U.S. President Donald Trump warned late Saturday that the United States will
“obliterate” energy plants in Iran if the government doesn’t fully open
the Strait of Hormuz, giving the country a 48-hour deadline to comply.
“If Iran doesn’t fully open, without threat, the Strait of Hormuz, within 48
hours from this exact point in time, the United States of America will hit and
obliterate their various power plants, starting with the biggest one first,”
Trump said in a post on Trust Social.
Iran warned in reply that any strike on its energy facilities would prompt
attacks on U.S. and Israeli energy and infrastructure facilities — specifically
information technology and desalination operations — in the region, the
Associated Press reported, citing a statement by an Iranian military
spokesperson carried by state media and semiofficial outlets.
The warnings of escalation in the Mideast conflict come after the British
government on Saturday confirmed that Tehran launched an unsuccessful attack on
Diego Garcia, a joint U.S.-U.K. military base in the Indian Ocean. Media
reports said Iran fired two ballistic missiles at the base but missed.
Meanwhile, Israel claimed that Iran has missiles with a range of about 4,000
kilometers, capable of hitting London, Paris and Berlin. “The Iranian terrorist
regime poses a global threat. Now, with missiles that can reach London, Paris or
Berlin,” the Israel Defense Forces said in a post on X.
Iran’s targeting of the base on Diego Garcia occurred before Britain on
Friday confirmed that U.S. use of its bases includes defensive operations
against “missile sites and capabilities being used to attack ships in the Strait
of Hormuz,” a permission that includes the Indian Ocean island.
Tag - Americas
Biotechnology is central to modern medicine and Europe’s long-term
competitiveness. From cancer and cardiovascular disease to rare conditions, it
is driving transformative advances for patients across Europe and beyond . 1
Yet innovation in Europe is increasingly shaped by regulatory fragmentation,
procedural complexity and uneven implementation across m ember s tates. As
scientific progress accelerates, policy frameworks must evolve in parallel,
supporting the full lifecycle of innovation from research and clinical
development to manufacturing and patient access.
The proposed EU Biotech Act seeks to address these challenges. By streamlining
regulatory procedures, strengthening coordination and supporting scale-up and
manufacturing, it aims to reinforce Europe’s position in a highly competitive
global biotechnology landscape .2
Its success, however, will depend less on ambition than on delivery. Consistent
implementation, proportionate oversight and continued global openness
will determine whether the a ct translates into faster patient access,
sustained investment and long-term resilience.
Q: Why is biotechnology increasingly seen as a strategic pillar for Europe’s
competitiveness, resilience and long-term growth?
Gilles Marrache, SVP and regional general manager, Europe, Latin America, Middle
East, Africa and Canada, Amgen: Biotechnology sits at the intersection of
health, industrial policy and economic competitiveness. The sector is one of
Europe’s strongest strategic assets and a leading contributor to research and
development growth . 3
At the same time, Europe’s position is under increasing pressure. Over the past
two decades, the EU has lost approximately 25 percent of its global share of
pharmaceutical investment to other regions, such as the United States and
China.
The choices made today will shape Europe’s long-term strength in the sector,
influencing not only competitiveness and growth, but also how quickly patients
can benefit from new treatments.
> Europe stands at a pivotal moment in biotechnology. Our life sciences legacy
> is strong, but maintaining global competitiveness requires evolution .” 4
>
> Gilles Marrache, SVP and regional general manager, Europe, Latin America,
> Middle East, Africa and Canada, Amgen.
Q: What does the EU Biotech Act aim to do and why is it considered an
important step forward for patients and Europe’s innovation ecosystem?
Marrache: The EU Biotech Act represents a timely opportunity to better support
biotechnology products from the laboratory to the market.
By streamlining medicines’ pathways and improving conditions for scale-up and
investment, it can help strengthen Europe’s innovation ecosystem and accelerate
patient access to breakthrough therapies. These measures will help anchor
biotechnology as a strategic priority for Europe’s future — and one that can
deliver earlier patient benefit — so long as we can make it work in practice.
Q: How does the EU Biotech Act address regulatory fragmentation, and where will
effective delivery and coordination be most decisive?
Marrache: Regulatory fragmentation has long challenged biotechnology development
in Europe, particularly for multinational clinical trials and innovative
products. The Biotech Act introduces faster, more coordinated trials, expanded
regulatory sandboxes and new investment and industrial capacity instruments.
The proposed EU Health Biotechnology Support Network and a u nion-level
regulatory status repository would strengthen transparency and
predictability. Together, these measures would support earlier regulatory
dialogue, help de-risk development and promote more consistent implementation
across m ember s tates.
They also create an opportunity to address complexities surrounding combination
products — spanning medicines, devices and diagnostics — where overlapping
requirements and parallel assessments have added delays.5 This builds on related
efforts, such as the COMBINE programme,6 which seeks to streamline the
navigation of the In Vitro Diagnostic Regulation , 7 Clinical Trials Regulation8
and the Medical Device Regulation9 through a single, coordinated assessment
process.
Continued clarity and coordination will be essential to reduce duplication and
accelerate development timelines .10
Q: What conditions will be most critical to support biotech
scale-up, manufacturing and long-term investment in Europe?
Marrache: Europe must strike the right balance between strategic autonomy and
openness to global collaboration. Any new instruments under the Biotech Act
mechanisms should remain open and supportive of all types of biotech
investments, recogni z ing that biotech manufacturing operates through globally
integrated and highly speciali z ed value chains.
Q: How can Europe ensure faster and more predictable pathways from scientific
discovery to patient access, while maintaining high standards of safety and
quality?
Marrache: Faster and more predictable patient access depends on strengthening
end-to-end pathways across the lifecycle. The Biotech Act will help ensure
continuity of scientific and regulatory experti z e, from clinical development
through post-authori z ation. It will also support stronger alignment with
downstream processes, such as health technology assessments, which are
critical to success.
Moreover, reducing unnecessary delays or duplication in approval processes can
set clearer expectations, more predictable development timelines and earlier
planning for scale-up.
Gilles Marrache, SVP and regional general manager, Europe, Latin America,
Middle East, Africa and Canada, Amgen. Via Amgen.
Finally, embedding a limited number of practical tools (procedural, digital or
governance-based) and ensuring they are integrated within existing European
Medicines Agency and EU regulatory structures can help achieve faster
patient access . 11
Q: What role can stronger regulatory coordination, data use and public - private
collaboration play in strengthening Europe’s global position in biotechnology?
Marrache: To unlock biotechnology’s full potential, consistent implementation is
essential. Fragmented approaches to secondary data use, divergent m ember
state interpretations and uncertainty for data holders still limit access to
high-quality datasets at scale. The Biotech Act introduces key building blocks
to address this.
These include Biotechnology Data Quality Accelerators to improve
interoperability, trusted testing environments for advanced innovation, and
alignment with the EU AI Act ,12 European Health Data Space13 and wider EU data
initiatives. It also foresees AI-specific provisions and clinical trial guidance
to provide greater operational clarity.
Crucially, these structures must simplify rather than add further layers of
complexity.
Addressing remaining barriers will reduce legal uncertainty for AI deployment,
support innovation and strengthen Europe’s competitiveness.
> These reforms will create a moderni z ed biotech ecosystem, healthier
> societies, sustainable healthcare systems and faster patient access to the
> latest breakthroughs in Europe .” 14
>
> Gilles Marrache, SVP and regional general manager, Europe, Latin America,
> Middle East, Africa and Canada, Amgen.
Q: As technologies evolve and global competition intensifies, how can
policymakers ensure the Biotech Act remains flexible and future-proof?
Marrache: To remain future-proof, the Biotech Act must be designed to evolve
alongside scientific progress, market dynamics and patient needs. Clear
objectives, risk-based requirements, regular review mechanisms and timely
updates to guidance will enhance regulatory agility without creating unnecessary
rigidity or administrative burden.
Continuous stakeholder dialogue combined with horizon scanning will be essential
to sustaining innovation, resilience and timely patient access over the long
term. Preserving regulatory openness and international cooperation will be
critical in avoiding fragmentation and maintaining Europe’s credibility as a
global biotech hub.
Q: Looking ahead, what two or three priorities should policymakers focus on to
ensure the EU Biotech Act delivers meaningful impact in practice?
Marrache: Looking ahead, policymakers should focus on three priorities for the
Biotech Act:
First, implementation must deliver real regulatory efficiency, predictability
and coordination in practice.
Second, Europe must sustain an open and investment-friendly framework that
reflects the global nature of biotechnology.
And third, policymakers should ensure a clear and coherent legal framework
across the lifecycle of innovative medicines, providing certainty for the use
of artificial intelligence — as a key driver of innovation in health
biotechnology.
In practical terms, the EU Biotech Act will be judged not by the number of new
instruments it creates, but by whether it reduces complexity, increases
predictability and shortens the path from scientific discovery to patient
benefit.
An open, innovation-friendly framework that is competitive at the global level
will help sustain investment, strengthen resilient supply chains and deliver
better outcomes for patients across Europe and beyond.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
References
1. Amgen Europe, The EU Biotech Act Unlocking Europe’s Potential, May 2025.
Retrieved from
https://www.amgen.eu/media/press-releases/2025/05/The_EU_Biotech_Act_Unlocking_Europes_Potential
2. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation to establish measures to
strengthen the Union’s biotechnology and biomanufacturing sectors, December
2025. Retrieved from
https://health.ec.europa.eu/publications/proposal-regulation-establish-measures-strengthen-unions-biotechnology-and-biomanufacturing-sectors_en
3. EFPIA, The pharmaceutical sector: A catalyst to foster Europe’s
competitiveness, February 2026. Retrieved from
https://www.efpia.eu/media/zkhfr3kp/10-actions-for-competitiveness-growth-and-security.pdf
4. The Parliament, Investing in healthy societies by boosting biotech
competitiveness, November 2024. Retrieved from
https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/partner/article/investing-in-healthy-societies-by-boosting-biotech-competitiveness#_ftn4
5. Amgen Europe, The EU Biotech Act Unlocking Europe’s Potential, May 2025.
Retrieved from
https://www.amgen.eu/docs/BiotechPP_final_digital_version_May_2025.pdf
6. European Commission, combine programme, June 2023. Retrieved from
https://health.ec.europa.eu/medical-devices-topics-interest/combine-programme_en
7. European Commission. Medical Devices – In Vitro Diagnostics, March 2026.
Retrieved from
https://health.ec.europa.eu/medical-devices-vitro-diagnostics_en
8. European Commission, Clinical trials – Regulation EU No 536/2014, January
2022. Retrieved from
https://health.ec.europa.eu/medicinal-products/clinical-trials/clinical-trials-regulation-eu-no-5362014_en
9. European Commission, Simpler and more effective rules for medical devices –
Commission proposal for a targeted revision of the medical devices
regulations, December 2025. Retrieved from
https://health.ec.europa.eu/medical-devices-sector/new-regulations_en#mdr
10. Amgen Europe, The EU Biotech Act Unlocking Europe’s Potential, May 2025.
Retrieved from
https://www.amgen.eu/docs/BiotechPP_final_digital_version_May_2025.pdf
11. AmCham, EU position on the Commission Proposal for an EU Biotech Act
12. European Commission, AI Act | Shaping Europe’s digital future, June 2024.
Retrieved from
https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/regulatory-framework-ai
13. European Commission, European Health Data Space, March 2025. Retrieved from
https://health.ec.europa.eu/ehealth-digital-health-and-care/european-health-data-space-regulation-ehds_en
14. The Parliament, Why Europe needs a Biotech Act, October 2025. Retrieved
from
https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/partner/article/why-europe-needs-a-biotech-act
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disclaimer
POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT
* The sponsor is Amgen Inc
* The ultimate controlling entity is Amgen Inc
* The political advertisement is linked to advocacy on the EU Biotech Act.
More information here.
BRUSSELS — United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres said Thursday there
are “reasonable grounds” to believe both sides in the U.S.-Israel conflict with
Iran may have committed war crimes, as attacks and retaliatory strikes on energy
facilities intensify.
Speaking exclusively to POLITICO on a visit to Brussels before Thursday’s
European Council summit, Guterres said: “If there are attacks either on Iran or
from Iran on energy infrastructure, I think that there are reasonable grounds to
think that they might constitute a war crime.”
Israel attacked Iran’s South Pars natural gas field on Wednesday, then Tehran
launched a retaliatory strike on a major energy complex in Qatar. Beyond that,
Guterres said the growing civilian casualties left both sides in the conflict
open to possible war crimes charges.
“I don’t see any difference. It doesn’t matter who targets civilians. It
is totally unacceptable,” he said.
Representatives for the U.S. and Israeli governments did not immediately respond
to requests for comment on Guterres’ remarks. America and Israel began a bombing
campaign on Feb. 28, killing Iran’s supreme leader and sparking ongoing
retaliatory missile-and-drone attacks from Tehran on sites across the Middle
East.
Having called for deescalation in the region, Guterres appeared to blame Israel
for driving the conflict forward, and called on U.S. President Donald Trump to
persuade Israeli leader Benjamin Netanyahu to bring it to an end.
“The war needs to stop … and I believe that it is in the hands of the U.S. to
make it stop. It is possible [to end the war], but it depends on the political
will to do it,” Guterres told host Anne McElvoy for an episode of the EU
Confidential podcast publishing Friday morning.
“I am convinced that Israel, as a strategy, wants to achieve a total destruction
of the military capacity of Iran and regime change. And I believe Iran has a
strategy, which is to resist for as much time as possible and to cause as much
harm as possible. So the key to solve the problem is that the U.S. decides to
claim that they have done their job.
“President Trump will be able to convince … those that need to be convinced that
the work is done. That the work can end,” Guterres added.
The secretary-general also attributed America’s decision to launch strikes on
Iran to Israel.
“I have no doubt that this was something that corresponds to Israel’s strategy …
to draw the United States into a war. That objective was achieved. But this
is creating dramatic suffering in Iran, [and] in the region, even in Israel. And
it is creating a devastating impact in the global economy and whose consequences
are still too early to foresee. So, we absolutely must end this conflict,” he
said.
But finding an off-ramp might prove difficult, and relations between the U.N.
and the Trump administration remain frosty.
Asked if he had spoken with Trump since the conflict began three weeks ago,
Guterres responded emphatically: “No, no, no … I speak with those I need to
speak to. But this is not a soap opera.”
He claimed, however, to have been “in contact with all sides,” including with
the Trump administration, since hostilities spread across the Gulf.
“It’s vital for the world at large that this war ends quickly,” Guterres said.
“This is indeed spiraling out of control and the recent attacks represent an
escalation that is extremely dangerous.”
Trump said on his Truth Social site that the U.S. had not authorized the attack
by Israel on the South Pars site, and that Israel had “violently lashed out,”
raising questions about how much influence the U.S. has over its ally.
“My hope is that the United States will be able to understand that this has
gone too far,” Guterres said.
The conflict was primarily benefitting Russia, Guterres added, with Moscow
welcoming the distraction from its own war on Ukraine.
“Russia is the biggest beneficiary of the Iran crisis,” Guterres said. “Russia
is the country that is gaining more with what’s happening in this horrible
disaster. Russia is already the winner.”
Meanwhile, European leaders, including U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer and
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, have said they won’t be sending ships to the
Persian Gulf in response to Trump’s appeal for help to open the Strait of
Hormuz. France has said it will only contribute support vessels “when the
situation is calmer.”
Guterres applauded the restraint shown by the Europeans, despite Trump’s anger
at their refusal to actively support the war or help reopen the Strait of
Hormuz, a critical maritime artery that Iran has largely sealed off, driving up
global energy prices.
“I think these countries made their own reading of the situation, and I
believe they took a decision not to get too much involved, knowing that the most
important objective is the deescalation,” he said.
Listen to the full episode of EU Confidential on Friday morning.
LONDON — Britain will reduce its aid sent to Africa by more than half, as the
government unveils the impact of steep cuts to development assistance for
countries across the world.
On Thursday the Foreign Office revealed the next three years of its overseas
development spending, giving MPs and the public the first look at the impact of
Labour’s decision to gut Britain’s aid budget in order to fund an increase in
defense spending.
Government figures show that the value of Britain’s programs in Africa will fall
by 56 percent from the £1.5 billion in 2024/25 when Labour took office to £677
million in 2028/9. It follows the move to reduce aid spending from 0.5 to 0.3
percent of gross national income.
However, the government did not release the details of the funding for specific
countries, giving Britain’s ambassadors and diplomats time to deliver the news
personally to their counterparts across the world ahead of any potential
backlash from allies.
Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper told MPs that affected countries want Britain
“to be an investor, not just a donor” and “want to attract finance, not be
dependent on aid,” as she pointed to money her department had committed to
development banks and funds which will help Africa raise money.
The decision shows a substantial shift in the government’s focus, moving away
from direct assistance for countries, and funneling much of the remaining money
into international organizations and private finance initiatives.
Chi Onwurah, chair of the All Party Parliamentary Group for Africa, told
POLITICO that she was “dismayed at the level and extent of the cuts to
investment in Africa and the impact it will have particularly on health and
economic development.”
She added: “I hope the government recognizes that security of the British people
is not increased by insecurity in Africa and increased migration from Africa,
quite the opposite.”
Ian Mitchell from the Center for Global Development think tank noted the move
was “a remarkable step back from Africa by the U.K.”
NEW PRIORITIES
Announcing the cuts in the House of Commons, Cooper stressed that the decision
to reduce the aid budget had been “hugely difficult,” pointing to similar moves
by allies such as France and Germany following the U.S. President Donald Trump’s
decision to dramatically shrink America’s aid programs after taking office in
January 2025.
She insisted that it was still “part of our moral purpose” to tackle global
disease and hunger, reiterating Labour’s ambition to work towards “a world free
from extreme poverty on a livable planet.”
Cooper set out three new priorities for Britain’s remaining budget: funding for
unstable countries with conflict and humanitarian disasters, funneling money
into “proven” global partnerships such as vaccine organizations, and a focus on
women and girls, pledging that these will be at the core of 90 percent of
Britain’s bilateral aid programs by 2030.
A box with the Ukrainian flag on it awaits collection in Peterborough, U.K. on
March 10, 2022. | Martin Pope/Getty Images
Only three recipients will see their aid spending fully protected: Ukraine, the
Palestinian territories and Sudan. Lebanon will also see its funding protected
for another year. All bilateral funding for G20 countries will end.
Despite the government’s stated priorities, the scale of the cuts mean that even
the areas it is seeking to protect will not be protected fully.
An impact assessment — which was so stark that ministers claimed they had to
rethink some of the cuts in order to better protect focus areas such as
contraception — published alongside the announcement found that there will
likely be an end to programs in Malawi where 250,000 young people will lose
access to family planning, and 20,000 children risk dropping out of school.
“These steep cuts will impact the most marginalized and left behind
communities,” said Romilly Greenhill, CEO of Bond, the U.K. network for NGOs,
adding: “The U.K. is turning its back on the communities that need support the
most.”
Last-minute negotiations did see some areas protected from more severe cuts,
with the BBC World Service seeing a funding boost, the British Council set to
receive an uplift amid its financial struggles, and the Independent Commission
for Aid Impact (ICAI) — the aid spending watchdog that had been at risk of being
axed — continuing to operate with a 40 percent budget cut.
GREEN THREAT
Though the move will not require legislation to be confirmed — after Prime
Minister Keir Starmer successfully got the move past his MPs last year — MPs
inside his party and out have lamented the impact of the cuts, amid the ongoing
threat to Labour’s left from a resurgent Green Party under new leader Zack
Polanski.
Labour MP Becky Cooper, chair of the APPG on global health and security said
that her party “is, and always has been, a party of internationalism” but
today’s plans would “put Britain and the world at risk.”
Sarah Champion, another Labour MP who chairs the House of Commons international
development committee said that the announcement confirmed that there “will be
no winners from unrelenting U.K. aid cuts, just different degrees of losers,”
creating a “desperately bleak” picture for the world’s most vulnerable. “These
cuts do not aid our defense, they make the whole world more vulnerable,” she
added.
Her Labour colleague Gareth Thomas, a former development minister, added: “In an
already unsafe world, cutting aid risks alienating key allies and will make
improving children’s health and education in Commonwealth countries more
difficult.”
The announcement may give fresh ammunition to the Greens ahead of May’s local
elections, where the party is eyeing up one of its best nights in local
government amid a collapse in support for Labour among Britain’s young,
progressive, and Muslim voters.
Reacting to the news that Britain will cut its aid to developing countries aimed
at combatting climate change, Polanski said: “Appalling and just unbelievably
short-sighted. Our security here in the U.K. relies on action around the world
to tackle the climate crisis.”
President Donald Trump said Wednesday that the U.S. had no advance knowledge of
an Israeli strike on a major Iranian natural gas field that prompted Iran to
retaliate against neighboring Qatar and sent oil prices soaring.
Even as he distanced the U.S. from the strike on the South Pars gas field, Trump
vowed to “massively blow up the entirety of the field” if Iran attacked Qatar
again.
“The United States knew nothing about this particular attack, and the country of
Qatar was in no way, shape, or form, involved with it, nor did it have any idea
that it was going to happen,” he said in a social media post.
The president’s response to the attack on the world’s largest gas field, which
supplies the vast majority of Iran’s domestic energy demands, appeared to be an
unusual acknowledgment of a breakdown in coordination between Israel and the
U.S. in the war that the two countries launched with joint strikes on Feb. 28.
Trump said Israel struck a “relatively small section” of the natural gas field.
He said South Pars would not be targeted in the future unless Iran launches
further attacks on Qatar, in which case he threatened to destroy the entire
natural gas field.
“NO MORE ATTACKS WILL BE MADE BY ISRAEL pertaining to this extremely important
and valuable South Pars Field unless Iran unwisely decides to attack a very
innocent, in this case, Qatar – In which instance the United States of America,
with or without the help or consent of Israel, will massively blow up the
entirety of the South Pars Gas Field at an amount of strength and power that
Iran has never seen or witnessed before,” he said.
Iran depends heavily on natural gas to produce electricity and heat throughout
the country. The natural gas from South Pars fulfills 80 percent of Iran’s
natural gas demands.
The White House is pleading with allies to help secure the Strait of Hormuz —
and privately assuring them that President Donald Trump is fine with high-level
statements — as it pushes to calm financial markets, according to three European
officials.
The Trump administration is urging European and Asian allies to issue these
public commitments by the end of the week, the officials said. The White House
is less concerned about specific contributions at this stage, they added. All
were granted anonymity to discuss sensitive deliberations.
The move comes as Trump has been getting increasingly irate about allies not
signing on to help keep ships moving through the vital waterway, posting on
Truth Social on Tuesday: “WE DO NOT NEED THE HELP OF ANYONE!”
Even just a note of public support could help reassure increasingly dismayed
investors, and perhaps give the Trump administration a framework of cooperation
to build on later.
Those who have spoken with Trump administration officials in recent days said
it’s clear the White House values the market reaction most of all, according to
two of the European officials.
Asked for comment, the White House pointed to Trump’s criticism of allies in the
Oval Office Tuesday.
“I think NATO is making a very foolish mistake,” Trump told reporters during an
appearance Tuesday beside Ireland’s leader in the Oval Office. “I’ve long said …
I wonder whether or not NATO would ever be there for us. So this is a, this was
a great test, because we don’t need them, but they should have been there.”
Trump’s war with Iran has put many of America’s closest allies and partners in a
difficult spot. Trump didn’t brief many of these countries about the operation
ahead of time. Those that got advanced notice had hours or days, not weeks, to
prepare to defend their infrastructure and people in the region.
In Europe, committing ships to escort tankers through the strait would take away
resources needed to help defend Ukraine against Russian attacks. In the
Indo-Pacific, publicly backing a Hormuz security effort risks domestic backlash
in countries where another Middle East conflict is unpopular, while also raising
concerns about diverting already stretched naval resources from deterring China
and protecting critical regional sea lanes.
It would also take time for many countries to reroute ships or other assets to
the Middle East.
While many of Washington’s allies are keen to find a way to support Trump’s
efforts, some want to sort out the details of their contributions before signing
on to the effort, one of the European officials said.
“Leaders are well aware that it’s a one-way street with him, that they can no
longer count on the U.S. the way they used to. But most are looking to avoid a
total rupture,” another one of the European officials said. “So despite the
ironic twist here, they are weighing practical and political considerations, not
emotional ones. If there is a lack of interest in what he’s asking, it’s because
Europe is already stretched economically and with defending Ukraine. But there
is also real concern about oil prices and what it would mean if the strait is
shut down.”
Trump repeated his earlier complaints on Tuesday that the U.K. had been too slow
to accede to his requests to send two aircraft carriers to the Strait of Hormuz.
But those aircraft carriers are located in far away theaters — such as near
Australia — and would take weeks to get in place, should the U.K. bow to Trump’s
request.
Speaking alongside Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on Tuesday, U.K.
Prime Minister Keir Starmer said Europe must not be distracted by the Middle
East.
“Putin can’t be the one who benefits from the conflict in Iran, whether that’s
oil prices or the dropping of sanctions,” Starmer said. “It is really important
we keep our resolve in relation to supporting Ukraine, doing everything we can
to weaken the hand of Putin.”
Germany, Canada and Australia, meanwhile, have ruled out any military
participation.
France did the same on Tuesday, with President Emmanuel Macron saying France is
“not a party to the conflict and therefore France will never take part in
operations to open or liberate the Strait of Hormuz” and would only participate
in naval escorts “once the situation has calmed down.”
Tokyo is “vigorously examining” whether the dispatch of escort vessels “is
within the bounds of the law,” Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi said
Tuesday, per the Japan Times. That hesitation likely reflects the restrictions
imposed by Japan’s post-war constitution, which forbid “armed troops to be
dispatched to the land, sea, or airspace of other countries with the aim of
using force.”
Trump has flip-flopped publicly about how much the U.S. needs its allies to help
protect freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and has downplayed how
much the shutdown of the channel affects America.
Anwar Gargash, the diplomatic adviser to the UAE’s president, said Tuesday that
his country was considering joining the U.S. effort to secure Hormuz.
“We all have a responsibility to ensure the flow of trade, the flow of energy,”
he said at an online event hosted by the Council on Foreign Relations.
Some affected countries have talked about standing up their own operations to
protect freedom of navigation when the conditions allow.
European foreign ministers also met on Monday to discuss extending its Operation
Aspides, which stood up last year to protect ships transiting the Red Sea amid
Houthi attacks.
At the same time, U.S. allies are seeking better information from Washington
about what Trump and his team see as the endpoint for the war that began in late
February.
“Allies are still more in an, ‘Ok so, how’s it going, what’s your thinking mode.
What are your assessments? We hear what you’re saying publicly on the aims, but
what does success and the point you put the pencil down look like?’” the first
European official said.
Phelim Kine contributed to this report.
A top Pentagon official told lawmakers Tuesday that existing military operations
targeting Latin American drug cartels are “just the beginning” — and left open
the possibility of deploying ground forces even as lethal boat strikes against
alleged smugglers continue indefinitely.
The comments from Joseph Humire, acting assistant secretary of defense for
homeland defense, during a House Armed Services Committee hearing raised
immediate concerns from congressional Democrats who said the efforts appear to
be another “forever war” without clear goals or a stated end date.
It’s the latest example of the administration doubling down on aggressive
foreign policy interventions without clarifying what victory might look like,
despite President Donald Trump’s past campaign pledges to avoid embroiling
America in more overseas conflicts. And it raises the prospect that the nation’s
armed forces could be further strained amid a massive air war over Iran.
Democrats on Tuesday also questioned military leaders’ assertions that the
six-month effort to sink smuggling vessels in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific
has made a meaningful impact on illegal drugs entering American borders, and
whether it follows proper rules of engagement for enemy combatants or amounts to
war crimes.
“We could shoot suspected criminals dead on the street here in America, and it
may be a deterrent to crime, but that doesn’t make it legal,” said Rep. Gil
Cisneros (D-Calif.).
But Humire insisted the open-ended missions — dubbed Operation Southern Spear —
are “saving American lives” and compliment President Donald Trump’s other border
security mandates.
“Interdiction is necessary, but insufficient,” he said. “Deterrence has a
signaling effect on narco-terrorists, and raises the risks with their
movements.”
At least 157 people have been killed in 45 strikes on alleged drug smuggling
boats in the seas around South America since early September, according to
Defense Department statistics. More than 15,000 service members have been
deployed to the region for counter-drug missions, training efforts and blockade
enforcement over the last six months, though some of those numbers have been
drawn down since the start of the conflict in Iran.
Humire said officials have seen a 20 percent reduction in suspected drug vessels
traveling the Caribbean and a 25 percent reduction in the Eastern Pacific
traffic since the start of the military operations.
But committee ranking member Adam Smith (D-Wash.) questioned whether those
numbers actually translate into fewer drugs on American streets, or simply
evidence that smugglers are being forced into other shipping lanes or land
routes.
Humire said officials are looking to expand to land strikes against known cartel
routes and hideouts, but are working with partner country militaries on that
work. The U.S. Defense Department launched operations with Ecuadorian forces
against narco-terrorist groups in that country earlier this month.
He would not, however, rule out potential unilateral strikes in South American
countries later on. Smith called that hedge concerning.
Republicans on the committee largely praised the military’s anti-drug
operations, dismissing the Democratic criticism.
“Defending the homeland does not stop at our border,” said committee Chair Mike
Rogers (R-Ala.). “It also requires confronting threats at their source. The
president has made it clear that narco-terrorists and hostile foreign powers
will find no sanctuary or foothold anywhere in our hemisphere.”
President Donald Trump has often frustrated European allies with his overt
entreaties to Russian President Vladimir Putin and harsh words for Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
But behind the seeming imbalance is a longer-term strategic goal – countering
China.
The Trump administration believes that incentivizing Russia to end the war in
Ukraine, welcoming it back economically and showering it with U.S. investments,
could eventually shift the global order away from China.
It’s a gamble – and one Ukrainians are concerned with – but it underscores the
administration’s belief that the biggest geopolitical threat facing the United
States and the West is China, not Putin’s Russia. While countering China isn’t
the only reason the administration wants a truce, it does help explain why after
more than 15 months of fruitless talks and multiple threats to walk away, the
president’s team – special envoy Steve Witkoff and son-in-law Jared Kushner –
keep looking for a breakthrough.
A Trump administration official, granted anonymity to discuss ongoing
negotiations, said finding a “way to align closer with Russia” could create “a
different power balance with China that could be very, very beneficial.”
The administration’s desire to use Ukraine peace negotiations to counter China
has not been previously reported.
But many observers believe this plan has little hope of succeeding – at least
while Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping remain in charge. And the idea of
giving Russia economic incentives to grow closer to the U.S. is concerning for
Ukraine, said a Ukrainian official, granted anonymity to discuss diplomatic
matters.
“We had such attempts in the past already and it led to nothing,” they said.
“Germany had [Ostpolitik, Germany’s policy toward the East], for that and now
Russia is fighting the deadliest war in Europe.”
And when it comes to banking on breaking apart China and Russia, the Ukrainian
official noted that both countries “have one [thing] in common which you can not
beat – they hate the U.S. as a symbol of democracy.”
Still, the strategy is in keeping with the administration’s broader foreign
policy initiatives aimed at least in part in countering Chinese influence.
Taking out Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro and pressuring Cuba’s government to
the brink of collapse all diminishes China’s influence in the Western
Hemisphere. The administration threatened Panama, which withdrew from Chinese
leader Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative a month after Trump took office and called
Peru’s deal with China surrounding its deepwater port in Chancay a “cautionary
tale.”
And striking Iran shifted China’s oil import potential, as Tehran supplied
Beijing with more than 13 percent of its oil in 2025, according to Reuters.
Indeed, the Trump administration official noted that between Venezuela, Iran and
Russia, China was buying oil at below-market rates, subsidizing its consumption
“to the tune of over $100 billion a year for the last several years.”
“So that’s been a massive subsidy for China by being able to buy oil from these
places on the black market, sometimes $30 a barrel lower than what the spot
market is,” the person said.
Even as there are reports that Russia is sharing intelligence with Iran, the
U.S. and Russia keep talking. Witkoff and Kushner met with Kirill Dmitriev, a
top adviser to Putin, last week. The Russians called the meeting “productive.”
Witkoff said they’d keep talking. These negotiations and the broader efforts to
counter China now take place under the spectre of Trump asking several
countries, including China, for help securing the Strait of Hormuz.
The National Security Strategy, released in November, spilled a fair amount of
ink on China, though it often doesn’t mention Beijing directly. Many U.S.
lawmakers — from both parties — consider China the gravest long-term threat to
America’s global power.
“There is a longstanding kind of U.S. strategic train of thought that says that
having Russia and China working together is very much not in our interests, and
finding ways to divide them, or at least tactically collaborate with the partner
who’s less of a long term strategic threat to us,” said said Alexander Gray,
Trump’s National Security Council chief of staff in his first term.
Gray, who is currently the CEO of American Global Strategies, a consulting firm,
compared the effort to former Secretary of State and national security adviser
Henry Kissinger, who spearheaded President Richard Nixon’s trip to China during
the Cold War in an effort to pull that country away from the Soviet Union.
The State Department declined to comment for this report. However, a State
Department spokesperson previously told POLITICO that China’s economic ties with
Latin American countries present a “national security threat” for the U.S. that
the administration is actively trying to mitigate.
The White House declined to comment.
Fred Fleitz, another Trump NSC chief of staff in his first term, noted that the
president has “pressed Putin to end the war to normalize Russia’s relationship
with the U.S. and Europe,” and wants Russia to rejoin the G8.
“It is clear that Trump wants to find a way to end the war in Ukraine and to
coexist peacefully with Russia,” said Fleitz, who now serves as the vice chair
for American Security at the America First Policy Institute. “But I also believe
he correctly sees the growing Russia-China alliance as a far greater threat to
U.S. and global security than the Ukraine War and therefore wants to find ways
to improve U.S.-Russia relations to weaken or break that alliance.”
Others, however, remain skeptical. Craig Singleton, senior director of the China
program at Foundation for Defense of Democracies, said the goal to break Russia
and China is “appealing in theory, but in practice the partnership between
Moscow and Beijing is iron-clad.”
“Obviously there is nothing wrong with testing diplomacy and President Trump is
a dealmaker. But history probably suggests that this won’t really result in
much,” Singleton added. “The likely outcome [with Russia] is limited tactical
cooperation with the U.S., not some sort of durable break with Beijing.”
And China seeks to keep Russia as an ally and junior partner in its relationship
as a counter to Western powers. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reaffirmed the
relationship in a press conference this month, saying, “in a fluid and turbulent
world, China-Russia relationship has stood rock-solid against all odds.”
Secretary of State Marco Rubio, shortly after his confirmation, hinted at the
broader strategy, saying in an interview, that “a situation where the Russians
are permanently a junior partner to China, having to do whatever China says they
need to do because of their dependence on them” is not a “good outcome” for
Russia, the U.S. or Europe.
But Rubio, like the Trump administration official given anonymity to discuss
ongoing negotiations, both acknowledged that fully severing those ties would be
a tough lift.
“I don’t know if we’ll ever be successful at peeling them completely off a
relationship with the Chinese,” Rubio said in February of last year.
Adam Savit, director for China policy at the America First Policy Institute,
argued that “Russia matters at the margins, but it won’t be a decisive variable
in the U.S.-China competition,” and that the “center of gravity is East Asia.”
“Russia gives China strategic depth, a friendly border, energy supply, and a
second front in Ukraine to sap Western attention,” he said. “Getting closer to
Russia could complicate China’s strategic position, but Moscow is a declining
power and solidly the junior partner in that relationship.”
Joe Kent, the director of the National Counterterrorism Center, announced
Tuesday he was resigning over the war in Iran — a stunning defection that shows
how President Donald Trump’s decision to strike Tehran has divided some of the
most loyal corners of his administration.
“Iran posed no imminent threat to our nation, and it is clear that we started
this war due to pressure from Israel and its powerful American lobby,” Kent said
in a post on X Tuesday morning. “Until June of 2025, you understood that the
wars in the Middle East were a trap that robbed America of the precious lives of
our patriots and depleted the wealth and prosperity of our nation.”
Kent did not immediately respond to a request for comment. Spokespeople for
White House and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which
houses the NCTC, also did not immediately reply to requests for comment on
Kent’s statement.
Trump nominated Kent for the post last February. He was confirmed by the Senate
in July.
This is a developing story.
The 21st century is more likely to belong to Beijing than to Washington — at
least that’s the view from four key U.S. allies.
Swaths of the public in Canada, Germany, France and the U.K. have soured on the
U.S., driven by President Donald Trump’s foreign policy decisions, according to
recent results from The POLITICO Poll.
Respondents in these countries increasingly see China as a more dependable
partner than the U.S. and believe the Asian economic colossus is leading on
advanced technologies, including artificial intelligence. Critically, Europeans
surveyed see it as possible to reduce reliance on the U.S. but harder to reduce
reliance on China — suggesting newfound entanglements that could drastically tip
the balance of global power away from the West.
Here are five key takeaways from the poll highlighting the pivot from the U.S.
to China.
The POLITICO Poll — in partnership with U.K. polling firm Public First — found
that respondents in those four allied countries believe it is better to depend
on China than the U.S. following Trump’s turbulent return to office.
That appears to be driven by Trump’s disruption, not by a newfound stability in
China: In a follow-up question, a majority of respondents in both Canada and
Germany agreed that any attempts to get closer to China are because the U.S. has
become harder to depend on — not because China itself has become a more reliable
partner. Many respondents in France (38 percent) and the U.K. (42 percent) also
shared that sentiment.
Under Trump’s “America First” ethos, Washington has upended the “rules-based
international order” of the past with sharp-elbowed policies that have isolated
the U.S. on the global stage. This includes slow-walking aid to
Ukraine, threatening NATO allies with economic punishment and withdrawing from
major international institutions, including the World Health Organization and
the United Nations Human Rights Council. His punitive liberation day tariffs, as
well as threats to annex Greenland and make Canada “the 51st state,” have only
further strained relationships with top allies.
Beijing has seized the moment to cultivate better business ties with European
countries looking for an alternative to high U.S. tariffs on their exports. Last
October, Beijing hosted a forum aimed at shoring up mutual investments with
Europe. More recently, senior Chinese officials described EU-China ties as a
partnership rather than a rivalry.
“The administration has assisted the Chinese narrative by acting like a bully,”
Mark Lambert, former deputy assistant secretary of State for China and Taiwan in
the Biden administration, told POLITICO. “Everyone still recognizes the
challenges China poses — but now, Washington no longer works in partnership and
is only focused on itself.”
These sentiments are already being translated into action.
Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney declared a “rupture” between Ottawa and
Washington in January and backed that rhetoric by sealing a trade deal with
Beijing that same month. The U.K. inked several high-value export deals with
China not long after, while both French President Emmanuel Macron and German
Chancellor Friedrich Merz have returned from recent summits in Beijing
with Chinese purchase orders for European products.
Respondents across all four allied countries are broadly supportive of efforts
to create some distance from the U.S. — and say they’re also more dependent on
China. In Canada, 48 percent said it would be possible to reduce reliance on the
U.S. and believe their government should do so. In the U.K., 42 percent said
reducing reliance on the U.S. sounded good in theory, but were skeptical it
could happen in practice.
By contrast, fewer respondents across those countries believe it would actually
be possible to reduce reliance on China — a testament to Beijing’s dominance of
global supply chains.
Young adults may be drawn to China as an alternative to U.S. cultural hegemony.
Respondents between the ages of 18 and 24 were significantly more supportive
than their older peers of building a closer relationship with China.
A recent study commissioned by the Institute of European Studies at the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences — a Beijing-based think tank — suggests most young
Europeans get their information about China and Chinese life through social
media. Nearly 70 percent of those aged 18 to 25 said they rely on social media
and other short-form video platforms for information on China.
And the media they consume is likely overwhelmingly supportive of China, as
TikTok, one of the most popular social media platforms in the world, was built
by Chinese company ByteDance and has previously been accused of suppressing
content deemed negative toward China.
According to Alicja Bachulska, a policy fellow at the European Council on
Foreign Relations, younger generations believe the U.S. has led efforts to
depict China as an authoritarian regime and a threat to democracy, while
simultaneously degrading its own democratic values.
The trend “pushes a narrative that ‘we’ve been lied to’ about what China is,”
said Bachulska, as “social sentiment among the youth turns against the U.S.”
“It’s an expression of dissatisfaction with the state of U.S. politics,” she
added.
There’s a clear consensus among those surveyed in Europe and Canada that China
is winning the global tech race — a coveted title central to Chinese leader Xi
Jinping’s grand policy vision.
China is leading the U.S. and other Western nations in the development of
electric batteries and robotics, while Chinese designs have also become the
global standard in electric vehicles and solar panels.
“There has been a real vibe shift in global perception of Chinese tech and
innovation dominance,” said Sarah Beran, who served as deputy chief of mission
in the U.S. embassy in Beijing during the Biden administration.
This digital rat race is most apparent in the fast-paced development of
artificial intelligence. China has poured billions of dollars into research
initiatives, poaching top tech talent from U.S. universities and funding
state-backed tech firms to advance its interests in AI.
The investment appears to be paying off — a plurality of respondents from
Canada, Germany, France and the U.K. believe that China is more likely to
develop the first superintelligent AI.
But these advancements have done little to change American minds. A majority of
respondents in the U.S. still see American-made tech as superior to Chinese
tech, even in the realm of AI.
As Washington and its allies grow more estranged, the perception of the U.S. as
the dominant world power is in retreat — though most Americans don’t see it that
way.
About half of all respondents in Canada, Germany, France and the U.K. believe
that China is rapidly becoming a more consequential superpower. This is
particularly true among those who say the U.S. is no longer a positive force for
the world.
By contrast, 63 percent of respondents in the U.S. believe their nation will
maintain its dominance in 10 years — reflecting major disparities in beliefs
about global power dynamics between the U.S. and its European allies.
This view of China as the world’s power center may not have been entirely
organic. The U.S. has accused Beijing of pouring billions of dollars into
international information manipulation efforts, including state-backed media
initiatives and the deployment of tools to stifle online criticism of China and
its policies.
Some fear that a misplaced belief among U.S. allies in the inevitability of
China surpassing the U.S. as a global superpower could be helping accelerate
Beijing’s rise.
“Europe is capable of defending itself against threats from China and contesting
China’s vision of a more Sinocentric, authoritarian-friendly world order,” said
Henrietta Levin, former National Security Council director for China in the
Biden administration. “But if Europe believes this is impossible and does not
try to do so, the survey results may become a self-fulfilling prophecy.”
METHOLODGY
The POLITICO Poll was conducted from Feb. 6 to Feb. 9, surveying 10,289 adults
online, with at least 2,000 respondents each from the U.S., Canada, U.K., France
and Germany. Results for each country were weighted to be representative on
dimensions including age, gender and geography, and have an overall margin of
sampling error of ±2 percentage points for each country. Smaller subgroups have
higher margins of error.