Laura Thornton is the senior director for democracy programs at the McCain Institute. She spent more than two decades in Asia and the former Soviet Union with the National Democratic Institute. Earlier this month, I spoke at a conference in Bucharest for Eastern Europe’s democracy activists and leaders. I was discussing foreign malign influence operations, particularly around elections, highlighting Russia’s hybrid war in Moldova, when a Hungarian participant pointed out that U.S. President Donald Trump had offered Hungary’s illiberal strongman Viktor Orbán a one-year reprieve for complying with U.S. sanctions for using Russian oil and gas. With Hungarian elections around the corner and this respite being a direct relief to Orbán’s economy, “Is that not election interference?” she asked. The next day, while at the Moldova Security Forum in Chișinău, a Polish government official expressed his deep concern about sharing intelligence with the current U.S. administration. While he had great respect for the embassy in Warsaw, he noted a lack of trust in some leaders in Washington and his worry that intelligence would get leaked, in the worst case to Russia — as had happened during Trump’s first term. My week came to an end at a two-day workshop for democracy activists, all who described the catastrophic impact that the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) elimination had on their work, whether that be protecting free and fair elections, combating disinformation campaigns or supporting independent media. “It’s not just about the money. It’s the loss of the U.S. as a democratic partner,” said one Georgian participant. Others then described how this withdrawal had been an extraordinary gift to Russia, China and other autocratic regimes, becoming a main focus of their disinformation campaigns. According to one Moldovan participant, “The U.S. has abandoned Moldova” was now a common Russian narrative, while Chinese messaging in the global south was also capitalizing on the end of USAID to paint Washington as an unreliable ally. Having spent a good deal of my career tracking malign foreign actors who undermine democracy around the world and coming up with strategies to defend against them, this was a rude reality check. I had to ask myself: “Wait, are we the bad guys?” It would be naive to suggest that the U.S. has always been a good faith actor, defending global democracy throughout its history. After all, America has meddled in many countries’ internal struggles, supporting leaders who didn’t have their people’s well-being or freedom in mind. But while it has fallen short in the past, there was always broad bipartisan agreement over what the U.S. should be: a reliable ally; a country that supports those less fortunate, stands up against tyranny worldwide and is a beacon of freedom for human rights defenders. America’s values and interests were viewed as intertwined — particularly the belief that a world with more free and open democracies would benefit the U.S. As the late Senator John McCain famously said: “Our interests are our values, and our values are our interests.” At the Moldova Security Forum in Chișinău, a Polish government official expressed his deep concern about sharing intelligence with the current U.S. administration. | Artur Widak/Getty Images I have proudly seen this born out in my work. I’ve lived in several countries that have had little to offer the U.S. with regards to trade, extractive industries or influence, and yet we supported their health, education and agriculture programs. We also stood up for defenders of democracy and freedom fighters around the world, with little material benefit to ourselves. I’ve worked with hundreds of foreign aid and NGO workers in my life, and I can say not one of them was in it for a “good trade deal” or to colonize resources. But today’s U.S. foreign policy has broken from this approach. It has abandoned the post-World War II consensus on allies and the value of defending freedom, instead revolving around transactions and deal-making, wielding tariffs to punish or reward, and defining allies based on financial benefit rather than shared democratic values. There are new ideological connections taking place as well — they’re just not the democratic alliances of the past. At the Munich Security Forum earlier this year, U.S. Vice President JD Vance chose to meet with the far-right Alternative for Germany party rather than then-Chancellor Olaf Scholz. The Conservative Political Action Committee has also served as a transatlantic bridge to connect far-right movements in Europe to those in the U.S., providing a platform to strongmen like Orbán. The recently released U.S. National Security Strategy explicitly embraces this pivot away from values toward more transactional alliances, as well as a fondness for “patriotic European parties” and a call to “resist” the region’s “current trajectory” — a clear reference to the illiberal, far-right movements in Europe. Meanwhile, according to Harvard University’s school of public health, USAID’s closure has tragically caused hundreds of thousands of deaths, while simultaneously kneecapping the work of those fighting for freedom, human rights and democracy. And according to Moldovan organizations I’ve spoken with, while the EU and others continue to assist them in their fight against Russia’s hybrid attacks ahead of this year’s September elections, the American withdrawal is de facto helping the Kremlin’s efforts. It should have come as no surprise to me that our partners are worried and wondering whose side the U.S. is really on. But I also believe that while a country’s foreign policy often reflects the priorities and values of that nation as a whole, Americans can still find a way to shift this perception. Alliances aren’t only built nation-to-nation — they can take place at the subnational level, creating bonds between democratic cities or states in the U.S. with like-minded local governments elsewhere. Just like Budapest doesn’t reflect its anti-democratic national leadership, we can find connections and share lessons learned. Moreover, partnerships can be forged at the civil society level too. Many American democracy and civic organizations, journalists and foundations firmly believe in a pro-democracy U.S. foreign policy, and they want to build communities with democratic actors globally. At a meeting in Prague last month, a former German government official banged their hand on the table, emphatically stating: “The transatlantic relationship is dead!” And I get it. I understand that the democratic world may well be tempted to cut the U.S. off as an ally and partner. But to them I’d like to say that it’s not our democracy organizations, funding organizations and broader government that abandoned them when national leadership changed. Relationships can take on many shapes, layers and connections, and on both sides of the Atlantic, those in support of democracy must now find new creative avenues of cooperation and support. I hope our friends don’t give up on us so easily.

EUROPE’S CENTER ISN’T HOLDING ANYMORE Despite recent election wins for moderates in the Netherlands, Germany and the U.K., the far right is stronger than ever. By TIM ROSS in Jaywick, England Illustration by Merijn Hos for POLITICO In recent elections, voters in Europe have given hope to embattled centrist politicians across the Western world.   Donald Trump may have romped back into the White House, but the international movement of MAGA-aligned populists has run into trouble across the Atlantic. At elections in the U.K., France, Germany, the Netherlands, Romania — and in a sprawling vote across 27 EU countries for the European Parliament — mainstream candidates defeated populist hardliners and far-right nationalists.  “There remains a majority in the center for a strong Europe, and that is crucial for stability,” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said, after the EU Parliament elections last year. “In other words, the center is holding.”   Sixteen months later, that hold is looking anything but secure.    Hard-right and far-right politicians are now leading the polls in France, the U.K. and even Germany. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s approval rating is a dire 21 percent. His French counterpart, Emmanuel Macron, is even lower, at 11 percent — and the mood is so grim that this fall’s spectacular theft at the Louvre is being treated by some as a giant metaphor for a country unable to manage its challenges.   Even von der Leyen’s own EU conservatives now rely on the votes of far right lawmakers to get her plans approved in Brussels. One outraged centrist likened the shift to those German politicians who enabled Adolf Hitler to take power. Populists at the extremes, meanwhile, cast themselves as the obvious alternative for populations that want change. And now they can expect Trump to help: In a brutal rupture of transatlantic norms, a new U.S. National Security Strategy aims to use American diplomacy to cultivate “resistance” to political correctness in Europe — especially on migration — and to support parties it describes as “patriotic.” Trump himself told POLITICO he would endorse candidates he believed would move Europe in the right direction. On that rightward trajectory, in the next four years the political map of the West faces its most dramatic upheaval since the Cold War. The implications for geopolitics, from trade to defense, could be profound.   “What [Europeans are] getting from Trump is the strategy of maximum polarization that hollows out the center,” said Will Marshall from the Progressive Policy Institute, the centrist American think tank that backed Bill Clinton in the 1990s. “The old established parties of left and right that dominated the post war era have gotten weaker,” he said. “The nationalist or populist right’s revolt is against them.”  Nowhere is this recent transformation more dramatic than in the U.K.   As the sun sinks toward the horizon over a calm sea one Thursday evening in November, half a dozen regulars huddle around the bar in the Never Say Die pub, a few yards from the beach at Jaywick Sands, on the east coast of England.   Built in the 1930s as a resort 70 miles from London, Jaywick is now the most deprived neighborhood in the country. The area had such a bad image that in 2018 a U.S. MAGA ad used a photograph of a dilapidated Jaywick street to warn of the apocalyptic future facing America if Trump’s candidates were not elected.   Jaywick was named England’s most deprived neighbourhood in October — for the fourth time since 2010. | Tolga Akmen/EPA It is here among the pebbledashed bungalows and England flags hanging limp from lampposts that a new political force — Nigel Farage’s rightwing Reform UK — has built its heartland.   At the bar, Dave Laurence, 82, says he doesn’t vote, as a rule, but made an exception for Farage, who was elected to represent the area last year. “I quite like him. He’s doing the best he can,” Laurence says as he sips his pint of lager, with ’80s pop hits playing in the background. “I’ll vote for him again.”  Laurence freely describes himself as “racist” and says he would never vote for a Black person, such as the center-right Conservative Party’s leader Kemi Badenoch. What troubles him most, he says, is the number of immigrants who have arrived in the U.K. during his lifetime, especially those crossing the Channel in small boats. Soon, Laurence fears, the country will be “full of Muslims and they’ll fucking rebel against us.”  With its anti-establishment, immigration-fighting agenda, Farage’s Reform UK offers voters a program tightly in tune with far-right parties that have gained ground across the West. According to opinion polls, Farage now has a real chance of becoming the U.K.’s next prime minister if the vote were held today. (A general election is not due until 2029).   It’s startling to note that as recently as July 2024, Starmer’s Labour Party won a historic landslide and some of his triumphant election aides traveled to the U.S. to advise Democrats on strategy. Today, Starmer is derided as “First Gear Keir” as he fights off leadership rivals rumored to be trying to oust him. And Reform isn’t the only force remaking British party politics. To the left of Labour, the Greens have also made recent gains in the polls under a new leader calling himself an “eco-populist.”   Farage’s stunning rise from the sidelines to the front of a political revolution carries lessons well beyond Britain’s borders. Europeans raised in the old school of mainstream politics fear that the traditional centerground — their home turf — will not hold.   ‘DURABLY UNSTABLE’   Macron, for his part, tried to counter the rise of the hard right by calling a snap election for the French National Assembly last year. The gamble backfired, delivering a hung parliament that has been unable to agree on key economic policies ever since. Macron is now historically unpopular.   French lawmakers’ clashes over the budget have toppled three of Macron’s picks as prime minister since the summer of 2024. A backlash against his plan to raise the pension age has forced ratings agencies to mull a damaging downgrade. Macron, who himself became president by launching a new centrist movement to rival the political establishment, now has no traditional party machinery to help bolster his position. “He’ll leave a political landscape that is perhaps durably unstable. It’s unforgivable,” said Alain Minc, an influential adviser and former mentor to the French president.  The chaos gives populists their chance. The main politicians making any running in conversations about the next presidential election belong to the far-right National Rally of Marine Le Pen and its youthful party president Jordan Bardella, who are riding high in the polls at 34 percent.   In Germany, too, the center ground is steadily eroding.   Though Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s conservatives won a snap election in February, his ideologically uneasy coalition, which consists of his own conservative bloc and the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD), holds one of the slimmest parliamentary majorities for a government since 1945, with just 52 percent of seats. That leaves the Merz coalition vulnerable to small defections within the ranks and makes it hard for him to achieve anything ambitious in government. The far-left Die Linke party and the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) both surged at the last election, too, with AfD winning the best result in a national election for any far-right party since World War II.  Merz’s attempt to defang the AfD by moving his conservatives sharply to the right on the issue of migration seems to have backfired. The AfD has only continued its rise, surpassing Merz’s conservatives in many polls.   The rise of the far-right is a cultural shock to many centrist Germans, given the country’s deeply entrenched desire to avoid repeating its past. “For a long time in Germany we thought with our history, and the way we teach in our schools, we would be a bit more immune to that,” one concerned German official said. “It turned out we are not.”   Even in the Netherlands, where centrist Rob Jetten won a famous but narrow victory over the far-right firebrand Geert Wilders in October, there are reasons for mainstream politicians to worry. Wilders’ Freedom Party is still one of the biggest forces in the land, winning the same number of seats as Jetten’s D66. He could well return next time, just as Trump did in the U.S.   WHERE DID ALL THE VOTERS GO?   According to polling firm Ipsos, a large proportion of voters in many Western democracies now have little faith in the political process. While they still believe in democratic values, they are dissatisfied with the way democracy is working for them.   A large survey questioning around 10,000 voters across nine countries found 45 percent were dissatisfied, fueling support for the extremes. Among voters on the far left (57 percent) and the far right (54 percent), levels of dissatisfaction were highest of all.   The countries with the highest rates of dissatisfaction in the Ipsos study were France and the Netherlands, where political upheaval has taken its toll on faith in the system.   Anti-riot police officers stand next to a demonstration called by far-right activist Els Rechts against the Netherlands’ current asylum policy, in September in The Hague. | Josh Walet/ANP via Getty Images Alongside the coronavirus pandemic and the aftermath of lockdowns, the biggest drivers of dissatisfaction were the cost of living, immigration and crime, according to Gideon Skinner from Ipsos. Trust in politics fell in the 90s and took another hit in the late 2000s at the time of the financial crash, he said.   “There may be specific things that have made it worse over the last couple of years but it’s also a long-term condition,” Skinner told POLITICO. “It’s something we do need to worry about and there is not a silver bullet that can fix it all.”  Perhaps the greatest problem for incumbent centrists is that in most cases their economies are so moribund that they lack the fiscal firepower to spend money addressing the issues disillusioned voters care about most — like high living costs, ailing public services and migration.  THE INEQUALITY EMERGENCY   The financial crisis of 2008 and the coronavirus lockdowns of 2020-21 left many governments strapped for cash. In the U.K., for example, the economy was 16 percent smaller than it should have been a decade after the 2008 crash if prior growth trends had continued, according to Anand Menon, professor of European politics at King’s College London.   “Crucially, the impact of the financial crisis, like the impact of so much else in our politics, was massively unequal,” Menon said. “Prosperous places with high productivity, with well-educated workforces suffered far, far less than poorer parts of the country.”   Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz submitted a study to the G20 in November warning that the world was facing an “inequality emergency.” Fueled by war, pandemic and trade disruptions, the crisis risks preparing the ground for more authoritarian leaders, his report said.   In many Western countries, the centerground is more than just a metaphor. It is in capital cities like London, Paris and Washington that power and money accumulate and the economic and political elites seek to maintain their grip on the status quo.   The further you travel from these centers out to areas in decline, the more likely you are to find support for radical politics.   As Menon notes, Britain’s 2016 revolution — the referendum vote to leave the European Union after almost half a century of membership — can be mapped onto the culinary geography of the country.   “Pret a Manger” is a smart national chain of sandwich and coffee shops, catering for hungry commuters and office workers in wealthy, successful British cities. “Places that had a Pret voted Remain,” Menon said. Parts of the U.K. where median wages were lower were disproportionately likely to vote to leave the EU.   IMMIGRATION, IMMIGRATION, IMMIGRATION   After the Brexit vote in 2016, immigration slid from the top of the priority list for British voters and Farage himself took a step back. Both have now returned, as Farage rides a wave of headlines about irregular migrants landing in small boats from France.   From January to May this year, there were a record 14,800 small boat crossings, 42 percent more than in the same period in the previous year, according to Oxford University’s Migration Observatory.   For Laurence, in the Never Say Die pub, the small boats represent the biggest issue of all. “What’s going to happen in 10 years’ time? What’s going to happen in 20 years’ time when the boat people are still coming over?” he asked.   A decade ago, German Chancellor Angela Merkel opened the doors to hundreds of thousands of refugees arriving into Europe from Syria, as well as Afghanistan and Iraq. The AfD surged in the months that followed, permanently changing German politics. At February’s election, the AfD won a record 21 percent of the vote, finishing in second place behind Merz’s conservative bloc.  “The fundamental failure that is common to the whole [centrist] transatlantic community is on immigration,” said Marshall from the Progressive Policy Institute. “All of the far-right movements have made it their top issue.”   It is the perceived threat that waves of migration pose to traditional national cultures which drives much of the support for the far right. Trump’s White House is now primed to join the European nationalists’ fight. According to a new U.S. National Security Strategy document released in December, Europe is facing “civilisational erasure” from unrestricted immigration, as well as falling birthrates. The analysis draws on the so-called great replacement theory, a racist conspiracy theory. Free speech — in the MAGA definition, at least — is another casualty of conventional centrist rule in Europe, as political correctness veers into “censorship,” the U.S. document said. Protesters demostrate under the motto “Loud against Nazis” in early February in Berlin. After years of decline, The Left party  pulled off a stunning revival in the general election later that month. | John MacDougall via AFP/Getty Images In his interview with POLITICO earlier this week, Trump aligned himself fully with the strategy paper. European nations are “decaying” and their “weak” leaders can expect to be challenged by rivals with American support, he said. “I’d endorse,” he added. In Brussels, the double-punch of the president’s interview and the strategy document left diplomats and officials feeling bruised and alarmed all over again, after a period in which they allowed themselves to hope that the transatlantic alliance wasn’t dying. One EU diplomat was blunt in assessing Trump’s new method: “It’s autocracy.” THE STOLEN JEWELS  Sometimes, it takes a random news event — ostensibly unconnected to politics — to crystalize the national mood. In Paris, the theft of France’s priceless crown jewels from the Louvre provided just such an opportunity, morphing into an indictment of an establishment that can’t get the job done, even when the job simply involves thoroughly locking the windows at the world’s most famous museum. National Rally leader Jordan Bardella called the incident a “humiliation” before asking: “How far will the breakdown of the state go?”   In Britain, just a month after Starmer’s victory last year, riots broke out across the country, fueled by far-right extremists. The catalyst was the murder of three young girls aged 6, 7 and 9, in Southport, northwest England, by a Black teenager wrongly identified at the time on social media — in posts amplified by the far-right — as a Muslim.   At the time, Farage suggested the police were withholding the truth about the suspect, earning him the fury of mainstream politicians. While stressing he did not support violence, Farage railed against what he called “two-tier policing,” a phrase popular among far-right commentators who claim police treat right-wing protesters more harshly than those on the left.  It’s an opinion that resonates in Jaywick. Chennelle Rutland, 56, is walking her two dogs along the beachfront, admiring the view as the sun sets, flaring the sky orange, then purple. The colors catch the surface of the flat sea. “It’s one rule for one and one rule for the other,” she says. “The whites have got to shut up because if you do say anything, you’re ‘racist’ and ‘far right.’”   Far-right activist Tommy Robinson invited his supporters to attend the “Unite The Kingdom” rally in September. | Christopher Furlong/Getty Images It would be wrong to characterise residents of Jaywick as simply ignorant or full of rage. Many who spoke to POLITICO there were cheerful, happy with their community and up to speed with the news. But, just as they’d soured on their country’s centrist establishment, they were also tuning out its favored news sources.   In Jaywick, some of Farage’s voters prefer GB News, Britain’s answer to Fox News, which launched in 2021, or learn about current affairs from YouTube and other social media. The BBC — for decades the mainstay of the British media landscape — has lost a portion of its audience here. Right-wing commentators and politicians attack it as biased. Trump has lately joined in, threatening to sue over a BBC edit that he said deceptively made it look as if he was explicitly inciting violence. The BBC’s director general and head of news both resigned. In the process, another piece of Britain’s onetime centerground was giving way.   WHAT NEXT?   There are reasons for centrists to hope. In Rome, Giorgia Meloni’s hard-right Brothers of Italy party has become less extreme in power, and the worst fears of moderates about a group with its historic roots in neo-fascism have not come to pass. She remains popular, and while pushing a culture war at home, she has avoided the wrath of the EU leadership and kept Trump onside.   Populists and nationalists don’t always win. Trump lost in 2020. In the Netherlands, Wilders lost in October this year, though only by a whisker. Romania’s Nicușor Dan won the presidency as a centrist in May, but again only narrowly defeating his far-right opponent.   Structural obstacles may also slow the radicals’ progress. The U.K.’s first-past-the-post voting system makes it hard for new parties to do well. The two-round French system has so far stopped Le Pen’s National Rally from gaining power as centrists combine to back moderates. In Germany, a similar “firewall” exists under which center parties keep the far-right out.   After the Brexit vote in 2016, immigration slid from the top of the priority list for British voters and Farage himself took a step back. Both have now returned. | Tolga Akmen/EPA Even as he enjoys a sustained lead in the polls and wins local elections in the U.K., Farage has not convinced voters that Reform would do a good job. Even some of his supporters worry he will be out of his depth in government.   The problem, for the centrists who are in power, is that a lot of voters seem to think they, too, are out of their depth. And, whether that involves dealing with migration, combatting inequality, or just boosting the security around the Mona Lisa, it’s a reputation they’ll need to fix in order to survive — no easy task given the intractability of the challenges facing the rich world.  The next year will see more elections at which the centrists — and their populists rivals — will be tested. In Hungary Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, long seen as the far-right bad boy of EU politics, is fighting to keep power at an election expected in April. There are regional votes in Germany where the AfD is on track to prosper. France may require yet another snap election to end its political paralysis. Trump’s diplomats and officials will be ready to intervene. Farage’s party, too, will be on the ballot in 2026: It is expected to make gains in Wales, Scotland and local votes elsewhere next spring. After that, his sights will be on the U.K. general election expected in 2029, by which time European politics may look very different.   “Of course I know Mr. Orban and of course I know Giorgia Meloni, of course I know these people,” Farage told POLITICO at a recent Reform rally. “I suspect that after the next election cycle in Europe there will be even more that I know.” Natalie Fertig in Washington, Clea Caulcutt in Paris and James Angelos in Berlin contributed to this report.  

Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music * Amazon Music In Gießen will die AfD am Wochenende ihre neue Jugendorganisation gründen: „Generation Deutschland“. Die alte Junge Alternative gilt als verbrannt und doch  rückt die neue Jugend inhaltlich kaum von den alten radikalen Positionen ab. Im Zentrum steht Jean-Pascal Hohm, bestens vernetzt in der rechtsextremen Szene, nun designierter Chef des neuen Verbands. Nach außen moderater, im Kern unverändert hart.  Frederik Schindler und Pauline von Pezold analysieren, wie die AfD die Jugend enger unter Parteikontrolle bringen will, welche Machtkämpfe, besonders in Nordrhein-Westfalen, die Wahl überschatten und warum das Antragsbuch bewusst klein gehalten wurde, um inhaltliche Debatten zu verhindern. Das Berlin Playbook als Podcast gibt es jeden Morgen ab 5 Uhr. Gordon Repinski und das POLITICO-Team liefern Politik zum Hören – kompakt, international, hintergründig. Für alle Hauptstadt-Profis: Der Berlin Playbook-Newsletter bietet jeden Morgen die wichtigsten Themen und Einordnungen. Jetzt kostenlos abonnieren. Mehr von Host und POLITICO Executive Editor Gordon Repinski: Instagram: @gordon.repinski | X: @GordonRepinski. Legal Notice (Belgium) POLITICO SRL Forme sociale: Société à Responsabilité Limitée Siège social: Rue De La Loi 62, 1040 Bruxelles Numéro d’entreprise: 0526.900.436 RPM Bruxelles info@politico.eu www.politico.eu

THE ALTAR BOYS WHO GREW UP TOGETHER — AND TRIED TO KEEP EUROPE’S CENTER FROM CRUMBING The lives of Daniel Caspary and René Repasi often overlapped as they grew up. In the European Parliament, they became political rivals — but were also united in common cause. By MAX GRIERA and NETTE NÖSTLINGER in Stutensee, Germany Photo-illustrations by Klawe Rzeczy for POLITICO Sometimes it’s the least extraordinary places that throw up the most startling of coincidences.   In this case, a tiny German town — nothing special: a stone’s throw from the Rhine river, a small 18th century castle, the kind of suburban sleepiness where boys like Daniel Caspary and René Repasi while away their teenage years cycling to the city to party or the nearest lake to cool off — has produced rival leading European politicians who have been key to assuring EU political stability in a time of unprecedented fragmentation.  The way their lives have intertwined is astonishing. Caspary, now 49, and Repasi, three years his junior, went to the same school. There, they both organized a cabaret of political satire. They honed their skills on the student newspaper. They were both altar boys in the same church. And they both scored their first political victories on their town’s council. Almost since birth, their lives have taken staggeringly parallel paths. Now, they’re on different sides in the European Parliament.  Advertisement Caspary is leader in the Parliament of the center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), the largest faction in the European People’s Party. Repasi is the equivalent for the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD), the third-largest national delegation in the Socialists and Democrats group. The EPP and the S&D are the two biggest Parliament groups and for decades have between them held a grip on EU power. Despite the rivalry between their umbrella political families, with antagonism only worsening since the 2024 EU elections, the two men have cemented their reputation as the backchannels between the two sides, attempting to safeguard what in EU circles is known as the “grand coalition” between center right and center left. That’s significant because the Parliament is fractured like never before. Aping a trend seen across western democracies, the middle ground is crumbling. Politicians like Caspary and Repasi represent the old ways of doing things ― political opponents, yes, but ready to put aside their differences so their two sides can work together to face down the extremes. Increasingly, that’s no longer a given in the European Parliament. That was evident when the EPP, earlier this month, abandoned its traditional centrist allies and pressed ahead with the support of far-right groups to approve cuts to green rules.  Daniel Caspary, the charismatic old-school conservative deeply rooted in his community, in his class photo from the year he graduated. | Stutensee’s Thomas Mann-Gymnasium 1993-1994 annuary René Repasi, the cosmopolitan and slick social democrat with an impressive track record in academia, in his class photo from the year before he graduated. | Stutensee’s Thomas Mann-Gymnasium 1993-1994 annuary A good relationship between the pair has been particularly useful because the leaders of the two pan-European groups rarely conceal their mutual dislike and are increasingly finding it tough to reach compromise positions on new laws, such as on green rules for business or on controlling migration.  “Of course we have many differences politically, but it’s good if you can talk,” Caspary told POLITICO. “We’ve known each other for ages … We know that we can trust each other.”   “He was always a sort of leading figure,” Repasi said, remembering their shared childhoods in Stutensee. I “looked up to him.”  Advertisement While their paths overlapped, they could barely be more different personally and politically. Caspary is the charismatic old-school conservative deeply rooted in his community, pressing the flesh at local events and using the language of the person in the street. He still lives in the area. Repasi, by contrast, is the cosmopolitan ― the slick social democrat with an impressive track record in academia, a man of scholarly rhetoric who moved away from Germany completely. “What Repasi lacks,” said Mathias Zurawski, a journalist who attended the same school, “Caspary offers. And vice versa.”   ALTAR BOYS Stutensee’s discreet Catholic St. Josef Church is in the town’s backstreets. The garden surrounding it boasts abundant fruit trees. Posters advertise meetings of the scout group.  It’s humble in comparison to the more spectacular Protestant church on the main street. It’s here where the Caspary and Repasi families worshipped. And it’s where the two boys built trust in each other.  “We met for the first time in the youth groups of the Catholic church,” Caspary said. “We talked about this. I think this stands for some values. We always try to be honest.”  Those early religious experiences play a big role in Caspary’s life today, said Ansgar Mayr, a regional CDU politician who has known him since he made his first steps in politics.    Stutensee’s St Josef Catholic Church, where Caspary and Repasi used to serve as altar boys. | Max Griera/POLITICO “He was greatly influenced by his time in the Catholic Church and also his time with the Scouts, who are Catholic Scouts,” Mayr said. “His circle of friends, outside the political bubble, comes very much from the Catholic Church and parish youth groups.”   The pair served as altar boys, assisting the priest at Mass and kneeling as part of the liturgy. On Christmas, they sang carols around town. The Social Democrat Repasi’s Catholicism has lapsed somewhat, but despite being “one of those guys who go to church only at Christmas,” he said Christian values serve as guidance for his daily life and political career. CHAOS AND REVOLUTION The pair’s paths crossed again as teenagers in high school. The Thomas-Mann Gymnasium is just a stone’s throw from the church. It’s seen better days and is due to be renovated next year. For now, it still looks as it did in the 1990s. It’s easy to imagine Caspary and Repasi here. The lockers they’d have used line the corridors and the classrooms are plain, aside from the vintage orange cubical washbasins. In those years, they both dived into extracurricular activities. Caspary founded an annual political cabaret show. At 18, he handed the organizing baton to Repasi, who suddenly found himself facing the daunting task, he said, of raising money to cover costs.  “If the whole thing was a success, [that] was due to the fact that he [Caspary] handed it over, and we did the transition period together,” said Repasi.  Advertisement The boys’ school yearbooks portray two kids destined for greater things. Alongside a photo of Caspary humorously dressed as a medic, his classmates described him as “source of the most creative interjections (‘yes, but…’) that elicit a wide range of reactions from teachers, ranging from amusement to annoyance.” It’s “hard to believe,” the entry said, “that this chaotic person will one day take on a leading role as a conservative politician.”  Repasi’s friends saw him as a revolutionary. His portrait shows him wearing a Soviet hat. “Discussions with him often turn into fights,” his schoolmates said. “But no one else is as good at arguing objectively.”  The boys also bumped into each other on the school’s newspaper, Pepperoni. Caspary was already acting as a sporadic school reporter, when Repasi — a couple of years later — became editor in chief. The boys weren’t scared of hitting the establishment where it hurt. Pepperoni signified “something that stings”  so was “a means to express criticism,” said former teacher Sabine Graf, who taught French and German at the school at the time.  Yearbook of Daniel Caspary, featuring a photo of Thomas Mann blended with Albert Einstein’s famous tongue picture, symbolizing science. | 50 years anniversary book, Thomas Mann Gymnasium 1974-2024 Covers of the Pepperoni school magazine, which both Caspary and Repasi contributed to. | 50 years anniversary book, Thomas Mann Gymnasium 1974-2024 Yearbook of René Repasi, featuring a pig with a black flag, symbolizing social class revolution and anarchism. | 50 years anniversary book, Thomas Mann Gymnasium 1974-2024 Those shared experiences form the basis of the two men’s relationship in the Parliament today. “You can always say you can trust me,” Repasi said. “But actually you can only do so if you have experienced it. And I experienced it in my past that I can trust him and that I can rely on him.”  VOTERS’ CRITICISM These days, Stutensee isn’t immune to the political winds that blow across the whole of Europe. With populism, of right and left, on the rise, centrist politicians who broadly prefer to focus on points of agreement rather than division aren’t in vogue. The Alternative for Germany (AfD) came in second in Germany’s national election earlier this year ― the best showing for a far-right party since the Nazi rise to power. The AfD isn’t represented on the city council here, but locals acknowledge there’s a desire to kick the establishment. An establishment symbolized by men like Caspary and Repasi. Despite their deep roots in the town, many reject the idea they’re local heroes. “They show up at some celebratory events around town with their family a couple of times a year, but you don’t hear from them afterwards,” said a 37-year-old bartender at the smoke-filled bar in town, who gives his name only as Dominik. A handful of people at the bar hear his remarks and nod.  Dominik also went to Thomas-Mann Gymnasium. He knew Caspary’s brother. But he insisted neither politician can be trusted. They’re not “looking out for the interests of the people,” he said.  But early on in their careers, the two politicians made some tangible changes for locals. When they were both on their school’s student council,  Caspary campaigned for a night bus line between Stutensee and the city of Karlsruhe, 10km away. In some ways, he succeeded, advancing a cause that led to the construction of a durable tram connection built years later.   “During this campaign, I realized that if you start engaging with the town representatives, like the mayor, like the city council members, then you can change things,” Caspary said.      Advertisement Repasi’s political awakening came when the regional government tried to cut by a year the time that students attended high school to align practices with other European countries. The school’s leadership wanted to participate in the pilot, despite most students being opposed. “I found it total nonsense,” Repasi said. “I was mobilizing the school kids to come to this meeting of the municipal council, and I think for the first time ever it was totally full.”     The students cheered loudly when their arguments, compiled by Repasi, were presented to the mayor. The council ultimately rejected the plan. If the bus line was Caspary’s first political victory, this was Repasi’s.  MR. STUTENSEE VS. MR. EUROPE Eventually, they drifted apart.   These days, Caspary’s image is one of a politician still deeply rooted to his home, who found his way to Brussels by chance. People close to him describe him as a family man, raising his five children just a few kilometers from where he grew up. Repasi, in contrast, is seen as a professor-turned-politician, someone with a strong passion for European affairs who deliberately chose to build his life abroad.   Classroom of Thomas Mann Gymnasium, intact since Caspary and Repasi studied in it. | Max Griera/POLITICO For Repasi, who was raised by a German mother and Hungarian father, “cosmopolitanism runs through his life,” said Graf, the schoolteacher. She and another former teacher both recalled his in-depth study on the Yugoslav Wars. He became a professor of European law in Geneva and Rotterdam, where he raised two sons with his Polish wife.    Caspary was elected to the European Parliament almost by accident in 2004, at 28, because of the CDU’s exceptionally strong showing.   “My plan was to become the chairperson of the group in my city council,” he said.  Advertisement For Repasi, on the other hand, ending up working in an EU institution was his dream, according to colleagues. He even dabbled with joining Caspary in the CDU. But in his village, the party didn’t feel very welcoming, he said. “I’m Western-looking enough not to have any discrimination experiences like Turkish people, but my strange family name was strange enough in my village,” he said.   Repasi’s road to the Parliament was bumpier than Caspary’s. He ran in three elections but never made it, ultimately joining when another SPD member gave up her mandate in 2022. TOGETHER IN BRUSSELS ― AND THEN APART AGAIN Reuniting in the European Parliament was almost like a homecoming for Repasi. Caspary presented him with a basket of delicacies from the region around Stutensee. Repasi’s rise since then has been rapid. He became the head of the SPD faction in the S&D only two years after his arrival. And in that time, they’ve put their friendship to good use. Cordial catchups soon turned into high-level political negotiations. They were suddenly in charge of leading the biggest German parties in the Parliament and had to overcome the increasing estrangement between their group leaders, Manfred Weber, the head of the EPP group, and Iratxe García, the S&D chair. Caspary was elected to the European Parliament almost by accident in 2004 because of the CDU’s exceptionally strong showing. | Michael Kappeler/picture alliance via Getty Images For Repasi, ending up working in an EU institution was his dream. | Marijan Murat/picture alliance via Getty Images That’s why they have been in constant dialogue, “to bring together political lines,” Caspary said. “We do speak about conflicts that are arising,” Repasi said. “Whether we can totally solve them is a different question.”  Other MEPs say the good relationship between the German conservatives and Socialists has proved critical. “The stability of the mandate” ― European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s loose coalition of centrist parties ― “is at stake, and what can help cement a stronger cooperation is the link between the CDU and SPD,” said Javi López, a Spanish S&D lawmaker and Parliament vice-president.     But nothing lasts forever and the double act is about to split once more. In October, the German government nominated Caspary to be its representative at the European Court of Auditors, in Luxembourg. Advertisement On Thursday he is expected to be confirmed by the Parliament. That will leave a gap, according to his colleagues. “Over the years, he has been a steady and unifying presence, bringing together a team of highly diverse personalities,” said Niclas Herbst, chair of the Parliament budgetary control committee, and one of the names floated to succeed Caspary. “He is, in the best sense, a true generalist — someone who can swiftly and thoroughly grasp complex political issues … I know there is great anticipation in Luxembourg for his arrival.”  When Caspary departs, Repasi will have to find himself another opposite number to build up a trusting relationship. But it remains to be seen whether the fraying ties between center right and center left can retain at least one strong thread. While that won’t be impossible, it certainly won’t come as easy as a relationship forged in little Stutensee. Out of experiences in church, student politics and the school newspaper, the foundations held up well.

Yulia Navalnaya is an economist and a Russian opposition leader, and the widow of Alexei Navalny. If I had to describe the movement that my husband Alexei Navalny created in just a few words, I’d say this: We are a pro-European movement. We believe Russia is an inseparable part of European civilization, and that the European model of development is the one best suited for our country. From this comes our conviction that the dark years of Putinism are not an historical inevitability but an aberration. And that when the regime of Vladimir Putin ends, Russia will have the chance to return to the European path. But what does this “European path” actually mean? From Hungary to Portugal, Sweden to Greece, Europe is vast and diverse. Its nations differ in both governance and their political evolution. Moreover, 2025 has been a year of hard tests for the continent’s countries, even by recent standards. Putin’s war against Ukraine continues, and the EU faces intense political pressure both from without and within. Economically, the situation is also far from ideal, as EU countries are forced to sharply increase their spending on defense and security, giving new ammunition to populists of every stripe. Things that seemed self-evident until recently, now appear more uncertain. Marginal views on fundamental issues — from humanist values to migration, environmental policies, minority rights and relations with dictatorships — are suddenly being expressed from the highest platforms. Not long ago, this would have been unthinkable. When Alexei Navalny spoke of the “Beautiful Russia of the Future,” he envisioned a peaceful, democratic, prosperous European country. But what does it mean to be a European country today? Despite all its internal challenges, contradictions and disagreements, Europe has always been — for me and for many Russians — a symbol of well-being. After World War II, Europe became a remarkable example of a progressive society built on mutual respect. Racism, colonialism, militarism, imperialism and, above all, the rejection of democracy and human rights became unacceptable. And the values enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights served as a guiding light for movements fighting dictatorships around the world — including in Russia, inspiring Soviet dissidents in their unequal and heroic struggle against Communist tyranny. These same values have always been the essence of our own program, forming a consistent, rather than situational, opposition to Putin. It is crucial to understand that our main disagreement with Putin is not tactical but value-based. I, my husband — who was murdered by Putin — and many of our allies opposed him long before he invaded Ukraine, at a time when he was welcomed in European capitals. And we will continue to oppose him if he remains in power in Russia when this terrible war ends. It is crucial to understand that our main disagreement with Putin is not tactical but value-based. | Contributor/Getty Images We do not ask for anything extravagant or extraordinary. We simply want Russia to be a country that cares, first and foremost, about the dignity, rights and future of its people — just as European countries do. We want the same basic rights and freedoms that Europeans see as part and parcel to everyday life. We fight for the primacy of human rights over the interests of the state. We demand genuine freedom of speech and assembly, so that anyone who disagrees with the government can openly campaign and criticize without fear prison, exile or assassination — as happened to my husband. We strive for democracy. For the right of any citizen to compete and win the trust of voters in free and fair elections. We support federalism and local self-government, so that people can choose their representatives not only at the national level but also in their regions, cities and towns. In a multiethnic country like Russia, this is essential. Only through functioning self-governance can its peoples preserve their culture, language and identity. We also fight for independent and fair courts. We strive for democracy. For the right of any citizen to compete and win the trust of voters in free and fair elections. | Marek Antoni Iwanczuk/NurPhoto via Getty Images We defend the right to private property. At the same time, we believe that a country as rich as Russia must be generous to its citizens, and that revenue from its natural resources must not be stolen by the ruling elite or spent on wars. And, of course, we seek peace — because the very idea of waging war seems as absurd to us as it does to any normal European. We want Russia to be a good neighbor and a reliable partner to all countries around it, both East and West. These are the European values that unite hundreds of millions of people, from Tallinn to Lisbon, despite all their visible differences and the polarization inherent in daily politics today. Rule of law, not arbitrariness. Respect for institutions, not personal whim. A state that serves people, not people who serve the state. As you can see, we aren’t radicals. We are all very different people in terms of our views, but we are united by one thing above all else: We are enemies of Putin’s regime, which has brought war, dictatorship, corruption and terror to our country. We oppose not just Putin personally but his entire authoritarian, anti-democratic, anti-parliamentarian, militarist, xenophobic and chauvinistic worldview. Putinism has no ideology — it is simply the denial of modern European civilization’s values. We are normal Europeans who share fundamental European values. When I speak with European politicians, they often ask what they can do to help our movement, our struggle against Putin and his war. My answer is simple: Be strong, principled and consistent. It is in our shared interest that Europe remains united and successful — only then can it stand up to the challenges of our time, including helping those still fighting for freedom. Europe is more than capable of resisting hypocrisy and double standards. It is more than capable of extending a hand to tens of millions of pro-European Russians — and helping that number grow. This will ensure that the beautiful Russia of the future, for which Alexei Navalny gave his life, will be peaceful, democratic and prosperous — in other words, a normal European country.

Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music * Amazon Music Friedrich Merz und Julia Klöckner haben es angekündigt: 2027 soll zum ersten Mal in der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik eine Bundespräsidentin gewählt werden. Doch wer könnte das sein? Gordon Repinski erklärt, wie sich die Union jetzt sortiert, warum Namen wie Karin Prien und Ilse Aigner kursieren und wieso Merz die Fehler der Merkel-Ära vermeiden will. Danach geht der Blick in die Niederlande: Dort erlebt der politische Liberalismus ein Comeback. Die Partei D66 landet nicht nur wie prognostiziert weit vorne, sondern gewinnt überraschend die Wahl. Angeführt wird sie von Rob Jetten, einem neuen Hoffnungsträger auch in der EU. Hans von der Burchard analysiert, wie die Niederlande das rechtspopulistische Experiment um Geert Wilders beenden und wie es jetzt weitergehen wird.  Im 200-Sekunden-Interview zieht Otto Fricke seine Lehren aus dem Wahlsieg der niederländischen Linksliberalen: Was die FDP in Deutschland von Rob Jetten lernen und umsetzen kann, bespricht er mit Gordon Repinski. Das Berlin Playbook als Podcast gibt es jeden Morgen ab 5 Uhr. Gordon Repinski und das POLITICO-Team liefern Politik zum Hören – kompakt, international, hintergründig. Für alle Hauptstadt-Profis: Der Berlin Playbook-Newsletter bietet jeden Morgen die wichtigsten Themen und Einordnungen. Jetzt kostenlos abonnieren. Mehr von Host und POLITICO Executive Editor Gordon Repinski: Instagram: @gordon.repinski | X: @GordonRepinski.

LONDON — For Britain’s government, it’s a no-go. For the Greens’ new leader Zack Polanski, it’s a must. The end of free movement of people with the EU has been a “disaster” for the U.K. that should be urgently reversed, Polanski told POLITICO — in his first major intervention on EU policy. Elected leader of the left-wing environmentalist party last month, Polanski’s brand of “eco populism” is already cutting through with some voters. POLITICO’s polling average shows his party steadily climbing to 13 percent — more than double the 6 percent they won in last year’s general election. One outlier even shows them drawing level with Labour. While Polanski — a relative outsider who sits in London’s regional assembly rather than Westminster — has so far cut through by focusing on domestic policy, inequality and the cost of living, he’s now setting out his stall on Europe. Though Labour Prime Minister Keir Starmer has sought to reset relations with the EU, he’s done so within tight red lines designed to appeal to Brexit supporters: no re-entry to the single market, no rejoining the customs union, and absolutely no return to freedom of movement. Polanski has no such qualms, and he’s not impressed with the prime minister’s caution. “It all feels a little bit ‘meh,’ for want of a better description,” he told POLITICO of Starmer’s reset so far. “It doesn’t really feel like he has any kind of passionate vision of what the future looks like, or any real direction that he’s driving it in. He doesn’t really have a vision for this country. So how is he going to have a vision of what the future of Europe looks like?” ‘DISASTER’ In particular, the Green leader is unapologetic about a return to free movement of people — which ended in 2021. It’s an issue most politicians in Westminster won’t go anywhere near for fear of landing on the wrong side of voters annoyed about immigration. “The restriction on free movement has been a disaster,” he said, adding that it should be in the “first phase” of any rapprochement. “It’s interesting to see [Nigel Farage’s party] Reform banging on about immigration, but we know immigration has risen since Brexit. “It’s just risen from countries outside of Europe. So even on its own terms, Reform and the Brexit Party’s own project was a disaster by their own criteria. And I think free movement is really important, both for our citizens and citizens around Europe.” Though Keir Starmer has sought to reset relations with the EU, he’s done so within tight red lines designed to appeal to Brexit supporters. | Stefan Rousseau/PA Images via Getty Images Net migration to the U.K. was 431,000 in 2024 — significantly higher than rates in the 2010s when numbers were typically between 200,000 and 300,000. But despite welcoming more newcomers than ever, Brits have lost their right to move abroad within the EU. Polling commissioned by POLITICO shows voters aren’t impressed with the new system and are open to turning back the clock, if somewhat disinterested in the policy detail. Starmer’s EU reset, primed at a summit in May this year, involves negotiating a new agrifood deal with the EU to smooth trade in food, closer cooperation on energy, and a “youth experience” scheme that doesn’t restore free movement but would give a capped number of young people time-limited visas to live abroad. Polanski, however, thinks the government should go further on building ties with the EU in other areas. “I think rejoining the customs union is something we should be doing as soon as possible,” he said. “It’s just resulting in higher prices for people.” It’s a policy also backed by the opposition Liberal Democrats, with whom the Greens are bidding for disillusioned Labour voters. As for rejoining the bloc altogether? “Over longer term, absolutely we should be rejoining the European Union. But we’ve got to make sure that that conversation is a conversation all the public’s involved with. I think one of the reasons Brexit happened is because so many people feel like politics is done to them rather than with them,” he said. “I think Brexit was a catastrophic decision. I think it’s also important that politicians listen to the fact that the public made that decision, and I believe they made that decision because of the lack of investment in their communities and need and want of something different. I think you’d be hard pressed to find anyone, though, who thinks that was a right decision that has made our communities any wealthier.” INTERNATIONALISM The Green leader told POLITICO that “really grim” plans by the Tories and Reform to leave the European Convention on Human Rights show “the slow march towards fascism that this country is on.” But he said the rightward drift across Europe is a reason to get stuck in, not to hang back. “I think there’s some really worrying trends across Europe, particularly around the far right, and we’re seeing the beginnings of some of those trends in our own country. I think any political party has a decision to make, which is: Do you stay isolationist and out of Europe and say, ‘Well, you know, they’re going right wing, so we’re not going to get involved.’ “Or do you say actually: International and indeed, socialist solidarity looks like working with left-wing or progressive movements across Europe in ways that look to reform Europe; to make sure that the entire project is moving in a direction that ultimately protects people’s freedom, protects the poorest communities across Europe, and is the best thing for our country, too.”

LONDON — Former British Prime Minister Theresa May laid into her own political party Monday night, accusing it of taking a populist tilt to the right that risks emboldening Nigel Farage. May criticized the Conservatives’ decision to repeal the Climate Change Act 2008, which requires the government to cut carbon emissions by 80 percent by 2050, as an “extreme and unnecessary measure”  that would “fatally undermine” Britain’s leadership on climate issues. The U.K. committed to reaching net zero under May’s administration, something Tory Leader Kemi Badenoch has since called “impossible.” Badenoch has also advocated extensive oil and gas extraction from the North Sea. “This announcement only reinforces climate policy as a dividing line in our politics, rather than being the unifying issue it once was,” May told fellow members of the House of Lords. “And, for the Conservative Party, it risks chasing votes from Reform at the expense of the wider electorate.” May also lambasted the “villainization of the judiciary” by politicians “peddling populist narratives” and said this would “erode public trust in the institutions of our democracy and therefore in democracy itself.” Shadow Justice Secretary Robert Jenrick, who narrowly lost the Tory leadership contest last year, used his conference speech earlier this month as a tirade against “dozens of judges with ties to open-borders charities” and said “judges who blur the line between adjudication and activism can have no place in our justice system.” Though May recalled “frustrating” experiences coming up “against the courts” as a minister, she urged her party to “tread carefully.” “Every step we take to reduce our support for human rights merely emboldens our rivals and weakens our position in the world,” the former prime minister said. “Those politicians in the Western world who use populism and polarisation for their own short-term political ends risk handing a victory to our enemies.”

The south Wales town of Caerphilly is known better for its vast, 13th century castle than its politics — but establishment parties might want to pay it a visit. A century of rule by the center-left Labour Party was smashed to rubble Friday in a by-election for the Senedd, the Welsh parliament. Labour’s vote bled away in its oldest heartland to two rivals: Welsh nationalists Plaid Cymru on the left (47.4 percent) and Nigel Farage’s populist Reform UK on the right (36 percent). Labour’s mere 11 percent is alarming strategists ahead of full elections to the Senedd in 2026, as well as a Westminster general election by 2029. By-elections must be read with skepticism because they give voters a “free hit” on the ruling party. And in many ways, this result was uniquely Welsh. Labour only regained Westminster in 2024 but here the party had all the trappings of incumbency, long running both the local council and Welsh government. Plaid’s specific support base for Senedd elections does not read across to Westminster. Welsh institutions including health and education are creaking. Welsh political rows (such as Labour’s 20mph road speed limits) were prominent. Yet the result also has wider lessons for an establishment party fighting populists in a fractured age, facing both ways to two rivals each promising to restore pride in their country. POLITICO looks at five takeaways that will resonate beyond the castle walls. 1) WATCH OUT FOR THE NON-VOTERS Turnout on a wet October Thursday was 50.4 percent, Caerphilly’s highest ever in a Senedd election. This was fueled in part by people who rarely vote choosing to back right-wing populists, argued strategists from Labour and Reform. The phenomenon was not as great as Farage’s party hoped, and it met a greater surge of Plaid voters seeking to stop him. Even so, one Labour strategist — granted anonymity to speak freely, like others in this article — argued non-voters were “definitely” a factor in Reform’s support. They pointed to higher-than-usual turnouts in recent council by-elections where Reform has done well. Gareth Beer, a Reform parliamentary candidate in 2024, recalled one interaction this week in Caerphilly: “This guy said he hadn’t voted for 26 years, and he’s going to vote for Reform now, just to give [Labour] a kick up the backside.” This “poses a challenge for our traditional campaigning methods,” argued the Labour strategist quoted above. They added: “We’ve spent all these years farming data on people who we know vote, and are often inclined to vote Labour. Whereas these voters, because they don’t vote, our first instinct is we don’t bother. So we have no data on them.” The south Wales town of Caerphilly is known better for its vast, 13th century castle than its politics — but establishment parties might want to pay it a visit. | Andrew Matthews/PA Images via Getty Images Polling by Survation, shared with POLITICO, indicates there might a similar pattern across the U.K., albeit less pronounced. In a September sample of around 1,200 people who did not vote in 2024, 27 percent said they would now back Reform — up from 8 percent a year earlier. Only 20 percent of them would vote Labour, down from 35 percent. 2) TACTICAL VOTING IS A BIG DEAL Plaid argued successfully that it — not Labour — was best placed to keep Reform out of power. “People have seen it’s a two-horse race and they’ve decided they have to vote tactically to stop Reform,” a Plaid Cymru strategist said on polling day. Labour used unorthodox methods in a failed bid to swing voters the other way. A Labour leaflet circulated this week depicted Reform on 32 percent, Labour 28 and Plaid 19 with the headline: “Is it worth the risk?” Yet the small print admitted it was based on six-month-old modelling for the Westminster seat. This speaks to an existential dilemma. Labour’s dominance has long made it the fallback option for voters who want to keep the Conservatives — or Reform — out of power. If Prime Minister Keir Starmer can no longer convince people of that, he is in deep trouble. Ironically, this question of tactical voting matters least in Wales. This was likely the last Senedd election under the current system before a semi-proportional model launches next year. But Westminster elections are still fought under “first past the post,” a winner-takes-all system where each seat has only one MP. Even so, one Labour strategist argued non-voters were “definitely” a factor in Reform’s support. | Matthew Horwood/Getty Images Tactical voting in a U.K. general election, where Labour is facing multiple fronts, will be far more unpredictable than Caerphilly. While Plaid is an “established receptacle for disaffected progressives,” according to the Labour strategist quoted above, the centrist and left-wing vote in England is split between Labour, the Liberal Democrats, the Green Party and a nascent party co-founded by former Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn. 3) INCUMBENCY SUCKS Labour knows the force of anti-incumbency in Britain, having run its 2024 campaign on a single word — “change.” That same word has now come back to bite Wales’ Labour establishment. The result suggests there are no safe havens where parties can count on historical support, and that parties that were until recently on the sidelines (Plaid and Reform) can hit the big time. “Betrayal was the most common word we heard on the doorstep,” said one Reform aide. Labour’s proposed solution is the same as it has been since summer 2024: “delivery.” Nick Thomas-Symonds, a ministerial ally of Starmer and Welsh historian of Labour, promised Friday to “redouble our efforts” on showing tangible change. One Labour minister said: “We’ve got to start listening to people and delivering on the basics. Stop trying to be existential and be too big picture. That’s not going to cut it any more — people are fed up and disengaged and angry.” This by-election result will make that harder in itself. Labour is two seats short of a Senedd majority, so will need opposition support to pass its budget in January. The result might suggest the center cannot hold — but with caveats. Welsh Labour itself is not centrist, and has long been further to the left than U.K. Labour. Even so, the Labour strategist quoted above said: “We’re losing progressives to Plaid, and we’re losing post-industrial lower-middle class people who are sick of everything to Reform.” The picture may be more positive for Labour in Scotland, where it is up against the incumbent Scottish National Party in May 2026 elections. One Labour official said: “The dynamics there are different … I think the thing that’s keeping Scottish Labour going is most people say they’re driven by whether or not the NHS runs. And they don’t think the SNP has done a good job of running public services in Scotland.” 4) WATCH YOUR MESSAGING Many internal Labour grumbles were about the party’s messaging. Incumbency left Labour’s candidate Richard Tunnicliffe in an impossible position locally. His interventions included fighting library closures proposed by Caerphilly’s own Labour council. By contrast, Reform and Plaid were able to score easy wins by campaigning on local and Welsh issues, such as the NHS, education and 20mph zones (Reform put up a striking billboard against the latter). There was also frustration in Labour that Reform could talk up concerns about migration when the issue is not devolved to the Welsh government. But Beer said people’s concerns were justified: “They watch TV and they see what’s happening in the rest of the country.” And the Labour strategist quoted above said: “We can’t just fight this fight with facts. It’s vibes. You can tell people that only 2.5 percent of people on Caerphilly are immigrants, but this isn’t how you fight that fight. There are still too many people who think that if people only knew the truth, they wouldn’t vote Reform. It’s not that simple.” Some Labour figures raised eyebrows too about a social media strategy designed to appeal to 16- and 17-year-olds (who can vote in Senedd elections). This included a slow-motion TikTok clip portraying Labour’s candidate as sexy “daddy” and a low-fi polling day message that said “our graphic designer is on leave” and “pls vote welsh labour today x.” A Labour Senedd member said there was “huge unhappiness in the Labour group at the way the campaign has been run — not we that thought we could do well, but for making us look like idiots.” 5) NOTHING STICKS TO THE POPULISTS … YET Plaid and Labour both had a gift handed to them mid-campaign. Reform’s former leader in Wales, Nathan Gill, pleaded guilty in September to taking bribes to make statements in favor of Russia while being a Member of the European Parliament. Yet there was disagreement between activists who spoke to POLITICO about how much it had come up on the doorstep, if at all. One Welsh Labour strategist argued the issue did cut through to voters, but “whether it cut through to the extent where it makes a massive difference I don’t know.” This speaks to a wider question troubling Labour strategists (and pleasing Reform aides) in Westminster — whether any attack can stick to Farage’s outfit. “You might say we’re a bit Teflon,” Beer accepted. “But the general public are not interested in petty squabbling and the kind of stuff we get stuck in the weeds about, the tittle tattle. They just want to get the country fixed.” There is a silver lining for Labour, though. Reform’s performance in Caerphilly was worse than a Survation poll last week predicted. The 11-point gap with Plaid was far wider than expected. And the party is now grappling with a delivery problem of its own, planning tax rises in councils where it won control in England. Reform might — just — be starting to see where the ceiling lies on its support. Or at least, that’s what its rivals will fervently hope.

AMSTERDAM — The Party of European Socialists’ top brass huddled in Amsterdam last week to take stock of their waning influence across Europe. Apart from being an opportunity for national party leaders to meet bilaterally and rally participants with panels and speeches, the congress was framed as a grand debate on the future of social democracy. It was also a chance for observers to do a temperature check on a political family that is hoping to claw back power in upcoming elections in the Netherlands and Sweden. So who’s up in Socialist world, and who’s down? And what solutions were proposed to battle the far right? POLITICO reads the runes. WINNERS * Europe’s far right The guests of honor, present on almost all panels and yet not physically in Amsterdam, were transatlantic right-wing populism and the far-right leaders surging across Europe. “We cannot go back to that dark past, we will fight the far right with all our might,” PES President Stefan Löfven concluded, framing the struggle as social democracy’s central mission in the coming years. In sketching out the future of social democracy, many leaders positioned it squarely against the far right, using the contrast as a roadmap for renewal. Others were more open to play within the right-wing populist terrain, giving topics such as migration and national identity a Socialist twist.  “There is an anxiety about identity, which doesn’t mean that we should take the obsession of the far right on our side, but it means we have to respond to this anxiety,” said French social democratic leader and MEP Raphaël Glucksmann. “In France, we have to say something about what it means to be French … and it will be even the opposite response to the far right, but … we have to respond to the fears that do exist.” Romania’s Social Democratic Party will amend its statutes to change its definition of itself from “left-wing” to “center-left,” and will drop the “progressive” descriptor for attachment to the “democratic, national, religious, traditional and cultural values of the Romanian people.” * Sánchez’s ego During the congress, many national party leaders praised Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez for boosting Spain’s economy while reducing inequality — in other words, using his policies to show that social democracy can work. “They raise the wages, they raise the pensions, they tax the rich, they invest massively in climate transition, they invest massively and they regulate housing and they legalize thousands of migrants … and it works,” said the leader of the Belgian Walloon socialists, Paul Magnette, pointing to the success of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party in polls after governing for seven years. During the congress, many national party leaders praised Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez for boosting Spain’s economy while reducing inequality — in other words, using his policies to show that social democracy can work. | Fernando Otero/Europa Press via Getty Images Sánchez received a standing ovation at the congress, with leaders tripping over each other to shake his hand as he arrived for a group photo. In an early morning closed-door meeting on Saturday, Sánchez told his lieutenants in Brussels and beyond to be ambassadors for Spanish social democracy. “They say we are the last bastion of social democracy in Europe, but in reality, we are the seed,” he said, according to two people with knowledge of the discussions. * Workers Many leaders agreed that the main problem with social democracy was that politicians had forgotten their roots in labor movements. They vowed to listen again to workers’ concerns and to double down on investing in the welfare state. “We have to bring back workers at the core of our decisions … Workers now vote for [the] far right and that’s a harsh truth … because choices that were made were to the disadvantage of workers,” Glucksmann said. The party doubled down on social democracy’s mainstays — health care, job creation, affordable housing and renewable energy — as the core of its campaign program. LOSERS * Migrants The Socialists were unable to agree on how to tackle migration. The party kept mum on the topic in its congress resolutions and campaign plans, although many leaders locked horns on the issue when it was brought up during panels. During a debate on Saturday, Swedish Social Democratic Party chief Magdalena Andersson said her party’s key to success in the polls has been to get tough on migration.   During a debate on Saturday, Swedish Social Democratic Party chief Magdalena Andersson said her party’s key to success in the polls has been to get tough on migration. | Nils Petter Nilsson/Getty Images “We are way stricter on migration and on crime than we were before, because of the situation in Sweden, we took more refugees than any other European countries during the crisis [in] 2015,” Andersson said. “We have a lot of shootings, we have to take this [seriously], we are much tougher on crime than we were before.” Italian Democratic Party leader Elly Schlein, who promotes a humanitarian approach to migration with a focus on inclusion rather than deportations, seemed to rebuff Andersson, arguing the Socialists can’t defeat the far right “by running after their agenda.” Similarly, Sánchez said during a speech: “To be credible, we must also remain loyal to our principles, we cannot accept the far right’s frameworks, we cannot renounce our convictions for the sake of political convenience.” * Actual voting Everything the congress was meant to vote on had already been decided beforehand behind closed doors, with many of the attendees seeing the gathering as a talking shop. Löfven was reelected president by ballot on Friday night unopposed. His team of vice presidents remains largely unchanged and was agreed on by party leaders behind closed doors during a dinner and without an open contest or vote. Delegates also rubber-stamped membership and policy resolutions with an informal show of hands — no roll call, no records kept and no one counting the votes. The setup left little room for dissent in public, and even less for accountability. * Smer The Socialists also kicked out Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico’s Smer party. (Its membership was previously suspended in October 2023 and its MEPs were ejected from the Socialists and Democrats group in the European Parliament.) “If they want to punish us because we have defined marriage as a unique union between a man and a woman, that we said there are only two sexes and that we said that in these issues our law takes precedence over European law, if that’s why we have to be expelled, then it’s an honor for us,” AP reported Fico as saying in reaction to the expulsion.