Europe’s chemical industry has reached a breaking point. The warning lights are no longer blinking — they are blazing. Unless Europe changes course immediately, we risk watching an entire industrial backbone, with the countless jobs it supports, slowly hollow out before our eyes. Consider the energy situation: this year European gas prices have stood at 2.9 times higher than in the United States. What began as a temporary shock is now a structural disadvantage. High energy costs are becoming Europe’s new normal, with no sign of relief. This is not sustainable for an energy-intensive sector that competes globally every day. Without effective infrastructure and targeted energy-cost relief — including direct support, tax credits and compensation for indirect costs from the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) — we are effectively asking European companies and their workers to compete with their hands tied behind their backs. > Unless Europe changes course immediately, we risk watching an entire > industrial backbone, with the countless jobs it supports, slowly hollow out > before our eyes. The impact is already visible. This year, EU27 chemical production fell by a further 2.5 percent, and the sector is now operating 9.5 percent below pre-crisis capacity. These are not just numbers, they are factories scaling down, investments postponed and skilled workers leaving sites. This is what industrial decline looks like in real time. We are losing track of the number of closures and job losses across Europe, and this is accelerating at an alarming pace. And the world is not standing still. In the first eight months of 2025, EU27 chemicals exports dropped by €3.5 billion, while imports rose by €3.2 billion. The volume trends mirror this: exports are down, imports are up. Our trade surplus shrank to €25 billion, losing €6.6 billion in just one year. Meanwhile, global distortions are intensifying. Imports, especially from China, continue to increase, and new tariff policies from the United States are likely to divert even more products toward Europe, while making EU exports less competitive. Yet again, in 2025, most EU trade defense cases involved chemical products. In this challenging environment, EU trade policy needs to step up: we need fast, decisive action against unfair practices to protect European production against international trade distortions. And we need more free trade agreements to access growth market and secure input materials. “Open but not naïve” must become more than a slogan. It must shape policy. > Our producers comply with the strictest safety and environmental standards in > the world. Yet resource-constrained authorities cannot ensure that imported > products meet those same standards. Europe is also struggling to enforce its own rules at the borders and online. Our producers comply with the strictest safety and environmental standards in the world. Yet resource-constrained authorities cannot ensure that imported products meet those same standards. This weak enforcement undermines competitiveness and safety, while allowing products that would fail EU scrutiny to enter the single market unchecked. If Europe wants global leadership on climate, biodiversity and international chemicals management, credibility starts at home. Regulatory uncertainty adds to the pressure. The Chemical Industry Action Plan recognizes what industry has long stressed: clarity, coherence and predictability are essential for investment. Clear, harmonized rules are not a luxury — they are prerequisites for maintaining any industrial presence in Europe. This is where REACH must be seen for what it is: the world’s most comprehensive piece of legislation governing chemicals. Yet the real issues lie in implementation. We therefore call on policymakers to focus on smarter, more efficient implementation without reopening the legal text. Industry is facing too many headwinds already. Simplification can be achieved without weakening standards, but this requires a clear political choice. We call on European policymakers to restore the investment and profitability of our industry for Europe. Only then will the transition to climate neutrality, circularity, and safe and sustainable chemicals be possible, while keeping our industrial base in Europe. > Our industry is an enabler of the transition to a climate-neutral and circular > future, but we need support for technologies that will define that future. In this context, the ETS must urgently evolve. With enabling conditions still missing, like a market for low-carbon products, energy and carbon infrastructures, access to cost-competitive low-carbon energy sources, ETS costs risk incentivizing closures rather than investment in decarbonization. This may reduce emissions inside the EU, but it does not decarbonize European consumption because production shifts abroad. This is what is known as carbon leakage, and this is not how EU climate policy intends to reach climate neutrality. The system needs urgent repair to avoid serious consequences for Europe’s industrial fabric and strategic autonomy, with no climate benefit. These shortcomings must be addressed well before 2030, including a way to neutralize ETS costs while industry works toward decarbonization. Our industry is an enabler of the transition to a climate-neutral and circular future, but we need support for technologies that will define that future. Europe must ensure that chemical recycling, carbon capture and utilization, and bio-based feedstocks are not only invented here, but also fully scaled here. Complex permitting, fragmented rules and insufficient funding are slowing us down while other regions race ahead. Decarbonization cannot be built on imported technology — it must be built on a strong EU industrial presence. Critically, we must stimulate markets for sustainable products that come with an unavoidable ‘green premium’. If Europe wants low-carbon and circular materials, then fiscal, financial and regulatory policy recipes must support their uptake — with minimum recycled or bio-based content, new value chain mobilizing schemes and the right dose of ‘European preference’. If we create these markets but fail to ensure that European producers capture a fair share, we will simply create new opportunities for imports rather than European jobs. > If Europe wants a strong, innovative resilient chemical industry in 2030 and > beyond, the decisions must be made today. The window is closing fast. The Critical Chemicals Alliance offers a path forward. Its primary goal will be to tackle key issues facing the chemical sector, such as risks of closures and trade challenges, and to support modernization and investments in critical productions. It will ultimately enable the chemical industry to remain resilient in the face of geopolitical threats, reinforcing Europe’s strategic autonomy. But let us be honest: time is no longer on our side. Europe’s chemical industry is the foundation of countless supply chains — from clean energy to semiconductors, from health to mobility. If we allow this foundation to erode, every other strategic ambition becomes more fragile. If you weren’t already alarmed — you should be. This is a wake-up call. Not for tomorrow, for now. Energy support, enforceable rules, smart regulation, strategic trade policies and demand-driven sustainability are not optional. They are the conditions for survival. If Europe wants a strong, innovative resilient chemical industry in 2030 and beyond, the decisions must be made today. The window is closing fast. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is CEFIC- The European Chemical Industry Council  * The ultimate controlling entity is CEFIC- The European Chemical Industry Council  More information here.

President Donald Trump promised that a wave of emergency tariffs on nearly every nation would restore “fair” trade and jump-start the economy. Eight months later, half of U.S. imports are avoiding those tariffs. “To all of the foreign presidents, prime ministers, kings, queens, ambassadors, and everyone else who will soon be calling to ask for exemptions from these tariffs,” Trump said in April when he rolled out global tariffs based on the United States’ trade deficits with other countries, “I say, terminate your own tariffs, drop your barriers, don’t manipulate your currencies.” But in the time since the president gave that Rose Garden speech announcing the highest tariffs in a century, enormous holes have appeared. Carveouts for specific products, trade deals with major allies and conflicting import duties have let more than half of all imports escape his sweeping emergency tariffs. Some $1.6 trillion in annual imports are subject to the tariffs, while at least $1.7 trillion are excluded, either because they are duty-free or subject to another tariff, according to a POLITICO analysis based on last year’s import data. The exemptions on thousands of goods could undercut Trump’s effort to protect American manufacturing, shrink the trade deficit and raise new revenue to fund his domestic agenda. In September, the White House exempted hundreds of goods, including critical minerals and industrial materials, totaling nearly $280 billion worth of annual imports. Then in November, the administration exempted $252 billion worth of mostly agricultural imports like beef, coffee and bananas, some of which are not widely produced in the U.S. — just after cost-of-living issues became a major talking point out of Democratic electoral victories — on top of the hundreds of other carveouts. “The administration, for most of this year, spent a lot of time saying tariffs are a way to offload taxes onto foreigners,” said Ed Gresser, a former assistant U.S. trade representative under Democratic and Republican administrations, including Trump’s first term, who now works at the Progressive Policy Institute, a D.C.-based think tank. “I think that becomes very hard to continue arguing when you then say, ‘But we are going to get rid of tariffs on coffee and beef, and that will bring prices down.’ … It’s a big retreat in principle.” The Trump administration has argued that higher tariffs would rebalance the United States’ trade deficits with many of its major trading partners, which Trump blames for the “hollowing out” of U.S. manufacturing in what he evoked as a “national emergency.” Before the Supreme Court, the administration is defending the president’s use of the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act to enact the tariffs, and Trump has said that a potential court-ordered end to the emergency tariffs would be “country-threatening.” In an interview with POLITICO on Monday, Trump said he was open to adding even more exemptions to tariffs. He downplayed the existing carveouts as “very small” and “not a big deal,” and said he plans to pair them with tariff increases elsewhere. Responding to POLITICO’s analysis, White House spokesperson Kush Desai said, “The Trump administration is implementing a nuanced and nimble tariff agenda to address our historic trade deficit and safeguard our national security. This agenda has already resulted in trillions in investments to make and hire in America along with over a dozen trade deals with some of America’s most important trade partners.” To date, the majority of exemptions to the “reciprocal” tariffs — the minimum 10 percent levies on most countries — have been for reasons other than new trade deals, according to POLITICO’s analysis. The White House also pushed back against the notion that November’s cuts were made in an effort to reduce food prices, saying that the exemptions were first outlined in the September order. The U.S. granted subsequent blanket exemptions, regardless of the status of countries’ trade negotiations with the Trump administration, after announcing several trade deals. Following the exemptions on agricultural tariffs, Trump announced on Monday a $12 billion relief aid package for farmers hurt by tariffs and rising production costs. The money will come from an Agriculture Department fund, though the president said it was paid for by revenue from tariffs (by law, Congress would need to approve spending the money that tariffs bring in). In addition to the exemptions from Trump’s reciprocal tariffs, more than $300 billion of imports are also exempted as part of trade deals the administration has negotiated in recent months, including with the European Union, the United Kingdom, Japan and more recently, Malaysia, Cambodia and Brazil. The deal with Brazil removed a range of products from a cumulative tariff of 50 percent, making two-thirds of imports from the country free from emergency tariffs. For Canadian and Mexican goods, Trump imposed tariffs under a separate emergency justification over fentanyl trafficking and undocumented migrants. But about half of imports from Mexico and nearly 40 percent of those from Canada will not face tariffs because of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada free trade agreement that Trump negotiated in his first term. Last year, importers claimed USMCA exemptions on $405 billion in goods; that value is expected to increase, given that the two countries are facing high tariffs for the first time in several years. The Trump administration has also exempted several products — including autos, steel and aluminum — from the emergency reciprocal tariffs because they already face duties under Section 232 of the U.S. Trade Expansion Act of 1962. The imports covered by those tariffs could total up to $900 billion annually, some of which may also be exempt under USMCA. The White House is considering using the law to justify further tariffs on pharmaceuticals, semiconductors and several other industries. For now, the emergency tariffs remain in place as the Supreme Court weighs whether Trump exceeded his authority in imposing them. In May, the U.S. Court of International Trade ruled that Trump’s use of emergency authority was unlawful — a decision the U.S. Court of Appeals upheld in August. During oral arguments on Nov. 5, several Supreme Court justices expressed skepticism that the emergency statute authorizes a president to levy tariffs, a power constitutionally assigned to Congress. As the rates of tariffs and their subsequent exemptions are quickly added and amended, businesses are struggling to keep pace, said Sabine Altendorf, an economist with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. “When there’s uncertainty and rapid changes, it makes operations very difficult,” Altendorf said. “Especially for agricultural products where growing times and planting times are involved, it’s very important for market actors to be able to plan ahead.” ABOUT THE DATA Trump’s trade policy is not a straightforward, one-size-fits-all approach, despite the blanket tariffs on most countries of the world. POLITICO used 2024 import data to estimate the value of goods subject to each tariff, accounting for the stacking rules outlined below. Under Trump’s current system, some tariffs can “stack” — meaning a product can face more than one tariff if multiple trade actions apply to it. Section 232 tariffs cover automobiles, automobile parts, products made of steel and aluminum, copper and lumber — and are applied in that order of priority. Section 232 tariffs as a whole then take priority over other emergency tariffs. We applied this stacking priority order to all imports to ensure no double-counting. To calculate the total exclusions, we did not count the value of products containing steel, aluminum and copper, since the tariff would apply only to the known portion of the import’s metal contentand not the total import value of all products containing them. This makes the $1.7 trillion in exclusions a minimum estimate. Goods from Canada and Mexico imported under USMCA face no tariffs. Some of these products fall under a Section 232 category and may be charged applicable tariffs for the non-USMCA portion of the import. To claim exemptions under USMCA, importers must indicate the percentage of the product made or assembled in Canada or Mexico. Because detailed commodity-level data on which imports qualify for USMCA is not available, POLITICO’s analysis estimated the amount that would be excluded from tariffs on Mexican and Canadian imports by applying each country’s USMCA-exempt share to its non-Section 232 import value. For instance, 38 percent of Canada’s total imports qualified for USMCA. The non-Section 232 imports from Canada totaled around $320 billion, so we used only $121 billion towards our calculation of total goods excluded from Trump’s emergency tariffs. Exemptions from trade deals included those with the European Union, the United Kingdom, Japan, Brazil, Cambodia and Malaysia. They do not include “frameworks” for agreements announced by the administration. Exemptions were calculated in chronological order of when the deals were announced. Imports already exempted in previous orders were not counted again, even if they appeared on subsequent exemption lists.

BRUSSELS — Denmark is holding the line and pressing ahead with plans to schedule a crucial vote of EU ambassadors on the EU-Mercosur trade deal next week, in a tug-of-war splitting countries across the bloc. “In the planning of the Danish presidency, the intention is to have the vote on the Mercosur agreement next week to enable the Commission President to sign the agreement in Brazil on Dec. 20,” an official with the Danish presidency of the Council of the EU told POLITICO. This is the first official confirmation from Copenhagen that it will go ahead with scheduling the vote over the deal with the Latin American countries in the coming days, despite warnings from France, Poland and Italy that the texts as they stand would not garner their support.  This risks leaving the Danish presidency of the Council short of the supermajority needed to get the deal over the line. Under EU rules, this would require the support of a “qualified” majority of EU member countries — meaning 15 of the bloc’s 27 members representing 65 percent of its population. The outcome of the vote will determine whether European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen can fly, as is now planned, to Brazil on Dec. 20 for a signing ceremony with her Mercosur counterparts. France however has been playing for time in an effort to delay its approval of the accord, which has been more than 25 years in the making — a strategy several diplomats warn could ultimately kill the trade deal.  They cite fears that further stalling could embolden opposition in the European Parliament or complicate the next steps when Paraguay, which is more skeptical of the agreement, takes over the presidency of the Mercosur bloc. “If we can’t agree on Mercosur, we don’t need to talk about European sovereignty anymore. We will make ourselves geopolitically irrelevant,” said a senior EU diplomat. European leaders, including French President Emmanuel Macron, are expected to descend on Brussels on Thursday for a high-stakes EU summit. While not formally on the agenda, the trade deal with Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay is expected to loom large. A farmers demonstration is also expected in Brussels on the same day.  Countries backing the deal, including Germany and Sweden, argue that France has already been accommodated, pointing to proposed additional safeguards designed to protect European farmers in the event of a surge in Latin American beef or poultry imports. The instrument, which still requires validation by EU institutions, was a proposal from the Commission to placate Poland and France, whose influential farming constituencies worry they would be undercut by Latin American beef or poultry.  The texts submitted for the upcoming vote were published last week and include a temporary strengthened safeguard, committing to closely monitor market disruptions — one of the key conditions for Paris to back the deal.

PARIS — Far-right presidential hopeful Marine Le Pen has criticized France’s participation in European defense programs, arguing they’re a waste of money that should be spent on the country’s military instead. “[French President Emmanuel] Macron has consistently encouraged European institutions to interfere in our defense policy,” she told French lawmakers on Wednesday. Slamming the European Defence Fund and the European Peace Facility — two EU-level defense funding and coordination initiatives — and industrial defense projects between France and Germany, she said: “A great deal of public money has been wasted and precious years have been lost, for our manufacturers, for our armed forces and for the French people.” Le Pen was speaking in the National Assembly during a debate about boosting France’s defense budget. Some 411 MPs of the 522 lawmakers present voted in favor of increasing military expenditures — although the Greens and the Socialists warned they won’t let social spending suffer as a result. The far-right National Rally has an anti-EU agenda and is wary of defense industrial cooperation with Germany. Le Pen criticized Macron’s proposal this past summer to enter into a strategic dialogue with European countries on how France’s nuclear deterrent could contribute to Europe’s security. She also slammed the Future Air Combat System, a project to build a next-generation fighter jet with Germany and Spain, describing it as a “blatant failure.” She hinted she would axe the program if she won power in France’s next presidential elections, scheduled for 2027, along with another initiative to manufacture a next-generation battle tank with Berlin, known as the Main Ground Combat System. Le Pen claimed that France’s military planning law was contributing to EU funds that were, in turn, being spent on foreign defense contractors. “Cutting national defense budgets to create a European defense system actually means financing American, Korean or Israeli defense companies,” she said. Marine Le Pen criticized Emmanuel Macron’s proposal this past summer to enter into a strategic dialogue with European countries on how France’s nuclear deterrent could contribute to Europe’s security. | Pool Photo by Sebastien Bozon via Getty Images The French government has long pushed for Buy European clauses to be attached to the use of EU money, with mixed results. “[European Commission President Ursula] von der Leyen did not hear you, or perhaps did not listen to you, promising to purchase large quantities of American weapons in the unfair trade agreement with President [Donald] Trump,” Le Pen declared. In reality, the EU-U.S. trade deal agreed earlier this year contains no legally binding obligation to buy U.S. arms.

Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music * Amazon Music Brussels was jolted this week by dawn raids and an alleged fraud probe involving current and former senior EU diplomats. Host Sarah Wheaton speaks with Zoya Sheftalovich — a longtime Brussels Playbook editor who has just returned from Australia to begin her new role as POLITICO’s chief EU correspondent — and with Max Griera, our European Parliament reporter, to unpack what we know so far, what’s at stake for Ursula von der Leyen, and where the investigation may head next. Then, with Zoya staying in the studio, we’re joined by Senior Climate Correspondent Karl Mathiesen, Trade and Competition Editor Doug Busvine and Defense Editor Jan Cienski to take stock of the Commission’s first year — marked by this very bumpy week. We look at competitiveness, climate, defense and the fast-shifting global landscape — and our panel delivers its score for von der Leyen’s team.

A pair of documents laying out the Trump administration’s global security strategy have been delayed for weeks due in part to changes that Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent insisted on concerning China, according to three people familiar with the discussions on the strategies. The documents — the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy — were initially expected to be released earlier this fall. Both are now almost done and will likely be released this month, one of the people said. The second person confirmed the imminent release of the National Security Strategy, and the third confirmed that the National Defense Strategy was coming very soon. All were granted anonymity to discuss internal deliberations. The strategies went through multiple rounds of revisions after Bessent wanted more work done on the language used to discuss China, given sensitivity over ongoing trade negotiations with Beijing and the elevation of the Western Hemisphere as a higher priority than it had been in previous administrations, the people said. The National Security Strategy has been used by successive administrations to outline their overall strategic priorities from the economic sphere to dealing with allies and adversaries and military posture. The drafting goes through a series of readthroughs and comment periods from Cabinet officials in an attempt to capture the breadth of an administrations’ vision and ensure the entire administration is marching in the same direction on the president’s top issues. The administration has been involved in sensitive trade talks with Beijing for months over tariffs and a variety of trade issues, but the Pentagon has maintained its position that China remains the top military rival to the United States. The extent of the changes after Bessent’s requests remains unclear, but two of the people said that Bessent wanted to soften some of the language concerning Chinese activities while declining to provide more details. Any changes to one document would require similar changes to the other, as they must be in sync to express a unified front. It is common for the Treasury secretary and other Cabinet officials to weigh in during the drafting and debate process of crafting a new strategy, as most administrations will only release one National Security Strategy per term. In a statement, the Treasury Department said that Bessent “is 100 percent aligned with President Trump, as is everyone else in this administration, as to how to best manage the relationship with China.” The White House referred to the Treasury Department. Trump administration officials have alternately decried the threat from China and looked for ways to improve relations with Beijing. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth is expected to deliver a speech on Friday at the Reagan Library in Simi Valley, California, on Pentagon efforts to build weapons more quickly to meet the China challenge. At the same time, Hegseth is working with his Chinese counterpart, Adm. Dong Jun, to set up a U.S.-China military communication system aimed to prevent disagreements or misunderstandings from spiraling into unintended conflict in the Indo-Pacific. Bessent told the New ‍York Times Dealbook summit on Wednesday that China was on schedule to meet the pledges it made under a ‌U.S.-China trade agreement, including purchasing 12 million metric tons of soybeans by February 2026. “China is on track to ‍keep every ⁠part of the deal,” ⁠he said. Those moves by administration officials are set against the massive Chinese military buildup in the Indo-Pacific region and tensions over Beijing’s belligerent attitude toward the Philippines, where Beijing and Manila have been facing off over claims of land masses and reefs in the South China Sea. The U.S. has been supplying the Philippines with more sophisticated weaponry in recent years in part to ward off the Chinese threat. China has also consistently flown fighter planes and bombers and sailed warships close to Taiwan’s shores despite the Taiwan Relations Act, an American law that pledges the U.S. to keep close ties with the independent island. The National Security Strategy, which is put out by every administration, hasn’t been updated since 2022 under the Biden administration. That document highlighted three core themes: strategic competition with China and Russia; renewed investment and focus on domestic industrial policy; and the recognition that climate change is a central challenge that touches all aspects of national security. The strategy is expected to place more emphasis on the Western Hemisphere than previous strategies, which focused on the Middle East, counterterrorism, China and Russia. The new strategy will include those topics but also focus on topics such as migration, drug cartels and relations with Latin America — all under the umbrella of protecting the U.S. homeland. That new National Defense Strategy similarly places more emphasis on protecting the U.S. homeland and the Western Hemisphere, as POLITICO first reported, a choice that has caused some concern among military commanders. Both documents are expected to be followed by the “global posture review,” a look at how U.S. military assets are positioned across the globe, and which is being eagerly anticipated by allies from Germany to South Korea, both of which are home to tens of thousands of U.S. troops who might be moved elsewhere.

Steven Everts is the director of the EU Institute for Security Studies The intense diplomatic maneuvering to shape an endgame to the war in Ukraine has revealed a troubling reality: Even when it comes to its own security, the EU struggles to be a central player. The ongoing negotiations over Ukraine’s future — a conflict European leaders routinely describe as “existential” — are proceeding with minimal input from the bloc. And while others set the tone and direction, Europe remains reactive: managing the fallout, limiting the damage and hoping to recuperate its influence. This marginalization isn’t the result of a single decision or down to one person — no matter how consequential U.S. President Donald Trump may be. Rather, it reflects a deeper vulnerability and an unsettling pattern. Anyone looking at Europe’s choices in recent months can see a psychology of weakness. It paints the picture of a continent lacking courage, unable to take decisive action even when it comes to its core interests and when policy alternatives are within reach. Europe is losing confidence, sinking into fatalism and justifying its passivity with the soothing thought that it has no real choice, as its cards are weak. Besides, in the long run, things will work out. Just wait for the U.S. midterms. But will they? And can Europe afford to wait? Ukraine certainly cannot. Simply commenting on others’ peace plan drafts in some form of “track-changes diplomacy” isn’t enough. Decisions are needed, and they’re needed now. Europe is a continent of rich countries with ample capabilities. But while its leaders insist Ukraine’s security and success are essential to Europe’s own security and survival, its actual military assistance to Kyiv has declined in recent months. On the financial end, Europe is flunking the test it set for itself. Ukraine requires approximately €70 billion annually — and yes, this is a large sum, but it amounts to only 0.35 percent of the EU’s GDP. This is within Europe’s collective capacity. Yet for months now, member countries have been unable to agree on the mechanisms for using frozen Russian assets or suitable alternatives that could keep Ukraine afloat. Instead, we’ve seen dithering and the triumph of small thinking. It’s also rather telling that the U.S. attempt to simply impose how these assets are to be used, with 50 percent of the profits going to Washington instead of Kyiv, is finally jolting Europe into action. Regrettably, Europe’s psychology of weakness is equally visible in the economic domain, as the EU-U.S. trade agreement struck this July was a classic case of how frailty can masquerade as “pragmatism.” Brussels had the tools to respond to Washington’s tariffs and coercive measures, including counter-tariffs and its anti-coercion instrument. But under pressure from member countries fearful of broader U.S. disengagement from European security and Ukraine, it chose not to use them. The result was a one-sided “deal” with a 15 percent unilateral tariff, which breaks the World Trade Organization’s rules and obliges Europe to make energy purchases and investments in the U.S. worth hundreds of billions of dollars. Even worse, the deal didn’t produce the stability advertised as its main benefit. Washington has since designated Europe’s energy transition measures and tech regulations as “trade barriers” and “taxes on U.S. companies,” signaling that further retaliatory steps may follow. Just last week, the U.S. upped the pressure once more, when its trade representatives met EU ministers and openly challenged existing EU rules on tech. Regrettably, Europe’s psychology of weakness is equally visible in the economic domain, as the EU-U.S. trade agreement struck this July was a classic case of how frailty can masquerade as “pragmatism.”. | Thierry Monasse/Getty Images More than on defense, the EU is meant to be an economic and regulatory superpower. But despite decades of leveraging its economic weight for political purposes, the EU is now adrift, faced with a widening transatlantic power play over trade and technology. Similar patterns of retreat mark the EU’s actions in other areas as well. As Russia escalates its hybrid warfare operations against the bloc’s critical infrastructure, Europe’s response remains hesitant. As China dramatically weaponizes its export controls on critical mineral exports, Europe continues to respond late and without clear coordination. And in the Middle East, despite being one of the leading donors to Gaza, Europe is peripheral in shaping any ceasefire and reconstruction plans. In crisis after crisis, Europe’s role is not only small but shrinking still. The question is, when will Europeans decide they’ve had enough of this weakness and irrelevance? This is, above all, a matter of psychology, of believing in one’s capabilities, including the capacity to say “no.” But this is only possible if Europe invests in its ability to take major decisions together — through joint political authority and financial resources. There is no way out of this without investing in a stronger EU. This basic argument has been made a hundred times before. But while insisting on “more political will” among member countries is, indeed, right, it’s also too simplistic. We have to acknowledge that building a stronger EU also means having to give somethings up. But in return we will gain something essential: The ability to stand firm in a world of Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping. This is both necessary and priceless.

EU countries are taking a harder look at who builds, owns and works on key infrastructure like ports, IT and rail — and that concern is now spilling into a wave of legislation aimed at countries like China. Sweden is the latest to move, proposing this week to give local authorities new powers to block “hostile states” from bidding on infrastructure if their involvement could threaten national security. “It’s part of a defense issue,” a Swedish official told POLITICO, describing growing worries about countries like China gaining access to public infrastructure. “We are acting very quickly on that, since we see a risk that hostile states might try to infiltrate infrastructure such as ports, but also IT solutions and energy infrastructure.” It’s also a worry in Poland, Austria and inside EU institutions — all of which are rushing to put in safeguards to block, or at least monitor, third-country investment in key tech and transport infrastructure. What accelerated Sweden’s move was a recent EU court ruling involving Turkish and Chinese companies bidding on two railway projects. Judges concluded that suppliers from countries without a free-trade agreement with the EU do not enjoy the same rights as EU firms — a reading Stockholm took as both a green light and a warning signal. Sweden’s new rules are due to take effect in 2027. No specific cases were cited, but the investigation repeatedly pointed to China — which also sits at the center of very similar concerns in Poland. Warsaw has long been uneasy about the scale of Chinese involvement in its ports. A new draft bill put forward by the country’s president would “adapt the existing regulations concerning the operation of ports, and in particular the ownership of real estate located within the boundaries of ports.” The president argued that the current model — state-owned port authorities holding land and infrastructure and leasing it long-term to terminal operators — needs tightening if the country wants to maintain control over assets of “fundamental importance to the national economy.” Gen. Dariusz Łuczak, former head of Poland’s Internal Security Agency and now adviser to the Special Services Commission, told Polish media late last month that “the most important provisions are those concerning the early termination of perpetual use agreements.” However, it’s unclear if the legislation will pass as President Karol Nawrocki is broadly opposed to the government led by Prime Minster Donald Tusk. The EU is also moving. Ana Miguel Pedro, a Portuguese member of the European Parliament with the center-right European People’s Party, told POLITICO in the spring that the growing presence of Chinese state-owned companies in European port terminals “is not just an economic concern, but a strategic vulnerability.” Those concerns appear in the bloc’s new military mobility package, which calls for member countries to put in place “stricter rules on the ownership and control of strategic dual use infrastructure.” Transport Commissioner Apostolos Tzitzikostas also flagged the Chinese presence in ports and said it will feature in the European Commission’s upcoming ports strategy, due in 2026. Austria has also been pushed into the debate after long-distance trains built by Chinese state-owned manufacturer CRRC rolled onto the Vienna-Salzburg line for the first time — triggering a political backlash. The country’s Mobility Minister Peter Hanke said the EU must tighten procurement and digital-security rules for state-backed rail purchases — and Vienna plans to propose new legislation before the end of the year. The Commission did not immediately respond to a request for comment. Industry is pushing Brussels to go even further. The European Rail Supply Industry Association argued that the bloc’s procurement rules are relics of an earlier era and asked the Commission to update them so companies from countries that shut out EU bidders cannot freely compete for European contracts. Sweden’s investigators saw the same risks. “Third-country suppliers without an agreement should not be given a more advantageous position than they have today and than other suppliers have,” Anneli Berglund Creutz, who led the Swedish government’s procurement review, told reporters. Contracting authorities, she added, should have the ability “to take into account the nationality of suppliers and to select suppliers from hostile states” — possibly excluding them “when that protects national security.”

LONDON — Chancellor Rachel Reeves has insisted that the government’s new trade deals will boost growth, after the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) snubbed a request to count them in its growth forecast. In its pre-budget forecast on Wednesday, the OBR acknowledged that new trade deals “have the potential to increase U.K. trade and GDP,” including the government’s Brexit “reset” deal with the EU and its free trade agreement with India. But the budget watchdog indicated that neither of the deals had met the criteria to be included in its forecast. As elements of the U.K.-EU reset deal were still under negotiation, the OBR said there was “not sufficient detail to assess their potential fiscal and economic impacts.” In the case of the India deal, the OBR said it could be seen to increase GDP by 0.13 percent, in line with the government’s impact assessment, but only once ratified. When it came to the U.S. trade pact — which saw the U.K. hit with 10 percent baseline tariffs on most goods — the OBR noted that some “details of the future trading arrangement are yet to be negotiated and confirmed.” The assessments came as a disappointment for Reeves, who had pinned her hopes on trade as a booster for growth. In an interview with the BBC on Thursday, the chancellor said she was “confident that the growth policies that we’re pursuing will grow our economy,” pointing to trade deals with the EU, India and U.S., as well as planning and pensions reforms. “Why do I say that?” Reeves added. “Because the OBR said in the spring our economy would grow by 1 percent this year. They revised it up yesterday to 1.5 percent. The IMF, the OECD, the Bank of England, also revised up their growth forecasts for this year.” “So I’ve defied the forecast this year, and I’m determined to defy them next year and the year after, because it is absolutely the case that the best way to fund our public services and keep taxes down is to grow the economy.” GLOBAL HEADWINDS While the U.K.-EU reset deal and India deal are not included in the OBR’s current forecast, it does offers some hope for the future. “The result of the UK-EU strategic partnership and the Youth Mobility Scheme are still being negotiated and therefore there is not sufficient detail to assess their potential fiscal and economic impacts,” it said. “We will consider whether any such impacts should be included in the forecast once the full details of the agreements have been finalised, published and agreed by both the EU and UK. This is the standard approach we have taken to assessing the fiscal and economic impacts of trade deals and other international agreements.” The assessments came as a disappointment for Reeves, who had pinned her hopes on trade as a booster for growth. | Neil Hall/EPA Once the U.K.-India free trade agreement is ratified by both countries, the OBR said it could increase real GDP by amounts rising to 0.13 percent by 2040, in line with the government’s impact assessment. But Reeves has less reasons to be cheerful about the state of trade overall, with global trade growth expected to slow from 3.7 percent in 2024 to 2.3 percent in 2026 in line with the IMF’s forecast. Speaking at a Resolution Foundation event on Thursday, OBR chair Richard Hughes said tariffs and global trade restrictions had played a part in their decision to downgrade productivity. “There are some new global headwinds in the global economy since our forecast in March — U.S. tariffs going up and also just wider global trade restrictions being put in place,” Hughes warned. “Trade wars are very bad things for everybody, especially an open economy like the U.K., which relies a lot on trade as a driver for growth so and for the first time that I’ve seen in my career, the IMF is actually forecasting over the next five years trade falling as a share of GDP.”

In a luxury Saudi hotel some 3,000 miles away from her economic woes, Britain’s Chancellor Rachel Reeves delivered a plucky pitch to some of the wealthiest people on the planet. “I believe that countries are successful when they are open and trading — I think that’s good for productivity because competition spurs productivity, growth,” she told business leaders at the Fortune Global Forum last month. “And in a small and open economy like Britain’s … we want our businesses to be able to access global markets.” With this in mind, the chancellor said, Britain was striking trade deals with the EU, the U.S., as well as fast-growing economies like India, as she teased “big opportunities” from an upcoming free trade agreement with Gulf countries. With a difficult budget looming, the chancellor has increasingly turned her gaze overseas in her elusive search for economic growth. And with the Office for Budget Responsibility expected to downgrade the U.K.’s productivity outlook before the budget, Reeves is urging the fiscal watchdog to positively “score” new trade deals according to how much growth they might deliver. But her efforts may be in vain. Far from being the magic bullet that will reinvigorate the economy, the benefits of trade deals may take years to materialize — and some government claims appear to be overstated, experts have told POLITICO. EU ‘RESET’ HOPES By the government’s estimation, its plans to “reset” its relationship with the European Union will add nearly £9 billion to the U.K. economy by 2040, equivalent to a GDP boost of 0.3 percent. Key elements include deals on agrifood, energy trading, and a youth mobility scheme.  Separate analysis by John Springford, an associate fellow at the Centre for European Reform in London, is more optimistic, predicting a GDP boost of between 0.3 and 0.7 percent over ten years as a result of the agreement. The biggest uplifts, he claims, would come from a youth mobility deal.  But negotiations on key elements of the deal have only just begun, and Springford admits details are still “a bit sketchy.” As a result, he says, it would be difficult for the OBR to accept Reeves’ ask to score these deals, which would also take a long time to play out. Even if the government’s estimates are met, he added, the deal will do little to reverse the overall damage caused by Brexit, which the OBR estimates will reduce the U.K.’s long-run productivity by 4 percent. “The damage caused by Brexit can never be significantly repaired without getting rid of one or all of the government’s ‘red lines’,” he continued, in reference to Labour’s refusal to rejoin the single market or customs union.  In recent months the chancellor has talked about the impact of Brexit on the economy, but has suggested this impact can be offset by the reset deal, as well as by trade deals with non-EU countries. “There is no doubting that the impact of Brexit is severe and long lasting,” she said in an interview with Sky News in October, “and that is why we are trying to do trade deals around the world, with the U.S., India, but most importantly with the EU, so that our exporters here in Britain have a chance to sell things made here all around the world.” Guests at the Fortune Global Forum 2025 Gala Dinner. | Cedric Ribeiro/Getty Images for Fortune Media But Ahmet Kaya, principal economist at the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, said the EU deal was “more symbolic than transformative.”  “It slightly eases checks on agri-food products, which should help certain sectors, but the macroeconomic effect is minimal considering that the government’s impact estimate is just £9 billion — which is cumulative gain over time — relative to the size of the £3.6 trillion economy.” INDIA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT Reeves will also be pinning her growth hopes on the U.K.’s recently completed free trade agreement with India, which the government predicts will boost U.K. GDP by 0.13 percent, worth £4.8 billion a year.  The deal will ultimately see India remove tariffs on up to 90 percent of U.K. exports and cut India’s average effective tariffs on U.K. goods from roughly 15 percent to 3 percent, with significant benefits for Britain’s automotive and Scotch whisky exports. But Sophie Hale, principal economist at the Resolution Foundation, said it could take 10 to 15 years for the full effects of the deal to be felt, partly because many tariff reductions will be introduced gradually and are subject to quotas. “Given the OBR is looking over a five-year window, we really aren’t going to expect a big impact,” she said. “Even if it was spread evenly, you’re maybe getting less than half of that by the end of the forecast, because it has to actually be implemented.” The deal is “definitely worth having,” Hale added. “But in terms of … OBR productivity growth forecasts or shifting the dial on U.K. growth, it’s pretty small and a lot of those impacts are going to be delayed.”  TARIFF TERRORS Reeves will also be hoping that the U.K.’s Economic Prosperity Deal with the U.S. — announced with much fanfare in May — will have gone some way in cushioning the impact of President Donald Trump’s punitive tariff regime. The deal saw the U.K. hit with 10 percent baseline tariffs on most goods, with reduced duties for automotives, steel and aluminum, and increased market access for agricultural exports.  While this gave Britain a comparative advantage over most other countries, it has still left the U.K. in a weaker trade position with the U.S. than a year ago. According to NIESR’s latest forecast, U.S. tariffs have reduced U.K. growth by around 0.1 percentage points this year and 0.2 percentage points next year.  “That’s a smaller drag than expected in March, reflecting the more moderate global spill-overs from tariffs, but the overall impact remains negative,” said Kaya. But even this remains uncertain. Like the EU deal agreed earlier this year, much of the EPD remains under negotiation, including pharmaceutical tariffs, which makes it difficult to “score” in terms of its economic impact. MAKING TRADE DEALS WORK Even when trade deals are fully agreed and implemented, their economic impacts are not guaranteed, and it is sometimes an uphill struggle to get businesses to actually make use of them.  “Trade deals have the potential to support economic growth, but their impact does not appear overnight and needs time and support to make it happen,” noted George Riddell, managing director of the Goyder trade consultancy.  “Businesses need to make connections with local customers, understand local regulatory requirements and establish partnerships to help with relevant legal, tax and customs procedures.” In the government’s trade strategy, published over the summer, the Department for Business and Trade committed to overhauling how it supports U.K. businesses and provides export advice through a “one-stop-shop.”  “While the new website is a substantial improvement on what was there before, more needs to be done to get businesses using it,” said Riddell.  Britain’s Chancellor of the Exchequer Rachel Reeves will be hoping that the U.K.’s Economic Prosperity Deal with the U.S. will have gone some way in cushioning the impact of President Donald Trump’s punitive tariff regime. | Pool photo by Jordan Pettitt/AFP via Getty Images Trade Minister Chris Bryant acknowledged this issue in a recent speech, telling businesses the estimates of the economic impact of trade deals could only be realized “if businesses are ambitious enough to exploit these opportunities.”  “It’s not just about signing free trade agreements,” he said at a pitching event for exporters earlier this month. “We can sign FTAs, we can do all that negotiating … But it’s exploiting those FTAs once they’ve been signed that is really important and will actually drive growth.” Looking back at the U.K.’s first post-Brexit trade deals, David Henig, director of the UK Trade Policy Project at the European Centre for International Political Economy think tank, says there is little sign of material impact. “There is currently no evidence that the new trade deals with Australia and New Zealand have affected the U.K. economy in any meaningful sense,” he said, adding there was “nothing that indicates any permanent increase in trade so far.” ‘BEATING THE FORECASTS’ As the budget approaches, Reeves’ growth ambitions look increasingly uncertain. The OBR has downgraded the U.K.’s productivity outlook, potentially increasing government borrowing by £14 billion and £20 billion. Just last week, figures from the Office for National Statistics show that U.K. GDP fell unexpectedly by 0.1 percent in September. Publicly, at least, the chancellor has remained upbeat. “My job as chancellor is to try and beat those forecasts,” she said last month, “and what we’re doing with those trade deals with India, the U.S. and the EU, the investments that we’ve secured, including from big tech companies in the U.K., shows that we have a huge amount to offer as a place to grow a business, to start and scale a business.  “We’ll continue to secure those investments in all parts of Britain, to create those good jobs, paying wages and to boost our productivity, which means that we will start to see those numbers coming through in economic growth and prosperity for working people.” James Fitzgerald contributed to this report.