Jamie Dettmer is opinion editor and a foreign affairs columnist at POLITICO Europe. Over the past few days, Ukraine has been hitting Russia back as hard as it can with long-range drone strikes, and it has three objectives in mind: lifting Ukrainian spirits as the country suffers blackouts from Russia’s relentless air attacks; demonstrating to Western allies that it has plenty of fight left; and, finally, cajoling Moscow into being serious about peace negotiations and offering concessions. However, the latter is likely to be a forlorn endeavor. And at any rate, amid the ongoing diplomatic chaos, which negotiations are they aiming for? U.S. President Donald Trump’s negotiators have been talking up the prospects of a peace deal — or at least being closer to one than at any time since Russia’s invasion began nearly four years ago. But few in either Kyiv or Europe’s other capitals are persuaded the Kremlin is negotiating in good faith and wants a peace deal that will stick. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz certainly doesn’t think so. Last week, he argued that Russian President Vladimir Putin is just spinning things out, “clearly playing for time.” Many Ukrainian politicians are also of a similar mind, including Yehor Cherniev, deputy chairman of the Committee on National Security, Defense and Intelligence of Ukraine’s Rada: “We see all the signals they’re preparing to continue the war, increasing arms production, intensifying their strikes on our energy infrastructure,” he told POLITICO.  “When it comes to the talks, I think the Russians are doing as much as they can to avoid irritating Donald Trump, so he won’t impose more sanctions on them,” he added. Indeed, according to fresh calculations by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs’ Janis Kluge, Russia has increased its military spending by another 30 percent year-on-year, reaching a record $149 billion in the first nine months of 2025. The war effort is now eating up about 44 percent of all Russian federal tax revenue — a record high. And as social programs are gutted to keep up, some Western optimists believe that Russia’s anemic growing economy and the staggering cost of war mean Putin soon won’t have any realistic option but to strike an agreement. But predictions of economic ruin forcing Putin’s hand have been made before. And arguably, Russia’s war economy abruptly unwinding may pose greater political and social risks to his regime than continuing his war of attrition, as Russian beneficiaries — including major business groups, security services and military combatants — would suffer a serious loss of income while seeking to adapt to a postwar economy. The war also has the added bonus of justifying domestic political repression. War isn’t only a means but an end in itself for Putin, and patriotism can be a helpful tool in undermining dissent. Nonetheless, the introduction of Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner as a key negotiator is significant — he is “Trump’s closer” after all, and his full engagement suggests Washington does think it can clinch a deal with one last heave. Earlier this month, U.S. Special Envoy Gen. Keith Kellogg had indicated a deal was “really close,” with a final resolution hanging on just two key issues: the future of the Donbas and the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. The negotiations are in the “last 10 meters,” he said. But again, which negotiations? Those between Washington and Moscow? Or those between Washington and Kyiv and the leaders of Europe’s coalition of the willing? Either way, both have work to do if there is to be an end to the war. Putin has refused to negotiate with Kyiv and Europe directly, in effect dispatching Trump to wring out concessions from them. And no movement Trump’s negotiators secure seems to satisfy a Kremlin that’s adept at dangling the carrot — namely, a possible deal to burnish the U.S. president’s self-cherished reputation as a great dealmaker, getting him ever closer to that coveted Nobel Peace Prize. Of course, for Putin, it all has the added benefit of straining the Western alliance, exploiting the rifts between Washington and Europe and widening them. All the frenzied diplomacy underway now seems more about appeasing Trump and avoiding the blame for failed negotiations or for striking a deal that doesn’t stick — like the Minsk agreements. For example, longtime Putin opponent Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s New Eurasian Strategies Center believes the Russian president remains “convinced that Russia retains an advantage on the battlefield,” and therefore “sees no need to offer concessions.” “He prefers a combination of military action and diplomatic pressure — a tactic that, in the Kremlin’s view, the West is no longer able to resist. At the same time, any peace agreement that meets Russia’s conditions would set the stage for a renewed conflict. Ukraine’s ability to defend itself would be weakened as a result of the inevitable political crisis triggered by territorial concessions, and the transatlantic security system would be undermined. This would create an environment that is less predictable and more conducive to further Russian pressure,” they conclude. Indeed, the only deal that might satisfy Putin would be one that, in effect, represents Ukrainian capitulation — no NATO membership, a cap on the size of Ukraine’s postwar armed forces, the loss of all of the Donbas, recognition of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and no binding security guarantees. But this isn’t a deal Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy can ink — or if he did, it would throw Ukraine into existential political turmoil. “I don’t see the Parliament ever passing anything like that,” opposition lawmaker Oleksandra Ustinova told POLITICO. And if it did, “it might lead to a civil war” with many patriots who have fought, seeing it as a great betrayal, she added. “Everybody understands, and everybody supports Zelenskyy in doing what he’s doing in these negotiations because we understand if he gives up, we’re done for.” Not that she thinks he will. So, don’t expect any breakthroughs in the so-called peace talks this week. Putin will maintain his maximalist demands while sorrowfully suggesting a deal could be struck if only Zelenskyy would be realistic, while the Ukrainian leader and his European backers will do their best to counter. And they will all be performing to try and stay in Trump’s good books.  

Jamie Dettmer is opinion editor and a foreign affairs columnist at POLITICO Europe. “It must be a policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure,” said former U.S. President Harry Truman during a speech to Congress in 1947. The Truman Doctrine, as this approach became known, saw the defense of democracy abroad as of vital interest to the U.S. — but that’s not a view shared by President Donald Trump and his acolytes. If anyone had any doubts about this — or harbored any lingering hopes that Vice President JD Vance was speaking out of turn when he launched a blistering attack on Europe at the Munich Security Conference earlier this this year — then Washington’s new National Security Strategy (NSS) should settle the matter. All U.S. presidents release such a strategy early in their terms to outline their foreign policy thinking and priorities, which in turn shapes how the Pentagon’s budget is allocated. And with all 33 pages of this NSS, the world’s despots have much to celebrate, while democrats have plenty to be anxious about — especially in Europe. Fleshing out what the Trump administration means by “America First,” the new security strategy represents an emphatic break with Truman and the post-1945 order shaped by successive U.S. presidents. It is all about gaining a mercantilist advantage, and its guiding principle is might is right. Moving forward, Trump’s foreign policy won’t be “grounded in traditional, political ideology” but guided by “what works for America.” And apparently what works for America is to go easy on autocrats, whether theocratic or secular, and to turn on traditional allies in a startling familial betrayal. Of course, the hostility this NSS displays toward Europe shouldn’t come as a surprise — Trump’s top aides have barely disguised their contempt for the EU, while the president has said he believes the bloc was formed to “screw” the U.S. But that doesn’t dull the sting. Over the weekend, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas sought to present a brave face despite the excoriating language the NSS reserves for European allies, telling international leaders at the Doha Forum: “We haven’t always seen eye-to-eye on different topics. But the overall principle is still there: We are the biggest allies, and we should stick together.” But other seasoned European hands recognize that this NSS marks a significant departure from what has come before. “The only part of the world where the new security strategy sees any threat to democracy seems to be Europe. Bizarre,” said former Swedish Prime Minister and European Council on Foreign Relations co-chair Carl Bildt. He’s right. As Bildt noted, the NSS includes no mention, let alone criticism, of the authoritarian behavior of the “axis of autocracy” — China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. It also rejects interventionist approaches to autocracies or cajoling them to adopt “democratic or other social change that differs widely from their traditions and histories.” For example, the 2017 NSS framed China as a systemic global challenger in very hostile terms. “A geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order is taking place in the Indo-Pacific region,” that document noted. But the latest version contains no such language amid clear signs that Trump wants to deescalate tensions; the new paramount objective is to secure a “mutually advantageous economic relationship.” All should be well as long as China stays away from the Western Hemisphere, which is the preserve of the U.S. — although it must also ditch any idea of invading Taiwan. “Deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority” the NSS reads. Likewise, much to Moscow’s evident satisfaction, the document doesn’t even cast Russia as an adversary — in stark contrast with the 2017 strategy, which described it as a chief geopolitical rival. No wonder Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov welcomed the NSS as a “positive step” and “largely consistent” with Russia’s vision. “Overall, these messages certainly contrast with the approaches of previous administrations,” he purred. While Beijing and Moscow appear delighted with the NSS, the document reserves its harshest language and sharpest barbs for America’s traditional allies in Europe. “The core problem of the European continent, according to the NSS, is a neglect of ‘Western’ values (understood as nationalist conservative values) and a ‘loss of national identities’ due to immigration and ‘cratering birthrates,’” noted Liana Fix of the Council on Foreign Relations. “The alleged result is economic stagnation, military weakness and civilizational erasure.” The new strategy also lambasts America’s European allies for their alleged “anti-democratic” practices,accusing them of censorship and suppressing political opposition in a dilation of Vance’s Munich criticism. Ominously, the NSS talks about cultivating resistance within European nations by endorsing “patriotic” parties — a threat that caused much consternation when Vance made it, but is now laid out as the administration’s official policy. Regime change for Europe but not for autocracies is cause for great alarm. So how will Europe react? Flatter Trump as “daddy,” like NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte did in June? Pretend the U.S. administration isn’t serious, and muddle through while overlooking slights? Take the punishment and button up as it did over higher tariffs? Or toughen up, and get serious about strategic autonomy? Europe has once again been put on the spot to make some fundamental choices — and quickly. But doing anything quickly isn’t Europe’s strong point. Admittedly, that’s no easy task for a bloc that makes decisions by consensus in a process designed to be agonizingly slow. Nor will it be an easy road at the national level, with all 27 countries facing critical economic challenges and profound political divisions that Washington has been seeking to roil. With the assistance of Trump’s ideological bedfellows like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Slovakia’s Robert Fico, the impasse will only intensify in the coming months. Trump 2.0 is clearly a disorienting step change from the president’s first term — far more triumphalist, confident, uncompromisingly mercantilist; and determined to ignore guardrails; and more revolutionary in how it implements its “America First” agenda. The NSS just makes this clearer, and the howls of disapproval from critics will merely embolden an administration that sees protest as evidence it’s on the right track. Europe’s leaders have had plenty of warnings, but apart from eye-rolling, hand-wringing and wishful thinking they failed to agree on a plan. However, trying to ride things out isn’t going to work this time around — and efforts to foist a very unfavorable “peace” deal on Ukraine may finally the trigger the great unraveling of the Western alliance. The bloc’s options are stark, to be sure. Whether it kowtows or pushes back, it’s going to cost Europe one way or another.

Jamie Dettmer is opinion editor and a foreign affairs columnist at POLITICO Europe. “These are the times that try men’s souls,” wrote pamphleteer Thomas Paine in the dark days of December 1776, as America’s war to free itself of the British seemed doomed. In a bid to lift flagging spirits, he continued: “Tyranny, like hell, is not easily conquered; yet we have this consolation with us, that the harder the conflict, the more glorious the triumph.” That victory was sorely in doubt for much of the war, but the revolutionaries persevered, and with French assistance — which has often been downplayed since — they triumphed after eight years of brutish conflict. Ukraine’s struggle has been longer. In effect, the country has been fighting to be free of Russia since 2014, and right now, these times are, indeed, trying Ukrainian souls. As it stands, there is scant grounds for optimism that, for all its heroism, Ukraine can turn things around. The country is unlikely to emerge from its most perilous winter of the war in a stronger position, better able to withstand what’s being foisted upon it. In fact, it could be in a much weaker state — on the battlefield, the home front, and in terms of its internal politics. Indeed, as it tries to navigate its way through America’s divisive “peace plan,” this might be the best Ukraine can hope for — or at least some variation that doesn’t entail withdrawing from the territory in eastern Ukraine it has managed to retain. On the battlefield, Ukraine’s forces are currently hard pressed and numerically disadvantaged. Or, as lawmaker Mariana Bezuhla recently argued: “Ukrainian commanders simply can’t keep up” and are “being jerked around within a framework set by the enemy.” Meanwhile, on the home front, pummeling Russian drone attacks and airstrikes are degrading the country’s power system and wrecking its natural gas infrastructure, which keeps 60 percent of Ukrainians warm during the frigid winter months. The country is also running out of money. It’s hard to see a Europe mired in debt providing the $250 billion Kyiv will need in cash and arms to sustain the fight for another four years — and that’s on top of the $140 billion reparations loan that might be offered if Belgium lifts its veto on using Russia’s immobilized assets held in Brussels. If all that weren’t enough, Ukraine is being roiled by a massive corruption scandal that appears to implicate Ukrainian presidential insiders, sapping the confidence of allies and Ukrainians alike. It’s also providing those in the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump and the MAGA movement with ammunition to argue that Washington should be done with Ukraine. And now, of course, Kyiv is having to cope with a contentious U.S. effort to end Russia’s war, which has been advanced in such a chaotic diplomatic process that it wouldn’t be out of place in an episode of “The West Wing.” At times, negotiations have descended into farce, with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio forswearing the original peace plan one minute, saying it came from Russia and not a Trump administration proposal, only to swiftly backtrack. And earlier this week, a Reuters report suggested the 28-point plan was, in fact, modeled on a Russian proposal that Kremlin officials shared with their U.S. counterparts in mid-October. Meanwhile, on the home front, pummeling Russian drone attacks and airstrikes are degrading the country’s power system and wrecking its natural gas infrastructure. | Mykola Tys/EPA But for all the buffoonery — including reports that Special Envoy Steve Witkoff coached high-ranking Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov on how Russian President Vladimir Putin should speak to Trump — a tweaked 19-point version of the “peace plan” may well be the best Ukraine can realistically expect, even though it heavily favors Russia. As this column has argued before, a Ukrainian triumph was always unlikely — that is if by triumph one means the restoration of the country’s 1991 borders and NATO membership. This isn’t through any fault of Ukraine, the David in the fight against Goliath, but rather that of Kyiv’s Western allies, who were never clear-sighted or practical in their thinking, let alone ready to do what was necessary to defeat Russia’s revanchism and vanquish a Putin regime heedless of the death toll of even its own troops. Despite their high-blown rhetoric, at no stage in the conflict have Ukraine’s allies agreed on any clear war aims. Some pressed for a debate, among them former Lithuanian foreign minister Gabrielius Landsbergis, who was worried about a mismatch between Western magniloquence and what the U.S. and Europe were actually prepared to do and give. “We talk about victory, and we talk about standing with Ukraine to the very end — but let’s also talk about this,” he told POLITICO in a 2023 interview. But that debate never happened because of fears it would disunite allies. Nonetheless, Western leaders continued to characterize the war as a contest between good and evil, with huge stakes for democracy. They cast it as a struggle not only for territory but between liberal and autocratic values, and as one with global consequences. But in that case, why be restrained in what you supply? Why hold back on long-range munitions and tanks? Why delay supplying F-16s? And why prevent Ukraine from using Western-supplied long-range missiles to strike deeper into Russia? Or, as Ukraine’s former top commander Gen. Valery Zaluzhny fumed in the Washington Post: “To save my people, why do I have to ask someone for permission what to do on enemy territory?” For former Ukrainian foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba, for all its talk of standing with Ukraine for as long as it takes, the West never really grasped the war’s importance or consequences: “You cannot win a war where Russia clearly knows what its strategic goal is in every detail; [where] Ukraine knows what its strategic goal is in every detail; but [where] the West, without whom Ukraine cannot win, does not know what it is fighting for,” he told POLITICO last year. “This is the real tragedy of this war.” At times, negotiations have descended into farce, with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio forswearing the original peace plan one minute, saying it came from Russia and not a Trump administration proposal, only to swiftly backtrack. | Martial Trezzini/EPA The currently discussed 19-point plan is, of course, an improvement on the original 28-point plan — nonetheless, it is an ugly and shameful one. But this is what happens if you run down your military forces and arms production for decades, fail to draw enforceable red lines and don’t ask hard questions before making grand promises. For Ukraine, such a poor deal that leaves it with weak security guarantees, without 20 percent of its territory and prohibits it from joining NATO, will have great domestic consequences and carry the high likelihood of civil strife. It isn’t hard to see how the army and its veterans might react. Many of them will see it as a stab in the back, an enraging betrayal that needs to be punished. It will also mean rewarding Putin’s thuggishness and no real accountability for the bestial nature of his army’s atrocious behavior or the unlawful, detestable deportations from occupied parts of Ukraine to Russia. And it will, no doubt, embolden the axis of autocrats. The American Revolution had lasting global consequences — so, too, will this war.

Jamie Dettmer is opinion editor and a foreign affairs columnist at POLITICO Europe. As Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine nearly four years ago, Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, then head of Ukraine’s state-owned national power company Ukrenergo, was scrambling to keep the lights on. Somehow, he succeeded and continued to do so every year, earning the respect of energy executives worldwide by ensuring the country was able to withstand Russian missile and drone strikes on its power grid and avoid catastrophic blackouts — until he was abruptly forced to resign in 2024, that is. Kudrytskyi’s dismissal was decried by many in the energy industry and also prompted alarm in Brussels. At the time, Kudrytskyi told POLITICO he was the victim of the relentless centralization of authority that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his powerful head of office Andriy Yermak often pursue. He said he feared “corrupt individuals” would end up taking over the state-owned company. According to his supporters, it is that kind of talk — and his refusal to remain silent — that explains why Kudrytskyi ended up in a glass-enclosed cubicle in a downtown Kyiv courtroom last week, where he was arraigned on embezzlement charges. Now, opposition lawmakers and civil society activists are up in arms, labeling this yet another example of Ukraine’s leadership using lawfare to intimidate opponents and silence critics by accusing them of corruption or of collaboration with Russia. Zelenskyy’s office declined to comment. Others who have received the same treatment include Zelenskyy’s predecessor in office, Petro Poroshenko, who was sanctioned and arraigned on corruption charges this year — a move that could prevent him from standing in a future election. Sanctions have frequently been threatened or used against opponents, effectively freezing assets and blocking the sanctioned person from conducting any financial transactions, including using credit cards or accessing bank accounts. Poroshenko has since accused Zelenskyy of creeping “authoritarianism,” and seeking to “remove any competitor from the political landscape.” That may also explain why Kudrytskyi has been arraigned, according to opposition lawmaker Mykola Knyazhitskiy, who believes the use of lawfare to discredit opponents is only going to get worse as the presidential office prepares for a possible election next year in the event there’s a ceasefire. They are using the courts “to clear the field of competitors” to shape a dishonest election, he fears. Others, including prominent Ukrainian activist and head of the Anti-Corruption Action Center Daria Kaleniuk, argue the president and his coterie are using the war to monopolize power to such a degree that it threatens the country’s democracy. Kaleniuk was in the courtroom for Kudrytskyi’s two-hour arraignment, and echoes the former energy boss’s claim that the prosecution is “political.” According to Kaleniuk, the case doesn’t make any legal sense, and she said it all sounded “even stranger” as the prosecutor detailed the charges against Kudrytskyi: “He failed to show that he had materially benefited in any way” from an infrastructure contract that, in the end, wasn’t completed, she explained. The case in question is related to a contract Kudrytskyi authorized seven years ago as Ukrenergo’s then-deputy director for investments. But the subcontractor didn’t even begin work on the assigned infrastructure improvements, and Ukrenergo was able to claw back an advance payment that was made. Kaleniuk’s disquiet is also echoed by opposition lawmaker Inna Sovsun, who told POLITICO, “there’s no evidence that [Kudrytskyi] enriched himself.” “There was no damage done. I can’t help but think that this is all politically motivated,” she said. Sovsun turned up to the arraignment to offer herself as a bail guarantor if needed — two other lawmakers offered to act as guarantors as well, but the judge instead decided on another procedure to set Kudrytskyi free from pre-trial detention by requiring the payment of bail bond of $325,000.   One senior Ukrainian adviser, who asked not to be identified so they could speak about the case, dismissed the defense’s description of the case against Kudrytskyi as being politically motivated and claiming there was no substance to the embezzlement allegations. “People should wait on this case until the full hearing,” he added. But for former Deputy Prime Minister Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze, the case “doesn’t look good from any angle — either domestically or when it comes to international partners.” The timing, she said, is unhelpful for Ukraine, as it coincides with Kyiv’s ongoing appeal for more European energy assistance ahead of what’s likely to be the war’s most perilous winter. With Russia mounting missile and drone strikes on a far larger scale than before, Ukraine’s energy challenge is likely to be even more formidable. And unlike previous winters, Russia’s attacks have been targeting Ukraine’s drilling, storage and distribution facilities for natural gas in addition to its electrical power grid. Sixty percent of Ukrainians currently rely on natural gas to keep their homes warm. Some Ukrainian energy executives also fear Kudrytskyi’s prosecution may be part of a preemptive scapegoating tactic to shift blame in the event that the country’s energy system can no longer withstand Russian attacks. Citing unnamed sources, two weeks ago Ukrainian media outlet Ukrainska Pravda reported that former energy executives fear they are being lined up to be faulted for failing to do enough to boost the energy infrastructure’s resilience and harden facilities. “They need a scapegoat now,” a foreign policy expert who has counseled the Ukrainian government told POLITICO. “There are parts of Ukraine that probably won’t have any electricity until the spring. It’s already 10 degrees Celsius in Kyiv apartments now, and the city could well have extended blackouts. People are already pissed off about this, so the president’s office needs scapegoats,” he said, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss the matter freely. “The opposition is going to accuse Zelenskyy of failing Ukraine, and argue he should have already had contingencies to prevent prolonged blackouts or a big freeze, they will argue,” he added. Senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and author of “Battleground Ukraine” Adrian Karatnycky also worries about the direction of political travel. “While he’s an inspirational and brave wartime leader, there are, indeed, worrying elements to Zelenskyy’s rule,” he said.

Jamie Dettmer is opinion editor and a foreign affairs columnist at POLITICO Europe. When U.S. President Donald Trump unveiled his 20-point Gaza peace plan, diplomats and commentators noted echoes of another deal former British Prime Minister Tony Blair had a hand in — the Good Friday Agreement. It was this landmark document, signed in 1998, that started the process that would end three decades of sectarian strife in Northern Ireland, known as the Troubles. The similarities between the two immediately struck academic David Mitchell, a Trinity College professor of reconciliation and peace studies. Several phrases appeared to be “lifted from the Good Friday Agreement — or at least inspired by it,” he told POLITICO, particularly those about a “process of demilitarization,” the “decommissioning” of weapons and “placing weapons permanently beyond use.” According to Mitchell, “the word ‘decommissioning’ wasn’t much in use until the Good Friday Agreement; people hadn’t really heard it before. I guess [it] was to try to take the sting out of disarmament, and maybe make it look less like a defeat for the paramilitaries.” No doubt this approach helped the Irish Republican Army’s pro-agreement camp eventually sell the landmark deal to the movement’s reluctant hard men. Nonetheless, it took nearly nine years to get Northern Ireland’s IRA to fully disarm and bring the conflict, which saw around 3,500 killed and 50,000 injured, to an end. So how long before Hamas disarms? The fact that the Good Friday Agreement — some of its core assumptions and the overall design of its confidence-building steps — served as a model for Gaza is hardly surprising. After all, Trump tapped Blair to help oversee postwar Gaza’s governance. The former prime minister also worked on the plan during the last six months of the previous U.S. administration, and subsequently with Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner and Special Envoy Steve Witkoff when it was revived by the current administration. And as it was in Northern Ireland, disarmament is shaping up to be the Gaza plan’s most likely stumbling stone, particularly as it moves from its fairly simple transactional first phase of hostage–prisoner swaps and the cessation of hostilities to its second phase, which will see Hamas and allied Palestinian militant groups in the enclave lay down their arms. Phase three — if we ever get there — envisions the reconstruction of civil governance and the rebuilding of Gaza, which will of course take years. But so too will disarmament — if what unfolded in Northern Ireland is a guide. On Tuesday, after Hamas was accused of launching an attack on Israeli forces in the Rafah area, an impatient Trump warned the group to disarm or face a “FAST, FURIOUS, & BRUTAL!” end. But so far, the only disarmament that has taken place involves a family-based clan in Khan Yunis handing over its weapons to Hamas, as the militant group began a campaign of violence against clan-based opponents and Gazans it claims collaborated with Israel during the war. The main lesson from the Northern Ireland peace process, which came close to unraveling several times over disarmament, is that even with the strongest will in the world, it’s going to take considerable time — something that will give the deal’s opponents, whether Israeli or Palestinian, plenty of opportunity to throw a spanner in the works. The Good Friday Agreement was among Blair’s finest moments, and one he proudly argues remains an example to the world: “You had leaders who were prepared even at personal political risk to face down the recalcitrant elements in their own parties and move forwards,” he said on the 25th anniversary of its signing. “That’s why it’s a lesson for peace processes everywhere.” And moving forward, Blair will no doubt remind us that patience will be vital — something U.S. Vice President JD Vance already hinted at during his remarks in Israel on Tuesday. While echoing Trump and warning that “if Hamas does not co-operate, it will be obliterated,” Vance also stressed it would take “a very, very long time” to implement the 20-point plan and declined to set a deadline or timetable for Hamas to disarm. Drawing further parallels, Mitchell observed that after the Good Friday Agreement was signed, “decommissioning was immediately the most important issue.” It “dominated the whole peace process until 2007 and took on massive symbolic importance. There was some devolution and power-sharing, but it kept collapsing because Unionists didn’t have confidence [in] the IRA’s seriousness about disarmament,” he said. Hamas claims it has redeployed its gunmen only to ensure the enclave doesn’t plunge into anarchy. | Bashar Taleb/AFP via Getty Images “As a militant group, your weapons are absolutely essential to your identity, which I assume is the case with Hamas. So, you don’t want to give them up lightly,” he added. Indeed, not. Once the ceasefire took effect, Hamas wasted no time, openly reappearing in areas the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had just vacated and reasserting control over a chunk of the enclave. One Hamas officer told Qatar’s Al-Araby TV that redeployed gunmen would confiscate weapons from “fugitives” — a catch-all term for Palestinians opposing the group. And not long after, a video posted on Gaza-based social media networks showed an armed masked man shooting a Palestinian in the leg — a punishment often used by the militants against suspected collaborators. There have been more such shootings and executions since. Hamas claims it has redeployed its gunmen only to ensure the enclave doesn’t plunge into anarchy. But when it comes to eventual disarmament, it has only issued opaque statements, with a senior Hamas official telling Reuters earlier this week that he couldn’t commit to the group’s disarming. Asked if Hamas would lay down its arms, a member of the group’s politburo, Mohammed Nazzal, said: “I can’t answer with a yes or no. Frankly, it depends on the nature of the project. The disarmament project you’re talking about, what does it mean? To whom will the weapons be handed over?” He has a point: When it comes to the mechanics of decommissioning weapons, nothing is in place yet; there’s no one to receive them or monitor their destruction. Hamas is hardly going to hand over its arms to the IDF — much as the IRA didn’t hand theirs to the British army or the province’s police force, then known as the Royal Ulster Constabulary — as it would certainly get pushback from the hard men. Instead, Mitchell explained, it was two churchmen, a Methodist and a Catholic, who monitored the IRA destroying its weapons caches. “Basically, they were driven around the countryside inspecting the destruction of the weapons. It was all very secretive. Then they came back to the media and said: ‘We have seen the full and complete disarmament of the IRA.” Those arsenals were much smaller, though, and it’s difficult to imagine the likes of Israel’s National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir or Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich agreeing to such a stealthy process, taking the word of a pair of independent monitors that weapons have been placed beyond use. They will want total evidence and will be keen to rub Hamas’ nose in defeat. The most obvious solution here is for Hamas to hand its weapons over to an international stabilization force, which Vance said is still in the early stages of planning. He did not, however, directly link the actual mechanics of Hamas’ disarmament with the deployment of a stabilization force. That begs the question of Hamas’ intentions — including whether there’s a single chain of command or if splits will emerge within the militant group. “Is Hamas going to give up the weapons? Are they going to give up power? Even in recent days, we’ve seen that militants in Gaza aren’t entirely a monolith. To what extent does Hamas have operational control over all these elements?” asked Ned Price, a former U.S. diplomat who had worked with Blair and former Secretary of State Antony Blinken on the peace plan during the previous administration. For Mitchell, there’s one huge difference between the Good Friday Agreement and the Gaza plan: The former had the carrot of a political settlement, whereas Trump’s plan has no clear path to a two-state solution. “Northern Ireland’s peace process was linked with political progress, whereas in this agreement, there’s no linkage,” he said. That might prove to be the fatal flaw.

Jamie Dettmer is opinion editor and a foreign affairs columnist at POLITICO Europe. Last week, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy had hoped to capitalize on his warming relations with U.S. President Donald Trump to secure a supply of U.S. Tomahawk cruise missiles — weapons Kyiv believes could be a game-changer and deliver a decisive blow to the Kremlin’s war economy. Fresh off successfully brokering a ceasefire in Gaza, surely Trump would have the appetite to give Ukraine what it needs to force Russian President Vladimir Putin into getting serious about negotiations. But that isn’t what happened. Zelenskyy’s meeting in the White House was perfectly cordial — Trump used that word himself to characterize their encounter. There was no frostiness, and no return to the nastiness of last February’s now infamous Oval Office brawl. Zelenskyy learned his lesson thoroughly on that score and now knows deference is obligatory when approaching “daddy” Trump. The meeting was, however, fluffed, mainly because Ukraine was in too much of a hurry. “It wasn’t a bad meeting, just a victim of poor timing and inflated expectations,” said one Republican foreign-policy insider who was granted anonymity to speak candidly. But it could have been much more productive if Zelenskyy had readjusted his thinking and rejigged his agenda after the lengthy phone call Trump had with Putin the day before. During that two-and-a-half hour call, Trump teased Putin with the prospects of supplying Ukraine with Tomahawks: “I did actually say, would you mind if I gave a couple of thousand Tomahawks to your opposition? I did say that,” the U.S. president told reporters. “He didn’t like the idea.” And the outcome was an agreement to meet at another summit — this time in Budapest — with Trump once again seemingly persuaded that Putin might be ready to end the war. The Ukrainian leader doesn’t believe “Putin is ready just to finish this war,” as he told NBC’s “Meet the Press” in an interview Sunday. Nonetheless, Putin’s call should have prompted Zelenskyy and his team to recalibrate, dial down their expectations and, above all, downgrade their push for Cruise missiles, said the insider. “There was no way Trump was going to agree to Tomahawk acquisitions ahead of his meeting with Putin in Budapest.” The Ukrainian leader doesn’t believe “Putin is ready just to finish this war,” as he told NBC’s “Meet the Press” | Demetrius Freeman/The Washington Post via Getty Images But Ukraine ignored the counsel of its Republican friends in Washington — many of whom are skeptical Trump will agree to give Ukraine Tomahawks under any circumstances, for fear of escalation and drawing the U.S. deeper into the war. That’s not even considering the Pentagon’s worries about the U.S.’s own stockpiles, which Trump himself mentioned to reporters on Friday. By failing to drop the Tomahawk request, Ukraine squandered an opportunity to focus on a slew of other crucial items — foremost among them, air-to-air missiles for their F-16 and MiG warplanes and surface-to-air interceptor missiles for Patriot air-defense systems. Both are needed to shoot down drones and ballistic missiles, and Ukraine is desperately short of them because of the record airstrikes Russia is now mounting. The focus on Tomahawks also distracted from other key asks, such as getting Trump’s approval for the use of immobilized Russian sovereign assets to fund Ukraine’s defense. For his part, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent is in favor of this proposal. The U.S. only holds $7 billion in Russian assets, but the EU’s big three in the G7 — Germany, France and Italy — want Japan and America actively involved, as they worry that tapping into the €140 billion in Russian assets held in Europe could undermine the euro’s global credibility. If Washington and Tokyo were to take similar action, their fears would be allayed. There was also only limited progress on discussions about Ukraine importing liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the U.S., now that Russian airstrikes on Ukraine’s natural gas infrastructure have increased in both intensity and frequency. So far, Ukraine’s state oil and gas firm Naftogaz has bought around 0.5 billion cubic meters of U.S. LNG, but more will be needed if the country is to endure the winter. And earlier this month, Ukrainian Minister of Energy Svitlana Hrynchuk said Kyiv was aiming to increase its overall gas imports by 30 percent. Along these lines, the country’s Minister of Economy Oleksii Sobolev noted last week that Ukraine was “considering mechanisms to finance the purchase of American LNG and compressor equipment.” But according to an official from America’s export credit agency the Export-Import Bank, who asked to remain anonymous as they’re not authorized to speak with the media, these discussions are now bogged down because Ukraine is objecting to the rather restrictive loan terms being offered. And the bank has only limited legal maneuver to amend the terms. In fact, the huge delegation of Ukrainian ministers and officials — including Zelenskyy’s powerful Chief-of-Staff Andriy Yermak and Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko — sent to Washington ahead of Friday’s White House meeting struck out across the board, failing to finalize several major agreements involving both the U.S. government and the private sector.  “The idea was that there would be massive things readied, including some agreements with major U.S. defense companies and energy players, all to be inked during the White House meeting,” said the Republican insider. But in the end, nothing was oven-ready. “Unfortunately, nothing really concrete was agreed during the entire week,” another Republican foreign-policy adviser concurred. He also said the misguided focus on Tomahawks was only part of the problem — the other was the timing of Zelenskyy’s visit and the overall Ukrainian lobbying push in Washington. The focus on Tomahawks distracted from other key asks. | Smith Collection/Gado/Getty Images “We had urged them to delay,” he said. It was important that Svyrydenko and the economy officials were in Washington because of the annual IMF and World Bank meetings, but the rest of the lobbying effort should have been delayed for a week or so. And certainly, Zelenskyy’s offer of exchanging Ukrainian drone technology for Tomahawks was far too premature. For one, the Trump administration was still very much focused on the Middle East. Plus, with the government shutdown and the blame game over the budgetary battle between Democrats and Republicans, there wasn’t enough oxygen for Ukraine. In their defense, the adviser added, there’s rising alarm in Kyiv about how Ukraine will make it through this winter — likely the worst of the war so far. Zelenskyy hinted at this worry on Sunday, telling NBC that because Russia isn’t winning on the battlefield, it’s escalating airstrikes on infrastructure. “He’s using missiles and drones on our — he wants disaster — energy disaster during this winter by attacking us, each day [with] 500 Iranian drones and 20-30 missiles,” he said. And the Republican adviser agrees: “There’s a real danger is that Ukraine is headed for an energy catastrophe if the Russian strikes on the energy infrastructure persist.”

Jamie Dettmer is opinion editor and a foreign affairs columnist at POLITICO Europe. Ukrainian officials are displaying a newfound confidence — and it’s all thanks to U.S. President Donald Trump. Despite Russia’s pummeling airstrikes targeting the country’s energy system, the conviction that the end may finally be in sight is slowly spreading in Kyiv. Hopes in the capital are that by spring or summer, Russian President Vladimir Putin will be serious about negotiating, with talks of an end to the war sometime next year. In a recent closed-door parliamentary session with lawmakers from his Servant of the People party, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy hazarded Russia’s current heave in the country’s east may well be its final big land offensive in the conflict, according to those in attendance. Of course, the country will still have to endure another harsh winter, but Zelenskyy told them he expects there will be a real possibility of a truce — although, he noted, it won’t be easy. For that to happen, Russia needs to be hit with more economic and military pressure, so Putin understands the only logical outcome is to negotiate, and that prolonging the conflict will lead to no other advantages for him and will just bleed Russia. Thankfully, fresh off successfully brokering a ceasefire in Gaza, Trump seems determined to bring the war in Ukraine to a halt and add another notch in his belt to brandish at the Nobel Peace Prize judges. This is what a high-level Ukrainian delegation, including Zelenskyy’s powerful Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak and Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko, has been discussing with U.S. counterparts in Washington this week: How to leverage Putin into stopping his war, and how to help Ukraine endure Russia’s airstrikes this winter. And with Zelenskyy set to be in the White House on Friday for yet another face-to-face meeting with Trump, this time, they feel the tide might be turning in their favor. In his hour-long address in the Knesset on Monday, the U.S. president made clear his intention is to focus his efforts on ending the war between Ukraine and Russia: “It would be great if we could make a peace deal with [Iran] … First, we have to get Russia done,” he told Israeli lawmakers. For the man who once blamed Zelenskyy for the conflict, it seems this is now Putin’s war. Last month, Trump actually dubbed Russia the “aggressor.” It is this kind of talk that’s firing up Kyiv, and Zelenskyy didn’t miss a beat in responding: “We are working so that the day of peace comes for Ukraine as well. Russian aggression remains the last global source of destabilization, and if a ceasefire and peace have been achieved for the Middle East, the leadership and determination of global actors can certainly work for us, too,” he posted on social media. But Ukraine’s cautious confidence predates Trump’s Knesset speech. Slowly but surely, Trump and Zelenskyy have become aligned — more than anyone could have forecast back in February after their tempestuous Oval Office brawl, which was widely seen as an ambush. “You’re not in a good position. You don’t have the cards right now,” Trump had bellowed at Zelenskyy. Nor did things look good in August, when Trump greeted Putin on the tarmac of a Cold War-era air force base outside Anchorage, Alaska, for a summit that had Ukrainian and European leaders on the edge of their seats. They, along with the rest of the world, watched as Trump applauded the Russian ruler, had an animated but clearly friendly conversation on the red carpet, and invited a smirking Putin into the U.S. president’s official car to share a ride to the summit venue. To be sure, Putin had much to smile about: He had managed to secure the summit meeting despite being a wanted man for war crimes and was greeted on U.S. soil as a friend — not the leader of a pariah state that had invaded a sovereign European nation — all without agreeing to any major concessions or a ceasefire beforehand. He left Anchorage without committing to a truce either, despite Trump saying his Russian counterpart was keen to save thousands of lives during their joint press conference. With Zelenskyy set to be in the White House on Friday for yet another face-to-face meeting with Trump, this time, they feel the tide might be turning in their favor. | Photo by the Office of the President of Ukraine via Getty Images Since then, Putin hasn’t shown any solicitude for human life, and the continued strikes on civilian targets in Ukraine have contributed greatly to where Trump is now, explained one Republican foreign-policy insider, talking to POLITICO on condition of anonymity in order to speak freely. “Trump needed time to understand who Putin really is.” Plus, the media coverage calling the Alaska summit a “Putin triumph” infuriated Trump, the insider said. The Russian president, who appears convinced he just has to wait out the West, overplayed his hand by giving Trump nothing in Anchorage — or since, for that matter. Meanwhile, European leaders who Trump likes have continued their efforts to repair the damage the Oval Office bust-up wrought. The Republican insider lists British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, Finnish President Alexander Stubb and NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte as key players here, as well as Starmer’s National Security Adviser Jonathan Powell. He also said a winning card in the lobbying was Britain’s King Charles “telling Trump that Ukraine is great, and that has really changed Trump’s view of Ukraine.” But the insider also credits Zelenskyy for working hard on his relationship with Trump, and being careful with his language. “You have to understand that since the war began, Zelenskyy and Yermak had been used to being treated as rock stars, as global celebrities, and then Trump enters and says: ‘there’s only room for one diva here — me.’ That’s why we had the Oval Office blow-up,” he said. And proof of that has come in the form of increasingly friendly meetings with Trump, the most cordial of which took place on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly last month, with Trump praising the Ukrainian leader as a “brave man.” “We have great respect for the fight that Ukraine is putting up,” he said. “It’s pretty amazing, actually.” In his hour-long address in the Knesset on Monday, the U.S. president made clear his intention is to focus his efforts on ending the war between Ukraine and Russia. | Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images It was after that meeting that Trump surprised even Zelenskyy himself with the head-spinning comment that Ukraine might be able to reclaim all the territory it has lost to Russia. It also surprised some of Trump’s aides — after all, the U.S. had made clear Ukraine would have to give up land in return for peace only the previous month. There have been other factors shaping Trump’s shift too, and according to another Republican foreign policy adviser who asked to remain anonymous to freely discuss sensitive matters, these include China hosting Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un last month. “Please give my warmest regards to Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jong Un, as you conspire against the United States of America,” Trump scathingly posted on his Truth Social platform. “The best way to get back at Putin is to praise Zelenskyy — that’s how Trump sees it,” the adviser said. And going even further, ramp up U.S. support for Ukraine. To that end, Washington has recently increased its intelligence-sharing with Ukrainian forces to assist in long-range attacks on energy targets deep inside Russia, bringing the consequences of the war home to ordinary citizens. Meanwhile, talk of supplying Ukraine with Tomahawk Cruise missiles is meant to scare the Kremlin — although the risk of escalation will likely deter Trump from going that far. Overall, the cards have certainly started to flutter into Zelenskyy’s hands. Ukrainian officials and their supporters in the U.S. hope they’ll continue to do so — although they concede that with Trump, nothing can be taken for granted. How will he respond if Putin remains obdurate, as signs are that he will? Still, for all his unpredictability, they’re happier with this Trump than the one in February.

Jamie Dettmer is opinion editor and a foreign affairs columnist at POLITICO Europe. “I don’t know what happened,” said French economist Jean Pisani-Ferry recently, lamenting President Emmanuel Macron’s unraveling grand centrist project. His bewilderment is shared by disoriented centrists across the continent, all wondering how the ground has yielded under their feet as the tectonic plates of European politics continue to relentlessly shift, throwing the familiar into disarray. But could this be the point of no return? The first of the latest tremors was the political comeback of Czech populist billionaire Andrej Babiš, a self-proclaimed Trumpist and Euroskeptic agitator. His ANO party grabbed 35 percent of the vote in the country’s parliamentary elections last Sunday, leaving Petr Fiala’s pro-Western coalition behind at 23 percent. Though falling short of an overall majority, Babiš — who lambasted the current center-right government for giving “Czech mothers nothing, and Ukrainians everything” — will no doubt relish teaming up with Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and the far-right parties of the Patriots for Europe group in the European Parliament to disrupt any centrist “more Europe” policies. And seeking to tug the country away from supporting Ukraine, he has already pledged to scrap Czech ammunition supplies to Kyiv. Then, on Monday, French Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu resigned just hours after appointing a cabinet, plunging the country deeper into a political quagmire with its fractious parliament and lame-duck president in a political system designed by Charles de Gaulle for a powerful head of state. Macron has appointed and lost five prime ministers in two years and is still floundering. Could we be seeing the death throes of the Fifth Republic? At the end of the week, there will likely be more bad news for centrists in Portugal as well. Chega, the party of “God, fatherland and family” that in May became the official opposition, is set to do well in the country’s local elections — a harbinger of things to come. These are indeed heady, giddy times for national-conservative populists — and they’re celebrating as their rivals remain confounded. The outcome of the Czech election prompted the top populist leaders from across the continent to take to social media — including Orbán, Denmark’s Anders Vistisen, the Netherlands’ Geert Wilders, Austria’s Harald Vilimsky, France’s Marine Le Pen and Italy’s Matteo Salvini. “All across Europe, patriotic parties are being called to power by the people, who long to reclaim their freedom and prosperity!” Le Pen posted on X. But how did we get here? In the summer of 2024, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen had crowed the “center is holding.” Following European Parliament elections that saw right-wing populists and national conservatives make serious inroads but fall short of the huge surge they were expecting, it seemed voters still largely backed centrists. The first of the latest tremors was the political comeback of Czech populist billionaire Andrej Babiš, a self-proclaimed Trumpist and Euroskeptic agitator. | Martin Divisek/EPA But von der Leyen was being complacent — a common characteristic of mainstream centrists from both the left and right since Brexit and U.S. President Donald Trump’s first election in 2016. Centrists were too quick to dismiss both Brexit and Trump’s first term as aberrations. The world would right itself, they said. Even as late as 2023, the Global Progress Action Summit in Montreal — a gathering of center-left politicians — saw boisterous talk of another possible “progressive moment,” with the Third Way politics shaped by former British Prime Minister Tony Blair and former U.S. President Bill Clinton a quarter-century ago cited as an example. But since those first populist shifts, the centrist crack-up has grown more apparent to everyone else. The British Labour Party’s general election win in 2024 was an outlier — testimony to the unpopularity of the Conservatives rather than an embrace of Prime Minister Keir Starmer or an indication of a political trend. And U.S. President Joe Biden’s 2020 win seemed more like a pause in the crumbling of the ancien régime. Meanwhile, centrists on both the left and right have made too many excuses, without nearly enough rigorous self-analysis or readiness to challenge group-think or shibboleths. Instead, they’ve muttered about “deplorables” and blamed their setbacks on populists weaponizing issues like net zero, immigration, cultural disorientation, identity anxieties and the cost-of-living squeeze. They’ve easily reached for Russian disinformation and demagogic manipulation to explain away their misfortunes — talking almost as though the here-and-now challenges and fears faced by ordinary families are made up or overblown. And they haven’t been able to ease the nagging widespread sense that the West is in a doom-loop of structural decline and lacks the political will to correct. Centrists have consistently failed to understand that the jolts taking place under their feet were forewarnings of even bigger political earthquakes to come as the world changed. Now demoralized, either too laggardly to rethink policies or too quick to dress themselves in populist clothes — as Starmer’s Labour government is now trying to do with tougher immigration rules — more cracks are surely to come. Why vote for copycats when you can vote for the real thing? In Germany, for example, Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s asylum crackdown has done nothing to stem the rising popularity of the hard-right Alternative for Germany party — at least in opinion polls. Merz’s approval ratings are dismal this month, with 70 percent of Germans unhappy with his performance. So are national conservatives now unstoppable? Maybe so, until the tectonic plates settle. Or at least until they’re exposed as having no real answers to the immense challenges of Europe’s anemic economic growth, poor competitiveness and massive public debt.

Is Volodymyr Zelenskyy serious about quitting? Ukrainians appear reluctant to take at face value his claim during an interview last month that he’s “ready not to go for the second term because it’s not my goal.” In fact, it hardly caused a ripple of interest. And from political opponents it drew scorn and disbelief. Of course, it isn’t the first time Zelenskyy has talked about a readiness to quit. He did so last winter. Then relations were especially fraught with the White House, as U.S. President Donald Trump and his aides were echoing a Kremlin talking point by accusing the Ukrainian leader of being a “dictator” for not holding elections. His accusers handily overlooked the fact that the Ukrainian constitution prohibits elections during wartime while martial law is in effect. Nonetheless, in a move presumably aiming to take the sting out of the “autocrat” allegation, Zelenskyy announced dramatically that he was “ready” to go if his resignation would help secure a ceasefire with Russia and gain Ukraine’s admission into NATO. “If [it guarantees] peace for Ukraine, if you really need me to resign, I am ready. I can exchange it for NATO,” he said. This time round he told Axios: “My goal is to finish the war” and not necessarily to continue to run for office. He also vowed to ask Ukraine’s parliament to organize elections if a ceasefire is agreed. Presumably that would mean martial law would have to be lifted or there would have to be some legal maneuver to circumvent the constitutional ban. Ukraine’s former Deputy Prime Minister Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze, from the country’s opposition, takes the president’s talk about removing himself from the political scene with a barrel of salt. “Many of Zelenskyy’s actions point in the opposite direction,” she told POLITICO. “Deeds and not words matter.” Indeed, she isn’t alone in discounting Zelenskyy’s naysaying. Lawmakers from Ukraine’s ruling Servant of the People party didn’t leave a rare closed-door meeting with him last month under the impression he was actually thinking about calling it a day when the war is over. He seemed bullish about his prospects of winning reelection, a pair of lawmakers told POLITICO, and lashed out at opponents and critics, bemoaning members of parliament, civil society activists and journalists for failing to promote an unwaveringly flattering image of Ukraine to Western partners. In fact, partisan politics, very much a muscular, no-holds-barred sport in Ukraine, appears to have come roaring back. That has been triggered by an ill-judged — and ultimately aborted, under domestic and international pressure — maneuver in the summer by Zelenskyy and his aides to try to strip two key anti-corruption agencies of their independence just as both were starting in earnest to probe presidential office insiders. That effort — to halt probes into allies — is now widely seen by Zelenskyy’s rivals as being part and parcel of a stealthy albeit rough campaign by the President’s Office to prepare for an election down the road by ensuring opponents are placed at a disadvantage. “After what happened in July with the anti-corruption bodies, politics in Ukraine is back,” said a former Ukrainian minister. “It’s impossible to hide it.” He asked not to be identified for this article in order to avoid the ire of the president’s aides who, he says, are using lawfare to intimidate and silence critics and political opponents. Shortly after Zelenskyy’s election in 2019, more than 20 criminal cases, including one for high treason, were opened against the man he beat, Petro Poroshenko, the former Ukrainian president. | Andrea Campeanu/Getty Images Another former minister agrees, arguing that Zelenskyy’s aides are using all the power and tools at their disposal to smear and hamper rivals to tilt the playing field.  “Essentially, the tactic is that ‘you say something against us, we open up criminal proceedings against you and sanction you,’” he told POLITICO after being granted anonymity to speak freely. “They’re essentially blackmailing all their potential opponents or perceived opponents.” Lawfare against opponents, often involving allegations of treason and nefarious ties to Russia, isn’t a new tactic. Shortly after Zelenskyy’s election in 2019, more than 20 criminal cases, including one for high treason, were opened against the man he beat, Petro Poroshenko, the former Ukrainian president. And in February, Zelenskyy signed a decree sanctioning Poroshenko — in effect freezing his assets in Ukraine and blocking him from conducting financial transactions — prompting criticism and allegations of a “politically motivated” witch hunt. But lawfare is being used even more aggressively, both ministers say. And despite having had their independence restored, the anti-corruption agencies also remain in the bullseye. The climbdown over their independence has been replaced by a covert clampdown on the agencies, prominent civil society activists claim. They allege the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) is being used in a campaign of intimidation against the anti-corruption bodies and to block probes into presidential insiders. In July, as protests mounted to protect the integrity of the agencies, SBU agents raided the offices of Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and its Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAP) and also conducted at least 80 searches targeting their employees and investigators across the country. The SBU raiding parties gained access to sensitive case files, according to NABU. Since then raids have been mounted against former anti-corruption detectives who worked on sensitive cases. According to Daria Kaleniuk, executive director of the Anti-Corruption Action Center, an NGO: “Zelenskyy and the SBU’s immediate goal is to discredit the entire anti-corruption system.” Others point to an uptick in SBU investigations into a handful of former generals on charges of negligence in the early months of the war as likely evidence of alarm in the President’s Office over a possible election challenge by the former armed forces commander, Valery Zaluzhny. Dismissed after a fallout over war tactics, Zaluzhny is viewed by many as Zelenskyy’s likely main potential challenger. A survey in the summer by the Rating Sociological Group suggested the incumbent would secure 35.2 percent of the vote, with 25.3 percent going to Zaluzhny. Nonetheless Zelenskyy could well struggle in a second round to best the former commander-in-chief, now Ukraine’s envoy to Britain. “Criminal cases against generals for losses endured in 2022 is a potential leverage [that] presidential aides are weighing to use against Zaluzhny,” said one of the former ministers. Another former senior defense official disagreed, saying none of the generals were that close to Zaluzhny or much associated with him, and that the probes are being undertaken to uphold the rule of law. Maybe so, but last week Zaluzhny for the first time inched closer to criticizing Zelenskyy publicly than at any time since his dismissal, albeit indirectly in an op-ed slamming Ukraine’s Kursk offensive. The operation had been touted by Ukraine’s leader as a success, but Zaluzhny’s article said the losses had been “devastating” and the gains only marginal. Coincidence, or has the election starting pistol been fired? 

Jamie Dettmer is opinion editor and a foreign affairs columnist at POLITICO Europe. At a closed-door parliamentary meeting last week, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy didn’t disguise his indignation with domestic critics. According to a pair of attending lawmakers — who spoke with POLITICO on condition of anonymity for fear of inviting presidential wrath — the Ukrainian leader vented his frustrations to his own Servant of the People party, bemoaning members of parliament, civil society activists and journalists for failing to promote an unwaveringly flattering image of Ukraine to Western partners. The diatribe denouncing those who, in Zelenskyy’s words, were positioning themselves “against Ukraine” only added to what the lawmakers described as an encounter marked by underlying tension. Referring to reports about corruption and rights violations, the president combatively stated that Ukrainians saying anything negative about the situation inside the country were distracting from where the focus should be — on the war effort and bolstering support from foreign allies. Lawmakers had expected Zelenskyy to be more mollifying and gentle in tone — especially in light of his attempt to gut Ukraine’s two key independent anti-graft agencies over the summer, which provoked the first nationwide street protests since Russia’s full-scale invasion began in 2022. But as the Ukrainian leader focused on the state of the war and made clear his intention to run in any elections held after, these expectations weren’t met. And it appears it’s no longer just Zelenskyy’s partisan rivals who worry about a creeping monopolization of power. Truth is, there have been growing qualms and grumbles within party ranks about Zelenskyy’s highly personalized method of rule and his tendency to be dismissive of parliament — plus, the move against the anti-corruption agencies still rankles some of his own lawmakers. The President’s Office had ordered party lawmakers, many of whom were reluctant, to back the legislation subordinating the agencies to the politically appointed prosecutor general. But within a day of signing the law, Zelenskyy was forced to back down in the face of protests and European warnings about democratic backsliding. His aides then sought to shift blame to them for the whole fiasco — not an uncommon tactic when policies pushed by the President’s Office prove unpopular, they complain. The whole episode left many lawmakers questioning how Zelenskyy and his advisers failed to anticipate such a ferocious public reaction in the first place. Opinion polls have consistently shown that even in wartime, Ukrainians rank corruption as the country’s main domestic problem. Political opponents have long complained of the Ukrainian leader’s populist impatience with the constraints and complexities required to govern a democracy and of his innate prickliness to criticism. His defenders, however, are dismissive of the complaints, saying war requires a firm, decisive hand. Or, as Zelenskyy’s powerful Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak told POLITICO earlier this year: “Especially during wartime, decisions must be made quickly and clearly.” Presidential aides also point out their boss enjoys high favorability in opinion polls. They do have a point — and even many critics agree that the clamor and messiness of democracy shouldn’t be allowed to imperil the country as it fights an existential war. But they also stress that other wartime leaders took a markedly different approach — notably Britain’s Winston Churchill, who was keen to harness the country’s best, brightest and most capable from across the political spectrum to fill the ranks of wartime bureaucracy. And it isn’t just Zelenskyy’s partisan rivals who now worry about the drive to centralize power. While reticent to issue any public criticism for fear of handing Moscow a propaganda opening, according to three European envoys based in Kyiv who asked not to be identified for this article, Western allies have privately raised concerns. And some of the lawmakers in Zelenskyy’s party are also questioning recent developments— which have included firing elected mayors and exerting pressure on state agencies meant to be independent. Even before the war, the government was impatient with parliamentary oversight. Now, having virtually abandoned the routine of ministers being questioned by parliament committees, it’s being shunned almost entirely. Noticeably, the presidential administration has also increasingly struggled to muster the votes it needs to approve favored legislation, partly because ruling lawmakers are growing frustrated with pressure to kowtow to the President’s Office and are worried they’ll be blamed by their constituents when things go wrong. Recent government reshuffles have seen the forced departures of notable figures such as Minister of Foreign Affairs Dmytro Kuleba. | Kay Nietfeld/Picture Alliance via Getty Images This unease predates the attempt to eviscerate the anti-corruption agencies. And a string of purges of more independent-minded ministers and government officials have prompted behind-the-scenes disquiet too. Recent government reshuffles have seen the forced departures of notable figures such as Minister of Foreign Affairs Dmytro Kuleba, the head of Ukraine’s national power transmission network Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, and the highly popular armed forces commander General Valery Zaluzhny — now Ukraine’s ambassador to Britain — who clashed with Zelenskyy over war strategy. Each reshuffle has seen the president’s clam-like coterie of trusted friends and advisers accrue more power and control, while outliers ready to question and challenge — or who show streaks of independence — get ejected. The party mood wasn’t improved by Zelenskyy’s notorious Oval Office spat with U.S. President Donald Trump either, as the Ukrainian leader veered dangerously off-script, thanks, in large part, to goading by U.S. Vice President JD Vance. Displaying unusually autonomous behavior, and in what many viewed as implied criticism of Zelenskyy, Servant of the People lawmaker and Chairman of Ukraine’s parliament Ruslan Stefanchuk subsequently issued a statement saying Ukraine needed to repair relations with Trump quickly — hence the expectation that the Ukrainian leader would seek to reassure and appease his party in last week’s meeting. But the two lawmakers who spoke to POLITICO said that’s not how things turned out. Zelenskyy was unhappy with the poor level of attendance, as around a hundred of his party’s lawmakers failed to turn up. And the underlying tension only grew when one of them questioned the wisdom of gutting the anti-corruption agencies at a time when they were zeroing in on presidential administration insiders. While Zelenskyy did say he’d consult with them more in the future, “that seems unlikely,” one of the lawmakers lamented. “The whole narrative points to a further tightening of the screws at home. As far as the President’s Office sees it, you’re either with Zelenskyy or you’re a Russian stooge.” Indeed, the screws are being tightened. Just this month, for example, a group of around 20 former and retired Ukrainian diplomats and envoys were included in a regulation banning lawmakers and officials from traveling overseas without the express approval of authorities. “It is difficult to understand why, in the fourth year of the war, it suddenly became so important to ban a group of no more than 20 people from traveling abroad — people who have the contacts and authority to promote Ukraine’s interests among foreign audiences,” Kuleba, who is among those impacted, told POLITICO. “The only explanation can be political. And once such political logic takes hold, it becomes possible to arbitrarily decide which categories of people are allowed or forbidden to do certain things. Ambassadors are only an example, but one that reveals a much deeper problem.”