The Trump administration wants to work with traditional allies to secure new supplies of critical minerals. But months of aggression toward allies, culminating with since-aborted threats to seize Greenland, have left many cool to the overtures. While the State Department has drawn a lengthy list of participating countries for its first Critical Minerals Ministerial scheduled for Wednesday, a number of those attending are hesitant to commit to partnering with the U.S. in creating a supply chain that bypasses China’s current chokehold on those materials, according to five Washington-based diplomats of countries invited to or attending the event. State Department cables obtained by POLITICO also show wariness among some countries about signing onto a framework agreement pledging joint cooperation in sourcing and processing critical minerals. Representatives from more than 50 countries are expected to attend the meeting, according to the State Department — all gathered to discuss the creation of tech supply chains that can rival Beijing’s. But the meeting comes just two weeks since President Donald Trump took to the stage at Davos to call on fellow NATO member Denmark to allow a U.S. takeover of Greenland, and that isn’t sitting well. “We all need access to critical minerals, but the furor over Greenland is going to be the elephant in the room,” said a European diplomat. In the immediate run-up to the event there’s “not a great deal of interest from the European side,” the person added. The individual and others were granted anonymity to discuss sensitive diplomatic relationships. Their concerns underscore how international dismay at the Trump administration’s foreign policy and trade actions may kneecap its other global priorities. The Trump administration had had some success over the past two months rallying countries to support U.S. efforts to create secure supply chains for critical minerals, including a major multilateral agreement called the Pax Silica Declaration. Now those gains could be at risk. Secretary of State Marco Rubio wants foreign countries to partner with the U.S. in creating a supply chain for the 60 minerals (including rare earths) that the U.S. Geological Survey deems “vital to the U.S. economy and national security that face potential risks from disrupted supply chains.” They include antimony, used to produce munitions; samarium, which goes into aircraft engines; and germanium, which is essential to fiber-optics. The administration also launched a $12 billion joint public-private sector “strategic critical minerals stockpile” for U.S. manufacturers, a White House official said Monday. Trump has backed away from his threats of possibly deploying the U.S. military to seize Greenland from Denmark. But at Davos he demanded “immediate negotiations” with Copenhagen to transfer Greenland’s sovereignty to the U.S. That makes some EU officials leery of administration initiatives that require cooperation and trust. “We are all very wary,” said a second European diplomat. Rubio’s critical minerals framework “will not be an easy sell until there is final clarity on Greenland.” Trump compounded the damage to relations with NATO countries on Jan. 22 when he accused member country troops that deployed to support U.S. forces in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2021 of having shirked combat duty. “The White House really messed up with Greenland and Davos,” a third European diplomat said. “They may have underestimated how much that would have an impact.” The Trump administration needs the critical minerals deals to go through. The U.S. has been scrambling to find alternative supply lines for a group of minerals called rare earths since Beijing temporarily cut the U.S. off from its supply last year. China — which has a near-monopoly on rare earths — relented in the trade truce that Trump brokered with China’s leader Xi Jinping in South Korea in October. The administration is betting that foreign government officials that attend Wednesday’s event also want alternative sources to those materials. “The United States and the countries attending recognize that reliable supply chains are indispensable to our mutual economic and national security and that we must work together to address these issues in this vital sector,” the State Department statement said in a statement. The administration has been expressing confidence that it will secure critical minerals partnerships with the countries attending the ministerial, despite their concerns over Trump’s bellicose policy. “There is a commonality here around countering China,” Ruth Perry, the State Department’s acting principal deputy assistant secretary for ocean, fisheries and polar affairs, said at an industry event on offshore critical minerals in Washington last week. “Many of these countries understand the urgency.” Speaking at a White House event Monday, Interior Secretary Doug Burgum indicated that 11 nations would sign on to a critical minerals framework with the United States this week and another 20 are considering doing so. Greenland has rich deposits of rare earths and other minerals. But Denmark isn’t sending any representatives to the ministerial, according to the person familiar with the event’s planning. Trump said last month that a framework agreement he struck with NATO over Greenland’s future included U.S. access to the island’s minerals. Greenland’s harsh climate and lack of infrastructure in its interior makes the extraction of those materials highly challenging. Concern about the longer term economic and geostrategic risks of turning away from Washington in favor of closer ties with Beijing — despite the Trump administration’s unpredictability — may work in Rubio’s favor on Wednesday. “We still want to work on issues where our viewpoints align,” an Asian diplomat said. “Critical minerals, energy and defense are some areas where there is hope for positive movement.” State Department cables obtained by POLITICO show the administration is leaning on ministerial participants to sign on to a nonbinding framework agreement to ensure U.S. access to critical minerals. The framework establishes standards for government and private investment in areas including mining, processing and recycling, along with price guarantees to protect producers from competitors’ unfair trade policies. The basic template of the agreement being shared with other countries mirrors language in frameworks sealed with Australia and Japan and memorandums of understanding inked with Thailand and Malaysia last year. Enthusiasm for the framework varies. The Philippine and Polish governments have both agreed to the framework text, according to cables from Manila on Jan. 22 and Warsaw on Jan. 26. Romania is interested but “proposed edits to the draft MOU framework,” a cable dated Jan. 16 said. As of Jan. 22 India was noncommittal, telling U.S. diplomats that New Delhi “could be interested in exploring a memorandum of understanding in the future.” European Union members Finland and Germany both expressed reluctance to sign on without clarity on how the framework aligns with wider EU trade policies. A cable dated Jan. 15 said Finland “prefers to observe progress in the EU-U.S. discussions before engaging in substantive bilateral critical mineral framework negotiations.” Berlin also has concerns that the initiative may reap “potential retaliation from China,” according to a cable dated Jan. 16. Trump’s threats over the past two weeks to impose 100 percent tariffs on Canada for cutting a trade deal with China and 25 percent tariffs on South Korea for allegedly slow-walking legislative approval of its U.S. trade agreement are also denting enthusiasm for the U.S. critical minerals initiative. Those levies “have introduced some uncertainty, which naturally leads countries to proceed pragmatically and keep their options open,” a second Asian diplomat said. There are also doubts whether Trump will give the initiative the long-term backing it will require for success. “There’s a sense that this could end up being a TACO too,” a Latin American diplomat said, using shorthand for Trump’s tendency to make big threats or announcements that ultimately fizzle. Analysts, too, argue it’s unlikely the administration will be able to secure any deals amid the fallout from Davos and Trump’s tariff barrages. “We’re very skeptical on the interest and aptitude and trust in trade counterparties right now,” said John Miller, an energy analyst at TD Cowen who tracks critical minerals. “A lot of trading partners are very much in a wait-and-see perspective at this point saying, ‘Where’s Trump really going to go with this?’” And more unpredictability or hostility by the Trump administration toward longtime allies could push them to pursue critical mineral sourcing arrangements that exclude Washington. “The alternative is that these other countries will go the Mark Carney route of the middle powers, cooperating among themselves quietly, not necessarily going out there and saying, ‘Hey, we’re cutting out the U.S.,’ but that these things just start to crop up,” said Jonathan Czin, a former China analyst at the CIA now at the Brookings Institution. “Which will make it more challenging and allow Beijing to play divide and conquer over the long term.” Felicia Schwartz contributed to this report.

BERLIN — Friedrich Merz embarks on his first trip to the Persian Gulf region as chancellor on Wednesday in search of new energy and business deals he sees as critical to reducing Germany’s dependence on the U.S. and China. The three-day trip with stops in Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates illustrates Merz’s approach to what he calls a dangerous new epoch of “great power politics” — one in which the U.S. under President Donald Trump is no longer a reliable partner. European countries must urgently embrace their own brand of hard power by forging new global trade alliances, including in the Middle East, or risk becoming subject to the coercion of greater powers, Merz argues. Accompanying Merz on the trip is a delegation of business executives looking to cut new deals on everything from energy to defense. But one of the chancellor’s immediate goals is to reduce his country’s growing dependence on U.S. liquefied natural gas, or LNG, which has replaced much of the Russian gas that formerly flowed to Germany through the Nord Stream pipelines. Increasingly, German leaders across the political spectrum believe they’ve replaced their country’s unhealthy dependence on Russian energy with an increasingly precarious dependence on the U.S. Early this week, Merz’s economy minister, Katherina Reiche, traveled to Saudi Arabia ahead of the chancellor to sign a memorandum to deepen the energy ties between both countries, including a planned hydrogen energy deal. “When partnerships that we have relied on for decades start to become a little fragile, we have to look for new partners,” Reiche said in Riyadh. ‘EXCESSIVE DEPENDENCE’ Last year, 96 percent of German LNG imports came from the U.S, according to the federal government. While that amount makes up only about one-tenth of the country’s total natural gas imports, the U.S. share is set to rise sharply over the next years, in part because the EU agreed to purchase $750 billion worth of energy from the U.S. by the end of 2028 as part of its trade agreement with the Trump administration. The EU broadly is even more dependent on U.S. LNG, which accounted for more than a quarter of the bloc’s natural gas imports in 2025. This share is expected to rise to 40 percent by 2030. German politicians across the political spectrum are increasingly pushing for Merz’s government to find new alternatives. “After Russia’s war of aggression, we have learned the hard way that excessive dependence on individual countries can have serious consequences for our country,” said Sebastian Roloff, a lawmaker focusing on energy for the center-left Social Democrats, who rule in a coalition with Merz’s conservatives. Roloff said Trump’s recent threat to take over Greenland and the new U.S. national security strategy underscored the need to “avoid creating excessive dependence again” and diversify sources of energy supply. The Trump administration’s national security strategy vows to use “American dominance” in oil, gas, coal and nuclear energy to “project power” globally, raising fears in Europe that the U.S. will use energy exports to gain leverage over the EU. Last year, 96 percent of German LNG imports came from the U.S, according to the federal government. | Pool photo by Lars-Josef Klemmer/EPA That’s why Merz and his delegation are also seeking closer ties to Qatar, one of the world’s largest producers and exporters of natural gas as well as the United Arab Emirates, another major LNG producer. Last week, the EU’s energy chief, Dan Jørgensen, said the bloc would step up efforts to to reduce it’s dependence on U.S. LNG., including by dealing more with Qatar. One EU diplomat criticised Merz for seeking such cooperation on a national level. Germany is going “all in on gas power, of course, but I can’t see why Merz would be running errands on the EU’s behalf,” said the diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity. ‘AUTHORITARIAN STRONGMEN’ Merz will also be looking to attract more foreign investment and deepen trade ties with the Gulf states as part of a wider strategy of forging news alliances with “middle powers” globally and reduce dependence on U.S. and Chinese markets. The EU initiated trade talks with the United Arab Emirates last spring. Gulf states like Saudi Arabia also have their own concerns about dependencies on the U.S., particularly in the area of arms purchases. Germany’s growing defense industry is increasingly seen as promising partner, particularly following Berlin’s loosening of arms export restrictions. “For our partners in the region, cooperation in the defense industry will certainly also be an important topic,” a senior government official with knowledge of the trip said.  But critics point out that leaders of autocracies criticized for human rights abuses don’t make for viable partners on energy, trade and defense. Last week, the EU’s energy chief, Dan Jørgensen, said the bloc would step up efforts to to reduce it’s dependence on U.S. LNG., including by dealing more with Qatar. | Jose Sena Goulao/EPA “It’s not an ideal solution,” said Loyle Campbell, an expert on climate and energy policy for the German Council on Foreign Relations. “Rather than having high dependence on American LNG, you’d go shake hands with semi-dictators or authoritarian strongmen to try and reduce your risk to the bigger elephant in the room.” Merz, however, may not see a moral contradiction. Europe can’t maintain its strength and values in the new era of great powers, he argues, without a heavy dollop of Realpolitik. “We will only be able to implement our ideas in the world, at least in part, if we ourselves learn to speak the language of power politics,” Merz recently said. Ben Munster contributed to this report.

BRUSSELS — EU countries shouldn’t be afraid of integrating at different speeds if that’s what it takes to gain crucial leverage on the world stage, Mario Draghi said Monday. “We must take the steps that are currently possible, with the partners who are actually willing, in the domains where progress can currently be made,” said the former European Central Bank president and ex-prime minister of Italy during a ceremony at the University of Leuven in Belgium, where he was awarded an honorary doctorate. “Power requires Europe to move from confederation to federation,” said Draghi, stressing that only in domains where EU countries have pooled their competences has the bloc gained clout on the global stage.  “Where Europe has federated, [such as] on trade, on competition, on the single market, on monetary policy, we are respected as a power and negotiate as one,” he said, citing trade agreements recently negotiated with India and Latin America. Draghi’s call comes as Europe struggles to keep pace with the U.S. and China, and is facing Russian aggression in Ukraine plus a transatlantic ally that no longer acknowledges the benefits of its historic European ties. “This is a future in which Europe risks becoming subordinated, divided and de-industrialized at once, and a Europe that cannot defend its interests will not preserve its values for longer,” Draghi warned. In the face of those challenges, areas of weakness are those where EU capitals continue to maintain a grip, such as defense, industrial policy or foreign affairs, Draghi said. In these, he added, “we are treated as a loose assembly of middle-sized states to be divided and dealt with accordingly.” The former top official praised the bloc’s recent stance on Greenland, where it decided to resist rather than accommodate threats coming from the U.S. “By standing together in the face of direct threat, Europeans discovered the solidarity that had previously seemed out of reach,” he said.  Draghi will take part in an informal gathering of European leaders next week aimed at discussing the direction for the bloc’s competitiveness, together with another former Italian prime minister, Enrico Letta. Both have laid out their economic visions in reports that form the building blocks of President Ursula von der Leyen’s second term atop the European Commission.

Yanmei Xie is senior associate fellow at the Mercator Institute for China Studies. After Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney spoke at Davos last week, a whole continent contracted leadership envy. Calling the rules-based order — which Washington proselytized for decades before stomping on — a mirage, Carney gave his country’s neighboring hegemonic bully a rhetorical middle finger, and Europeans promptly swooned. But before the bloc’s politicians rush to emulate him, it may be worth cooling the Carney fever. Appearing both steely and smooth in his Davos speech, Carney warned middle powers that “when we only negotiate bilaterally with a hegemon, we negotiate from weakness.” Perhaps this was in reference to the crass daily coercion Canada has been enduring from the U.S. administration. But perhaps he was talking about the subtler asymmetry he experienced just days before in Beijing. In contrast to his defiance in Switzerland, Carney was ingratiating during his China visit. He signed Canada up for a “new strategic partnership” in preparation for an emerging “new world order,” and lauded Chinese leader Xi Jinping as a fellow defender of multilateralism. The visit also produced a cars-for-canola deal, which will see Canada slash tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles from 100 percent to 6.1 percent, and lift the import cap to 49,000 cars per year. In return, China will cut duties on Canadian canola seeds from 84 percent to 15 percent. In time, Ottawa also expects Beijing will reduce tariffs on Canadian lobsters, crabs and peas later this year and purchase more Canadian oil and perhaps gas, too. The agreement to launch a Ministerial Energy Dialogue will surely pave the way for eventual deals. These productive exchanges eventually moved Carney to declare Beijing a “more predictable” trade partner than Washington. And who can blame him? He was simply stating the obvious — after all, China isn’t threatening Canada with annexation. But one is tempted to wonder if he would have needed to flatter quite so much in China if his country still possessed some of the world’s leading technologies. The truth is, Canada’s oil and gas industry probably shouldn’t really be holding its breath. Chinese officials typically offer serious consideration rather than outright rejection out of politeness — just ask Russia, which has spent decades in dialogue with Beijing over a pipeline meant to replace Europe as a natural gas market. The cars-for-canola deal also carries a certain irony: Canada is importing the very technology that makes fossil fuels obsolete. China is electrifying at dizzying speed, with the International Energy Agency projecting its oil consumption will peak as early as next year thanks to “extraordinary” electric vehicle sales. That means Beijing probably isn’t desperate for new foreign suppliers of hydrocarbons, and the ministerial dialogue will likely drag on inconclusively — albeit courteously — well into the future. This state of Sino-Canadian trade can be seen as classic comparative advantage at work: China is good at making things, and Canada has abundant primary commodities. But in the not-so-distant past, it was Canadian companies that were selling nuclear reactors, telecom equipment, aircraft and bullet trains to China. Yet today, many of these once globe-spanning Canadian high-tech manufacturers have either exited the scene or lead a much-reduced existence. Somewhere in this trading history lies a cautionary tale for Europe. Deindustrialization can have its own self-reinforcing momentum. As a country’s economic composition changes, so does its political economy. When producers of goods disappear, so does their political influence. And the center of lobbying gravity shifts toward downstream users and consumers who prefer readily available imports. Europe’s indigenous solar manufacturers have been driven to near extinction by much cheaper Chinese products | STR/AFP via Getty Images Europe already has its own version of this story: Its indigenous solar manufacturers have been driven to near extinction by much cheaper Chinese products over the span of two decades. Currently, its solar industry is dominated by installers and operators who favor cheap imports and oppose trade defense. Simply put, Carney’s cars-for-canola deal is a salve for Canadian consumers and commodity producers, but it’s also industrial policy in reverse. In overly simplified terms, industrial policy is about encouraging exports of finished products over raw materials and discouraging the opposite in order to build domestic value-added capacity and productivity. But while Canada can, perhaps, make do without industry — as Carney put it in Davos, his ambition is to run “an energy superpower” — Europe doesn’t have that option. Agri-food and extractive sectors aren’t enough to stand up the continent’s economy — even with the likes of tourism and luxury goods thrown in. China currently exports more than twice as much to the EU than it imports. In container terms, the imbalance widens to 4-to-1. Meanwhile, Goldman Sachs estimates Chinese exports will shave 0.2 percentage point or more of GDP growth in Germany, Spain and Italy each year through 2029. And according to the European Central Bank, cars, chemicals, electric equipment and machinery — sectors that form Europe’s industrial backbone — face the most severe job losses from China trade shock. Europe shares Canada’s plight in dealing with the U.S., which currently isn’t just an unreliable trade partner but also an ally turned imperialist. This is why Carney’s speech resonates. But U.S. protectionism has only made China’s mercantilism a more acute challenge for Europe, as the U.S. resists the bloc’s exports and Chinese goods keep pouring into Europe in greater quantities at lower prices. European leaders would be mistaken to look for trade relief in China as Carney does, and bargain away the continent’s industrial capacity in the process. Whether it’s to resist an expansionist Russia or an imperial U.S., Europe still needs to hold on to its manufacturing base.

ABOARD THE PRIME MINISTER’S PLANE TO BEIJING — Keir Starmer rejected his Canadian counterpart’s call for mid-sized countries to band together in the face of unpredictable global powers — and insisted his “common sense” British approach will do just fine. The British prime minister arrives in China Wednesday for a trip aimed at rebooting the U.K.’s relationship with the Asian superpower. He’s the latest Western leader to make the visit — which will include a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping — after trips by Carney and France’s Emmanuel Macron. Carney used a searing speech at the World Economic Forum last week to warn of the “rupture” caused by “great powers” acting in their own self-interest. While he did not namecheck Donald Trump’s administration, the speech riled the U.S. president, who insisted: “Canada lives because of the United States.” The Canadian PM had called for middle powers to work together to “build something bigger, better, stronger, more just.” Starmer was pressed on those remarks on board his flight to China Tuesday. Asked whether he agreed that the old global order is dead — and whether smaller powers need to team up to push back at the U.S. and China, Starmer defended his own policy of trying to build bridges with Trump, Xi and the European Union all at once. “I’m a pragmatist, a British pragmatist applying common sense, and therefore I’m pleased that we have a good relationship with the U.S. on defense, security, intelligence and on trade and prosperity,” he says. “It’s very important that we maintain that good relationship.” He added: “Equally, we are moving forward with a better relationship with the EU. We had a very good summit last year with 10 strands of agreement. “We’ll have another summit this year with the EU, which I hope will be iterative, as well as following through on what we’ve already agreed. “And I’ve consistently said I’m not choosing between the U.S. and Europe. I’m really glad that the UK has got good relations with both.” Starmer’s government — which faces pressure from opposition parties back home as it re-engages with China — has stressed that it wants to cooperate, compete with and challenge Beijing when necessary, as it bids to build economic ties to aid the sputtering U.K. economy. “Obviously, China is the second biggest economy in the world, one of our biggest trading partners,” the British PM — who is flying with an entourage of British CEOs and business reps — said Tuesday. “And under the last government, we veered from the golden age to the ice age. And what I want to do is follow through on the approach I’ve set out a number of times now … which is a comprehensive and consistent approach to China. “I do think there are opportunities, but obviously we will never compromise national security in taking those opportunities.”

LONDON —  Keir Starmer lands in China trying to do everything at once. As his government searches desperately for economic growth, the prime minister’s policy is to cooperate, compete with, and, where appropriate, challenge the Asian superpower. That’s easier said than done. POLITICO asked five China analysts — ranging from former government ministers to ex-diplomats — to give their honest take on how the British PM should handle the days ahead. DON’T LECTURE — VINCE CABLE, FORMER BUSINESS SECRETARY Vince Cable, who visited China three times as U.K. business secretary between 2010 and 2015, says Starmer must not give Chinese President Xi Jinping public lectures. It will be tempting, given China’s human rights record. U.K. lawmakers are particularly concerned about Beijing’s treatment of Uyghur Muslims and Hong Kongers. “From experience, that just antagonizes people. They’ll respond in kind and will remind us about all the bad things the British have done throughout our history. You’ll get absolutely nowhere,” Cable, a former Liberal Democrat leader who wrote “The Chinese Conundrum: Engagement or Conflict” after leaving office, said.  Raising concerns in private is more likely to get a positive result, he thinks. “Although I’m by no means an admirer of President [Donald] Trump … his approach, which is business-like and uses actually quite respectful language in public, has actually had far more success in dealing with the Chinese than the traditional missionary approach of some Western European countries,” Cable adds.  LISTEN AND SPEAK UP — BEN BLAND, CHATHAM HOUSE ASIA-PACIFIC PROGRAM DIRECTOR Ben Bland, director of the Chatham House think tank’s Asia-Pacific program, warns there can’t be a return to the “naive optimism” of the “golden era” under Cameron. Britain should “listen to the Chinese leadership and try and understand more about how [Chinese President] Xi Jinping and other senior communist leaders see the world, how they see China,” the former Financial Times South China correspondent says. “The U.K.’s ability to influence China directly is quite limited, but it’s really important that we understand what they’re trying to do in the world.” Starmer should be clear about the U.K.’s red lines on espionage, interference in British society, and the harassment of people living in this country, Bland says. Vince Cable, who visited China three times as U.K. business secretary between 2010 and 2015, says Starmer must not give Chinese President Xi Jinping public lectures. | Andy Rain/EPA TREAT TRADE CAUTIOUSLY — CHARLES PARTON, FORMER DIPLOMAT “The Chinese are adept at the propaganda of these visits, and ensuring that everything seems wonderful,” Charles Parton, an ex-diplomat who was First Counsellor to the EU Delegation in Beijing between 2011 and 2016, warns.   “There’s an awful lot of strange counting going on of [investment] deals that have already been signed, deals that are on the cards to be signed [and] deals that are glimmers in the eye and almost certainly won’t be signed,” Parton, now an adviser to the Council on Geostrategy think tank, says. “Trade is highly fungible. It’s not political,” Parton, who is also a senior associate at the Royal United Services Institute, adds. “We shouldn’t be saying to ourselves ‘oh my gosh, we better knuckle down to whatever the Chinese want of us, because otherwise our trade and investment will suffer’,” he believes. “If you can push through trade investment which is beneficial — excellent. That’s great, but let’s not think that this is the be-all and end-all,” he warns. SEE CHINA AS IT IS — LUKE DE PULFORD, INTER-PARLIAMENTARY ALLIANCE ON CHINA EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR  Luke De Pulford, executive director of the hawkish global cross-party Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, is skeptical about the timing of Starmer’s China trip —  a week after ministers gave planning approval for Beijing’s controversial mega embassy in London. “Going to China against that backdrop, to look as if you’re going to make national security concessions in the hope of economic preferment, is unwise,” he says. He is also doubtful that closer ties with Beijing will improve the British economy. “All of the evidence seems to point towards China investing in the U.K. only in as far as it suits their strategic interests,” De Pulford says. “There’s a lot to lose and not very much to gain.”  Prioritizing the U.K. agenda will be paramount for Starmer. “There’s nothing wrong at all with visiting China if you’re going to represent your interests and the United Kingdom’s interests,” he says, while remaining doubtful that this will be achieved. SET OUT A CHINA STRATEGY — EVIE ASPINALL, BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY GROUP DIRECTOR  Securing a “symbolic, long-term relationship” with China should be a priority for Starmer, Evie Aspinall, who leads the non-partisan British Foreign Policy Group think tank, says. She wants the U.K.’s China Audit to be published in full, warning businesses “don’t have a strong understanding of what the U.K.’s approach is.”  The audit was launched in late 2024 to allow the government to understand Beijing’s threats and opportunities, but its findings have not been published in detail because much of its content is classified. “I think that’s a fundamental limitation,” Aspinall says, pointing out it is businesses which will generate the growth Starmer wants.  U.K. businesses need to know they “will be supported around some of those risks if they do decide to engage more closely with China,” she says.   

Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music * Amazon Music Die Koalition will raus aus dem Reformstillstand. Mit dem Bericht der Sozialstaatskommission soll heute ein Wendepunkt markiert werden: weniger Bürokratie, mehr Digitalisierung, effizientere Leistungen. Arbeitsministerin Bärbel Bas legt vor, der Kanzler positioniert sich. Gordon Repinski ordnet die Vorschläge gemeinsam mit Rasmus Buchsteiner ein und blickt auf die nächste, politisch heiklere Reformrunde bei Rente und Krankenversicherung. Im 200-Sekunden-Interview: Matthias Moosdorf, der frühere außenpolitische Sprecher der AfD. Es geht um Russland, den Angriffskrieg gegen die Ukraine, persönliche Verbindungen nach Moskau und um die Frage, wo politische Provokation endet und journalistische Konfrontation beginnt. Warum dieses Gespräch das letzte seiner Art bleibt, erklärt Repinski im Podcast. International richtet sich der Blick nach Brüssel und Neu-Delhi: Die EU setzt auf eine neue strategische Nähe zu Indien. Ein schlankes Handelsabkommen, ausgeklammerte Konfliktfelder und sicherheitspolitische Kooperation sollen Tempo bringen – auch als Lehre aus dem stockenden Mercosur-Deal. Oliver Nojan analysiert, warum die Kommission jetzt anders vorgeht und was geopolitisch auf dem Spiel steht. Zum Schluss: ein Rückblick auf „Young Female in Politics“ in Berlin und ein Ausblick auf den heutigen Weltwirtschaftsgipfel – eine Woche, in der sich alles um Reformdruck, Wirtschaft und politische Handlungsfähigkeit dreht. Das Berlin Playbook als Podcast gibt es jeden Morgen ab 5 Uhr. Gordon Repinski und das POLITICO-Team liefern Politik zum Hören – kompakt, international, hintergründig. Für alle Hauptstadt-Profis: Der Berlin Playbook-Newsletter bietet jeden Morgen die wichtigsten Themen und Einordnungen. Jetzt kostenlos abonnieren. Mehr von Host und POLITICO Executive Editor Gordon Repinski: Instagram: @gordon.repinski | X: @GordonRepinski. POLITICO Deutschland – ein Angebot der Axel Springer Deutschland GmbH Axel-Springer-Straße 65, 10888 Berlin Tel: +49 (30) 2591 0 information@axelspringer.de Sitz: Amtsgericht Berlin-Charlottenburg, HRB 196159 B USt-IdNr: DE 214 852 390 Geschäftsführer: Carolin Hulshoff Pol, Mathias Sanchez Luna

Dora Meredith is the director of ODI Europe. John Clarke is a former senior trade negotiator for the European Commission and former head of the EU Delegation to the WTO and the U.N. He is a fellow at Maastricht University and the Royal Asiatic Society, and a trade adviser for FIPRA public affairs. The EU rarely gets second chances in geopolitics. Yet last week, the European Parliament chose to throw one away. By voting to refer the long-awaited trade agreement with the Mercosur bloc to the Court of Justice of the EU for a legal opinion — a process that may take up two years — lawmakers dealt a serious blow to Europe’s credibility at a moment when speed and reliability matter more than ever. After more than two decades of negotiations, this deal was meant to signal that Europe could still act decisively in a world of intensifying geopolitical competition. As European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen argued this month, it was the ultimate test of Europe’s continued relevance on the world stage. Oblivious to this, the Parliament’s decision reinforces the perception that the bloc is unable to follow through, even when an agreement is finally within reach. It is, by any reasonable measure, a strategic own goal. The consequences of this go well beyond trade. Mercosur governments spent years negotiating this free trade agreement (FTA) in good faith, navigating Europe’s hesitation, shifting demands and inconsistent political signals. Understandably, they are now interpreting the referral to the court as a political move. For partners already hedging their bets in an increasingly contested global landscape, it reinforces doubts over whether Europe can be relied on. Meanwhile, for Europe, the true damage is to a deeper truth it all too often obscures: That its real power comes from the ability to make such agreements and then implement them seriously, consistently and at scale. The EU–Mercosur agreement isn’t just another trade deal. It was designed as a framework for long-term economic, political and strategic partnership with a region where Europe’s influence has been steadily eroding. It offers comprehensive market access in goods and services, clearer investment rules, access to critical materials, structured political dialogue and a cooperation-based approach to managing disputes. Taken together, it is meant to anchor Europe more firmly in South America at a time when others, most notably China, have moved faster and with fewer constraints. And while that level of ambition hasn’t disappeared with the Parliament’s vote, it has been put at serious risk. Over the years, much of the criticism surrounding the Mercosur deal has focused on sustainability. Indeed, if eventually passed, this will be the litmus test for whether the EU can translate its values into influence. And to that end, the deal makes a wide set of previously voluntary commitments legally binding, including the implementation of the Paris climate targets and adherence to international conventions on labor rights, human rights, biodiversity and environmental protection. However, it does so through dialogue-based enforcement rather than automatic withdrawal in the face of noncompliance — an approach that reflects the political realities in both Brussels and the Mercosur countries. This has disappointed those calling for tougher regulation, but it highlights an uncomfortable truth: Europe’s leverage over sustainability outcomes doesn’t come from pretending it can coerce partners into compliance but from sustained engagement and cooperation. That was a red line for Mercosur governments, and without it there would be no agreement at all. The deal’s novel “rebalancing mechanism” sits within this logic, as it allows Mercosur countries to suspend concessions if future unforeseen EU regulations effectively negate promised market access. Critics fear this provision could be used to challenge future EU sustainability measures, but Mercosur countries see it as a safeguard against possible unilateral EU action, as exemplified by the Deforestation Regulation. Moreover, in practice, such mechanisms are rarely used. Plus, its inclusion was the price of securing an additional sustainability protocol. Most crucially, though, none of this will resolve itself through legal delay. On the contrary, postponement weakens Europe’s ability to shape outcomes on the ground. Research from Brazil’s leading climate institutes shows that ambitious international engagement strengthens domestic pro‑environment coalitions by increasing transparency, resources and political leverage. Absence, by contrast, creates space for actors with far lower standards. South American and EU leaders join hands following the signing of the now-delayed Mercosur agreement, Jan. 17, 2026., Paraguay. | Daniel Duarte/AFP via Getty Images The same logic applies to the deal’s economic dimension. The Commission rightly highlights the headline figures: Billions of euros in tariff savings, expanded market access, secure access to critical minerals and growing trade. According to a recent study by the European Centre for International Political Economy, each month of delay represents €3 billion in foregone exports. But these numbers matter less than what lies beneath them: Europe will be gaining all this while offering limited concessions in sensitive agricultural sectors; and Mercosur countries will be gaining access to the world’s largest single market — but only if they can meet demanding regulatory and environmental standards that could strain domestic capacity. Again, the real power lies in the deal’s implementation. If managed well, such pressures can drive investment, modernize standards and reduce dependence on raw commodity exports as Latin American think tanks have argued. This transition is precisely what the EU’s €1.8 billion Global Gateway investment package was designed to support. And delaying the agreement delays that as well. The Parliament’s decision isn’t just a procedural setback — it damages Europe’s greatest strength at a time when hesitation carries real cost. It also creates an immediate institutional dilemma for the Commission. Despite the judicial stay, the Commission is legally free to apply the agreement provisionally, but this is a difficult call: Apply it and enter a firestorm of criticism about avoiding democratic controls that will backfire the day the Parliament finally gets to vote on the agreement; or accept a two-year delay and postpone the deal’s economic benefits possibly indefinitely — Mercosur countries aren’t going to hold out forever. If it is going to recover, over the coming months Europe has to do everything possible to demonstrate both to its Mercosur partners and the wider world that this delay doesn’t amount to disengagement. This means sustained political dialogue, credible commitments on investment and cooperation — including the rollout of the Global Gateway — as well as a clear plan for the deal’s implementation the moment this legal process concludes. Two years is an eternity in today’s geopolitical climate. If Europe allows this moment to pass without course correction, others won’t wait. The deal might be imperfect, but irrelevance is far worse a fate. Europe must be much bolder in communicating that reality — to the world and, perhaps more urgently, to its own public.

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz will call for “swift entry into force” of the EU trade agreements with South American countries of the Mercosur bloc and with Mexico in a joint declaration to be signed by the two leaders in Rome on Friday, seen by POLITICO. Earlier this week, Merz called on the European Commission to implement the controversial trade deal on a provisional basis despite lawmakers voting Wednesday to send the accord for judicial review, stalling its ratification for up to two years. After an informal meeting of the EU’s 27 leaders in Brussels on Thursday evening, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said there was “clear interest” in implementing the EU’s trade deal with Mercosur as soon as possible. “The question of provisional application was raised by several leaders tonight,” von der Leyen said, adding it was important to push forward the trade pact’s “benefits” as soon as possible. More than 20 ministers from Italy and Germany are meeting today at Rome’s opulent Villa Doria Pamphilj to discuss closer cooperation in areas including security and defense and resilience. Meloni and Merz will also call for “the finalization of agreements with important partners in the Indo-Pacific,” just as EU and India could sign a trade deal next week. In what sounded like a reference to tariff threats by U.S. President Donald Trump, the two leaders will say they “oppose the unilateral use of trade measures as well as the impact of non-market policies disrupting global trade.” Seb Starcevic contributed to this report.

Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music * Amazon Music Lars Klingbeil spricht mit Gordon Repinski über den Moment, in dem das World Economic Forum endgültig geopolitisch wird. Die Rede von Donald Trump, der europäische Schulterschluss – und die Frage, warum sich Europa jetzt nicht zurücklehnen darf. Außerdem geht es beim Spaziergang am Rande des Weltwirtschaftsforums um Fragen der Krisenfestigkeit des deutschen Wirtschaftsmodells. Ist Wettbewerbsfähigkeit ein sozialdemokratisches Thema? Klingbeil erklärt, warum sichere Arbeitsplätze, Investitionen und Resilienz für ihn keine Gegensätze sind. Das Berlin Playbook als Podcast gibt es jeden Morgen ab 5 Uhr. Gordon Repinski und das POLITICO-Team liefern Politik zum Hören – kompakt, international, hintergründig. Für alle Hauptstadt-Profis: Der Berlin Playbook-Newsletter bietet jeden Morgen die wichtigsten Themen und Einordnungen. Jetzt kostenlos abonnieren. Mehr von Host und POLITICO Executive Editor Gordon Repinski: Instagram: @gordon.repinski | X: @GordonRepinski. POLITICO Deutschland – ein Angebot der Axel Springer Deutschland GmbH Axel-Springer-Straße 65, 10888 Berlin Tel: +49 (30) 2591 0 information@axelspringer.de Sitz: Amtsgericht Berlin-Charlottenburg, HRB 196159 B USt-IdNr: DE 214 852 390 Geschäftsführer: Carolin Hulshoff Pol, Mathias Sanchez Luna