Dr. Daniel Steiners This is not an obituary for Germany’s economic standing. It is an invitation to shift perspective: away from the language of crisis and toward a clearer view of our opportunities — and toward the confidence that we have more capacity to shape our future than the mood indicators might suggest. For years, Germany seemed to be traveling along a self-evident path of success: growth, prosperity, the title of export champion. But that framework is beginning to fray. Other countries are catching up. Parts of our industrial base appear vulnerable to the pressures of transformation. And global dependencies are turning into strategic vulnerabilities. In short, the German model of success is under strain. Yet a glance at Europe’s economic history suggests that moments like these can also contain enormous potential — if strategic thinking and decisive action come together. One example, which I find particularly striking, takes us back to 1900. At the time, André and Édouard Michelin were producing tires in a relatively small market, when the automobile itself was still a niche product. They could have focused simply on improving their product. Instead, they thought bigger; not in silos, but in systems. With the Michelin Guide, they created incentives and orientation for greater mobility: workshop directories, road maps, and recommendations for hotels and restaurants made travel more predictable and attractive. What began as a service booklet for motorists gradually evolved into an entire ecosystem — and eventually into a globally recognized benchmark for quality. > In times of change, those who recognize connections and are willing to shape > them strategically can transform uncertainty into lasting strength. What makes this example remarkable is that the real innovation did not lie in the tire itself or merely even a clever marketing idea to boost sales. It lay in something more fundamental: connected thinking and ecosystem thinking. The decision to see mobility as a broad space for value creation. It was the courage to break out of silos, to recognize strategic connections, to deepen value chains — and to help define the standards of an emerging market. That is precisely the lesson that remains relevant today, including for policymakers. In times of change, those who recognize connections and are willing to shape them strategically can transform uncertainty into lasting strength. Germany’s industrial health economy is still too often viewed in public debate in narrowly sectoral terms — primarily through the lens of health care provision and costs. Strategically, however, it has long been an industrial ecosystem that spans research, development, manufacturing, digital innovation, exports and highly skilled employment. Just as Michelin helped shape the ecosystem of mobility, Germany can think of health as a comprehensive domain of value creation. The industrial health economy: cost driver or engine of growth? Yes, medicines cost money. In 2024, Germany’s statutory health insurance system spent around €55 billion on pharmaceuticals. But much of that increase reflects medical progress and the need for appropriate care in an aging society with changing disease patterns. Innovative therapies benefit both patients and the health system. They can improve quality and length of life while shifting treatment from hospitals into outpatient care or even into patients’ homes. They raise efficiency in the system, reduce downstream costs and support workforce participation. > In short, the industrial health economy is not merely part of our health care > system. It is a key industry, underpinning economic strength, prosperity and > the financing of our social security systems. Despite public perception, pharmaceutical spending has remained remarkably stable for years, accounting for roughly 12 percent of total expenditures in the statutory health insurance system. That figure also includes generics — medicines that enter the ‘world heritage of pharmacy’ after patent protection expires and remain available at low cost. Truly innovative, patent-protected medicines account for only about seven percent of total spending. Against these costs stands an economic sector in which Germany continues to hold a leading international position. With around 1.1 million employees and value creation exceeding €190 billion, the industrial health economy is among the largest sectors of the German economy. Its high-tech products, bearing the Made in Germany label, are in demand worldwide and contribute significantly to Germany’s export surplus. In short, the industrial health economy is not merely part of our health care system. It is a key industry, underpinning economic strength, prosperity and the financing of our social security systems. Its overall balance is positive. The central question, therefore, is this: how can we unlock its untapped potential? And what would it mean for Germany if we fail to recognize these opportunities while economic and innovative capacity increasingly shifts elsewhere? Global dynamics leave little room for hesitation Governments around the world have long recognized the strategic importance of the industrial health economy — for health care, for economic growth and for national security. China is demonstrating remarkable speed in scaling and implementing biotechnology. The United States, meanwhile, illustrates how determined industrial policy can look in practice. Regulatory authorities are being modernized, approval procedures accelerated and bureaucratic barriers systematically reduced. At the same time, domestic production is being strategically strengthened. Speed and market size act as magnets for capital — especially in a sector where research is extraordinarily capital-intensive and requires long-term planning security. When innovation-friendly conditions and economic recognition of innovation meet a large, well-funded market, global shifts follow. Today roughly 50 percent of the global pharmaceutical market is located in the United States, about 23 percent in Europe — and only 4 to 5 percent in Germany. This distribution is no coincidence; it reflects differences in economic and regulatory environments. At the same time, political pressure is growing on countries that benefit from the American innovation engine without offering an equally attractive home market or recognizing the value of innovation in comparable ways. Discussions around a Most Favored Nation approach or other trade policy instruments are moving in precisely that direction — and they affect Europe and Germany directly. For Germany, the implications are clear. Those who want to attract investment must strengthen their competitiveness. Those who want to ensure reliable health care must appropriately reward new therapies. Otherwise, these global dynamics will inevitably affect both the economy and health care at home. Already today, roughly one in four medicines introduced in the United States between 2014 and 2023 is not available in Europe. The gap is even larger for gene and cell therapies. The primacy of industrial policy: from consensus to action — now Germany does not lack potential or substance. We still have a strong industrial base, a tradition of invention, outstanding universities and research institutions, and a private sector willing to invest. Political initiatives such as the coalition agreement, the High-Tech Agenda and plans for a future strategy in pharmaceuticals and medical technology provide important impulses, which I strongly welcome. > A fair market environment without artificial price caps or rigid guardrails is > the strongest magnet for private capital, long-term investment and a resilient > health system. But programs must now translate into a coherent action plan for growth. We need innovation-friendly and stable framework conditions that consider health care, economic strength and national security together — as a strategic ecosystem, not as separate silos. The value of medical innovation must also be recognized in Germany. A fair market environment without artificial price caps or rigid guardrails is the strongest magnet for private capital, long-term investment and a resilient health system. Faster approval procedures, consistent digitalization and a determined reduction of bureaucracy are essential if speed is once again to become a competitive advantage and a driver of innovation. Germany can reinvent itself, of that I am convinced. With courage, strategic determination and an ambitious push for innovation. The choice now lies with us: to set the right course and unlock the potential that is already there.

Scattered among the candy shelves and freezer cabinets in Russian supermarkets across Germany are advertisements promoting a business with a service the government has tried to outlaw: a logistics company specialized in moving packages from the heart of Germany to Russia, in defiance of European Union sanctions. Trade restrictions have been in place since 2014 and were tightened just after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, when Western nations began to impose far-reaching financial and trade sanctions on Russia. But an investigation by the Axel Springer Global Reporters Network, which includes POLITICO, has identified a clandestine Berlin-based postal system that exploits the special status of postal parcels to transport all kinds of European goods — including banned electronics components — into President Vladimir Putin’s empire. We know every stop and turn in the route because we sent five packages and used digital tracking devices to follow them — through an illicit 1,100-mile journey that undermines the sanctions regime European policymakers consider their strongest tool to generate political pressure on Russian leaders by weakening their country’s economy. LS Logistics said its internal controls make violations of EU sanctions “virtually impossible” but that it was not immune from customers making fraudulent declarations about the goods they ship. “Sanctions enforcement is whack-a-mole,” said David Goldwyn, who worked on sanctions policy as U.S. State Department coordinator for international energy affairs and now chairs the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center’s energy advisory group. “It’s a hard process, and you have to constantly be adapting to how the evaders are adapting.” THE UZBEK LABEL In late December, we packed five square brown parcels with electronic components specifically banned under EU sanctions and addressed the parcels to locations in Moscow and St. Petersburg. When we brought our parcels to the counters of Russian supermarkets in Berlin, we told salespeople the packages included books, scarves and hats. But they never checked inside the packages, which in fact held banned electronic components we rendered unusable before packing. Salespeople charged us 13 euros per kilogram, about $7 per pound, refusing to provide receipts. What makes these cardboard packages even more special is their disguise: The employee does not affix Russian postal stickers to the boxes, but rather those of UzPost, the national postal service of Uzbekistan. The former Soviet republic is not subject to EU sanctions. UzPost maintains close ties to the Russian postal service, according to a person familiar with the entities’ history of cooperation granted anonymity to discuss confidential business practices. Tatyana Kim, the CEO of Russian ecommerce marketplace Wildberries and reputedly her country’s richest woman, recently acquired a large stake in UzPost, according to media reports. “We work with partners, including private postal service providers,” the Uzbek postal service stated in response to our inquiry. “They can use our solutions for deliveries.” In Germany, registered logistics companies are permitted to provide postal services — including pick-up, sorting and delivery — for international postal operators. However, the Federal Network Agency, which is responsible for postal oversight, says the Uzbek postal service is not authorized to perform any of these functions in Germany. (The Federal Network Agency said in a response to our inquiry that it is “currently reviewing” the case and that it would pursue penalties for LS if it is found to be using Uzbek documents without authorization.) After our packages spent one to two days at the supermarkets, we saw them begin to move. Inside each package we had placed a small black GPS device, naming them “Alpha,” “Beta,” “Gamma,” “Delta” and “Epsi.” We could track their movements in real time in an app, watching them closely as they wound through Berlin’s roads to Schönefeld, site of the capital’s international airport. There they stopped, unloaded into a modern warehouse that has been repurposed into a Russian shadow postal service. COLOGNE, TECHNICALLY In 2014, a retired professional gymnast was tasked with launching a subsidiary of Russia’s national postal service, the RusPost GmbH, which would operate with official authorization to collect, process and deliver postal items in Germany, according to a former employee granted anonymity to speak openly about the business. For 18 years, the St. Petersburg-raised Alexey Grigoryev had competed and coached at Germany’s highest levels, winning three national championship titles with the KTV Straubenhardt team and working with an Olympic gold medalist on the high bar. But he had no evident experience in the postal business. RusPost’s German business model collapsed upon the imposition of an expanded sanctions package in the weeks after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Much like American sanctions on Russia, the European Union blocks sensitive technical materials that could boost the Russian defense sector, while allowing the export of personal effects and quotidian consumer items. “The sanctions are accompanied by far-reaching export bans, particularly on goods relevant to the war, in order to put pressure on the Russian war economy,” according to a statement the Federal Ministry of Economics provided us. In March 2022, while conducting random checks of postal traffic to Moscow, customs officials discovered sanctioned goods (including cash, jewelry and electrical appliances) in numerous RusPost packages. The Berlin public prosecutor’s office launched an investigation of the company, concluding that a former RusPost managing director had deliberately failed to set up effective control mechanisms, in breach of his duties. He was charged with 62 counts of attempting to violate the Foreign Trade and Payments Act over an eight-month period; criminal proceedings are ongoing. The Russian postal network did not quite disappear, however. A new company called LS Logistics Solution GmbH was formed in December 2022, according to corporate filings. LS filled its top jobs, including customs manager and head of customer service, with former RusPost employees, according to their LinkedIn profiles. The new company listed as its business address an inconspicuous semi-detached house in a residential area of Cologne, across from a church. When we visited, we found an old white mailbox whose plated sign lists LS Logistics alongside dozens of other companies supposed to be housed there. But none of them seemed to be active. The building was empty during business hours, its mailbox overflowing with discolored brochures and old newspapers. The operational heart of LS is the warehouse complex in Berlin-Schönefeld, just a few minutes from the capital’s airport. The building itself is functional and anonymous: a long, gray industrial structure with several metal rolling doors, some fitted with narrow window slits. Through them, towering stacks of parcels are visible, packed tightly, sorted roughly, stretching deep into the hall. Trucks arrive and depart regularly, from loading bays lit by harsh white floodlights that cut through the otherwise quiet industrial area. Behind the warehouse lies a wide concrete parking lot where a black BMW SUV with a license plate bearing the initials AG is often parked. We saw a man resembling Grigoryev enter the car. The former head of RusPost officially withdrew from the postal business after authorities froze the company’s operations. Unofficially, however, the 50-year-old’s continued presence in Schönefeld suggests otherwise. According to one former RusPost employee, the warehouse near the airport serves as a collection point for parcels from all over Europe. Other logistics companies with Russian management have listed the warehouse as their business address, some of their logos decorating the façade. LS Logistics Solution GmbH has the largest sign of them all. THE A2 GETAWAY According to tracking devices, our packages spent several days in the warehouse before being loaded onto 40-ton trucks covered with grey tarps, among several that leave every day loaded with mail. They were then driven toward the Polish border, through the German city of Frankfurt (Oder). Without any long stops, the 40-ton trucks traversed Poland on the A2 motorway, past Warsaw. Two days after leaving Berlin, they were approaching the eastern edge of the European Union. They arrived at a border checkpoint in Brest, the Belarusian city where more than a hundred years ago Russia signed a peace pact with Germany to withdraw from World War I. Now it marked the last place for European officials to identify contraband leaving for countries they consider adversaries. In 2022, the European Union applied a separate set of sanctions on Belarus because its leader, Alexander Lukashenko, a close ally of Putin, has supported Russia’s presence in Ukraine. Yet despite provisions that should have stopped our packages from leaving Poland, they moved onward into Belarus, their tracking devices apparently undetected. What makes this possible is the special legal status that accompanies international mail. While a formal export declaration is required for the export of regular goods, such as those moving via container ship or rail freight, simplified paperwork helps speed up the departure process for postal items. At Europe’s borders, this distinction becomes crucial, as postal packages are examined largely on risk-based checks rather than comprehensive inspections. “International postal items are subject to the regular provisions of customs supervision both on import and on export and transit and are checked on a risk-oriented basis in accordance with applicable EU and national legislation, including with regard to compliance with sanctions regulations,” the German General Customs Directorate stated in response to our inquiry. Two of our tracking devices briefly lost their signal in Belarus — likely part of a widespread pattern of satellite navigation systems being disrupted across Eastern Europe — but after a journey of around 1,100 miles, they all showed the same destination. Our packages had reached Russia’s largest cities. Ukrainian authorities told us they were not surprised by our investigation. The country’s presidential envoy for sanctions policy, Vladyslav Vlasiuk, said at the Ukrainian embassy in Berlin that his government regularly collects intelligence on such schemes and shares it with international partners. “Nobody is doing enough, if you look at the number of cases,” Vlasiuk said. ONE STEP BEHIND After the arrival of the packages, we confronted all parties involved, including LS Logistics Solution GmbH, the mysterious shipper that helped transport the goods from Europe to Russia. We called Grigoryev several times, but he never answered; efforts to reach him through the company failed as well. An LS executive would not answer our questions about his role. “Our internal control mechanisms are designed in such a way that violations of EU sanctions are virtually impossible,” LS managing director Anjelika Crone wrote to us. “Shipments that do not meet the legal requirements are not processed further. We are not immune to fraudulent misdeclarations, such as those that obviously underlie the ‘test shipments’ you refer to.” Crone said she could not answer further questions due to data protection and contractual confidentiality concerns. This month, Germany took steps to strengthen enforcement of its sanctions regime, expanding the range of violations subject to criminal penalties. The law, passed by the Bundestag in January, amends the country’s Foreign Trade and Payments Act to integrate a European Union directive harmonizing criminal sanctions law across its 27 member states and ensure efficient, uniform enforcement. Germany was one of the 18 countries put on notice by EU officials last May for having failed to follow the 2024 directive. The Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs, which is responsible for implementing the new policy, argued in a statement to the Axel Springer Global Reporters Network that the very ingenuity of the logistics network we unmasked operating within Germany was a testament to the strength of the country’s sanctions regime. “The state-organized Russian procurement systems operate at enormous financial expense to create ever new and more complex diversion routes,” said ministry spokesperson Tim-Niklas Wentzel. “This confirms that the considerable compliance efforts of many companies and the work of the sanctions enforcement authorities in combating circumvention are also having a practical effect. Procurement is becoming increasingly difficult, time-consuming, and expensive for Russia.” According to those who have tried to administer sanctions laws, that argument rings true — but only partly. “It’s probably more fair to say that sanctions had a material impact and increased the cost of bad actors to achieve their goals. But to say that they’re working well is probably overstating the truth of the matter,” said Max Meizlish, formerly an official with the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and now a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. “When there’s evasion, it requires enforcement,” Meizlish went on. “And when you need more enforcement I think it’s hard to make a compelling case that the tool is working as intended.” The Axel Springer Global Reporters Network is a multi-publication initiative publishing scoops, investigations, interviews, op-eds and analysis that reverberate across the world. It connects journalists from Axel Springer brands—including POLITICO, Business Insider, WELT, BILD, and Onet— on major stories for an international audience. Their ambitious reporting stretches across Axel Springer platforms: online, print, TV, and audio. Together, these outlets reach hundreds of millions of people worldwide.

The far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) is celebrating a “major victory” in courts after judges in Cologne banned Germany’s domestic intelligence agency from treating the party as a “right-wing extremist group.” The temporary ruling issued Thursday prevents the BfV agency from using the label it slapped on the AfD in May 2025 — a mostly symbolic decision that nevertheless complicated the party’s efforts to broaden its appeal at home and polish its reputation abroad. AfD co-leader Tino Chrupalla hailed a “great day for democracy,” while his co-head Alice Weidel wrote on X that the ruling “indirectly put a stop to censorship fanatics.” Weidel has seized on the ruling as evidence the party was unfairly stigmatized and is now using the court’s intervention to support her party’s broader rebranding. The AfD has shifted steadily rightward since its founding in 2013 as a Euroskeptic force, mobilizing an increasingly radicalized base largely around migration. Lately, however, Weidel has tried to tone down the rhetoric to make her party more palatable to mainstream conservatives. It is currently moving to ban Kevin Dorow, a board member of its youth organisation, for remarks that “obviously suggested a closeness to National Socialism”, Die Welt reported. The strategy could test the long-standing firewall that has kept Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s center-right bloc from governing with the far right. A good electoral result in the state of Baden-Württemberg next week could signal that these efforts are paying off. AfD has not performed well historically in the southwestern state, and its candidates are currently polling in third with 19 percent, much higher than its nine percent result five years ago. The party also enjoys some momentum in Berlin, where an Insa survey put the AfD in second place with 17 percent — the first time the party has ranked so highly in the city-state, although it is neck and neck with three parties on the left ahead of the elections in September. The legal fight is far from over, though. Speaking to Welt TV on Friday, Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt said the AfD “remains a suspected case” — a status that still allows Germany’s domestic intelligence agency to monitor the party — and stressed that the main proceedings in the case still lie ahead. A final court decision could take years. Nette Nöstlinger contributed to this report.

Presented as an instrument aimed at strengthening farmers’ position in the food supply chain, the targeted revision of the Regulation on the Common Market Organisation was intended to address structural challenges within the sector. Yet, as the trilogue approaches, the debate has gradually crystallized around a different issue: restricting certain denominations used for plant-based products. This shift deserves careful scrutiny. How would limiting widely understood terms concretely improve farmers’ position in the food chain? The connection between the original objective of the proposal and the measure currently under discussion remains insufficiently substantiated. If the stated ambition is to reinforce resilience and fairness within the agricultural chain, it is legitimate to question whether terminology restrictions meaningfully contribute to that goal. > How would limiting widely understood terms concretely improve farmers’ > position in the food chain? In a letter addressed to Members of the European Parliament, GAIA calls for maintaining the current regulatory framework and rejecting the proposed restrictions, whether concerning existing plant-based products or future products derived from cellular agriculture. The objective is clear: to preserve coherent and proportionate regulation that protects consumers without weakening an innovative and strategic sector. Behind a word: a market and jobs Europe holds a leading position in several innovative segments of plant-based alternatives. The European market was estimated at €2.7 billion in 2024 and continues to structure a dynamic industrial ecosystem across member states. Companies operating in this field invest significantly in research and development, expand production capacities, create qualified jobs and actively contribute to the industrial dynamism of the single market. This ecosystem extends well beyond food production. It supports technological innovation, specialised logistics, supply chain transformation and new forms of industrial cooperation. It contributes to the modernization of the European agri-food sector and strengthens the competitiveness of the internal market. In a period where industrial policy and strategic autonomy are central to the European agenda, introducing regulatory uncertainty risks undermining a competitive advantage built on sustained investment and innovation. > The issue therefore goes beyond semantics: it concerns the stability and > predictability of the European regulatory framework. “Behind denominations lies a real European economy: jobs, innovation and competitiveness.” Restricting widely understood terms would entail compliance costs, packaging adjustments, potential litigation and a risk of divergent interpretations across member states. The issue therefore goes beyond semantics: it concerns the stability and predictability of the European regulatory framework — factors that are essential for long-term investment decisions and business planning. Cellular agriculture: anticipate without destabilizing The same reasoning applies to products derived from cellular agriculture. Although not yet present on European shelves, these technologies hold significant potential for future development. Estimates suggest that the cultivated protein value chain could represent between €15 billion and €80 billion in new markets, with the potential to create between 25,000 and 90,000 jobs in Europe. The European Union already counts 47 companies active in cultivated meat out of 174 worldwide, as well as 61 out of 158 companies operating in precision fermentation and biomass technologies. This demonstrates that Europe is not a passive observer but an active participant in emerging food technologies. Yet European investment in novel foods currently represents less than 1 percent of total agri-food innovation funding. In this context, regulatory stability becomes a decisive factor in consolidating emerging technological leadership and retaining investment within the EU. Introducing additional denomination restrictions at such an early stage may send an unintended signal of unpredictability. For innovative sectors that depend on long development cycles and significant capital expenditure, clarity and proportionality in regulation are structural conditions for growth. “Europe can be demanding. It cannot afford to be unpredictable in sectors where it seeks to innovate.” Consumer protection: a framework already validated Consumer protection is a legitimate objective and a cornerstone of EU law. However, it operates within an already established and functional legal framework. The Food Information to Consumers Regulation requires clear, accurate and non-misleading labeling. Annex VI explicitly provides that the absence or substitution of animal-derived ingredients must be indicated. In case C-438/23, the Court of Justice of the European Union confirmed that this framework provides sufficient safeguards against misleading practices. “The Court of Justice of the European Union has confirmed it: EU law already protects consumers.” > A plant-based product clearly identified as such does not constitute > linguistic ambiguity for the vast majority of consumers. The central argument in favor of additional restrictions rests on an assumption of consumer confusion. Yet available evidence indicates that consumers clearly distinguish animal-based products from plant-based alternatives when origin and composition are explicitly stated. Labeling transparency, rather than categorical prohibitions, remains the key instrument for ensuring informed choice. A plant-based product clearly identified as such does not constitute linguistic ambiguity for the vast majority of consumers. The debate should not be trivialized, but one principle deserves emphasis: regulation must protect without infantilizing. Suggesting that a single word, taken in isolation, would systematically mislead consumers underestimates their ability to read labels, understand context and make informed decisions. “Protecting consumers does not mean presuming a lack of discernment.” More than 600 companies and organizations from 22 member states have called for maintaining the current framework, underlining the importance of preserving single market coherence and avoiding regulatory fragmentation detrimental to innovation and competitiveness. Europe can reconcile consumer protection, legal certainty and competitiveness. It can do so by fully enforcing existing rules and targeting actual abuses rather than introducing general prohibitions that generate costs, legal uncertainty and unintended economic consequences. Ultimately, the question is not whether a word is liked or disliked. It is whether, in a context marked by major challenges related to industrial competitiveness, climate transition, economic security and geopolitical tension, this is where the union should concentrate its political and regulatory capital.

LONDON — Green Party Leader Zack Polanski said Tuesday he will support a motion titled “Zionism is racism” if it is linked to the Israeli government’s actions in Gaza. His comments come days before a crucial by-election in the Greater Manchester constituency of Gorton and Denton, where the Greens have presented themselves as the main left-wing challengers to the incumbent Labour Party. The motion, which will be put forward at the party’s spring conference next month, is titled “Zionism is Racism,” and also backs the “right of the Palestinian people to resistance and liberation from Israeli occupation, domination and subjugation.” Israel’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sharren Haskel on Sunday condemned the motion as “one of the most hateful and racist documents I’ve ever read.” Polanski, the Jewish leader of the eco-populist force, said his support for the motion would depend on the definition of Zionism. “I can give you some different definitions of Zionism and we can talk about whether they’re racist or not,” he told Times Radio. “If we’re talking about the definition that this Israeli government are clearly perpetrating through a genocide in Gaza, then yes, absolutely. That’s racist.” He stressed that any of the party’s more than 195,000 members could put forward a motion, and he will be “listening carefully to the debate,” adding that it isn’t “particularly helpful to have an argument or a debate about labels.” Pushed on whether he would vote for the motion, he said: “I’ll wait to hear the debate, but absolutely, if the definition of Zionism is what is happening right now by the Israeli government, then yes, absolutely, that’s racist and I’ll vote for it.” The by-election in Greater Manchester comes after a terrorist attack on Jews in northern Manchester last October at the Heaton Park Hebrew Congregation synagogue, where two people were killed. The attack took place during the Jewish Holiday of Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar.

SACRAMENTO, California — California Gov. Gavin Newsom stepped into the fight over age limits on social media Thursday, saying he wants state legislation that would restrict access to the powerful online platforms for teens under 16. In a policy position shared first with POLITICO, Newsom spokesperson Tara Gallegos said that the Democratic governor supports passing age-gating rules inspired by those Australia began enforcing last year, which bar teens under 16 from having social media accounts. Her comments came minutes after Newsom told reporters that “we have to address this issue” of teenagers’ chronic use of social media. “We need help. I think it’s long overdue that we’re having the debate,” Newsom said, when asked about age-gating during a press conference near San Francisco. “It is something that I’m very grateful that we are debating and pursuing at the state level.” With his remarks, the governor moved a step ahead of a bipartisan group of state lawmakers who this month introduced legislation that calls for “a minimum age requirement to open or maintain a social media account.” His comments mark a notable break from the governor’s typical reluctance to weigh in on pending legislation before it reaches his desk. Lawmakers are debating the age limit to include in the legislation. The bill’s lead author, Long Beach Democrat Josh Lowenthal, previously said he’s leaning toward setting the cutoff at 16. In staking out his position, Newsom joins a growing group of high-profile politicians arguing for the need to restrict access to Instagram, Snapchat, TikTok and other social media platforms that draw billions of daily users and have upended how people interact. The call for age limits has gained momentum since Australia put its ban in place, citing a growing body of research that the platforms can be addictive and harmful to teens’ mental health. When asked whether the governor would specifically support an outright ban on social media accounts for teens under 16 — as Australia has done — Gallegos said that was still in flux. Newsom’s comments Thursday follow recent overseas trips he made to the World Economic Forum in Switzerland and the Munich Security Conference. The governor said he directly discussed social media age limits in meetings with world leaders, including Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez. Spain and Malaysia are exploring Australia-style bans, while officials in France, Denmark and Italy are mulling a ban for kids under 15. On Wednesday, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz signaled he may back a proposal to restrict access for kids under 14 — an idea that’s gained steam back in the U.S., where bipartisan members of Congress are pushing a 13-and-under ban. Newsom previously touched on the issue during his State of the State address in January, in which he called on state lawmakers to explore stronger youth social media controls. During the speech, he questioned if California could “do more” following Australia’s social media ban. Even with the governor’s support, proposals to legally cut off teens’ access to social media are likely to spark fierce pushback from tech giants. Google, TikTok and Meta, which owns Facebook, are currently suing to block a 2024 state law that requires parental consent before minors view personalized content feeds, arguing it infringes on free speech. Tech industry group NetChoice, which lists Meta, Google and TikTok as members, has also indicated it may challenge two California social media laws passed last year: one requiring platforms to show minors health warning labels, and another requiring device-makers like Apple and Google to collect user ages. The same group of state lawmakers behind California’s age-gating bill also recently introduced legislation that would create an independent “eSafety Commission” to enforce digital platform regulations, modeled on a similarly named Australian agency. Newsom has not said whether he supports the measure.

LONDON — Police have asked the U.K. government to hold back from publishing a key exchange in which Downing Street asked Peter Mandelson about his links to Jeffrey Epstein, two people familiar with the discussions told POLITICO. No. 10’s then-chief of staff Morgan McSweeney emailed Mandelson asking three questions about his ties to the convicted sex offender, before Mandelson was appointed as Britain’s ambassador to the U.S. in December 2024. The emails on behalf of Prime Minister Keir Starmer were first reported by the BBC last September and included why Mandelson continued contact with Epstein after the sex offender’s 2008 conviction, as well as why he was reported to have stayed in one of Epstein’s homes while the financier was in prison. That exchange is one of a handful of documents relating to Mandelson’s appointment that the Metropolitan Police have asked the government not to publish at this time to avoid undermining a separate criminal investigation into Mandelson, said the two people referenced above. Both requested anonymity to discuss internal matters. While the criminal investigation is separate to the cache of vetting documents and private messages from 2024 and 2025 that are awaiting release, Mandelson was asked about his past as part of his appointment process. Met Police Commander Ella Marriott said on Dec. 4 that the force had asked the government “not to release certain documents at this time.” A Met Police spokesperson declined to confirm specifics when approach for comment by POLITICO but said the force was “focused on a timely and thorough process.” This person added: “An investigation into alleged misconduct in public office is under way and it is vital due process is followed so that our criminal investigation and any potential prosecution is not compromised. “As part of our enquiries, we will review material identified and provided to us by the Cabinet Office to assess whether publication is likely to have a detrimental impact on our investigation or any subsequent prosecution. We will work alongside the Cabinet Office to review relevant documents over the weeks ahead. The process to decide which documents should ultimately be published remains a matter for government and parliament.” A Cabinet Office spokesperson said: “We do not comment on police investigations.” Starmer has said Mandelson “repeatedly lied” to No. 10 about the extent of his friendship with Epstein — but the paper trail that would show what Downing Street knew, and when, remains caught in a tussle between police and the government. The prime minister has faced questions about his judgment in giving Mandelson the plum role, despite knowing he had continued his friendship with Epstein after his conviction, and has pledged transparency over the decision — which will be complicated by efforts to hold back key exchanges. The scandal has already cost the job of McSweeney, one of Starmer’s most senior allies, after he pushed for Mandelson’s appointment. Keir Starmer has said Mandelson “repeatedly lied” to No. 10 about the extent of his friendship with Jeffrey Epstein. | Carl Court/Getty Images MPs voted earlier this month to release documents relating to Mandelson’s appointment as ambassador, as well as a much wider cache of emails and text messages between Mandelson and ministers and political advisers in the ruling Labour Party. While the total cache amounts to tens of thousands of documents, the two people mentioned above said the process is currently prioritizing the much smaller number of files that relate directly to Mandelson’s appointment. Of those files relating to his appointment, the Met Police have asked for a smaller subset to be held back while its investigation into Mandelson is under way, one of the two people said.  The exchange with McSweeney was part of a wider vetting that Mandelson went through as part of his appointment. He was also subject to due diligence by the Cabinet Office, followed by deep security vetting after his posting had been announced. The Metropolitan Police are investigating whether Mandelson committed misconduct in public office after a 2009 email exchange, released in the Epstein files, appeared to show him forwarding the details of government financial discussions to Epstein. Officers have not yet interviewed Mandelson and he has denied wrongdoing.

ALDEN BIESEN, Belgium — The European Union should open up more to its trade partners in public procurement and curb Chinese investment in sectors like green tech, according to a new draft of a landmark industry act obtained by POLITICO on Thursday. Free-trade partners like the United Kingdom and Japan will breathe a sigh of relief as the draft Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA) foresees a definition of “Made in EU” that includes “trusted partners.” Brussels wants to throw up a higher barrier to investment from China by imposing a cap on foreign direct investment by countries that dominate a given global industry. The leak of the bill came as EU leaders held a retreat at a Belgian castle to wargame ways to reverse the bloc’s industrial decline in the face of China’s export dominance and America’s tech supremacy. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen is trying to find a balance between France’s protectionist instincts and calls for more openness led by Germany, Italy and the EU’s Nordic contingent. Leaders played down differences as they gathered at the Alden Biesen estate, with Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni saying her views on industrial strategy converged with those of German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, and brushing off suggestions the duo were trying to isolate French President Emmanuel Macron. “It is not something that we do against someone else, by excluding someone else,” she told reporters. Leaders reached a form of consensus on areas including the concept of a European preference, where there was openness to examining what it may mean and where it may be needed, according to a person briefed on the talks. The meeting kicked off an intense month of politicking on restoring EU competitiveness and its single market project, with the IAA due out on Feb. 25 and leaders to reconvene for a full-blown summit on March 19-20. The draft drew a swift and strong rebuke from Chinese business. “The latest version of the Industrial Accelerator Act is likely to undermine the investment confidence of leading Chinese companies,” the Chinese Chamber of Commerce to the EU said. “Beyond the political signaling, many of the proposed measures raise serious practical concerns, including the feasibility of mandatory local partnership requirements, which in many cases may simply not be commercially or technologically viable.” A big question mark over the industry push, which is being led by Industry Commissioner Stéphane Séjourné, is whether it can be sufficiently decisive to turn the economic tide. “Whatever new FDI rules will be enacted will be ineffective,” said Yanmei Xie, a senior associate fellow at the Mercator Institute for China Studies. Each EU member country has a different agenda and building a united front against Chinese dominance is a near impossibility. “Whoever is the lowest denominator becomes the de facto gatekeeper.” TRUSTED PARTNERS The latest draft of the IAA, which runs to 96 pages, broadens the definition of a European preference as it would apply to public procurement and other taxpayer-funded programs in energy-intensive industries, net-zero technologies and the automotive sector. In so doing it should allay fears among friendly trading nations of a “Fortress Europe” scenario.  The scope of Made in EU should include content originating from the EU and the European Economic Area, which spans Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. The draft also leaves the door open to “trusted partners” whose manufacturing “should be deemed equivalent to Union origin content.” Earlier on Thursday, Séjourné dismissed the notion that the Made in EU push would exclude trade partners. His cabinet said there was broad support, both politically and in industry for the work of the Commission, although “opinions diverge on the conditions and modalities of its implementation.” A broader Made in EU concept will be welcome in the U.K. after the country’s finance minister, Rachel Reeves, said on Wednesday that Britain needed to be part of the Made in EU club. “I actually support the idea of some sort of ‘Made in Europe’ or ‘Made in countries that share each other’s values,’” she told an event. Japan, a major auto exporter, will also welcome the shift. The country “very much meets the definition of a Trusted Partner of the EU,” Patrick Keating, Honda Europe’s head of government affairs, told POLITICO.  GETTING TOUGHER The EU executive doubled down on its efforts to curb foreign direct investments from China in its latest draft.  Should the current form hold, the IAA would limit investments by companies based in countries that control more than 40 percent of global manufacturing capacity across four sectors: batteries, electric vehicles, solar technologies, and the processing and recycling of critical raw materials. “The sectors indicated — those in which Beijing is a leader — as well as the reference to the 40 percent manufacturing capacity, highlight how the increasingly clear target of these measures are Chinese foreign direct investments,”said Luca Picotti, a lawyer at Italy’s Osservatorio Golden Power. The Commission’s proposal, which effectively mirrors Beijing’s 1980s forced joint venture policy, remains in the new draft. Chinese automakers that could be forced to give up some of their technology to their European competitors are pushing back on that strategy. BYD CEO Stella Li has called the model “outdated.” “It’s not efficient: We take decisions in a second, a joint venture takes months. It’s a model of the past,” she told Italian daily Corriere della Sera at the Davos World Economic Forum last month. Governments would also be compelled under the IAA to buy more climate-friendly materials, though the scope of the requirement remains elusive in the latest draft of the upcoming industry booster. The act also proposes introducing voluntary green steel labels.  The scale of the Commission’s intervention remains unclear in the draft, which is missing a section devoted to specific materials as well as a set of annexes, though hints are sprinkled throughout the document. “Public procurement is a powerful lever,” von der Leyen told industry representatives at an event in Antwerp on Wednesday, noting it amounts to 15 percent of EU GDP. “This is massive financial firepower controlled by European governments. But too often, we see that our public buyers have to take the subsidized foreign products instead of the high-quality European alternatives. That is homegrown value that we are leaving on the table.”  Aude van den Hove reported from Alden Biesen, Francesca Micheletti, Jordyn Dahl and Sebastian Starcevic from Brussels, and Zia Weise from Antwerp.

Finland has urged U.S. officials not to describe future security pledges to a postwar Ukraine as “Article 5-like,” implying that doing so could undercut the mutual defense clause at the heart of the NATO military alliance, according to a State Department cable obtained by POLITICO. The Jan. 20 cable hints at worries in some corners over the labels used during peace talks between Kyiv and Moscow. They show how sensitive some phrases can be in the national security realm, even when officials are merely trying to offer an analogy to various audiences. According to the cable, sent from the U.S. Embassy in Helsinki to Washington, Finnish Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen discussed the issue on Jan. 19 with U.S. Reps. Jack Bergman (R-Mich.) and Sarah Elfreth (D-Md.), both of whom are members of the House Armed Services Committee. Valtonen underscored Finland’s view that Russia is a “long-term strategic threat” and cautioned against a “weak” peace deal for Ukraine that would hinder its ability to defend itself against future Russian aggression, the cable states. But Valtonen cautioned against any suggestions of “Article 5-like” security guarantees in a postwar Ukraine, the cable adds. She warned that it risked conflating NATO’s Article 5 guarantees with whatever bilateral promises are made to Ukraine. It also quotes her as saying there should be a “firewall” between NATO and future security guarantees to Ukraine. Finland’s defense minister made similar points in a later meeting, according to the cable. Article 5 is a critical clause in the NATO pact that means an armed attack on one member of the 32-member alliance will be treated as an attack on all members. NATO has invoked the article only once: after Islamist terrorists attacked the U.S. on Sept. 11, 2001. The documents’ contents offer insight into concerns voiced by other Finnish leaders who have said that, while they want to help Ukraine protect itself, the concept of a security “guarantee” is a more serious matter they’re not ready to agree to just yet. A Finnish official said Valtonen’s office wouldn’t comment on confidential discussions, though underscored Helsinki’s long-standing goal of eventually accepting Ukraine into the NATO alliance. “Finland’s objective is to ensure that Ukraine receives the strongest possible security arrangements and guarantees in support of a sustainable and lasting peace,” the official said, who was granted anonymity to speak about sensitive policy matters. “Finland’s position is that Ukraine’s future lies within NATO.” Former NATO officials and analysts said the cable reflects growing concerns in various capitals about how engaging with a postwar Ukraine could affect individual countries in the long run. One potential problem is that “using the term Article 5 in other contexts implies NATO involvement that is not in fact a part of any of these proposed arrangements,” said Edward Wrong, a former NATO official. “Finland and many other NATO members want to ensure it is understood that Article 5 is unique to NATO.” The State Department declined to comment. Elfreth, one of the U.S. lawmakers Valtonen met with, did not address the session with the Finnish foreign minister directly, but said in a statement: “From our many meetings, it was clear to me that our NATO allies, new and old, are committed to advancing shared goals of defending our partners from Russian and other adversarial influences. Bergman declined to comment. Using Article 5 as a parallel has multiple upsides and downsides, especially given the range of attitudes toward Ukraine in NATO, the former officials and analysts said. That’s further complicated by the likelihood that individual countries, or select groups of countries — but not NATO itself — will offer Ukraine security aid in the near future. One challenge is that by referring to Article 5, even with the “like” attached to it, national leaders could hand political ammunition to opposition groups, said Josh Shifrinson, a scholar with the University of Maryland, College Park, who advocates for a more restrained foreign policy. There’s also the possibility that framing a security pledge to Ukraine as “Article 5-like” will entice Russia to test what that truly means. If Russia stages some sort of an armed attack and the countries backing Ukraine struggle to respond, that could raise questions about the strength of NATO’s Article 5, said Rachel Ellehuus, a former Biden administration Defense Department official assigned to NATO. On top of that, other members of NATO, especially those in Europe, are acutely aware of President Donald Trump’s dim views of the alliance. They are reacting to his demands that they step up defense spending and have taken on the lion’s share of aid to Ukraine. Given economic uncertainties in the years ahead, just how much they can support Ukraine is in question. “I’m guessing the Finns don’t want to overpromise and under-deliver,” Ellehuus said. Spokespeople for NATO declined to comment. Finland is one of NATO’s newest members, having joined after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The Finnish foreign minister comes across in the cable as tough on Russia, a country with which Finland shares an 830-mile border. “We should not be naïve in thinking they will change, especially if sanctions get [lifted]” and Russia becomes “empowered politically and economically,” Valtonen is quoted as saying. Although there are ongoing talks among the U.S., Ukraine and Russia in various formats, Russian leader Vladimir Putin has not committed to a substantial cease-fire and has made demands that many Ukrainians consider unacceptable for a peace deal. Victor Jack contributed to this report from Brussels.

BRUSSELS — Only a few days ago, EU diplomats and officials were whispering furtively about the idea they might one day need to think about how to push back against Donald Trump. They’re not whispering anymore.  Trump’s attempt, as EU leaders saw it, to “blackmail” them with the threat of tariffs into letting him take the sovereign Danish island of Greenland provoked a howl of outrage — and changed the world.  Previous emergency summits in Brussels focused on existential risks to the European Union, like the eurozone crisis, Brexit, the coronavirus pandemic, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This week, the EU’s 27 leaders cleared their diaries to discuss the assault they faced from America.  There can be little doubt that the transatlantic alliance has now been fundamentally transformed from a solid foundation for international law and order into a far looser arrangement in which neither side can be sure of the other.  “Trust was always the foundation for our relations with the United States,” said Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk as he arrived for the summit in Brussels on Thursday night. “We respected and accepted American leadership. But what we need today in our politics is trust and respect among all partners here, not domination and for sure not coercion. It doesn’t work in our world.”  The catalyst for the rupture in transatlantic relations was the U.S. president’s announcement on Saturday that he would hit eight European countries with tariffs of 10 percent for opposing his demand to annex Greenland.  That was just the start. In an avalanche of pressure, he then canceled his support for the U.K. premier’s decision to hand over the Chagos Islands, home to an important air base, to Mauritius; threatened France with tariffs on Champagne after Macron snubbed his Board of Peace initiative; slapped down the Norwegian prime minister over a Nobel Peace Prize; and ultimately dropped his threats both to take Greenland by military force and to hit countries that oppose him with tariffs.  Here was a leader, it seemed to many watching EU officials, so wild and unpredictable that he couldn’t even remain true to his own words.  But what dismayed the professional political class in Brussels and beyond was more mundane: Trump’s decision to leak the private text messages he’d received directly from other world leaders by publishing them to his 11.6 million followers on social media.  Trump’s screenshots of his phone revealed French President Emmanuel Macron offering to host a G7 meeting in Paris, and to invite the Russians in the sidelines. NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte, who once called Trump “daddy,” also found his private text to Trump made public, in which he praised the president’s “incredible” achievements, adding: “Can’t wait to see you.”  Leaking private messages “is not acceptable — you just don’t do it,” said one senior diplomat, like others, on condition of anonymity because the matter is sensitive. “It’s so important. After this, no one can trust him. If you were any leader you wouldn’t tell him anything. And this is a crucial means of communication because it is quick and direct. Now everything will go through layers of bureaucracy.”  Mark Carney had been one of the classic Davos set and was a regular attendee: suave, a little smug, and seeming entirely comfortable among snow-covered peaks and even loftier clientele. | Gian Ehrenzeller/EPA The value of direct contact through phone texts is well known to the leaders of Europe, who, as POLITICO revealed, have even set up their own private group chat to discuss how to respond when Trump does something inflammatory. Such messages enable ministers and officials at all levels to coordinate solutions before public statements have to be made, the same senior diplomat said. “If you don’t have trust, you can’t work together anymore.”  NO MORE NATO Diplomats and officials now fear the breakdown in personal trust between European leaders and Trump has potentially grave ramifications.  Take NATO. The military alliance is, at its core, a promise: that member countries will back each other up and rally to their defense if one of them comes under attack. Once that promise looks less than solid, the power of NATO to deter attacks is severely undermined. That’s why Denmark’s Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen warned that if Trump invaded the sovereign Danish territory of Greenland it would be the end of NATO.  The fact he threatened to do so has already put the alliance into intensive care, another diplomat said.  Asked directly if she could still trust the U.S. as she arrived at the Brussels summit, Frederiksen declined to say yes. “We have been working very closely with the United States for many years,” she replied. “But we have to work together respectfully, without threatening each other.”  European leaders now face two tasks: To bring the focus back to the short-term priorities of peace in Ukraine and resolving tensions over Greenland; and then to turn their attention to mapping out a strategy for navigating a very different world. The question of trust, again, underpins both.  When it comes to Ukraine, European leaders like Macron, Germany’s Friedrich Merz and the U.K.’s Keir Starmer have spent endless hours trying to persuade Trump and his team that providing Kyiv with an American military element underpinning security guarantees is the only way to deter Russian President Vladimir Putin from attacking again in future.  Given how unreliable Trump has been as an ally to Europe, officials are now privately asking what those guarantees are really worth. Why would Russia take America’s word seriously? Why not, in a year or two, test it to make sure?  THE POST-DAVOS WORLD Then there’s the realignment of the entire international system.  There was something ironic about the setting for Trump’s assaults on the established world order, and about the identities of those who found themselves the harbingers of its end.  Among the snow-covered slopes of the Swiss resort of Davos, the world’s business and political elite gather each year to polish their networks, promote their products, brag about their successes, and party hard. The super rich, and the occasional president, generally arrive by helicopter.  As a central bank governor, Mark Carney had been one of the classic Davos set and was a regular attendee: suave, a little smug, and seeming entirely comfortable among snow-covered peaks and even loftier clientele.  Now prime minister of Canada, this sage of the centrist liberal orthodoxy had a shocking insight to share with his tribe: “Today,” Carney began this week, “I’ll talk about the rupture in the world order, the end of a nice story, and the beginning of a brutal reality where geopolitics among the great powers is not subject to any constraints.”  “The rules-based order is fading,” he intoned, to be replaced by a world of “great power rivalry” in which “the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must.”  “The old order is not coming back. We should not mourn it. Nostalgia is not a strategy.”  Carney impressed those European officials watching. He even quoted Finnish President Alexander Stubb, who has enjoyed outsized influence in recent months due to the connections he forged with Trump on the golf course.  NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte, who once called Donald Trump “daddy,” also found his private text to Donald Trump made public, in which he praised the president’s “incredible” achievements, adding: “Can’t wait to see you.” |  Jim lo Scalzo/EPA Ultimately, Carney had a message for what he termed “middle powers” — countries like Canada. They could, he argued, retreat into isolation, building up their defenses against a hard and lawless world. Or they could build something “better, stronger and more just” by working together, and diversifying their alliances. Canada, another target of Trump’s territorial ambitions, has just signed a major partnership agreement with China. As they prepared for the summit in Brussels, European diplomats and officials contemplated the same questions. One official framed the new reality as the “post-Davos” world. “Now that the trust has gone, it’s not coming back,” another diplomat said. “I feel the world has changed fundamentally.”  A GOOD CRISIS It will be up to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and her team to devise ways to push the continent toward greater self-sufficiency, a state that Macron has called “strategic autonomy,” the diplomat said. This should cover energy, where the EU has now become reliant on imports of American gas.  The most urgent task is to reimagine a future for European defense that does not rely on NATO, the diplomat said. Already, there are many ideas in the air. These include a European Security Council, which would have the nuclear-armed non-EU U.K. as a member. Urgent efforts will be needed to create a drone industry and to boost air defenses.  The European Commission has already proposed a 100,000-strong standing EU army, so why not an elite special forces division as well? The Commission’s officials are world experts at designing common standards for manufacturing, which leaves them well suited to the task of integrating the patchwork of weapons systems used by EU countries, the same diplomat said.  Yet there is also a risk. Some officials fear that with Trump’s having backed down and a solution to the Greenland crisis now apparently much closer, EU leaders will lose the focus and clarity about the need for change they gained this past week. In a phrase often attributed to Churchill, the risk is that EU countries will “let a good crisis go to waste.”  Domestic political considerations will inevitably make it harder for national governments to commit funding to shared EU defense projects. As hard-right populism grows in major regional economies, like France, the U.K. and Germany, making the case for “more Europe” is harder than ever for the likes of Macron, Starmer and Merz. Even if NATO is in trouble, selling a European army will be tough.  While these leaders know they can no longer trust Trump’s America with Europe’s security, many of them lack the trust of their own voters to do what might be required instead.