OPTICS SERBIANS PUSHED OUT AS CHINA TAKES OVER A MINING EMPIRE Beijing’s investment is transforming the landscape in Bor — and the lives of the people who call it home. Text and photos by MATTEO TREVISAN in Bor, Serbia Ixeca, a farmer, observes a landslide in his orchard in Slatina, which he believes was caused by irregular operations at the underground mine owned by China’s state-owned group Zijin Mining. In northeastern Serbia, the town of Bor rose around some of Europe’s most significant copper and gold deposits. From the 1940s, the region quickly drew workers from all over Yugoslavia. Majdanpek, located just 70 kilometers away, expanded around another massive reserve, estimated at more than 600 million tons of ore. For decades, these mining centers sustained Yugoslav heavy industry, but today that legacy is increasingly fragile. Since 2018, the mining complex has been taken over by Chinese state-owned group Zijin Mining, which has invested €2.3 billion to increase production. The expansion goes far beyond industry — it is transforming the land and the lives of its inhabitants. Whole families are watching their homes, properties, and memories disappear as settlements are engulfed by the mine. The Serbian government has failed to provide meaningful alternatives for resettlement. Advertisement The environmental toll is profound: forests and rivers are being destroyed, wildlife is under threat, and residents endure some of the most polluted air in Europe. Meanwhile, a growing Chinese workforce — now numbering in the thousands — remains largely segregated in closed camps, seldom mixing with locals, leaving behind a vast yet intangible presence. Bor and Majdanpek illustrate a broader pattern. In 2022, Chinese investment in Serbia equaled the combined input of all 27 EU countries for the first time, raising questions about sovereignty and neocolonial influence. The debate grew sharper after the collapse of a Chinese-renovated railway station in Novi Sad that killed 16 people in 2024, sparking waves of protest. As Zijin Mining continues to expand its footprint, the region and its people are left suspended in a battle between economic profit and the slow erosion of collective memory — the disappearing homes, traditions and history of threatened communities. Feeling the change: Once a small village, the Serbian town of Bor experienced dramatic growth last century following the discovery of large gold and copper deposits. Above, Željko, who has worked at the mine for more than a decade, says that safety regulations have worsened and accidents have increased since China’s state-owned Zijin Mining bought the complex. Željko lost 40 percent of mobility in his right arm following a workplace accident in 2023. Also in the photos above, the Zivkovic family inside their home in Slatina, near Bor. The family’s main source of income is agriculture. In recent years, their land has been expropriated due to the expansion of Zijin Mining’s operations. The son now works as a driver for the mine, like many others in the area who can’t find other employment. CHAPTER 1 THE CHINESE New audience: A Chinese cook in a Chinese restaurant in Bor. The text on her apron could be translated as “I make money by the shovelful.” Next, large screens outside the Zijin Mining headquarters in Bor display videos promoting the company’s activities in the region. The company has brought in thousands of workers from China, housing them in camps within the mining area and preventing them from integrating with the local population. “This is colonization,” says Ixeca, whose family has lived off farming for generations. Now, the expansion of mining activity threatens their livelihood. Some of their lands have already been expropriated and they are suing Zijin Mining. Neighbors? The Chinese and Serbian flags inside a Chinese restaurant in Bor. The contract between Serbia and Zijin Mining remains classified, raising concerns over its legality. The Chinese presence in the area is overwhelming but often invisible. Only Zijin Mining managers and senior staff are allowed to leave the company’s camps, unlike regular workers from China. Leaving a mark: Top, one of the buildings used as offices by Zijin Mining in Bor. Serbia stands out as a focal point of the Chinese footprint not only in the Western Balkans but also across Central and Eastern Europe. Beijing has emerged as the largest individual investor in Serbia. Health risks: Above, an X-ray of the lungs of a woman from Krivelj, a village near Bor, who died of lung cancer at a young age. Her family blames pollution from mining activities. The effects of intensive extraction and smelting are felt across the region. Air quality is a major concern: A report from January 2024 revealed frequent spikes in sulfur dioxide levels around Bor, contributing to both acute and chronic respiratory issues, as well as acid rain. The study also found fine particulate matter containing heavy metals such as lead, cadmium, nickel and arsenic. No systematic assessment of public health has been carried out since Zijin took over operations. Hard at work: Next, a view of the copper and gold mine in Majdanpek. Bor and Majdanpek hold one of the largest copper reserves in the world and one of the biggest gold deposits in Europe. In 2023, Serbia exported approximately 1.06 million tons of copper ores and concentrates, worth $1.46 billion. The main buyer was China. Advertisement CHAPTER 2 THE SERBIANS Perspective: “It’s become like we’re sleeping on gold but dying of cancer,” says 73-year-old Joleht, seen inside her home in Slatina, right. Neighbors say that their homes are slowly collapsing due to the underground copper and gold mining operations. They face cracks and water infiltrations throughout the walls. Anger: People protest against the central government and widespread corruption march through the streets of Majdanpek in February 2025. Dead river: Bottom, the Borska Reka River, notoriously known as one of the most polluted waterways in Europe. It is the main tributary of the Veliki Timok River. Sediment analysis has shown high concentrations of copper, arsenic, and nickel, exceeding remediation thresholds, particularly near mining areas. As a result, the Borska Reka is considered a “dead river,” devoid of aquatic life, with severe environmental impacts that extend to the Danube via the Timok. The Batut Institute of Public Health published a study showing an increased mortality risk for both men and women in Bor across all age groups. Local NGO Ne damo Jadar was founded to demand that the Majdanpek mine comply with environmental regulations and to advocate for solutions for residents whose homes are threatened by the mine’s expansion. Over the years, several incidents of violence have occurred between the NGO’s members and the private guards patrolling the mine. Hunter: Miodrag, a farmer from the village of Slatina, hunts near the land now occupied by Zijin Mining. His family relied heavily on agriculture, but their property has now been reduced to just a few hectares. Miodrag is currently suing the Chinese company, claiming the land was unfairly expropriated. “One day, we’ll have a mine under our house.” He also says that hunting has become impossible due to constant noise and explosions: “I can feel my house shake.” Family business: Father, son, and grandfather from the Jovic family in the yard of their home in Slatina. Some of their farming lands have been expropriated. “It’s over, there’s nothing else to be done,” says Ivica Jovic. “At this point, I accept they’ll take my land, but at least give me another place and let me continue farming.” Jovic has received cease-and-desist letters from Zijin Mining, after allegedly verbally confronting Chinese workers operating on what was once his land. Expansion: One of the many facilities owned by Zijin Mining, near the village of Slatina, just outside of Bor. The city, born thanks to the mine, and the nearby villages are now at risk of disappearing due to its expansion. Advertisement CHAPTER 3 THE FUTURE Staying put: Jasna Bacilovic, with her daughter Katarina Tomić, inside their home in the village of Krivelj. The village is slowly disappearing due to the expansion of the mine, but both Jasna and her entire family are committed to preserving their home, which has belonged to them since the 1800s, and to defending the village. “I don’t want to live anywhere else. This is home. I remember when I was a child, I used to play with my friends on a hill not far from here, but now that hill doesn’t exist anymore. My children may never even see this village because it might disappear forever,” says Tomić. Krivelj used to have up to 22 kafane —family-run taverns and restaurants. Today, only one remains and the village is slowly disappearing. “The village sounds are disappearing. I no longer hear shutters opening, the radio coming from my uncle’s house, or my neighbors talking. I open the window and hear nothing,” says Bacilovic. The departed: The bus stop in Majdanpek covered with death notices of local residents. Today, the municipality of Bor is one of the wealthiest in Serbia, despite local salaries remaining low, as in the rest of the country. The mine has expanded to the point of becoming one with the town. There are plans to relocate the entire community to Metovnica, an undeveloped area with only a few scattered farms, but nothing has been confirmed yet. Keeping watch: Bottom, a resident of Majdanpek looks toward the mine owned by the Chinese company Zijin Mining. An activist who has been fighting for years against pollution and the uncontrolled expansion of the mine, he has received both verbal and physical threats for his social engagement. Last train: A glimpse inside the train station of Bor, now abandoned after a fire that some locals believe was intentional. They suspect Zijin is interested in acquiring the railway land and expanding its operations in the area. Past lives: Below, the black and white photos show houses abandoned due to the expansion of the mine. Many families have sold their homes to Zijin Mining, as the company continues to buy land. The expansion of its activities threatens to wipe out entire villages. Next chapter: “This is not the end of the world, but from here you can see it,” says Aladin Zekypy, pictured with his two children, aged 10 and 7, inside their home, which stands just a few dozen meters from the open-pit mine in Bor. He dreams of one day being able to afford a healthier place for his family.

BERLIN — German Vice Chancellor Lars Klingbeil expressed frustration with the EU’s response to the Greenland crisis, telling POLITICO the bloc must avoid a return to business as usual after U.S. President Donald Trump backed down from his threats to seize the Arctic territory and impose new tariffs on European countries. “Anyone in Europe who now thinks that we can sit back and relax, saying that everything has turned out fine somehow, take a deep breath and then carry on as before, has failed to understand what is at stake here,” Klingbeil told POLITICO’s Berlin Playbook Podcast in an interview conducted on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos. Klingbeil’s comments came ahead of an EU emergency summit in Brussels on Thursday during which European leaders agreed the post-World War II world order is slipping away, but diverged on the best strategy for dealing with Trump going forward. Klingbeil, who also acts as Germany’s finance minister, in particular voiced frustration over the European Commission’s handling of the Greenland crisis over the course of the past week, suggesting the Commission was not acting with enough urgency. “When I returned from Brussels on Monday, I was extremely frustrated because I had held talks with the Commission where I was given the impression that everything was great, everything was on the right track, and I don’t think that is appropriate given the situation we are in,” Klingbeil said. Klingbeil said that his frustration with the EU’s pace prompted him to reach out to his counterparts in Spain, France, the Netherlands, Italy and Poland to discuss economic competitiveness, raw materials and defense financing, among other matters, during a virtual meeting next week. “The urgency and pace that we actually need are not there at the moment, and that is something that greatly concerns me,” he said. “I’m a big fan and believer in the European Union, but I think a few countries need to take the lead now,” Klingbeil said. “I’m hopeful due to the fact that everyone in this circle has understood what’s at stake and that we can achieve something together.” Klingbeil also suggested Germany should pursue a middle ground when it comes to dealing with the Trump administration, seeking to preserve ties to the extent possible while strengthening Europe. “We must keep our hand outstretched at all times, and I believe that we must never destroy or jeopardize transatlantic relations on our part,” he said. “But I also believe — and I have made this clear over the last few days — that it is important for us to be clear and unambiguous as Europeans.”

Italy’s right-wing government led by Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni on Friday presented a new commercial strategy for the Arctic region. The document was officially presented in Rome by Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani, Defense Minister Guido Crosetto and University and Research Minister Anna Maria Bernini and aims to strengthen security cooperation and open business opportunities in the region. The new strategy reflects the polar north’s growing geopolitical and economic importance, as U.S. President Donald Trump seeks to expand American influence by acquiring or seizing Greenland from Denmark. In a statement, Meloni said Italy was “perfectly aware of how much this region of the world represents a strategic quadrant in global balances” and pledged to continue working to preserve the Arctic as “an area of peace, cooperation and prosperity.” She added that the Arctic must “increasingly be a priority of the European Union and NATO,” urging the transatlantic military alliance to develop a coordinated presence to “prevent tensions, preserve stability and respond to interference from other actors.” Tajani announced that he would travel to Washington in the coming weeks to discuss raw materials with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and other partners, and said Italy would also launch “an Italian business mission to the Arctic.” Anna Maria Bernini said Rome would host the Arctic Circle Rome Forum — Polar Dialogue in early March, bringing together entrepreneurs, defense firms, scientists, researchers and politicians to discuss the region. | Fabio Frustaci/EPA “Europe’s attention and Italy’s attention to the Arctic is not born today: we have always recognized the centrality,” Tajani said, adding that Rome was considering setting up a business group focused on exports in sectors such as defense, energy and space. “We want to support our companies and stand by them because the Arctic region is our priority.” Bernini said Rome would host the Arctic Circle Rome Forum — Polar Dialogue in early March, bringing together entrepreneurs, defense firms, scientists, researchers and politicians to discuss the region. The renewed focus on the Arctic comes as Denmark and several allies announced plans this week to reinforce their military presence in Greenland, following escalating rhetoric from U.S. President Donald Trump about American claims to Arctic territory. Crosetto, however, criticized the fragmented national deployments of troops, calling instead for a NATO-led approach. “Italy’s defense ministry has been focused on the Arctic for some time now, with the Navy, the Air Force and the Army carrying out exercises that did not start today, and that certainly are not about sending 15 soldiers to Greenland,” he said. “Imagine it: 15 Italians, 15 French, 15 Germans — it sounds like the beginning of a joke to me. I think it is in our interest to keep the Western world together, always thinking in NATO and U.N. terms,” he added.

BRUSSELS — EU leaders are scrambling to come up with a deal on Greenland’s future that would allow Donald Trump to claim victory on the issue without destroying the alliance that underpins European security.  From proposals to using NATO to bolster Arctic security to giving the U.S. concessions on mineral extraction, the bloc’s leaders are leaning heavily toward conciliation over confrontation with Trump, three diplomats and an EU official told POLITICO. The race to come up with a plan follows the U.S. president’s renewed claims that his country “needs” the island territory — and won’t rule out getting it by force. “In the end, we have always come to a common conclusion” with Washington, German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul said after meeting U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, adding that their talks on the Arctic territory were “encouraging.” German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said he hopes “a mutually acceptable solution” will be found within NATO. The foreign ministers of Greenland and Denmark will meet U.S. Vice President JD Vance alongside Rubio at the White House on Wednesday. They are hoping for “an honest conversation with the administration,” according to another EU diplomat familiar with plans for the meeting. THE ART OF THE DEAL Asked to describe a possible endgame on Greenland, the first EU diplomat said it could be a deal that would give Trump a victory he could sell domestically, such as forcing European countries to invest more in Arctic security as well as a promise that the U.S. could profit from Greenland’s mineral wealth. Trump is primarily looking for a win on Greenland, the diplomat said. “If you can smartly repackage Arctic security, blend in critical minerals, put a big bow on top, there’s a chance” of getting Trump to sign on. “Past experience” — for example when EU allies pledged to spend 5 percent of GDP on defense — showed “this is always how things have gone.” On defense, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte laid the groundwork for a deal when on Monday he said countries in the alliance were discussing ways of bolstering Arctic security. While the shape of the “next steps” touted by Rutte remain to be defined, a ramped-up investment by European NATO members is one possibility that could fit with Trump’s desire to see Europe shoulder greater responsibility for its security. On mineral extraction, details are blurrier. But a deal that guarantees the U.S. a share of profits from extraction of critical raw materials is one possibility, said the EU official. For now, capacity to extract critical raw materials from Greenland is limited. Denmark has spent years seeking investment for long-term projects, with little luck as countries have preferred obtaining minerals at a much cheaper rate on global markets. The EU is planning to more than double its investment in Greenland in its next-long term budget — including funds oriented toward critical raw materials projects. This could be a hook for Trump to accept a co-investment deal. Yet, if Trump’s real aim is the island’s minerals, Danes have been offering the U.S the chance to invest in Greenland for years — an offer refused by American officials, several diplomats said. If Trump’s push on Greenland is about China and Russia, he could easily ask Copenhagen to increase the presence of U.S troops on the island, they also say. A third EU diplomat questioned whether Trump’s real aim was to get into the history books. Trump’s Make America Great Again slogan “has become a geographical concept; he wants to go down in history as the man who has made America ‘greater’ — in geographical terms,” they said. PRESERVING NATO Above all, governments are trying to avoid a military clash, the three diplomats and EU official said. A direct intervention by the U.S. on Greenland — a territory belonging to a member of the EU and NATO — would effectively spell the end of the postwar security order, leaders have warned.  “It would be an unprecedented situation in the history of NATO and any defense alliance,” German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said Tuesday, adding that Berlin is talking with Copenhagen about the options at Europe’s disposal if the U.S. launches a takeover. EU Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius and Danish Prime Minister Mette Fredriksen both said a military intervention would be the end of NATO. “Everything would stop,” Fredriksen said. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte laid the groundwork for a deal when on Monday he said countries in the alliance were discussing ways of bolstering Arctic security. | Paul Morigi/Getty Images “No provision [in the alliance’s 1949 founding treaty] envisions an attack on one NATO ally by another one,” said a NATO diplomat, who was granted anonymity to speak freely. It would mean “the end of the alliance,” they added. Trump said “it may be a choice” for the U.S. between pursuing his ambition to take control of Greenland and keeping the alliance intact. Preserving NATO remains the bloc’s top priority, the first EU diplomat said. While both privately and publicly officials have forcefully rejected the idea Europe might “give up” Greenland to the U.S., the comments underscore how desperate governments are to avoid a direct clash with Washington. “This is serious – and Europe is scared,” said a fourth EU diplomat involved in discussions in Brussels on how the bloc responds. A fifth described the moment as “seismic,” because it signaled that the U.S. was ready to rip up a hundred years of ironclad relations.  STILL REELING While European leaders are largely on the same page that a military conflict is unconscionable, how to reach a negotiated settlement is proving thornier. Until the U.S. military strike on Venezuela on Jan. 3, and Trump’s fresh claims the U.S. needs to “have” Greenland, the Europeans were very conspicuously not working on a plan to protect Greenland from Trump — because to do so might risk making the threat real. “It’s been something we’ve anticipated as a potential risk, but something that we can do very little about,” said Thomas Crosbie, a U.S. military expert at the Royal Danish Defense College, which provides training and education for the Danish defense force. “The idea has been that the more we focus on this, and the more we create preparations around resisting this, the more we make it likely to happen. So there’s been anxiety that [by planning for a U.S. invasion] we may accidentally encourage more interest in this, and, you know, kind of escalate,” Crosbie said. But the problem was that, having spent six years studiously avoiding making a plan to respond to Trump’s threats, Europe was left scrabbling for one. Europeans are now faced with figuring out what they have in their “toolbox” to respond to Washington, a former Danish MP aware of discussions said. “The normal rulebook doesn’t work anymore.” Officials consider it the biggest challenge to Europe since the Second World War and they’re not sure what to do.  “We know how we would react if Russia started to behave this way,” the fourth diplomat said. But with the U.S, “this is simply not something we are used to.” Victor Jack, Nette Nöstlinger, Chris Lunday, Zoya Sheftalovich and Seb Starcevic contributed reporting.

BRUSSELS — On Greenland’s southern tip, surrounded by snowy peaks and deep fjords, lies Kvanefjeld — a mining project that shows the giant, barren island is more than just a coveted military base. Beneath the icy ground sits a major deposit of neodymium and praseodymium, rare earth elements used to make magnets that are essential to build wind turbines, electric vehicles and high-tech military equipment. If developed, Greenland, a semi-autonomous part of Denmark, would become the first European territory to produce these key strategic metals. Energy Transition Minerals, an Australia-based, China-backed mining company, is ready to break ground. But neither Copenhagen, Brussels nor the Greenlandic government have mobilized their state power to make the project happen. In 2009, Denmark handed Greenland’s inhabitants control of their natural resources; 12 years later the Greenlandic government blocked the mine because the rare earths are mixed with radioactive uranium. Since then the project has been in limbo, bogged down in legal disputes. “Kvanefjeld illustrates how political and regulatory uncertainty — combined with geopolitics and high capital requirements — makes even strategically important projects hard to move from potential to production,” Jeppe Kofod, Denmark’s former foreign minister and now a strategic adviser to Energy Transition Minerals, told POLITICO. Kvanefjeld’s woes are emblematic of Greenland’s broader problems. Despite having enough of some rare earth elements to supply as much as 25 percent of the world’s needs — not to mention oil and gas reserves nearly as great as those of the United States, and lots of other potential clean energy metals including copper, graphite and nickel — these resources are almost entirely undeveloped. Just two small mines, extracting gold and a niche mineral called feldspar used in glassmaking and ceramics, are up and running in Greenland. And until very recently, neither Denmark nor the European Union showed much interest in changing the situation. But that was before 2023, when the EU signed a memorandum of understanding with the Greenland government to cooperate on mining projects. The EU Critical Raw Materials Act, proposed the same year, is an attempt to catch up by building new mines both in and out of the bloc that singles out Greenland’s potential. Last month, the European Commission committed to contribute financing to Greenland’s Malmbjerg molybdenum mine in a bid to shore up a supply of the metal for the EU’s defense sector.  But with United States President Donald Trump threatening to take Greenland by force, and less likely to offer the island’s inhabitants veto power over mining projects, Europe may be too late to the party. “The EU has for many years had a limited strategic engagement in Greenland’s critical raw materials, meaning that Europe today risks having arrived late, just as the United States and China have intensified their interest,” Kofod said. In a world shaped by Trump’s increasingly belligerent foreign policy and China’s hyperactive development of clean technology and mineral supply chains, Europe’s neglect of Greenland’s natural wealth is looking increasingly like a strategic blunder. With Donald Trump threatening to take Greenland by force, and less likely to offer the island’s inhabitants veto power over mining projects, Europe may be too late to the party. | Jim Watson/AFP via Getty Images A HOSTILE LAND That’s not to say building mines in Greenland, with its mile-deep permanent ice sheet, would be easy. “Of all the places in the world where you could extract critical raw materials, [Greenland] is very remote and not very easily accessible,” said Ditte Brasso Sørensen, senior analyst on EU climate and industrial policy at Think Tank Europa, pointing to the territory’s “very difficult environmental circumstances.”  The tiny population — fewer than 60,000 — and a lack of infrastructure also make it hard to build mines. “This is a logistical question,” said Eldur Olafsson, CEO of Amaroq, a gold mining company running one of the two operating mines in Greenland and also exploring rare earths and copper extraction opportunities. “How do you build mines? Obviously, with capital, equipment, but also people. [And] you need to build the whole infrastructure around those people because they cannot only be Greenlandic,” he said.  Greenland also has strict environmental policies — including a landmark 2021 uranium mining ban — which restrict resource extraction because of its impact on nature and the environment. The current government, voted in last year, has not shown any signs of changing its stance on the uranium ban, according to Per Kalvig, professor emeritus at the Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland, a Danish government research organization. Uranium is routinely found with rare earths, meaning the ban could frustrate Greenland’s huge potential as a rare earths producer. It’s a similar story with fossil fuels. Despite a 2007 U.S. assessment that the equivalent of over 30 billion barrels in oil and natural gas lies beneath the surface of Greenland and its territorial waters — almost equal to U.S. reserves — 30 years of oil exploration efforts by a group including Chevron, Italy’s ENI and Shell came to nothing. In 2021 the then-leftist government in Greenland banned further oil exploration on environmental grounds.  Danish geologist Flemming Christiansen, who was deputy director of the Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland until 2020, said the failure had nothing to do with Greenland’s actual potential as an oil producer. Instead, he said, a collapse in oil prices in 2014 along with the high cost of drilling in the Arctic made the venture unprofitable. Popular opposition only complicated matters, he said. THE CLIMATE CHANGE EFFECT From the skies above Greenland Christiansen sees firsthand the dramatic effects of climate change: stretches of clear water as rising temperatures thaw the ice sheets that for centuries have made exploring the territory a cold, costly and hazardous business. “If I fly over the waters in west Greenland I can see the changes,” he said. “There’s open water for much longer periods in west Greenland, in Baffin Bay and in east Greenland.” Climate change is opening up this frozen land. Climate change is opening up this frozen land. | Odd Andersen/AFP via Getty Images Greenland contains the largest body of ice outside Antarctica, but that ice is melting at an alarming rate. One recent study suggests the ice sheet could cease to exist by the end of the century, raising sea levels by as much as seven meters. Losing a permanent ice cap that is several hundred meters deep, though, “gradually improves the business case of resource extraction, both for … fossil fuels and also critical raw materials,” said Jakob Dreyer, a researcher at the University of Copenhagen.   But exploiting Greenland’s resources doesn’t hinge on catastrophic levels of global warming. Even without advanced climate change, Kalvig, of the Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland, argues Greenland’s coast doesn’t differ much from that of Norway, where oil has been found and numerous excavation projects operate.     “You can’t penetrate quite as far inland as you can [in Norway], but once access is established, many places are navigable year-round,” Kalvig said. “So, in that sense, it’s not more difficult to operate mines in Greenland than it is in many parts of Norway, Canada or elsewhere — or Russia for that matter. And this has been done before, in years when conditions allowed.”    A European Commission spokesperson said the EU was now working with Greenland’s government to develop its resources, adding that Greenland’s “democratically elected authorities have long favored partnerships with the EU to develop projects beneficial to both sides.” But the spokesperson stressed: “The fate of Greenland’s raw mineral resources is up to the Greenlandic people and their representatives.” The U.S. may be less magnanimous. Washington’s recent military operation in Venezuela showed that Trump is serious about building an empire on natural resources, and is prepared to use force and break international norms in pursuit of that goal. Greenland, with its vast oil and rare earths deposits, may fit neatly into his vision. Where the Greenlandic people fit in is less clear.

BRUSSELS — European governments have launched a two-pronged diplomatic offensive to convince Donald Trump to back away from his claims on Greenland: by lobbying in Washington and pressing NATO to allay the U.S. president’s security concerns. The latest moves mark an abrupt change in Europe’s response to Trump’s threats, which are fast escalating into a crisis and have sent officials in Brussels, Berlin and Paris scrambling to sketch out an urgent way forward. Until now they have attempted to play down the seriousness of Trump’s ideas, fearing it would only add credence to what they hoped was mere rhetoric, but officials involved in the discussions say that has now changed. As if to underscore the shift, French President Emmanuel Macron became the most powerful European leader so far to starkly set out the challenges facing the continent. “The United States is an established power that is gradually turning away from some of its allies and breaking free from the international rules that it used to promote,” Macron said in his annual foreign policy address in Paris on Thursday. Trump ratcheted up his rhetoric this week, telling reporters on Sunday night “we need Greenland from the standpoint of national security.” The president has repeatedly refused to rule out military intervention, something Denmark has said would spell the end of NATO ― an alliance of 32 countries, including the U.S., which has its largest military force. Greenland is not in the EU but is a semi-autonomous territory in the Kingdom of Denmark, which is an EU member. Most of the diplomacy remains behind closed doors. The Danish ambassador to the U.S., Jesper Møller Sørensen, and the Greenlandic representative in Washington, Jacob Isbosethsen, held intensive talks with lawmakers on Capitol Hill. The two envoys are attempting to persuade as many of them as possible that Greenland does not want to be bought by the U.S. and that Denmark has no interest in such a deal, an EU diplomat told POLITICO. In an unusual show of dissent, some Trump allies this week publicly objected to the president’s proposal to take Greenland by military force. Danish officials are expected to provide a formal briefing and update on the situation at a meeting of EU ambassadors on Friday, two EU diplomats said. RUSSIAN, CHINESE INFLUENCE At a closed-door meeting in Brussels on Thursday, NATO ambassadors agreed the organization should reinforce the Arctic region, according to three NATO diplomats, all of whom were granted anonymity to talk about the sensitive discussions. Trump claimed the Danish territory is exposed to Russian and Chinese influence, and cited an alleged swarm of threatening ships near Greenland as a reason behind Washington’s latest campaign to control the territory. Experts largely dispute those claims, with Moscow and Beijing mostly focusing their defense efforts — including joint patrols and military investment — in the eastern Arctic. But U.S. Vice President JD Vance told reporters Thursday that Trump wants Europe to take Greenland’s security “more seriously,” or else “the United States is going to have to do something about it.” Europeans see finding a compromise with Trump as the first and preferred option. A boosted NATO presence on the Arctic island might convince the U.S. president that there is no need to own Greenland for security reasons. The Danish ambassador to the US and the Greenlandic representative in Washington held intensive talks with lawmakers on Capitol Hill. | Kevin Carter/Getty Images The NATO envoys meeting Thursday floated leveraging intelligence capabilities to better monitor the territory, stepping up defense spending to the Arctic, shifting more military equipment to the region, and holding more military exercises in the vicinity.  The request for proposals just days after the White House’s latest broadside reflects how seriously Europe is taking the ultimatum and the existential risk any incursion into Greenland would have on the alliance and transatlantic ties. NATO’s civil servants are now expected to come up with options for envoys, the alliance diplomats said. Thursday’s meeting of 32 envoys veered away from direct confrontation, the three NATO diplomats said, with one calling the mood in the room “productive” and “constructive.” Denmark’s ambassador, who spoke first, said the dispute was a bilateral issue and instead focused on the recent successes of NATO’s Arctic strategy and the need for more work in the region, the diplomats said — a statement that received widespread support. The Greenland issue was also raised at a closed-door meeting of EU defense and foreign policy ambassadors on Thursday even though it wasn’t on the formal agenda, the two EU diplomats said. The bloc’s capitals expressed solidarity with Denmark, they added. Jacopo Barigazzi contributed reporting.

BRUSSELS — NATO countries asked the alliance to beef up its presence in the Arctic after the U.S. ramped up threats to seize Greenland, three NATO diplomats told POLITICO. At a closed-door meeting in Brussels on Thursday, the alliance’s ambassadors agreed the organization should reinforce its Arctic flank, according to the diplomats, all of whom were granted anonymity to talk about the sensitive discussions. U.S. President Donald Trump has claimed the Danish territory is exposed to Russian and Chinese influence. Envoys floated leveraging intelligence capabilities to better monitor the territory, stepping up defense spending to the Arctic, shifting more military equipment to the region, and holding more military exercises in the vicinity.  The flurry of ideas underscores a growing European concern around U.S. intentions on Greenland. This week, the White House ratcheted up its claims on Greenland, and repeatedly refused to rule out a military takeover.  Europe is scrambling to placate the latest Trump threats and avoid a military intervention that Denmark has said would mean the end of the alliance. A compromise with the U.S. president is seen as the first and preferred option. The request for proposals just days after the White House’s latest broadside reflects how seriously Europe is taking the ultimatum and the existential risk any incursion onto Greenland would be on the alliance and transatlantic ties. NATO’s civil servants are now expected to come up with options for envoys, the alliance diplomats said. Alongside its wealth of raw material and oil deposits, Trump has cited an alleged swarm of threatening Russian and Chinese ships near Greenland as a reason behind Washington’s latest campaign to control the territory.  Experts largely dispute those claims, with Moscow and Beijing mostly focusing their defense efforts — including joint patrols and military investment — in the eastern Arctic. Thursday’s meeting of 32 envoys veered away from direct confrontation, the three NATO diplomats said, with one calling the mood in the room “productive” and “constructive.” Denmark’s ambassador, who spoke first, said the dispute was a bilateral issue and instead focused on recent successes of NATO’s Arctic strategy and the need for more work in the region, the diplomats said — a statement that received widespread support. The Greenland issue was also raised at a closed-door meeting of EU defense and foreign policy ambassadors on Thursday, despite it not being on the formal agenda, two EU diplomats said. The bloc’s capitals then expressed their solidarity for Denmark, they added. Denmark is expected to provide a formal briefing and update at a meeting of EU envoys on Friday, the same diplomats said. Zoya Sheftalovich contributed to this report.

BRUSSELS — The EU has struck a political agreement to overhaul the bloc’s foreign direct investment screening rules, the Council of the EU announced on Thursday, in a move to prevent strategic technology and critical infrastructure from falling into the hands of hostile powers. The updated rules — the first major plank of European Commission President’s Ursula von der Leyen’s economic security strategy — would require all EU countries to systematically monitor investments and further harmonize the way those are screened within the bloc. The agreement comes just over a week after Brussels unveiled a new economic security package. Under the new rules, EU countries would be required to screen investments in dual-use items and military equipment; technologies like artificial intelligence, quantum technologies and semiconductors; raw materials; energy, transport and digital infrastructure; and election infrastructure, such as voting systems and databases. As previously reported by POLITICO, foreign entities investing into specific financial services must also be subject to screening by EU capitals. “We achieved a balanced and proportionate framework, focused on the most sensitive technologies and infrastructures, respectful of national prerogatives and efficient for authorities and businesses alike,” said Morten Bødskov, Denmark’s minister for industry, business and financial affairs. It took three round of political talks between the three institutions to seal the update, which was a key priority for the Danish Presidency of the Council of the EU. One contentious question was which technologies and sectors should be subject to mandatory screening. Another was how capitals and the European Commission should coordinate — and who gets the final say — when a deal raises red flags. Despite a request from the European Parliament, the Commission will not get the authority to arbitrate disputes between EU countries on specific investment cases. Screening decisions will remain firmly in the purview of national governments. “We’re making progress. The result of our negotiations clearly strengthens the EU’s security while also making life easier for investors by harmonising the Member States’ screening mechanism,” said the lead lawmaker on the file, French S&D Raphaël Glucksmann. “Yet more remains to be done to ensure that investments bring real added value to the EU, so that our market does not become a playground for foreign companies exploiting our dependence on their technology. The Commission has committed to take an initiative; it must now act quickly,” he said in a statement to POLITICO. This story has been updated.

When the Franco-German summit concluded in Berlin, Europe’s leaders issued a declaration with a clear ambition: strengthen Europe’s digital sovereignty in an open, collaborative way. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s call for “Europe’s Independence Moment” captures the urgency, but independence isn’t declared — it’s designed. The pandemic exposed this truth. When Covid-19 struck, Europe initially scrambled for vaccines and facemasks, hampered by fragmented responses and overreliance on a few external suppliers. That vulnerability must never be repeated. True sovereignty rests on three pillars: diversity, resilience and autonomy. > True sovereignty rests on three pillars: diversity, resilience and autonomy. Diversity doesn’t mean pulling every factory back to Europe or building walls around markets. Many industries depend on expertise and resources beyond our borders. The answer is optionality, never putting all our eggs in one basket. Europe must enable choice and work with trusted partners to build capabilities. This risk-based approach ensures we’re not hostage to single suppliers or overexposed to nations that don’t share our values. Look at the energy crisis after Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. Europe’s heavy reliance on Russian oil and gas left economies vulnerable. The solution wasn’t isolation, it was diversification: boosting domestic production from alternative energy sources while sourcing from multiple markets. Optionality is power. It lets Europe pivot when shocks hit, whether in energy, technology, or raw materials. Resilience is the art of prediction. Every system inevitably has vulnerabilities. The key is pre-empting, planning, testing and knowing how to recover quickly. Just as banks undergo stress tests, Europe needs similar rigor across physical and digital infrastructure. That also means promoting interoperability between networks, redundant connectivity links (including space and subsea cables), stockpiling critical components, and contingency plans. Resilience isn’t theoretical. It’s operational readiness. Finally, Europe must exercise authority through robust frameworks, such as authorization schemes, local licensing and governance rooted in EU law. The question is how and where to apply this control. On sensitive data, for example, sovereignty means ensuring it’s held in Europe under European jurisdiction, without replacing every underlying technology component. Sovereign solutions shouldn’t shut out global players. Instead, they should guarantee that critical decisions and compliance remain under European authority. Autonomy is empowerment, limiting external interference or denial of service while keeping systems secure and accountable. But let’s be clear: Europe cannot replicate world-leading technologies, platforms or critical components overnight. While we have the talent, innovation and leading industries, Europe has fallen significantly behind in a range of key emerging technologies. > While we have the talent, innovation and leading industries, Europe has fallen > significantly behind in a range of key emerging technologies. For example, building fully European alternatives in cloud and AI would take decades and billions of euros, and even then, we’d struggle to match Silicon Valley or Shenzhen. Worse, turning inward with protectionist policies would only weaken the foundations that we now seek to strengthen. “Old wines in new bottles” — import substitution, isolationism, picking winners — won’t deliver competitiveness or security. Contrast that with the much-debated US Inflation Reduction Act. Its incentives and subsidies were open to EU companies, provided they invest locally, develop local talent and build within the US market. It’s not about flags, it’s about pragmatism: attracting global investments, creating jobs and driving innovation-led growth. So what’s the practical path? Europe must embrace ‘sovereignty done right’, weaving diversity, resilience and autonomy into the fabric of its policies. That means risk-based safeguards, strategic partnerships and investment in European capabilities while staying open to global innovation. Trusted European operators can play a key role: managing encryption, access control and critical operations within EU jurisdiction, while enabling managed access to global technologies. To avoid ‘sovereignty washing’, eligibility should be based on rigorous, transparent assessments, not blanket bans. The Berlin summit’s new working group should start with a common EU-wide framework defining levels of data, operational and technological sovereignty. Providers claiming sovereign services can use this framework to transparently demonstrate which levels they meet. Europe’s sovereignty will not come from closing doors. Sovereignty done right will come from opening the right ones, on Europe’s terms. Independence should be dynamic, not defensive — empowering innovation, securing prosperity and protecting freedoms. > Europe’s sovereignty will not come from closing doors. Sovereignty done right > will come from opening the right ones, on Europe’s terms. That’s how Europe can build resilience, competitiveness and true strategic autonomy in a vibrant global digital ecosystem.

High energy prices, risks on CBAM enforcement and promotion of lead markets, as well as increasing carbon costs are hampering domestic and export competitiveness with non-EU producers. The cement industry is fundamental to Europe’s construction value chain, which represents about 9 percent of the EU’s GDP. Its hard-to-abate production processes are also currently responsible for 4 percent of EU emissions, and it is investing heavily in measures aimed at achieving full climate neutrality by 2050, in line with the European Green Deal. Marcel Cobuz, CEO, TITAN Group  “We should take a longer view and ensure that the cement industry in EU stays competitive domestically and its export market shares are maintained.” However, the industry’s efforts to comply with EU environmental regulations, along with other factors, make it less competitive than more carbon-intensive producers from outside Europe. Industry body Cement Europe recently stated that, “without a competitive business model, the very viability of the cement industry and its prospects for industrial decarbonization are at risk.” Marcel Cobuz, member of the Board of the Global Cement and Concrete Association and CEO of TITAN Group, one of Europe’s leading producers, spoke with POLITICO Studio about the vital need for a clear policy partnership with Brussels to establish a predictable regulatory and financing framework to match the industry’s decarbonization ambitions and investment efforts to stay competitive in the long-term. POLITICO Studio: Why is the cement industry important to the EU economy?  Marcel Cobuz: Just look around and you will see how important it is. Cement helped to build the homes that we live in and the hospitals that care for us. It’s critical for our transport and energy infrastructure, for defense and increasingly for the physical assets supporting the digital economy. There are more than 200 cement plants across Europe, supporting nearby communities with high-quality jobs. The cement industry is also key to the wider construction industry, which employs 14.5 million people across the EU. At the same time, cement manufacturers from nine countries compete in the international export markets. PS: What differentiates Titan within the industry?  MC: We have very strong European roots, with a presence in 10 European countries. Sustainability is very much part of our DNA, so decarbonizing profitably is a key objective for us. We’ve reduced our CO2 footprint by nearly 25 percent since 1990, and we recently announced that we are targeting a similar reduction by 2030 compared to 2020. We are picking up pace in reducing emissions both by using conventional methods, like the use of alternative sources of low-carbon energy and raw materials, and advanced technologies. TITAN/photo© Nikos Daniilidis We have a large plant in Europe where we are exploring building one of the largest carbon capture projects on the continent, with support from the Innovation Fund, capturing close to two million tons of CO2 and producing close to three million tons of zero-carbon cement for the benefit of all European markets. On top of that, we have a corporate venture capital fund, which partners with startups from Europe to produce the materials of tomorrow with  very low or zero carbon. That will help not only TITAN but the whole industry to accelerate its way towards the use of new high-performance materials with a smaller carbon footprint. PS: What are the main challenges for the EU cement industry today?  MC: Several factors are making us less competitive than companies from outside the EU. Firstly, Europe is an expensive place when it comes to energy prices. Since 2021, prices have risen by close to 65 percent, and this has a huge impact on cement producers, 60 percent of whose costs are energy-related. And this level of costs is two to three times higher than those of our neighbors. We also face regulatory complexity compared to our outside competitors, and the cost of compliance is high. The EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) cost for the cement sector is estimated at €97 billion to €162 billion between 2023 and 2034. Then there is the need for low-carbon products to be promoted ― uptake is still at a very low level, which leads to an investment risk around new decarbonization technologies. > We should take a longer view and ensure that the cement industry in the EU > stays competitive domestically and its export market shares are maintained.” All in all, the playing field is far from level. Imports of cement into the EU have increased by 500 percent since 2016. Exports have halved ― a loss of value of one billion euros. The industry is reducing its cost to manufacture and to replace fossil fuels, using the waste of other industries, digitalizing its operations, and premiumizing its offers. But this is not always enough. Friendly policies and the predictability of a regulatory framework should accompany the effort. PS: In January 2026, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism will be fully implemented, aimed at ensuring that importers pay the same carbon price as domestic producers. Will this not help to level the playing field? MC: This move is crucial, and it can help in dealing with the increasing carbon cost. However, I believe we already see a couple of challenges regarding the CBAM. One is around self-declaration: importers declare the carbon footprint of their materials, so how do we avoid errors or misrepresentations? In time there should be audits of the importers’ industrial installations and co-operation with the authorities at source to ensure the data flow is accurate and constant. It really needs to be watertight, and the authorities need to be fully mobilized to make sure the real cost of carbon is charged to the importers. Also, and very importantly, we need to ensure that CBAM does not apply to exports from the EU to third countries, as carbon costs are increasingly a major factor making us uncompetitive outside the EU, in markets where we were present for more than 20 years. > CBAM really needs to be watertight, and the authorities need to be fully > mobilized to make sure the real cost of carbon is charged to the importers.” PS: In what ways can the EU support the European cement industry and help it to be more competitive? MC: By simplifying legislation and making it more predictable so we can plan our investments for the long term. More specifically, I’m talking about the revamping of the ETS, which in its current form implies a phase-down of CO2 rights over the next decade. First, we should take a longer view and ensure that the cement industry stays competitive and its export market shares are maintained, so a policy of more for longer should accompany the new ETS. > In export markets, the policy needs to ensure a level playing field for > European suppliers competing in international destination markets, through a > system of free allowances or CBAM certificates, which will enable exports to > continue.” We should look at it as a way of funding decarbonization. We could front-load part of ETS revenues in a fund that would support the development of technologies such as low-carbon materials development and CCS. The roll-out of Infrastructure for carbon capture projects such as transport or storage should also be accelerated, and the uptake of low-carbon products should be incentivized. More specifically on export markets, the policy needs to ensure a level playing field for European suppliers competing in international destination markets, through a system of free allowances or CBAM certificates, which will enable exports to continue. PS: Are you optimistic about the future of your industry in Europe?  MC: I think with the current system of phasing out CO2 rights, and if the CBAM is not watertight, and if energy prices remain several times higher than in neighboring countries, and if investment costs, particularly for innovating new technologies, are not going to be financed through ETS revenues, then there is an existential risk for at least part of the industry. Having said that, I’m optimistic that, working together with the European Commission we can identify the right policy making solutions to ensure our viability as a strategic industry for Europe. And if we are successful, it will benefit everyone in Europe, not least by guaranteeing more high-quality jobs and affordable and more energy-efficient materials for housing ― and a more sustainable and durable infrastructure in the decades ahead. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is Titan Group * The advertisement is linked to policy advocacy around industrial competitiveness, carbon pricing, and decarbonization in the EU cement and construction sectors, including the EU’s CBAM legislation, the Green Deal, and the proposed revision of the ETS. More information here.