Europe enters a more contested decade than any since the end of the Cold War. Yet the frontline shaping its security is no longer limited to land, sea, air or even space.   It runs directly through the digital backbone that powers modern life: the networks, data infrastructures and connectivity systems on which governments, economies and armed forces depend.  But Europe will not be secure until it takes this digital backbone’s security seriously, and governs its openness through risk-based, verifiable sovereignty rather than isolationism or complacency.  >  Europe will not be secure until it takes this digital backbone’s security > seriously, and governs its openness through risk-based, verifiable sovereignty A digital frontline that remains dangerously exposed  Hybrid threats no longer sit at the margins of European security. In reality, they cut straight through its core systems. Hospitals, energy grids, transport networks, financial markets and military command-and-control all rely on constant, resilient connectivity.   Via Vodafone. Joakim Reiter, group chief external and corporate affairs officer, Vodafone. And when those systems falter, nations falter. Recent blackouts in Portugal and Spain revealed what this means in practice. A ‘digital failure’ is not an IT incident. It is a national security event.   Adversaries have already drawn the lesson. Subsea cables carrying 95 percent of the world’s internet traffic face mounting sabotage risks. Satellites have become open theatres of geopolitical competition. And cyberattacks now routinely target both critical national infrastructure and the commercial networks that underpin defense readiness.   Despite this, much of Europe’s digital backbone is still approached as a utility, not a strategic asset. Market forces, on their own, cannot deliver the resilience, redundancy and diversity that modern deterrence requires. Piecemeal upgrades and fragmented responsibilities across civil, military and regulatory silos leave avoidable gaps that adversaries will inevitably exploit.  > A ‘digital failure’ is not an IT incident. It is a national security event.   Europe must therefore elevate secure connectivity to the level of defense preparedness — politically, financially and operationally. It requires moving beyond incrementalism to a coordinated framework that fosters and defends critical digital infrastructure — one that enables governments and operators to plan, train and respond together before, not during, the next crisis.  Sovereignty is about control, not isolation  Connectivity alone is not the issue. Europe’s strategic vulnerability also stems from how it governs the technologies on which its digital backbone depends.  And while digital sovereignty is one pillar of Europe’s wider resilience agenda — spanning critical value chains such as defense, automotive, chemicals and energy — it is the pillar without which none of the others can function.  Europe cannot attain digital sovereignty by continuing excessive dependence on a small number of non-European providers. But it also cannot achieve it by walling itself off from global innovation. Both extremes weaken resilience.  That’s why sovereignty done right means governing openness on Europe’s terms. Europe must keep critical operations in trusted European hands while maintaining access to the scale, performance and innovation that global platforms can provide.   This approach starts with understanding sovereignty across three dimensions:  — Data sovereignty: who has lawful access to information.  — Operational sovereignty: who runs and can intervene in critical systems.  — Technological sovereignty: which capabilities Europe must own or control.  The false choice between ‘ban foreign tech’ and ‘do nothing’ is a trap. The real path forward is risk-based, proportionate and verifiable. We must define what truly requires European control and work with like-minded international partners to build a trusted technology ecosystem. Sovereignty needs to be demonstrated in practice, not merely asserted in policy.  This approach would also enable Europe to pool industrial capacity with trusted partners such as Japan, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom and South Korea. This is cooperation that strengthens Europe rather than diluting control.   From principles to verifiable control  Europe should reject blanket bans based on EU borders that raise costs, slow next-generation deployment and fail to deliver true control. Instead, sovereignty must be translated into concrete, auditable mechanisms that strengthen resilience.   To deliver it, Europe should follow four core principles:   1. Harden the backbone: Europe must create a much better business case for investing in resilient fiber, advanced 5G technologies and future networks built with defense-grade security. And it must fortify subsea cables, satellite systems and cross-border infrastructure against hybrid threats. This is defense spending by another name.  2. Engineer sovereignty into operations: ensure Europe retains verifiable control over access to sensitive systems and require European oversight of critical operations. Authorities must be able to verify who operates critical systems, where data is processed and which legal jurisdiction applies.  3. Certify ‘Trusted European Operators’: establish an EU-wide certification enabling European-anchored providers to manage access to global platforms within EU-governed environments. Make interoperability and portability mandatory to prevent lock-in and ensure resilience.  4. End ‘sovereignty washing’: providers claiming sovereign capabilities must prove it. Europe must require auditable disclosures and rigorous, risk-based assessments. If claims cannot be verified, they should not determine Europe’s critical infrastructure decisions.  In parallel, Europe should adopt a single EU framework defining practical levels across the data, operational and technological dimensions. This would give CIOs, regulators and public bodies clarity and consistency.   From doctrine to delivery  As the dust settles on the annual Munich Security Conference, Europe faces a defining choice. It can carry on treating its digital backbone as regulatory plumbing and watch vulnerabilities compound. Or it can recognise this backbone for what it is — a core line of defence.  > The real test of seriousness is whether governments and operators can plan > together, train together and respond together when systems are stressed.  The real test of seriousness is whether governments and operators can plan together, train together and respond together when systems are stressed. And this depends on whether investment, procurement and certification systems finally move at the speed security demands.  The way forward lies neither in dependence nor in fantasies of self-sufficiency. It must be grounded in risk-based sovereignty, delivered through verifiable control, modernized infrastructure and deeper public–private cooperation, aligned with trustworthy allies.  Ultimately, Europe cannot defend what it cannot connect, and it cannot compete if it closes itself off. Europe will fail this critical strategic test if the regulatory agenda for connectivity — the Digital Networks Act, Cybersecurity Act and merger guidelines revisions — does little to strengthen the very networks its security depends on.  If Europe gets this right, it can build a digital backbone capable of deterring adversaries, supporting allies, protecting citizens and powering innovation for decades to come.  -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is Vodafone Group plc * The ultimate controlling entity is Vodafone Group plc * The political advertisement is linked to EU-level security and digital policy with particular focus on the Digital Networks Act, Cybersecurity Act, merger guidelines and broader digital sovereignty strategy. More information here.

“All we’ve got left now,” the Russian soldier said, “are radios, cables and pigeons.” A decision earlier this month by SpaceX to shut down access to Starlink satellite-internet terminals caused immediate chaos among Russian forces who had become increasingly reliant upon the Elon Musk-owned company’s technology to sustain their occupation of Ukraine, according to radio transmissions intercepted by a Ukrainian reconnaissance unit and shared with the Axel Springer Global Reporters Network, to which POLITICO belongs. The communications breakdown significantly constrained Russian military capabilities, creating new opportunities for Ukrainian forces. In the days following the shutdown, Ukraine recaptured roughly 77 square miles in the country’s southeast, according to calculations by the news agency Agence France-Presse based on data from the Washington-based Institute for the Study of War. SpaceX began requiring verification of Starlink terminals on Feb. 4, blocking unverified Russian units from accessing its services. Almost immediately, Ukrainian eavesdroppers heard Russian soldiers complaining about the failure of “Kosmos” and “Sinka” — apparently code names for Starlink satellite internet and the messaging service Telegram. “Damn it! Looks like they’ve switched off all the Starlinks,” one Russian soldier exclaimed. “The connection is gone, completely gone. The images aren’t being transmitted,” another shouted. Dozens of the recordings were played for Axel Springer Global Reporter Network reporters in an underground listening post maintained by the Bureviy Brigade in northeastern Ukraine. Neither SpaceX nor the Russian Foreign Ministry responded to requests for comment. “On the Russian side, we observed on the very day Starlink was shut down that artillery and mortar fire dropped drastically. Drone drops and FPV attacks also suddenly decreased,” said a Ukrainian aerial reconnaissance operator from the Bureviy Brigade who would agree to be identified only by the call sign Mustang, referring to first-person view drones. “Coordination between their units has also become more difficult since then.” The satellite internet network has become a crucial tool on the battlefield, sustaining high-tech drone operations and replacing walkie-talkies in low-tech combat. Since Russia’s February 2022 invasion, which destroyed much of Ukraine’s traditional communications infrastructure, Western governments have provided thousands of the Starlink units to Kyiv. With the portable terminals, there is no need to lay kilometers of cable that can be damaged by shelling or drone strikes. Drone footage can be transmitted in real time to command posts, artillery and mortar fire can be corrected with precision, and operational information can be shared instantly via encrypted messaging apps such as Signal or Telegram. At the outset of the Russian invasion, Starlink access gave Ukraine’s defenders a decisive operational advantage. Those in besieged Mariupol sent signs of life in spring 2022 via the backpack-size white dishes, and army units used them to coordinate during brutal house-to-house fighting in Bakhmut in 2023. Satellite internet became “one of, if not the most important components” of Ukraine’s way of war, according to military analyst Franz-Stefan Gady, an adviser to European governments and security agencies who regularly visits Ukrainian units. “Starlink constituted the backbone of connectivity that enabled accelerated kill chains by helping create a semi-transparent battlefield.” The operational advantages of Starlink did not go unnoticed by Russian forces. By the third year of the war, Starlink terminals were increasingly turning up in Russian-occupied territory. One of the first documented cases surfaced in January 2024 in the Serebryansky forest. Month by month, Ukrainian reconnaissance drones spotted more of the devices. The Ukrainian government subsequently contacted Musk’s company, urging it to block Russian access to the network. Mykhailo Fedorov, then digital minister and now defense minister, alleged Russian forces were acquiring the devices via third countries. “Ukraine will continue using Starlink, and Russian use will be restricted to the maximum extent possible,” Fedorov pledged in spring 2024. Yet Russian use of the terminals continued to grow throughout 2025, and their use was not limited to artillery or drone units. Even Russian infantry soldiers were carrying mini Starlink terminals in their backpacks. “We found Starlink terminals at virtually every Russian position along the contact line,” said Mustang. “At some point, it felt like the Russians had more devices than we did.” In the listening post this month, he scrolled through more than a dozen images from late 2025 showing Russian Starlink terminals set up between trees or beside the entrances to their positions. “We targeted their positions deliberately,” Mustang continued. “But even if we destroyed a terminal in the morning or evening, a new one was already installed by the next morning.” In the Russian-occupied eastern Ukrainian city of Kreminna, there was even a shop where soldiers could buy Starlink terminals starting in 2024. According to Ukrainian officials, these devices were not registered in Russia. SpaceX’s move in early February to enforce a stricter verification system effectively cut off unregistered Starlink terminals operating in Russian-occupied areas. Only devices approved and placed on a Ukrainian Ministry of Defense “whitelist” remained active, while terminals used by Russian forces were remotely deactivated. “That’s it, basically no one has internet at all,” a Russian soldier said in one of the messages played for Axel Springer reporters. “Everything’s off, everything’s off.” The temporary shutdown allowed Ukraine to slow the momentum of Vladimir Putin’s forces, although the localized counteroffensives do not represent a fundamental shift along the front. Soldiers from other Ukrainian units, including the Black Arrow battalion, confirmed the military consequences of the Starlink outage for Russian forces in their sectors in interviews with the Axel Springer Global Reporters Network. By mid-February, Russian shelling had increased again, though largely against frontline positions that had long been identified and precisely mapped — suggesting that Russia has yet to fully restore all of its lost capabilities. Now, analysts from the Bureviy Brigade say Russian forces are scrambling for alternatives. They have been forced to rely far more heavily on radio communication, according to Mustang, which creates additional opportunities for interception. Russian units will likely attempt to switch to their own satellite terminals. But their speed and connection quality are significantly lower, Mustang says. And because of their size, the devices are difficult to conceal.”The shutdown of Starlink, even if only of limited effect for now, highlights the limited ability of the Russian armed forces to rapidly implement ongoing cycles of innovation,” said Col. Markus Reisner of the Austrian Armed Forces. “This could represent a potential point of leverage for Western supporters to provide swift and sustainable support to Ukraine at this stage.“ The Axel Springer Global Reporters Network is a multi-publication initiative publishing scoops, investigations, interviews, op-eds and analysis that reverberate across the world. It connects journalists from Axel Springer brands — including POLITICO, Business Insider, WELT, BILD, and Onet — on major stories for an international audience. Its ambitious reporting stretches across Axel Springer platforms: online, print, TV, and audio. Together, these outlets reach hundreds of millions of people worldwide.

BRUSSELS — After years of looking at Turkey as a problem, the European Union is now viewing it as part of the solution. As negotiations for peace in Ukraine gather momentum, Turkey’s potential role in the post-war order — particularly as a peacekeeper and regional powerbroker in the Black Sea —makes it a critical partner for the EU. However, Brussels is taking baby steps with a country that has been backsliding on democracy and whose Islamist leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has jailed high-profile political opponents. In an attempt to thaw relations, Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos will visit Turkey on Friday. Ahead of her trip, Kos told POLITICO in a written statement: “Peace in Ukraine will change the realities in Europe, especially in the Black Sea region. Türkiye will be a very important partner for us.” “Preparing for peace and stability in Europe implies preparing a strong partnership with Türkiye,” she added. Turkey is a military heavyweight. It has the second-largest armed forces in NATO and holds a crucial strategic position in the Mediterranean and Middle East. Ankara’s control of the Bosphorus gives it immense sway over regional security, and it played a key role in brokering the Black Sea deal in July 2022 that granted safe passage to ships carrying Ukrainian grain. The country of 88 million people has also said it is willing to send peacekeeping troops to Ukraine if a deal is struck with Russia, and that it would take a leading role in Black Sea security.  However, relations between the EU and Turkey have deteriorated over the years, and have hardly been helped by Erdoğan’s lurch to autocracy and his crackdown on opposition mayors. Although officially a candidate to join the EU, the negotiations have been frozen since 2018. “In the latest EU enlargement reports we have seen steps away from EU standards, especially on the rule of law and democracy,” Kos said. “I know Türkiye has a very long democratic tradition and also a strong civil society, and this is what we need to see strengthened to build trust between the EU and Türkiye.” In Ankara, to take the first steps to a rapprochement, Kos will attend a ceremony in which the European Investment Bank and Turkey will sign off on €200 million in loans for renewable energy projects. The EIB suspended new lending to Turkey in 2019 because of a dispute over oil and gas drilling off Cyprus. Also on Friday, the Commission will unveil a study on “advancing a cross-regional connectivity agenda” with Turkey, Central Europe and the South Caucasus. The study, seen by POLITICO, maps out how investment is needed to strengthen transport, trade, energy and digital connections along the Trans-Caspian Corridor, which links China, Central Asia, the South Caucasus and the Black Sea. These are symbolic first steps toward bringing Ankara back into the fold, but they’re not what Turkey really wants from the EU — that would be an updated customs union agreement. The old deal was signed in 1995. New trade agreements signed by Brussels with India and the Mercosur group of South American countries put Turkey at a competitive disadvantage. Once they’re in place, Ankara will be forced to grant tariff-free access to goods from those countries, but that benefit won’t be reciprocated. Even Ekrem İmamoğlu, the democratically elected mayor of Istanbul, whose arrest last March triggered massive nationwide protests and international condemnation, weighed in in favor of upgrading the customs union deal. In a plea sent from his prison cell to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, European Council chief António Costa and Parliament President Roberta Metsola, İmamoğlu asked the EU to modernize the customs agreement with Turkey. “The Customs Union remains the only rules-based and normative framework underpinning Türkiye–EU relations,” İmamoğlu said in a social media post Thursday. “In the wake of EU free trade agreements with Mercosur and India, the asymmetrical consequences for Türkiye have become increasingly visible.” Updating Turkey’s deal would require buy-in from the European Council. However, Greece and Cyprus are staunchly opposed to warming relations without a goodwill gesture first from Ankara. Cyprus wants Ankara to allow its ships into Turkish ports, according to an EU official. Ankara does not recognize Cyprus due to the 1974 division of the island following a Turkish military invasion. “The strength of any future partnership needs to be underpinned by good political relations with our member states, and especially good neighbourly relations and relations with Cyprus,” Kos said. Cyprus’ deputy minister for European affairs, Marilena Raouna, told POLITICO that the country’s presidency of the Council of the EU “can be an opportunity” for EU-Turkey relations. She said Cyprus “has been constructive. And we look to Türkiye to also engage constructively.” So far, Ankara has shown little appetite to extend an olive branch. Last year it rejected Cyprus President Nikos Christodoulides’ proposal that Turkey open its ports to Cypriot-flagged ships in exchange for easier access to European visas for Turkish businesspeople. But U.S. President Donald Trump’s reshaping of geopolitical and trade relationships could push Europe and Turkey back toward one another. “The world is changing and history is accelerating. Türkiye-EU relations also need to adapt,” Turkey’s ambassador to the EU, Yaprak Balkan, told POLITICO. “The way these relations can become stronger is by building on mutual interests. We hope that we can build upon this philosophy in a very concrete manner. Türkiye’s strategic objective continues to be accession to the European Union and this should be the guiding light in our relations.” Restarting EU membership negotiations is not in the EU’s thinking just yet. Still, Kos said that “we need to look with fresh eyes at our relations” with the country. “My visit to Ankara … is about rebuilding trust and exploring how we can make our economic relationship work better for both sides.”

LONDON — Keir Starmer is off to China to try to lock in some economic wins he can shout about back home. But some of the trickiest trade issues are already being placed firmly in the “too difficult” box. The U.K.’s trade ministry quietly dispatched several delegations to Beijing over the fall to hash out deals with the Chinese commerce ministry and lay the groundwork for the British prime minister’s visit, which gets going in earnest Wednesday. But the visit comes as Britain faces growing pressure from its Western allies to combat Chinese industrial overproduction — and just weeks after Starmer handed his trade chief new powers to move faster in imposing tariffs on cheap, subsidized imports from countries like China. For now, then, the aim is to secure progress in areas that are seen as less sensitive. Starmer’s delegation of CEOs and chairs will split their time between Beijing and Shanghai, with executives representing City giants and high-profile British brands including HSBC, Standard Chartered, Schroders, and the London Stock Exchange Group, alongside AstraZeneca, Jaguar Land Rover, Octopus Energy, and Brompton filling out the cast list. Starmer will be flanked on his visit by Trade Secretary Peter Kyle and City Minister Lucy Rigby. Despite the weighty delegation, ministers insist the approach is deliberately narrow. “We have a very clear-eyed approach when it comes to China,” Security Minister Dan Jarvis said Monday. “Where it is in our national interest to cooperate and work closely with [China], then we will do so. But when it’s our national security interest to safeguard against the threats that [they] pose, we will absolutely do that.” Starmer’s wishlist will be carefully calibrated not to rock the boat. Drumming up Chinese cash for heavy energy infrastructure, including sensitive wind turbine technology, is off the table. Instead, the U.K. has been pushing for lower whisky tariffs, improved market access for services firms, recognition of professional qualifications, banking and insurance licences for British companies operating in China, easier cross-border investment, and visa-free travel for short stays. With China fiercely protective of its domestic market, some of those asks will be easier said than done. Here’s POLITICO’s pro guide to where it could get bumpy. CHAMPIONING THE CITY OF LONDON Britain’s share of China’s services market was a modest 2.7 percent in 2024 — and U.K. firms are itching for more work in the country. British officials have been pushing for recognition of professional qualifications for accountants, designers and architects — which would allow professionals to practice in China without re-licensing locally — and visa-free travel for short stays. Vocational accreditation is a “long-standing issue” in the bilateral relationship, with “little movement” so far on persuading Beijing to recognize U.K. professional credentials as equivalent to its own, according to a senior industry representative familiar with the talks, who, like others in this report, was granted anonymity to speak freely. But while the U.K.’s allies in the European Union and the U.S. have imposed tariffs on Chinese EVs, the U.K. has resisted pressure to do so. | Jessica Lee/EPA Britain is one of the few developed countries still missing from China’s visa-free list, which now includes France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Russia and Sweden.  Starmer is hoping to mirror a deal struck by Canadian PM Mark Carney, whose own China visit unlocked visa-free travel for Canadians.  The hope is that easier business travel will reduce friction and make it easier for people to travel and explore opportunities on the ground — it would allow visa-free travel for British citizens, giving them the ability to travel for tourism, attend business conferences, visit friends and family, and participate in short exchange activities.  SMOOTHING FINANCIAL FLOWS The Financial Conduct Authority’s Chair Ashley Alder is also flying out to Beijing, hoping to secure closer alignment between the two countries’ capital markets. He’ll represent Britain’s financial watchdog at the inaugural U.K-China Financial Working Group in Beijing — and bang the drum for better market connectivity between the U.K. and China. Expect emphasis on the cross-border investments mechanism known as the Shanghai-London and Shenzhen-London Stock Connect, plus data sovereignty issues associated with Chinese companies jointly listing on the London Stock Exchange, two figures familiar with the planning said. The Stock Connect opened up both markets to investors in 2019 which, according to FCA Chair Ashley Alder, led to listings worth almost $6 billion. “Technical obstacles have so far prevented us from realizing Stock Connect’s full potential,” Alder said in a speech last year. Alder pointed to a memorandum of understanding being drawn up between the FCA and China’s National Financial Regulatory Administration, which he said is “critical” to allow information to be shared quickly and for firms to be supervised across borders. But that raises its own concerns about Chinese use of data. “The goods wins are easier,” said a senior British business representative briefed on the talks. “Some of the service ones are more difficult.” TAPPING INTO CHINA’S BIOTECH BOOM Pharma executives, including AstraZeneca’s CEO Pascal Soriot, are among those heading to China, as Britain tries to burnish its credentials as a global life sciences hub — and attract foreign direct investment. China, once known mainly for generics — cheaper versions of branded medicine that deliver the same treatment — has rapidly emerged as a pharma powerhouse. According to ING Bank’s global healthcare lead, Stephen Farrelly, the country has “effectively replaced Europe” as a center of innovation. ING data shows China’s share of global innovative drug approvals jumped from just 4 percent in 2014 to 27 percent in 2024. Pharma executives, including AstraZeneca’s CEO Pascal Soriot, are among those heading to China, as Britain tries to burnish its credentials as a global life sciences hub — and attract foreign direct investment. | John G. Mabanglo/EPA Several blockbuster drug patents are set to expire in the coming years, opening the door for cheaper generic competitors. To refill thinning pipelines, drugmakers are increasingly turning to biotech companies. British pharma giant GSK signed a licensing deal with Chinese biotech firm Hengrui Pharma last July. “Because of the increasing relevance of China, the big pharma industry and the U.K. by definition is now looking to China as a source of those new innovative therapies,” Farrelly said. There are already signs of progress. Science Minister Patrick Vallance said late last year that the U.K. and China are ready to work together in “uncontroversial” areas, including health, after talks with his Chinese counterpart. AstraZeneca, the University of Cambridge and Beijing municipal parties have already signed a partnership to share expertise. And earlier this year, the U.K. announced plans to become a “global first choice for clinical trials.” “The U.K. can really help China with the trust gap” when it comes to getting drugs onto the market, said Quin Wills, CEO of Ochre, a biotech company operating in New York, Oxford and Taiwan. “The U.K. could become a global gold stamp for China. We could be like a regulatory bridgehead where [healthcare regulator] MHRA, now separate from the EU since Brexit, can do its own thing and can maybe offer a 150-day streamlined clinical approval process for China as part of a broader agreement.” SLASHING WHISKY TARIFFS  The U.K. has also been pushing for lowered tariffs on whisky alongside wider agri-food market access, according to two of the industry figures familiar with the planning cited earlier. Talks at the end of 2024 between then-Trade Secretary Jonathan Reynolds and his Chinese counterpart ended Covid-era restrictions on exports, reopening pork market access. But in February 2025 China doubled its import tariffs on brandy and whisky, removing its provisional 5 percent tariff and applying the 10 percent most-favored-nation rate. “The whisky and brandy issue became China leverage,” said the senior British business representative briefed on the talks. “I think that they’re probably going to get rid of the tariff.”  It’s not yet clear how China would lower whisky tariffs without breaching World Trade Organization rules, which say it would have to lower its tariffs to all other countries too. INDUSTRIAL TENSIONS The trip comes as the U.K. faces growing international pressure to take a tougher line on Chinese industrial overproduction, particularly of steel and electric cars. But in February 2025 China doubled its import tariffs on brandy and whisky, removing its provisional 5 percent tariff and applying the 10 percent most-favored-nation rate. | Yonhap/EPA But while the U.K.’s allies in the European Union and the U.S. have imposed tariffs on Chinese EVs, the U.K. has resisted pressure to do so. There’s a deal “in the works” between Chinese EV maker and Jaguar Land Rover, said the senior British business representative briefed on the talks quoted higher, where the two are “looking for a big investment announcement. But nothing has been agreed.” The deal would see the Chinese EV maker use JLR’s factory in the U.K. to build cars in Britain, the FT reported last week. “Chinese companies are increasingly focused on localising their operations,” said another business representative familiar with the talks, noting Chinese EV makers are “realising that just flaunting their products overseas won’t be a sustainable long term model.” It’s unlikely Starmer will land a deal on heavy energy infrastructure, including wind turbine technology, that could leave Britain vulnerable to China. The U.K. has still not decided whether to let Ming Yang, a Chinese firm, invest £1.5 billion in a wind farm off the coast of Scotland.

It seems impossible to have a conversation today without artificial intelligence (AI) playing some role, demonstrating the massive power of the technology. It has the potential to impact every part of business, and European policymakers are on board. In February 2025, Ursula von der Leyen, the European Commission president, said, “We want Europe to be one of the leading AI continents … AI can help us boost our competitiveness, protect our security, shore up public health, and make access to knowledge and information more democratic.” Research from Nokia suggests that businesses share this enthusiasm and ambition: 84 percent of more than 1,000 respondents said AI features in the growth strategy of their organization, while 62 percent are directing at least 20 percent of ICT capex budgets toward the technology. However, the equation is not yet balanced. Three-quarters of survey respondents state that current telecom infrastructure limits the ability to deliver on those ambitions. Meanwhile, 45 percent suggest these limitations would delay, constrain or entirely limit investments. There is clearly a disconnect between the ambition and the ability to deliver. At present, Europe lags the United States and parts of Asia in areas such as network deployment, related investment levels and scale. > If AI does not reach its full potential, EU competitiveness will suffer, > economic growth will have a ceiling, the creation of new jobs will have a > limit and consumers will not see the benefits. What we must remember primarily is that AI does not happen without advanced, trusted and future-proofed networks. Infrastructure is not a ‘nice to have’ it is a fundamental part. Simply put, today’s networks in Europe require more investments to power the AI dream we all have. If AI does not reach its full potential, EU competitiveness will suffer, economic growth will have a ceiling, the creation of new jobs will have a limit and consumers will not see the benefits. When we asked businesses about the challenge of meeting AI demands during our research, the lack of adequate connectivity infrastructure was the fourth common answer out of 15 potential options. Our telecom connectivity regulatory approach must be more closely aligned with the goal of fostering AI. That means progressing toward a genuine telecom single market, adopting a novel approach to competition policy to allow market consolidation to lead to more investments, and ensuring connectivity is always secure and trusted. Supporting more investments in next-generation networks through consolidation AI places heavy demands on networks. It requires low latency, high bandwidth and reliability, and efficient traffic management. To deliver this, Europe needs to accelerate investment in 5G standalone, fiber to enterprises, edge data centers and IP-optical backbone networks optimized for AI. > As industry voices such as Nokia have emphasized, the networks that power AI > must themselves make greater use of automation and AI. Consolidation (i.e. reducing the number of telecom operators within the national telecom markets of EU member states) is part of the solution. Consolidation will allow operators to achieve economies of scale and improve operating efficiency, therefore encouraging investment and catalyzing innovation. As industry voices such as Nokia have emphasized, the networks that power AI must themselves make greater use of automation and AI. Policy support should therefore extend to both network innovation and deployment. Trust: A precondition for AI adoption Intellectual property (IP) theft is a threat to Europe’s industrial future and only trusted technology should be used in core functions, systems and sectors (such as energy, transport and defense). In this context, the underlying connectivity should always be secure and trusted. The 5G Security Toolbox, restricting untrusted technology, should therefore be extended to all telecom technologies (including fiber, optics and IP) and made compulsory in all EU member states. European governments must make protecting their industries and citizens a high priority. Completing the digital single market Although the single market is one of Europe’s defining projects, the reality in telecoms — a key part of the digital single market — is still fragmented. As an example, different spectrum policies create barriers across borders and can limit network roll outs. Levers on top of advanced connectivity To enable the AI ecosystem in Europe, there are several different enabling levers European policymakers should advance on top of fostering advanced and trusted connectivity: * The availability of compute infrastructure. The AI Continent Action Plan, as well as the IPCEI Compute Infrastructure Continuum, and the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking should facilitate building AI data centers in Europe.   * Leadership in edge computing. There should also be clear support for securing Europe’s access to and leadership in edge solutions and building out edge capacity. Edge solutions increase processing speeds and are important for enabling AI adoption, while also creating a catalyst for economic growth. With the right data center capacity and edge compute capabilities available, European businesses can meet the new requirements of AI use cases.  * Harmonization of rules. There are currently implications for AI in several policy areas, including the AI Act, GDPR, Data Act, cybersecurity laws and sector-specific regulations. This creates confusion, whereas AI requires clarity. Simplification and harmonization of these regulations should be pursued.  * AI Act implementation and simplification. There are concerns about the implementation of the AI Act. The standards for high-risk AI may not be available before the obligations of the AI act enter into force, hampering business ambitions due to legal uncertainty. The application date of the AI Act’s provisions on high-risk AI should be postponed by two years to align with the development of standards. There needs to be greater clarity on definitions and simplification measures should be pursued across the entire ecosystem. Policies must be simple enough to follow, otherwise adoption may falter. Policy needs to act as an enabler, not a barrier to innovation.  * Upskilling and new skills. AI will require new skills of employees and users, as well as creating entirely new career paths. Europe needs to prepare for this new world.  If Europe can deliver on these priorities, the benefits will be tangible: improved services, stronger industries, increased competitiveness and higher economic growth. AI will deliver to those who best prepare themselves. We must act now with the urgency and consistency that the moment demands. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Author biography: Marc Vancoppenolle is leading the geopolitical and government relations EU and Europe function at Nokia. He and his team are working with institutions and stakeholders in Europe to create a favorable political and regulatory environment fostering broadband investments and cross sectoral digitalization at large. Vancoppenolle has over 30 years of experience in the telecommunication industry. He joined Alcatel in 1991, and then Alcatel-Lucent, where he took various international and worldwide technical, commercial, marketing, communication and government affairs leadership roles. Vancoppenolle is a Belgian and French national. He holds a Master of Science, with a specialization in telecommunication, from the University of Leuven complemented with marketing studies from the University of Antwerp. He is a member of the DIGITALEUROPE Executive Board, Associate to Nokia’s CEO at the ERT (European Round Table for Industry), and advisor to FITCE Belgium (Forum for ICT & Media professionals). He has been vice-chair of the BUSINESSEUROPE Digital Economy Taskforce as well as a member of the board of IICB (Innovation & Incubation Center Brussels).

A spat over in-flight Wi-Fi has spiralled into a public verbal brawl between Elon Musk and Ryanair CEO Michael O’Leary, pitting one of the world’s richest men against Europe’s most outspoken airline boss. The clash burst into the open after O’Leary dismissed Musk and his satellite internet business in a radio interview on Ireland’s Newstalk. Responding to Musk calling him “misinformed” over Ryanair’s refusal to install Starlink Wi-Fi, O’Leary told listeners he would “pay no attention whatsoever to Elon Musk.” “He’s an idiot — very wealthy, but still an idiot,” O’Leary said. He also described Musk’s social media platform X as a “cesspit.” Musk fired back on X, writing: “Ryanair CEO is an utter idiot. Fire him.” In a follow-up post, he accused O’Leary of getting Starlink’s fuel-burn impact wrong “by a factor of 10” and added: “Fire this imbecile.” Ryanair’s official X account also joined the fray, mocking Musk during a reported outage on his platform, replying: “perhaps you need Wi-Fi @elonmusk?” Behind the insults lies a substantive dispute about costs and aircraft performance. Ryanair has publicly ruled out installing Starlink across its more than 600 Boeing 737s, arguing the external antennas would increase drag and fuel consumption. O’Leary has said the technology would impose around a 2 percent fuel penalty and could cost the airline hundreds of millions of dollars a year, a trade-off he says makes little sense on short-haul flights where passengers are unlikely to pay for connectivity. Musk disputes those figures, pointing to airlines already flying with Starlink-equipped aircraft and arguing that fast internet will increasingly shape passenger choice.

In the desolate Arctic desert of Kangerlussuaq, Greenland, Europeans are building defenses against a new, up-and-coming security threat: space hacks. A Lithuanian company called Astrolight is constructing a ground station, with support from the European Space Agency, that will use laser beams to download voluminous data from satellites in a fast and secure manner, it announced last month.  It’s just one example of how Europe is moving to harden the security of its satellites, as rising geopolitical tensions and an expanding spectrum of hybrid threats are pushing space communications to the heart of the bloc’s security plans. For years, satellite infrastructure was treated by policymakers as a technical utility rather than a strategic asset. That changed in 2022, when a cyberattack on the Viasat satellite network coincided with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.   Satellites have since become popular targets for interference, espionage and disruption. The European Commission in June warned that space was becoming “more contested,” flagging increasing cyberattacks and attempts at electronic interference targeting satellites and ground stations. Germany and the United Kingdom warned earlier this year of the growing threat posed by Russian and Chinese space satellites, which are regularly spotted spying on their satellites.  EU governments are now racing to boost their resilience and reduce reliance on foreign technology, both through regulations like the new Space Act and investments in critical infrastructure. The threat is crystal clear in Greenland, Laurynas Mačiulis, the chief executive officer of Astrolight, said. “The problem today is that around 80 percent of all the [space data] traffic is downlinked to a single location in Svalbard, which is an island shared between different countries, including Russia,” he said in an interview. Europe’s main Arctic ground station sits in Svalbard and supports both the navigation systems of Galileo and Copernicus. While the location is strategic, it is also extremely sensitive due to nearby Russian and Chinese activities. Crucially, the station relies on a single undersea cable to connect to the internet, which has been damaged several times. “In case of intentional or unintentional damage of this cable, you lose access to most of the geo-intelligence satellites, which is, of course, very critical. So our aim is to deploy a complementary satellite ground station up in Greenland,” Mačiulis said. THE MUSK OF IT ALL A centerpiece of Europe’s ambitions to have secure, European satellite communication is IRIS², a multibillion-euro secure connectivity constellation pitched in 2022 and designed to rival Elon Musk’s Starlink system. “Today, communications — for instance in Ukraine — are far too dependent on Starlink,” said Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the founding chairman of political consultancy Rasmussen Global, speaking at an event in Brussels in November. “That dependence rests on the shifting ideas of an American billionaire. That’s too risky. We have to build a secure communications system that is independent of the United States.” The European system, which will consist of 18 satellites operating in low and medium Earth orbit, aims to provide Europe with fast and encrypted communication. “Even if someone intercepts the signal [of IRIS² ], they will not be able to decrypt it,” Piero Angeletti, head of the Secure Connectivity Space Segment Office at the European Space Agency, told POLITICO. “This will allow us to have a secure system that is also certified and accredited by the national security entities.” The challenge is that IRIS² is still at least four years away from becoming operational. WHO’S IN CHARGE? While Europe beefs up its secure satellite systems, governments are still streamlining how they can coordinate cyber defenses and space security. In many cases, that falls to both space or cyber commands, which, unlike traditional military units, are relatively new and often still being built out. Clémence Poirier, a cyberdefense researcher at the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich, said that EU countries must now focus on maturing them. “European states need to keep developing those commands,” she told POLITICO. “Making sure that they coordinate their action, that there are clear mandates and responsibilities when it comes to cyber security, cyber defensive operations, cyber offensive operations, and also when it comes to monitoring the threat.” Industry, too, is struggling to fill the gaps. Most cybersecurity firms do not treat space as a sector in its own right, leaving satellite operators in a blind spot. Instead, space systems are folded into other categories: Earth-observation satellites often fall under environmental services, satellite TV under media, and broadband constellations like Starlink under internet services. That fragmentation makes it harder for space companies to assess risk, update threat models or understand who they need to defend against. It also complicates incident response: while advanced tools exist for defending against cyberattacks on terrestrial networks, those tools often do not translate well to space systems. “Cybersecurity in space is a bit different,” Poirier added. “You cannot just implement whatever solution you have for your computers on Earth and just deploy that to your satellite.”

The Radio Spectrum Policy Group’s (RSPG) Nov. 12 opinion on the upper 6-GHz band is framed as a long-term strategic vision for Europe’s digital future. But its practical effect is far less ambitious: it grants mobile operators a cost-free reservation of one of Europe’s most valuable spectrum resources, without deployment obligations, market evidence or a realistic plan for implementation. > At a moment when Europe is struggling to accelerate the deployment of digital > infrastructure and close the gap with global competitors, this decision > amounts to a strategic pause dressed up as policy foresight. The opinion even invites the mobile industry to develop products for the upper 6-GHz band, when policy should be guided by actual market demand and product deployment, not the other way around. At a moment when Europe is struggling to accelerate the deployment of digital infrastructure and close the gap with global competitors, this decision amounts to a strategic pause dressed up as policy foresight. The cost of inaction is real. Around the world, advanced 6-GHz Wi-Fi is already delivering high-capacity, low-latency connectivity. The United States, Canada, South Korea and others have opened the 6-GHz band for telemedicine, automated manufacturing, immersive education, robotics and a multitude of other high-performance Wi-Fi connectivity use cases. These are not experimental concepts; they are operational deployments generating tangible socioeconomic value. Holding the upper 6- GHz band in reserve delays these benefits at a time when Europe is seeking to strengthen competitiveness, digital inclusion, and digital sovereignty. The opinion introduces another challenge by calling for “flexibility” for member states. In practice, this means regulatory fragmentation across 27 markets, reopening the door to divergent national spectrum policies — precisely the outcome Europe has spent two decades trying to avert with the Digital Single Market. > Without a credible roadmap, reserving the band for hypothetical cellular > networks only exacerbates policy uncertainty without delivering progress. Equally significant is what the opinion does not address. The upper 6-GHz band is already home to ‘incumbents’: fixed links and satellite services that support public safety, government operations and industrial connectivity. Any meaningful mobile deployment would require refarming these incumbents — a technically complex, politically sensitive and financially burdensome process. To date, no member state has proposed a viable plan for how such relocation would proceed, how much it would cost or who would pay. Without a credible roadmap, reserving the band for hypothetical cellular networks only exacerbates policy uncertainty without delivering progress. There is, however, a pragmatic alternative. The European Commission and the member states committed to advancing Europe’s connectivity can allow controlled Wi-Fi access to the upper 6-GHz band now — bringing immediate benefits for citizens and enterprises — while establishing clear, evidence-based criteria for any future cellular deployments. Those criteria should include demonstrated commercial viability, validated coexistence with incumbents, and fully funded relocation plans where necessary. This approach preserves long-term policy flexibility for member states and mobile operators, while ensuring that spectrum delivers measurable value today rather than being held indefinitely in reserve. > Spectrum is not an abstract asset. RSPG itself calls it a scarce resource that > must be used efficiently, but this opinion falls short of that principle. Spectrum is not an abstract asset. RSPG itself calls it a scarce resource that must be used efficiently, but this opinion falls short of that principle. Spectrum underpins Europe’s competitiveness, connectivity, and digital innovation. But its value is unlocked through use, not by shelving it in anticipation that hypothetical future markets might someday justify withholding action now. To remain competitive in the next decade, Europe needs a 6-GHz policy grounded in evidence, aligned with the single market, and focused on real-world impact. The upper 6-GHz band should be a driver of European innovation, not the latest casualty of strategic hesitation. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is Wi-Fi Alliance * The ultimate controlling entity is Wi-Fi Alliance More information here.

When the Franco-German summit concluded in Berlin, Europe’s leaders issued a declaration with a clear ambition: strengthen Europe’s digital sovereignty in an open, collaborative way. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s call for “Europe’s Independence Moment” captures the urgency, but independence isn’t declared — it’s designed. The pandemic exposed this truth. When Covid-19 struck, Europe initially scrambled for vaccines and facemasks, hampered by fragmented responses and overreliance on a few external suppliers. That vulnerability must never be repeated. True sovereignty rests on three pillars: diversity, resilience and autonomy. > True sovereignty rests on three pillars: diversity, resilience and autonomy. Diversity doesn’t mean pulling every factory back to Europe or building walls around markets. Many industries depend on expertise and resources beyond our borders. The answer is optionality, never putting all our eggs in one basket. Europe must enable choice and work with trusted partners to build capabilities. This risk-based approach ensures we’re not hostage to single suppliers or overexposed to nations that don’t share our values. Look at the energy crisis after Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. Europe’s heavy reliance on Russian oil and gas left economies vulnerable. The solution wasn’t isolation, it was diversification: boosting domestic production from alternative energy sources while sourcing from multiple markets. Optionality is power. It lets Europe pivot when shocks hit, whether in energy, technology, or raw materials. Resilience is the art of prediction. Every system inevitably has vulnerabilities. The key is pre-empting, planning, testing and knowing how to recover quickly. Just as banks undergo stress tests, Europe needs similar rigor across physical and digital infrastructure. That also means promoting interoperability between networks, redundant connectivity links (including space and subsea cables), stockpiling critical components, and contingency plans. Resilience isn’t theoretical. It’s operational readiness. Finally, Europe must exercise authority through robust frameworks, such as authorization schemes, local licensing and governance rooted in EU law. The question is how and where to apply this control. On sensitive data, for example, sovereignty means ensuring it’s held in Europe under European jurisdiction, without replacing every underlying technology component. Sovereign solutions shouldn’t shut out global players. Instead, they should guarantee that critical decisions and compliance remain under European authority. Autonomy is empowerment, limiting external interference or denial of service while keeping systems secure and accountable. But let’s be clear: Europe cannot replicate world-leading technologies, platforms or critical components overnight. While we have the talent, innovation and leading industries, Europe has fallen significantly behind in a range of key emerging technologies. > While we have the talent, innovation and leading industries, Europe has fallen > significantly behind in a range of key emerging technologies. For example, building fully European alternatives in cloud and AI would take decades and billions of euros, and even then, we’d struggle to match Silicon Valley or Shenzhen. Worse, turning inward with protectionist policies would only weaken the foundations that we now seek to strengthen. “Old wines in new bottles” — import substitution, isolationism, picking winners — won’t deliver competitiveness or security. Contrast that with the much-debated US Inflation Reduction Act. Its incentives and subsidies were open to EU companies, provided they invest locally, develop local talent and build within the US market. It’s not about flags, it’s about pragmatism: attracting global investments, creating jobs and driving innovation-led growth. So what’s the practical path? Europe must embrace ‘sovereignty done right’, weaving diversity, resilience and autonomy into the fabric of its policies. That means risk-based safeguards, strategic partnerships and investment in European capabilities while staying open to global innovation. Trusted European operators can play a key role: managing encryption, access control and critical operations within EU jurisdiction, while enabling managed access to global technologies. To avoid ‘sovereignty washing’, eligibility should be based on rigorous, transparent assessments, not blanket bans. The Berlin summit’s new working group should start with a common EU-wide framework defining levels of data, operational and technological sovereignty. Providers claiming sovereign services can use this framework to transparently demonstrate which levels they meet. Europe’s sovereignty will not come from closing doors. Sovereignty done right will come from opening the right ones, on Europe’s terms. Independence should be dynamic, not defensive — empowering innovation, securing prosperity and protecting freedoms. > Europe’s sovereignty will not come from closing doors. Sovereignty done right > will come from opening the right ones, on Europe’s terms. That’s how Europe can build resilience, competitiveness and true strategic autonomy in a vibrant global digital ecosystem.

Europe’s security does not depend solely on our physical borders and their defense. It rests on something far less visible, and far more sensitive: the digital networks that keep our societies, economies and democracies functioning every second of the day. > Without resilient networks, the daily workings of Europe would grind to a > halt, and so too would any attempt to build meaningful defense readiness. A recent study by Copenhagen Economics confirms that telecom operators have become the first line of defense in Europe’s security architecture. Their networks power essential services ranging from emergency communications and cross-border healthcare to energy systems, financial markets, transport and, increasingly, Europe’s defense capabilities. Without resilient networks, the daily workings of Europe would grind to a halt, and so too would any attempt to build meaningful defense readiness. This reality forces us to confront an uncomfortable truth: Europe cannot build credible defense capabilities on top of an economically strained, structurally fragmented telecom sector. Yet this is precisely the risk today. A threat landscape outpacing Europe’s defenses The challenges facing Europe are evolving faster than our political and regulatory systems can respond. In 2023 alone, ENISA recorded 188 major incidents, causing 1.7 billion lost user-hours, the equivalent of taking entire cities offline. While operators have strengthened their systems and outage times fell by more than half in 2024 compared with the previous year, despite a growing number of incidents, the direction of travel remains clear: cyberattacks are more sophisticated, supply chains more vulnerable and climate-related physical disruptions more frequent. Hybrid threats increasingly target civilian digital infrastructure as a way to weaken states. Telecom networks, once considered as technical utilities, have become a strategic asset essential to Europe’s stability. > Europe cannot deploy cross-border defense capabilities without resilient, > pan-European digital infrastructure. Nor can it guarantee NATO > interoperability with 27 national markets, divergent rules and dozens of > sub-scale operators unable to invest at continental scale. Our allies recognize this. NATO recently encouraged members to spend up to 1.5 percent of their GDP on protecting critical infrastructure. Secretary General Mark Rutte also urged investment in cyber defense, AI, and cloud technologies, highlighting the military benefits of cloud scalability and edge computing – all of which rely on high-quality, resilient networks. This is a clear political signal that telecom security is not merely an operational matter but a geopolitical priority. The link between telecoms and defense is deeper than many realize. As also explained in the recent Arel report, Much More than a Network, modern defense capabilities rely largely on civilian telecom networks. Strong fiber backbones, advanced 5G and future 6G systems, resilient cloud and edge computing, satellite connectivity, and data centers form the nervous system of military logistics, intelligence and surveillance. Europe cannot deploy cross-border defense capabilities without resilient, pan-European digital infrastructure. Nor can it guarantee NATO interoperability with 27 national markets, divergent rules and dozens of sub-scale operators unable to invest at continental scale. Fragmentation has become one of Europe’s greatest strategic vulnerabilities. The reform Europe needs: An investment boost for digital networks At the same time, Europe expects networks to become more resilient, more redundant, less dependent on foreign technology and more capable of supporting defense-grade applications. Security and resilience are not side tasks for telecom operators, they are baked into everything they do. From procurement and infrastructure design to daily operations, operators treat these efforts as core principles shaping how networks are built, run and protected. Therefore, as the Copenhagen Economics study shows, the level of protection Europe now requires will demand substantial additional capital. > It is unrealistic to expect world-class, defense-ready infrastructure to > emerge from a model that has become structurally unsustainable. This is the right ambition, but the economic model underpinning the sector does not match these expectations. Due to fragmentation and over-regulation, Europe’s telecom market invests less per capita than global peers, generates roughly half the return on capital of operators in the United States and faces rising costs linked to expanding security obligations. It is unrealistic to expect world-class, defense-ready infrastructure to emerge from a model that has become structurally unsustainable. A shift in policy priorities is therefore essential. Europe must place investment in security and resilience at the center of its political agenda. Policy must allow this reality to be reflected in merger assessments, reduce overlapping security rules and provide public support where the public interest exceeds commercial considerations. This is not state aid; it is strategic social responsibility. Completing the single market for telecommunications is central to this agenda. A fragmented market cannot produce the secure, interoperable, large-scale solutions required for modern defense. The Digital Networks Act must simplify and harmonize rules across the EU, supported by a streamlined governance that distinguishes between domestic matters and cross-border strategic issues. Spectrum policy must also move beyond national silos, allowing Europe to avoid conflicts with NATO over key bands and enabling coherent next-generation deployments. Telecom policy nowadays is also defense policy. When we measure investment gaps in digital network deployment, we still tend to measure simple access to 5G and fiber. However, we should start considering that — if security, resilience and defense-readiness are to be taken into account — the investment gap is much higher that the €200 billion already estimated by the European Commission. Europe’s strategic choice The momentum for stronger European defense is real — but momentum fades if it is not seized. If Europe fails to modernize and secure its telecom infrastructure now, it risks entering the next decade with a weakened industrial base, chronic underinvestment, dependence on non-EU technologies and networks unable to support advanced defense applications. In that scenario, Europe’s democratic resilience would erode in parallel with its economic competitiveness, leaving the continent more exposed to geopolitical pressure and technological dependency. > If Europe fails to modernize and secure its telecom infrastructure now, it > risks entering the next decade with a weakened industrial base, chronic > underinvestment, dependence on non-EU technologies and networks unable to > support advanced defense applications. Europe still has time to change course and put telecoms at the center of its agenda — not as a technical afterthought, but as a core pillar of its defense strategy. The time for incremental steps has passed. Europe must choose to build the network foundations of its security now or accept that its strategic ambitions will remain permanently out of reach. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is Connect Europe AISBL * The ultimate controlling entity is Connect Europe AISBL * The political advertisement is linked to advocacy on EU digital, telecom and industrial policy, including initiatives such as the Digital Networks Act, Digital Omnibus, and connectivity, cybersecurity, and defence frameworks aimed at strengthening Europe’s digital competitiveness. More information here.