La “pace” tra Thailandia e Cambogia che Donald Trump rivendica tra i successi
della propria amministrazione rischia di andare definitivamente in frantumi.
Dopo gli scontri di lunedì, sono cominciate le evacuazioni di massa di cittadini
thailandesi residenti nelle regioni di confine. “Oltre 400 mila persone sono
state trasferite nei rifugi – ha noto è il ministero della Difesa di Bangkok-. I
civili sono stati fatti evacuare in maniera massiccia a causa di quella che
abbiamo valutato come una minaccia imminente per la loro sicurezza”. Phnom Penh,
da parte sua, ha affermato che “101.229 persone sono state evacuate in rifugi
sicuri e presso le case dei parenti in cinque province”.
I due paesi si accusano a vicenda di attaccare i civili nelle aree a ridosso
della frontiera. Martedì sera, il ministero della Difesa della Cambogia ha
dichiarato che da lunedì sono state uccise 9 persone e 20 sono rimaste
gravemente ferite, mentre funzionari thailandesi hanno affermato che 4 soldati
hanno perso la vita e 68 sono rimasti feriti.
Questa mattina, ha affermato l’esercito di Bangkok, le forze cambogiane hanno
lanciato razzi BM-21 nei pressi dell’ospedale Phanom Dong Rak, nel distretto di
Surin, costringendo i pazienti e il personale a evacuare. Inoltre droni, razzi
BM-21 e carri armati sono stati utilizzati in altri punti di confine, tra cui il
contestato tempio di Preah Vihear.
Secondo l’esercito di Phnom Penh, invece, la Thailandia ha utilizzato fuoco di
artiglieria e droni per lanciare attacchi nella provincia di Pursat, sparando
anche colpi di mortaio contro residenze civili nella provincia di Battambang .
Alcuni caccia F-16 thailandesi, poi, sarebbero entrati nello spazio aereo
cambogiano e hanno sganciato bombe vicino alle aree civili.
Dall’altra parte dell’oceano, Trump ha dichiarato di voler salvare il cessate il
fuoco raggiunto a luglio. “Mi dispiace dirlo, questa è una guerra tra Cambogia e
Thailandia, è iniziata oggi e domani dovrò fare una telefonata – ha detto ieri
il capo della Casa Bianca in un comizio in Pennsylvania -. Chi altri potrebbe
dire che farò una telefonata e fermerò una guerra tra due paesi molto potenti,
Thailandia e Cambogia?”. Se dalla Thailandia sembra esserci più scetticismo
sulla mediazione di negoziati, un importante consigliere del primo ministro
cambogiano ha dichiarato a Reuters che il suo paese è “pronto a parlare in
qualsiasi momento”.
L'articolo Thailandia-Cambogia, oltre 500mila evacuati dopo gli scontri al
confine. Trump: “Farò una telefonata per fermare la guerra” proviene da Il Fatto
Quotidiano.
Tag - Asia
Jamie Dettmer is opinion editor and a foreign affairs columnist at POLITICO
Europe.
“It must be a policy of the United States to support free peoples who are
resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure,”
said former U.S. President Harry Truman during a speech to Congress in 1947. The
Truman Doctrine, as this approach became known, saw the defense of democracy
abroad as of vital interest to the U.S. — but that’s not a view shared by
President Donald Trump and his acolytes.
If anyone had any doubts about this — or harbored any lingering hopes that Vice
President JD Vance was speaking out of turn when he launched a blistering attack
on Europe at the Munich Security Conference earlier this this year — then
Washington’s new National Security Strategy (NSS) should settle the matter.
All U.S. presidents release such a strategy early in their terms to outline
their foreign policy thinking and priorities, which in turn shapes how the
Pentagon’s budget is allocated. And with all 33 pages of this NSS, the world’s
despots have much to celebrate, while democrats have plenty to be anxious about
— especially in Europe.
Fleshing out what the Trump administration means by “America First,” the new
security strategy represents an emphatic break with Truman and the post-1945
order shaped by successive U.S. presidents. It is all about gaining a
mercantilist advantage, and its guiding principle is might is right.
Moving forward, Trump’s foreign policy won’t be “grounded in traditional,
political ideology” but guided by “what works for America.” And apparently what
works for America is to go easy on autocrats, whether theocratic or secular, and
to turn on traditional allies in a startling familial betrayal.
Of course, the hostility this NSS displays toward Europe shouldn’t come as a
surprise — Trump’s top aides have barely disguised their contempt for the EU,
while the president has said he believes the bloc was formed to “screw” the U.S.
But that doesn’t dull the sting.
Over the weekend, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas sought to present a brave
face despite the excoriating language the NSS reserves for European allies,
telling international leaders at the Doha Forum: “We haven’t always seen
eye-to-eye on different topics. But the overall principle is still there: We are
the biggest allies, and we should stick together.”
But other seasoned European hands recognize that this NSS marks a significant
departure from what has come before. “The only part of the world where the new
security strategy sees any threat to democracy seems to be Europe. Bizarre,”
said former Swedish Prime Minister and European Council on Foreign Relations
co-chair Carl Bildt.
He’s right. As Bildt noted, the NSS includes no mention, let alone criticism, of
the authoritarian behavior of the “axis of autocracy” — China, Russia, Iran and
North Korea. It also rejects interventionist approaches to autocracies or
cajoling them to adopt “democratic or other social change that differs widely
from their traditions and histories.”
For example, the 2017 NSS framed China as a systemic global challenger in very
hostile terms. “A geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions
of world order is taking place in the Indo-Pacific region,” that document noted.
But the latest version contains no such language amid clear signs that Trump
wants to deescalate tensions; the new paramount objective is to secure a
“mutually advantageous economic relationship.”
All should be well as long as China stays away from the Western Hemisphere,
which is the preserve of the U.S. — although it must also ditch any idea of
invading Taiwan. “Deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving
military overmatch, is a priority” the NSS reads.
Likewise, much to Moscow’s evident satisfaction, the document doesn’t even cast
Russia as an adversary — in stark contrast with the 2017 strategy, which
described it as a chief geopolitical rival. No wonder Kremlin spokesperson
Dmitry Peskov welcomed the NSS as a “positive step” and “largely consistent”
with Russia’s vision. “Overall, these messages certainly contrast with the
approaches of previous administrations,” he purred.
While Beijing and Moscow appear delighted with the NSS, the document reserves
its harshest language and sharpest barbs for America’s traditional allies in
Europe.
“The core problem of the European continent, according to the NSS, is a neglect
of ‘Western’ values (understood as nationalist conservative values) and a ‘loss
of national identities’ due to immigration and ‘cratering birthrates,’” noted
Liana Fix of the Council on Foreign Relations. “The alleged result is economic
stagnation, military weakness and civilizational erasure.”
The new strategy also lambasts America’s European allies for their alleged
“anti-democratic” practices,accusing them of censorship and suppressing
political opposition in a dilation of Vance’s Munich criticism. Ominously, the
NSS talks about cultivating resistance within European nations by endorsing
“patriotic” parties — a threat that caused much consternation when Vance made
it, but is now laid out as the administration’s official policy.
Regime change for Europe but not for autocracies is cause for great alarm. So
how will Europe react?
Flatter Trump as “daddy,” like NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte did in June?
Pretend the U.S. administration isn’t serious, and muddle through while
overlooking slights? Take the punishment and button up as it did over higher
tariffs? Or toughen up, and get serious about strategic autonomy?
Europe has once again been put on the spot to make some fundamental choices —
and quickly. But doing anything quickly isn’t Europe’s strong point. Admittedly,
that’s no easy task for a bloc that makes decisions by consensus in a process
designed to be agonizingly slow. Nor will it be an easy road at the national
level, with all 27 countries facing critical economic challenges and profound
political divisions that Washington has been seeking to roil. With the
assistance of Trump’s ideological bedfellows like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and
Slovakia’s Robert Fico, the impasse will only intensify in the coming months.
Trump 2.0 is clearly a disorienting step change from the president’s first term
— far more triumphalist, confident, uncompromisingly mercantilist; and
determined to ignore guardrails; and more revolutionary in how it implements its
“America First” agenda. The NSS just makes this clearer, and the howls of
disapproval from critics will merely embolden an administration that sees
protest as evidence it’s on the right track.
Europe’s leaders have had plenty of warnings, but apart from eye-rolling,
hand-wringing and wishful thinking they failed to agree on a plan. However,
trying to ride things out isn’t going to work this time around — and efforts to
foist a very unfavorable “peace” deal on Ukraine may finally the trigger the
great unraveling of the Western alliance.
The bloc’s options are stark, to be sure. Whether it kowtows or pushes back,
it’s going to cost Europe one way or another.
President Donald Trump intends for the U.S. to keep a bigger military presence
in the Western Hemisphere going forward to battle migration, drugs and the rise
of adversarial powers in the region, according to his new National Security
Strategy.
The 33-page document is a rare formal explanation of Trump’s foreign policy
worldview by his administration. Such strategies, which presidents typically
release once each term, can help shape how parts of the U.S. government allocate
budgets and set policy priorities.
The Trump National Security Strategy, which the White House quietly released
Thursday, has some brutal words for Europe, suggesting it is in civilizational
decline, and pays relatively little attention to the Middle East and Africa.
It has an unusually heavy focus on the Western Hemisphere that it casts as
largely about protecting the U.S. homeland. It says “border security is the
primary element of national security” and makes veiled references to China’s
efforts to gain footholds in America’s backyard.
“The United States must be preeminent in the Western Hemisphere as a condition
of our security and prosperity — a condition that allows us to assert ourselves
confidently where and when we need to in the region,” the document states. “The
terms of our alliances, and the terms upon which we provide any kind of aid,
must be contingent on winding down adversarial outside influence — from control
of military installations, ports, and key infrastructure to the purchase of
strategic assets broadly defined.”
The document describes such plans as part of a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe
Doctrine. The latter is the notion set forth by President James Monroe in 1823
that the U.S. will not tolerate malign foreign interference in its own
hemisphere.
Trump’s paper, as well as a partner document known as the National Defense
Strategy, have faced delays in part because of debates in the administration
over elements related to China. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent pushed for some
softening of the language about Beijing, according to two people familiar with
the matter who were granted anonymity to describe internal deliberations.
Bessent is currently involved in sensitive U.S. trade talks with China, and
Trump himself is wary of the delicate relations with Beijing.
The new National Security Strategy says the U.S. has to make challenging choices
in the global realm. “After the end of the Cold War, American foreign policy
elites convinced themselves that permanent American domination of the entire
world was in the best interests of our country. Yet the affairs of other
countries are our concern only if their activities directly threaten our
interests,” the document states.
In an introductory note to the strategy, Trump called it a “roadmap to ensure
that America remains the greatest and most successful nation in human history,
and the home of freedom on earth.”
But Trump is mercurial by nature, so it’s hard to predict how closely or how
long he will stick to the ideas laid out in the new strategy. A surprising
global event could redirect his thinking as well, as it has done for recent
presidents from George W. Bush to Joe Biden.
Still, the document appears in line with many of the moves he’s taken in his
second term, as well as the priorities of some of his aides.
That includes deploying significantly more U.S. military prowess to the Western
Hemisphere, taking numerous steps to reduce migration to America, pushing for a
stronger industrial base in the U.S. and promoting “Western identity,” including
in Europe.
The strategy even nods to so-called traditional values at times linked to the
Christian right, saying the administration wants “the restoration and
reinvigoration of American spiritual and cultural health” and “an America that
cherishes its past glories and its heroes.” It mentions the need to have
“growing numbers of strong, traditional families that raise healthy children.”
As POLITICO has reported before, the strategy spends an unusual amount of space
on Latin America, the Caribbean and other U.S. neighbors. That’s a break with
past administrations, who tended to prioritize other regions and other topics,
such as taking on major powers like Russia and China or fighting terrorism.
The Trump strategy suggests the president’s military buildup in the Western
Hemisphere is not a temporary phenomenon. (That buildup, which has
included controversial military strikes against boats allegedly carrying drugs,
has been cast by the administration as a way to fight cartels. But the
administration also hopes the buildup could help pressure Venezuelan leader
Nicolas Maduro to step down.)
The strategy also specifically calls for “a more suitable Coast Guard and Navy
presence to control sea lanes, to thwart illegal and other unwanted migration,
to reduce human and drug trafficking, and to control key transit routes in a
crisis.”
The strategy says the U.S. should enhance its relationships with governments in
Latin America, including working with them to identify strategic resources — an
apparent reference to materials such as rare earth minerals. It also declares
that the U.S. will partner more with the private sector to promote “strategic
acquisition and investment opportunities for American companies in the region.”
Such business-related pledges, at least on a generic level, could please many
Latin American governments who have long been frustrated by the lack of U.S.
attention to the region. It’s unclear how such promises square with Trump’s
insistence on imposing tariffs on America’s trade partners, however.
The National Security Strategy spends a fair amount of time on China, though it
often doesn’t mention Beijing directly. Many U.S. lawmakers — on a bipartisan
basis — consider an increasingly assertive China the gravest long-term threat to
America’s global power. But while the language the Trump strategy uses is tough,
it is careful and far from inflammatory.
The administration promises to “rebalance America’s economic relationship with
China, prioritizing reciprocity and fairness to restore American economic
independence.”
But it also says “trade with China should be balanced and focused on
non-sensitive factors” and even calls for “maintaining a genuinely mutually
advantageous economic relationship with Beijing.”
The strategy says the U.S. wants to prevent war in the Indo-Pacific — a nod to
growing tensions in the region, including between China and U.S. allies such as
Japan and the Philippines.
“We will also maintain our longstanding declaratory policy on Taiwan, meaning
that the United States does not support any unilateral change to the status quo
in the Taiwan Strait,” it states. That may come as a relief to Asia watchers who
worry Trump will back away from U.S. support for Taiwan as it faces ongoing
threats from China.
The document states that “it is a core interest of the United States to
negotiate an expeditious cessation of hostilities in Ukraine,” and to mitigate
the risk of Russian confrontation with other countries in Europe.
But overall it pulls punches when it comes to Russia — there’s very little
criticism of Moscow.
Instead, it reserves some of its harshest remarks for U.S.-allied nations in
Europe. In particular, the administration, in somewhat veiled terms, knocks
European efforts to rein in far-right parties, calling such moves political
censorship.
“The Trump administration finds itself at odds with European officials who hold
unrealistic expectations for the [Ukraine] war perched in unstable minority
governments, many of which trample on basic principles of democracy to suppress
opposition,” the strategy states.
The strategy also appears to suggest that migration will fundamentally change
European identity to a degree that could hurt U.S. alliances.
“Over the long term, it is more than plausible that within a few decades at the
latest, certain NATO members will become majority non-European,” it states. “As
such, it is an open question whether they will view their place in the world, or
their alliance with the United States, in the same way as those who signed the
NATO charter.”
Still, the document acknowledges Europe’s economic and other strengths, as well
as how America’s partnership with much of the continent has helped the U.S. “Not
only can we not afford to write Europe off — doing so would be self-defeating
for what this strategy aims to achieve,” it says.
“Our goal should be to help Europe correct its current trajectory,” it says.
Trump’s first-term National Security Strategy focused significantly on the U.S.
competition with Russia and China, but the president frequently undercut it by
trying to gain favor with the leaders of those nuclear powers.
If this new strategy proves a better reflection of what Trump himself actually
believes, it could help other parts of the U.S. government adjust, not to
mention foreign governments.
As Trump administration documents often do, the strategy devotes significant
space to praising the commander-in-chief. It describes him as the “President of
Peace” while favorably stating that he “uses unconventional diplomacy.”
The strategy struggles at times to tamp down what seem like inconsistencies. It
says the U.S. should have a high bar for foreign intervention, but it also says
it wants to “prevent the emergence of dominant adversaries.”
It also essentially dismisses the ambitions of many smaller countries. “The
outsized influence of larger, richer, and stronger nations is a timeless truth
of international relations,” the strategy states.
The National Security Strategy is the first of several important defense and
foreign policy papers the Trump administration is due to release. They include
the National Defense Strategy, whose basic thrust is expected to be similar.
Presidents’ early visions for what the National Security Strategy should mention
have at times had to be discarded due to events.
After the 9/11 attacks, George W. Bush’s first-term strategy ended up focusing
heavily on battling Islamist terrorism. Biden’s team spent much of its first
year working on a strategy that had to be rewritten after Russia moved toward a
full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
After more than three decades in the pharmaceutical industry, I know one thing:
science transforms lives, but policy determines whether innovation thrives or
stalls. That reality shapes outcomes for patients — and for Europe’s
competitiveness. Today, Europeans stand at a defining moment. The choices we
make now will determine whether Europe remains a global leader in life sciences
or we watch that leadership slip away.
It’s worth reminding ourselves of the true value of Europe’s life sciences
industry and the power we have as a united bloc to protect it as a European
good.
Europe has an illustrious track record in medical discovery, from the first
antibiotics to the discovery of DNA and today’s advanced biologics. Still today,
our region remains an engine of medical breakthroughs, powered by an
extraordinary ecosystem of innovators in the form of start-ups, small and
medium-sized enterprises, academic labs, and university hospitals. This strength
benefits patients through access to clinical trials and cutting-edge treatments.
It also makes life sciences a strategic pillar of Europe’s economy.
The economic stakes
Life sciences is not just another industry for Europe. It’s a growth engine, a
source of resilience and a driver of scientific sovereignty. The EU is already
home to some of the world’s most talented scientists, thriving academic
institutions and research clusters, and a social model built on universal access
to healthcare. These assets are powerful, yet they only translate into future
success if supported by a legislative environment that rewards innovation.
> Life sciences is not just another industry for Europe. It’s a growth engine, a
> source of resilience and a driver of scientific sovereignty.
This is also an industry that supports 2.3 million jobs and contributes over
€200 billion to the EU economy each year — more than any other sector. EU
pharmaceutical research and development spending grew from €27.8 billion in 2010
to €46.2 billion in 2022, an average annual increase of 4.4 percent. A success
story, yes — but one under pressure.
While Europe debates, others act
Over the past two decades, Europe has lost a quarter of its share of global
investment to other regions. This year — for the first time — China overtook
both the United States and Europe in the number of new molecules discovered.
China has doubled its share of industry sponsored clinical trials, while
Europe’s share has halved, leaving 60,000 European patients without the
opportunity to participate in trials of the next generation of treatments.
Why does this matter? Because every clinical trial site that moves elsewhere
means a patient in Europe waits longer for the next treatment — and an ecosystem
slowly loses competitiveness.
Policy determines whether innovation can take root. The United States and Asia
are streamlining regulation, accelerating approvals and attracting capital at
unprecedented scale. While Europe debates these matters, others act.
A world moving faster
And now, global dynamics are shifting in unprecedented ways. The United States’
administration’s renewed push for a Most Favored Nation drug pricing policy —
designed to tie domestic prices to the lowest paid in developed markets —
combined with the potential removal of long-standing tariff exemptions for
medicines exported from Europe, marks a historic turning point.
A fundamental reordering of the pharmaceutical landscape is underway. The
message is clear: innovation competitiveness is now a geopolitical priority.
Europe must treat it as such.
A once-in-a-generation reset
The timing couldn’t be better. As we speak, Europe is rewriting the
pharmaceutical legislation that will define the next 20 years of innovation.
This is a rare opportunity, but only if reforms strengthen, rather than weaken,
Europe’s ability to compete in life sciences.
To lead globally, Europe must make choices and act decisively. A triple A
framework — attract, accelerate, access — makes the priorities clear:
* Attract global investment by ensuring strong intellectual property
protection, predictable regulation and competitive incentives — the
foundations of a world-class innovation ecosystem.
* Accelerate the path from science to patients. Europe’s regulatory system must
match the speed of scientific progress, ensuring that breakthroughs reach
patients sooner.
* Ensure equitable and timely access for all European patients. No innovation
should remain inaccessible because of administrative delays or fragmented
decision-making across 27 systems.
These priorities reinforce each other, creating a virtuous cycle that
strengthens competitiveness, improves health outcomes and drives sustainable
growth.
> Europe has everything required to shape the future of medicine: world-class
> science, exceptional talent, a 500-million-strong market and one of the most
> sophisticated pharmaceutical manufacturing bases in the world.
Despite flat or declining public investment in new medicines across most member
states over the past 20 years, the research-based pharmaceutical industry has
stepped up, doubling its contributions to public pharmaceutical expenditure from
12 percent to 24 percent between 2018 and 2023. In effect, we have financed our
own innovation. No other sector has done this at such scale. But this model is
not sustainable. Pharmaceutical innovation must be treated not as a cost to
contain, but as a strategic investment in Europe’s future.
The choice before us
Europe has everything required to shape the future of medicine: world-class
science, exceptional talent, a 500-million-strong market and one of the most
sophisticated pharmaceutical manufacturing bases in the world.
What we need now is an ambition equal to those assets.
If we choose innovation, we secure Europe’s jobs, research and competitiveness —
and ensure European patients benefit first from the next generation of medical
breakthroughs. A wrong call will be felt for decades.
The next chapter for Europe is being written now. Let us choose the path that
keeps Europe leading, competing and innovating: for our economies, our societies
and, above all, our patients. Choose Europe.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disclaimer
POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT
* The sponsor is European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and
Associations (EFPIA)
* The ultimate controlling entity is European Federation of Pharmaceutical
Industries and Associations (EFPIA)
* The political advertisement is linked to the Critical Medicines Act.
More information here.
Elisabeth Braw is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, the author of the
award-winning “Goodbye Globalization” and a regular columnist for POLITICO.
Russia’s shadow fleet just won’t go away.
Countries in the Baltic Sea region have tried virtually every legal means of
stopping this gnawing headache for every country whose waters have been
traversed by these mostly dilapidated vessels — and yes, sinking them would be
illegal.
Now, these rust buckets are starting to cause an additional headache. Because
they’re usually past retirement age, these vessels don’t last long before they
need to be scrapped. This has opened a whole shadow trade that’s bound to cause
serious harm to both humans and the environment.
Earlier this month, the globally infamous Eagle S ship met its end in the
Turkish port of Aliağa. The bow of the 229-meter oil tanker was on shore, its
stern afloat, with cranes disassembling and moving its parts into a sealed area.
The negative environmental impact of this landing method “is no doubt higher
than recycling in a fully contained area,” noted the NGO Shipbreaking Platform
on its website.
But in the grand scheme of things, the Eagle S’s end was a relatively clean one.
The 19-year-old Cook Islands-flagged oil tanker is a shadow vessel that had been
transporting sanctioned Russian oil since early 2023. It then savaged an
astonishing five undersea cables in the Gulf of Finland on Christmas Day last
year, before being detained by the Finnish authorities.
People are willing to own shadow vessels because they can make a lot of money
transporting sanctioned cargo. However, as the tiny, elusive outfits that own
them would struggle to buy shiny new vessels even if they wanted to, these ships
are often on their last legs — different surveys estimate that shadow vessels
have an average age of 20 years or more.
Over the last few years, Russia’s embrace of the shadow fleet for its oil export
has caused the fleet to grow dramatically, as tanker owners concluded they can
make good money by selling their aging ships into the fleet. (They’d make less
selling the vessels to shipbreakers.) Today, the shadow fleet encompasses the
vast majority of retirement-age oil tankers. But after a few years, these
tankers and ships are simply too old to sail, especially since shadow vessels
undergo only the most cursory maintenance.
To get around safely rules, less-than-scrupulous owners often sell their nearly
dead ships to “final journey” firms, which have the sole purpose of disposing of
them. | Ole Berg-Rusten/EPA
For aged ships, the world of official shipping has what one might call a funeral
process: a scrapping market.
In 2024, 409 ships were scrapped through this official market, though calling it
“official” makes it sound clean and safe, which, for the most part, it isn’t. A
few of the ships scrapped last year were disassembled in countries like Denmark,
Norway and the Netherlands, which follow strict rules regarding human and
environmental safety. A handful of others were scrapped in Turkey, which has an
OK record. But two-thirds were scrapped in Southeast Asia, where the
shipbreaking industry is notoriously unsafe.
To get around safely rules, less-than-scrupulous owners often sell their nearly
dead ships to “final journey” firms, which have the sole purpose of disposing of
them. These companies and their middlemen then make money by selling the ships’
considerable amount of steel to metal companies. But in India, Pakistan and
Bangladesh — the latter is the world’s most popular shipbreaking country —
vessels are disassembled on beaches rather than sealed facilities, and by
workers using little more than their hands.
Of course, this makes the process cheap, but it also makes it dangerous.
According to the NGO Shipbreaking Platform, last year, 15 South Asian
shipbreaking workers lost their lives on the job and 45 were injured. Just one
accident involving an oil tanker claimed the lives of six workers and injured
another six.
This brings us to the shadow fleet and its old vessels, as they, too, need to be
scrapped. But many of them are under Western sanctions, which presents a
challenge to their owners since international financial transactions are
typically conducted in U.S. dollars.
Initially, I had suspected that coastal nations would start finding all manner
of shadow vessels abandoned in their waters and would be left having to arrange
the scrapping. But as owners want to make money from the ships’ metal, this
frightening scenario hasn’t come to pass. Instead, a shadow shipbreaking market
is emerging.
Open-source intelligence research shows that shadow vessel owners are now
selling their sanctioned vessels to final-journey firms or middlemen in a
process that mirror the official one. Given that these are mostly sanctioned
vessels, the buyers naturally get a discount, which the sellers are more than
willing to provide. After all, selling a larger shadow tanker for scrap value
and making something to the tune of $10 to $15 million is more profitable than
abandoning it.
And how are the payments made? We don’t know for sure, but they’re likely in
crypto or a non-U.S. dollar currency.
These shady processes make the situation even more perilous for the workers
doing the scrapping, not to mention for the environment. “Thanks to a string of
new rules and regulations over the past five decades, shipping has become much
safer, and that has reduced the number of accidents significantly in recent
decades,” explained Mats Saether, a lawyer at the Nordisk legal services
association in Oslo. “It’s regrettable that the shadow fleet is reversing this
trend.” It certainly is.
Indeed, the scrapping of shadow vessels is a practice that demands serious
scrutiny. Greenpeace, Human Rights Watch and other NGOs could do a good deed for
the environment and unfortunate shipbreaking workers by conducting
investigations. And surely the Bangladeshi government wouldn’t want to see
Bangladeshi lives lost because Russia needs oil for war?
Greenpeace, Human Rights Watch and other NGOs could do a good deed for the
environment and unfortunate shipbreaking workers by conducting investigations. |
Ole Berg-Rusten/EPA
There’s an opportunity here for Western governments to help too. They could
offer shadow vessel owners legal leniency and a way to sell their ships back
into the official fleet — if the owners provide the authorities with details
about the fleet’s inner workings and vow to leave the business.
Does that sound unlikely to succeed? Possibly. But that’s what people said about
Italy’s pentiti system, and they were proven wrong. Besides, the shadow fleet is
such a tumor on the shipping industry and the world’s waterways that almost any
measure is worth a try.
President Donald Trump has yet to follow through on his threat to impose an
additional 10 percent tariff on Canadian imports, four weeks after he halted
“all trade negotiations” over an anti-tariff ad the province of Ontario ran
during the Major League Baseball World Series.
“Because of their serious misrepresentation of the facts, and hostile act, I am
increasing the Tariff on Canada by 10% over and above what they are paying now,”
Trump wrote on Truth Social on Oct. 25, after announcing two days earlier that
he was terminating trade talks over the the ”egregious” ad.
Trump’s announcement had Canadian exporters preparing for a worst-case scenario:
a sweeping levy layered on top of existing double-digit duties, which would have
been particularly painful for industries like autos, where components cross the
border multiple times before reaching their final form.
But to date, the Trump administration hasn’t sent any official documentation
ordering U.S. Customs and Border Protection to enforce the new, higher duty, and
U.S. importers have not received any new regulatory guidance.
“We monitor the federal registry and follow executive order activity on a
regular basis and haven’t seen any changes,” said Flavio Volpe, the president of
Canada’s Automotive Parts Manufacturers’ Association, which controls over 90
percent of independent parts production in Canada.
The White House did not say whether it still plans to impose the tariff when
asked for comment. But a separate U.S. official suggested the Trump
administration had opted to hold off on additional duties — which would have
sent tariffs on Canadian goods to 45 percent — and instead continue to dangle
the threat as the two sides gear up for future talks.
“The Canadians know what’s on the table,” said the official, granted anonymity
to discuss private conversations.
Volpe said a personal intervention by Carney in Asia last month may have helped
matters, too. “We understand that the prime minister spoke with the president
directly about the ads, it may very well be that they settled the matter between
them,” he said.
Trump told reporters he had “a very nice” conversation with Carney while the two
leaders were in Gyeongju, South Korea, in late October for the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation summit, and that Carney “apologized for what they did with
the commercial.” Carney later confirmed the apology and said he had told Ontario
Premier Doug Ford not to air the ad, in the first place.
The spot, which the province spent about $53 million to air during the Toronto
Blue Jays’ playoff run, stitched together portions of a 1987 Reagan radio
address about the harms of tariffs — a move the Trump administration has seized
on to argue the ad misrepresented the former president’s stance.
“Canada was caught, red handed, putting up a fraudulent advertisement on Ronald
Reagan’s Speech on Tariffs,” Trump complained in the Oct. 25 post. “Their
Advertisement was to be taken down, IMMEDIATELY, but they let it run last night
during the World Series, knowing that it was a FRAUD.”
The Ontario government stopped airing the ad soon after.
Speaking to Canadian business leaders in Ottawa on Wednesday, U.S. Ambassador to
Canada Pete Hoekstra continued to blast the Ontario ad. “You do not come into
America and start running political ads, government-funded political ads, and
expect no consequences or reaction from the United States of America and the
Trump administration,” Hoekstra said during remarks at the 2025 National
Manufacturing Conference.
Hoekstra said trade talks with Canada will restart eventually, but warned “it’s
not going to be easy.” He did not mention the additional 10 percent tariff and
whether it was still in the works.
One Canadian official told POLITICO they have not received any documentation
from the administration related to the additional tariff.
The U.S. and Canada have a free trade agreement under a deal Trump negotiated
during his first term. But the president still hiked tariffs on Canadian imports
earlier this year, citing the country’s supposed role in the flow of fentanyl
into the United States, and also hit the North American neighbor and other
countries with double-digit duties on various sectors including steel, aluminum,
autos and lumber. The administration, however, has exempted shipments that meet
the terms of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement — the trade deal the
president negotiated in his first term — which covers the vast majority of goods
now being exported from Canada to the U.S.
Carney and Trump projected optimism about the state of talks to lower those
duties when the prime minister visited the White House in October. But
administration officials have privately complained that Carney’s government is
slow-walking the negotiations and refusing to make concessions. The White House
has taken particular umbrage at Canadian efforts to secure exemptions from the
U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs.
Canada U.S. Trade Minister Dominic LeBlanc told reporters in Montreal last week
he’s willing to go back to the negotiating table when Trump is ready, in order
to get a deal that’s good for both Canadian and American workers.
“We remain ready and willing to do that work, but we’re not going to wait around
and look at our phones and turn up the notifications to make sure we don’t miss
a ding because somebody sent us a text message at 9:30 at night,” LeBlanc said.
Businesses from Wall Street to main street are struggling to comply with
President Donald Trump’s byzantine tariff regime, driving up costs and
counteracting, for some, the benefits of the corporate tax cuts Republicans
passed earlier this year.
Trump has ripped up the U.S. tariff code over the past year, replacing a
decades-old system that imposed the same tariffs on imports from all but a few
countries with a vastly more complicated system of many different tariff rates
depending on the origin of imported goods.
To give an example, an industrial product that faced a mostly uniform 5 percent
tariff rate in the past could now be taxed at 15 percent if it comes from the EU
or Japan, 20 percent from Norway and many African countries, 24 to 25 percent
from countries in Southeast Asia and upwards of 50 percent from India, Brazil or
China.
“This has been an exhausting year, I’d say, for most CEOs in the country,” said
Gary Shapiro, CEO and vice chair of the Consumer Technology Association, an
industry group whose 1,300 member companies include major brands like Amazon,
Walmart and AMD, as well as many small businesses and startups. “The level of
executive time that’s been put in this has been enormous. So instead of focusing
on innovation, they’re focusing on how they deal with the tariffs.”
Upping the pressure, the Justice Department has announced that it intends to
make the prosecution of customs fraud one of its top priorities.
The proliferation of trade regulations and threat of intensified enforcement has
driven many companies to beef up their staff and spend what could add up to tens
of millions of dollars to ensure they are not running afoul of Trump’s
requirements.
The time and expense involved, combined with the tens of billions of dollars in
higher tariffs that companies are paying each month to import goods, amount to a
massive burden that is weighing down industries traditionally reliant on
imported products. And it’s denting, for some, the impact of the hundreds of
billions of dollars of tax cuts that companies will receive over the next decade
via the One Big Beautiful Bill Act championed by the White House.
“Every CEO survey says this is their biggest issue,” said Shapiro.
A recent survey by KPMG, a professional services firm, found 89 percent of CEOs
said they expect tariffs to significantly impact their business’ performance and
operations over the next three years, with 86 percent saying they expect to
respond by increasing prices for their goods and services as needed.
Maytee Pereira, managing director for customs and international trade at
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, another professional services firm, has seen a similar
trend. “Many of our clients have been spending easily 30 to 60 percent of their
time having tariff conversations across the organization,” Pereira said.
That’s forced CEOs to get involved in import-sourcing decisions to an
unprecedented degree and intensified competition for personnel trained in
customs matters.
“There’s a real dearth of trade professionals,” Pereira said. “There isn’t a day
that I don’t speak to a client who has lost people from their trade teams,
because there is this renewed need for individuals with those resources, with
those skill sets.”
But the impact goes far beyond a strain on personnel into reducing the amount of
money that companies are willing to spend on purchasing new capital equipment or
making other investments to boost their long-term growth.
“People are saying they can’t put money into R&D,” said one industry official,
who was granted anonymity because of the risk of antagonizing the Trump
administration. “They can’t put money into siting new factories in the United
States. They don’t have the certainty they need to make decisions.”
A White House spokesperson did not respond to a request for comment. However,
the administration has previously defended tariffs as key to boosting domestic
manufacturing, along with their overall economic agenda of tax cuts and reduced
regulation.
They’ve also touted commitments from companies and other countries for massive
new investments in the U.S. in order to avoid tariffs, although they’ve
acknowledged it will take time for the benefits to reach workers and consumers.
“Look, I would have loved to be able to snap my fingers, have these facilities
going. It takes time,” Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said in an interview
this week on Fox News. “I think 2026 is going to be a blockbuster year.”
For some companies, however, any benefit they’ve received from Trump’s push to
lower taxes and reduce regulations has been substantially eroded by the new
burden of complying with his complicated tariff system, said a second industry
official, who was also granted anonymity for the same reason.
“It is incredibly complex,” that second industry official said. “And it keeps
changing, too.”
Matthew Aleshire, director of the Milken Institute’s Geo-Economics Initiative,
said he did not know of any studies yet that estimate the overall cost, both in
time and money, for American businesses to comply with Trump’s new trade
regulations. But it appears substantial.
“I think for some firms and investors, it may be on par with the challenges
experienced in the early days of Covid. For others, maybe a little less so. And
for others, it may be even more complex. But it’s absolutely eating up or taking
a lot of time and bandwidth,” Aleshire said.
The nonpartisan think tank’s new report, “Unintended Consequences: Trade and
Supply Chain Leaders Respond to Recent Turmoil,” is the first in a new series
exploring how companies are navigating the evolving trade landscape, he said.
One of the main findings is that it has become very difficult for companies to
make decisions, “given the high degree of uncertainty” around tariff policy,
Aleshire said.
Trump’s “reciprocal” tariffs — imposed on most countries under a 1977 emergency
powers act that is now being challenged in court — start at a baseline level of
10 percent that applies to roughly 100 trading partners. He’s set higher rates,
ranging from 15 to 41 percent, on nearly 100 others, including the 27-member
European Union. Those duties stack on top of the longstanding U.S. “most-favored
nation” tariffs.
Two notable exceptions are the EU and Japan, which received special treatment in
their deals with Trump.
Companies also could get hit with a 40 percent penalty tariff if the Trump
administration determines an item from a high-tariffed country has been
illegally shipped through a third country — or assembled there — to obtain a
lower tariff rate. However, businesses are still waiting for more details on how
that so-called transshipment provision, which the Trump administration outlined
in a summer executive order, will work.
The president also has hit China, Canada and Mexico with a separate set of
tariffs under the 1977 emergency law to pressure those countries to do more to
stop shipments of fentanyl and precursor chemicals from entering the United
States.
Imports from Canada and Mexico are exempt from the fentanyl duties, however, if
they comply with the terms of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, a trade pact
Trump brokered in his first term. That has spared most goods the U.S. imports
from its North American neighbors, but also has forced many more companies to
spend time filling out paperwork to document their compliance.
Trump’s increasingly baroque tariff regime also includes the “national security”
duties he has imposed on steel, aluminum, autos, auto parts, copper, lumber,
furniture and heavy trucks under a separate trade law.
But the administration has provided a partial exemption for the 25 percent
tariffs he has imposed on autos and auto parts, and has struck deals with the
EU, Japan and South Korea reducing the tariff on their autos to 15 percent.
In contrast, Trump has taken a hard line against exemptions from his 50 percent
tariffs on steel and aluminum, and recently expanded the duties to cover more
than 400 “derivative” products, such as chemicals, plastics and furniture, that
contain some amount of steel and aluminum or are shipped in steel and aluminum
containers.
And the administration is not stopping there, putting out a request in
September for further items it can add to the steel and aluminum tariffs.
“This is requiring companies that do not even produce steel and aluminum
products to keep track of and report what might be in the products that they’re
importing, and it’s just gotten incredibly complicated,” one of the industry
officials granted anonymity said.
That’s because companies need to precisely document the amount of steel or
aluminum used in a product to qualify for a tariff rate below 50 percent.
“Any wrong step, like any incorrect information, or even delay in providing the
information, risks the 50 percent tariff value on the entire product, not just
on the metal. So the consequence is really high if you don’t get it right,” the
industry official said.
The administration has also signaled plans to similarly expand tariffs for other
products, such as copper.
And the still unknown outcomes of ongoing trade investigations that could lead
to additional tariffs on pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, critical minerals,
commercial aircraft, polysilicon, unmanned aircraft systems, wind turbines,
medical products and robotics and industrial machinery continue to make it
difficult for many companies to plan for the future.
Small business owners say they feel particularly overwhelmed trying to keep up
with all the various tariff rules and rates.
“We are no longer investing into product innovation, we’re not investing into
new hires, we’re not investing into growth. We’re just spending our money trying
to stay afloat through this,” said Cassie Abel, founder and CEO of Wild Rye, an
Idaho company which sells outdoor clothing for women, during a virtual press
conference with a coalition of other small business owners critical of the
tariffs.
Company employees have also “spent hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of hours
counter-sourcing product, pausing production, restarting production, rushing
production, running price analysis, cost analysis, shipping analysis,” Abel
said. “I spent zero minutes on tariffs before this administration.”
In one sign of the duress small businesses are facing, they have led the charge
in the Supreme Court case challenging Trump’s use of the 1977 International
Emergency Economic Powers Act to impose both the reciprocal and the
fentanyl-related tariffs.
Crutchfield Corp., a family-owned electronics retailer based in Charlottesville,
Virginia, filed a “friend of the court” brief supporting the litigants in the
case, in which the owners detailed its difficulties in coping with Trump’s
erratic tariff actions.
“If tariffs can be imposed, increased, decreased, suspended or altered … through
the changing whim of a single person, then Crutchfield cannot plan for the short
term, let alone the long run,” the company wrote in its brief, asking “the Court
to quell the chaos.”
BELÉM, Brazil — Germany is scrambling to solve a diplomatic dispute between
Australia and Turkey for fear it becomes the default host of next year’s UN
climate talks.
Turkey and Australia remain deadlocked, with both adamant they want to host the
annual conference in 2026.
Intense diplomacy is happening on the margins of this year’s edition, a two-week
summit that began Monday in Brazil. If no resolution is found, Germany, as host
of the UN climate organization, is obligated to step in under the rules of the
treaty.
“We would have to, but we do not want to,” said German State Secretary in the
Environment Ministry Jochen Flasbarth on Monday. He said preparing a host site
within 12 months of the talks would stretch Germany’s rigid bureaucracy.
“These are not easy things to do. Germany needs more time for a conference.
That’s why all the signals we’re sending out are, for heaven’s sake, get
Australia and Turkey to agree so that this technical solution doesn’t come into
play,” he said.
German representatives have approached British officials in recent days to seek
their help to resolve the standoff between Ankara and Canberra, according to one
person with direct knowledge of the talks and one person briefed on their
nature.
Both were granted anonymity to disclose details of confidential conversations.
The relevant German and U.K. departments said no such approach was made.
According to one of the people, Germany has also told the UN climate secretariat
it does not want to host the conference. The UN body declined to comment.
The UN secretariat is housed in the former West German capital Bonn, which
played host to talks in 1999 and 2017. If the conference defaults there, Germany
would host. However, the presidency and running of the talks would technically
remain with the current hosts, Brazil.
Flasbarth said Germany could host UN talks with more notice. “We would have no
concerns whatsoever about hosting a conference, but it would have to be part of
an orderly process and not a stopgap measure.”
The location of the talks rotates through five groups of countries. Turkey,
Germany, the U.K. and Australia are all in the same group, which needs to arrive
at a decision by consensus. Australia’s bid, which is being made in conjunction
with Pacific island nations, has been publicly supported by Germany, France and
the U.K.
Britain has found itself embroiled in the standoff because Turkish diplomats
insist the U.K. promised to support their bid for the 2026 talks, known as
COP31, in return for Turkey dropping its attempts to host the 2021 version,
POLITICO earlier reported. The conference was held in Glasgow after Turkey
abandoned its bid in return for several diplomatic favors.
“We would have to, but we do not want to,” said German State Secretary in the
Environment Ministry Jochen Flasbarth on Monday. | Thierry Monasse/Picture
Alliance via Getty Images
Ankara insists Britain has broken its promise by backing the Australians.
British diplomats insist the U.K. only ever agreed to consider the bid.
This week, German officials queried whether Britain could make a peace offering
to Turkey that might convince them to allow Australia to host COP31 in the South
Australian city of Adelaide.
Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese wrote to Turkish President Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan offering to allow the Turks to host the section of the talks
reserved for world leaders’ speeches, said the two people familiar with the
discussions, who said Erdoğan had not responded.
Albanese’s office did not respond to a request to comment. The Turkish
government similarly did not respond.
The demands from Turkey fit a pattern, said Richie Merzian, a former Australian
climate diplomat, now CEO of the Melbourne-based Clean Energy Investor Group.
Turkey’s ability to veto decisions in the UN group of wealthy potential host
nations has given it the power to bid for talks and gain concessions from rival
hosts.
“Their sole interest is their self-interest, which is always just to push for
more finance from their end,” Merzian said, also noting that western Asia has
hosted two of the past three climate talks in Azerbaijan and the United Arab
Emirates. “The last thing the world needs is another COP in that corner of the
world that doesn’t actually go anywhere.”
Merzian said he expected the issue to be resolved in the final days of the
conference currently underway in Brazil.
Due to the standoff, whichever country hosts the 2026 conference will have
limited time to prepare. This potentially hampers efforts to lay diplomatic
groundwork for talks required to confront shortfalls in funding and policy that
have left the world far off track from addressing climate change.
The Chinese government has agreed to resume exports of key chips for the
European auto sector, according to Dutch Prime Minister Dick Schoof.
“We were informed by China that they will enable the resumption of supplies from
Chinese factories from Nexperia,” Schoof told Bloomberg Friday on the sidelines
of the COP30 climate summit in Brazil.
The crisis was sparked in October when the Netherlands seized control of the
Dutch-based chipmaker, a subsidiary of Chinese chip giant Wingtech, prompting
Beijing to impose retaliatory export restrictions.
Schoof told the newswire that the resolution was the result of cooperation
between the Netherlands, Germany and the European Commission, as well as recent
Dutch-Chinese diplomatic talks, alongside a trade detente between the U.S. and
China.
German auto firm Aumovio disclosed on an earnings call on Friday that it had
been informed that it had received the necessary permissions to begin importing
Nexperia’s chips.
President Donald Trump is no longer content to stand aloof from the global
alliance trying to combat climate change. His new goal is to demolish it — and
replace it with a new coalition reliant on U.S. fossil fuels.
Trump’s increasingly assertive energy diplomacy is one of the biggest challenges
awaiting the world leaders, diplomats and business luminaries gathering for a
United Nations summit in Brazil to try to advance the fight against global
warming. The U.S. president will not be there — unlike the leaders of countries
including France, Germany and the United Kingdom, who will speak before
delegates from nearly 200 nations on Thursday and Friday. But his efforts to
undermine the Paris climate agreement already loom over the talks, as does his
initial success in drawing support from other countries.
“It’s not enough to just withdraw from” the 2015 pact and the broader U.N.
climate framework that governs the annual talks, said Richard Goldberg, who
worked as a top staffer on Trump’s White House National Energy Dominance Council
and is now senior adviser to the think tank Foundation for Defense of
Democracies. “You have to degrade it. You have to deter it. You have to
potentially destroy it.”
Trump’s approach includes striking deals demanding that Japan, Europe and other
trading partners buy more U.S. natural gas and oil, using diplomatic
strong-arming to deter foreign leaders from cutting fossil fuel pollution,
and making the United States inhospitable to clean energy investment.
Unlike during his first term, when Trump pulled out of the Paris Agreement but
sent delegates to the annual U.N. climate talks anyway, he now wants to render
them ineffective and starved of purpose by drawing as many other countries as
possible away from their own clean energy goals, according to Cabinet officials’
public remarks and interviews with 20 administration allies and alumni, foreign
diplomats and veterans of the annual climate negotiations.
Those efforts are at odds with the goals of the climate summits, which included
a Biden administration-backed pledge two years ago for the world to transition
away from fossil fuels. Slowing or reversing that shift could send global
temperatures soaring above the goals set in Paris a decade ago, threatening a
spike in the extreme weather that is already pummeling countries and economies.
The White House says Trump’s campaign to unleash American oil, gas and coal is
for the United States’ benefit — and the world’s.
“The Green New Scam would have killed America if President Trump had not been
elected to implement his commonsense energy agenda — which is focused on
utilizing the liquid gold under our feet to strengthen our grid stability and
drive down costs for American families and businesses,” White House spokesperson
Taylor Rogers said in a statement. “President Trump will not jeopardize our
country’s economic and national security to pursue vague climate goals that are
killing other countries.”
‘WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE PARIS AGREEMENT DIE’
The Trump administration is declining to send any high-level representatives to
the COP30 climate talks, which will formally begin Monday in Belém, Brazil,
according to a White House official who declined to comment on the record about
whether any U.S. government officials would participate.
Trump’s view that the annual negotiations are antithetical to his energy and
economic agenda is also spreading among other Republican officials. Many GOP
leaders, including 17 state attorneys general, argued last month that attending
the summit would only legitimize the proceedings and its expected calls for
ditching fossil fuels more swiftly.
Climate diplomats from other countries say they’ve gotten the message about
where the U.S. stands now — and are prepared to act without Washington.
“We have a large country, a president, and a vice president who would like to
see the Paris Agreement die,” Laurence Tubiana, the former French government
official credited as a key architect of the 2015 climate pact, said of the
United States.
“The U.S. will not play a major role” at the summit, said Jochen Flasbarth,
undersecretary in the German Ministry of Environmental Affairs. “The world is
collectively outraged, and so we will focus — as will everyone else — on
engaging in talks with those who are driving the process forward.”
Trump and his allies have described the stakes in terms of a zero-sum contest
between the United States and its main economic rival, China: Efforts to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions, they say, are a complete win for China, which sells
the bulk of the world’s solar, wind, battery and electric vehicle technology.
That’s a contrast from the approach of former President Joe Biden, who pushed a
massive U.S. investment in green technologies as the only way for America to
outcompete China in developing the energy sources of the future. In the Trump
worldview, stalling that energy transition benefits the United States, the
globe’s top producer of oil and natural gas, along with many of the technologies
and services to produce, transport and burn the stuff.
“If [other countries] don’t rely on this technology, then that’s less power to
China,” said Diana Furchtgott-Roth, who served in the U.S. Transportation
Department during Trump’s first term and is now director of the Center for
Energy, Climate and Environment at the conservative think tank the Heritage
Foundation.
TRUMP FINDS ALLIES THIS TIME
Two big developments have shaped the president’s new thinking on how to
counteract the international fight against climate change, said George David
Banks, who was Trump’s international climate adviser during the first
administration.
The first was the Inflation Reduction Act that Democrats passed and Biden signed
in 2022, which promised hundreds of billions of dollars to U.S. clean energy
projects. Banks said the legislation, enacted entirely on partisan lines, made
renewable energy a political target in the minds of Trump and his fossil-fuel
backers.
The second is Trump’s aggressive use of U.S. trading power during his second
term to wring concessions from foreign governments, Banks said. Trump has
required his agencies to identify obstacles for U.S. exports, and the United
Nations’ climate apparatus may be deemed a barrier for sales of oil, gas and
coal.
Trump’s strategy is resonating with some fossil fuel-supporting nations,
potentially testing the climate change comity at COP30. Those include emerging
economies in Africa and Latin America, petrostates such as Saudi Arabia, and
European nations feeling a cost-of-living strain that is feeding a resurgent
right wing.
U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright drew applause in March at a Washington
gathering called the Powering Africa Summit, where he called it “nonsense” for
financiers and Western nations to vilify coal-fired power. He also asserted that
U.S. natural gas exports could supply African and Asian nations with more of
their electricity.
Wright cast the goal of achieving net-zero greenhouse gas pollution by 2050 —
the target dozens of nations have embraced — as “sinister,” contending it
consigns developing nations to poverty and lower living standards.
The U.S. about-face was welcome, Sierra Leone mining and minerals minister
Julius Daniel Mattai said during the conference. Western nations had kneecapped
financing for offshore oil investments and worked to undercut public backing for
fossil fuel projects, Mattai said, criticizing Biden’s administration for only
being interested in renewable energy.
But now Trump has created room for nations to use their own resources, Mattai
said.
“With the new administration having such a massive appetite for all sorts of
energy mixes, including oil and gas, we do believe there’s an opportunity to
explore our offshore oil investments,” he said in an interview.
TURNING UP THE HEAT ON TRADING PARTNERS
Still, Banks acknowledged that Trump probably can’t halt the spread of clean
energy. Fossil fuels may continue to supply energy in emerging economies for
some time, he said, but the private sector remains committed to clean energy to
meet the U.N.’s goals of curbing climate change.
That doesn’t mean Trump won’t try.
The administration’s intent to pressure foreign leaders into a more
fossil-fuel-friendly stance was on full display last month at a London meeting
of the U.N.’s International Maritime Organization where U.S. Cabinet secretaries
and diplomats succeeded in thwarting a proposed carbon emissions tax on global
shipping.
That coup followed a similar push against Beijing a month earlier, when Mexico —
the world’s biggest buyer of Chinese cars — slapped a 50 percent tariff on
automotive imports from China after pressure from the Trump administration.
China accused the U.S. of “coercion.”
Trump’s attempt to flood global markets with ever growing amounts of U.S. fossil
fuels is even more ambitious, though so far incomplete.
The EU and Japan — under threat of tariffs — have promised to spend hundreds of
billions of dollars on U.S. energy products. But so far, new and binding
contracts have not appeared.
Trump has also tried to push China, Japan and South Korea to invest in a $44
billion liquefied natural gas project in Alaska, so far to no avail.
In the face of potential tariffs and other U.S. pressure, European ministers and
diplomats are selling the message that victory at COP30 might simply come in the
form of presenting a united front in favor of climate action. That could mean
joining with other major economies such as China and India, and forming common
cause with smaller, more vulnerable countries, to show that Trump is isolated.
“I’m sure the EU and China will find themselves on opposite sides of many
debates,” said the EU’s lead climate negotiator, Jacob Werksman. “But we have
ways of working with them. … We are both betting heavily on the green
transition.”
Avoiding a faceplant may actually be easier if the Trump administration does
decide to turn up in Brazil, said Li Shuo, the director of China Climate Hub at
the Asia Society Policy Institute in Washington.
“If the U.S. is there and active, I’d expect the rest of the world, including
the EU and China, to rest aside their rhetorical games in front of a larger
challenge,” Li wrote via text.
And for countries attending COP, there is still some hope of a long-term win.
Solar, wind, geothermal and other clean energy investments are continuing apace,
even if Trump and the undercurrents that led to his reelection have hindered
them, said Nigel Purvis, CEO of climate consulting firm Climate Advisers and a
former State Department climate official.
Trump’s attempts to kill the shipping fee, EU methane pollution rules and
Europe’s corporate sustainability framework are one thing, Purvis said. But when
it comes to avoiding Trump’s retribution, there is “safety in numbers” for the
rest of the world that remains in the Paris Agreement, he added. And even if the
progress is slower than originally hoped, those nations have committed to
shifting their energy systems off fossil fuels.
“We’re having slower climate action than otherwise would be the case. But we’re
really talking about whether Trump is going to be able to blow up the regime,”
Purvis said. “And I think the answer is ‘No.’”
Nicolas Camut in Paris, Zia Weise in Brussels and Josh Groeneveld in Berlin
contributed to this report.