europe needs stable energy partners. “It’s a war that appears to have no plan,” Støre said at the Offshore Norge Annual Conference in Oslo on Thursday, referring to the U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran. “In such unpredictable times, Norway needs to be reliable.” Since Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Norway has become Europe’s largest pipeline gas supplier, replacing much of the fuel that once flowed from Russia. “All the gas we produce in Norway goes to Europe, and around 90 to 95 percent of oil we produce goes to Europe,” Anders Opedal, chief executive of Norwegian oil and gas company Equinor, told POLITICO. But while Oslo is positioning itself as a pillar of Europe’s energy security, Norwegian officials say the country cannot quickly ramp up production even if geopolitical tensions tighten global supply. Norway’s Energy Minister Terje Aasland said his country is already operating close to maximum output. “We are at the top of production capacity just now,” he told POLITICO. Increasing supply would require new exploration and investment, Aasland said, as his government works to slow an expected decline in production after 2030 by developing additional resources on the Norwegian continental shelf. “Our focus is to be a stable and long and predictable supplier of energy to the European market,” he said. ARCTIC TENSIONS At the same time, Norway is pushing back against calls in Brussels to halt oil and gas development in the Arctic as the EU revises its Arctic strategy. The EU’s current policy commits the bloc to pursuing an international moratorium on Arctic oil and gas extraction, but the strategy is now under review, with a public consultation closing March 16 and a revised version expected before the summer. Norwegian officials, industry groups and unions are lobbying Brussels to drop the idea, arguing Europe will continue to need Norwegian Arctic gas as it phases out Russian supplies. Aasland defended Norway’s record in the region, pointing to the Barents Sea — where the country launched the Johan Castberg oil field last August — as an example of responsible development. “We have delivered oil and gas to the European market from the Arctic for several decades,” he said. “And we will develop it.” Industry leaders say Arctic production already plays a role in replacing Russian supplies. “When we opened the Johan Castberg field last year, the first cargo went straight to Europe, replacing Russian oil,” Opedal said. “Any moratorium here would actually reduce Europe’s security of supply.” Norway supplies roughly a third of EU gas imports, though Arctic gas accounts for a much smaller share, around 3 percent of the bloc’s imports. Still, Norwegian leaders argue a moratorium would send the wrong signal while Europe remains dependent on external energy supplies. Norwegian officials, industry groups and unions are lobbying Brussels to drop the idea, arguing Europe will continue to need Norwegian Arctic gas as it phases out Russian supplies. | Soeren Stache/picture alliance via Getty Images Ine Eriksen Søreide, the leader of Norway’s Conservative party, said calls to stop Arctic development clash with Europe’s current energy security priorities. “It sends a very bad signal when the Commission says we need to stop oil and gas development in the Arctic, because that’s development the EU relies on,” she said. Experts say the broader Arctic energy picture is dominated by Russia, which has major plans to expand liquefied natural gas production through projects such as Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG 2. Malte Humpert, founder and senior fellow at the Arctic Institute, said climate change is rapidly transforming the once-inaccessible region. “If we didn’t have climate change, we wouldn’t be talking about Arctic geopolitics,” he told POLITICO. “Climate change is actively reshaping the map, where suddenly there’s new trade routes available that didn’t exist even 10, 15 years ago.” OIL AND GAS AREN’T GOING ANYWHERE FOR NOW Across Oslo’s political spectrum, the message is broadly the same: Europe still needs reliable fossil fuel suppliers, and Norway intends to remain one of them. Opposition leader Sylvi Listhaug of the right-wing Progress Party argued Europe should encourage Norway to produce more oil and gas to reduce reliance on authoritarian regimes. “The more Norway can produce of gas, the less dependent Europe will be” on non-democratic producers, she said. Ine Eriksen Søreide, the leader of Norway’s Conservative party, said calls to stop Arctic development clash with Europe’s current energy security priorities. | Pool photo by Olivier Doulier/AFP via Getty Images Listhaug also warned that high energy prices risk undermining European competitiveness. “Energy and economic growth are a one-to-one relationship,” she said. Even as Norway expands renewables, leaders insist fossil fuels will remain crucial to Europe’s energy system during the long transition to cleaner alternatives. “We have to have two thoughts in our heads at the same time,” Aasland said.