Yanmei Xie is senior associate fellow at the Mercator Institute for China Studies. After Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney spoke at Davos last week, a whole continent contracted leadership envy. Calling the rules-based order — which Washington proselytized for decades before stomping on — a mirage, Carney gave his country’s neighboring hegemonic bully a rhetorical middle finger, and Europeans promptly swooned. But before the bloc’s politicians rush to emulate him, it may be worth cooling the Carney fever. Appearing both steely and smooth in his Davos speech, Carney warned middle powers that “when we only negotiate bilaterally with a hegemon, we negotiate from weakness.” Perhaps this was in reference to the crass daily coercion Canada has been enduring from the U.S. administration. But perhaps he was talking about the subtler asymmetry he experienced just days before in Beijing. In contrast to his defiance in Switzerland, Carney was ingratiating during his China visit. He signed Canada up for a “new strategic partnership” in preparation for an emerging “new world order,” and lauded Chinese leader Xi Jinping as a fellow defender of multilateralism. The visit also produced a cars-for-canola deal, which will see Canada slash tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles from 100 percent to 6.1 percent, and lift the import cap to 49,000 cars per year. In return, China will cut duties on Canadian canola seeds from 84 percent to 15 percent. In time, Ottawa also expects Beijing will reduce tariffs on Canadian lobsters, crabs and peas later this year and purchase more Canadian oil and perhaps gas, too. The agreement to launch a Ministerial Energy Dialogue will surely pave the way for eventual deals. These productive exchanges eventually moved Carney to declare Beijing a “more predictable” trade partner than Washington. And who can blame him? He was simply stating the obvious — after all, China isn’t threatening Canada with annexation. But one is tempted to wonder if he would have needed to flatter quite so much in China if his country still possessed some of the world’s leading technologies. The truth is, Canada’s oil and gas industry probably shouldn’t really be holding its breath. Chinese officials typically offer serious consideration rather than outright rejection out of politeness — just ask Russia, which has spent decades in dialogue with Beijing over a pipeline meant to replace Europe as a natural gas market. The cars-for-canola deal also carries a certain irony: Canada is importing the very technology that makes fossil fuels obsolete. China is electrifying at dizzying speed, with the International Energy Agency projecting its oil consumption will peak as early as next year thanks to “extraordinary” electric vehicle sales. That means Beijing probably isn’t desperate for new foreign suppliers of hydrocarbons, and the ministerial dialogue will likely drag on inconclusively — albeit courteously — well into the future. This state of Sino-Canadian trade can be seen as classic comparative advantage at work: China is good at making things, and Canada has abundant primary commodities. But in the not-so-distant past, it was Canadian companies that were selling nuclear reactors, telecom equipment, aircraft and bullet trains to China. Yet today, many of these once globe-spanning Canadian high-tech manufacturers have either exited the scene or lead a much-reduced existence. Somewhere in this trading history lies a cautionary tale for Europe. Deindustrialization can have its own self-reinforcing momentum. As a country’s economic composition changes, so does its political economy. When producers of goods disappear, so does their political influence. And the center of lobbying gravity shifts toward downstream users and consumers who prefer readily available imports. Europe’s indigenous solar manufacturers have been driven to near extinction by much cheaper Chinese products | STR/AFP via Getty Images Europe already has its own version of this story: Its indigenous solar manufacturers have been driven to near extinction by much cheaper Chinese products over the span of two decades. Currently, its solar industry is dominated by installers and operators who favor cheap imports and oppose trade defense. Simply put, Carney’s cars-for-canola deal is a salve for Canadian consumers and commodity producers, but it’s also industrial policy in reverse. In overly simplified terms, industrial policy is about encouraging exports of finished products over raw materials and discouraging the opposite in order to build domestic value-added capacity and productivity. But while Canada can, perhaps, make do without industry — as Carney put it in Davos, his ambition is to run “an energy superpower” — Europe doesn’t have that option. Agri-food and extractive sectors aren’t enough to stand up the continent’s economy — even with the likes of tourism and luxury goods thrown in. China currently exports more than twice as much to the EU than it imports. In container terms, the imbalance widens to 4-to-1. Meanwhile, Goldman Sachs estimates Chinese exports will shave 0.2 percentage point or more of GDP growth in Germany, Spain and Italy each year through 2029. And according to the European Central Bank, cars, chemicals, electric equipment and machinery — sectors that form Europe’s industrial backbone — face the most severe job losses from China trade shock. Europe shares Canada’s plight in dealing with the U.S., which currently isn’t just an unreliable trade partner but also an ally turned imperialist. This is why Carney’s speech resonates. But U.S. protectionism has only made China’s mercantilism a more acute challenge for Europe, as the U.S. resists the bloc’s exports and Chinese goods keep pouring into Europe in greater quantities at lower prices. European leaders would be mistaken to look for trade relief in China as Carney does, and bargain away the continent’s industrial capacity in the process. Whether it’s to resist an expansionist Russia or an imperial U.S., Europe still needs to hold on to its manufacturing base.

LONDON —  Keir Starmer lands in China trying to do everything at once. As his government searches desperately for economic growth, the prime minister’s policy is to cooperate, compete with, and, where appropriate, challenge the Asian superpower. That’s easier said than done. POLITICO asked five China analysts — ranging from former government ministers to ex-diplomats — to give their honest take on how the British PM should handle the days ahead. DON’T LECTURE — VINCE CABLE, FORMER BUSINESS SECRETARY Vince Cable, who visited China three times as U.K. business secretary between 2010 and 2015, says Starmer must not give Chinese President Xi Jinping public lectures. It will be tempting, given China’s human rights record. U.K. lawmakers are particularly concerned about Beijing’s treatment of Uyghur Muslims and Hong Kongers. “From experience, that just antagonizes people. They’ll respond in kind and will remind us about all the bad things the British have done throughout our history. You’ll get absolutely nowhere,” Cable, a former Liberal Democrat leader who wrote “The Chinese Conundrum: Engagement or Conflict” after leaving office, said.  Raising concerns in private is more likely to get a positive result, he thinks. “Although I’m by no means an admirer of President [Donald] Trump … his approach, which is business-like and uses actually quite respectful language in public, has actually had far more success in dealing with the Chinese than the traditional missionary approach of some Western European countries,” Cable adds.  LISTEN AND SPEAK UP — BEN BLAND, CHATHAM HOUSE ASIA-PACIFIC PROGRAM DIRECTOR Ben Bland, director of the Chatham House think tank’s Asia-Pacific program, warns there can’t be a return to the “naive optimism” of the “golden era” under Cameron. Britain should “listen to the Chinese leadership and try and understand more about how [Chinese President] Xi Jinping and other senior communist leaders see the world, how they see China,” the former Financial Times South China correspondent says. “The U.K.’s ability to influence China directly is quite limited, but it’s really important that we understand what they’re trying to do in the world.” Starmer should be clear about the U.K.’s red lines on espionage, interference in British society, and the harassment of people living in this country, Bland says. Vince Cable, who visited China three times as U.K. business secretary between 2010 and 2015, says Starmer must not give Chinese President Xi Jinping public lectures. | Andy Rain/EPA TREAT TRADE CAUTIOUSLY — CHARLES PARTON, FORMER DIPLOMAT “The Chinese are adept at the propaganda of these visits, and ensuring that everything seems wonderful,” Charles Parton, an ex-diplomat who was First Counsellor to the EU Delegation in Beijing between 2011 and 2016, warns.   “There’s an awful lot of strange counting going on of [investment] deals that have already been signed, deals that are on the cards to be signed [and] deals that are glimmers in the eye and almost certainly won’t be signed,” Parton, now an adviser to the Council on Geostrategy think tank, says. “Trade is highly fungible. It’s not political,” Parton, who is also a senior associate at the Royal United Services Institute, adds. “We shouldn’t be saying to ourselves ‘oh my gosh, we better knuckle down to whatever the Chinese want of us, because otherwise our trade and investment will suffer’,” he believes. “If you can push through trade investment which is beneficial — excellent. That’s great, but let’s not think that this is the be-all and end-all,” he warns. SEE CHINA AS IT IS — LUKE DE PULFORD, INTER-PARLIAMENTARY ALLIANCE ON CHINA EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR  Luke De Pulford, executive director of the hawkish global cross-party Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, is skeptical about the timing of Starmer’s China trip —  a week after ministers gave planning approval for Beijing’s controversial mega embassy in London. “Going to China against that backdrop, to look as if you’re going to make national security concessions in the hope of economic preferment, is unwise,” he says. He is also doubtful that closer ties with Beijing will improve the British economy. “All of the evidence seems to point towards China investing in the U.K. only in as far as it suits their strategic interests,” De Pulford says. “There’s a lot to lose and not very much to gain.”  Prioritizing the U.K. agenda will be paramount for Starmer. “There’s nothing wrong at all with visiting China if you’re going to represent your interests and the United Kingdom’s interests,” he says, while remaining doubtful that this will be achieved. SET OUT A CHINA STRATEGY — EVIE ASPINALL, BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY GROUP DIRECTOR  Securing a “symbolic, long-term relationship” with China should be a priority for Starmer, Evie Aspinall, who leads the non-partisan British Foreign Policy Group think tank, says. She wants the U.K.’s China Audit to be published in full, warning businesses “don’t have a strong understanding of what the U.K.’s approach is.”  The audit was launched in late 2024 to allow the government to understand Beijing’s threats and opportunities, but its findings have not been published in detail because much of its content is classified. “I think that’s a fundamental limitation,” Aspinall says, pointing out it is businesses which will generate the growth Starmer wants.  U.K. businesses need to know they “will be supported around some of those risks if they do decide to engage more closely with China,” she says.   

LONDON — Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney left Beijing and promptly declared the U.S.-led “world order” broken. Don’t expect his British counterpart to do the same. Keir Starmer will land in the Chinese capital Wednesday for the first visit by a U.K. prime minister since 2018. By meeting President Xi Jinping, he will end what he has called an “ice age” under the previous Conservative administration, and try to win deals that he can sell to voters as a boost to Britain’s sputtering economy. Starmer is one of a queue of leaders flocking to the world’s second-largest economy, including France’s Emmanuel Macron in December and Germany’s Friedrich Merz next month. Like Carney did in Davos last week, the British PM has warned the world is the most unstable it has been for a generation. Yet unlike Carney, Starmer is desperate not to paint this as a rupture from the U.S. — and to avoid the criticism Trump unleashed on Carney in recent days over his dealings with China. The U.K. PM is trying to ride three horses at once, staying friendly — or at least engaging — with Washington D.C., Brussels and Beijing.  It is his “three-body problem,” joked a senior Westminster figure who has long worked on British-China relations. POLITICO spoke to 22 current and former officials, MPs, diplomats, industry figures and China experts, most of whom were granted anonymity to speak frankly. They painted a picture of a leader walking the same tightrope he always has surrounded by grim choices — from tricky post-Brexit negotiations with the EU, to Donald Trump taking potshots at British policies and freezing talks on a U.K.-U.S. tech deal. Starmer wants his (long-planned) visit to China to secure growth, but be cautious enough not to compromise national security or enrage Trump. He appears neither to have ramped up engagement with Beijing in response to Trump, nor reduced it amid criticism of China’s espionage and human rights record. In short, he doesn’t want any drama. “Starmer is more managerial. He wants to keep the U.K.’s relationships with big powers steady,” said one person familiar with planning for the trip. “You can’t really imagine him doing a Carney or a Macron and using the trip to set out a big geopolitical vision.” An official in 10 Downing Street added: “He’s clear that it is in the U.K.’s interests to have a relationship with the world’s second biggest economy. While the U.S. is our closest ally, he rejects the suggestion that means you can’t have pragmatic dealings with China.” He will be hoping Trump — whose own China visit is planned for April — sees it that way too. BRING OUT THE CAVALRY Starmer has one word in his mind for this trip — growth, which was just 0.1 percent in the three months to September. The prime minister will be flanked by executives from City giants HSBC, Standard Chartered, Schroders and the London Stock Exchange Group; pharmaceutical company AstraZeneca; car manufacturer Jaguar Land Rover; energy provider Octopus; and Brompton, the folding bicycle manufacturer. The priority in Downing Street will be bringing back “a sellable headline,” said the person familiar with trip planning quoted above. The economy is the overwhelming focus. While officials discussed trying to secure a political win, such as China lifting sanctions it imposed on British parliamentarians in 2021, one U.K. official said they now believe this to be unlikely. Between them, five people familiar with the trip’s planning predicted a large number of deals, dialogues and memorandums of understanding — but largely in areas with the fewest national security concerns. These are likely to include joint work on medical, health and life sciences, cooperation on climate science, and work to highlight Mandarin language schemes, the people said.  Officials are also working on the mutual recognition of professional qualifications and visa-free travel for short stays, while firms have been pushing for more expansive banking and insurance licences for British companies operating in China. The U.K. is meanwhile likely to try to persuade Beijing to lower import tariffs on Scotch whisky, which doubled in February 2025. A former U.K. official who was involved in Britain’s last prime ministerial visit to China, by Theresa May in 2018, predicted all deals will already be “either 100 or 99 percent agreed, in the system, and No. 10 will already have a firm number in its head that it can announce.” THREADING THE NEEDLE Yet all five people agreed there is unlikely to be a deal on heavy energy infrastructure, including wind turbine technology, that could leave Britain vulnerable to China. The U.K. has still not decided whether to let Ming Yang, a Chinese firm, invest £1.5 billion in a wind farm off the coast of Scotland. And while Carney agreed to ease tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles (EVs), three of the five people familiar with the trip’s planning said that any deep co-operation on EV technology is likely to be off the table. One of them predicted: “This won’t be another Canada moment. I don’t see us opening the floodgates on EVs.” Britain is trying to stick to “amber and green areas” for any deals, said the first person familiar with the planning. The second of the five people said: “I think they‘re going for the soft, slightly lovey stuff.” Britain has good reason to be reluctant, as Chinese-affiliated groups have long been accused of hacking and espionage, including against MPs and Britain’s Electoral Commission. Westminster was gripped by headlines in December about a collapsed case against two men who had been accused of spying for China. Chinese firm Huawei was banned from helping build the U.K.’s 5G phone network in 2020 after pressure from Trump. Even now, Britain’s security agencies are working on mitigations to telecommunications cables near the Tower of London. They pass close to the boundary of China’s proposed embassy, which won planning approval last week. Andrew Small, director of the Asia Programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations, a think tank working on foreign and security policy, said: “The current debate about how to ‘safely’ increase China’s role in U.K. green energy supplies — especially through wind power — has serious echoes of 5G all over again, and is a bigger concern on the U.S. side than the embassy decision.”  Starmer and his team also “don’t want to antagonize the Americans” ahead of Trump’s own visit in April, said the third of the five people familiar with trip planning. “They’re on eggshells … if they announce a new dialogue on United Nations policy or whatever bullshit they can come up with, any of those could be interpreted as a broadside to the Trump administration.” All these factors mean Starmer’s path to a “win” is narrow. Tahlia Peterson, a fellow working on China at Chatham House, the international affairs think tank, said: “Starmer isn’t going to ‘reset’ the relationship in one visit or unlock large-scale Chinese investment into Britain’s core infrastructure.” Small said foreign firms are being squeezed out of the Chinese market and Xi is “weaponizing” the dependency on Chinese supply chains. He added: “Beijing will likely offer extremely minor concessions in areas such as financial services, [amounting to] no more than a rounding error in economic scale.” Chancellor Rachel Reeves knows the pain of this. Britain’s top finance minister was mocked when she returned with just £600 million of agreements from her visit to China a year ago. One former Tory minister said the figure was a “deliberate insult” by China. Even once the big win is in the bag, there is the danger of it falling apart on arrival. Carney announced Canada and China would expand visa-free travel, only for Beijing’s ambassador to Ottawa to say that the move was not yet official. Despite this, businesses have been keen on Starmer’s re-engagement.  Rain Newton-Smith, director-general of the Confederation of British Industry, said firms are concerned about the dependence on Chinese rare earths but added: “If you map supply chains from anywhere, the idea that you can decouple from China is impossible. It’s about how that trade can be facilitated in the best way.” EMBASSY ROW Even if Starmer gets his wins, this visit will bring controversies that (critics say) show the asymmetry in Britain’s relationship with China. A tale of two embassies serves as a good metaphor.  Britain finally approved plans last week for China’s new outpost in London, despite a long row over national security. China held off formally confirming Starmer’s visit until the London embassy decision was finalized, the first person familiar with planning for the trip said. (Others point out Starmer would not want to go until the issue was resolved.) The result was a scramble in which executives were only formally invited a week before take-off. And Britain has not yet received approval to renovate its own embassy in Beijing. Officials privately refer to the building as “falling down,” while one person who has visited said construction materials were piled up against walls. It is “crumbling,” added another U.K. official: “The walls have got cracks on them, the wallpaper’s peeling off, it’s got damp patches.” British officials refused to give any impression of a “quid pro quo” for the two projects under the U.K.’s semi-judicial planning system. But that means much of Whitehall still does not know if Britain’s embassy revamp in Beijing will be approved, or held back until China’s project in London undergoes a further review in the courts. U.K. officials are privately pressing their Chinese counterparts to give the green light. One of the people keenest on a breakthrough will be Britain’s new ambassador to Beijing Peter Wilson, a career diplomat described by people who have met him as “outstanding,” “super smart” and “very friendly.”  For Wilson, hosting Starmer will be one of his trickiest jobs yet. The everyday precautions when doing business in China have made preparations for this trip more intense. Government officials and corporate executives are bringing secure devices and will have been briefed on the risk of eavesdropping and honeytraps. One member of Theresa May’s 2018 delegation to China recalled opening the door of what they thought was their vehicle, only to see several people with headsets on, listening carefully and typing. They compared it to a scene in a spy film. Activists and MPs will put Starmer under pressure to raise human rights issues — including what campaigners say is a genocide against the Uyghur people in Xinjiang province — on a trip governed by strict protocol where one stray word can derail a deal.  Pro-democracy publisher Jimmy Lai, who has British nationality, is facing sentencing in Hong Kong imminently for national security offenses. During the PM’s last meeting with Xi in 2024, Chinese officials bundled British journalists out of the room when he raised the case. Campaigners had thought Lai’s sentencing could take place this week. All these factors mean tension in the British state — which has faced a tussle between “securocrats” and departments pushing for growth — has been high ahead of the trip. Government comments on China are workshopped carefully before publication. Earlier this month, Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper told POLITICO her work on Beijing involves looking at “transnational repression” and “espionage threats.” But when Chancellor Rachel Reeves met China’s Finance Minister He Lifeng in Davos last week to tee up Starmer’s visit, the U.K. Treasury did not publicize the meeting — beyond a little-noticed photo on its Flickr account. SLOW BOAT TO CHINA Whatever the controversies, Labour’s China stance has been steadily taking shape since before Starmer took office in 2024. Labour drew inspiration from its sister party in Australia and the U.S. Democrats, both of which had regular meetings with Beijing. Party aides argued that after a brief “golden era” under Conservative PM David Cameron, Britain engaged less with China than with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The result of Labour’s thinking was the policy of “three Cs” — “challenge, compete, and cooperate.” A procession of visits to Beijing followed, most notably Reeves last year, culminating in Starmer’s trip. His National Security Adviser Jonathan Powell was involved in planning across much of 2025, even travelling to meet China’s top diplomat, Wang Yi, in November. Starmer teed up this week’s visit with a December speech arguing the “binary” view of China had persisted for too long. He promised to engage with Beijing carefully while taking a “more transactional approach to pretty well everything.”  The result was that this visit has long been locked in; just as Labour aides argue the London embassy decision was set in train in 2018, when the Tory government gave diplomatic consent for the site. Labour ministers “just want to normalize” the fact of dealing with China, said the senior Westminster figure quoted above. Newton-Smith added: “I think the view is that the government’s engagement with eyes wide open is the right strategy. And under the previous government, we did lose out.” But for each person who praises the re-engagement, there are others who say it has left Britain vulnerable while begging for scraps at China’s table. Hawks argue the hard details behind the “three Cs” were long nebulous, while Labour’s long-awaited “audit” of U.K.-China relations was delayed before being folded briefly into a wider security document. “Every single bad decision now can be traced back to the first six months,” argued the third person familiar with planning quoted above. “They were absolutely ill-prepared and made a series of decisions that have boxed them into a corner.” They added: “The government lacks the killer instinct to deal with China. It’s not in their DNA.” Luke de Pulford, a human rights campaigner and director of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, argued the Tories had engaged with China — Foreign Secretary James Cleverly visited in 2023 — and Labour was simply going much further. “China is pursuing an enterprise to reshape the global order in its own image, and to that end, to change our institutions and way of life to the extent that they’re an obstacle to it,” he said. “That’s what they’re up to — and we keep falling for it.” END OF THE OLD ORDER? His language may be less dramatic, but Starmer’s visit to China does have some parallels with Canada. Carney’s trip was the first by a Canadian PM since 2017, and he and Xi agreed a “new strategic partnership.” Later at Davos, the Canadian PM talked of “the end of a pleasant fiction” and warned multilateral institutions such as the United Nations are under threat. One British industry figure who attended Davos said of Carney’s speech: “It was great. Everyone was talking about it. Someone said to me that was the best and most poignant speech they’d ever seen at the World Economic Forum. That may be a little overblown, but I guess most of the speeches at the WEF are quite dull.” The language used by Starmer, a former human rights lawyer devoted to multilateralism, has not been totally dissimilar. Britain could no longer “look only to international institutions to uphold our values and interests,” he said in December. “We must do it ourselves through deals and alliances.” But while some in the U.K. government privately agree with Carney’s point, the real difference is the two men’s approach to Trump. Starmer will temper his messaging carefully to avoid upsetting either his Chinese hosts or the U.S., even as Trump throws semi-regular rocks at Britain. To Peterson, this is unavoidable. “China, the U.S. and the EU are likely to continue to dominate global economic growth for the foreseeable future,” she said. “Starmer’s choice is not whether to engage, but how.” Esther Webber contributed reporting.

It seems impossible to have a conversation today without artificial intelligence (AI) playing some role, demonstrating the massive power of the technology. It has the potential to impact every part of business, and European policymakers are on board. In February 2025, Ursula von der Leyen, the European Commission president, said, “We want Europe to be one of the leading AI continents … AI can help us boost our competitiveness, protect our security, shore up public health, and make access to knowledge and information more democratic.” Research from Nokia suggests that businesses share this enthusiasm and ambition: 84 percent of more than 1,000 respondents said AI features in the growth strategy of their organization, while 62 percent are directing at least 20 percent of ICT capex budgets toward the technology. However, the equation is not yet balanced. Three-quarters of survey respondents state that current telecom infrastructure limits the ability to deliver on those ambitions. Meanwhile, 45 percent suggest these limitations would delay, constrain or entirely limit investments. There is clearly a disconnect between the ambition and the ability to deliver. At present, Europe lags the United States and parts of Asia in areas such as network deployment, related investment levels and scale. > If AI does not reach its full potential, EU competitiveness will suffer, > economic growth will have a ceiling, the creation of new jobs will have a > limit and consumers will not see the benefits. What we must remember primarily is that AI does not happen without advanced, trusted and future-proofed networks. Infrastructure is not a ‘nice to have’ it is a fundamental part. Simply put, today’s networks in Europe require more investments to power the AI dream we all have. If AI does not reach its full potential, EU competitiveness will suffer, economic growth will have a ceiling, the creation of new jobs will have a limit and consumers will not see the benefits. When we asked businesses about the challenge of meeting AI demands during our research, the lack of adequate connectivity infrastructure was the fourth common answer out of 15 potential options. Our telecom connectivity regulatory approach must be more closely aligned with the goal of fostering AI. That means progressing toward a genuine telecom single market, adopting a novel approach to competition policy to allow market consolidation to lead to more investments, and ensuring connectivity is always secure and trusted. Supporting more investments in next-generation networks through consolidation AI places heavy demands on networks. It requires low latency, high bandwidth and reliability, and efficient traffic management. To deliver this, Europe needs to accelerate investment in 5G standalone, fiber to enterprises, edge data centers and IP-optical backbone networks optimized for AI. > As industry voices such as Nokia have emphasized, the networks that power AI > must themselves make greater use of automation and AI. Consolidation (i.e. reducing the number of telecom operators within the national telecom markets of EU member states) is part of the solution. Consolidation will allow operators to achieve economies of scale and improve operating efficiency, therefore encouraging investment and catalyzing innovation. As industry voices such as Nokia have emphasized, the networks that power AI must themselves make greater use of automation and AI. Policy support should therefore extend to both network innovation and deployment. Trust: A precondition for AI adoption Intellectual property (IP) theft is a threat to Europe’s industrial future and only trusted technology should be used in core functions, systems and sectors (such as energy, transport and defense). In this context, the underlying connectivity should always be secure and trusted. The 5G Security Toolbox, restricting untrusted technology, should therefore be extended to all telecom technologies (including fiber, optics and IP) and made compulsory in all EU member states. European governments must make protecting their industries and citizens a high priority. Completing the digital single market Although the single market is one of Europe’s defining projects, the reality in telecoms — a key part of the digital single market — is still fragmented. As an example, different spectrum policies create barriers across borders and can limit network roll outs. Levers on top of advanced connectivity To enable the AI ecosystem in Europe, there are several different enabling levers European policymakers should advance on top of fostering advanced and trusted connectivity: * The availability of compute infrastructure. The AI Continent Action Plan, as well as the IPCEI Compute Infrastructure Continuum, and the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking should facilitate building AI data centers in Europe.   * Leadership in edge computing. There should also be clear support for securing Europe’s access to and leadership in edge solutions and building out edge capacity. Edge solutions increase processing speeds and are important for enabling AI adoption, while also creating a catalyst for economic growth. With the right data center capacity and edge compute capabilities available, European businesses can meet the new requirements of AI use cases.  * Harmonization of rules. There are currently implications for AI in several policy areas, including the AI Act, GDPR, Data Act, cybersecurity laws and sector-specific regulations. This creates confusion, whereas AI requires clarity. Simplification and harmonization of these regulations should be pursued.  * AI Act implementation and simplification. There are concerns about the implementation of the AI Act. The standards for high-risk AI may not be available before the obligations of the AI act enter into force, hampering business ambitions due to legal uncertainty. The application date of the AI Act’s provisions on high-risk AI should be postponed by two years to align with the development of standards. There needs to be greater clarity on definitions and simplification measures should be pursued across the entire ecosystem. Policies must be simple enough to follow, otherwise adoption may falter. Policy needs to act as an enabler, not a barrier to innovation.  * Upskilling and new skills. AI will require new skills of employees and users, as well as creating entirely new career paths. Europe needs to prepare for this new world.  If Europe can deliver on these priorities, the benefits will be tangible: improved services, stronger industries, increased competitiveness and higher economic growth. AI will deliver to those who best prepare themselves. We must act now with the urgency and consistency that the moment demands. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Author biography: Marc Vancoppenolle is leading the geopolitical and government relations EU and Europe function at Nokia. He and his team are working with institutions and stakeholders in Europe to create a favorable political and regulatory environment fostering broadband investments and cross sectoral digitalization at large. Vancoppenolle has over 30 years of experience in the telecommunication industry. He joined Alcatel in 1991, and then Alcatel-Lucent, where he took various international and worldwide technical, commercial, marketing, communication and government affairs leadership roles. Vancoppenolle is a Belgian and French national. He holds a Master of Science, with a specialization in telecommunication, from the University of Leuven complemented with marketing studies from the University of Antwerp. He is a member of the DIGITALEUROPE Executive Board, Associate to Nokia’s CEO at the ERT (European Round Table for Industry), and advisor to FITCE Belgium (Forum for ICT & Media professionals). He has been vice-chair of the BUSINESSEUROPE Digital Economy Taskforce as well as a member of the board of IICB (Innovation & Incubation Center Brussels).

President Donald Trump may be backing down on his threat to seize Greenland, but his push for the island has already changed the way foreign policy is done in Washington and beyond. More than any other global issue I’ve seen Trump tackle, his obsession with Greenland has shifted paradigms and broken brains. And I’m talking about big brains: diplomats, foreign policy analysts, economic specialists. People on the left and a fair number on the right. Even diplomats not from Europe are rattled. “It was like, huh?” said an African official in Washington. “The shocking part was the level of the threat, how serious he was. And it’s not over.” Suzanne Maloney, a Middle East analyst who directs the Brookings Institution’s foreign policy program, said it has felt “as though the world has gone mad.” She added: “The language, the determination on this particular issue just feels disconnected from our national interest.” Not long ago, many foreign policy professionals were still asking if the post-World War II “rules-based international order” was dead. In the wake of Trump’s Greenland gambit, I’m hearing more flat-out declare it’s a corpse. Canada’s leader, Mark Carney, said as much at the World Economic Forum this week. That means foreign policy consultants are rethinking advice they give to clients, while think tankers are reconsidering their travel and study plans. Maloney, for one, said she had to submit her department’s policy research priorities for the coming fiscal year to her superiors this week, but that she warned them the list could change by next week. Diplomats from Europe said the Greenland crisis has created a new reality because it’s clearer than ever that even allies are not safe from Trump’s machinations. “It creates a sort of fear in the European Union,” one European diplomat told me. “It’s not just about expanding our imagination, but just to realize this is a different day and the traditional ways — the rules, the laws — don’t necessarily apply. Everything is now negotiable.” (I granted the diplomat and others I spoke to anonymity to discuss a sensitive issue.) That’s even though Trump toned down his rhetoric Wednesday. He first said he won’t use military force to take over Greenland and later announced he’d withdraw a threat of tariffs after reaching a “framework” deal over the territory. Few details were immediately available. But Trump, who has wanted Greenland since his first term, changes his mind so often that Europeans — or any other global actor — would be foolish to trust that this issue is resolved. He has a history of walking away from deals, including ones his administration crafted. He also has three more years in this term. The sense from Trump critics I spoke to for this column was that they’re not ready to relax even though he’s softened his tone. “His overriding interest is to expand the map of the United States,” said Eric Green, a former senior National Security Council official who dealt with Russia and Central Asia in the Biden administration. “Sooner or later he’s going to come back to that.” Trump’s Greenland desires have scrambled the plans of many foreign affairs practitioners to a degree that’s unusual even for a president who delights in upending conventional wisdom. The whole Greenland debacle is especially hard for people who teach international relations, many of whom keep having to redo their syllabi. These scholars are trained to use neutral language to explain the actions of power players. The goal is to help students learn methods to understand the world. But “there comes a point where you just want to say this is a fucking stupid idea,” said Daniel Drezner, academic dean at Tufts University’s Fletcher School. Trump’s Greenland push also came with a level of personal self-interest that went beyond the “America First” justification he has used to explain other actions. He has said he is pursuing Greenland in part because he was upset that he had not been given the Nobel Peace Prize. “It feels a bit like ‘The Twilight Zone’,” Green said. “He’s linking a personal slight to a geopolitical request that is completely unreasonable.” Trump’s foreign policy moves typically have some logic behind them. You don’t have to agree with the logic, but you can still see it. He bombed Iran’s nuclear facilities because it was a rare chance to set back a program that could threaten the U.S. He captured Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro because he wants access to Venezuelan oil and could make a case that Maduro is a narcotrafficker whose regime undermines the U.S. He imposed tariffs on practically every other country because he believes it will help the U.S. become more economically self-sufficient over time. In bullying Denmark to hand over, or sell, Greenland, Trump and his aides have said they are thinking of the U.S. national interest. The island is strategically located and contains many useful natural resources. Alex Gray, who served in a senior role at the National Security Council in Trump’s first term, said one long-term worry is that Greenland’s residents will eventually insist on full independence from Denmark, making them more vulnerable to China or Russia. “Which is why we need to put our best foot forward and offer them some very compelling things,” Gray said of U.S. overtures to Greenland. Trump does have a history of making seemingly outrageous demands before settling for whatever he can get. He’s sometimes been spooked by the markets, which have not reacted well to his push for Greenland. Some people say he chickens out, but the approach has its benefits. It forces people to talk about issues that otherwise get ignored (like the fecklessness of the U.N.) or settle for terms that otherwise they’d abhor. Still, Trump’s insistence that the U.S. control Greenland has stained America’s reputation with its allies. That’s a price detractors say should never have had to be paid. After all, Washington already has tremendous access to Greenland under past agreements with Denmark; U.S. troops already operate in Greenland and Washington can send more. Trump’s demand that Denmark grant the territory to the U.S. is a body blow to U.S. relations with its European allies. It also hurts NATO, a military alliance that includes the U.S. and Denmark — and which would defend Greenland should an adversarial power threaten it. For people trying to advise clients, teach students, make policy or otherwise engage the public, Trump’s Greenland moves underscore how hard the foreign policy prediction game has become. The true effects of Trump’s moves may not be felt until long after he’s out of office. He often acts as if he’s making a more significant change than he really is; the effective rate of his tariffs, for example, is often lower than his proclamations. Many of Trump’s policies also contradict one another. For instance, Trump supposedly wants African countries to build their economies and be less dependent on foreign aid, but his tariffs hurt those economies. It doesn’t help that so much of what’s happening with Greenland comes down to the personality of one man. This is probably an argument for all of us to take a class on political psychology. Or maybe join a support group for exhausted foreign policy professionals?

Ha dell’incredibile il ritrovamento avvenuto nel mare della città di Cagayan de Oro, sull’Isola di Mindanao, nelle Filippine. Alcuni operai si sono accorti che in acqua svolazzava un uccello in difficoltà. I lavoratori hanno salvato il pennuto, scoprendo solo in un secondo momento che si trattava di uno degli animali più rari e a maggior rischio estinzione del mondo: il bucero delle Sulu. I fatti risalgono allo scorso novembre ma la notizia è uscita solo ora. L’esemplare è stato recuperato con l’aiuto delle autorità competenti ed è stato trasferito in un centri di recupero per la fauna selvatica, dove i veterinari del Dipartimento dell’Ambiente e delle Risorse Naturali filippino (il Denr) hanno curato le ferite. Successivamente, il bucero è stato liberato in un’area naturale considerata sicura per la specie. Secondo l’Iucn (International Union for the Conservation of Nature), il bucero delle Sulu è considerato “in pericolo critico”, ossia l’ultimo gradino prima della scomparsa definitiva. Nel 2019, gli esperti hanno stabilito l’esistenza di appena 27 individui adulti in tutto il mondo. I buceri sono animali tipici dell’Africa subsahariana e dell’Asia meridionale e del Sud-est asiatico. La scomparsa del bucero delle Sulu è legata alla distruzione delle foreste e al bracconaggio, seguito dal traffico illegale dell’animale selvatico. Per gli esperti, il ritrovamento dell’uccello nel mare davanti a Cagayan de Oro resta un mistero. IL RITROVAMENTO MISTERIOSO Il ritrovamento del bucero del Sulu nelle Filippine ha sorpreso gli esperti. L’Isola di Mindanao, dov’è stato salvato l’animale, dista circa 600 chilometri dall’unico luogo conosciuto in cui ancora sopravvive questa specie. Secondo i veterinari, è improbabile che un uccello localizzato e tipico delle foreste dell’arcipelago delle Sulu (da cui prende il nome) abbia volato per centinaia di chilometri in mare aperto. L’ipotesi più probabile è quella del traffico illegale dell’esemplare, che sarebbe stato catturato e trasportato fino a Cagayan de Oro. L'articolo Operai salvano un animale in difficoltà in mare e fanno una scoperta incredibile: è un bucero delle Sulu, uno degli esemplari più rari e a maggior rischio estinzione del mondo proviene da Il Fatto Quotidiano.

Mark Leonard is the director and co-founder of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) and author of “Surviving Chaos: Geopolitics when the Rules Fail” (Polity Press April 2026). The international liberal order is ending. In fact, it may already be dead. White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller said as much last week as he gloated over the U.S. intervention in Venezuela and the capture of dictator Nicolás Maduro: “We live in a world … that is governed by strength, that is governed by force, that is governed by power … These are the iron laws of the world.” But America’s 47th president is equally responsible for another death — that of the united West. And while Europe’s leaders have fallen over themselves to sugarcoat U.S. President Donald Trump’s illegal military operation in Venezuela and ignore his brazen demands on Greenland, Europeans themselves have already realized Washington is more foe than friend. This is one of the key findings of a poll conducted in November 2025 by my colleagues at the European Council on Foreign Relations and Oxford University’s Europe in a Changing World research project, based on interviews with 26,000 individuals in 21 countries. Only one in six respondents considered the U.S. to be an ally, while a sobering one in five viewed it as a rival or adversary. In Germany, France and Spain that number approaches 30 percent, and in Switzerland — which Trump singled out for higher tariffs — it’s as high as 39 percent. This decline in support for the U.S. has been precipitous across the continent. But as power shifts around the globe, perceptions of Europe have also started to change. With Trump pursuing an America First foreign policy, which often leaves Europe out in the cold, other countries are now viewing the EU as a sovereign geopolitical actor in its own right. This shift has been most dramatic in Russia, where voters have grown less hostile toward the U.S. Two years ago, 64 percent of Russians viewed the U.S. as an adversary, whereas today that number sits at 37 percent. Instead, they have turned their ire toward Europe, which 72 percent now consider either an advisory or a rival — up from 69 percent a year ago. Meanwhile, Washington’s policy shift toward Russia has also meant a shift in its Ukraine policy. And as a result, Ukrainians, who once saw the U.S. as their greatest ally, are now looking to Europe for protection. They’re distinguishing between U.S. and European policy, and nearly two-thirds expect their country’s relations with the EU to get stronger, while only one-third say the same about the U.S. Even beyond Europe, however, the single biggest long-term impact of Trump’s first year in office is how he has driven people away from the U.S. and closer to China, with Beijing’s influence expected to grow across the board. From South Africa and Brazil to Turkey, majorities expect their country’s relationship with China to deepen over the next five years. And in these countries, more respondents see Beijing as an ally than Washington. More specifically, in South Africa and India — two countries that have found themselves in Trump’s crosshairs recently — the change from a year ago is remarkable. At the end of 2024, a whopping 84 percent of Indians considered Trump’s victory to be a good thing for their country; now only 53 percent do. Of course, this poll was conducted before Trump’s intervention in Venezuela and before his remarks about taking over Greenland. But with even the closest of allies now worried about falling victim to a predatory U.S., these trends — of countries pulling away from the U.S. and toward China, and a Europe isolated from its transatlantic partner — are likely to accelerate. Meanwhile, Washington’s policy shift toward Russia has also meant a shift in its Ukraine policy. And as a result, Ukrainians, who once saw the U.S. as their greatest ally, are now looking to Europe for protection. | Joe Raedle/Getty Images All the while, confronted with Trumpian aggression but constrained by their own lack of agency, European leaders are stuck dealing with an Atlantic-sized chasm between their private reactions and what they allow themselves to say in public. The good news from our poll is that despite the reticence of their leaders, Europeans are both aware of the state of the world and in favor of a lot of what needs to be done to improve the continent’s position. As we have seen, they harbor no illusions about the U.S. under Trump. They realize they’re living in an increasingly dangerous, multipolar world. And majorities support boosting defense spending, reintroducing mandatory conscription, and even entertaining the prospect of a European nuclear deterrent. The rules-based order is giving way to a world of spheres of influence, where might makes right and the West is split from within. In such a world, you are either a pole with your own sphere of influence or a bystander in someone else’s. European leaders should heed their voters and ensure the continent belongs in the first category — not the second.

Immaginate la seguente scena: il Milan chiude un accordo di partnership con una determinata azienda e – all’evento ufficiale che sancisce la collaborazione – manda un attore spacciandolo come presidente del club. Non proprio il massimo a livello di immagine e credibilità. Questo fatto è accaduto davvero ma a parti invertite. L’accordo c’è stato e ha riguardato la società rossonera con sureWin, che per la stagione 2025-26 è diventato “Official Regional Online Casino Partner in Asia” del Milan. Nell’ottobre 2025 è arrivata la firma, immortalata da una foto tra il Direttore Commerciale dei rossoneri Maikel Oettle e il fondatore di sureWin, William Anderson, che nell’immagine tiene in mano una maglia del Milan con stampato, sul retro, il logo della sua azienda. O meglio, di quella che dovrebbe essere la sua azienda. Perché dietro il nome di William Anderson si nasconde in realtà l’attore Craig Haydon, un inglese che da qualche anno bazzica il mondo della fiction nel sudest asiatico. Il curriculum di Haydon è visibile sul sito IMDb, il noto portale dedicato a cinema e serie tv. Ha lavorato nella fiction The Singapore Grip, trasmessa anche in Gran Bretagna, e più recentemente in due film: Malbatt – Misi Bakara, una sorta di Black Hawk Down singaporiano, e The Causeway, serie televisiva per il mercato malese e indonesiano. Non è finita. Il sito di investigazione sportiva Josimar ha trovato altre interpretazioni di Haydon al di fuori del grande e piccolo schermo, come avvenuto proprio nel caso William Anderson-sureWin. I ruoli ricoperti? Impiegato di un ufficio pubblicitario a Kuala Lumpur, dirigente dell’azienda Precision Data Analytics, che è titolare di una newsletter economica taiwanese, presidente di Trade Root International con il nome di Gerry Charles. Per gli scettici, basta visitare la pagina della citata pubblicazione e confrontare le foto. Non è la prima volta che sureWin utilizza degli attori in eventi pubblici. Lo scorso 9 luglio al Menara Ecoworld di Kuala Lumpur è salito sul palco a ricevere un premio non il fantomatico William Anderson, ma un altro “dirigente esecutivo” della società, che corrisponde alle fattezze del musicista americano Rhadd Hunt, trasferitosi nel 2020 in Malesia, dove ha abbandonato il basso e il canto in favore di una carriera come doppiatore e attore. Anche in questo caso, la sua filmografia è tranquillamente consultabile su IMDb. La domanda che sorge spontanea riguarda invece il motivo per il quale non un’azienda qualunque, ma quella che viene definita come “il casinò più affidabile di tutta l’Asia” debba usare delle controfigure per presenziare a simili incontri pubblici. Va detto che sureWin, come numerosi operatori asiatici nel mondo del betting e del gioco online, opera illegalmente, ma non sembra nemmeno porsi troppo il problema di nascondere la cosa. Una delle loro pagine principali reindirizza infatti a siti dedicati ai clienti in Malesia, Singapore, Cambogia e Vietnam, tutti paesi in cui il gioco d’azzardo online è vietato. È presente anche in Australia, pur non figurando nell’elenco dei fornitori autorizzati al gioco d’azzardo interattivo online. Se, nel citato evento del Menara Ecoworld, sureWin ha ottenuto un riconoscimento per l’onestà da parte della AEEF, una piattaforma internazionale gestita da imprenditori asiatici, la trasparenza latita o, quantomeno, presenta dei buchi non da poco. Per esempio la validità della licenza ottenuta dall’autorità di regolamentazione filippina PAGCOR, non reperibile in nessun database dell’ente, e comunque decaduta dal primo gennaio 2025 dopo che un decreto del presidente filippino Marcos ha azzerato tutte le licenze concesse da PAGCOR. Infatti alla voce Licenze adesso sureWin scrive di essere azienda “verificata” da società quali Meta e GoDaddy, come se fosse sufficiente una casella spuntata per certificare la regolarità operativa di sureWin. Curioso inoltre che la foto del nuovo hub operativo nella Filippine di sureWin corrisponda esattamente all’ufficio di una società chiamata D&V Philippines, che si occupa di outsourcing e contabilità non correlata e che non ha legami con il casinò online. Il Milan non sembra essere particolarmente fortunato con le partnership asiatiche. Dal 2017 a oggi, sono sfilate Vwin, Yabo, MansionBet, Kaiyun e Leyu, alcune delle quali coinvolte in giri pochi chiari già raccontati dal fattoquotidiano.it, compresi gli ultimi casi relativi alla Germania. Partnership spesso di breve durata. Per ragioni facilmente intuibili. Adesso è il turno di sureWin, attiva comunque a livello di sponsorizzazioni anche nell’ambito dell’hip-hop mainstream e della distribuzione cinematografica. Qualcuno però informi William Anderson-Craig Haydon che è arrivato tardi. Il Milan non è più quello di una volta e – nel caso la carriera da attore si metta male – non può nemmeno sperare di riciclarsi in qualche fiction targata Mediaset. Credit photo: acmilan.com L'articolo Tra gli sponsor del Milan spunta un opaco sito di scommesse: a firmare l’accordo c’era un attore di sit-com spacciato per il fondatore proviene da Il Fatto Quotidiano.

Ivo Daalder, a former U.S. ambassador to NATO, is a senior fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center and host of the weekly podcast “World Review with Ivo Daalder.” He writes POLITICO’s From Across the Pond column In justifying his military operation against Venezuela, U.S. President Donald Trump reached back in time over two centuries and grabbed hold of the Monroe Doctrine. But it’s another 19th-century interest that propelled his extraordinary gambit in the first place — oil. According to the New York Times, what started as an effort to press the Venezuelan regime to cede power and end the flow of drugs and immigrants into the U.S., began shifting into a determination to seize the country’s oil last fall. And the president was the driving force behind this shift. That’s hardly surprising though — Trump has been obsessed with oil for decades, even as most of the world is actively trying to leave it behind. As far back as the 1980s, Trump was complaining about the U.S. protecting Japan, Saudi Arabia and others to secure the free flow of oil. “The world is laughing at America’s politicians as we protect ships we don’t own, carrying oil we don’t need, destined for allies who won’t help,” he wrote in a 1987 newspaper ad. Having supported the Iraq War from the outset, he later complained that the U.S. hadn’t sufficiently benefited from it. “I would take the oil,” he told the Wall Street Journal in 2011. “I would not leave Iraq and let Iran take the oil.” That same year, he also dismissed humanitarian concerns in Libya, saying: “I am only interested in Libya if we take the oil.” In justifying his military operation against Venezuela, U.S. President Donald Trump reached back in time over two centuries and grabbed hold of the Monroe Doctrine. | Henry Chirinos/EPA Unsurprisingly, “take the oil” later became the mantra for Trump’s first presidential campaign — and for his first term in office. Complaining that the U.S. got “nothing” for all the money it spent invading Iraq: “It used to be, ‘To the victor belong the spoils’ … I always said, ‘Take the oil,’” he griped during a Commander in Chief Forum in 2016. As president, he also insisted on keeping U.S. forces in Syria for that very reason in 2019. “I like oil,” he said, “we’re keeping the oil.” But while Iraq, Libya and even Syria were all conflicts initiated by Trump’s predecessors, Venezuela is quite another matter. Weeks before seizing Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, Trump made clear what needed to happen: On Dec. 16, 2025, he announced an oil blockade of the country “until such time as they return to the United States of America all of the Oil, Land, and other Assets that they previously stole from us.” Then, after capturing Maduro, Trump declared the U.S. would “run the country” in order to get its oil. “We’re in the oil business,” he stated. “We’re going to have our very large United States oil companies … go in, spend billions of dollars, fix the badly broken infrastructure, and start making money.” “We’re going to be taking out a tremendous amount of wealth out of the ground,” Trump insisted. “It goes also to the United States of America in the form of reimbursement for the damages caused us by that country.” On Wednesday, Energy Secretary Chris Wright announced that Venezuela would ship its oil to the U.S. “and then infinitely, going forward, we will sell the production that comes out of Venezuela into the marketplace,” effectively declaring the expropriation of Venezuela’s most important national resources. All of this reeks of 19th-century imperialism. But the problem with Trump’s oil obsession goes deeper than his urge to steal it from others — by force if necessary. He is fixated on a depleting resource of steadily declining importance. And yet, this doesn’t seem to matter. Throughout his reelection campaign, Trump still emphasized the need to produce more oil. “Drill, baby, drill” became as central to his energy policy as “take the oil” was to his views on military intervention. He called on oil executives to raise $1 billion for his campaign, promising his administration would be “a great deal” for their industry. And he talked incessantly of the large reservoirs of “liquid gold” in the U.S., claiming: “We’re going to make a fortune.” But these weren’t just campaign promises. Upon his return to office, Trump unleashed the full force of the U.S. government to boost oil production at home and exports abroad. He established a National Energy Dominance Council, opened protected lands in Alaska and the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge for oil and gas exploration, signed a mandate for immediate offshore oil and gas leases into law, and accelerated permitting reforms to speed up pipeline construction, refinery expansion and liquid natural gas exports. At the same time, he’s been castigating efforts to cut greenhouse gas emissions as part of a climate change “hoax,” he withdrew the U.S. from the Paris Climate Agreement once again, and he took a series of steps to end the long-term transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy. He signed a law ending credits and subsidies to encourage residential solar and electric vehicle purchases, invoked national security to halt offshore wind production and terminated grants encouraging renewable energy production. Then, after capturing Nicolás Maduro, Trump declared the U.S. would “run the country” in order to get its oil. | Henry Chirinos/EPA The problem with all these efforts is that the U.S. is now banking on fossil fuels, precisely as their global future is waning. Today, oil production is already outpacing consumption, and global demand is expected to peak later this decade. Over the last 12 months, the cost of oil has decreased by over 23 percent, pricing further exploration and production increasingly out of the market. Meanwhile, renewable energy is becoming vastly more cost-effective. The future, increasingly, lies in renewables to drive our cars; heat, cool and light up our homes; power our data centers, advanced manufacturing factories and everything else that sustains our lives on Earth. By harnessing the power of the sun, the force of wind and the heat of the Earth, China is building its future on inexhaustible resources. And while Beijing is leading the way, many others are following in its footsteps. All this, just as the U.S. goes back to relying on an exhaustive fossil fuel supply. What Trump is betting on is becoming the world’s largest — and last — petrostate. China is betting on becoming its largest and lasting electrostate. Which side would you rather be on?

The message from Capitol Hill on both sides of the aisle is clear: Get ready for U.S. relations with China to spiral all over again in the new year. The one-year trade truce brokered in October between President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping is already looking shaky. And lawmakers are preparing to reup clashes over trade, Taiwan and cyber-intrusions when they return in January. “It’s like a heavyweight fight, and we’re in that short time period in-between rounds, but both sides need to be preparing for what is next after the truce,” Rep. Greg Stanton (D-Ariz.), a member of the House Select Committee on China, said in an interview. POLITICO talked to more than 25 lawmakers, including those on the House Select Committee on China, the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s East Asia subcommittee and the Congressional Executive Commission on China, for their views on the durability of the trade treaty. Both Republicans and Democrats warned of turbulence ahead. More than 20 of the lawmakers said they doubt Xi will deliver on key pledges the White House said he made in October, including reducing the flow of precursor chemicals to Mexico that cartels process into fentanyl and buying agreed volumes of U.S. agricultural goods. “China can never be trusted. They’re always looking for an angle,” Sen. Thom Tillis (R-N.C.) said. That pessimism comes despite an easing in U.S.-China tensions since the Trump-Xi meeting in South Korea. The bruising cycle of tit-for-tat tariffs that briefly hit triple digits earlier this year is currently on pause. Both countries have relaxed export restrictions on essential items (rare earths for the U.S., chip design software for China), while Beijing has committed to “expanding agricultural product trade” in an apparent reference to the suspension of imports of U.S. agricultural products it imposed earlier this year. This trend may continue, given that Trump is likely to want stability in the U.S.-China relationship ahead of a summit with Xi planned for April in Beijing. “We’re starting to see some movement now on some of their tariff issues and the fentanyl precursor issue,” Sen. Steve Daines (R-Mont.) said. But a series of issues have been brushed aside in negotiations or left in limbo — a status quo the Trump administration can only maintain for so long. The U.S.-China trade deal on rare earths that Bessent said the two countries would finalize by Thanksgiving remains unsettled. And the White House hasn’t confirmed reporting from earlier this month that Beijing-based ByteDance has finalized the sale of the TikTok social media app ahead of the Jan. 23 deadline for that agreement. “The idea that we’re in a period of stability with Beijing is simply not accurate,” said Sen. Jeanne Shaheen (D-N.H.), ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Shaheen has been sounding the alarm on China’s national security threats since she entered the Senate in 2009. But even some lawmakers who have been more open to engagement with Beijing — such as California Democratic Reps. Ro Khanna and Ami Bera — said that they don’t expect the armistice to last. The White House is more upbeat about the prospects for U.S.-China trade ties. “President Trump’s close relationship with President Xi is helping ensure that both countries are able to continue building on progress and continue resolving outstanding issues,” the White House said in a statement, adding that the administration “continues to monitor China’s compliance with our trade agreement.” It declined to comment on the TikTok deal. Still, the lawmakers POLITICO spoke with described four issues that could derail U.S.-China ties in the New Year: A SOYBEAN SPOILER U.S. soybean farmers’ reliance on the Chinese market gives Beijing a powerful non-tariff trade weapon — and China doesn’t appear to be following through on promises to renew purchases. The standoff over soybeans started in May, when China halted those purchases, raising the prospect of financial ruin across farming states including Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska and Indiana — key political constituencies for the GOP in the congressional midterm elections next year. The White House said last month that Xi committed to buying 12 million metric tons of U.S. soybeans in November and December. But so far, Beijing has only purchased a fraction of that agreed total, NBC reported this month. “What agitates Trump and causes him to react quickly are things that are more domestic and closer to home,” Rep. Jill Tokuda (D-Hawaii) said. China’s foot-dragging on soybean purchases “is the most triggering because it’s hurting American farmers and consumers, so that’s where we could see the most volatility in the relationship,” she said. That trigger could come on Feb. 28 — the new deadline for that 12 million metric ton purchase, which Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced earlier this month. The Chinese embassy in Washington declined to comment on whether Beijing plans to meet this deadline. The White House said one of the aspects of the trade deal it is monitoring is soybean purchases through this growing season. THE TAIWAN TINDERBOX Beijing’s threats to invade Taiwan are another near-term potential flashpoint, even though the U.S. hasn’t prioritized the issue in its national security strategy or talks between Xi and Trump. China has increased its preparations for a Taiwan invasion this year. In October, the Chinese military debuted a new military barge system that addresses some of the challenges of landing on the island’s beaches by deploying a bridge for cargo ships to unload tanks or trucks directly onto the shore. “China is tightening the noose around the island,” said Rep. Ro Khanna (D-Calif.), who joined a bipartisan congressional delegation to China in September and returned calling for better communications between the U.S. and Chinese militaries. Some of the tension around Taiwan is playing out in the wider region, as Beijing pushes to expand its military reach and its influence. Chinese fighter jets locked radar — a prelude to opening fire — on Japanese aircraft earlier this month in the East China Sea. “There is a real chance that Xi overplays his hand on antagonizing our allies, particularly Australia and Japan,” Rep. Seth Moulton (D-Mass.) said. “There is still a line [China] cannot cross without making this truce impossible to sustain.” The U.S. has a decades-long policy of “strategic ambiguity” under which it refuses to spell out how the U.S. would respond to Chinese aggression against Taiwan. Trump has also adhered to that policy. “You’ll find out if it happens,” Trump said in an interview with 60 Minutes in November. MORE EXPORT RESTRICTIONS ON THE WAY Beijing has eased its export restrictions on rare earths — metallic elements essential to both civilian and military applications — but could reimpose those blocks at any time. Ten of the 25 lawmakers who spoke to POLITICO said they suspect Beijing will reimpose those export curbs as a convenient pressure point in the coming months. “At the center of the crack in the truce is China’s ability to levy export restrictions, especially its chokehold on the global supply of rare earths and other critical minerals,” Rep. André Carson (D-Ind.) said. Others are worried China will choose to expand its export controls to another product category for which it has market dominance — pharmaceuticals. Beijing supplies 80 percent of the U.S. supply of active pharmaceutical ingredients — the foundations of common drugs to treat everything from high blood pressure to type 2 diabetes. “Overnight, China could turn off the spigot and many basic pharmaceuticals, including things like aspirin, go away from the supply chain in the United States,” Rep. Nathaniel Moran (R-Texas) said. China restarted exports of rare earths earlier this month, and its Commerce Ministry pledged “timely approval” of such exports under a new licensing system, state media reported. Beijing has not indicated its intent to restrict the export of pharmaceuticals or their components as a trade weapon. But the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission urged the Food and Drug Administration to reduce U.S. reliance on Chinese sources of pharmaceuticals in its annual report last month. The Chinese embassy in Washington didn’t respond to a request for comment. GROWING CHINESE MILITARY MUSCLE China’s drive to develop a world-class military that can challenge traditional U.S. dominion of the Indo-Pacific could also derail relations between Washington and Beijing in 2026. China’s expanding navy — which, at more than 200 warships, is now the world’s largest — is helping Beijing show off its power across the region. The centerpiece of that effort in 2025 has been the addition of a third aircraft carrier, the Fujian, which entered into service last month. The Fujian is two-thirds the size of the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier. But like the Ford, it boasts state-of-the-art electromagnetic catapults to launch J-35 and J-15T fighter jets. The Trump administration sees that as a threat. The U.S. aims to insulate allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific from possible Chinese “sustained successful military aggression” powered by Beijing’s “historic military buildup,” Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said earlier this month at the Reagan National Defense Forum. Five lawmakers said they see China’s increasingly aggressive regional military footprint as incompatible with U.S. efforts to maintain a stable relationship with Beijing in the months ahead. “We know the long-term goal of China is really economic and diplomatic and military domination around the world, and they see the United States as an adversary,” Moran said. Daniel Desrochers contributed to this report.