LONDON — The U.K. government is “dragging its heels” on whether to classify China as a major threat to Britain’s national security, the parliament’s intelligence watchdog warned on Monday. Lawmakers on the Intelligence and Security Committee — which has access to classified briefings as part of its work overseeing Britain’s intelligence services — said they are “concerned” by apparent inaction over whether to designate Beijing as a top-level threat when it comes to influencing Britain. Ministers have been under pressure to put China on the “enhanced tier” of Britain’s Foreign Influence Registration Scheme — a tool to protect the economy and society from covert hostile activity. Both Iran and Russia have been placed on the top tier, which adds a new layer of restrictions and accountability to their activities in Britain. The government has so far resisted calls to add China to that list, even though Beijing has been accused of conducting state-threat activities in the U.K. such as industrial espionage, cyber-attacks and spying on politicians.  In its annual report the Committee said British intelligence agency MI5 had previously told them that measures like the registration scheme would “have proportionately more effect against … Chinese activity.” The Committee said “hostile activity by Russian, Iranian and Chinese state-linked actors is multi-faceted and complex,” adding that the threat of “state-sponsored assassination, attacks and abductions” of perceived dissidents has “remained at a higher level than we have seen in previous years.”  It added that while there are “a number of difficult trade-offs involved” when dealing with Beijing, it has “previously found that the Government has been reluctant to prioritise security considerations when it comes to China.” “The Government should swiftly come to a decision on whether to add China to the Enhanced Tier of the [Foreign Influence Registration Scheme],” the Committee said, demanding that it be provided a “full account” to “ensure that security concerns have not been overlooked in favour of economic considerations.” The pressure comes as U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer prepares to visit China in January — the first British leader to visit the country since Theresa May in 2018.  A government spokesperson said: “National security is the first duty of this government. We value the [Intelligence and Security Committee]’s independent oversight and the thoroughness of their scrutiny. “This report underscores the vital, complex work our agencies undertake daily to protect the UK. “This Government is taking a consistent, long term and strategic approach to managing the UK’s relations with China, rooted in UK and global interests. We will cooperate where we can and challenge where we must.”

LONDON — On the face of it, the new MI6 chief’s first speech featured many of the same villains and heroes as those of her predecessors. But in her first public outing Monday, Blaise Metreweli, the first female head of the U.K.’s foreign intelligence service, sent a strong signal that she intends to put her own stamp on the role – as she highlighted a wave of inter-connected threats to western democracies. Speaking at MI6’s HQ in London, Metreweli, who took over from Richard Moore in October, highlighted a confluence of geo-political and technological disruptions, warning “the frontline is everywhere” and adding “we are now operating in a space between peace and war.” In a speech shot through with references to a shifting transatlantic order and the growth of disinformation, Metreweli made noticeably scant  reference to the historically close relationship with the U.S. in intelligence gathering — the mainstay of the U.K.’s intelligence compact for decades. Instead, she highlighted that a “new bloc and identities are forming and alliances reshaping.” That will be widely seen to reflect an official acknowledgement that the second Donald Trump administration has necessitated a shift in the security services towards cultivating more multilateral relationships. By comparison with a lengthy passage on the seriousness of the Russia threat to Britain, China got away only with a light mention of its cyber attack tendencies towards the U.K. — and was referred to more flatteringly as “a country where a central transformation  is  taking place this century.” Westminster hawks will note that Metreweli — who grew up in Hong Kong and  so knows the Chinese system close-up — walked gingerly around the risk of conflict in the  South China Sea and Beijing’s espionage activities targeting British politicians – and even its royals. In a carefully-placed line, she reflected that she was  “going to break with tradition and won’t give you a global threat tour.” Moore, her predecessor, was known for that approach, which delighted those who enjoyed a plain-speaking MI6 boss giving pithy analysis of global tensions and their fallout, but frustrated some in the Foreign Office who believed the affable Moore could be too unguarded in his comments on geo-politics. The implicit suggestion from the new chief was that China needs to be handled differently to the forthright engagement with “aggressive, expansionist and revisionist” Russia. The reasons may well lie in the aftermath of a bruising argument within Whitehall about how to handle the recent case of two Britons who were arrested for spying for China, and with a growth-boosting visit to Beijing by the prime minister scheduled for 2026. Sources in the service suggest the aim of the China strategy is to avoid confrontation, the better to further intelligence-gathering and have a more productive economic relationship with Beijing. More hardline interpreters of the Secret Intelligence Service will raise eyebrows at her suggestion that the “convening power” of the service would enable it to “ defuse tensions.” But there was no doubt about Metreweli’s deep concern at the impacts of social-media disinformation and distortion, in a framing which seemed just as worried about U.S. tech titans as conventional state-run threats:  “We are being contested from battlefield to boardroom — and even our brains — as disinformation manipulates our understanding of each other.” Declaring that “some  algorithms become as powerful as states,” seemed to tilt at outfits like Elon Musk’s X and Mark Zuckerberg’s Meta-owned Facebook. Metreweli warned that “hyper personalized tools could become a new vector for conflict and control,” pushing their effects on societies and individuals  in “minutes not months – my service must operate in this new context too.” The new boss used the possessive pronoun, talking about “my service” in her speech several times – another sign that she intends to put a distinctive mark of the job, now that she has, at the age of just 48,  inherited the famous green-ink pen in which the head of the service signs correspondence.  Metreweli is experienced operator in war zones including Iraq who spent a secondment with MI5, the domestic intelligence service, and won the job in large part because of her experience in the top job via MI6’s science and technology “Q”  Branch. She clearly wants to expedite changes in the service – saying agents must be as fluent in computer coding as foreign languages. She is also expected to try and address a tendency in the service to harvest information, without a clear focus on the action that should follow – the product of a glut of intelligence gathered via digital means and AI. She  was keen to stress that the human factor is at the heart of it all — an attempt at reassurance for spies and analysts wondering if they might be replaced by AI agents as the job of gathering intelligence in the era of facial recognition and biometrics gets harder.  Armed with a steely gaze Metreweli speaks fluent human, occasionally with a small smile. She is also the first incumbent of the job to wear a very large costume jewelry beetle brooch on her sombre navy attire. No small amount of attention in Moscow and Beijing could go into decoding that.

DUBLIN — Neutral and poorly armed Ireland — long viewed as “Europe’s blind spot” — announced Thursday it will spend €1.7 billion on improved military equipment, capabilities and facilities to deter drones and potential Russian sabotage of undersea cables. The five-year plan, published as Defense Minister Helen McEntee visited the Curragh army base near Dublin,  aims in part to reassure European allies that their leaders will be safe from attack when Ireland — a non-NATO member largely dependent on neighboring Britain for its security — hosts key EU summits in the second half of next year. McEntee said Ireland intends to buy and deploy €19 million in counter-drone technology “as soon as possible, not least because of the upcoming European presidency.” Ireland’s higher military spending — representing a 55 percent increase from previous commitments — comes barely a week after a visit by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy exposed Ireland’s inability to secure its own seas and skies. Five unmarked drones buzzed an Irish naval vessel supposed to be guarding the flight path of Zelenskyy’s plane shortly after the Ukrainian leader touched down at Dublin Airport. The Irish ship didn’t fire at the drones, which eventually disappeared. Irish authorities have been unable to identify their source, but suspect that they were operated from an unidentified ship later spotted in European Space Agency satellite footage. The Russian embassy in Dublin denied any involvement. Ireland’s navy has just eight ships, but sufficient crews to operate only two at a time, even though the country has vast territorial waters containing critical undersea infrastructure and pipelines that supply three-fourths of Ireland’s natural gas. The country has no fighter jets and no military-grade radar and sonar. Some but not all of those critical gaps will be plugged by 2028, McEntee pledged. She said Ireland would roll out military-grade radar starting next year, buy sonar systems for the navy, and acquire up to a dozen helicopters, including four already ordered from Airbus. The army would upgrade its Swiss-made fleet of 80 Piranha III armored vehicles and develop drone and anti-drone units. The air force’s fixed-wing aircraft will be replaced by 2030 — probably by what would be Ireland’s first wing of combat fighters. Thursday’s announcement coincided with publication of an independent assessment of Ireland’s rising security vulnerabilities on land, sea and air. The report, coauthored by the Dublin-based think tank IIEA and analysts at Deloitte, found that U.S. multinationals operating in Ireland were at risk of cyberattacks and espionage by Russian, Chinese and Indian intelligence agents operating in the country.

Denmark’s military intelligence service has for the first time classified the U.S. as a security risk, a striking shift in how one of Washington’s closest European allies assesses the transatlantic relationship. In its 2025 intelligence outlook published Wednesday, the Danish Defense Intelligence Service warned that the U.S. is increasingly prioritizing its own interests and “using its economic and technological strength as a tool of power,” including toward allies and partners. “The United States uses economic power, including in the form of threats of high tariffs, to enforce its will and no longer excludes the use of military force, even against allies,” it said, in a pointed reference to Washington trying to wrest control of Greenland from Denmark. The assessment is one of the strongest warnings about the U.S. to come from a European intelligence service. In October, the Dutch spies said they had stopped sharing some intelligence with their U.S. counterparts, citing political interference and human rights concerns. The Danish warning underscores European unease as Washington leverages industrial policy more aggressively on the global stage, and highlights the widening divide between the allies, with the U.S. National Security Strategy stating that Europe will face the “prospect of civilizational erasure” within the next 20 years. The Danish report also said that “there is uncertainty about how China-U.S. relations will develop in the coming years” as Beijing’s rapid rise has eroded the U.S.’s long-held position as the undisputed global power. Washington and Beijing are now locked in a contest for influence, alliances and critical resources, which has meant the U.S. has “significantly prioritized” the geographical area around it — including the Arctic — to reduce China’s influence. “The USA’s increasingly strong focus on the Pacific Ocean is also creating uncertainty about the country’s role as the primary guarantor of security in Europe,” the report said. “The USA’s changed policy places great demands on armaments and cooperation between European countries to strengthen deterrence against Russia.” In the worst-case scenario, the Danish intelligence services predict that Western countries could find themselves in a situation in a few years where both Russia and China are ready to fight their own regional wars in the Baltic Sea region and the Taiwan Strait, respectively.

BERLIN — Germany will launch a new federal counter-drone unit as concerns mount over a surge of suspicious drones overflying military sites and critical infrastructure, Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt said Tuesday. The formation will be part of the federal police’s national special operations arm, and will be trained and certified specifically for drone detection and neutralization, Dobrindt said at an event outside Berlin. The unit will eventually grow to 130 officers, deployed across Germany and moved quickly to hot spots when needed. Germany has over €100 million budgeted this year and next for counter-drone technology, the minister said. The systems include sensors and jammers designed to disrupt hostile drone signals, with the capability to intercept or shoot them down if necessary. “It is an important signal that we are confronting hybrid threats,” Dobrindt said. “We are creating a clear mission to detect, intercept and, yes, also shoot down drones when necessary. We cannot accept that hybrid threats, including drones, become a danger to our security.” Dobrindt said Germany will procure systems from both German and Israeli manufacturers, with further purchases expected in the coming months. This week, Germany’s state interior ministers are also due to decide whether to establish a joint federal-state counter-drone center, bringing together federal and state police forces and the military to coordinate detection and response. Berlin’s new unit marks its most significant move so far toward a standing national counter-drone capability. German security agencies have tracked hundreds of suspicious drone flyovers this year, including near barracks, naval facilities and critical infrastructure. Officials warn that small, commercially available drones are increasingly deployed in Europe for espionage, probing defenses and hybrid operations. Some European governments have pointed the finger of blame at Russia, but so far proof is lacking. Airports across Europe have also been forced to close thanks to overflying drones. Last month, the U.K., France and Germany sent staff and equipment to help Belgium counter drone incursions around sensitive facilities. Many countries are trying to figure out how to deal with the drones in a safe and legal way, as shooting them down could endanger people on the ground.

BRUSSELS — European Parliament members this week rubbished the EU executive’s Democracy Shield plan, an initiative aimed at bolstering the bloc’s defenses against Russian sabotage, election meddling and cyber and disinformation campaigns. The Commission’s plan “feels more like a European neighborhood watch group chat,” Kim van Sparrentak, a Dutch member of the Greens group, told a committee meeting on Monday evening. On Tuesday, EU Justice Commissioner Michael McGrath faced the brunt of that censure before the full Parliament plenary, as centrist and left-leaning lawmakers panned the plan for its weaknesses and far-right members warned that Brussels is rolling out a propaganda machine of its own. “We want to see more reform, more drive and more actions,” Swedish center-right lawmaker Tomas Tobé, who leads the Parliament’s report on the matter, told McGrath. The European Democracy Shield was unveiled Nov. 12 as a response to Russia’s escalating meddling in the bloc. In past months, Europe has been awash in hybrid threats. Security services linked railway disruptions in Poland and the Baltics to Russian-linked saboteurs, while unexplained drone flyovers have crippled public services in Belgium and probed critical infrastructure sites across the Nordics. At the same time, pro-Kremlin influence campaigns have promoted deepfake videos and fabricated scandals and divisive narratives ahead of elections in Moldova, Slovakia and across the EU, often using local intermediaries to mask their origins.   Together these tactics inform a pressure campaign that European security officials say is designed to exhaust institutions, undermine trust and stretch Europe’s defenses.  The Democracy Shield was a key pledge President Ursula von der Leyen made last year. But the actual strategy presented this month lacks teeth and concrete actions, and badly fails to meet the challenge, opponents said. While “full of new ways to exchange information,” the strategy presents “no other truly new or effective proposals to actually take action,” said van Sparrentak, the Dutch Greens lawmaker.  EU RESPONSE A WORK IN PROGRESS Much of the Shield’s text consists of calls to support existing initiatives or proposed new ones to come later down the line.   One of the pillars of the initiative, a Democratic Resilience Center that would pool information on hybrid warfare and interference, was announced by von der Leyen in September but became a major sticking point during the drafting of the Shield before its Nov. 12 unveiling.  The final proposal for the Center lacks teeth, critics said. Instead of an independent agency, as the Parliament had wanted, it will be a forum for exchanging information, two Commission officials told POLITICO.  The Center needs “a clear legal basis” and should be “independent” with “proper funding,” Tobé said Tuesday.   Austrian liberal Helmut Brandstätter said in a comment to POLITICO that “some aspects of the center are already embedded in the EEAS [the EU’s diplomatic service] and other institutions. Instead of duplicating them, we should strive to consolidate and streamline our tools.” EU countries also have to opt into participating in the center, creating a risk that national authorities neglect its work.  RIGHT BLASTS EU ‘CENSORSHIP’  For right-wing and far-right forces, the Shield reflects what they see as EU censorship and meddling by Brussels in European national politics.   “The stated goals of the Democracy Shield look good on paper but we all know that behind these noble goals, what you actually want is to build a political machinery without an electoral mandate,” said Csaba Dömötör, a Hungarian MEP from the far-right Patriots group.   “You cannot appropriate the powers and competence of sovereign countries and create a tool which is going to allow you to have an influence on the decisions of elections” in individual EU countries, said Polish hard-right MEP Beata Szydło.   Those arguments echo some of the criticisms by the United States’ MAGA movement of European social media regulation, which figures like Vice President JD Vance have previously compared to Soviet-era censorship laws.  The Democracy Shield strategy includes attempts to support European media organizations and fact-checking to stem the flood of disinformation around political issues. Romanian right-wing MEP Claudiu-Richard Târziu said her country’s 2024 presidential elections had been cancelled due to “an alleged foreign intervention” that remained unproven.  “This Democracy Shield should not create a mechanism whereby other member states could go through what Romania experienced in 2024 — this is an attack against democracy — and eventually the voters will have zero confidence,” he said.  In a closing statement on Tuesday at the plenary, Commissioner McGrath defended the Democracy Shield from its hard-right critics but did not respond to more specific criticisms of the proposal.  “To those who question the Shield and who say it’s about censorship. What I say to you is that I and my colleagues in the European Commission will be the very first people to defend your right to level robust debate in a public forum,” he said.

Two of the world’s most prolific state-linked cybercrime groups — Russia’s Gamaredon and North Korea’s Lazarus collective — have been spotted sharing resources, new research showed on Thursday. Experts at cybersecurity firm Gen Digital found overlapping tactics and shared infrastructure between the two groups. The discovery is “unprecedented,” said Director of Threat Intelligence at Gen Digital Michal Salat. “I don’t recall two countries working together on [Advanced Persistent Threat] attacks,” he said, referring to attacks that are sophisticated, long-term campaigns often conducted by nation-state actors. If confirmed, it would mark a new level of coordination between Moscow and Pyongyang. The Gamaredon cybercrime group is linked to Russia’s Federal Security Service and has aggressively targeted Ukrainian government networks since the start of the invasion in 2022, mostly for intelligence collection. Lazarus, a well-known North Korean threat group, conducts everything from espionage to financially motivated cybercrime. While tracking Gamaredon’s use of Telegram channels to share the servers controlling its malware, analysts discovered that one of those servers was also being used by Lazarus. One Gamaredon-run server was also found hosting a hidden version of malware linked to Lazarus. The file closely matched Lazarus’ typical tools. Nation-state hacking groups rarely host or distribute one another’s malware. Researchers believe the findings indicate the two groups are likely sharing systems, and could very well be cooperating directly. At a minimum, it shows that one group is deliberately imitating the other. Salat added that Gamaredon may be studying Lazarus’ methods, too. Lazarus is known for using fake job offers to trick victims and for stealing cryptocurrency, a key revenue source for North Korea, which is under heavy global sanctions. Moscow and Pyongyang have increased cooperation, including among their militaries, in previous years. Western security services believe Pyongyang has sent thousands of North Korean soldiers to Russia to support the war in Ukraine. Ukrainian authorities last month said North Korean troops were flying drones across the border, and Ukrainian military intelligence said last week North Korea would send thousands of workers to Russia to manufacture drones.

WARSAW — Saboteurs who damaged a small section of a rail line linking the Polish capital to the eastern city of Lublin and on to Ukraine were two Ukrainians working for Russia, Prime Minister Donald Tusk told the Polish parliament Tuesday. Train traffic along the busy route was halted Sunday morning after a high-speed Intercity train driver spotted damage to the line, warning nearby trains. “The outcome could have been a serious disaster with victims,” Tusk told MPs. The perpetrators are two Ukrainian nationals “who have been operating and cooperating with Russian services for a prolonged period of time,” the Polish leader said. They had left their country for Belarus, from where they arrived in Poland shortly before carrying out the attack on the rail line. Both returned to Belarus before Polish services identified them.  Tusk said one of the suspects had a track record of being involved in acts of sabotage in Ukraine. The other, he added, was a resident of the eastern Ukrainian region of Donbas. “Polish security services and prosecutors have all personal data of these individuals, as well as recorded images of them,” Tusk said, adding Poland will ask Belarusian and Russian authorities to hand over the suspects to face trial. The Warsaw-Lublin train route that was attacked is one of country’s busiest, linking the capital to the biggest city in eastern Poland and on toward Ukraine.  Tusk described the two attempts at sabotaging the line. “The first involved placing a steel clamp on the track, with a likely intention to derail a train. The incident was meant to be recorded by a mobile phone with a power bank that had been set up near the tracks. That attempt proved entirely unsuccessful. “[In] the second incident … a military-grade C-4 explosive was detonated using an initiating device connected by a 300-meter electrical cable.” Tusk also said that the government will introduce a higher degree of security alert, known as “Charlie,” along selected rail lines. A lower security alert, “Bravo,” remains in place for the rest of the country. Since Russia’s full-scale assault on Ukraine in February 2022, Poland has been on high alert for cases of foreign espionage and sabotage, and has arrested multiple people on those grounds. Last month, two Ukrainian nationals were detained on suspicion of spying for a foreign intelligence service. Other recent incidents include an alleged Belarusian refugee accused by authorities of being a Russian operative, a fire set in a shopping mall near Warsaw and an alleged attempt to sabotage a railway station in southern Poland by leaving an unmarked railcar on tracks used by passenger trains. “The adversary has begun preparations for war,” the Polish chief of the general staff, Gen. Wiesław Kukuła, told Polish Radio Monday. “It is building a certain environment here that is intended to undermine public trust in the government and institutions such as the armed forces and the police. This is to create conditions conducive to potential aggression on Polish territory,” Kukuła said.

LONDON — British lawmakers are being actively targeted by agents of the Chinese state with lucrative job offers on LinkedIn, according to the U.K.’s intelligence services. House of Commons Speaker Lindsay Hoyle on Tuesday circulated an espionage alert from security agency MI5, which warned that two “recruitment head-hunters” are “known to be using” profiles on the career-focused social network “to conduct outreach at scale” for the Chinese security services. “Their aim is to collect information and lay the groundwork for long-term relationships, using professional networking sites, recruitment agents and consultants acting on their behalf,” the message from Hoyle to MPs — which mirrors one issued by his counterpart in the House of Lords — says. Speaking in the Commons on Tuesday, U.K. Security Minister Dan Jarvis said the latest assessment showed how China “is attempting to recruit and cultivate individuals with access to sensitive information about parliament and the U.K. government.” He said such work is being carried by a group of Chinese intelligence officers “often masked through the use of cover companies or external headhunters.” “China has a low threshold for what information is considered to be of value, and will gather individual pieces of information to build a wider picture,” he warned in a House of Commons statement. In a bid to get on the front foot over the issue, Jarvis on Tuesday announced a new “counter political interference and espionage action plan.” Measures include tougher risk assessment rules for recipients of donations, and enhanced enforcement powers for the Electoral Commission, the U.K.’s elections watchdog. Security campaigns led by the U.K. parliamentary authorities will also take place, including tailored briefings for Britain’s devolved governments, political parties, and all candidates taking part in devolved and local elections next May. “This activity involves a covert and calculated attempt by a foreign power to interfere with our sovereign affairs in favor of its own interests, and this government will not tolerate it,” Jarvis warned. The guidance follows a bitter political row in the U.K. over Chinese interference in British politics. British prosecutors this year dropped charges against two men accused of spying for China, one of whom previously worked in parliament. The Palace of Westminster is also contemplating tightening parliamentary access for Chinese visitors.

Elisabeth Braw is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, the author of the award-winning “Goodbye Globalization” and a regular columnist for POLITICO. Over the past two years, state-linked Russian hackers have repeatedly attacked Liverpool City Council — and it’s not because the Kremlin harbors a particular dislike toward the port city in northern England. Rather, these attacks are part of a strategy to hit cities, governments and businesses with large financial losses, and they strike far beyond cyberspace. In the Gulf of Finland, for example, the damage caused to undersea cables by the Eagle S shadow vessel in December incurred costs adding up to tens of millions of euros — and that’s just one incident. Russia has attacked shopping malls, airports, logistics companies and airlines, and these disruptions have all had one thing in common: They have a great cost to the targeted companies and their insurers. One can’t help but feel sorry for Liverpool City Council. In addition to looking after the city’s half-million or so residents, it also has to keep fighting Russia’s cyber gangs who, according to a recent report, have been attacking ceaselessly: “We have experienced many attacks from this group and their allies using their Distributed Botnet over the last two years,” the report noted, referring to the hacktivist group NoName057(16), which has been linked to the Russian state. “[Denial of Service attacks] for monetary or political reasons is a widespread risk for any company with a web presence or that relies on internet-based systems.” Indeed. Over the past decades, state-linked Russian hackers have targeted all manner of European municipalities, government agencies and businesses. This includes the 2017 NotPetya attack, which brought down “four hospitals in Kiev alone, six power companies, two airports, more than 22 Ukrainian banks, ATMs and card payment systems in retailers and transport, and practically every federal agency,” as well as a string of multinationals, causing staggering losses of around $10 billion. More recently, Russia has taken to targeting organizations and businesses in other ways as well. There have been arson attacks, including one involving Poland’s largest shopping mall that Prime Minister Donald Tusk subsequently said was definitively “ordered by Russian special services.” There have been parcel bombs delivered to DHL; fast-growing drone activity reported around European defense manufacturing facilities; and a string of suspicious incidents damaging or severing undersea cables and even a pipeline. The costly list goes on: Due to drone incursions into restricted airspace, Danish and German airports have been forced to temporarily close, diverting or cancelling dozens of flights. Russia’s GPS jamming and spoofing are affecting a large percentage of commercial flights all around the Baltic Sea. In the Red Sea, Houthi attacks are causing most ships owned by or flagged in Western countries to redirect along the much longer Cape of Good Hope route, which adds costs. The Houthis are not Russia, but Russia (and China) could easily aid Western efforts to stop these attacks — yet they don’t. They simply enjoy the enormous privilege of having their vessels sail through unassailed. The organizations and companies hit by Russia have so far managed to avert calamitous harm. But these attacks are so dangerous and reckless that people will, sooner or later, lose their lives. There have been arson attacks, including one involving Poland’s largest shopping mall that Prime Minister Donald Tusk subsequently said was definitively “ordered by Russian special services.” | Aleksander Kalka/Getty Images What’s more, their targets will continue losing a lot of money. The repairs of a subsea data cable alone typically costs up to a couple million euros. The owners of EstLink 2 — the undersea power cable hit by the Eagle S— incurred losses of nearly €60 million. Closing an airport for several hours is also incredibly expensive, as is cancelling or diverting flights. To be sure, most companies have insurance to cover them against cyber attacks or similar harm, but insurance is only viable if the harm is occasional. If it becomes systematic, underwriters can no longer afford to take on the risk — or they have to significantly increase their premiums. And there’s the kicker: An interested actor can make disruption systematic. That is, in fact, what Russia is doing. It is draining our resources, making it increasingly costly to be a business based in a Western country, or even a city council or government authority, for that matter. This is terrifying — and not just for the companies that may be hit. But while Russia appears far beyond the reach of any possible efforts to convince it to listen to its better angels, we can still put up a steely front. The armed forces put up the literal steel, of course, but businesses and civilian organizations can practice and prepare for any attacks that Russia, or other hostile countries, could decide to launch against them. Such preparation would limit the possible harm such attacks can lead to. It begs the question, if an attack causes minimal disruption, then what’s the point of instigating it in the first place? That’s why government-led gray-zone exercises that involve the private sector are so important. I’ve been proposing them for several years now, and for every month that passes, they become even more essential. Like the military, we shouldn’t just conduct these exercises — we should tell the whole world we’re doing so too. Demonstrating we’re ready could help dissuade sinister actors who believe they can empty our coffers. And it has a side benefit too: It helps companies show their customers and investors that they can, indeed, weather whatever Russia may dream up.