BRUSSELS — In the 10 years since the Brussels terror attacks, the EU has
tightened its security strategy but the internet is opening up new threats,
according to the bloc’s counterterrorism coordinator.
Daesh is “mutating jihadism,” Bartjan Wegter told POLITICO in an interview on
the eve of the anniversary of the terrorist attacks in Brussels, which pushed
the bloc to bolster border protection and step up collaboration and
information-sharing.
The group has “calculated that it’s much more effective to radicalize people who
are already inside the EU through online environments rather than to organize
orchestrated attacks from outside our borders,” he said. “And they’re very good
at it.”
Ten years ago, two terrorists from Daesh (also known as the so-called Islamic
State) blew themselves up at Brussels Airport. Another explosion tore through a
metro car at Maelbeek station, in the heart of Brussels’ EU district. Thirty-two
people were killed, and hundreds more injured.
The attacks came just months after terrorists killed 130 people in attacks on a
concert hall, a stadium, restaurants and bars in Paris, exposing gaps in
information-sharing in the bloc’s free-travel area. The terrorists had moved
between countries, planning the attacks in one and carrying them out in another,
said Wegter, who is Dutch. “That’s where our vulnerabilities were.”
Today, violent jihadism remains a threat and new large-scale attacks can’t be
excluded. But the probability is “much, much lower today than it was 10 years
ago,” said Wegter.
In the aftermath of the attacks, the bloc changed its security strategy with a
focus on prevention and a “security reflex” across every policy field, according
to Wegter. It’s also stepping up police and judicial collaboration through
Europol and Eurojust, and it’s putting in place databases — including the
Schengen Information System — so countries could alert each other about
high-risk individuals, as well as an entry/exit system to monitor who enters and
leaves the free-travel area.
But the bloc is facing a new type of threat, as security officials see a gradual
increase in attempted terrorist attacks by lone actors. A lot of that is being
cultivated online and increasingly, younger people are involved.
“We’ve seen cases of children 12 years old. And, the radicalization process [is]
also happening faster,” Wegter said. “Sometimes we’re talking about weeks or
months.”
In 2024, a third of all arrests connected to potential terror threats were of
people aged between 12 and 20 years old, and France recorded a tripling of the
number of minors radicalized between 2023 and 2024, said Wegter.
“Just put yourself in the shoes of law enforcement … You’re dealing with young
people who spend most of their time online … Who may not have a criminal record.
Who, if they are plotting attacks, may not be using registered weapons. It’s
very hard to prevent.”
Violent jihadism is just one of the threats EU security officials worry are
being cultivated online.
Wegter said there is also an emerging trend of a violent right-wing extremist
narrative online — and to a lesser extent, violent left-wing extremism. There’s
also what he called “nihilistic extremist violence,” a new phenomenon that can
feature elements of different ideologies or a drive to overthrow the system, but
which is fundamentally minors seeking an identity through violence.
“What we see online, some of these images are so horrible that even law
enforcement needs psychological support to see this kind of stuff,” said Wegter.
Law enforcement’s ability to get access to encrypted data and information on
people under investigation is crucial, he stressed, and he drew parallels with
the steps the EU took to secure the Schengen free movement 10 years ago.
“If you want to preserve the good things of the internet, we also need to make
sure that we have … some key mechanisms to safeguard the internet also.”
Tag - Terrorism
‘ALL I COULD DO WAS JUST WAIT AND PRAY’: AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE BRUSSELS
BOMBINGS
10 years ago, terror attacks shook the Belgian capital. Here’s how the day and
its aftermath unfolded, in the words of those who lived it.
By SONJA RIJNEN and SEBASTIAN STARCEVIC
Illustration by Patrik Svensson for POLITICO
On March 22, 2016, just before 8 a.m. on an ordinary weekday morning, two
explosions ripped through the departure hall of the main international airport
in Brussels. The nail-packed bombs shredded flesh and blew off limbs as flaming
tiles rained down from the ceiling.
About an hour later, across town, a third detonation took out a train carriage
at a metro station in the city’s European Quarter.
Tensions and security measures in Brussels had been escalating since coordinated
Islamist terrorist attacks had killed more than 130 people in Paris four months
earlier, including 90 at a rock concert in the Bataclan theater.
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Belgian officials had warned of possible strikes just days before, after raids
in Brussels led to the capture of key suspects linked to the deadly assaults in
neighboring France.
A decade on, POLITICO spoke with politicians, emergency service officials,
journalists, survivors and their families about that fateful morning,
reconstructing a timeline of the Brussels bombings and the painful days that
followed.
*The following interviews were conducted in English, French and Dutch. They have
been translated, edited and condensed for clarity.
AT ZAVENTEM AIRPORT
At 7:58 a.m., two suicide bombers detonated explosives, nine seconds apart, in
the crowded departure hall.
Karen Northshield, American-Belgian athlete and survivor: I was at the Brussels
international airport to fly out to the U.S., like a lot of other people that
day. The moment I was hit by the first bomb, literally all hell broke loose. I’m
swept off my feet, I’m on my back, fatally injured and just waiting, hoping,
praying somebody will come and see me.
Tara Palmeri, journalist and former POLITICO reporter: I think I just got a
Twitter alert. I was still in bed, hadn’t properly woken up for work yet, and I
saw the news of the terror attack. I got in an Uber and asked them to get me as
close to the airport as possible. They dropped me off on the highway, and I
started walking. When I got there, it was chaos. People were running. It was
like a crime scene.
Karen Northshield: I was lying on the floor for the longest time. I’m losing my
breath. I’m losing every ounce of strength I have in me. There’s blood gushing
out of my leg. And I’m thinking: “How did this happen?” There were other
survivors that were severely injured. They were waiting for help. There was a
lot of noise and crying and yelling and screaming. Of course, it was chaos.
Tara Palmeri: I just remember the sound of the sirens. It reminded me of a World
War II movie. In my head, I remember feeling like I was in the middle of a war.
Karen Northshield: When a life-or-death situation happens, the body can do
amazing things. I was able to hoist myself up onto an airport cart. At a certain
moment, I looked off to the side and saw somebody running back in. He was a
couple meters away from me, looking to see if there were any more bodies to
save. I’m thinking: “This is my only chance. It’s now or never.” I do everything
I can to gain just enough strength to show him I’m alive, so I wave my hand, and
he understands. He comes running to me, pushes me out and wheels me on one of
the carts out to the sidewalk, then he disappears.
A plume of smoke rises over Brussels airport after the terrorist attack on March
22, 2016 in Brussels, Belgium. | Sylvain Lefevre/Getty Images
Tara Palmeri: I remember there was this wonderful woman who taught yoga at the
gym. She was an American girl [Karen], and she lost, like, half her body.
Karen Northshield: It took about an hour before the ambulance finally arrived
[at the airport]. I was doing everything I could to stay awake and remain
conscious and remain alive. But that hour just felt like hell. I was literally
dying, and all I could do was just wait and pray that God would come rescue me.
When the ambulance finally arrived, I think my subconscious mind said: “Okay,
you’re good. Now you can let them take care of the rest.”
AT THE MAELBEEK METRO STATION
At 9 a.m., another suicide bomber detonated inside a subway car at Maelbeek
Station.
Christelle Giovanetti, survivor: On March 22, 2016, I left for work. I didn’t
usually take the metro, but once every two months I had a meeting in the city
center, which fell on that day.
The metro started moving, and as soon as the first car entered the tunnel, the
explosion happened. I was sitting in that first car — it was in the second one
that the suicide bomber blew himself up. There was a big ball of fire and the
sound of a really loud explosion. I was thrown up and then crashed back into my
seat.
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Silvia Sciorilli Borrelli, journalist and former POLITICO reporter: I was based
in London and had started at POLITICO just a few months prior, so I was on a
trip to Brussels. Because I had woken up late, I decided I was going to take the
metro from Maelbeek.
I was on the phone with my dad because he’d heard on the radio about the bombs
that went off at the airport, and he called to check I was OK. While I was
talking to him, I heard these loud bangs, and it was the bomb going off at the
metro station right below where I was standing, right where I was about to go.
Christelle Giovanetti: I remember being in the dark because I was already
partially in the subway tunnel. I remember touching my legs and wondering what
was on me — it was debris and dust. It felt like I had swallowed dust and had
things in my mouth. There was a man next to me who kept praying.
Then, there was some movement, there was some noise, and people started
switching on their phones, so everything came back to life a bit. The driver
came from his cabin and helped us take out a window for an emergency exit. We
let people out, women and children first. I was one of the last ones out.
Silvia Sciorilli Borrelli: Obviously, when it happened, it was surreal because
I’d never been anywhere where bombs were going off. It’s just one of those very
strange situations where you realize you’re in the middle of something that will
become big news, but in the moment, you don’t really realize it’s happening. I
remember just telling my dad I was going to get off the phone.
Christelle Giovanetti: I think I was a bit in shock, so instead of leaving like
everyone else, I stood stuck on the platform. There were things on the ground,
human pieces. I was very taken aback. There was a young woman who was with me
who told me not to look. I looked anyway.
Policemen stand guard at the entrance of a security perimeter set near the
Maelbeek metro station, on March 22, 2016. | Emmanuel Dunand/AFP via Getty
Images
I wanted to go into the second train car, but it wasn’t possible. All the people
who had died were there. I saw a lot of horrors. I pulled one woman out of the
rubble who was stuck and was barely responding.
Tine Gregoor, physician and volunteer first responder: My partner and I were by
chance in the car in the European Quarter, and I saw on Twitter there had been a
second attack in the area. I thought there probably wasn’t a doctor there yet,
so I walked to the site. I said: “Je suis medicin” (“I am a doctor”). At some
point, I met someone, I think from the fire department, who took me to a
first-aid station. The most critically injured were brought there.
Christelle Giovanetti: The first police arrived on the opposite platform. There
was no light in the station, so we couldn’t see each other well. The officer
yelled at me to evacuate, and I shouted back that there were survivors. He
replied that I should get out. So, I stepped over a lot of things, and I went up
the escalator. I couldn’t even see a meter in front of me because of the smoke.
At the top, there were already firemen and ambulances.
Lack of equipment was a problem for everyone. I had respiratory problems because
I inhaled a lot of gas from the bomb, but I couldn’t get a mask because they
didn’t have enough of them, and they were obviously given to someone who was no
longer breathing.
Silvia Sciorilli Borrelli: Basically, the Thon Hotel (on Rue de la Loi) turned
into triage, and from the hotel gym — I think it was on the first floor — you
could see law enforcement arriving, and people being taken out of the metro
station on stretchers, both the injured and the deceased.
Tine Gregoor: People just kept coming. Tables were moved to the side, and at one
point there were 11 seriously injured people just in that room, which was
actually quite small. They were all lying side by side, each one in worse
condition than the other. It was very intense. They all had life-threatening
injuries. Anyone that could still walk was sent to another room.
Christelle Giovanetti: We were triaged based on our injuries and then sent to a
hospital. In the beginning, I was surrounded by passersby, people who had taken
care of me and other victims. We became very close because we’d all come out of
something terrible. One of the people who was on the metro with me and with whom
I had spent all morning at the Thon came looking for me. It was good to see him,
even though we hadn’t known each other just the day before. He took care of me,
went to get me water and charged my phone.
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Tine Gregoor: I was taking care of injuries that were like war injuries. At one
point I had a scalp in my hands. The victims couldn’t hear anything, and they
were covered in black stuff. I had to improvise a lot because we had very little
material.
We also had to triage and decide who we thought had the highest chance of
survival. There were many people with broken bones, almost all of them had
severe burns and some had brain injuries too. You could see their heads were
swollen. After an hour, the most seriously injured were taken to the hospital.
In the chaos, I’d lost my handbag and keys. I was a bit dazed. I remember a
nurse asking me if I was OK, and I said yes. You just had to flip a switch and
keep going.
FIRST RESPONSE
Authorities raced to secure EU institutions, clear the metro and identify
victims, while families desperately awaited news. In total, 32 people were
killed and more than 340 were injured.
Philippe Vansteenkiste, director of V-Europe and special adviser on Victims of
Terrorism to the European Commission: On the morning of March 22, I was driving
my kids to school. The day before, my wife had told me to stop listening to the
news with the kids in the car because it’s not always pleasant, so I’d switched
on music that day. When I arrived at the school, I heard that a bomb had
exploded at the airport. My sister worked at the airport.
Then, I got a call from my mother saying my sister wasn’t answering her phone.
She usually did a morning shift that ended at 6 a.m. But someone had called in
sick that day, and my sister decided to stay until 8 a.m. At around 8:45 a.m., I
suddenly had a very weird feeling I’d never had before. It was like my sister
passed by to say goodbye. I jumped in the car and decided to drive straight to
my parents.
Christian Decobecq, former head of Disaster Victim Identification (DVI), Belgian
federal police: I received a call from one of my colleagues who told me there
had been an explosion at Zaventem. We’d been fearing attacks — especially after
France — and the federal police were on alert.
Special police forces stand guard outside the Council Chamber of Brussels on
March 24, 2016 during investigations into the Paris and Brussels terror attacks.
| Kenzo Tribouillard/AFP via Getty Images
The DVI was only a team of seven, but we had a pool of 80 in case of major
disasters. I started putting together teams on my whiteboard — teams for
recovering bodies, autopsies, speaking to families for identification, and
logistics and coordination, etc. We heard about the second explosion in Maelbeek
while I was writing the names. So, I drew a line on my whiteboard and assigned a
second team.
Alexander De Croo, former prime minister of Belgium: At that point, I was deputy
prime minister, and my competencies were digital and telecom. The first thing
was that the telecom network was crashing. I remember that, without consulting
anyone, I sent a tweet asking people to please use IP-based messaging such as
WhatsApp instead of calling and sending texts. It’s been my most retweeted post
of my whole life. It helped a lot in reducing the tension on the telecom
network.
Jean-Luca Cocci, head of Dispatching Unit, European Parliament: Once we had more
or less understood what had happened, first at the airport and then in the
Maelbeek metro, we knew this was something we’d never experienced before. This
wasn’t attacks in France or Germany — it was next door. It was the EU’s
backyard.
The first thing that collapsed was the mobile network because of congestion, so
I launched one of the first WhatsApp groups. We needed to immediately inform
everybody we could with the means that we had.
Tom Michiels, former technical director, Brussels Metro Business Unit:
Initially, getting information was almost impossible because communication [was
cut off]. But I realized quite quickly that we would need to go on-site. It
became apparent we would need a team on standby to clean up the train. We went
to Maelbeek, but we were not allowed down. We were there for hours on standby.
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Christian Decobecq: The first thing the DVI does is go on-site and recover the
bodies. Once the bodies have been collected, we transport them, and postmortem
activities are carried out in collaboration with forensic experts.
When I realized it was terrorism, one of the first things that went through my
head was: “Do not make mistakes.” The French had told me they made a mistake
with two young girls. They didn’t follow the Interpol standards and made a
comparison based on visible identification and an ID card. The two girls looked
alike, and they gave the news to the wrong family. I thought to myself:
“Christian, you must not do that. We will follow the procedures, and that may
take some time.”
Jean-Luca Cocci: The EU institutions took the decision to keep people at home
and let them stay there until we had certainty from the Belgian authorities that
no other explosions or attacks were ongoing. We had many requests coming one
after the other: What about my kids in school? Should we join them? Should I
leave Parliament and go home? It was hard to give instructions because
information was coming in from everywhere. So, block by block, step by step, we
tried to answer all the questions.
Alexander De Croo: Brussels had very strict rules about how much power cell
towers could have because of concerns that they might impact our health. We
decided to tell telecom networks to double their power to get network stability.
By late afternoon, I think we had our first Security Council meeting with
government and the heads of security agencies. I think the first major
discussions were about if we could have the military in the streets to secure
some high-risk areas. It was a tense discussion. It’s still a difficult
discussion these days.
Dimitri Defre, emergency preparedness coordinator, University Hospital Leuven:
That first day was the most dramatic in terms of the medical aspect. But
alongside that, we also had the forensic part of things. We were quickly
designated the hospital in charge of analyzing all the physical remains of the
victims and perpetrators from the airport.
There were a lot of moving parts. We had to improvise because our morgue was not
big enough for the extra bodies alongside the usual flow.
A ambulance man pushes a stretcher with a body bag outside the Maalbeek metro
station. | Philippe Huguen/AFP via Getty Images
Philippe Vansteenkiste: We couldn’t find [my sister]. It was a very, very
intense and difficult day. No one understood exactly what was going on, and as
time goes by, you just get more and more desperate. Then, as evening approaches,
suddenly all the helplines are closed because their office hours are over. You
start to feel so much frustration because you need help, and it’s just not
coming.
Tom Michiels: Around 11 p.m., we were allowed down [to the metro]. The police
had done their investigation, so we worked for a few hours. We saw quite a scene
— the train was folded open like a sardine box. The roof had been blown open and
a piece was stuck to the ceiling. We were thinking: “What can we do to get this
train back to a depot?” We realized relatively quickly that we needed more
equipment, so around 3 or 4 a.m., we made the necessary contact.
Our team went to sleep for 3 hours before getting back to work. There were 12 to
15 of us working on the train. There was a bit of urgency to clean up for
political reasons. To get the metro running as fast as possible, to show: “Look,
we won’t let ourselves get destroyed.” Over four days, we only slept six hours.
Christian Decobecq: There are standards we follow: The bodies must be identified
via scientific methods — that is to say, teeth, DNA or fingerprints. Only based
on this can we make a positive identification. It takes time, of course. We
started this the first day.
The DVI also meets with relatives for an interview to establish what the persons
looked like. What were they wearing? Do they wear jewelry? Do they have any
tattoos or scars? What’s the address of their doctor and dentist? We also asked
if they had traveled abroad. If they’d been to America, then maybe we could find
their fingerprints.
Philippe Vansteenkiste: We kept searching for [my sister], on and on. On
Thursday afternoon, we finally got a call that we should come to the DVI. I went
with my mother, and they asked for a description of my sister. It took an
hour-and-a-half. Finally, a step was being taken.
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Then, on Friday morning, a policeman called me, thinking I had already received
the news that my sister had been killed — I hadn’t. So, it had happened on
Tuesday, and I got the news that she had passed away on Friday, a bit by
mistake. It took four days. I understand the DVI cannot make errors, but she had
a uniform. She had a badge. It can’t be that families have to wait for such a
long time.
Christian Decobecq: I know that for the bereaved, one minute feels like a
century, but we have to be absolutely sure. We can’t make mistakes.
At one point, all the families were gathered at a Red Cross center, and I
explained as much as I could. There was one family, where the wife came to me
and said: “Sir, sir, please give my husband back.” I’ve never forgotten that.
THE AFTERMATH
In the ensuing days, political leaders rushed to show resolve and solidarity.
But as Belgium struggled to comprehend how the attacks were able to take place,
many began demanding answers.
Philippe Close, mayor of Brussels: In 2016, I was deputy mayor and a member of
the Brussels Parliament. We were aware the risk existed. But in democracies, we
think it’s impossible because we live in peace, that it’s unimaginable that
people would attack their own country. We know that intelligence services do
their utmost to control and arrest terrorist cells, but this last group decided
to act, I think because they knew they were recognized by the services.
Was the city prepared? For an attack, no. To help the injured people, yes. There
was a lot of solidarity. We are one of the most multicultural cities in the
world, and it’s important that a large part of the population want to defend
that, also after the attack.
A Belgian serviceman stands guard at the Maalbeek metro station on its
re-opening day on April 25, 2016 in Brussels, after being closed since the 22
March attacks. | John Thys/AFP via Getty Images
Alexander De Croo: I found the prime minister [Charles Michel] handled it well.
In general, the government did well. But when terrorist attacks happen, one way
or another, it is a failure to prevent that. It was a case of really working
together with security services and also making some legal reforms to give
police and legal institutions more leverage to act against these terrorists.
Tara Palmeri: I remember there was a lot of debate about the right to move
freely within the EU and how countries like Belgium just aren’t able to protect
their citizens the way they can in the U.S. There was a huge sense that they
should have done more to protect their citizens. One of the top priorities of a
state is to provide security to its people. They weren’t able to do that.
Philippe Close: I remember we decided not to freeze the city. It’s a very
difficult decision. The advice is to close everything. We didn’t decide that. If
we decided to do that, when would we reopen? The population is made more afraid
by the measures than the risks. As a politician, you need to pay attention to
the balance between the risk and also the values you want to defend, and that
our city needs to continue to live. If you don’t defend that, they win.
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Silvia Sciorilli Borrelli: On the evening of the attacks, the day after and the
days following, there was an incredible silence at the airport, the train
station and around the city in general. It was suddenly extremely empty and
quiet.
Because it wasn’t very long after the Paris attacks, it was a moment in time in
Europe where everyone kind of had a sense of being in potential danger and
wanting to avoid situations that could put them in harm’s way. So, everyone was
a bit wary of just carrying on with their regular lives.
Christelle Giovanetti: The week that followed was really complicated because I
felt like there was an attack going on inside my head. I had hearing problems,
felt withdrawn in my suffering, and even though the people around me were really
present, I couldn’t find what would help me.
A woman reacts during a minute of silence held at a makeshift memorial in front
of Brussel’s Stock Exchange on Place de la Bourse (Beursplein) on March 24,
2016. | Philippe Huguen/AFP via Getty Images
A week after, the police organized a discussion group among victims. It was the
first time I met other victims since the attack, and that really helped me. It
was the starting point for my recovery. Sitting down with other people who have
been through the same thing really helped. In the end, I got four days of sick
leave and then went back to work.
Karen Northshield: I ended up in the hospital for 79 days — 79 days nonstop in
terms of terror, in terms of agony, in terms of suffering. My body, my skin, my
cells, my bones, everything was fully in flames. I had zero chance of survival,
my heart had stopped so many times, I went into septic shock so many times.
Everything I had built up until then, all my hopes, all my dreams just vanished
into thin air.
Françoise Schepmans, member of the Brussels Parliament and former mayor of
Molenbeek: I understand the anger that people felt at that time because it was a
period of fear and uncertainty for residents. They were deeply worried.
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Silvia Sciorilli Borrelli: There was a general sense of wariness of the people
around you, which I think was the worst part, really. I have always thought of
Brussels as an inclusive city where different people mingle, and there’s just a
melting pot of people from different walks of life. Suddenly those people or
those communities were singled out.
Alexander De Croo: This was the first major terrorist attack in 40 years. It
opened many people’s eyes to the fact that no one is shielded from this. I think
it’s a major trauma in Belgian society. I think that we’ve always been a very
stable and peaceful society. People from the security forces [used to] say that
we don’t really have a culture of security — and that’s true. But that’s also
the type of society we had. Politicians in general were very accessible and had
no security forces, parliament and ministries essentially had open doors. That
had to change quite a bit. It really changed the way we look at how we have to
secure our society.
Philippe Close: Our police departments need to study these terrorist actions
more. For example, what happens in the Middle East is always a risk for Brussels
— and we know it. We need to invest in intelligence. We also need to detect
radicalism. A large part of people become [radicalized] on social networks. I
think there’s a real responsibility from Facebook, Instagram, TikTok and all of
them, to manage what we can put on social networks more.
Françoise Schepmans: A lot has changed in the last 10 years. People were afraid
back then. Today, we are better prepared, better coordinated and better equipped
to prevent and respond to threats. We have stronger tools, clearer procedures
and more experience in protecting our society. Unfortunately, in today’s world,
we have to be aware that anything can happen. That’s why we must stay vigilant
and prepared. But at the same time, we cannot live in fear. We have to stay
hopeful, united and trust that our institutions and our society are stronger
than they were before.
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LONDON — Two men have been charged Wednesday evening with spying on locations
and individuals linked to the Jewish community on behalf of Iran.
Nematollah Shahsavani, a 40-year-old dual British and Iranian national, and
Alireza Farasati, a 22-year-old Iranian national, were charged under the
National Security Act with engaging in conduct likely to assist a foreign
intelligence service between July 9 and Aug. 15 last year.
The Crown Prosecution Service confirmed the charges related to Iran.
The Metropolitan Police’s Deputy Assistant Commissioner Vicki Evans described
the charges as “extremely serious” after counter terror Police investigated
alleged surveillance of places and people in London’s Jewish community.
“We fully recognise that the public — and in particular the Jewish community —
will be concerned,” Evans said. “I hope this investigation reassures them that
we will not hesitate to take action if we identify there may be a threat to
their safety, and will be relentless in our pursuit of those who may be
responsible.”
The men were originally arrested and detained on March 6 while two other men
arrested on the same day were released without charge.
The head of the Crown Prosecution Service’s Special Crime and Counter Terrorism
Division Frank Ferguson said “the charge relates to carrying out activities in
the U.K. such as gathering information and undertaking reconnaissance of
targets.”
Shahsavani and Farasati will appear at Westminster Magistrates’ Court Thursday
March 19.
Anton, a 44-year-old Russian soldier who heads a workshop responsible for
repairing and supplying drones, was at his kitchen table when he learned last
month that Elon Musk’s SpaceX had cut off access to Starlink terminals used by
Russian forces. He scrambled for alternatives, but none offered unlimited
internet, data plans were restrictive, and coverage did not extend to the areas
of Ukraine where his unit operated.
It’s not only American tech executives who are narrowing communications options
for Russians. Days later, Russian authorities began slowing down access
nationwide to the messaging app Telegram, the service that frontline troops use
to coordinate directly with one another and bypass slower chains of command.
“All military work goes through Telegram — all communication,” Anton, whose name
has been changed because he fears government reprisal, told POLITICO in voice
messages sent via the app. “That would be like shooting the entire Russian army
in the head.”
Telegram would be joining a home screen’s worth of apps that have become useless
to Russians. Kremlin policymakers have already blocked or limited access to
WhatsApp, along with parent company Meta’s Facebook and Instagram, Microsoft’s
LinkedIn, Google’s YouTube, Apple’s FaceTime, Snapchat and X, which like SpaceX
is owned by Musk. Encrypted messaging apps Signal and Discord, as well as
Japanese-owned Viber, have been inaccessible since 2024. Last month, President
Vladimir Putin signed a law requiring telecom operators to block cellular and
fixed internet access at the request of the Federal Security Service. Shortly
after it took effect on March 3, Moscow residents reported widespread problems
with mobile internet, calls and text messages across all major operators for
several days, with outages affecting mobile service and Wi-Fi even inside the
State Duma.
Those decisions have left Russians increasingly cut off from both the outside
world and one another, complicating battlefield coordination and disrupting
online communities that organize volunteer aid, fundraising and discussion of
the war effort. Deepening digital isolation could turn Russia into something
akin to “a large, nuclear-armed North Korea and a junior partner to China,”
according to Alexander Gabuev, the Berlin-based director of the Carnegie Russia
Eurasia Center.
In April, the Kremlin is expected to escalate its campaign against Telegram —
already one of Russia’s most popular messaging platforms, but now in the absence
of other social-media options, a central hub for news, business and
entertainment. It may block the platform altogether. That is likely to fuel an
escalating struggle between state censorship and the tools people use to evade
it, with Russia’s place in the world hanging in the balance.
“It’s turned into a war,” said Mikhail Klimarev, executive director of the
internet Protection Society, a digital rights group that monitors Russia’s
censorship infrastructure. “A guerrilla war. They hunt down the VPNs they can
see, they block them — and the ‘partisans’ run, build new bunkers, and come
back.”
THE APP THAT RUNS THE WAR
On Feb. 4, SpaceX tightened the authentication system that Starlink terminals
use to connect to its satellite network, introducing stricter verification for
registered devices. The change effectively blocked many terminals operated by
Russian units relying on unauthorized connections, cutting Starlink traffic
inside Ukraine by roughly 75 percent, according to internet traffic analysis
by Doug Madory, an analyst at the U.S. network monitoring firm Kentik.
The move threw Russian operations into disarray, allowing Ukraine to make
battlefield gains. Russia has turned to a workaround widely used before
satellite internet was an option: laying fiber-optic lines, from rear areas
toward frontline battlefield positions.
Until then, Starlink terminals had allowed drone operators to stream live video
through platforms such as Discord, which is officially blocked in Russia but
still sometimes used by the Russian military via VPNs, to commanders at multiple
levels. A battalion commander could watch an assault unfold in real time and
issue corrections — “enemy ahead” or “turn left” — via radio or Telegram. What
once required layers of approval could now happen in minutes.
Satellite-connected messaging apps became the fastest way to transmit
coordinates, imagery and targeting data.
But on Feb. 10, Roskomnadzor, the Russian communications regulator, began
slowing down Telegram for users across Russia, citing alleged violations of
Russian law. Russian news outlet RBC reported, citing two sources, that
authorities plan to shut down Telegram in early April — though not on the front
line.
In mid-February, Digital Development Minister Maksut Shadayev said the
government did not yet intend to restrict Telegram at the front but hoped
servicemen would gradually transition to other platforms. Kremlin spokesperson
Dmitry Peskov said this week the company could avoid a full ban by complying
with Russian legislation and maintaining what he described as “flexible contact”
with authorities.
Roskomnadzor has accused Telegram of failing to protect personal data, combat
fraud and prevent its use by terrorists and criminals. Similar accusations have
been directed at other foreign tech platforms. In 2022, a Russian court
designated Meta an “extremist organization” after the company said it would
temporarily allow posts calling for violence against Russian soldiers in the
context of the Ukraine war — a decision authorities used to justify blocking
Facebook and Instagram in Russia and increasing pressure on the company’s other
services, including WhatsApp.
Telegram founder Pavel Durov, a Russian-born entrepreneur now based in the
United Arab Emirates, says the throttiling is being used as a pretext to push
Russians toward a government-controlled messaging app designed for surveillance
and political censorship.
That app is MAX, which was launched in March 2025 and has been compared to
China’s WeChat in its ambition to anchor a domestic digital ecosystem.
Authorities are increasingly steering Russians toward MAX through employers,
neighborhood chats and the government services portal Gosuslugi — where citizens
retrieve documents, pay fines and book appointments — as well as through banks
and retailers. The app’s developer, VK, reports rapid user growth, though those
figures are difficult to independently verify.
“They didn’t just leave people to fend for themselves — you could say they led
them by the hand through that adaptation by offering alternatives,” said Levada
Center pollster Denis Volkov, who has studied Russian attitudes toward
technology use. The strategy, he said, has been to provide a Russian or
state-backed alternative for the majority, while stopping short of fully
criminalizing workarounds for more technologically savvy users who do not want
to switch.
Elena, a 38-year-old Yekaterinburg resident whose surname has been withheld
because she fears government reprisal, said her daughter’s primary school moved
official communication from WhatsApp to MAX without consulting parents. She
keeps MAX installed on a separate tablet that remains mostly in a drawer — a
version of what some Russians call a “MAXophone,” gadgets solely for that app,
without any other data being left on those phones for the (very real) fear the
government could access it.
“It works badly. Messages are delayed. Notifications don’t come,” she said. “I
don’t trust it … And this whole situation just makes people angry.”
THE VPN ARMS RACE
Unlike China’s centralized “Great Firewall,” which filters traffic at the
country’s digital borders, Russia’s system operates internally. Internet
providers are required to route traffic through state-installed deep packet
inspection equipment capable of controlling and analyzing data flows in real
time.
“It’s not one wall,” Klimarev said. “It’s thousands of fences. You climb one,
then there’s another.”
The architecture allows authorities to slow services without formally banning
them — a tactic used against YouTube before its web address was removed from
government-run domain-name servers last month. Russian law explicitly provides
government authority for blocking websites on grounds such as extremism,
terrorism, illegal content or violations of data regulations, but it does not
clearly define throttling — slowing traffic rather than blocking it outright —
as a formal enforcement mechanism. “The slowdown isn’t described anywhere in
legislation,” Klimarev said. “It’s pressure without procedure.”
In September, Russia banned advertising for virtual private network services
that citizens use to bypass government-imposed restrictions on certain apps or
sites. By Klimarev’s estimate, roughly half of Russian internet users now know
what a VPN is, and millions pay for one. Polling last year by the Levada Center,
Russia’s only major independent pollster, suggests regular use is lower, finding
about one-quarter of Russians said they have used VPN services.
Russian courts can treat the use of anonymization tools as an aggravating factor
in certain crimes — steps that signal growing pressure on circumvention
technologies without formally outlawing them. In February, the Federal
Antimonopoly Service opened what appears to be the first case against a media
outlet for promoting a VPN after the regional publication Serditaya Chuvashiya
advertised such a service on its Telegram channel.
Surveys in recent years have shown that many Russians, particularly older
citizens, support tighter internet regulation, often citing fraud, extremism and
online safety. That sentiment gives authorities political space to tighten
controls even when the restrictions are unpopular among more technologically
savvy users.
Even so, the slowdown of Telegram drew criticism from unlikely quarters,
including Sergei Mironov, a longtime Kremlin ally and leader of the Just Russia
party. In a statement posted on his Telegram channel on Feb. 11, he blasted the
regulators behind the move as “idiots,” accusing them of undermining soldiers at
the front. He said troops rely on the app to communicate with relatives and
organize fundraising for the war effort, warning that restricting it could cost
lives. While praising the state-backed messaging app MAX, he argued that
Russians should be free to choose which platforms they use.
Pro-war Telegram channels frame the government’s blocking techniques as sabotage
of the war effort. Ivan Philippov, who tracks Russia’s influential military
bloggers, said the reaction inside that ecosystem to news about Telegram has
been visceral “rage.”
Unlike Starlink, whose cutoff could be blamed on a foreign company, restrictions
on Telegram are viewed as self-inflicted. Bloggers accuse regulators of
undermining the war effort. Telegram is used not only for battlefield
coordination but also for volunteer fundraising networks that provide basic
logistics the state does not reliably cover — from transport vehicles and fuel
to body armor, trench materials and even evacuation equipment. Telegram serves
as the primary hub for donations and reporting back to supporters.
“If you break Telegram inside Russia, you break fundraising,” Philippov said.
“And without fundraising, a lot of units simply don’t function.”
Few in that community trust MAX, citing technical flaws and privacy concerns.
Because MAX operates under Russian data-retention laws and is integrated with
state services, many assume their communications would be accessible to
authorities.
Philippov said the app’s prominent defenders are largely figures tied to state
media or the presidential administration. “Among independent military bloggers,
I haven’t seen a single person who supports it,” he said.
Small groups of activists attempted to organize rallies in at least 11 Russian
cities, including Moscow, Irkutsk and Novosibirsk, in defense of Telegram.
Authorities rejected or obstructed most of the proposed demonstrations — in some
cases citing pandemic-era restrictions, weather conditions or vague security
concerns — and in several cases revoked previously issued permits. In
Novosibirsk, police detained around 15 people ahead of a planned rally. Although
a small number of protests were formally approved, no large-scale demonstrations
ultimately took place.
THE POWER TO PULL THE PLUG
The new law signed last month allows Russia’s Federal Security Service to order
telecom operators to block cellular and fixed internet access. Peskov, the
Kremlin spokesman, said subsequent shutdowns of service in Moscow were linked to
security measures aimed at protecting critical infrastructure and countering
drone threats, adding that such limitations would remain in place “for as long
as necessary.”
In practice, the disruptions rarely amount to a total communications blackout.
Most target mobile internet rather than all services, while voice calls and SMS
often continue to function. Some domestic websites and apps — including
government portals or banking services — may remain accessible through
“whitelists,” meaning authorities allow certain services to keep operating even
while broader internet access is restricted. The restrictions are typically
localized and temporary, affecting specific regions or parts of cities rather
than the entire country.
Internet disruptions have increasingly become a tool of control beyond
individual platforms. Research by the independent outlet Meduza and the
monitoring project Na Svyazi has documented dozens of regional internet
shutdowns and mobile network restrictions across Russia, with disruptions
occurring regularly since May 2025.
The communications shutdown, and uncertainty around where it will go next, is
affecting life for citizens of all kinds, from the elderly struggling to contact
family members abroad to tech-savvy users who juggle SIM cards and secondary
phones to stay connected. Demand has risen for dated communication devices —
including walkie-talkies, pagers and landline phones — along with paper maps as
mobile networks become less reliable, according to retailers interviewed by RBC.
“It feels like we’re isolating ourselves,” said Dmitry, 35, who splits his time
between Moscow and Dubai and whose surname has been withheld to protect his
identity under fear of governmental reprisal. “Like building a sovereign grave.”
Those who track Russian public opinion say the pattern is consistent: irritation
followed by adaptation. When Instagram and YouTube were blocked or slowed in
recent years, their audiences shrank rapidly as users migrated to alternative
services rather than mobilizing against the restrictions.
For now, Russia’s digital tightening resembles managed escalation rather than
total isolation. Officials deny plans for a full shutdown, and even critics say
a complete severing would cripple banking, logistics and foreign trade.
“It’s possible,” Klimarev said. “But if they do that, the internet won’t be the
main problem anymore.”
A French soldier was killed and several others were wounded in an attack on a
counterterrorism training exercise in northern Iraq, French President Emmanuel
Macron said early Friday.
“Chief Warrant Officer Arnaud Frion of the 7th Chasseurs Alpins Battalion in
Varces died for France during an attack in the Erbil region of Iraq,” Macron
posted on X, confirming the first French fatality of the Middle East war that
began with the U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran last month.
The French president called the attack “unacceptable,” adding that the soldiers
were in Iraq as part of an ongoing effort against the Islamic State.
“Their presence in Iraq is part of the strict framework of the fight against
terrorism,” Macron said. “The war in Iran cannot justify such attacks.”
The French military command had earlier said that six soldiers involved in
providing counterterrorism training in Iraq had been wounded in a drone strike
in Kurdistan’s Erbil region and taken for medical treatment. It did not provide
details of the drone’s origins.
An Italian base in Erbil was targeted by a drone strike Thursday but no
casualties were reported as a result of that attack.
Across the country, after the U.S. unleashed strikes in Iran last weekend,
veterans anxiously held their breath. They said they’ve seen this story before —
and it didn’t turn out well.
The military campaign, which plunged the region into chaos, triggered a profound
wave of déjà vu for post-9/11 veterans who served in Iraq and Afghanistan. And
while the nearly dozen veterans who spoke to POLITICO recognize the brutalities
of the repressive Iranian regime, they said they have little appetite for
another war in the Middle East.
Most said they are wary of President Donald Trump’s goals in Iran — on Friday,
he demanded “unconditional surrender” from the region — and how many soldiers
will be sacrificed in that pursuit. They said they are angry that
Congress rebuffed efforts to halt the war. And they’re particularly frustrated
by an administration that’s been steadily whittling down veteran support
systems.
“There is a sense from the government [that] they’re kind of using us as pawns,”
said Brandon Waithe, a former Air Force master sergeant who served in Iraq and
Afghanistan. “They want to send us to war, but they don’t want to pay for the
results of it.”
More than anything, the veterans said, they’re worried the U.S. hasn’t learned
from its past military mistakes.
In 2001, the U.S. launched a widespread military campaign in Iraq and
Afghanistan, designed to eliminate terrorist threats after the Sept. 11 attacks
— wars that dragged on for decades. Over 7,000 soldiers died, some at the hands
of Iranian-funded weapons and insurgent groups. Troops withdrew from Afghanistan
in 2021; the Taliban retook control soon after. In its wake, the U.S. left
behind years of “civil war, mass death and metastasizing terrorism,” said Phil
Klay, a U.S. Marine Corps veteran who served in Iraq.
The post-9/11 soldiers said they’re still grappling with what they see as the
futility of their efforts in those wars. According to Jason Dempsey, a former
infantry officer who deployed in both Iraq and Afghanistan, this generation of
veterans is more cautious about military force compared with soldiers from the
Vietnam War era.
“There’s a much greater sense of melancholy and disappointment at this latest
iteration of what we’re doing [now],” Dempsey said.
Maggie Seymour, who served in the Marines in Iraq, Afghanistan and Kuwait from
2007 to 2016, said her immediate reaction when U.S. fighter jets attacked Iran
was: “Are you fucking kidding me?”
“People are killed,” added Keegan Evans, who was a Marine Corps helicopter pilot
in Iraq. “Sons, daughters, brothers, fathers, the whole list, they don’t come
home. And the very legitimate question: What is it for?”
“You served in Iraq, you want our country to have learned a certain set of
lessons about military force,” Klay said. “A certain kind of caution when it
comes to this.”
From their perspective, U.S.-backed regime change is rarely successful, and
certainly not via airstrike. Diplomacy, they argue, matters more than
“chest-pumping” lethality. The aftershocks of combat last far beyond a news
cycle. Immediate, tactical wins don’t guarantee success in an enduring war.
Military operations must have a long-term plan.
“This makes the Iraq War planning look like grand strategy,” said Chris Purdy,
an army combat engineer who deployed to Iraq in 2011. The U.S. has “rushed into
things like a bunch of five-year-olds playing soccer,” said Evans.
“This operation is thinking without acting, which is arguably what we did in any
number of wars,” said Seymour. “You could cite any number of examples that
didn’t work out.”
The veteran community isn’t a monolith — indeed, Trump’s Cabinet contains
high-ranking officials who served in Iraq and Afghanistan, including Vice
President JD Vance and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. (Trump acknowledged this
week that Vance was “maybe less enthusiastic” at the start of the war with
Iran.)
But for some veterans, the sobering reminder is reflecting on “how poorly
conceived and executed those 20 years of war were,” Dempsey said. ”And today, to
see the U.S. “doubling down” on the worst of those wars, is “immensely
depressing.”
“We signed up [in 2001] because we thought we were doing this great, amazing
thing,” said Jackie Schneider, a Hoover Institution fellow and Air Force veteran
who served in South Korea and Japan. “And the results of that are complicated
and unclear. Did we ever accomplish what we set out for?”
That’s an answer that veterans don’t have an answer for, Schneider said. And
that’s “devastating for this generation,” she added.
The Department of Defense did not respond to requests for comment.
So far, Trump’s second presidency has been defined by a rapid succession of
military actions. He bombed Iranian nuclear facilities last June. In January, he
decapitated the Venezuelan government with the swift arrest of President Nicolás
Maduro.
But when it comes to Iran, Trump’s endgame is unclear. His administration has
touted ever-changing arguments for striking Iran: regime change, nuclear
capabilities, a hidden ballistic missile program. Meanwhile, on Sunday, Abbas
Araghchi, Iran’s foreign minister, dismissed Trump’s demand for surrender,
telling “Meet the Press” that Iran “will keep fighting for the sake of our
people.”
Already, more than 1,000 people have been killed in Iran; seven American
soldiers have died in action.
Veterans worry the body count will continue to escalate.
“Risking your life,” Dempsey said, “getting grievously injured or killed; a
friend or family member gets grievously injured or killed; for a [reason] that
the president can’t even articulate?
“People will [ask],” he continued, “Is my life to be used for one man’s whim?”
In the past few days, Cynthia Kao, a former U.S. Air Force reservist who served
in Afghanistan, has fielded dozens of phone calls within her veterans network.
The anxiety is palpable, she said. A few reservists told her they fear they will
be treated as “cannon fodder.”
“I am not afraid to die for my country,” is something Kao has heard from her
peers. “What I am afraid to do, is die for somebody who’s got their own agenda.”
LONDON — A U.K. minister hit out Tuesday at a planned march associated with the
Iranian regime due to take place in London this weekend.
The annual Al Quds Day rally, which has taken place since 1979, is scheduled for
Sunday.
Courts Minister Sarah Sackman told Times Radio: “I’m clear that hate on marches
like the Al Quds march has no place in British society. The authorities and the
police should take the enforcement action needed against these marches.”
Sackman said a decision about whether the march could happen would be made by
Home Secretary Shabana Mahmood and the police.
“I don’t want to see marches and the views expressed in this go ahead,” Sackman
said. “The decision’s not for me, but I’ve made my views very clear.”
Sackman later told LBC that marchers “shouldn’t be on the streets of London
calling for hate and hostility against this country. That’s thoroughly
anti-British.”
Organized by the Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC), the march is named
after the Arabic word for Jerusalem and part of a wider international event
expressing support for a Palestinian state and opposition to Israel.
A cross-party group of 90 politicians has called for Mahmood to ban the march,
claiming it would legitimize Tehran’s agenda and send an “unmistakably troubling
message” given the targeting of dissidents.
In a letter to Met Police Commissioner Mark Rowley dated Sunday IHRC Chair
Massoud Shadjareh hit back at what he described as “exaggerated and patently
false claims” that the march supports terrorism and antisemitism. The
demonstration has “always been good‑natured and peaceful,” Shadjareh added.
An explosion that rocked the U.S. embassy in Oslo early on Sunday morning could
have been terrorism, police in the Norwegian capital have said.
The blast occurred at 1 a.m. local time outside the embassy’s consular section,
causing no injuries and only minor damage. “One of the hypotheses is that it is
an act of terrorism,” Frode Larsen, head of the Oslo police investigation and
intelligence unit, told public broadcaster NRK.
Some U.S. politicians shared that assessment. House Intelligence Committee
Chairman Rick Crawford (R-Ark.) said the explosion “may have been a terrorist
attack.”
“We need to be very diligent about not only our security here at home, but
obviously targets around the world where there are U.S. assets including
embassies and so on,” he told Fox News.
Since the start of the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran on Feb. 28, Washington has
closed its embassies in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Kuwait and placed others on
high alert. An Iranian drone struck a parking lot near the U.S. embassy in Dubai
last week, while drone fire hit the U.S. embassy in Riyadh.
“We’ve been very fortunate, obviously, but our embassies and our diplomatic
facilities are under direct attack from a terroristic regime,” U.S. Secretary of
State Marco Rubio said at the time of the Dubai attack.
Separately, at least 10 people were killed and many more injured when U.S.
marines opened fire on protesters who attempted to storm the U.S. consulate in
Karachi, Pakistan on March 1, shortly after the U.S. and Israel began striking
Iran and assassinated Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
While police in Oslo have identified no suspects and no motive in the explosion
of the embassy there, Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre described it as a “very
serious and completely unacceptable” event.
Sen. Tim Kaine, (D-Va.), who sits on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
said Sunday that he’s been “in dialogue with State Department personnel around
the world” regarding escalated security at U.S. embassies and consulates.
“Other embassies or consulates have had protests that were merging toward
violence or at least frightening to our diplomats,” he said during an interview
with CBS.
Norwegian police didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment.
Ukraine on Friday accused Hungary of detaining seven employees of the
state-owned Oschadbank and seizing millions in cash and gold.
Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha said the seven Ukrainians were
transporting funds between Austria and Ukraine as part of a routine banking
operation when Hungarian authorities stopped the convoy in Budapest.
“In fact, we are talking about Hungary taking hostages and stealing money,”
Sybiha wrote on X. “If this is the ‘force’ announced earlier today by Mr. Orbán,
then it is the force of a criminal gang. This is state terrorism and
racketeering.”
Kyiv has sent a diplomatic note demanding the immediate release of the employees
and said it will ask the European Union to provide a legal assessment of
Hungary’s actions.
In an update later Friday, Sybiha said Ukrainian consuls have not been granted
access to the seven detainees. “The Hungarian side has not provided any
explanation,” he wrote. “We demand their immediate release and prepare next
actions, including at the EU level.”
Oschadbank said two armored vehicles were detained during a regular transfer
between Austria’s Raiffeisen Bank and the Ukrainian state lender. The shipment
included $40 million, €35 million and 9 kilograms of gold, the bank said.
GPS data shows the vehicles are located in central Budapest near a Hungarian
security facility, according to Oschadbank. The whereabouts of the seven
employees remain unknown.
Officials familiar with the situation, granted anonymity to speak freely, told
POLITICO the vehicles were located on the grounds of Hungary’s anti-terrorism
center in Budapest.
The incident comes amid a rapidly escalating dispute between Kyiv and Budapest
over oil flows through the Druzhba pipeline, which supplies Russian crude to
Hungary and Slovakia and has been disrupted after a January drone attack damaged
infrastructure in Ukraine.
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has accused Kyiv of blocking oil supplies
and vowed Thursday to “break the Ukrainian oil blockade by force.” Speaking on a
radio show Friday morning, Orbán warned: “We will also stop things that are
important to Ukraine passing through Hungary.”
Hungary’s Interior Ministry did not respond to a request for comment.
Veronika Melkozerova contributed to this report.
LONDON — The Iranian regime is warning it will attack European cities in any
country that joins Donald Trump’s military operation and governments across the
region are stepping up security in response.
So far, Iranian drones have already targeted Cyprus, with one striking a British
Royal Air Force base on the island, and others shot down before they could hit.
That prompted the U.K., France and Greece to send jets, warships and helicopters
to Cyprus to protect the country from further drone attacks.
But with the British, French and German leaders saying they are ready to launch
defensive military action in the Middle East, Tehran threatened to retaliate
against these countries with attacks on European soil.
“It would be an act of war. Any such act against Iran would be regarded as
complicity with the aggressors. It would be regarded as an act of war against
Iran,” Esmail Baghaei, Iran’s foreign ministry spokesperson, told Iranian state
media.
Mark Rutte, the former Dutch Prime Minister who now leads NATO, warned on
Tuesday that Tehran posed a threat that reached deep into Europe.
“Let’s be absolutely clear-eyed to what’s happening here,” Rutte said. “Iran is
close to getting its hands on a nuclear capability and on a ballistic missile
capability, which is posing a threat not only to the region — the Middle East,
including posing an existential threat to Israel — it is also posing a huge
threat to us here in Europe.” Iran is “an exporter of chaos” responsible over
decades for terrorist plots and assassination attempts, including against people
living on European soil, he said.
Here, POLITICO sets out what Iran is capable of, and where European countries
may be at greatest risk.
MISSILES AIMED AT ATHENS AND EVEN BERLIN
According to reports, Iran has been developing an intercontinental ballistic
missile with a range of 10,000 kilometers, which would put European and even
American territory potentially within range, said Antonio Giustozzi from the
Royal United Services Institute think tank in London. It is not clear whether,
under constant attack, Tehran would be able to manufacture and deploy an
experimental missile like this, he said.
“Realistically, the further away you fire them, the less precise they will be,”
Giustozzi told POLITICO. “Let’s say they had four or five long-range missiles.
There may be some value to target something in Europe just to create some
excitement and scare public opinion from intervening.”
Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal is known to include several medium-range
systems that stretch to roughly 2,000 kilometers, according to the Center for
Strategic and International Studies’ Missile Threat database.
The solid-fueled Sejjil and Khorramshahr missiles are both assessed to have
about that range, which would extend to parts of southeastern Europe from
Iranian territory, including areas of Greece, Bulgaria and Romania, depending on
the launch location.
Romania has a U.S. missile shield site at Deveselu in the southern part of the
country which was built to intercept potential missile attacks from Iran. This
week, military security was stepped up at the site, according to Romania’s
defense minister.
Tehran has long described 2,000 kilometers as a self-imposed ceiling for its
ballistic missile program — a limit that keeps most of Europe outside of the
envelope while preserving regional reach.
Defence Express, a Kyiv-based defense consultancy group, said the Khorramshahr
missile may be capable of hitting targets 3,000 kilometers away if it was fitted
with a lighter warhead, potentially bringing Berlin and Rome within range.
However, the number of such long-range missiles in Iran’s arsenal is unlikely to
be large.
‘SHAHED’ DRONES AND TOYS PACKED WITH EXPLOSIVES
Iran has invested heavily in drone development and production, and these
uncrewed projectiles may be its best flexible weapon. Iran’s “Shahed” drones
have been deployed by Russian forces since the early days of the full-scale
invasion of Ukraine. These one-way attack drones have a range claimed to be as
much as 2,500 kilometers.
To reach targets inside European territory they would need to fly at low
altitude across countries such as Turkey and Jordan, though Cyprus has already
found out it is within range. Analysts believe the drone that hit U.K.’s RAF
Akrotiri air base in Cyprus was likely a shahed-type, and may have been fired
from Lebanon by Hezbollah, Iran’s proxy.
But Giustozzi said commercially available drones — even toys — could be used to
cause havoc inside Europe. Iran is known to have a network of sleeper agents
operating across many countries in Europe, he said, who use criminal groups to
carry out attacks.
They could be tasked with a coordinated effort to fly drones over civilian
airports, forcing flights to be halted and causing chaos to air traffic across
Europe, he said. This would be cheap and easy to do. More ambitious attacks
could include striking military targets with drones loaded with explosives.
A residential building and cars are damaged by a Shahed drone attack in Kharkiv,
Ukraine, last month. The drones have been deployed by Russian forces since the
early days of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. | Pavlo Pakhomenko/NurPhoto
via Getty Images
But such risk may be low, Giustozzi said, as Iran may not have been able to
smuggle bomb making components into European countries as this has not been its
primary mode of operation in the region in recent years.
HIT SQUADS AND TERRORISTS
Tehran’s recent focus has been on intimidating and targeting people and groups
who are critical of the regime, particularly among the large Iranian diaspora
dispersed widely across European countries, according to analysts.
According to an intelligence summary from one Western government, Iran has a
long record of plots to assassinate and attack targets inside Europe. Its
state-sponsored terrorism involves a mix of direct operations by Iranian forces
and, according to the intelligence summary, a growing reliance on organized
criminal gangs to maintain “plausible deniability.”
In the past decade, incidents have included the arrest of Iranian diplomat
Assadollah Assadi for providing explosives to a couple tasked with bombing a
large rally of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI). Assadi was
sentenced to 20 years in prison.
After massive cyberattacks against state infrastructure, the Albanian government
formally severed all ties with Iran in 2022. Four years earlier, Albania
expelled the Iranian ambassador and several diplomats for plotting a truck bomb
attack against an Iranian dissident camp. The Dutch government accused Iran of
involvement in the targeted killing of two dissidents, in 2015 and 2017.
Suspected Iranian-backed assassination plots and other attacks have also been
reported in Belgium, Cyprus, France, Germany, Sweden, and the U.K., among other
countries in Europe.
CYBER ATTACKS
The threat to Europeans from Iran is not just physical, with the regime long
being regarded as a capable actor in cyber warfare.
Experts and officials warned Iran could launch fresh cyber operations against
Europe in the wake of the war started by the U.S. and Israel, either by
targeting governments directly or by hitting critical infrastructure operators.
“We have to monitor now the situation very carefully when it comes to our cyber
security and especially our critical infrastructure,” European Commission
Executive Vice President Henna Virkkunen told POLITICO. “We know that the online
dimension is also very important, the recruiting channel and especially the
propaganda is also spread very much online.”
Iran is typically seen as one of the big four cyber adversaries to the West —
alongside Russia, China and North Korea. So far, however, there is little
evidence to suggest it’s actively targeting Europe.
In fact, Iran’s cyber activity has largely stopped since the U.S. bombing began,
according to one senior European cybersecurity official, granted anonymity to
discuss ongoing assessments.
If and when European countries make their support for U.S. and Israeli
activities more explicit, that will likely draw them into the firing line, cyber
industry officials said. “Europe should definitely expect that exactly what
happened in the Gulf could happen and should happen in Europe,” said Gil
Messing, chief of staff at Israeli cyber firm Check Point.
EU Commissioner Henna Virkkunen spoke of the need to monitor cyber security and
especially critical infrastructure. | Thierry Monasse/Getty Images
Messing said his firm is already seeing evidence of cyberattacks in Cyprus, the
only EU country that Iran has targeted with physical attacks so far. There’s no
evidence of attacks in other European countries but it’s likely coming down the
tracks, he said.
And if attacks do take place, Iran’s capabilities, though lessened in recent
years, remain significant, experts said. Iran’s security and intelligence
services have cyber units comprising hundreds of people, with tens of millions
of dollars of funding, Messing said.
“If the regime lasts,” the senior official quoted above said, “they will be
back.”
Victor Goury-Laffont, Laura Kayali, Antoaneta Roussi, Joshua Berlinger and
Sebastian Starcevic contributed reporting.