BRUSSELS — EU countries shouldn’t be afraid of integrating at different speeds if that’s what it takes to gain crucial leverage on the world stage, Mario Draghi said Monday. “We must take the steps that are currently possible, with the partners who are actually willing, in the domains where progress can currently be made,” said the former European Central Bank president and ex-prime minister of Italy during a ceremony at the University of Leuven in Belgium, where he was awarded an honorary doctorate. “Power requires Europe to move from confederation to federation,” said Draghi, stressing that only in domains where EU countries have pooled their competences has the bloc gained clout on the global stage.  “Where Europe has federated, [such as] on trade, on competition, on the single market, on monetary policy, we are respected as a power and negotiate as one,” he said, citing trade agreements recently negotiated with India and Latin America. Draghi’s call comes as Europe struggles to keep pace with the U.S. and China, and is facing Russian aggression in Ukraine plus a transatlantic ally that no longer acknowledges the benefits of its historic European ties. “This is a future in which Europe risks becoming subordinated, divided and de-industrialized at once, and a Europe that cannot defend its interests will not preserve its values for longer,” Draghi warned. In the face of those challenges, areas of weakness are those where EU capitals continue to maintain a grip, such as defense, industrial policy or foreign affairs, Draghi said. In these, he added, “we are treated as a loose assembly of middle-sized states to be divided and dealt with accordingly.” The former top official praised the bloc’s recent stance on Greenland, where it decided to resist rather than accommodate threats coming from the U.S. “By standing together in the face of direct threat, Europeans discovered the solidarity that had previously seemed out of reach,” he said.  Draghi will take part in an informal gathering of European leaders next week aimed at discussing the direction for the bloc’s competitiveness, together with another former Italian prime minister, Enrico Letta. Both have laid out their economic visions in reports that form the building blocks of President Ursula von der Leyen’s second term atop the European Commission.

President Donald Trump, in a brief phone call with POLITICO, cast himself as the savior for a United Nations in danger of financial collapse, touting his ability to get members to pay unpaid dues. But he declined Sunday to say whether the United States would make good on the billions of dollars it owes the international body. Trump, speaking from Florida, said he was unaware that the U.S. was behind on its commitments to the U.N. but he was sure he could “solve the problem very easily” and get other countries to pay — if only the U.N. would ask. “If they came to Trump and told him, I’d get everybody to pay up, just like I got NATO to pay up,” he said, referring to himself in the third person. “All I have to do is call these countries… they would send checks within minutes.” Trump’s comments follow a report in The New York Times that senior U.N. officials have warned the organization could be forced to scale back operations — or even shut its New York headquarters — if it runs out of cash. Trump dismissed the idea out of hand. “I don’t think it’s appropriate. The U.N. is not leaving New York, and it’s not leaving the United States, because the U.N. has tremendous potential,” Trump said, striking a protective tone toward an institution he has frequently attacked. The U.N. declined to respond to Trump’s Sunday comments. Trump’s remarks are notable for a president who has leaned into an “America First” doctrine, and in the last month captured the Venezuelan president, Nicolás Maduro, threatened to strike Iran and take Greenland from Danish control. Trump has also retreated from numerous multilateral institutions in both his first and second terms. Most recently in January, he signed an executive order withdrawing the U.S. from 66 organizations, agencies and commissions, including the U.N.’s population agency and the U.N. treaty that establishes international climate negotiations. Last year, the Trump administration cut hundreds of millions of dollars in foreign aid and dismantled USAID, and routinely portrayed international organizations as vehicles for other countries to take advantage of the United States. Against that backdrop, Trump’s defense of the United Nations — at least in principle — is striking. While he insisted the organization has failed to live up to its promise, he framed it as an institution that remains indispensable, particularly as his own role on the global stage eventually ends. “When I’m no longer around to settle wars, the U.N. can,” he said, acknowledging that he won’t always be the one intervening in global conflicts. “It has tremendous potential. Tremendous.”

Tech mogul Elon Musk poured $10 million into two major Republican super PACs at the end of last year, according to campaign finance disclosures submitted Saturday, as he once again takes a more active role in GOP politics. The Tesla and SpaceX CEO, who had a public falling out with President Donald Trump last spring and said he was giving up on political spending, gave $5 million in December to each of the Congressional Leadership Fund and Senate Leadership Fund, two groups that aim to help the GOP keep control of Congress this year. It was Musk’s second round of donations to both groups this cycle, having previously given in June, amid his feud with Trump. Those contributions came shortly before Musk floated starting his own political party, an initiative that never seemed to gain much headway. But Musk and Trump have patched up their differences more recently, with the tech CEO joining Trump for dinner at Mar-a-Lago earlier this month. Musk has also been back to advocating for Republican politics on X, which he owns, pushing for senators to pass a plussed up version of the SAVE Act, a bill that would require states to collect proof of citizenship from people registering to vote. Musk has thrown his support behind a version called the SAVE Act Plus, calling for ID requirements and a ban of mail voting for most Americans along with other changes to election administration. Musk was the biggest individual donor to political committees during the 2024 election cycle, spending roughly $290 million, mostly through his own super PAC, America PAC, in support of Trump. In the first few months of the Trump administration, he played an active role with the Department of Government Efficiency, but began fighting with Trump and Republicans around the president’s One Big Beautiful Bill Act. Musk also threw himself into a Wisconsin Supreme Court election in April where his preferred candidate lost by 10 points. Musk’s funds accounted for just a fraction of total fundraising for both SLF and CLF. SLF raised nearly $77 million in the final six months of 2025 and had $100 million cash on hand, while CLF raised over $38 million over that period and had more than $54 million cash on hand.

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney publicly backed Kevin Warsh as the next chair of the Federal Reserve on Friday, calling him a “fantastic choice,” in a rare point of alignment amid an escalating U.S.-Canada trade war. “Kevin Warsh is a fantastic choice to lead the world’s most important central bank at this crucial time,” Carney wrote on X shortly after President Donald Trump announced he will nominate the former Fed board member to replace current chair, Jerome Powell. Carney is an experienced central banker himself. He oversaw the Bank of Canada from 2008-2013, briefly overlapping with Warsh’s first tenure as a Fed governor, before leading the Bank of England from 2013-2020. The endorsement stood out as relations between the Trump administration and Canada continue to strain, with Canadian officials warning that Trump’s trade agenda and broader foreign policy are destabilizing both the U.S. and Canadian economies. On Saturday, Trump threatened to impose a 100 percent tariff on Canada if it follows through on a planned trade deal with China. In his latest threat Thursday, he said he would impose a 50 percent tariff on Canadian-made aircrafts after a dispute over aviation certification. “Canada is effectively prohibiting the sale of Gulfstream products in Canada through this very same certification process,” the president wrote on Truth Social. “If, for any reason, this situation is not immediately corrected, I am going to charge Canada a 50% Tariff on any and all Aircraft sold into the United States of America.” Earlier this week, the Bank of Canada said U.S. tariffs are expected to have a “lasting negative impact” on Canada’s economy, citing prolonged uncertainty tied to Trump’s trade policies. “It’s pretty clear that the days of open rules-based trade with the United States are over,” Bank of Canada Gov. Tiff Macklem said. “It’s not a good thing for Americans. It’s not a good thing for Canadians.” In an interview with Reuters on Wednesday, Macklem said Trump’s actions could derail the central bank’s economic forecasts, pointing to Trump’s repeated tariff threats against Canada and other actions abroad, including repeat pressure on Greenland and the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. “There is unusual potential for a new shock, a new disruption,” he said. “Geopolitical risks are elevated.” Macklem also voiced his support for Powell, telling Reuters that he told Powell in a private conversation that he was “doing a good job under difficult circumstances.” Several global central bank leaders, including Macklem, issued a joint statement earlier this month in support of Powell and the Federal Reserve after the Department of Justice launched a criminal investigation into the Fed chair. They warned that political pressure on central banks could undermine global financial stability. “We stand in full solidarity with the Federal Reserve System and its Chair Jerome H. Powell,” the statement said. “Chair Powell has served with integrity, focused on his mandate and an unwavering commitment to the public interest. To us, he is a respected colleague who is held in the highest regard by all who have worked with him.”

The Chinese hoped President Donald Trump’s push for Greenland would help them peel Europe away from America. The Finns were desperate to prevent a trade war over the island. And Iceland was furious over a suggestion that it’s next on Trump’s target list — the “52nd state.” A batch of State Department cables obtained by POLITICO expose the deep reverberations of the president’s demands for Greenland as foreign officials vented their frustrations this month with American counterparts. The messages, which have not been previously reported, offer a behind-the-scenes glimpse into the thinking of allies and adversaries about the impact of Trump’s would-be land grab. They highlight a new point of tension in a transatlantic relationship already strained by Russia’s war in Ukraine, fights over tariffs and U.S. criticism of European policies. And they come just as Trump discusses a framework deal that stops short of allowing the U.S. to own Greenland, but which could expand U.S. military and mining activity in the Danish territory. The cables — perhaps most critically — underscore how important the U.S. remains to so many countries in Europe, even if Trump’s behavior is pushing that continent’s leaders to the edge. “Let’s not get a divorce,” Finland’s Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen said, according to one cable, “especially not a messy one.” A cable from the U.S. Embassy in Beijing on Jan. 21 suggests the Chinese government is eager to benefit from Trump’s moves against Greenland. The situation “offers China an opportunity to benefit from European hedging” and could “amplify trans-Atlantic frictions,” U.S. diplomats wrote in laying out the thinking in China. But the cable, which cites media and analysts affiliated with the ruling Chinese Communist Party, also notes that Chinese leadership was aware that a larger U.S. military footprint in Greenland could complicate their goals in the Arctic and “consolidate U.S. military and infrastructure advantages.” Chinese Embassy spokesperson Liu Pengyu didn’t address the content of the cable directly, but said any Chinese actions were in line with international law. “China’s activities in the Arctic are aimed at promoting the peace, stability and sustainable development of the region,” Liu said. Another cable, dated Jan. 20 from the U.S. Embassy in Helsinki, outlined the concern in the Finland foreign minister’s office over Trump’s threats to impose tariffs on European countries that had sent military advisers to Greenland to plan troop exercises. Valtonen came across as eager to calm tensions. She told visiting U.S. lawmakers that the arrival of a few soldiers in Greenland was a “misunderstanding,” according to the cable. Finland had no plans to do anything “against the Americans” and the officers — “a couple of guys” — were already back in Finland, she said. She downplayed European Union threats to retaliate over the threatened tariffs, calling it a negotiating tactic, and said she’d push the EU to “do anything to prevent a trade war.” The Finnish government did not respond to a request for comment. When asked about the cables, the State Department referred to Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s testimony on Wednesday to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He noted that talks between the U.S., Denmark and Greenland have started, and “will be a regular process,” though he didn’t offer any detail. “We’ve got a little bit of work to do, but I think we’re going to wind up in a good place,” he said. “And I think you’ll hear the same from our colleagues in Europe very shortly.” There was also drama in Iceland after Trump’s nominee for ambassador to that country, Billy Long, joked that Iceland could become the “52nd state” — presumably once Greenland became the 51st — and he would act as governor. Iceland’s Permanent Secretary of State Martin Eyjólfsson summoned U.S. Chargé d’Affaires Erin Sawyer to demand a high-level U.S. apology and tell her that such talk “has no place in international discourse,” according to a Jan. 23 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Reykjavík to Washington. Sawyer told him making Iceland a state was not U.S. policy, according to the cable, and pointed out that Long had apologized for the comments. There was no indication Sawyer delivered a high-level apology from the U.S. government as Iceland had requested. The Icelandic Embassy did not respond to a request for comment. Trump last week walked back months of threats about taking Greenland by force and launching a trade war against NATO allies over the issue. He and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte reached a “framework of a future deal” on Greenland at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Trump announced. The proposals Rutte and Trump have discussed include three main elements. One would allow the U.S. to have full sovereignty over its bases in Greenland, along the lines of Britain’s basing rights in Cyprus, according to a European diplomat and another person familiar with the planning. The U.S. would also be allowed to establish more bases, although Denmark would get a veto over where on the Arctic island, according to the person. They, like others interviewed, were granted anonymity to discuss internal planning. The framework includes the possibility of integrating Trump’s Golden Dome defense shield into plans for a framework as well as a NATO mission focused on the Arctic. The proposal would also give the U.S. first right of refusal on natural resource extraction projects. It’s not clear how long it will take to hash out details or bring Greenland and Denmark on board. Both insist that, whatever happens, they will not compromise on sovereignty. Despite that confident rhetoric, Trump’s threats about Greenland have posed an existential threat for NATO, which rarely sees such intra-alliance feuding. Rutte has moved fast in search of a compromise. He has used NATO’s machinery to his advantage, capitalizing on Europe’s eagerness to keep the alliance together to lobby allies in favor of stepping up work on Arctic security. Rutte was “persistent,” one senior NATO diplomat said. The NATO leader, armed with concrete options he could offer Trump, sought to align national positions. As the crisis escalated, he spent “many days” in calls with national security advisers and leaders, including Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, French President Emmanuel Macron, Italy’s Giorgia Meloni, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Britain’s Keir Starmer and Trump, according to a person familiar with the calls. His efforts led to the session in Davos, which Trump described as “very productive,” and appeared to defuse a potential NATO eruption. But European officials remain worried about the diplomatic situation and uncertain of what Trump seeks. “What we need right now in NATO is unity,” a European official said, “And what the United States is doing is a huge mistake by raising this Greenland topic.” Nette Nöstlinger in Berlin contributed to this report.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio tried to do two things at once in testimony to senators Wednesday: take the temperature down after President Donald Trump rattled NATO by seeking to acquire Greenland, while delivering Trump’s message that the alliance must change. Rubio’s tightrope walk was on display at a sometimes-testy Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, where senators pressed him to repair frayed ties with Denmark and other allies. The moment underscored how Rubio’s — sometimes seen as the most pro-European of Trump’s top team — balances the administration’s America First views. Tensions between Europe and the U.S. spiked this month after Trump threatened tariffs and refused for weeks to rule out using force to take over the self-governing Danish territory. He has since backed down, describing a “framework” for talks following a meeting with NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte in Switzerland. European leaders have warned that the damage could linger. Rubio, however, offered an upbeat spin. “I thought it was noteworthy and important that the president, at a speech in Davos, made very clear that the United States was not going to use force or military force,” Rubio said in an exchange with Sen. Chris Coons (D-Del.). “So I think we’re going to wind up in a good place.” Friction between the U.S. and Europe had intensified earlier this month after Stephen Miller, a top Trump aide, argued on CNN that Greenland rightfully belonged to the United States and that the administration could seize it if it wanted. Trump’s refusal to rule that out for weeks fueled the tensions. Rubio stressed Wednesday that the issue would now shift to a “very professional, straightforward” diplomatic process. “We’re going to try to do it in a way that isn’t like a media circus every time these conversations happen, because we think that creates more flexibility on both sides to arrive at a positive outcome,” he said. Coons pushed back on Trump’s claim that the U.S. gets little in return from NATO, rebuking remarks questioning the role of allied troops in Afghanistan. Coons cited a recent visit to Denmark, where he laid a wreath honoring Danish troops who “served, fought and died alongside Americans.” Rubio did not dispute Denmark’s sacrifices but pivoted to Trump’s core argument that NATO allies must shoulder a greater share of the security burden. “NATO needs to be reimagined,” Rubio said. “One of the things we’ve explained to our allies in NATO is the United States is not simply focused on Europe,” he added. “We also have defense needs in the Western Hemisphere. We have defense needs in the Indo-Pacific. We may be the richest country in the world, but we don’t have unlimited resources.”

President Donald Trump on Tuesday said he has no problem with the sharp decline in the dollar that’s been triggered by convulsions in global bond markets and growing skepticism about the U.S.’s reliability as a trading partner. “I think it’s great,” Trump told reporters in Iowa when asked about the currency’s decline. “Look at the business we’re doing. The dollar’s doing great.” Trump has long maintained that a weaker currency helps industries that he’s seeking to boost — particularly manufacturers, but also oil and gas. And U.S. corporations that export goods and services abroad typically report stronger earnings when they can convert foreign payments into a weaker greenback. But a soft dollar also diminishes the purchasing power of U.S. businesses and consumers and can lead to higher inflation. That’s one reason why Treasury officials, including Secretary Scott Bessent, have historically advocated for a stronger dollar. Some of Trump’s other advisers — including Fed Gov. Stephen Miran, who’s on leave from his role as the president’s top economic adviser — argue that the dollar’s strength in recent years has placed domestic businesses at a competitive disadvantage to overseas-based companies. The greenback was trading at its lowest level in nearly four years before Trump weighed in on its recent declines. After the president’s remarks, its value sank even further against a basket of foreign currencies. Trump’s foreign policy agenda and repeated tariff threats — including his push to acquire Greenland — have amplified a “sell America” narrative that has hurt the dollar and other U.S. asset prices. A possible intervention to prop up the value of the Japanese yen has also pushed down the dollar over the last week.

Former Polish president Andrzej Duda has joined the conservative U.S. Heritage Foundation as a distinguished visiting fellow. The move highlights the burgeoning ties between the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement and the European nationalist right. The Washington-based think tank said Monday that Duda would work on “transatlantic security, European defense readiness, democratic resilience, and policy recommendations for the future of conservative leadership in Europe.” Heritage praised Duda for strengthening Poland’s military posture and boosting its defense spending during his two terms in office between 2015 and 2025, portraying him as a model of sovereignty-focused leadership at a time of “heightened geopolitical risk.” “President Duda governed with a clear-eyed understanding of what nations owe their people: secure borders, public safety, and the courage to stand up to self-appointed global elites. We are pleased to welcome him to Heritage at a moment when the future of the West depends on nations that still remember who they serve,” Heritage’s Kevin Roberts said in a statement. Heritage is an influential conservative think thank in the U.S. that has become closely associated with the MAGA movement around President Donald Trump, promoting hard-right-wing views on borders, national sovereignty and culture war issues. It authored the controversial Project 2025 roadmap for the second Trump presidency. As president, Duda openly courted Trump, including by proposing a permanent U.S. military base in Poland dubbed “Fort Trump.” In a statement for Heritage, Duda said he was “honored” to join the think tank: “I look forward to contributing that experience to Heritage’s long-standing work advancing conservative policy solutions for Europe.” Duda’s political camp, the right-wing opposition Law and Justice (PiS) party, is enthusiastic about Trump and MAGA politics. PiS officials have long echoed Trump’s political rhetoric, voiced support for his “Board of Peace,” and praised his administration’s hugely controversial crackdown on immigrants. PiS lawmakers chanted “Donald Trump!” in the Polish parliament after Trump secured his second term in office in late 2024.  Trump, for his part, endorsed Duda’s successor, Karol Nawrocki, to be president of Poland in 2025. Nawrocki’s victory has blocked the incumbent pro-EU government of Prime Minister Donald Tusk from effectively implementing its agenda. Trump’s chaotic brand of diplomacy has rankled several far-right parties in Europe, but it has not diminished Nawrocki and PiS’s enthusiasm for him, at least publicly. After Trump belittled the role of Washington’s NATO allies in Afghanistan, provoking anger from numerous European leaders including Tusk, Nawrocki responded only with non-specific praise for Polish soldiers there without referring to Trump directly.

The new U.S. defense strategy formally pushes Europe down Washington’s list of priorities while elevating Greenland to a core homeland security concern — suggesting European allies will be expected to shoulder more responsibility for their own defense. “Although Europe remains important, it has a smaller and declining share of global economic power,” the National Defense Strategy, published late Friday, states. “It follows that while the United States will remain engaged in Europe, it must — and will — prioritize defending the U.S. homeland and deterring China.” The strategy also makes clear that in Europe “allies will take the lead” against threats that are “less severe” for the United States but more acute for them, with Washington providing “critical but more limited support.” The document argues that Europe is economically and militarily capable of defending itself, noting that non-U.S. NATO members dwarf Russia in economic scale, and are therefore “strongly positioned to take primary responsibility for Europe’s conventional defense.” At the same time, the strategy places emphasis on Greenland, explicitly listing the Arctic island — alongside the Panama Canal — as terrain the U.S. must secure to protect its homeland interests. The Pentagon says it will provide the president with “credible options to guarantee U.S. military and commercial access to key terrain from the Arctic to South America, especially Greenland,” adding that “we will ensure that the Monroe Doctrine is upheld in our time.” That framing aligns with President Donald Trump’s recent rhetoric on Greenland, which has unsettled European capitals and fueled concern over Washington’s long-term intentions in the Arctic. The defense strategy builds on the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy released in December, which recast the Western Hemisphere — rather than Europe — as the primary arena for defending U.S. security. While the earlier document went further in criticizing Europe’s trajectory, both strategies stress continued engagement paired with a clear expectation that European allies will increasingly take the lead on threats closer to home.

Its been a bad stretch of polling for President Donald Trump. In recent weeks, a string of new polls has found Trump losing ground with key constituencies, especially the young, non-white and low-propensity voters who swung decisively in his direction in 2024. The uptick in support for Trump among those non-traditional Republican voters helped fuel chatter of an enduring “realignment” in the American electorate — but the durability of that realignment is now coming into doubt with those same groups cooling on Trump. Surveying the findings of the most recent New York Times-Siena poll, polling analyst Nate Cohn bluntly declared that “the second Trump coalition has unraveled.” Is it time to touch up the obituaries for the Trumpian realignment? To find out, I spoke with conservative pollster and strategist Patrick Ruffini, whose 2024 book “Party of the People” was widely credited with predicting the contours of Trump’s electoral realignment. Ruffini cautioned against prematurely eulogizing the GOP’s new coalition, noting that the erosion of support has so far not extended to the constituencies that have served as the primary drivers of the Trumpian realignment — particularly white working-class voters and working-class Latinos and Asian Americans. But he also acknowledged that the findings of the recent polls should raise alarms for Republicans ahead of 2026 and especially 2028. His advice to Trump for reversing the trend: a relentless focus on “affordability,” which the White House has so far struggled to muster, and which remains the key issue dragging down the president. “I think that is undeniable,” he said. “It’s the number one issue among the swing voter electorate.” This conversation has been edited for length and clarity. Based on your own polling, do you agree that “the second Trump coalition has unraveled?” It really depends on how you define the Trump coalition. The coalition that has really reshaped American politics over the last decade has been a coalition that saw voters who are aligned with a more populist view of America come into the Republican Party — in many cases, after voting for Barack Obama twice. Those shifts have proven to be pretty durable, especially among white working-class voters but also among conservative Hispanic voters and conservative Asian American voters. You have another group of voters who is younger and disconnected from politics — a group that had been really one of the core groups for Barack Obama and the Democrats back in the 2010s. They didn’t always vote, but there was really no hope or prospect for Republicans winning that group or being very competitive with that group. That happens for the first time in 2024, when that specific combination of young, minority, male voters really comes into play in a big way. But that shift right has proven to be a little bit less durable — and maybe a lot less durable — because of the nature of who those voters are. They’re not really connected to one political party, and they’re inherently non-partisan. So what you’re seeing is less of a shift among people who reliably vote in midterms, and what we are seeing is more of a shift among those infrequent voters. The question then becomes are these voters going to show up in 2026? How big of a problem is it for Republicans if they don’t? How alarmed should Republicans be by the current trends? I think they’re right to focus on affordability. You’ve seen that as an intentional effort by the White House, including what seems like embracing some Democratic policy proposals that also are in some ways an end-run around traditional Republican and conservative economics — things like a 10 percent cap on credit card interest. What’s the evidence that cost of living is the thing that’s primarily eroding Republican support among that group of voters you described? I think that is undeniable. It’s the number one issue among the swing voter electorate. However you want to define the swing voter electorate in 2024, cost of living was far and away the number one issue among the Biden-to-Trump voters in 2024. It is still the number one issue. And that’s because of demographically who they are. The profile of the voter who swung in ‘24 was not just minority, but young, low-income, who tends to be less college-educated, less married and more exposed to affordability concerns. So I think that’s obviously their north star right now. The core Democratic voter is concerned about the erosion of norms and democracy. The core Republican voter is concerned about immigration and border security. But this swing vote is very, very much concerned about the cost of living. Is there any evidence that things like Trump’s immigration crackdown or his foreign policy adventurism are contributing at all to the erosion of support among this group? I have to laugh at the idea of foreign policy being decisive for a large segment of voters. I think you could probably say that, to the extent that Trump had some non-intervention rhetoric, there might be some backlash among some of the podcast bros, or among the Tucker Carlson universe. But that is practically a non-entity when it comes to the actual electorate and especially this group that is floating between the two political parties. Maybe there’s a dissident faction on the right that is particularly focused on this, but what really matters is this cost-of-living issue, which people don’t view as having been solved by Trump coming into office. The White House would say — and Vance said recently — that it takes a while to turn the Titanic around. Which is not the most reassuring metaphor, but sure. Exactly, but nonetheless. I think a lot of these things are very interesting bait for media, but they are not necessarily what is really driving the voters who are disconnected from these narratives. What about his immigration agenda? Does that seem to be having any specific effect? I do think there’s probably some aspect of this that might be challenging with Latinos, but I think it’s very easy to fall back into the 2010 pattern of saying Latino voters are inordinately primarily focused on immigration, which has proven incorrect time after time after time. So, yes, I would say the ICE actions are probably a bit negative, but I think Latino voters primarily share the same concerns as other voters in the electorate. They’re primarily focused on cost of living, jobs and health care. How would Trump’s first year in office have looked different if he had been really laser-focused on consolidating the gains that Republicans saw among these voters in 2024? What would he have done that he didn’t do, and what shouldn’t he have done that he did do? I would first concede that the focus on affordability needed to be, like, a Day 1 concern. I will also concede how hard it is to move this group that is very, very disaffected from traditional politics and doesn’t trust or believe the promises made by politicians — even one as seemingly authentic as Trump. I go back to 2018. While in some ways you would kill for the economic perceptions that you had in 2018, that didn’t seem to help them much in the midterms. The other problem with a laser focus on affordability on Day 1 is that I don’t think it clearly aligns with what the policy demanders on the right are actually asking for. If you ask, “What is MAGA economic policy?”, for many, MAGA economic policy is tariffs — and in many ways, tariffs run up against an impulse to do something about affordability. Now, to date, we haven’t really seen that actually play out. We haven’t really seen an increase in the inflation rate, which is good. But there’s an opportunity cost to focusing on certain issues over this focus on affordability. I think the challenge is that I don’t think either party has a pre-baked agenda that is all about reducing costs. They certainly had a pre-baked agenda around immigration, and they do have a pre-baked agenda around tariffs. What else has stopped the administration from effectively consolidating this part of the 2024 coalition? It’s a very hard-to-reach group. In 2024, Trump’s team had the insight to really put him front-and-center in these non-political arenas, whether it was going to UFC matches or appearing on Joe Rogan. I think it’s very easy for any administration to come into office and pivot towards the policy demanders on the right, and I think that we’ve seen a pivot in that direction, at least on the policy. So I would say they should be doing more of that 2024 strategy of actually going into spaces where non-political voters live and talking to them. Is it possible to turn negative perception around among this group? Or is it a one-way ratchet, where once you’ve lost their support, it’s very hard to get it back? I don’t think it’s impossible. We are seeing some improvement in the economic perception numbers, but we also saw how hard it is to sustain that. I think the mindset of the average voter is just that they’re in a far different place post-Covid than they were pre-Covid. There’s just been a huge negative bias in the economy since Covid, so I think any thought that, “Oh, it would be easy that Trump gets elected, and that’s going to be the thing that restores optimism” was wrong. I think he’s taken really decisive action, and he has solved a lot of problems, but the big nut to crack is, How do you break people out of this post-Covid economic pessimism? The more critical case that could be made against Trump’s approach to economic policy is not just that he’s failed to address the cost-of-living crisis, but that he’s actively done things that run contrary to any stated vision of economic populism. The tax cuts are the major one, which included some populist components tacked on, but which was essentially a massively regressive tax cut. Do you think that has contributed to the sour feeling among this cohort at all? I think we know very clearly when red lines are crossed and when different policies really get voters writ large to sit up and take notice. For instance, it was only when you had SNAP benefits really being cut off that Congress had any impetus to actually solve the shutdown. I don’t think people are quite as tuned in to the distributional effects of tax policy. The White House would say that there were very popular parts of this proposal, like the Trump accounts and no tax on tips, that didn’t get coverage — and our polling has shown that people have barely actually heard about those things compared to some of the Democratic lines of attack. So I think that the tax policy debate is relatively overrated, because it simply doesn’t matter as much to voters as much as the cultural issues or the general sense that life is not as affordable as it was. Assuming these trends continue and this cohort of sort of young, low-propensity voters continues to shift away from Trump, what does the picture look like for Republicans in 2026 and 2028? I would say 2026 is perhaps a false indicator. In the midterms, you’re really talking about an electorate that is going to be much older, much whiter, much more college-educated. I think you really have to have a presidential campaign to test how these voters are going to behave. And presidential campaigns are also a choice between Republicans and Democrats. I think certainly Republicans would want to make it into a Republican-versus-Democrat choice, because polling is very clear that voters do not trust the Democrats either on these issues. It’s clear that a lot of these voters have actually moved away from the Democratic Party — they just haven’t necessarily moved into the Republican Party. Thinking big picture, does this erosion of support change or alter your view of the “realignment” in any respect? I’ve always said that we are headed towards a future where these groups are up for grabs, and whichever party captures them has the advantage. That’s different from the politics of the Obama era, where we were talking about an emerging Democratic majority driven by a generational shift and by the rise of non-white voters in the electorate. The most recent New York Times poll has Democrats ahead among Latino voters by 16 points, which is certainly different than 2024, when Trump lost them by just single digits, but that is a far cry from where we were in 2016 and 2018. So I think in many respects, that version of it is coming true. But if 2024 was a best-case scenario for the right, and 2026 is a worst-case scenario, we really have to wait till 2028 to see where this all shakes out.