BERLIN — German Defense Minister Boris Pistorus will spend next week touring the
Indo-Pacific with a passel of corporate chiefs in tow to make deals across the
region.
It’s part of an effort to mark a greater impact in an area where Berlin’s
presence has been minor, but whose importance is growing as Germany looks to
build up access to natural resources, technology and allies in a fracturing
world.
“If you look at the Indo-Pacific, Germany is essentially starting from scratch,”
said Bastian Ernst, a defense lawmaker from Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s
Christian Democrats. “We don’t have an established role yet, we’re only just
beginning to figure out what that should be.”
Pistorius leaves Friday on an eight-day tour to Japan, Singapore and Australia
where he’ll be aiming to build relations with other like-minded middle powers —
mirroring countries from France to Canada as they scramble to figure out new
relationships in a world destabilized by Russia, China and a United States led
by Donald Trump.
“Germany recognizes this principle of interconnected theaters,” said
Elli-Katharina Pohlkamp, visiting fellow of the Asia Programme at the European
Council on Foreign Relations. Berlin, she said, “increasingly sees Europe’s
focus on Russia and Asia’s focus on China and North Korea as security issues
that are linked.”
The military and defense emphasis of next week’s trip marks a departure from
Berlin’s 2020 Indo-Pacific guidelines, which laid a much heavier focus on trade
and diplomacy.
Pistorius’ outreach will be especially important as Germany rapidly ramps up
military spending at home. Berlin is on track to boost its defense budget to
around €150 billion a year by the end of the decade and is preparing tens of
billions in new procurement contracts.
But not everything Germany needs can be sourced in Europe.
Australia is one of the few alternatives to China in critical minerals essential
to the defense industry. It’s a leading supplier of lithium and one of the only
significant producers of separated rare earth materials outside China.
Australia also looms over a key German defense contract.
Berlin is considering whether to stick with a naval laser weapon being developed
by homegrown firms Rheinmetall and MBDA, or team up with Australia’s EOS
instead.
That has become a more sensitive political question in Berlin. WELT, owned by
POLITICO’s parent company Axel Springer, reported that lawmakers had stopped the
planned contract for the German option, reflecting wider concern over whether
Berlin should back a domestic system or move faster with a foreign one. That
means what Pistorius sees in Australia could end up shaping a decision back in
Germany.
TALKING TO TOKYO
Japan offers something different — not raw materials but military integration,
logistics and technology.
Pohlkamp said the military side of the relationship with Japan is now “very much
about interoperability and compatibility, built through joint exercises, mutual
visits, closer staff work, expanded information exchange and mutual learning.”
She described Japan as “a kind of yardstick for Germany,” a country that lives
with “an enormous threat perception” not only militarily but also economically,
because it is surrounded by pressure from China, North Korea and Russia.
The Japan-Germany Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement took effect in July
2024, giving the two militaries a framework for reciprocal supplies and services
and making future port calls for naval vessels, exercises and recurring
cooperation easier to sustain.
Pohlkamp said what matters most to Tokyo are not headline-grabbing deployments
but “plannable, recurring contributions, which are more valuable than big,
one-off shows of force.”
But that ambition only goes so far if Germany’s presence remains sporadic.
Bundeswehr recruits march on the market square to take their ceremonial oath in
Altenburg on March 19, 2026. | Bodo Schackow/picture alliance via Getty Images
Berlin has sent military assets to the region for training exercises in recent
years — a frigate in 2021, combat aircraft in 2022, army participation in 2023,
and a larger naval mission in 2024.
But as pressure grows on Germany to beef up its military to hold off Russia,
along with its growing presence in Lithuania and its effort to keep supplying
Ukraine with weapons, the attention given to Asia is shrinking. The government
told parliament last year it sent no frigate in 2025, plans none in 2026 and has
not yet decided on 2027.
Germany’s current military engagement in the Indo-Pacific consists of a single
P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, sent to India in February as part of the
Indo-Pacific Deployment 2026 exercises.
Germany, according to Ernst, is still “relatively blank” in the region. What it
can contribute militarily remains narrow: “A bit of maritime patrol, a frigate,
mine clearance.”
Pohlkamp said Germany’s role in Asia is still being built “in small doses” and
is largely symbolic. But what matters is whether Berlin can turn occasional
visits and deployments into something steadier and more predictable.
The defense ministry insists that is the point of Pistorius’s trip. Ministry
spokesperson Mitko Müller said Wednesday that Europe and the Indo-Pacific are
“inseparably linked,” citing the rules-based order, sea lanes, international law
and the role of the two regions in global supply and value chains.
The new P-8A Poseidon reconnaissance aircraft stands in front of a technical
hangar at Nordholz airbase on Nov. 20, 2025. | Christian Butt/picture alliance
via Getty Images
The trip is meant to focus on the regional security situation, expanding
strategic dialogue, current and possible military cooperation, joint exercises
including future Indo-Pacific deployments, and industrial cooperation.
That explains why industry is traveling with Pistorius.
Müller said executives from Airbus, TKMS, MBDA, Quantum Systems, Diehl and Rohde
& Schwarz are coming along, suggesting Berlin sees the trip as a chance to widen
defense ties on the ground.
But any larger German role in Asia would have to careful calibrated to avoid
angering China — a key trading partner that is very wary of European powers
expanding their regional presence.
“That leaves Germany trying to do two things at once,” Pohlkamp said. “First,
show up often enough to matter, but not so forcefully that it gets dragged into
a confrontation it is neither politically nor militarily prepared to sustain.”
Tag - Raw materials
BRUSSELS — The European Union and Australia are expected to conclude talks on a
long-awaited trade deal early next week, with Commission President Ursula von
der Leyen on Wednesday announcing she would visit from March 23-25.
Von der Leyen will meet Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese in Canberra,
according to a Commission statement. Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič is also
expected to join the trip, although planning might yet change due to flight
disruptions in the Middle East.
Albanese confirmed the visit, saying in a statement that he would meet both von
der Leyen and Šefčovič on March 24.
Brussels and Canberra relaunched trade negotiations after Donald Trump’s return
to the White House last year. They had collapsed amid acrimony at the end of
2023 amid disagreements over quotas on beef and lamb. The breakthrough comes as
the EU looks to get closer to the Pacific-centered CPTPP trade bloc through its
deepening bonds with Australia.
In a letter to EU leaders shared Monday, von der Leyen said the EU and Australia
were in “the final stretch towards concluding” their trade agreement.
“In addition to removing trade barriers, it will also facilitate access to
critical raw materials — such as lithium, cobalt, rare earth elements, and
hydrogen — and strengthen Europe’s presence in one of the world’s most dynamic
economic regions,” she wrote, as part of a list on the Commission’s efforts to
boost competitiveness.
Negotiators had grappled in the home stretch to close the gap on access for
Australian beef and lamb to the European market; EU trade protections on
specialty foods; critical minerals; and an Australian tax on luxury cars.
Canberra and Brussels are also looking to seal a security and defense
partnership, which is finalized.
The EU top diplomat Kaja Kallas, who would be signing the defense deal, known as
Security and Defense Partnership, is however not expected to be part of the
trip. The pace would come on the heels of similar partnerships signed with the
U.K., Canada and most recently India.
Speaking last week at at the annual gathering of diplomats with the External
Action Service, the EU’s diplomatic body, Kallas said that the deal was coming
as she announced that “later this week, I will sign the tenth [SDP] with
Australia and subsequent ones with Iceland and Ghana in the coming days.”
James Panichi, Zoya Sheftalovich, Sebastian Starcevic and Nette Nöstlinger
contributed reporting.
Every day across Europe, millions of citizens wear, sleep on, eat off or rely on
rental textiles provided by industrial laundries. From hospital linens and
reusable surgical gowns to industrial workwear, hotel bedding, restaurant
textiles and hygiene products, textile services operate quietly but
indispensably at the heart of Europe’s economy. In many countries, more than 90
percent of hospitals and hotels would be forced to close within days without a
continuous supply of hygienically cleaned textiles, while pharmaceutical and
food production facilities would halt operations within 24 hours.
Behind this essential service stands a highly organi z ed European industry that
combines operational excellence with a circular, service-based business model —
washing and keeping textiles in use for longer, reducing waste and lowering
environmental impact while safeguarding public health. By relying on reuse,
repair and professional maintenance, the system significantly reduces the need
for virgin raw materials sourced from outside Europe.
At the same time, these locally anchored service models create skilled jobs,
generate tax revenues in the communities where companies operate and drive
continuous innovation in circular solutions — supporting new business
opportunities and industrial development across the European Union .
> In this time of on going and challenging geo-political change, it will become
> crucial to fully recogni z e the strategic value of circular, service-based
> business models, which strengthen competitiveness and resilience while
> delivering on Europe’s sustainability objectives.
>
> Hartmut Engler, CEO of CWS Workwear
As several important legislative files move forward in Brussels, it is time to
reflect on what textile services need to continue to implement sustainable
solutions. Public procurement rules are a great vector to promote and encourage
circular business models while delivering on the strategic autonomy ambition of
the EU.
Public authorities across the EU spend over € 2.6 trillion annually on
purchasing services, works and supplies, accounting for around 15 percent of the
EU ’s GDP. However, too much of this investment is directed toward linear
services and disposable goods, slowing down progress toward Europe’s
environmental and industrial objectives.
With the revision of the EU public procurement rules, it should be recogni z ed
that the EU’s circular economy and environmental aims are greatly advanced by
the textile rental industry. Specifically, g reen p ublic p rocurement should
become mandatory across all EU m ember s tates and should also encourage
alternatives to direct purchase such as leasing models or product-as-a-service
business models.
Public procurement should not be driven solely by value-for-money
considerations, but by a holistic lifecycle approach that reflects long-term
environmental and social performance. Introducing mandatory lifecycle costing as
an award criterion would ensure that sustainability is measured over the full
duration of a contract, not just at the point of purchase.
> Longevity of product should be the first priority of the upcoming Circular
> Economy Act. The most sustainable product is ultimately the one that is kept
> in use the longest, putting durability and repairability at the centre of
> environmental benefits.
>
> Elena Lai, s ecretary g eneral of the European Textile Services Association
European Textile Services Association (ETSA) members already deliver sustainable
business models with product-as-a-service models implementing repair, reuse and
extended use. Such business models should be empowered and further supported in
legislation, hand in hand with recycling. Extending a product’s useful life
delivers far greater climate and resource benefits than breaking products down
for recycling after short use cycles. It preserves the embedded energy, water
and raw materials already invested.
However, prioriti z ing longevity does not mean neglecting end-of-life
solutions. At the same time, ETSA members are joining forces to invest in a
joint recycling pilot project, translating circular ambition into practical
industrial solutions. They are developing innovative processes to transform
end-of-life textiles into recycled fib er s suitable for insulation materials,
industrial wipers and other high-value applications — with the long-term vision
of advancing closed-loop systems in which recycled fib er s can increasingly
serve as raw materials for new textile production.
Recycling requires stable markets and long-term policy certainty, and the sector
is actively investing in building both. By developing concrete use cases for
recycled content, these initiatives help strengthen European recycling value
chains while further reducing dependency on third-country suppliers.
> Europe does not need to invent circular solutions from scratch. They already
> exist. The priority now is to put in place policies that support circular,
> service-based business models. These models are built on durability and
> extending product lifespans to get more value from the resources we already
> use.
>
> Elena Lai, s ecretary g eneral of the European Textile Services Association
Textile services are not an emerging concept but a proven, scalable European
solution — reducing consumption, anchoring jobs locally, safeguarding public
health and lowering emissions. By recogni z ing and supporting service-based
reuse models in forthcoming legislation, the EU can accelerate its
sustainability ambitions while strengthening competitiveness and strategic
autonomy.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disclaimer
POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT
* The sponsor is ETSA – European Textiles Service Association
* The ultimate controlling entity is ETSA – European Textiles Service
Association
* This political advertisement advocates for the recognition and support of
circular, service-based business models within forthcoming EU legislation; by
addressing the Circular Economy Act, the revision of EU Public Procurement
rules, Green Public Procurement requirements and lifecycle costing criteria,
it seeks to influence policymakers and the public debate on EU
sustainability, industrial policy and procurement frameworks, bringing it
within the scope of the TTPA.
More information here.
BRUSSELS — The European Commission will adopt the Industrial Accelerator Act
(IAA) on Wednesday, finally backing the landmark measure that would define a
European preference in green public procurement after several delays.
Haggling over the planned regulation went right down to the wire, with a meeting
of cabinet chiefs that began on Monday spilling into Tuesday, the day before
Ursula von der Leyen’s College of Commissioners will now sign off on an agreed
text. According to one Commission official, another 44 changes were made to the
draft at the meeting that ran into overtime.
Paula Pinho, the Commission’s chief spokesperson, confirmed at Tuesday’s regular
midday briefing that “commissioners are expected to adopt a proposal for an
Industrial Accelerator Act.”
The landmark measure would define a “Made in EU” preference in green public
procurement — while pushing back a decision for six months on whether friendly
third countries can be included in its scope. This means that, even after
Wednesday’s announcement, countries like the U.K. or Switzerland will still need
to lobby to get inside the tent.
The IAA would also set restrictions on inward investment for dominant players in
strategic green industries. These would mainly have China in mind, and cover
batteries and energy storage, electric vehicles and components, solar
photovoltaic, and the extraction, processing and recycling of critical raw
materials, according to a draft obtained by POLITICO last week.
An earlier version of the proposal, which is being overseen by Industry
Commissioner Stéphane Séjourné, was panned last month by as many as nine
departments of the EU executive. By the end of last week that was down to three,
including the Commission’s powerful trade department, according to one person
familiar with the discussion. They were granted anonymity to discuss the
closed-door talks.
Germany also led a rearguard action by 10 EU countries — which styled themselves
as the Friends of Industry — who support less industry regulation and more open
trade, with Economy Minister Katherina Reiche saying it would create “a
regulatory wasteland that nobody can understand anymore.”
With so many changes being made at the last minute, including dropping entire
industries like tech from the purview of the legislation, critics say the bill
is nowhere near ready for prime time and is at risk of being heavily revised
when it goes for review by the Council of the EU, which represents the bloc’s 27
member countries, and European lawmakers.
Additional reporting by Gerardo Fortuna.
BERLIN — Faced with Donald Trump’s decision to strike Iran, German Chancellor
Friedrich Merz has a notably resigned message for the U.S. president: Who are we
Europeans to judge?
Despite the German leader’s deep concern that the conflict in the Middle East
will spiral out of control, with potentially grave consequences for Europe, Merz
said ahead of his Tuesday Oval Office meeting with Trump that he was in no
position to criticize the U.S. president. After all, he argued, Germany’s own
approach to Iran has been ineffectual — and Europe needs the U.S. to end
Russia’s war in Ukraine.
“Now is not the time to lecture our partners and allies,” Merz said in Berlin
one day before his departure to the U.S. “The German government’s view of
developments in Iran is determined by our own geopolitical vulnerability, as
Russia’s war against Ukraine is in no way less than the injustice of the Iranian
regime.”
Merz has judiciously been making the right noises in the build-up to the
Washington visit. He sounded tough against Beijing’s market-distorting trade
practices after a meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping last week, and is
admitting Europe’s failures in trying to deal with Iran. That’s exactly what
Trump wants to hear.
The chancellor has established a relatively good rapport with Trump, according
to people close to him, and is certain to leverage this to try to cajole the
president to align with Europe on two issues of vital, immediate interest to the
EU — support for Ukraine, and the administration’s tariff plans in a moment of
great uncertainty following the U.S. Supreme Court’s rejection of Trump’s tariff
regime.
The visit may not resemble Merz’s stop at the White House last year, when
foreign leaders were more often subjected to lengthy public inquisitions before
a phalanx of press in the Oval Office. Last time, Merz sat deferentially as
Trump did most of the talking. This time, Trump may seize the opportunity to try
to get Merz to back him on Iran in front of cameras.
One of Merz’s main goals will be to convince Trump to put more pressure on
Russian President Vladimir Putin to end the war in Ukraine. | Guido
Bergmann/Bundesregierung via Getty Images
Merz’s statements ahead of the meeting suggest he could try to curry favor with
the president by potentially addressing U.S. Republican claims that Europe has
been “pathetically soft” on Iran — as Trump ally U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham put
it — by arguing they have a point.
Merz on Sunday said his government is “drawing sober conclusions” from the
failures of its policy toward Tehran. “Appeals from Europe” and packages of
sanctions had failed because Europe was “not prepared to enforce fundamental
interests with military force,” the chancellor said.
Even as Germany stays out of the military conflict with Iran, Merz hopes his
conciliatory tone will work to draw Trump closer on Ukraine and tariffs —
the two issues that have most tested transatlantic ties. German officials don’t
expect to convert Trump on these issues, but remain hopeful they can make
incremental progress.
“Merz and Trump still get along well,” said Metin Hakverdi, a center-left
lawmaker who serves as the German government’s transatlantic coordinator. “That
doesn’t mean Trump will stop being Trump. But it does mean that you can clearly
articulate your interests to him.”
UKRAINE AND TARIFFS
One of Merz’s main goals will be to convince Trump to put more pressure on
Russian President Vladimir Putin to end the war in Ukraine by toughening
American sanctions on Moscow, say people familiar with the chancellor’s
thinking. To do so, the chancellor is likely to cast the U.S. fight against the
regime in Tehran in terms of a larger struggle.
Helpfully for that argument, Putin has referred to the killing of Khamenei as “a
cynical violation of all norms of human morality and international law.”
As Stefan Kornelius, Merz’s spokesperson, told reporters on Monday: “We have
also seen in Russia’s reaction to the American actions in Iran that there is
once again a clear taking of sides here that the U.S. will not share … I believe
this conflict shows once again where right and wrong lie in Ukraine.”
Russia’s rising battlefield casualties — which it can no longer compensate for
with new recruits — may also provide an opening for Merz to convince Trump to
pressure Russia, said Norbert Röttgen, a senior lawmaker in Merz’s conservative
party.
“There are both military and economic problems for Russia that are increasing
and becoming more and more apparent,” said Röttgen. “That is a certain new
factor.”
At the same time, Merz — who was in China last week — will likely talk to Trump
about what he sees as the need for the U.S and the EU to draw closer together to
confront common challenges posed by Beijing, including Chinese subsidies to
loss-making companies and dependencies on Beijing for critical raw materials.
“In this context, the chancellor will probably also point out that the U.S.
tariff policy of course makes de-risking even more problematic, because it puts
us in a situation where we are under pressure from two sides,” Röttgen said of
the EU’s position.
It may help Merz’s cause that he sounded almost Trumpian last week during his
visit to Beijing. After meeting Chinese President Xi Jinping, Merz bemoaned his
country’s ballooning trade deficit with China in language Trump would likely
endorse, calling Germany’s trade dynamic with China “unhealthy.”
Whether Merz’s conciliatory tone will work to draw Trump closer on Ukraine and
tariffs — the two issues that have most tested transatlantic ties — remains a
big question. | Pool photo by Evan Vucci via AFP/Getty Images
Merz may also have some direct leverage to exert in discussions in Washington.
Trump is eager for foreign companies to move more of their production facilities
to the U.S., including German automotive manufacturing facilities, a U.S.
official said last week. A primary focus of their meeting will be deepening the
economic cooperation between the U.S. and Germany, the official added.
But given Trump’s steadfast commitment to tariffs, the most Merz may be able to
realistically hope for is clarity on the administration’s plans for EU levies —
especially in light of the president’s uneven response to the Supreme Court
decision that derailed the EU–U.S. trade deal.
German and EU leaders at least want to ensure that tariffs under the new regime
will not exceed the 15 percent tariff cap agreed in the summer. “We therefore
expect clarity from the U.S. government on the next steps,” Sebastian Hille, a
spokesperson for Merz’s government, said last week. “We want to achieve
stability and predictability in trade relations. This is essential for us and
also for U.S. companies.”
At the same time, Merz will want to ensure there’s no broader escalation in the
president’s trade wars.
“The tariff screw can be turned again as a geostrategic tool,” said Hakverdi,
Berlin’s transatlantic coordinator. “That is the central problem, and that is
precisely why personal exchanges at the highest level are so important.”
LONDON — U.K. Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper will announce a critical minerals
deal with Kazakhstan on Thursday as the West scrambles to diversify its supply
chains away from China.
Britain’s top diplomat will host foreign ministers from the five Central Asian
countries — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan — at
Lancaster House in London.
Cooper will unveil the critical minerals deal with Kazakh Foreign Minister
Yermek Kosherbayev, alongside pacts with the other countries covering carbon
capture and higher education.
“Central Asia is an important region with huge potential to boost economic
growth,” Cooper told POLITICO in a statement. “These agreements deliver for
British businesses, strengthen economic security and are a clear demonstration
of U.K. support for the independence of the Central Asian states.”
The new plan of action will diversify U.K. supply chains by supporting British
investment in critical minerals in Kazakhstan. The MoU was signed by
Kazakhstan’s Deputy Minister for Industry Olzhas Saparbekov and Trade Minister
Chris Bryant.
“Global demand for critical raw materials is rising rapidly, driven by clean
energy technologies, advanced manufacturing and defence industries,” Kosherbayev
wrote in a recent op-ed. Kazakhstan, he noted, produces 22 of the 36 minerals
identified in the U.K.’s Critical Minerals Strategy last November, including
uranium, titanium, silicon and rhenium.
Kazakhstan is a global critical minerals powerhouse, supplying over 40 percent
of the world’s uranium and leading in titanium production. It is a top‑ten
copper and zinc exporter.
Early this month, U.K. Foreign Minister Seema Malhotra was in Washington for a
key meeting of 50 nations to diversify critical mineral supply chains away from
China. The U.K. set out a Critical Minerals Strategy last November to ensure
that by 2035 no more than 60 percent of Britain’s supply of any one critical
mineral comes from a single country.
In further efforts to support the economic security and independence of the
Central Asia republics, Cooper will also announce a new agreement on U.K.
education cooperation with Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, alongside a
second campus for Coventry University in Almaty, Kazakhstan, and a new AI Center
at the university’s campus in Astana.
She will also unveil a deal for British start-up Valor Carbon and the Government
of Kyrgyzstan to develop carbon capture projects and a £100 million deal to
plant 25,000 hectares of forest.
BERLIN — China was once the promised land for German industry. Now it’s a
massive strategic headache for Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who departs on his
inaugural visit to Beijing on Tuesday.
For years, Berlin was the driving force behind closer EU relations with China —
brushing aside human rights concerns to lobby for a landmark investment deal in
2020. Closer trade relations with China, German leaders argued, would have a
moderating effect on the regime in Beijing, a justification encapsulated with
the mantra Wandel durch Handel, or change through trade.
For a long time, it was also good for business. Germany was one of the few EU
countries to run surpluses with Beijing, supplying the vital components and
machinery that fueled China’s economic ascent. Its industrial giants like
carmaker Volkswagen and chemical company like BASF made huge investments to
harness the Chinese market.
But that all-in approach to China now increasingly appears to be a historic
policy miscalculation on par with Germany’s misguided energy dependence on
Russia before the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine four years ago.
In public, Merz hasn’t admitted the scale of the challenge. Last week, he told
fellow conservatives that he is traveling to China to forge closer cooperation.
“We have a strategic interest in finding partners around the world who think
like us, who act like us,” he said.
But many German industry leaders are now urging the chancellor to take a far
tougher line and are howling over what they call the “China shock.” Since the
Covid pandemic, the trade relationship has flipped to an eye-watering deficit —
€90 billion in 2025 — and China is widely blamed for much of the hemorrhaging of
jobs in Germany’s all-important manufacturing sector — now running at roughly
10,000 job losses per month.
Frustratingly for the reflexive transatlanticist Merz, pivoting to President
Donald Trump’s U.S., which is locked in an unpredictable tariff showdown with
Europe, is hardly a viable option.
That means Merz has to find some way to engage with Chinese leader Xi Jinping.
Jörg Wuttke, a long-time China watcher who briefed the chancellor on Feb. 17
ahead of his visit, said he was surprised by how “well prepared he was.” For
close to two hours, Merz took notes from a group of six China experts, saying
little beyond asking questions. His priority, Wuttke said, was conveying the
problems in a way that would connect with Xi.
“He realizes he is possibly the most important politician for China in Europe,”
Wuttke said.
But China seems to have the best cards. Germany has over time become reliant on
critical raw materials imported from China, giving Beijing the power to shut
down German plants almost at will even as Berlin tries to pursue a longer term
policy of reducing such dependencies or “de-risking.”
That goal will take years to realize, however. By then, a growing number of
German industry leaders are arguing, much of the damage will have been inflicted
as German companies buckle due to massive Chinese price advantages resulting
from subsidies, deliberate dumping and an undervalued currency.
Merz himself admits that Germany should hold no “illusions” about China and its
ambition to “define a new multilateral order according to its own rules.”
“Merz is going at the worst possible time in terms of the impact of the China
shock on the German economy,” said Andrew Small, director of the Asia program at
the European Council on Foreign Relations. “The numbers are obviously absolutely
horrible, with no projection that they’ll get better.”
WHO HAS THE LEVERAGE?
In many ways, the trip will look like those taken by chancellors in the past,
when China’s vast and fast-growing market was considered the hope of German
industry. Merz is traveling with a delegation of some two-dozen business
executives. Over the course of three days, with stops in Beijing and the tech
hub of Hangzhou, he will dine with Xi and visit the Forbidden City as well as
outposts of Mercedes Benz and Siemens Energy.
But few expect any sweeping deals will be reached. German industry leaders are
instead calling for more concrete and immediate progress to improve their
circumstances.
“Our companies are coming under increasing pressure because key competitive
conditions are being systematically distorted,” Thilo Brodtmann, the managing
director of VDMA, said in a statement ahead of Merz’s trip. As a consequence, he
said, German machinery exports to China fell by 8.5 percent during the first 11
months of last year, while machinery imports from China rose by 12.5 percent.
Brodtmann called on the chancellor to address Chinese export controls on rare
earths and to end China’s practice of subsidizing loss-making “zombie companies”
that offer cut-rate prices. “German companies are not competing with other
companies, but with the Chinese treasury,” he said of subsidies more broadly.
The most powerful tool Merz has at his disposal is China’s growing dependence on
the European market, which only increased as Chinese domestic demand has fallen.
For Merz, a longtime free-trade purist, a push to threaten defensive tariffs
within the framework of the EU is not only anathema — it’s potentially reckless
at time when Germany is also dealing with the fallout of Trump’s trade wars.
Trump’s attempt to confront China also provides something of a cautionary tale.
In the midst of a trade feud between the U.S and China last year, Beijing
announced sweeping export controls on rare-earth magnets and the raw materials
needed to make them. Weeks later, Trump and Xi reached a detente, with Beijing
agreeing to delay rare earth export restrictions for one year.
But Nicolas Zippelius, a lawmaker focusing on China relations for Merz’s
conservatives, said Merz may be more forceful than he lets on in public.
“I would say that China and Germany can hurt each other very badly,” said
Zippelius. “We must not underestimate Germany’s strong voice within the EU. And
the EU has shown in the past that it has power, for example through tariffs and
other measures.”
Such conversations would happen in private, Zippelius added.
“I don’t think it helps to take risks against each other in the open,” he said.
“But in closed-door talks, you can communicate that very clearly. And there you
definitely have leverage.”
To that end, Merz could choose to ally itself more closely with France, which
has emerged as one of the loudest voices warning that China is steadily
hollowing out Europe’s industrial base while the continent is distracted by
Trump.
The only question is whether China would take Merz’s warnings seriously.
“The leverage is there,” said Small of the European Council on Foreign
Relations. “But on the Chinese side, the assessment is that Europe is not
willing to use it.”
Indeed, China knows the EU has backed off in the past over potential trade
conflicts with Beijing in sectors such as solar panels and telecommunications
due to fear of Chinese retaliation.
As Merz and other European leaders look for an answer, time is on China’s side,
added Small.
“Unless there is more serious concerted action on the European side, China will
calculate that it can get away with exactly what it’s doing at the moment and
all of these problems will continue,” he said.
Nette Nöstlinger contributed to this report.
EUROPE’S VANISHING CARS ARE JEOPARDIZING ITS RAW MATERIALS SECURITY
Used cars are a treasure trove of metals essential in energy technology, but the
EU is letting them vanish without a trace.
By MARIANNE GROS
in Brussels
Illustration by Natália Delgado/ POLITICO
EU decision-makers don’t have to look far to find cheap critical raw materials:
Just 5 kilometers away from the EU quarter, car dealers up and down Heyvaert
Street are scooping them up and shipping them to Africa.
Dealerships in this industrial precinct in southwest Brussels send European used
vehicles — many too polluting to be allowed on the continent’s roads — to
African countries like Senegal, Sierra Leone and Nigeria, where the market for
Europe’s unwanted automobiles is thriving.
That one street intimately connects the capital of the EU — where some 10
million new cars hit the roads each year — to a global supply chain of used
vehicles that sustains road transport in developing markets.
One day these cars will end up in junkyards far away, and with them tons of
valuable metals that the EU could recycle and reuse to run its economy.
But Europe’s age-old habit of exporting unwanted goods is coming back to bite it
as the bloc looks to recycle its way out of its reliance on raw materials
imported from China.
The EU is scrambling to secure new sources of critical metals and minerals
necessary for clean energy and military technology — a task of increasing
urgency as geopolitical tensions disrupt traditional supply chains.
For a small continent like Europe that is poor in natural resources but rich in
consumer goods, old cars are a promising source of these materials. The vehicles
are full of metals such as copper, platinum and steel that are essential in a
long list of critical industries such as clean energy and military technology.
And they’ll become even more valuable as early generations of electric vehicles
— full of battery metals like lithium, cobalt and nickel — reach the end of
their lifespans.
But the EU isn’t close to taking advantage of this prospect. Along with those
that are legally exported, between 3 million and 4 million end-of-life cars
disappear without a trace from the EU each year.
That’s a third of all cars that get deregistered. Some go missing because of
a gap in the paper trail. Others get exported through obscure trade routes. Many
are dismantled illegally, with the more valuable parts sold online or in
non-compliant dealerships — while the rest are dumped, creating a pollution
risk.
“We see big and currently unused potential in recycling, reuse and also
substitution” of critical raw materials, said Keit Pentus-Rosimannus, a member
of the European Court of Auditors who last month co-authored a report on the
EU’s difficulties in securing a supply of critical raw materials.
But that recycling and reuse can only happen if the waste products, e.g. cars,
make it to recycling hubs in the first place.
The market for Europe’s unwanted automobiles is thriving in cities like Lagos in
Nigeria. | Olympia De Maismont/AFP via Getty Images
“The illegal dismantling and export of [end-of-life vehicles] is mainly
motivated by profits from the sale of spare parts and metals,” the German
Environment Agency wrote in a study on the topic back in 2020. Unauthorized
dismantlers are “neglecting proper depollution, to avoid additional costs,” the
study explained.
In a separate paper published in 2022, the agency estimated that 20 percent of
all German vehicles that “go missing” — over 72,000 cars — are exported
illegally.
According to Interpol data, nearly 3.6 million vehicles and vehicle parts from
Europe — not just EU countries — were registered in the Stolen Motor Vehicles
database as of Dec. 31, 2025.
EUROPE’S MISSED OPPORTUNITY
The EU has made materials recycling a strategic pillar of its mission to reduce
reliance on imports from China in an increasingly hostile geopolitical
environment.
Europe’s economy runs on importing critical raw materials, such as nickel,
copper and lithium, as well as rare earths and so-called platinum group metals
like palladium or platinum. It needs them to build car engines, weapons and
products that contribute to the bloc’s green tech transition, including
batteries, chips and solar panels.
While the metals are mined all over the world, China overwhelmingly
dominates the processing and refining of these critical raw materials.
To address this, the European Commission says it wants to launch new mining
projects, sign deals with other countries to diversify its supply, and promote
recycling projects.
With the introduction of the Critical Raw Materials Act in 2024, EU
governments are required to adopt national circularity measures to boost the
recovery of critical raw materials and simplify permitting processes for
recycling and recovery projects.
The law says that 25 percent of the EU’s annual strategic raw material
consumption should come from domestic recycling by 2030. Last December, the
Commission announced additional measures as part of a new plan
called RESourceEU.
But many argue that progress is too slow. “Most EU targets that are in place do
not incentivize the recycling of specific individual materials. High processing
costs, limited availability of materials, technical and regulatory issues also
make the use of the recycling sector less competitive,” the Court of Auditors’
Pentus-Rosimannus said.
Others say the EU is doing little to reduce consumption in the first
place. Policymakers need to be “addressing [materials] consumption aspects
to accelerate this process in addition to everything else that is being done on
the recycling part” said the European Environment Agency’s head of the clean and
circular economy group, Daniel Montalvo. EU policies should tackle “how we can
change this upstream part of the material cycle so that we use products more
intensively and for longer,” he added.
RECYCLERS NEED HELP
End-of-life vehicles should all end up in one of Europe’s 13,000 authorized
treatment facilities like the one in Menen, Belgium, which straddles the
country’s border with France and is run by recycling company Galloo.
Running a recycling center is expensive and illegal dismantlers create unfair
competition because they avoid regulatory and compliance costs. | Sebastian
Kahnert/picture alliance via Getty Images
“We can dismantle 17 cars at once here. Usually, we treat 10 to 15 thousand cars
a year, but this year we’re around 3 or 4 thousand on this
site,” said Emmanuel Katrakis, the company’s director of public and regulatory
affairs.
Galloo set up Valorauto, a joint venture
with French-Italian automaker Stellantis, in 2023. Valorauto runs a vehicle
take-back and recycling service through 300 authorized treatment facilities in
Western Europe.
The low turnover in Europe’s car fleet — a result of stagnating sales since the
Covid pandemic due to Europe’s weaker economy — means fewer cars end up
in recycling centers.
Once the vehicles reach what can only be described as a cemetery for cars, the
vehicles get scrubbed of polluting substances and taken apart. Most of
the plastic, rubber, glass and iron can be recycled.
Crucially, the more precious resources in their engines, catalytic converters
and electrical systems can be collected. Two thirds of vehicles that reach
end-of-life status end up in this system.
But running a recycling center is expensive. Illegal dismantlers create unfair
competition because they avoid regulatory and compliance costs, which drives
the price down, while also diverting some of the end-of-life-vehicle flow — and
therefore revenue — away from authorized centers.
“We’re tired of having bad actors in our sectors who are willing to work with a
completely illegal market,” Katrakis said.
Cars also get dropped off with missing parts.”We’re going to buy their car
for €150, maybe €200, but they know they can sell their catalytic
converter separately for €60. They do the math,” he added.
For Valorauto’s general manager, Thomas Delgado, online marketplaces should be
held responsible for enabling the car dismantling grey market, saying they
don’t monitor the sellers properly. “There are several marketplaces that
should do their part to help [us] fight this system” he said, by preventing
individual sellers from selling a car part unless they can prove they are
registered as an authorized treatment facility.
Then there are Europe’s faulty registration systems. A lot of these cars go
missing because they are sold second-hand in another country but are never
deregistered in their country of origin. “Today we have national computer
systems that are supposed to track things, but they’re totally
overwhelmed,” Delgado said.
There are also gaps between the car registries and the database of insured
vehicles. Responsibility for monitoring these systems is often shared by several
national ministries.
National governments have tried to address the issue by creating incentives for
car owners to drop their vehicles off at authorized centers. In Denmark, for
example, owners can get a “scrapping premium” when their vehicle is dropped off
at an approved dealer.
A new regulation on end-of-life vehicles aims to clarify when a car is legally
considered waste. | Nicolas Tucat/AFP via Getty Images
At the EU level, a new regulation on end-of-life vehicles aims to address the
issue with “clearer rules on the distinction between a used vehicle and an
end-of-life vehicle” and “a strict framework for transfers of ownership,” but
some of the technical aspects of the law are still being discussed. The law also
aims to clarify when a car is legally considered waste.
The automotive sector is glad to see the EU will “implement an EU-wide
registration/deregistration system and regulate the export of ELVs outside the
EU, preventing valuable raw materials from leaving the European
market,” according to ACEA, the sector’s main lobby.
GETTING A SECOND LIFE
Over 800,000 used vehicles are exported from the EU each year, mainly to African
countries, according to EU data. The revised end-of-life vehicle regulation
states that only roadworthy cars can be exported from the EU.
Just because a car isn’t allowed on the streets of a European city doesn’t mean
it should be dismantled immediately, however.
“It’s important to make the distinction because they are not necessarily at the
end of life everywhere,” said Pierre Hajjar, chief executive officer of Socar
Shipping Agencies, a vehicle shipping company on Brussels’ Heyvaert St. Last
December local police raided the street, seizing 45 vehicles and forcing several
dealerships to close for not complying with national rules on cash payments or
for not having the right environmental permits.
With the revised end-of-life-vehicle regulation, the EU wants to increase
traceability so “only high-quality, technically fit European vehicles will be
exported.” But for African markets, Hajjar says that’s already the case.
“For Africa, everything goes by boat, everything is extremely
traceable,” he said, because port authorities and maritime shipping companies
have high thresholds for the kind of vehicles that can be exported.
“Whereas in Eastern countries it’s road transport … there isn’t really any
traceability, they cross the borders quite easily,” he added.
BRUSSELS — Ireland on Monday sounded the alarm over a new group of Europe’s
largest six economies, dubbed “E6,” amid fears that smaller countries’ interests
could be bulldozed.
“I am conscious, and I say this very respectfully, a lot of the countries in
that E6 will have different views on some fundamental issues,” Irish Finance
Minister Simon Harris said ahead of a meeting with his eurozone peers in
Brussels.
“I would much rather see a structure where countries come together on issues
where they share a common view rather than the entry to the club being based on
your size exclusively,” he said.
Harris’ comments came after the finance ministers of Germany, France, Italy,
Spain, the Netherlands and Poland met in Brussels, behind closed doors, earlier
in the day to discuss how best to speed up Europe’s plans to take on Wall
Street.
That’s a problem for the likes of Dublin, which has a direct stake in the plans
to deepen the bloc’s financial markets. Most money managers in Europe do the
bulk of their business in Ireland and Luxembourg, which oppose efforts to create
a single EU watchdog for the biggest financiers across the bloc.
Monday’s E6 gathering was the second meeting of its kind, with another planned
in March, amid growing frustration that the EU is moving too slowly to keep pace
with the economic powerhouses of the U.S. and China.
The shock surrounding U.S. President Donald Trump’s pursuit of Greenland also
convinced the EU’s most powerful countries to agree on political positions ahead
of G7 meetings — especially when it comes to securing critical raw materials.
“What happened with Greenland served as a wake-up call,” Germany’s finance
minister, Lars Klingbeil, told reporters ahead of the Eurogroup. “We’ll be
transparent.” The goal is to agree on certain topics and present them to the
rest of the EU, he added.
The next E6 meeting will focus on boosting the euro on the global stage and
making defense investments more effective. Not everyone’s opposed. Some
diplomats perceive E6 as little more than a political tactic to push the most
reluctant countries to go ahead on controversial issues.
TWO-SPEED EUROPE
While there are other formats that smaller countries can attend to influence
policy, the E6 club is designed to coordinate policy positions on economic
initiatives.
That’s put several countries on edge. Political appetite for a two-speed Europe
has been building, in which smaller groups of nations can peel off and sign up
to initiatives that are mired in European discord.
Several countries have expressed concern over the E6 club since its creation.
Handling political debates within such an exclusive forum could also dilute the
Eurogroup, which in itself is an informal body that finance ministers have used
to discuss sensitive topics away from the public eye.
“That’s going to kill the Eurogroup,” one EU diplomat said. “I think it’s a big
mistake.”
Kathryn Carlson contributed to this report.
ALDEN BIESEN, Belgium — The European Union should open up more to its trade
partners in public procurement and curb Chinese investment in sectors like green
tech, according to a new draft of a landmark industry act obtained by POLITICO
on Thursday.
Free-trade partners like the United Kingdom and Japan will breathe a sigh of
relief as the draft Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA) foresees a definition of
“Made in EU” that includes “trusted partners.” Brussels wants to throw up a
higher barrier to investment from China by imposing a cap on foreign direct
investment by countries that dominate a given global industry.
The leak of the bill came as EU leaders held a retreat at a Belgian castle to
wargame ways to reverse the bloc’s industrial decline in the face of China’s
export dominance and America’s tech supremacy. European Commission President
Ursula von der Leyen is trying to find a balance between France’s protectionist
instincts and calls for more openness led by Germany, Italy and the EU’s Nordic
contingent.
Leaders played down differences as they gathered at the Alden Biesen estate,
with Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni saying her views on industrial
strategy converged with those of German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, and brushing
off suggestions the duo were trying to isolate French President Emmanuel Macron.
“It is not something that we do against someone else, by excluding someone
else,” she told reporters.
Leaders reached a form of consensus on areas including the concept of a European
preference, where there was openness to examining what it may mean and where it
may be needed, according to a person briefed on the talks. The meeting kicked
off an intense month of politicking on restoring EU competitiveness and its
single market project, with the IAA due out on Feb. 25 and leaders to reconvene
for a full-blown summit on March 19-20.
The draft drew a swift and strong rebuke from Chinese business.
“The latest version of the Industrial Accelerator Act is likely to undermine the
investment confidence of leading Chinese companies,” the Chinese Chamber of
Commerce to the EU said. “Beyond the political signaling, many of the proposed
measures raise serious practical concerns, including the feasibility of
mandatory local partnership requirements, which in many cases may simply not be
commercially or technologically viable.”
A big question mark over the industry push, which is being led by Industry
Commissioner Stéphane Séjourné, is whether it can be sufficiently decisive to
turn the economic tide.
“Whatever new FDI rules will be enacted will be ineffective,” said Yanmei Xie, a
senior associate fellow at the Mercator Institute for China Studies. Each EU
member country has a different agenda and building a united front against
Chinese dominance is a near impossibility. “Whoever is the lowest denominator
becomes the de facto gatekeeper.”
TRUSTED PARTNERS
The latest draft of the IAA, which runs to 96 pages, broadens the definition of
a European preference as it would apply to public procurement and other
taxpayer-funded programs in energy-intensive industries, net-zero technologies
and the automotive sector. In so doing it should allay fears among friendly
trading nations of a “Fortress Europe” scenario.
The scope of Made in EU should include content originating from the EU and the
European Economic Area, which spans Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. The draft
also leaves the door open to “trusted partners” whose manufacturing “should be
deemed equivalent to Union origin content.”
Earlier on Thursday, Séjourné dismissed the notion that the Made in EU push
would exclude trade partners. His cabinet said there was broad support, both
politically and in industry for the work of the Commission, although “opinions
diverge on the conditions and modalities of its implementation.”
A broader Made in EU concept will be welcome in the U.K. after the country’s
finance minister, Rachel Reeves, said on Wednesday that Britain needed to be
part of the Made in EU club. “I actually support the idea of some sort of ‘Made
in Europe’ or ‘Made in countries that share each other’s values,’” she told an
event.
Japan, a major auto exporter, will also welcome the shift. The country “very
much meets the definition of a Trusted Partner of the EU,” Patrick Keating,
Honda Europe’s head of government affairs, told POLITICO.
GETTING TOUGHER
The EU executive doubled down on its efforts to curb foreign direct investments
from China in its latest draft.
Should the current form hold, the IAA would limit investments by companies based
in countries that control more than 40 percent of global manufacturing capacity
across four sectors: batteries, electric vehicles, solar technologies, and the
processing and recycling of critical raw materials.
“The sectors indicated — those in which Beijing is a leader — as well as the
reference to the 40 percent manufacturing capacity, highlight how the
increasingly clear target of these measures are Chinese foreign direct
investments,”said Luca Picotti, a lawyer at Italy’s Osservatorio Golden Power.
The Commission’s proposal, which effectively mirrors Beijing’s 1980s forced
joint venture policy, remains in the new draft.
Chinese automakers that could be forced to give up some of their technology to
their European competitors are pushing back on that strategy. BYD CEO Stella Li
has called the model “outdated.”
“It’s not efficient: We take decisions in a second, a joint venture takes
months. It’s a model of the past,” she told Italian daily Corriere della Sera at
the Davos World Economic Forum last month.
Governments would also be compelled under the IAA to buy more climate-friendly
materials, though the scope of the requirement remains elusive in the latest
draft of the upcoming industry booster. The act also proposes introducing
voluntary green steel labels.
The scale of the Commission’s intervention remains unclear in the draft, which
is missing a section devoted to specific materials as well as a set of annexes,
though hints are sprinkled throughout the document.
“Public procurement is a powerful lever,” von der Leyen told industry
representatives at an event in Antwerp on Wednesday, noting it amounts to 15
percent of EU GDP. “This is massive financial firepower controlled by European
governments. But too often, we see that our public buyers have to take the
subsidized foreign products instead of the high-quality European alternatives.
That is homegrown value that we are leaving on the table.”
Aude van den Hove reported from Alden Biesen, Francesca Micheletti, Jordyn Dahl
and Sebastian Starcevic from Brussels, and Zia Weise from Antwerp.