DUBLIN — Neutral and poorly armed Ireland — long viewed as “Europe’s blind spot” — announced Thursday it will spend €1.7 billion on improved military equipment, capabilities and facilities to deter drones and potential Russian sabotage of undersea cables. The five-year plan, published as Defense Minister Helen McEntee visited the Curragh army base near Dublin,  aims in part to reassure European allies that their leaders will be safe from attack when Ireland — a non-NATO member largely dependent on neighboring Britain for its security — hosts key EU summits in the second half of next year. McEntee said Ireland intends to buy and deploy €19 million in counter-drone technology “as soon as possible, not least because of the upcoming European presidency.” Ireland’s higher military spending — representing a 55 percent increase from previous commitments — comes barely a week after a visit by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy exposed Ireland’s inability to secure its own seas and skies. Five unmarked drones buzzed an Irish naval vessel supposed to be guarding the flight path of Zelenskyy’s plane shortly after the Ukrainian leader touched down at Dublin Airport. The Irish ship didn’t fire at the drones, which eventually disappeared. Irish authorities have been unable to identify their source, but suspect that they were operated from an unidentified ship later spotted in European Space Agency satellite footage. The Russian embassy in Dublin denied any involvement. Ireland’s navy has just eight ships, but sufficient crews to operate only two at a time, even though the country has vast territorial waters containing critical undersea infrastructure and pipelines that supply three-fourths of Ireland’s natural gas. The country has no fighter jets and no military-grade radar and sonar. Some but not all of those critical gaps will be plugged by 2028, McEntee pledged. She said Ireland would roll out military-grade radar starting next year, buy sonar systems for the navy, and acquire up to a dozen helicopters, including four already ordered from Airbus. The army would upgrade its Swiss-made fleet of 80 Piranha III armored vehicles and develop drone and anti-drone units. The air force’s fixed-wing aircraft will be replaced by 2030 — probably by what would be Ireland’s first wing of combat fighters. Thursday’s announcement coincided with publication of an independent assessment of Ireland’s rising security vulnerabilities on land, sea and air. The report, coauthored by the Dublin-based think tank IIEA and analysts at Deloitte, found that U.S. multinationals operating in Ireland were at risk of cyberattacks and espionage by Russian, Chinese and Indian intelligence agents operating in the country.

Eoin Drea is senior research officer at the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies. Catherine Connolly’s election as Ireland’s next president highlights just how delusional the country has become when it comes to security. It should also serve as a wake-up call for other EU members in terms of the country’s unreliability on defense issues. Opposing Germany’s rearmament on the basis that it represents a “revitalization” of its “military industrial base” isn’t even Connolly’s most extreme position. To her, Berlin’s current spending plans are reminiscent of the military build-up in the 1930s. She’s critical of NATO, voted no to the Lisbon and Nice treaties in Irish referenda and has called Hamas “part of the fabric of the Palestinian people.” Yet, she romped home with nearly 65 percent of the vote. That’s because Connolly’s views aren’t fringe or some populist narrative — they actually represent mainstream political sentiment on the Emerald Isle. As the EU starts focusing on rearmament, Ireland’s traveling in the exact opposite direction. Even with war raging in Ukraine, America’s growing unpredictability and Russia probing undersea infrastructure in Irish waters, Dublin’s political culture remains mired in myths of neutrality and moral exceptionalism — and it is refusing to budge. This approach is no longer credible in Brussels. And it’s why only a defense union with Britain can save Ireland now. Despite bumper budget surpluses underpinned by surging receipts from U.S. tech and pharma companies, Ireland is refusing to spend more on its armed forces. The country’s defense spending has barely risen above inflation since 2022. It’s capital budget for defense stands at a paltry €300 million for 2026 — and this is in an EU country with no fighter jets, navy ships with sporadically working guns and only enough sailors to send a single vessel on patrol per day. Dublin has demonstrably failed to seize the geopolitical moment, and is instead being scarily naïve. And given the circumstances, only a formal bilateral agreement with the U.K. can deliver the territorial security that Ireland — and the EU’s western borders — desperately needs. This is realpolitik, not Celtic sentimentality. The case for a defense union rests on two inconvenient but undeniable truths. First, geography — not history — is destiny. Ireland and Britain share an island archipelago, as well as a free travel area. Despite Brexit, there remains no physical border between Southern and Northern Ireland. And the country has long prioritized maintaining its common travel zone with Britain over potentially joining the EU’s Schengen area. The current reality is that British jets already respond to threats in Irish airspace with the Irish government’s approval, and it’s the British Navy that hunts Russian threats in Irish waters. But Irish sovereignty would be better protected through structured partnership — one along the lines of the Belgian and Dutch naval forces — than through the kind of cheapskate dependence that currently exists. Second, the U.K. has what Ireland simply refuses to provide: fighters, frigates, satellites, cyber infrastructure and institutional depth. France and Germany lack both proximity and capability to consistently patrol the Irish Sea and North Atlantic. Continental European forces can’t scramble from nearby airfields or deploy from Ireland-adjacent ports on short notice. Catherine Connolly romped home with nearly 65 percent of the vote. | Niall Carson/PA Images via Getty Images The framework I’m talking about is rather simple: Joint Anglo-Irish responsibility for air policing and maritime surveillance in Irish zones, with Irish participation in joint command, training and procurement mechanisms. Ireland would also invest in complementary capabilities like patrol vessels, intelligence, cyber defense and infrastructure protection. And no Ireland-based British bases would be necessary; forward deployment and joint operation centers would suffice. Speaking more broadly, a formal Anglo-Irish agreement would also embed Britain in EU defense policy. A key objective in Brussels, considering the ongoing war in Ukraine and the uncertainty over future U.S. support. Such a union would intertwine the security objectives of London, Washington and the EU, and could also be narrowly tailored to placate the perennially disgruntled French. No foreign adventures. No NATO. Just credible security capabilities in Irish waters and skies. Ireland has long prided itself on being one of Europe’s most globalized economies. It hosts U.S. tech and pharma giants, and its economy is fueled by their corporate taxes. Dublin depends on free trade and stable institutions. Yet, the same political class celebrating such openness to global capital demands insularity when it comes to security. The cognitive dissonance is staggering. How can one host Apple, Google, and Pfizer while playing neutral on defense? Of course, opposition will undoubtedly come from the “1916 Brigade,” who worship neutrality as doctrine rather than policy, and see any British security cooperation as treasonable. But this position is neither principled nor rational. The 1916 Brigade dreams of Western prosperity without Western security obligations — that is not neutrality. It is nativism wrapped in nationalist mythology. Austria — the neutrality model some invoke — spends about three times Ireland’s defense percentage and maintains real military capability. Simply put, Ireland’s military helplessness has been subsidized by British and NATO-member taxpayers for far too long. It’s time for the country to focus on the present, not the past.

BERLIN — Friedrich Merz said the quiet part out loud back in May: Germany intends to build the Bundeswehr into “the strongest conventional army in Europe,” pledging to give it “all the financial resources it needs.” Five months later, the German chancellor aims to add the hardware to that ambition, according to new internal government documents seen by POLITICO.  The sprawling 39-page list lays out €377 billion in desired buys across land, air, sea, space and cyber. The document is a planning overview of arms purchases that will be spelled out in the German military’s 2026 budget, but many are longer-term purchases for which there is no clear time frame. Taken together, it’s a comprehensive roadmap for Germany’s long-overdue defense overhaul, anchored firmly in domestic industry. Politically, the timing tracks with Merz’s shift to a new financing model. Since the spring, Berlin has moved to carve out defense from Germany’s constitutional debt brake, allowing sustained multiyear spending beyond the nearly exhausted €100 billion special fund set up under former Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s tenure. Items on the list will eventually appear, in smaller tranches, when they’re mature enough for a parliamentary budget committee vote. All procurements valued over €25 million need the committee’s sign-off. HUNDREDS OF BILLIONS The documents show that the Bundeswehr wants to launch about 320 new weapons and equipment projects over the next year’s budget cycle. Of those, 178 have a listed contractor. The rest remain “still open,” showing that much of the Bundeswehr’s modernization plan is still on the drawing board. German companies dominate the identifiable tenders with around 160 projects, worth about €182 billion, tied to domestic firms.  Rheinmetall is by far the biggest winner. The Düsseldorf-based group and its affiliated ventures appear in 53 separate planning lines worth more than €88 billion. Around €32 billion would flow directly to Rheinmetall, while another €56 billion is linked to subsidiaries and joint ventures, such as the Puma and Boxer fighting vehicle programs run with KNDS. The document foresees a total of 687 Pumas, including 662 combat versions and 25 driver-training vehicles, to be delivered by 2035. Rheinmetall is by far the biggest winner. | Hannibal Hanschke/EPA In air defense, the Bundeswehr aims to procure 561 Skyranger 30 short-range turret systems for counter-drone and short-range protection — a program fully under Rheinmetall’s lead. Along with that come grenades and rifle rounds in the millions. Diehl Defence emerges as the Bundeswehr’s second major industrial anchor after Rheinmetall. The Bavarian missile manufacturer appears in 21 procurement lines worth €17.3 billion. The largest share comes from the IRIS-T family, which is set to form the backbone of Germany’s future air defense architecture. According to the document, the Bundeswehr aims to buy 14 complete IRIS-T SLM systems valued at €3.18 billion, 396 IRIS-T SLM missiles for about €694 million and another 300 IRIS-T LFK short-range missiles worth €300 million. Together, these lines alone amount to around €4.2 billion — making IRIS-T one of the most significant single air defense programs in the Bundeswehr’s planning. Drones are also gaining ground on the military wish list.  On the higher end, the Bundeswehr wants to expand its armed Heron TP fleet operated with Israel’s IAI, aiming to buy new munitions for around €100 million. A dozen new LUNA NG tactical drones follow at about €1.6 billion. For the navy, four uMAWS maritime drones appear in the plan for an estimated €675 million, which will include replacement parts, training and maintenance. Several of the Bundeswehr’s most expensive new projects sit not on land, sea or in the air — but in orbit. The list includes more than €14 billion in satellite programs, calling for new geostationary communications satellites, upgraded ground control stations and, most ambitiously, a low-Earth-orbit satellite constellation worth €9.5 billion to ensure constant, jam-resistant connectivity for troops and command posts. The push aligns with Defense Minister Boris Pistorius’ €35 billion plan to boost Germany’s “space security.” KEEPING THE CASH AT HOME One of the most politically charged plans on the Bundeswehr’s wish list is the potential top-up of 15 F-35 jets from Lockheed Martin, worth about €2.5 billion under the U.S. Foreign Military Sales system.  These would keep Germany’s nuclear-sharing role intact but also retain its reliance on American maintenance, software and mission-data access. It could also signal a further German convergence on American weaponry it cannot replace, just as political tensions deepen over the Franco-German-Spanish sixth-generation fighter jet, the Future Combat Air System. The same U.S. framework appears across other high-profile projects.  The Bundeswehr plans to buy 400 Tomahawk Block Vb cruise missiles for roughly €1.15 billion, along with three Lockheed Martin Typhon launchers valued at €220 million — a combination that would give Germany a 2,000-kilometer strike reach.  The navy’s interim maritime-patrol aircraft plan, worth €1.8 billion for four Boeing P-8A Poseidons, also sits within the foreign military sales pipeline. One of the most politically charged plans on the Bundeswehr’s wish list is the potential top-up of 15 F-35 jets from Lockheed Martin. | Kevin Carter/Getty Images All three tie Berlin’s future strike and surveillance capabilities to U.S. export and sustainment control. Together, about 25 foreign-linked projects worth roughly €14 billion appear clearly in the Bundeswehr’s internal planning — less than 5 percent of the total €377 billion in requested spending.  Yet they account for nearly all of Germany’s strategic, nuclear-related and long-range capabilities, from nuclear-certified aircraft to deep-strike and maritime surveillance systems. By contrast, nearly half of the list is anchored in German industry, spanning armored vehicles, sensors and ammunition lines. In financial terms, domestic firms dominate; politically, however, the few foreign systems define the country’s most sensitive military roles.

BRUSSELS — As Beijing further weaponizes its control over the flow of minerals that Western countries need for their green, defense and digital ambitions, Europe has to face an uncomfortable truth: It won’t escape China’s dominance anytime soon. The Chinese government’s shock imposition earlier in October of sweeping export controls on rare-earth magnets and the raw materials needed to make them has escalated a running trade feud with the United States. The embargo threatens vast — and rapid — collateral damage on the European Union and has forced its way onto the agenda of a high-level summit on Thursday. “A crisis in the supply of critical raw materials is no longer a distant risk. It is on our doorstep,” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said in a pre-summit speech to European lawmakers. “Now, we must accelerate decisively and urgently. We need faster, more reliable supply of critical raw materials, both here in Europe and with trusted partners. I will be ready to propose further measures to ensure Europe’s economic security and I will accelerate what we have already put in motion.” Beijing’s announcement this month drew a fierce rebuke from U.S. President Donald Trump, who threatened to hike tariffs on Chinese goods to 100 percent. Trump is due to hold a high-stakes meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of an Asia-Pacific summit at the end of October. The EU, which imports nearly all of its rare earths and permanent magnets from the Middle Kingdom, is caught in the crossfire. “We have no interest in escalation,” Maroš Šefčovič, the EU’s trade chief, told reporters Tuesday. “However, this situation casts a shadow over our relationship. Therefore, a prompt resolution is essential.” China and the EU will “intensify contacts at all levels” on the issue, Šefčovič added. Wang Wentao, the Chinese trade minister, has accepted an invitation to come to Brussels in the coming days to discuss the restrictions, Šefčovič said after a two-hour call between the two. The EU is also consulting with the G7 group of industrialized nations on a coordinated response on critical minerals ahead of an Oct. 30-31 ministerial meeting in Canada. Yet, behind the talk of adequate diplomatic responses and potential retaliation there is no escaping the dominance in rare earths that China has built up over decades. For now at least. “In the short term there’s nothing you can do, except try and negotiate with the Chinese,” said Philip Andrews-Speed, senior research fellow at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.  HIT WHERE IT HURTS Beijing dominates the entire supply chain of rare earths — a group of 17 minerals used in permanent magnets found in everything from electric vehicles and wind turbines, to F-35 fighter jets and naval vessels. Under its new export controls, importers will need a government license to access not only those permanent magnets, but also the refined metals and alloys that go into them. China already weaponized its leading position in producing and refining critical raw materials — and specifically rare-earth elements like scandium, yttrium and dysprosium — in response to Trump’s first wave of punitive tariffs back in April. Eventually, the White House caved in. This time, again, the Chinese export controls are “a tit-for-tat for U.S. policy,” said a person from the Chinese business sector, granted anonymity to speak candidly. The EU is being hit, too: “The effects are direct and enormous, particularly for the defence sector,” Tobias Gehrke and Janka Oertel of the European Council on Foreign Relations wrote in a commentary. “The EU defence industry risks grinding to a halt as inventory shortfalls could leave it struggling to produce and deliver enough weapons for the war in Ukraine.” China accounts for 61 percent of rare earths extraction and 92 percent of refining, according to the International Energy Agency. It provides nearly 99 percent of the EU’s supply of the 17 rare earths, as well as about 98 percent of its rare earth permanent magnets. UNDERDOG DIPLOMACY  In addition to its minerals monopoly, Beijing has built a legal foundation to capitalize on it — through an export control toolbox that mirrors the one Washington has used to cap exports of leading-edge technology to China. The EU lacks a comparable armory that would allow it to respond in kind. Whereas export controls are now a go-to option in Washington’s and Beijing’s trade negotiation strategies, to Brussels, protecting national security remains the sole legitimate justification to deploy such measures.  “The EU will need to find a way to live in this new reality,” said Antonia Hmaidi, senior analyst at think tank Merics, adding that the bloc may have to give up its belief in the rules-based trading system that characterized the post-World War Two era. “It could also mean that the EU chooses not to play that game, but then the EU needs a different game to play,” she said, adding that weaponizing EU market access could be a powerful alternative. Ahead of Thursday’s summit, calls are growing to ready the EU’s Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI), the only trade policy tool the EU can wield against economic coercion. Working mostly through deterrence, the bloc’s so-called trade bazooka seeks to prevent foreign powers from pressuring European countries — but only foresees action as a last resort. “It’s the usual sabre rattling from the usual subjects, but activating the ACI is not seriously under consideration at this stage,” said one EU diplomat, who was also granted anonymity. Asked whether the EU executive is looking at the ACI, the Commission’s deputy chief spokesperson Olof Gill said: “Right now we’re focused on engagement, and we’re not going to go down the road of speculating about any other possibility.” That engagement is delivering scant results. In June, Beijing agreed to set up a “green channel” for European companies to speed the approval of export licenses. And yet, Šefčovič said, only half of the 2,000 priority applications submitted by European companies to the Chinese authorities had been “properly addressed.” CATCHING UP  Moving forward, the EU needs to dramatically ramp up its diversification efforts. At a meeting with industry leaders on Monday, Industry Commissioner Stéphane Séjourné said the EU’s response must build on two pillars, according to his cabinet: a diplomatic solution and a more resilient supply chain. China accounts for 61 percent of rare earths extraction and 92 percent of refining, according to the International Energy Agency. | VCG/Gett Images That, however, won’t happen overnight. Especially since the EU executive unveiled its grand plan to diversify its supply of raw materials away from China two years ago, officials have been stressing the need to stockpile more of the metals and minerals, ramp up domestic mining and production and seal new partnerships. But concrete action is still lagging, with experts and industry alike lamenting the lack of funding being put on the table. James Watson, director general at metals lobby Eurometaux, welcomed the EU executive’s decision to award “strategic project” status to some 60 mines and refineries inside and outside the bloc, but added: “We still need dedicated funding for the sector, as well as addressing structural issues, such as higher energy costs and heavier administrative burdens, that put as at a competitive disadvantage compared with our global competitors.” Camille Gijs and Koen Verhelst contributed reporting.

LONDON — The U.K., Canada and the EU are mulling a coordinated response at the G7 level to China’s expansion of export controls on critical minerals at a key meeting at the end of this month. With Canada due to host G7 ministers in Toronto at the end of October, the allies are seeking to accelerate efforts to diversify away from Beijing’s dominance in the rare-earth sector.  This comes after Beijing last week announced new restrictions on foreign access to rare-earth magnets and the refined metals and alloys needed to make them over national security concerns. The move immediately raised alarm from the EU and G7 allies over supply chain security for technologies ranging from electric vehicles and wind turbines, to F-35 fighter jets and naval vessels. China mines about 60 percent and processes about 90 percent of the world’s rare-earth metals.  Ministers from the G7 are “putting our shoulders to the task, buckling down and trying to get as many concrete steps taken as we can to create alternatives for the critical minerals that have been put on export restrictions,” Canadian Energy and Natural Resources Minister Tim Hodgson told POLITICO in an interview Thursday at the end of a three-day trip to London. “We had a meeting with the G7 envoys on critical minerals while I was here, all working towards further development of a coordinated, multilateral approach to dealing with the recent restrictions,” Hodgson said. “We’re working on those as we speak and we’ll hopefully have some announcements by the time we get to the minister’s meeting in Toronto at the end of the month.” The move immediately raised alarm from the EU and G7 allies over supply chain security for technologies ranging from electric vehicles and wind turbines, to F-35 fighter jets and naval vessels. | AFP via Getty Images According to one EU official briefed on the G7 discussions, the Canadians are working on a term sheet of measures to accelerate stockpiling, activate critical mineral partnerships, and build out mining activities in a more concerted approach. EU trade chief Maroš Šefčovič this week urged the G7 to respond jointly. Šefčovič is expected to discuss the matter with Chinese Commerce Minister Wang Wentao early next week.  The European Commission is seeking to foster coordinated measures against Beijing’s curbs, two other Commission officials told POLITICO. One of them said the EU executive would launch a study of the impact of the new bans on EU industry early next week.  “It’s coercion. We need to see how we will respond,” said the other Commission official, who like the others cited in the story was granted anonymity to discuss the sensitive discussions. CODEPENDENCY RISK China’s export curbs triggered an escalatory threat from President Donald Trump to hit Beijing with 100 percent tariffs. While Washington has since scaled back the confrontation, top U.S. officials are also drawing the consequences of Beijing’s lockdown on critical minerals. “China’s actions have once again demonstrated the risk of being dependent on them, on rare earths, and for that matter, anything,” Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said. “If China wants to be an unreliable partner to the world, then the world will have to decouple. The world does not want to decouple.” China’s export curbs triggered an escalatory threat from President Donald Trump to hit Beijing with 100 percent tariffs. | Demetrius Freeman/The Washington Post via Getty Images Hodgson and Canadian Environment Minister Julie Dabrusin will host their G7 counterparts from top global economies, including the U.S., Japan, Italy, Germany, the U.K. and France, in Toronto from Oct. 30-31. Beijing’s new restrictions are an “amping up” of curbs on critical minerals China has announced this year, Hodgson said. G7 allies, he added, are working on “a number of actual contracts” with private sector firms that they hope to announce at the Toronto meeting. The G7 is encouraging international firms and other countries to use financial tools to increase global supplies of critical minerals. “That would include things like stockpiling agreements, that would include things like off-take agreements, that would include things like potentially contract for differences on critical minerals,” Hodgson said. Ottawa is working to implement these “in real terms” following the June G7 leaders meeting in Canada, where Prime Minister Mark Carney proposed a critical minerals buying group, Hodgson said. “Canada is a potential supplier of many of those critical minerals.”  Securing supply chains of critical minerals is playing an increasingly vital role in geopolitics as China tightens the tap on supplies. The U.K. renewed trade talks with Greenland this month, promising to secure critical minerals supply chains. And in Mumbai last week, Britain’s Keir Starmer and India’s Narendra Modi buckled down to collaborate on downstream processing and research projects to “strengthen and diversify critical mineral supply chains.” During his stay in London, Hodgson met U.K. Energy Secretary Ed Miliband and Britain’s critical minerals envoy, Industry Minister Chris McDonald. “We believe that multilateralism is the way to counter non-market activities by certain states,” Hodgson said, advocating for multilateralism in response to China’s crackdown. “We don’t believe using trade as a tool of state manipulation is in anyone’s interest.” Graham Lanktree reported from London, Camille Gijs and Bjarke Smith-Meyer from Brussels and Clea Caulcutt from Paris. Doug Palmer and Jacopo Barigazzi contributed reporting.

BERLIN — Germany’s new military procurement plan, obtained by POLITICO, shows that Berlin will steer its massive rearmament drive primarily to European industry, with only 8 percent going for American weapons. That’s a blow for Donald Trump, who has been putting pressure on European countries to continue buying U.S. arms despite the geopolitical turmoil emanating from the White House. The procurement plan shows Germany preparing to push through nearly €83 billion in contracts over the next year. The list, drawn up for the German parliament’s budget committee, details 154 major defense purchases between September 2025 and December 2026.  Under German law, any contract worth more than €25 million must be submitted to parliament for approval. And in those pages, projects led by American companies appear only in a handful of cases. The only big-ticket items with American contractors in the lead are about €150 million earmarked for torpedoes attached to Boeing’s P-8A aircraft and roughly €5.1 billion for Raytheon’s MIM-104 Patriot air defense missiles and launchers.  Counting other U.S.-led buys on the list — from AMRAAM and ESSM missiles to radio packages — the total comes to about €6.8 billion, around 8 percent of Berlin’s plan, with the rest overwhelmingly going to European industry. GOOD CUSTOMER In recent years, Germany has been one of Washington’s biggest defense buyers.  According to U.S. government data, Berlin signed off on more than $17 billion in foreign military sales between 2020 and 2024, hitting a $13.9 billion record in 2023, highlighting increased demand following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.  That spree briefly made Germany one of the top destinations worldwide for U.S. arms exports alongside Poland and Japan. Now Germany appears to be focusing on European industry. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, European NATO members bought 64 percent of their weapons from the U.S. between 2020 and 2024. Trump wants that to continue. After clinching a trade deal with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in July, Trump touted that the EU would buy “vast amounts” of American weapons worth “hundreds of billions.” The only big-ticket items with American contractors in the lead are about €150 million earmarked for torpedoes attached to Boeing’s P-8A aircraft and roughly €5.1 billion for Raytheon’s MIM-104 Patriot air defense missiles and launchers. | Omar Marques/Getty Images The joint statement from that deal went even further, pledging that the EU “plans to substantially increase procurement of military and defense equipment from the United States, with the support and facilitation of the U.S. government.” But defense spending in Europe isn’t decided in Brussels, it’s decided by national governments. And in Berlin, the numbers are telling a different story. The most expensive single item is the F-127 frigate program, planned to be designed by German marine giant TKMS. Due before the budget committee in June 2026, its estimated cost runs at €26 billion. The new warships are meant to provide long-range air and missile defense for the navy. Another centerpiece is the Eurofighter Tranche 5 — built by Airbus, BAE Systems and Leonardo — with €4 billion set to be approved in October 2025 for new aircraft and another €1.9 billion for radar upgrades. Together with further investments in electronic warfare systems and avionics packages, the plan shows Berlin is doubling down on its existing European fighter fleet to bridge production delays for the troubled Future Combat Air System (FCAS), a next-generation fighter that’s supposed to be built by Germany, France and Spain. The army features prominently as well. More than €3.4 billion is planned for additional Boxer armored vehicles in October, built by Rheinmetall and KNDS. That goes along with €3.8 billion for a new unnamed wheeled tank destroyer. A few projects on the list, such as a €40 million mobile reconnaissance support system under the title MAUS, come with funding attached but no publicly designated contractor. MODERNIZATION DRIVE  Politically sensitive programs include a €2.3 billion modernization of the Taurus cruise missile, set to be approved in December. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz is under pressure from Kyiv to supply them to Ukraine, but so far German governments have balked at transferring the missiles. Air defense is another major focus. The plan includes more than €300 million for additional German-built IRIS-T SLM units, €755 million for ship-launched missiles, and €490 million for new short-range air defense missiles.  One of the more dicey projects on the list is the Eurodrone, with €196 million set aside to develop its “detect and avoid” system — a prerequisite for the drone to fly safely in European airspace. The program, led by Airbus, Dassault and Leonardo, has been plagued by delays and rising costs, yet Berlin is pressing ahead with fresh funding in this budget cycle. The navy’s share goes beyond the future frigates. Upgrades for Germany’s current F-123 frigates are priced at €1.7 billion, while a package of anti-submarine warfare systems and new torpedoes will add several hundred million euros more. The document also lists dozens of smaller but still significant contracts: €274 million for a fleet auxiliary vessel and hundreds of millions for new trucks, radios, drones, and ammunition of every caliber. Taken together, they add up to a comprehensive modernization effort touching every branch of the armed forces.

President Donald Trump shared details of a third airstrike on a vessel in international waters allegedly carrying drugs, killing three people. Trump said in a social media post on Friday the U.S. military attacked a boat he said was “conducting narcotrafficking” in the waters near South America and Central America, and that intelligence indicated the boat was headed for the United States. “Intelligence confirmed the vessel was trafficking illicit narcotics, and was transiting along a known narcotrafficking passage enroute to poison Americans,” Trump wrote on X. “The strike killed 3 male narcoterrorists aboard the vessel, which was in international waters.” It’s unclear when the strike Trump detailed on Friday took place. In total, 17 people have been killed in three U.S. airstrikes on suspected drug-running vessels this month. Trump initially revealed the third strike to reporters on Tuesday as he departed Washington for his state visit to the United Kingdom. “We knocked off, actually three boats, not two, but we saw two,” he said on Tuesday, referring to the two strikes Trump had formerly announced. The use of military force on alleged drug smugglers has raised concerns about violating the due process rights of suspected criminals. Republican Sen. Rand Paul sharply criticized the White House following the first attack, and Democrats requested the administration share the intelligence it used to justify the first two attacks. Legal experts from both parties have suggested the attacks may be illegal. John Yoo, the former Bush administration DOJ official who crafted the legal justification for enhanced interrogation techniques against suspected terrorists after the Sept. 11 attacks, told POLITICO that the Trump administration has not made a sufficient argument to treat suspected cartel members as enemies of war. “We can’t just consider anything that harms the country to be a matter for the military. Because that could potentially include every crime,” Yoo said.

Ivo Daalder, former U.S. ambassador to NATO, is a senior fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center and host of the weekly podcast “World Review with Ivo Daalder.” He writes POLITICO’s From Across the Pond column. In the competition between China and the U.S., China is winning. That isn’t a conclusion many would have drawn six months ago, but now it’s inescapable. What’s different today is that since taking office, the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump has taken many steps that play directly into its adversary’s hands, weakening its own ability to outcompete. And we will soon be at the point where this trend is irreversible. For decades, China followed Deng Xiaoping’s dictum to “hide your strength and bide your time.” Unfortunately, most Western countries, led by the U.S., ignored the latter part of this admonition — that Beijing was biding its time — and instead focused on China as a huge new market for Western goods, services and capital. Everyone could get rich from China getting rich, or so it seemed — a sentiment that Deng and his successors were absolutely fine with. Their purpose, however, wasn’t to get rich just for the sake of it, but to gain the necessary power to compete and win against the world’s sole remaining superpower. So, by the time Xi Jinping ascended to power in 2013, China no longer needed to bide its time, and it started to show its strength. In the past decade, China increased its military spending by 800 percent — the biggest military build-up in peacetime history. It now deploys more naval vessels than the U.S.; it is modernizing its nuclear arsenal, aiming to reach close to parity with Russia and the U.S. by the end of the decade; and it flexes military muscle in places that have long been under the sole purview of the U.S. However, while its military expansion and reach is impressive, China’s economic, scientific and technological advances are most worrisome. Seventy percent of the world’s countries now trade more with China than with the U.S., with over half of them trading twice as much with China. In Trump’s own words, America may be a big department store, but the products you can buy in its stores — and in those across the world — are made in China. Trade isn’t the only market Beijing’s cornered either. Following a clear and consistent strategy that was first outlined by Xi in 2015, today it leads the world in electric vehicles and batteries, robotics, quantum communications, renewable technologies and more. Indeed, according to one study, while 20 years ago the U.S. led China in 60 of the 64 frontier technologies key to defense, energy, computing, biotech and other sectors, China now leads in 57 of these technologies. This determination to win is particularly obvious in one area that has featured prominently in the news recently: rare earth elements and magnets that are critical for defense, electronics and green-technology manufacturing. As it stands, China holds almost 50 percent of the world’s rare earth reserves, controls 70 percent of rare earth mines and accounts for 90 percent of global rare earth refining capacity. It also controls over 90 percent of critical magnet production, and successfully used that near-monopoly to force the Trump administration into backing down from its escalating tariff war and chip export controls. Seventy percent of the world’s countries now trade more with China than with the U.S., with over half of them trading twice as much with China. | Alex Plavevski/EPA But even in the areas where the U.S. retains a lead — think AI and quantum computing — China is catching up. The release of DeepSeek, for example, shocked the AI community for its speed and sophistication, as it nearly equaled the vastly more expensive models developed by U.S. tech companies. And the next DeepSeek generation, I’m told by a top Microsoft AI official, may even exceed the most advanced models from OpenAI and other firms. All of this indicates China’s not only catching up but, in many ways, surpassing the U.S. America has many advantages in this race — which is how it has managed to stay ahead, even as Beijing embarked on its long-term strategy to overtake it. But in the past six months, the Trump administration has systematically begun to dismantle many of them. Let’s take partnerships: The biggest advantage for the U.S. is that it has allies, while China has clients. Collectively, the U.S. and its allies can outcompete, outspend, out-innovate, out-trade, out-finance and out-attract others to its side. But Washington’s allies in North America, Europe and Asia increasingly — and rightfully — fear that the current “America First” policy is putting them last. They’ve been told to defend themselves, to pay 15 percent or more in tariffs and, in the case of Canada and Denmark, to cede territory. As a result, they’re turning toward each other and reducing their military, economic and political ties to Washington. And that’s not all. The Trump administration is also pursuing funding policies around universities and immigration that directly undercut America’s ability to compete with China. For 80 years, federal research dollars funded scientific and technological breakthroughs like the internet, genetic sequencing, space exploration, vaccines, cancer cures and much more. The country’s modern research universities led the way in spurring these innovations, drawing talent from across the globe to benefit from and contribute to its ecosystem of innovation. But Trump has now cut federal funding for basic research by a third, blocked research grants to top universities for purely ideological reasons and tightened immigration for international students and scholars. One poll suggests that 75 percent of scientists in the U.S. today are looking to leave the country and work elsewhere. It’s hard to underestimate the damage these policies are doing to U.S. competitiveness. To give just one example, many of the country’s closest allies are now offering lucrative grants and research opportunities to entice the talent pool at the core of America’s success as a global innovation machine. This isn’t just shooting yourself in the foot — it’s shooting yourself in the head. And unless Washington rectifies the situation swiftly, it will find not just Beijing but other parts of the world passing it by.