LONDON — On the face of it, the new MI6 chief’s first speech featured many of the same villains and heroes as those of her predecessors. But in her first public outing Monday, Blaise Metreweli, the first female head of the U.K.’s foreign intelligence service, sent a strong signal that she intends to put her own stamp on the role – as she highlighted a wave of inter-connected threats to western democracies. Speaking at MI6’s HQ in London, Metreweli, who took over from Richard Moore in October, highlighted a confluence of geo-political and technological disruptions, warning “the frontline is everywhere” and adding “we are now operating in a space between peace and war.” In a speech shot through with references to a shifting transatlantic order and the growth of disinformation, Metreweli made noticeably scant  reference to the historically close relationship with the U.S. in intelligence gathering — the mainstay of the U.K.’s intelligence compact for decades. Instead, she highlighted that a “new bloc and identities are forming and alliances reshaping.” That will be widely seen to reflect an official acknowledgement that the second Donald Trump administration has necessitated a shift in the security services towards cultivating more multilateral relationships. By comparison with a lengthy passage on the seriousness of the Russia threat to Britain, China got away only with a light mention of its cyber attack tendencies towards the U.K. — and was referred to more flatteringly as “a country where a central transformation  is  taking place this century.” Westminster hawks will note that Metreweli — who grew up in Hong Kong and  so knows the Chinese system close-up — walked gingerly around the risk of conflict in the  South China Sea and Beijing’s espionage activities targeting British politicians – and even its royals. In a carefully-placed line, she reflected that she was  “going to break with tradition and won’t give you a global threat tour.” Moore, her predecessor, was known for that approach, which delighted those who enjoyed a plain-speaking MI6 boss giving pithy analysis of global tensions and their fallout, but frustrated some in the Foreign Office who believed the affable Moore could be too unguarded in his comments on geo-politics. The implicit suggestion from the new chief was that China needs to be handled differently to the forthright engagement with “aggressive, expansionist and revisionist” Russia. The reasons may well lie in the aftermath of a bruising argument within Whitehall about how to handle the recent case of two Britons who were arrested for spying for China, and with a growth-boosting visit to Beijing by the prime minister scheduled for 2026. Sources in the service suggest the aim of the China strategy is to avoid confrontation, the better to further intelligence-gathering and have a more productive economic relationship with Beijing. More hardline interpreters of the Secret Intelligence Service will raise eyebrows at her suggestion that the “convening power” of the service would enable it to “ defuse tensions.” But there was no doubt about Metreweli’s deep concern at the impacts of social-media disinformation and distortion, in a framing which seemed just as worried about U.S. tech titans as conventional state-run threats:  “We are being contested from battlefield to boardroom — and even our brains — as disinformation manipulates our understanding of each other.” Declaring that “some  algorithms become as powerful as states,” seemed to tilt at outfits like Elon Musk’s X and Mark Zuckerberg’s Meta-owned Facebook. Metreweli warned that “hyper personalized tools could become a new vector for conflict and control,” pushing their effects on societies and individuals  in “minutes not months – my service must operate in this new context too.” The new boss used the possessive pronoun, talking about “my service” in her speech several times – another sign that she intends to put a distinctive mark of the job, now that she has, at the age of just 48,  inherited the famous green-ink pen in which the head of the service signs correspondence.  Metreweli is experienced operator in war zones including Iraq who spent a secondment with MI5, the domestic intelligence service, and won the job in large part because of her experience in the top job via MI6’s science and technology “Q”  Branch. She clearly wants to expedite changes in the service – saying agents must be as fluent in computer coding as foreign languages. She is also expected to try and address a tendency in the service to harvest information, without a clear focus on the action that should follow – the product of a glut of intelligence gathered via digital means and AI. She  was keen to stress that the human factor is at the heart of it all — an attempt at reassurance for spies and analysts wondering if they might be replaced by AI agents as the job of gathering intelligence in the era of facial recognition and biometrics gets harder.  Armed with a steely gaze Metreweli speaks fluent human, occasionally with a small smile. She is also the first incumbent of the job to wear a very large costume jewelry beetle brooch on her sombre navy attire. No small amount of attention in Moscow and Beijing could go into decoding that.

President Donald Trump intends for the U.S. to keep a bigger military presence in the Western Hemisphere going forward to battle migration, drugs and the rise of adversarial powers in the region, according to his new National Security Strategy. The 33-page document is a rare formal explanation of Trump’s foreign policy worldview by his administration. Such strategies, which presidents typically release once each term, can help shape how parts of the U.S. government allocate budgets and set policy priorities. The Trump National Security Strategy, which the White House quietly released Thursday, has some brutal words for Europe, suggesting it is in civilizational decline, and pays relatively little attention to the Middle East and Africa. It has an unusually heavy focus on the Western Hemisphere that it casts as largely about protecting the U.S. homeland. It says “border security is the primary element of national security” and makes veiled references to China’s efforts to gain footholds in America’s backyard. “The United States must be preeminent in the Western Hemisphere as a condition of our security and prosperity — a condition that allows us to assert ourselves confidently where and when we need to in the region,” the document states. “The terms of our alliances, and the terms upon which we provide any kind of aid, must be contingent on winding down adversarial outside influence — from control of military installations, ports, and key infrastructure to the purchase of strategic assets broadly defined.” The document describes such plans as part of a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. The latter is the notion set forth by President James Monroe in 1823 that the U.S. will not tolerate malign foreign interference in its own hemisphere. Trump’s paper, as well as a partner document known as the National Defense Strategy, have faced delays in part because of debates in the administration over elements related to China. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent pushed for some softening of the language about Beijing, according to two people familiar with the matter who were granted anonymity to describe internal deliberations. Bessent is currently involved in sensitive U.S. trade talks with China, and Trump himself is wary of the delicate relations with Beijing. The new National Security Strategy says the U.S. has to make challenging choices in the global realm. “After the end of the Cold War, American foreign policy elites convinced themselves that permanent American domination of the entire world was in the best interests of our country. Yet the affairs of other countries are our concern only if their activities directly threaten our interests,” the document states. In an introductory note to the strategy, Trump called it a “roadmap to ensure that America remains the greatest and most successful nation in human history, and the home of freedom on earth.” But Trump is mercurial by nature, so it’s hard to predict how closely or how long he will stick to the ideas laid out in the new strategy. A surprising global event could redirect his thinking as well, as it has done for recent presidents from George W. Bush to Joe Biden. Still, the document appears in line with many of the moves he’s taken in his second term, as well as the priorities of some of his aides. That includes deploying significantly more U.S. military prowess to the Western Hemisphere, taking numerous steps to reduce migration to America, pushing for a stronger industrial base in the U.S. and promoting “Western identity,” including in Europe. The strategy even nods to so-called traditional values at times linked to the Christian right, saying the administration wants “the restoration and reinvigoration of American spiritual and cultural health” and “an America that cherishes its past glories and its heroes.” It mentions the need to have “growing numbers of strong, traditional families that raise healthy children.” As POLITICO has reported before, the strategy spends an unusual amount of space on Latin America, the Caribbean and other U.S. neighbors. That’s a break with past administrations, who tended to prioritize other regions and other topics, such as taking on major powers like Russia and China or fighting terrorism. The Trump strategy suggests the president’s military buildup in the Western Hemisphere is not a temporary phenomenon. (That buildup, which has included controversial military strikes against boats allegedly carrying drugs, has been cast by the administration as a way to fight cartels. But the administration also hopes the buildup could help pressure Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro to step down.) The strategy also specifically calls for “a more suitable Coast Guard and Navy presence to control sea lanes, to thwart illegal and other unwanted migration, to reduce human and drug trafficking, and to control key transit routes in a crisis.” The strategy says the U.S. should enhance its relationships with governments in Latin America, including working with them to identify strategic resources — an apparent reference to materials such as rare earth minerals. It also declares that the U.S. will partner more with the private sector to promote “strategic acquisition and investment opportunities for American companies in the region.” Such business-related pledges, at least on a generic level, could please many Latin American governments who have long been frustrated by the lack of U.S. attention to the region. It’s unclear how such promises square with Trump’s insistence on imposing tariffs on America’s trade partners, however. The National Security Strategy spends a fair amount of time on China, though it often doesn’t mention Beijing directly. Many U.S. lawmakers — on a bipartisan basis — consider an increasingly assertive China the gravest long-term threat to America’s global power. But while the language the Trump strategy uses is tough, it is careful and far from inflammatory. The administration promises to “rebalance America’s economic relationship with China, prioritizing reciprocity and fairness to restore American economic independence.” But it also says “trade with China should be balanced and focused on non-sensitive factors” and even calls for “maintaining a genuinely mutually advantageous economic relationship with Beijing.” The strategy says the U.S. wants to prevent war in the Indo-Pacific — a nod to growing tensions in the region, including between China and U.S. allies such as Japan and the Philippines. “We will also maintain our longstanding declaratory policy on Taiwan, meaning that the United States does not support any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait,” it states. That may come as a relief to Asia watchers who worry Trump will back away from U.S. support for Taiwan as it faces ongoing threats from China. The document states that “it is a core interest of the United States to negotiate an expeditious cessation of hostilities in Ukraine,” and to mitigate the risk of Russian confrontation with other countries in Europe. But overall it pulls punches when it comes to Russia — there’s very little criticism of Moscow. Instead, it reserves some of its harshest remarks for U.S.-allied nations in Europe. In particular, the administration, in somewhat veiled terms, knocks European efforts to rein in far-right parties, calling such moves political censorship. “The Trump administration finds itself at odds with European officials who hold unrealistic expectations for the [Ukraine] war perched in unstable minority governments, many of which trample on basic principles of democracy to suppress opposition,” the strategy states. The strategy also appears to suggest that migration will fundamentally change European identity to a degree that could hurt U.S. alliances. “Over the long term, it is more than plausible that within a few decades at the latest, certain NATO members will become majority non-European,” it states. “As such, it is an open question whether they will view their place in the world, or their alliance with the United States, in the same way as those who signed the NATO charter.” Still, the document acknowledges Europe’s economic and other strengths, as well as how America’s partnership with much of the continent has helped the U.S. “Not only can we not afford to write Europe off — doing so would be self-defeating for what this strategy aims to achieve,” it says. “Our goal should be to help Europe correct its current trajectory,” it says. Trump’s first-term National Security Strategy focused significantly on the U.S. competition with Russia and China, but the president frequently undercut it by trying to gain favor with the leaders of those nuclear powers. If this new strategy proves a better reflection of what Trump himself actually believes, it could help other parts of the U.S. government adjust, not to mention foreign governments. As Trump administration documents often do, the strategy devotes significant space to praising the commander-in-chief. It describes him as the “President of Peace” while favorably stating that he “uses unconventional diplomacy.” The strategy struggles at times to tamp down what seem like inconsistencies. It says the U.S. should have a high bar for foreign intervention, but it also says it wants to “prevent the emergence of dominant adversaries.” It also essentially dismisses the ambitions of many smaller countries. “The outsized influence of larger, richer, and stronger nations is a timeless truth of international relations,” the strategy states. The National Security Strategy is the first of several important defense and foreign policy papers the Trump administration is due to release. They include the National Defense Strategy, whose basic thrust is expected to be similar. Presidents’ early visions for what the National Security Strategy should mention have at times had to be discarded due to events. After the 9/11 attacks, George W. Bush’s first-term strategy ended up focusing heavily on battling Islamist terrorism. Biden’s team spent much of its first year working on a strategy that had to be rewritten after Russia moved toward a full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

LONDON — In February Britain’s cash-strapped Labour government cut international development spending — and barely anyone made a noise. The center-left party announced it would slice the country’s spending on aid down to only 0.3 percent of gross domestic income — from 0.5 percent — in order to fund a hike in defense spending. MPs, aid experts and officials have told POLITICO that the scale of the cuts is on a par with — or even exceeding — those of both the previous center-right Conservative government or the United States under Donald Trump. This leaves Britain’s development arm, once globally envied as a vehicle for poverty alleviation, a shadow of its former self. The move — prompted by U.S. demands to up its NATO spending, and mirroring the Trump administration’s move to gut its own USAID development budget — shocked Labour’s progressive MPs, supporters and backers in the aid sector. But unlike attempted cuts to British welfare spending, the real-world backlash was muted, with the resignation of Britain’s development minister prompting little further dissent or change in policy. There was no mutiny in parliament, and only limited domestic and international condemnation outside of an aid sector torn between making their voices heard — and keeping in Whitehall’s good books over slices of the shrinking pie. Some fear a return grab over the aid budget could still be on the cards — but that the government will find that there is little left to cut. Gideon Rabinowitz, director of policy and advocacy at Bond, the U.K. network for NGOs, warned that, instead of “reversing the cuts by the previous Conservative government, Labour has compounded them, and lives will be lost as a result.” “These cuts will further tarnish the U.K.’s reputation as it continues to be known as an unreliable global partner, breaking Labour’s manifesto commitment,” he warned. “The Conservatives started the fire, but instead of putting it out, this Labour government threw petrol on it.” ‘IT WAS THE PERFECT TIME TO DO IT’ When Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced the cut to international aid — a bid to save over £6 billion by 2027 — Labour MPs, including those who worked in the sector before being elected, were notably silent. The move followed a 2021 Conservative cut to aid spending — from 0.7 percent in the Tory brand-rebuilding David Cameron years down to 0.5 percent. At the time, Labour MPs had met that Tory cut with howls of outrage. This time it was different. Some were genuinely shocked, while others feared retribution from a Downing Street that had flexed its muscles at MPs who rebelled on what they saw as points of conscience. “No one was expecting it, so there was no opportunity to campaign around it,” said one Labour MP. “Literally none of us had any idea it was coming.” Remaining spending is largely mandatory contributions to organizations such as the World Bank. | Daniel Slim/AFP via Getty Images The same MP noted that there are around 50 Labour MPs from the new 2024 intake who had some form of development background before coming into parliament. Yet they were put “completely under the cosh” by Downing Street and government whips. “It was the perfect time to do it,” the MP said. A number of MPs who might have been vocal have since been made parliamentary private secretaries — the most junior government role. “They have basically gagged the people who would be most likely to be outspoken on it,” the MP above said. The department’s ministerial team is now more likely to be loyal to the Starmer project. “I just felt hurt, and wounded. We were stunned. None of us saw it coming,” said one MP from the 2024 cohort, adding: “They priced in that backlash wouldn’t come.” But they added: “If we were culpable so were NGOs, too inward-looking and focused on peripheral issues.” The lack of outcry from MPs would, however, seem to put them largely in step with the wider British public. Polling and focus groups from think tank More in Common suggest that despite the majority of voters thinking spending on international aid is the right thing to do in a variety of circumstances, only around 20 percent of the public think the budget was cut too much.  The second new-intake Labour MP quoted above said the policy was therefore an “easy thing to sell on the doorstep,” and “in my area, there’s not going to be shouting from the rooftops to spend more money on aid.” DIMINISHED AND DEMORALIZED The cuts to aid come at a time when Britain’s Foreign Office is undergoing a radical overhaul. While the department describes its plans as “more agile,” staff, programs and entire areas of focus are all ripe for cuts to save money. The department is looking to make redundancies for around 25 percent of staff based in the U.K. MPs have voiced concern that development staff will be among the first to make the jump due to the government’s shift away from aid. The department insists that no final decisions have been taken over the size and shape of the organization. Major cuts are expected across work on education, conflict, and WASH (Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene.) The government’s Integrated Security Fund — which funds key counter-terror programs abroad — is also looking to scale back work abroad which does not have a clear link to Britain’s national security. The British Council — a key soft-power organization viewed as helping combat Chinese and Russian reach across the world — told MPs it is in “real financial peril” and would be cutting its presence in 35 of the 97 countries it operates. The BBC’s World Service is seeing similar cuts to its global reach. The Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI), the watchdog for aid spending, is also not safe from the ax as the government continues its bonfire of regulators. The FCDO did not refute the expected pathway of cuts. Published breakdowns of spending allocations for the next three years are due to be published in the coming months, an official said. A review of Britain’s development and diplomacy policies conducted by economist Minouche Shafik — who has since been moved into Downing Street — sits discarded in the department. The government refuses to publish its findings. Aid spending was spared a repeat visit by Chancellor Rachel Reeves in her government-wide budget last month — but that hasn’t stopped MPs worrying about a second bite. | Pool Photo by Adrian Dennis via Getty Images The second 2024 intake MP quoted earlier in the piece said that following the U.S. decisions on aid and foreign policy “there was an expectation that the U.K., as a responsible international partner, as a leader on a lot of this stuff, would fill the gap to some extent, and then take more of a leadership role on it, and we’ve done the opposite.” NOTHING LEFT TO CUT Aid spending was spared a repeat visit by Chancellor Rachel Reeves in her government-wide budget last month — but that hasn’t stopped MPs worrying about a second bite. While few MPs or those in the aid sector feel Britain will ever return to the lofty heights of its 0.7 percent commitment, they predict there will be harder resistance if the government comes back for more. “I don’t think they’re going to try and do it again, as there’s no money left,” the second 2024 intake MP said. But they pointed out that a large portion of the remaining aid budget is spent on in-country costs such as accommodation for asylum seekers. Savings identified from the asylum budget would be sent back to the Treasury, rather than put back into the aid budget, they noted. Remaining spending is largely mandatory contributions to organizations such as the World Bank or the United Nations and would, they warned, involve “getting rid of international agreements and chopping up longstanding influence at big international institutions that we are one of the leading people in.” The United Nations is already facing its own funding crisis as it struggles to adjust to the global downturn in aid spending. British diplomat Tom Fletcher — who leads the UN’s humanitarian response — said earlier this year that the organization has been “forced into a triage of human survival,” adding: “The math is cruel, and the consequences are heartbreaking.” The government still has a commitment to returning to 0.7 percent of GNI “as soon as the fiscal circumstances allow.” The tests for this ramp back up were set out four years ago. Britain must not be borrowing for day-to-day spending and underlying debt must be falling. The last two budgets have forecast that the government will not meet these tests in this parliament. FARAGE CIRCLES In the meantime, Labour’s opponents feel emboldened to go further. Both the Conservatives and Reform UK have said that they would further cut the aid budget. The Tories have vowed to slice it down to 0.1 percent of GNI, while Nigel Farage’s Reform UK is eyeing fresh cuts of at least by £7-8 billion a year. A third 2024 Labour MP said that there was a degree of pressure among some colleagues to match the Conservatives’ 0.1 percent pledge. Though no country has gone as far as Uganda’s Idi Amin in setting up a “save Britain fund” for its “former colonial masters,” Britain’s departure on international aid gives space for other countries wanting to step up to further their own foreign policy aims. The space vacated by Britain and America has prompted warnings that China will step in, while countries newer to international development such as Gulf states could try and fill the void. Many of these nations are unlikely to ever fund the same projects as the U.K. and the U.S., forcing NGOs to look to alternate donors such as philanthropists to fund their work. “There’ll be a big, big gap, and it won’t be completely filled,” the second new intake MP said. An FCDO spokesperson said the department was undergoing “an unprecedented transformation,” and added: “We remain resolutely committed to international development and have been clear we must modernize our approach to development to reflect the changing global context. We will bring U.K. expertise and investment to where it is needed most, including global health solutions and humanitarian support.”

When the Franco-German summit concluded in Berlin, Europe’s leaders issued a declaration with a clear ambition: strengthen Europe’s digital sovereignty in an open, collaborative way. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s call for “Europe’s Independence Moment” captures the urgency, but independence isn’t declared — it’s designed. The pandemic exposed this truth. When Covid-19 struck, Europe initially scrambled for vaccines and facemasks, hampered by fragmented responses and overreliance on a few external suppliers. That vulnerability must never be repeated. True sovereignty rests on three pillars: diversity, resilience and autonomy. > True sovereignty rests on three pillars: diversity, resilience and autonomy. Diversity doesn’t mean pulling every factory back to Europe or building walls around markets. Many industries depend on expertise and resources beyond our borders. The answer is optionality, never putting all our eggs in one basket. Europe must enable choice and work with trusted partners to build capabilities. This risk-based approach ensures we’re not hostage to single suppliers or overexposed to nations that don’t share our values. Look at the energy crisis after Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. Europe’s heavy reliance on Russian oil and gas left economies vulnerable. The solution wasn’t isolation, it was diversification: boosting domestic production from alternative energy sources while sourcing from multiple markets. Optionality is power. It lets Europe pivot when shocks hit, whether in energy, technology, or raw materials. Resilience is the art of prediction. Every system inevitably has vulnerabilities. The key is pre-empting, planning, testing and knowing how to recover quickly. Just as banks undergo stress tests, Europe needs similar rigor across physical and digital infrastructure. That also means promoting interoperability between networks, redundant connectivity links (including space and subsea cables), stockpiling critical components, and contingency plans. Resilience isn’t theoretical. It’s operational readiness. Finally, Europe must exercise authority through robust frameworks, such as authorization schemes, local licensing and governance rooted in EU law. The question is how and where to apply this control. On sensitive data, for example, sovereignty means ensuring it’s held in Europe under European jurisdiction, without replacing every underlying technology component. Sovereign solutions shouldn’t shut out global players. Instead, they should guarantee that critical decisions and compliance remain under European authority. Autonomy is empowerment, limiting external interference or denial of service while keeping systems secure and accountable. But let’s be clear: Europe cannot replicate world-leading technologies, platforms or critical components overnight. While we have the talent, innovation and leading industries, Europe has fallen significantly behind in a range of key emerging technologies. > While we have the talent, innovation and leading industries, Europe has fallen > significantly behind in a range of key emerging technologies. For example, building fully European alternatives in cloud and AI would take decades and billions of euros, and even then, we’d struggle to match Silicon Valley or Shenzhen. Worse, turning inward with protectionist policies would only weaken the foundations that we now seek to strengthen. “Old wines in new bottles” — import substitution, isolationism, picking winners — won’t deliver competitiveness or security. Contrast that with the much-debated US Inflation Reduction Act. Its incentives and subsidies were open to EU companies, provided they invest locally, develop local talent and build within the US market. It’s not about flags, it’s about pragmatism: attracting global investments, creating jobs and driving innovation-led growth. So what’s the practical path? Europe must embrace ‘sovereignty done right’, weaving diversity, resilience and autonomy into the fabric of its policies. That means risk-based safeguards, strategic partnerships and investment in European capabilities while staying open to global innovation. Trusted European operators can play a key role: managing encryption, access control and critical operations within EU jurisdiction, while enabling managed access to global technologies. To avoid ‘sovereignty washing’, eligibility should be based on rigorous, transparent assessments, not blanket bans. The Berlin summit’s new working group should start with a common EU-wide framework defining levels of data, operational and technological sovereignty. Providers claiming sovereign services can use this framework to transparently demonstrate which levels they meet. Europe’s sovereignty will not come from closing doors. Sovereignty done right will come from opening the right ones, on Europe’s terms. Independence should be dynamic, not defensive — empowering innovation, securing prosperity and protecting freedoms. > Europe’s sovereignty will not come from closing doors. Sovereignty done right > will come from opening the right ones, on Europe’s terms. That’s how Europe can build resilience, competitiveness and true strategic autonomy in a vibrant global digital ecosystem.

European Council President António Costa intends to summon EU leaders to an informal retreat in rural Belgium next February to discuss Europe’s competitiveness. The meeting of the bloc’s heads of state and government will take place on Feb. 12 at Alden Biesen Castle, a XVI century moated complex in the eastern Belgian region of Limburg, Costa said in an interview with Portuguese daily Expresso. The informal summit on competitiveness will take place just a few months after the leaders debated the European Commission’s proposal to foster a pan-European industrial revival by merging cash for research, defense and innovation in the EU’s 2028-2035 budget. Shortly before taking office a year ago, the Council president said he wanted to organize periodic, informal meetings of EU leaders where they could discuss broad, strategic topics without the need to reach definitive conclusions. The objective was to create space for the kinds of debates that regularly derailed official summits chaired by Costa’s predecessor, Charles Michel. Although Costa wanted to hold the retreats outside the Belgian capital, security concerns obliged him to hold the first of these events in Brussels’ central Egmont Palace last February. During that session, EU leaders discussed issues related to the wider topic of European defense. Last week the bloc’s leaders attended an informal meeting in Luanda, Angola, where talks focused on the ongoing efforts to secure a lasting peace in Ukraine. During the wide-ranging interview with Expresso, which marked his first year in the Council presidency, Costa said the greatest challenge he has faced was that of stabilizing relations between the EU and U.S. President Donald Trump. That goal, he said, had been achieved, but he acknowledged that the dynamics between Brussels and Washington are “different” than they once were. Costa said it was essential for the EU to “remain calm, serene, and continue to strive to be constructive” when dealing with Trump, and noted that the relationship between Brussels and Washington is not “between equals.” The EU, he noted, is made up of 27 member countries “each with its own policies and interests,” while the U.S. operates as a single, federal entity.

BRUSSELS — The EU and the U.K. failed to reach a deal on allowing Britain to take part in the bloc’s €150 billion Security Action for Europe loans-for-weapons program, three diplomats told POLITICO today. The negotiations have been very difficult, with London and Brussels clashing on how much the U.K. would have to pay to take part in joint procurements financed by SAFE. The U.K was offering only millions of euros, while the EU slashed its initial request for London to pay between €4.5 billion and €6.5 billion to a lower €2 billion. Head of the Commission’s Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space, Timo Pesonen, told EU ambassadors this morning that there’s no deal with the U.K., one of the diplomats said. The Commission is also negotiating a similar agreement with Canada. Pesonen said he will inform about the state of play of those talks this afternoon, but that there is more optimist that a deal can be reached with Ottawa.

The European Space Agency’s members approved a record €22.1 billion three-year budget and widened its mandate to include security and defense — a big change for an organization that had been dedicated “exclusively” to the peaceful use of space. “ESA’s intergovernmental framework provides the credentials and tools for developing space technologies and systems … for security and defence,” read the resolution adopted this week by the organization’s 23 members, according to a slide shared with reporters Thursday The ESA called the move a “historic change.” The war in Ukraine has shown the importance of space assets, both for intelligence gathering and secure communications. Europe is also looking to cut its reliance on U.S. companies, including Elon Musk’s SpaceX. In one example of the shift, the ESA’s new dual-use Earth observation project dubbed the European Resilience from Space, could have both civilian and military applications. Poland played a leading role in pushing for the ESA to be more involved in defense, the agency’s Director General  Josef Aschbacher told reporters. Warsaw and the organization are currently discussing setting up a new ESA centre in Poland that would focus on security. The budget includes €3.4 billion for Earth observation, €2.1 billion for secure communications and €900 million to develop European rocket launchers. That’s a significant increase compared to the previous budget of nearly €17 billion. “This is amazing,” Aschbacher said of the larger budget. Germany is the lead contributor, at about €5 billion, with France and Italy following at more than €3 billion each.

BRUSSELS — You can even put an exact date on the day when Brussels finally gave up on its decade-long dream of seeking to be the predominant global tech regulator that would rein in American tech titans like Google and Apple.  It came last Wednesday — Nov. 19 — when the European Commission made an outright retreat on its data and privacy rules and hit pause on its AI regulation, all part of an attempt to make European industries more competitive in the global showdown with the United States and China.   It sounded the death knell for what has long been described as the “Brussels Effect” — the idea that the EU would be a trailblazer on tech legislation and set the world’s standards for privacy and AI.  Critics say Washington is now setting the deregulatory trajectory, while U.S. President Donald Trump is battering down Europe’s ambitions by threatening to roll out tariffs against countries that he accuses of attacking “our incredible American Tech Companies.” “I don’t hear anybody in Brussels saying ‘We’re a super regulator’ anymore,” said Marietje Schaake, who shaped Europe’s tech rulebooks as a former European Parliament member and special adviser to the European Commission. The big pivot away from rule-setting came in a “digital omnibus” proposal on Wednesday — a core part of Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s “simplification” program to cut red tape to make Europe more competitive. The digital omnibus was one of the “main discussion points” at a meeting between the EU’s tech chief Henna Virkkunen and U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick and Trade Representative Jamieson Greer. | Nicolas Tucat/AFP via Getty Images “Whether you call it ‘simplification’ or ‘deregulation,’ you are certainly moving away from the high watermark era of regulation,” said Anu Bradford, a professor at Columbia University who coined the term “Brussels Effect” in 2012. The deregulation drive followed a year in which the Trump administration pressured the EU to roll back enforcement of its tech rulebooks, which Big Tech giants and Trump himself deem “taxes” targeted at U.S. companies. The digital omnibus was one of the “main discussion points” at a meeting between the EU’s tech chief Henna Virkkunen, U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick and Trade Representative Jamieson Greer on Monday. “We adopted a major package that would have an impact not only on EU companies, but also on U.S. companies, so this is the appropriate moment … to explain what we’re doing on our side,” European Commission spokesperson Thomas Regnier told reporters on Monday when asked why Virkkunen had discussed the topic with her U.S. counterparts. Lutnick, however, told Bloomberg that Washington was seeking more than just an explanation of EU laws — it wanted changes to its tech rulebooks as well. U.S. giants like Google and Meta have led a full-frontal lobbying push to replace heavy-handed EU enforcement with lighter-touch rules. Behind the push to break the shackles for tech firms is a fear of missing out on the promised economic boom linked to AI technologies. The bloc has traded its role as global tech cop for a ticket to the AI race.  GLOBAL FIRST Brussels showed its ambition to lead the world in regulating the online space throughout the 2010s. In 2016 it adopted the General Data Protection Regulation. Since then, the law has been copied in new legislation across more than 100 countries, said Joe Jones, director of research and insights at the International Association of Privacy Professionals.  When the GDPR came into force, international companies like Microsoft, Google and Facebook acknowledged it spurred them to apply EU privacy standards globally.  It served as a quintessential case of the Brussels Effect: When setting the bar in Brussels, multinational firms would roll out standards across their businesses far beyond the EU’s borders. Other governments, too, copied some of Brussels’ early attempts at setting the rules. After the GDPR, the EU adopted other laws that had the ambition of reining in Big Tech, either by pressing platforms to police for illegal content through its Digital Services Act or by blocking them from using their dominance to favor own services through the Digital Markets Act. Right after the EU adopted its risk-focused AI rulebook, Trump took office and scrapped AI safety rules embraced by his predecessor Joe Biden.  | Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images The EU’s latest blockbuster tech rulebook, the Artificial Intelligence Act, was Brussels’ latest attempt at pioneering legislation, as it sought to address the risks posed by the fledgling technology. “There was more confidence in the EU’s regulation, partially because the EU seemed confident. Right now, when the EU seems to be retreating, any government around is also asking the same question,” Bradford said. Right after the EU adopted its risk-focused AI rulebook, Trump took office and scrapped AI safety rules embraced by his predecessor Joe Biden.   The changing of the guard in Washington came right as Brussels was waking up to the need to be competitive in a global technology race. Former Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi presented the EU’s competitiveness report in 2024, just weeks before Trump won a second term. “I think the Brussels effect is still alive and well. It just has a bit of the Draghi effect, in that it has a bit of this geopolitical innovation, pro-growth effect in it,” said IAPP’s Jones.  According to German politician Jan Philipp Albrecht, a former European Parliament member who was a chief architect of the GDPR, Europe has become blind to the benefits of its regulatory regime that set the gold standard. “Europeans have no self-secureness anymore … They don’t see the strength in their own market and in their own regulatory and innovative power,” Albrecht said.  WASHINGTON EFFECT Other critics of deregulation are taking a step further, claiming that Washington has hijacked the Brussels Effect — but just on its own terms.   “In an odd way, maybe the Trump administration has taken inspiration from the Brussels Effect, in the sense [that] they see what it means for this one regulating entity to be the one that sets global standards,” said Brian J. Chen, policy director at nonprofit research group Data & Society. It’s just, “they want to be the ones setting those standards,” Chen said. The Trump administration pressured Brussels to tone down its tech regulation during heated trade talks this summer, POLITICO previously reported. That the EU followed through with scaling back its tech laws just as the U.S. is pressing the EU is bad optics, said Schaake, the former lawmaker. “The timing of the whole simplification [package] is very bad,” she said.  She argued that it’s essential to deal with the unnecessary burden on companies, but issuing the digital omnibus after the U.S. pressure “looks like a response to that criticism.” Commission spokesperson Thomas Regnier dismissed the idea that the EU was acting on U.S. pressure. “On the digital omnibus, absolutely no third country had an influence on our sovereign simplification agenda. Because this omnibus is about Europe: less administrative burden, less overlaps, less costs,” Regnier said in a comment on Friday. “We have always been clear: Europe has its sovereign right to legislate,” Regnier added. “Nothing in the omnibus is watering down our digital legislation and we will keep enforcing it, firmly but always fairly.” This article has been updated to include new developments.

BRUSSELS — When the colonial governments of Belgium and Portugal ordered the construction of a railway connecting oil- and mineral-rich regions in the African interior to the Atlantic, their primary objective was to plunder resources such as rubber, ivory and minerals for export to Western countries.  Today, that same stretch of railway infrastructure, snaking through Zambia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola to the port of Lobito, is being modernized and extended with U.S. and EU money to facilitate the transport of sought-after minerals like cobalt and copper. Just this month, Jozef Síkela, the EU commissioner for international partnerships, signed a €116 million investment package for the corridor, often hailed as a model initiative under Global Gateway, the bloc’s infrastructure development program. This time around, however, Brussels says it’s committed to resetting its historically tainted relationship with the region — a message European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa will stress when they address African and EU leaders at a Nov. 24-25 summit in Luanda, Angola, which is this year celebrating 50 years of independence from Portuguese rule.  “Global Gateway is about mutual benefits,” von der Leyen said in a keynote speech in October. The program should “focus even more on key value chains,” including the metals and minerals needed in everything from smartphones to wind turbines and defense applications.  The aim, she said, is to “build up resilient value chains together. With local infrastructure, but also local jobs, local skills and local industries.”  Yet Brussels is scrambling to enter a region only to find that China got there first. Batches of copper sheets are stored in a warehouse and wait to be loaded on trucks in Zambia. | Per-Anders Pettersson/Getty Images African countries are already the primary suppliers of minerals to Beijing, which has secured access to their resource wealth — unhindered by any historical baggage of colonial exploitation — and is now the world’s dominant processor. Europe’s emphasis on retaining economic value in host countries — rather than merely extracting resources for export — answers calls by African leaders for a more equitable and sustainable approach to developing their countries’ natural resources.  “The EU has been quite vocal, since the beginning of the raw minerals diplomacy two years ago, saying: We want to be the ethical partner,” said Martina Matarazzo, international and EU advocacy coordinator at Resource Matters, a Belgian NGO focusing on resource extraction, which also has an office in Kinshasa, DRC.  But “there is a big gap” between what’s being said and what’s being done, she added, pointing out that it is still unclear how the Lobito Corridor can be a “win-win” project, rather than just facilitating the shipping of minerals abroad.  Brussels finds itself under growing pressure to diversify its supply chains of lithium, rare earths and other raw materials away from China — which has demonstrated time and again it is ready to weaponize its market dominance. To that end, it is drafting a new plan, due on Dec. 3, to accelerate the bloc’s diversification efforts.   In African countries, however, Brussels is still struggling to establish itself as an attractive, ethical alternative to Beijing, which has long secured vast access to the continent’s resources through large-scale investments in mining, processing and infrastructure.  To enter the minerals space, the EU needs to walk the talk in close cooperation with African leaders — doing so may be its only chance to secure resources while moving away from its extractivist past, POLITICO has found in conversations with researchers, policymakers and civil society.  RESOURCE RUSH Appetite for Africa’s vast natural riches first drew colonizers to the continent — and laid “the foundation for post-independence resource dependency and external interference,” according to the Africa Policy Research Institute. Now, the continent’s deposits of vital minerals have turned it into a strategic player, with Zambian President Hakainde Hichilema last year setting a goal of tripling copper output by the end of the decade, for instance. Beijing has often used Belt and Road, its international development initiative, to secure mining rights in exchange for infrastructure projects. Washington, which lags far behind Beijing, is also stepping up its game, with investments into Africa quietly overtaking China’s. President Donald Trump has extended the U.S. security umbrella to war-torn areas in exchange for access to resources, for example brokering a — shaky — peace deal between Rwanda and the DRC. EU companies are “really trying to catch up,” said Christian Géraud Neema Byamungu, an expert on China-Africa relations and the Francophone Africa editor of the China Global South Project. “They left Africa when there was a sense that Africa is not really a place to do business.” DOING THINGS DIFFERENTLY Against this backdrop, the key question for the EU is: What can it offer to set itself apart from other partners? On paper, the answer is clear: a responsible approach to resource extraction that prioritizes creating local economic value, along with high environmental and social standards.  “We want to focus on the sustainable development of value chains and how to work with our African partners to support their rise of the value chains,” said an EU official ahead of the Luanda summit, where minerals will be a key topic. “This is not about extraction only,” they added. But so far, that still has to translate into a concrete impact on the ground. “We are not at the point where we can see how really the EU is trying to change things on the ground in terms of value addition in DRC,” said Emmanuel Umpula Nkumba, executive director of NGO Afrewatch. “I am not naïve, they are coming to make money, not to help us,” he added.  Not only has offtake from the Lobito Corridor been slow, but the project has also come under fire for prioritizing Western interests over African development and agency, and for potentially leading to the destruction of local forests, community displacement and an overall lack of benefits for local populations.  The 2024 Lobito Corridor Trans-Africa Summit | Andrew Caballero-Reynolds/AFP via Getty Images The EU, however, views the corridor as “a symbol of the partnership between the African and European continent and an example of our shared investment agenda,” according to a Commission spokesperson, who called it “a lifeline towards sustainable development and shared prosperity.” Finally, while “value addition” has become a catchphrase, it’s unclear whether EU and African leaders see eye to eye on what the term means.  African industry representatives and officials often point to building a domestic supply chain up to the final product. EU officials, by contrast, tend to envision refining minerals in the country of origin and then exporting them, according to a report published by the European Council on Foreign Relations. A SUSTAINABLE BUSINESS CASE? The second component of the EU’s approach — strong sustainability and human rights safeguards — faces major trouble, not least in the name of making the EU more competitive.  In Brussels, proposed rules that would require companies to police their supply chains for environmental harm and human rights violations are dying a slow death, as conservative politicians channel complaints from businesses that they can’t bear the cost of complying. An investigation by the Business & Human Rights Resource Centre of the 13 mining, refining and recycling projects outside the bloc labeled “strategic” by the EU executive — including four in Africa — identified “an inconsistent approach to key human rights policies.”  However, under pressure from African leaders, stricter safeguards are slowly becoming more important in the sector: “high [environmental, social and governance] standards” are a core component of the African Union’s mining strategy published in 2024.  The Chinese, too, are adapting quickly.  “China’s also getting good with standards,” said Sarah Logan, a visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations who co-authored the assessment of African and European interpretations of value addition. “If they are made to, Chinese mining companies are very capable of adhering to ESG standards.”  Therefore, besides massively scaling up investment, the EU and European companies will need to turn their promise of being a reliable and ethical partner into reality — sooner rather than later. “The only way to distinguish ourselves from the Chinese is to guarantee these benefits for communities,” Spanish Green European lawmaker Ana Miranda Paz told a panel discussion on the Lobito Corridor in Brussels. This story has been updated with comment from the European Commission.

LONDON — Ukraine’s staunchest allies held emergency talks on the sidelines of the G20 summit in South Africa in an attempt to stop Donald Trump forcing Kyiv to hand swathes of territory to Russia in a lopsided peace deal.  Western governments were privately shocked and dismayed at the new 28-point outline for a peace deal from the U.S. president’s team this week, seeing it as an attempt to force Ukraine to give Vladimir Putin everything he wants.  European leaders are now frantically working up counter-proposals to put to Trump in an effort to mitigate the worst of the U.S. proposals, according to multiple officials familiar with the matter, granted anonymity to speak candidly.  More than a dozen leaders including Germany’s Friedrich Merz, France’s Emmanuel Macron, the U.K.’s Keir Starmer, the EU’s Ursula von der Leyen and Canada’s Mark Carney met for an urgent discussion at the G20 summit in Johannesburg to coordinate their response with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. “The draft is a basis which will require additional work,” the leaders said in a joint statement after discussing Trump’s plan.  “We are clear on the principle that borders must not be changed by force. We are also concerned by the proposed limitations on Ukraine’s armed forces, which would leave Ukraine vulnerable to future attack.” The leaders reiterated the “strength” of their continued support for Ukraine and insisted that any provisions in a peace deal that affected the EU or NATO would require proper “consent” from the members of these multinational blocs. The main aim of Ukraine’s friends is to strengthen Zelenskyy’s position and ensure he has their public backing for whatever comes next. While none of Ukraine’s allies has been involved in drafting Trump’s plan or has said they think it is fair, they took care not to reject the 28-point blueprint outright, for fear of antagonizing Trump.  CRISIS TALKS Instead, intense work is going on behind the scenes to devise alternatives that would better protect Ukrainian and European interests, the officials said. However, it is clear that none of Ukraine’s friends and allies believe the raw Trump plan is acceptable and some do not even want to give it any credibility at all.  One EU diplomat said engaging with the U.S. proposals would “lend legitimacy to something that has been drawn up without Ukrainian or European involvement, while its impact would directly affect us. As such it’s a non-starter.”  The crisis talks in Johannesburg came as the Trump administration piles pressure on Zelenskyy to agree to the terms of their plan by a deadline of Thanksgiving, next Thursday. If Zelenskyy refuses, Trump could cut off access to U.S. intelligence on Russian activities, as well as halt American military support, both of which have been critical in keeping Ukraine in the fight for the past three-and-a-half years.  Then Ukraine would be left almost entirely reliant on support from Europe, and EU leaders are already struggling to work out how to help.  “We have been working for a just and sustainable peace with Ukraine and for Ukraine together with our friends and partners,” European Commission President von der Leyen said after a meeting with Zelenskyy on Friday. “We have discussed the current situation and we are clear that there should be nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine.”  European leaders are now frantically working up counter-proposals to put to Trump in an effort to mitigate the worst of the U.S. proposals, according to multiple officials. | Pool picture by Henry Nicholls/WPA via Getty Images Von der Leyen also spoke with Macron, Starmer and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni. The British leader made clear that he and others would work to try to improve the Trump plan. “Ukraine’s friends and partners will meet in the margins of the G20 summit to discuss how we can secure a full ceasefire and create the space for meaningful peace negotiations,” Starmer said. “We will discuss the current proposal on the table, and in support of President Trump’s push for peace, look at how we can strengthen this plan for the next phase of negotiations.” Trump is intensifying his push for a peace accord at a particularly sensitive time for Zelenskyy — who is battling to contain a swirling corruption scandal — and that is part of the point. U.S. officials think Zelenskyy’s weakness at home will make it more likely that he will agreee to their terms.  Zelenskyy himself said on Friday that his country is facing one of the most difficult moments in its history and may be forced to choose between losing its “dignity” and losing “a key partner.”  THURSDAY DEADLINE Putin meanwhile has backed Trump’s deal, which includes unfreezing Russian assets currently held in Europe, and preparing the way for potentially lucrative reconstruction work from which America would profit. The U.S. proposal also suggests future Russian-American projects would flow from the peace.  In another irritation to Brussels, Hungary’s Putin-friendly leader, Viktor Orbán, also backed the U.S. plan. It’s not clear what happens if Ukraine does not sign up to the deal by Trump’s Thursday deadline. European officials note that Trump has frequently imposed deadlines — on Putin as well as on trade partners — only for these to pass without consequences. One suggestion is that America could cut off its intelligence sharing support for Ukraine’s military, which Trump has done before, before restoring it again.  Europeans are dismayed that they — and Ukraine — have been completely cut out of Trump’s work on the draft peace accord, which his envoy Steve Witkoff drew up. EU officials insist that since Europe is now a much bigger donor than the U.S. to Ukraine’s military effort it must not be ignored in any negotiations.  More importantly for von der Leyen, Starmer and the rest of the leaders, there cannot be a deal done over Zelenskyy’s head. European officials and former officials have described the 28-point plan as “scandalous” and said Witkoff needs “a psychiatrist” if he thinks it will fly.