CAMP VIKING, Norway — In the deep snow of the Arctic mountains, Britain’s Royal
Marines are readying for war with Russia.
The elite troops are introduced to the wilderness by camping in the snow in
temperatures below minus 20C. They finish by jumping through ice holes and
shouting their name, rank and number before they can be pulled out of the water.
Then they roll in the snow, drink a tot of rum, and toast King Charles III.
Britain’s extreme weather training in this area dates to the Cold War, but Camp
Viking — its facility in Skjold, northern Norway — is new and growing. It opened
in 2023 after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and is due to reach a peak
of 1,500 personnel this spring, followed by 2,000 next year. Britain is
“effectively doubling” the number of its Royal Marines in Norway over three
years, Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper told POLITICO in an interview.
Exercises mirror missions the troops would conduct if NATO’s Article 5 on
collective defense was triggered — reflecting the reality that “we are no longer
at peace,” Brigadier Jaimie Norman, commander of the U.K. Commando Forces, told
Cooper and her Norwegian counterpart Espen Barth Eide on a visit to the site
Thursday. “We see ourselves on a continuum that has war on one end to peace on
the other, and we are somewhere on that continuum.”
Yet this is only one hemisphere of the Arctic. On the other, U.S. President
Donald Trump is stoking a very different crisis by pushing for ownership of
Greenland.
The risks that link the two regions — which have shipping lanes busier than ever
with Russian and Chinese vessels as the polar ice caps melt — are similar,
albeit less immediate for Greenland than Norway. Yet Greenland is consuming huge
global bandwidth.
It is little wonder that Eide, greeting Cooper after he spent two days in
Ukraine, lamented that they could not focus more on Ukraine and “less on other
things.”
Trump has left them with no other choice.
FIRE UP THE ‘ARCTIC SENTRY’
Cooper and Eide’s response is to publicly back the idea of an “Arctic Sentry”
NATO mission, a military co-operation that would aim to counter Russian threats
— while reassuring Trump of Europe’s commitment to the region.
Details of the mission — including the number of troops it would involve and
whether it would comprise land, sea or air deployments — remain hazy.
It could mean that exercises like those in northern Norway are deployed in
Greenland too, as well as the shipping lanes around them. Lanes in northern
Europe have seen a rise in shadow fleets carrying sanctioned oil and alleged
sabotage of communications cables.
Yvette Cooper’s message to Trump, and everyone else, was to insist there is no
real division between the eastern and western Arctic. | Stefan Rousseau/Getty
Images
But as with so many issues, they have yet to discover whether Trump will take
heed. Cooper’s intervention came one day after U.S. Vice President JD Vance met
Danish and Greenlandic representatives at the White House amid growing tensions
over Trump’s repeatedly stated intention to take control of Greenland.
Cooper’s message to Trump, and everyone else, was to insist there is no real
division between the eastern and western Arctic. “The security of the Arctic is
all linked,” she said — citing Russia’s northern fleet, shadow fleet, oil
tankers, non-military assets, spy ships and threats to undersea cables.
“Look at the map of the Arctic and where you have the sea channels,” she added.
“You can’t look at any one bit of Arctic security on its own, because the whole
point of the Arctic security is it has an impact on our transatlantic security
as a whole.
“Some of the Russian threat is through its Northern Fleet and into the Atlantic.
That is a transatlantic threat. That is something where clearly you can’t simply
revert to Europe’s defense on its own.”
Yet in parts of Britain and Europe, there are plenty of people who fear Trump is
asking Europe to do exactly that. European allies have long pushed the U.S.
president to nail down commitments to Ukraine.
A mere hint of this frustration is visible in Eide. He was keen to point out
that the risk to his end of the Arctic is more immediate.
“Just to the east of our eastern border, you come to the Kola Peninsula and
Murmansk,” he said, standing on a snowy outcrop. “That region has the largest
conglomeration of nuclear weapons in the world — and particularly, the second
strike capability of Russia is there. They need access to the open oceans, and
in a wartime situation, we don’t want them to have that access.”
He added: “If there is a crisis, this area will immediately be a center of
gravity because of the importance of the nuclear capabilities of Russia, the
submarine base and so on. It will go from low tension to being in the midst of
it in a very short time. That’s why we need to plan for rapid reinforcement, for
rapid stepping up, and also to have a constant military pressure presence in
this area.”
Managing this Trump reassurance is a tricky balance. Rachel Ellehus, director
general of the non-partisan foreign affairs think tank RUSI and a former U.S.
representative at NATO, said: “You want to signal solidarity and presence and
engagement, and send a message that Europe is stepping up for this alleged
Russian and Chinese threat in and around Greenland.
“But you don’t want to kind of stick your finger in the eye of the United States
or signal that you’re looking for some sort of confrontation.”
Perhaps for this reason, Ellehus suggested NATO itself is holding back. “The one
voice that has been quite silent is that of NATO,” she said. “It’s quite odd
that Mark Rutte has not issued a secretary general statement expressing
solidarity with Denmark and underscoring that any security concerns that the
United States might have could legitimately be addressed through the NATO
alliance, because both Denmark and Greenland are members of their territories
covered by the Article Five guarantee.
“I think it does have consequences in terms of the credibility of the alliance,
and I think we could see an intensification of the practice whereby allies are
turning to bilateral or regional relationships, score and meet their security to
meet their security needs, rather than relying on multinational alliances like
NATO.”
A NEW ERA
A reminder of how fast multilateralism is changing hangs on the library wall in
the quaint, pink and white British embassy in Helsinki.
The photo, dated July 1975, shows British Prime Minister Harold Wilson in the
embassy garden with U.S. President Gerald Ford, Henry Kissinger and others on
the cusp of signing the Helsinki Accords. The agreement, emphasizing the rights
of sovereignty and territorial integrity, was part of a drumbeat toward the end
of the Cold War.
Britain’s extreme weather training in this area dates to the Cold War, but Camp
Viking — its facility in Skjold, northern Norway — is new and growing. | Ben
Dance / FCDO
Across the street in Helsinki is the fortress-like embassy of the U.S. — where
Trump is one of those calling the shots on territorial integrity these days. As
well as his designs on Greenland, the president recently said NATO “would not be
an effective force or deterrent” without American military power and said he did
not need international law.
Britain and many of its allies are loath to accept any suggestion of any cracks
in the alliance. Asked by POLITICO if NATO was in crisis, Finland’s Foreign
Minister Elisa Valtonen insisted: “NATO is stronger than it’s ever been.”
Cooper, too, said NATO is “extremely strong” — and argued that those who
describe his administration as a destabilising force are being too simplistic.
She pointed to the presence of Marco Rubio, a more traditional Republican than
Trump who Europeans have found easier to work with than the president, along
with work on security guarantees for Ukraine, collaboration on “Five Eyes”
intelligence and the plan for Gaza, much of which was led by the U.S.
“Of course, everyone can see this administration operates in a different way,”
she said, but “in every discussion I’ve had with … Rubio, there has always been
a really strong commitment to NATO.” The Gaza plan, she added pointedly, “was
actually drawing on international law, the UN framework.”
But one U.K. official, not authorized to speak publicly, said there were three
schools of thought about Trump’s comments on Greenland. The first is the
president’s stated aim that he is concerned about security threats to the
Arctic; the second is that he is seeking business opportunities there.
And then “there is one school of thought that ultimately, he just wants to take
it … he just wants to make America bigger,” they said.
Tag - Shipping
HELSINKI — The U.K. is ready to work with its European allies to intercept
vessels in Russia’s “shadow fleet,” Britain’s chief foreign minister said
Wednesday.
A week after British armed forces supported the U.S. seizure of a
Russian-flagged oil tanker in the North Atlantic, Yvette Cooper said Britain is
prepared to work on enforcement with “other countries and other allies” against
ships suspected of carrying sanctioned oil or damaging undersea infrastructure.
Promising “stronger action” to break the shadow fleet’s “chokehold,” she added:
“It means a more robust response, and it means as we see operations by shadow
fleet vessels, standing ready to be able to act.”
While the foreign secretary would not be drawn on the specific action the U.K.
might take, her charged rhetoric appears to be laying the ground for future
interventions that go beyond last week’s coordination with the Trump
administration.
Officials believe that the U.K. government has identified a legal basis for the
military to board shadow fleet vessels in international shipping lanes, in
certain cases.
Cooper did not rule out the prospect of British forces boarding vessels, telling
POLITICO: “It means looking at whatever is appropriate, depending on the
circumstances that we face.”
She also did not rule out using oil from seized vessels to fund the Ukrainian
war effort — but cautioned that the prospect was of a different order to using
frozen Russian assets to fund Ukraine. That idea hit a wall in discussions
between EU countries in December.
The foreign secretary said: “As you know, we’ve had all sorts of discussions in
the past about different Russian sovereign assets. That’s a different set of
circumstances. So we take the approach that it always has to be done within an
international legal framework and on a case-by-case basis.”
Asked directly if she was talking about joint shadow fleet operations with
European allies, Cooper said: “We stand ready to work with allies on stronger
enforcement around the shadow fleet.”
Cooper made her comments on Wednesday after a demonstration on board the Finnish
Border Guard ship Turva. It took part in a Dec. 31 operation to seize a cargo
ship sailing from Russia to Israel, which was accused of deliberately damaging a
cable between Helsinki and Estonia.
Finnish authorities demonstrated a mock operation similar to the one that seized
the ship on New Year’s Eve. Cooper watched as five armed officers slid down a
rope from a helicopter onto the deck and stormed the bridge, shouting: “Hands
up.” The operation took around three minutes.
Cooper said after the demonstration: “The reason for being here is to see the
work that Finland has been doing around the shadow fleet, and to look at what
the further potential is for us to work with allies to strengthen that
enforcement work.”
Mari Rantanen, Finland’s interior minister, said the age of some Russian-linked
tankers using northern shipping routes risks an ecologically disastrous oil
spill. | Olivier Hoslet/EPA
She name-checked work by France and Finland, while one U.K. official said she
also intends to work with Norway.
Mari Rantanen, Finland’s interior minister, said the age of some Russian-linked
tankers using northern shipping routes risks an ecologically disastrous oil
spill. “These vessels, these tankers, are very old,” she told POLITICO. “They
are not built [for] this kind of icy weather, and they are in very bad shape, so
the environmental risk is huge.”
Mikko Simola, the commander of the Gulf of Finland coastguard, said he has seen
“a rapid change since early 2022” in the prevalence of malign activity, for
which Moscow denies responsibility.
Simola said he would let the courts decide who was culpable, but said it was
“certainly very strange to believe that in a short period of time, many cable
and gas pipe damages would happen by accident in the same area.”
BRUSSELS — Donald Trump blew up global efforts to cut emissions from shipping,
and now the EU is terrified the U.S. president will do the same to any plans to
tax carbon emissions from long-haul flights.
The European Commission is studying whether to expand its existing carbon
pricing scheme that forces airlines to pay for emissions from short- and
medium-haul flights within Europe into a more ambitious effort covering all
flights departing the bloc.
If that happens, all international airlines flying out of Europe — including
U.S. ones — would face higher costs, something that’s likely to stick in the
craw of the Trump administration.
“God only knows what the Trump administration will do” if Brussels expands its
own Emissions Trading System to include transatlantic flights, a senior EU
official told POLITICO.
A big issue is how to ensure that the new system doesn’t end up charging only
European airlines, which often complain about the higher regulatory burden they
face compared with their non-EU rivals.
The EU official said Commission experts are now “scratching their heads how you
can, on the one hand, talk about extending the ETS worldwide … [but] also make
sure that you have a bit of a level playing field,” meaning a system that
doesn’t only penalize European carriers.
Any new costs will hit airlines by 2027, following a Commission assessment that
will be completed by July 1.
Brussels has reason to be worried.
“Trump has made it very clear that he does not want any policies that harm
business … So he does not want any environmental regulation,” said Marina
Efthymiou, aviation management professor at Dublin City University. “We do have
an administration with a bullying behavior threatening countries and even
entities like the European Commission.”
The new U.S. National Security Strategy, released last week, closely hews to
Trump’s thinking and is scathing on climate efforts.
“We reject the disastrous ‘climate change’ and ‘Net Zero’ ideologies that have
so greatly harmed Europe, threaten the United States, and subsidize our
adversaries,” it says.
In October, the U.S. led efforts to prevent the International Maritime
Organization from setting up a global tax to encourage commercial fleets to go
green. The no-holds-barred push was personally led by Trump and even threatened
negotiators with personal consequences if they went along with the measure.
In October, the U.S. led efforts to prevent the International Maritime
Organization from setting up a global tax aimed at encouraging commercial fleets
to go green. | Nicolas Tucat/AFP via Getty Images
This “will be a parameter to consider seriously from the European Commission”
when it thinks about aviation, Efthymiou said.
The airline industry hopes the prospect of a furious Trump will scare off the
Commission.
“The EU is not going to extend ETS to transatlantic flights because that will
lead to a war,” said Willie Walsh, director general of the International Air
Transport Association, the global airline lobby, at a November conference in
Brussels. “And that is not a war that the EU will win.”
EUROPEAN ETS VS. GLOBAL CORSIA
In 2012, the EU began taxing aviation emissions through its cap-and-trade ETS,
which covers all outgoing flights from the European Economic Area — meaning EU
countries plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. Switzerland and the U.K. later
introduced similar schemes.
In parallel, the U.N.’s International Civil Aviation Organization was working on
its own carbon reduction plan, the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for
International Aviation. Given that fact, Brussels delayed imposing the ETS on
flights to non-European destinations.
The EU will now be examining the ICAO’s CORSIA to see if it meets the mark.
“CORSIA lets airlines pay pennies for pollution — about €2.50 per passenger on a
Paris-New York flight,” said Marte van der Graaf, aviation policy officer at
green NGO Transport & Environment. Applying the ETS on the same route would cost
“€92.40 per passenger based on 2024 traffic.”
There are two reasons for such a big difference: the fourfold higher price for
ETS credits compared with CORSIA credits, and the fact that “under CORSIA,
airlines don’t pay for total emissions, but only for the increase above a fixed
2019 baseline,” Van der Graaf explained.
“Thus, for a Paris-New York flight that emits an average of 131 tons of CO2,
only 14 percent of emissions are offset under CORSIA. This means that, instead
of covering the full 131 tons, the airline only has to purchase credits for
approximately 18 tons.”
Efthymiou, the professor, warned the price difference is projected to increase
due to the progressive withdrawal of free ETS allowances granted to aviation.
The U.N. scheme will become mandatory for all U.N. member countries in 2027 but
will not cover domestic flights, including those in large countries such as the
U.S., Russia and China.
KEY DECISIONS
By July 1, the Commission must release a report assessing the geographical
coverage and environmental integrity of CORSIA. Based on this evaluation, the EU
executive will propose either extending the ETS to all departing flights from
the EU starting in 2027 or maintaining it for intra-EU flights only.
Opposition to the ETS in the U.S. dates back to the Barack Obama administration.
| Pete Souza/White House via Getty Images
According to T&E, CORSIA doesn’t meet the EU’s climate goals.
“Extending the scope of the EU ETS to all departing flights from 2027 could
raise an extra €147 billion by 2040,” said Van der Graaf, noting that this money
could support the production of greener aviation fuels to replace fossil
kerosene.
But according to Efthymiou, the Commission might decide to continue the current
exemption “considering the very fragile political environment we currently have
with a lunatic being in power,” she said, referring to Trump.
“CORSIA has received a lot of criticism for sure … but the importance of CORSIA
is that for the first time ever we have an agreement,” she added. “Even though
that agreement might not be very ambitious, ICAO is the only entity with power
to put an international regulation [into effect].”
Regardless of what is decided in Brussels, Washington is prepared to fight.
Opposition to the ETS in the U.S. dates back to the Barack Obama administration,
when then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton sent a letter to the Commission
opposing its application to American airlines.
During the same term, the U.S. passed the EU ETS Prohibition Act, which gives
Washington the power to prohibit American carriers from paying for European
carbon pricing.
John Thune, the Republican politician who proposed the bill, is now the majority
leader of the U.S. Senate.
BRUSSELS — If you ordered Christmas presents from a Chinese web shop, they are
likely to be toxic, unsafe or undervalued. Or all of the above. The EU is trying
to do something about the flood but is tripping over itself 27 times to get
there.
“It’s absolutely crazy…” sighs one EU official. The official, granted anonymity
to discuss preparations to tackle the problem, said that at some airport freight
hubs, an estimated 80 percent of such inbound packages don’t comply with EU
safety rules.
The numbers are dizzying. In 2024, 4.6 billion small packages with contents
worth less than €150 entered the EU. That all-time record was broken in
September of this year.
Because these individual air-mail packages replace whole containers shipping the
same product, the workload for customs officials has increased exponentially
over recent years. Non-compliant, cheaply-made products — such as dangerous toys
or kitchen items — bring health risks. And a growing pile of garbage.
It’s a problem for everyone along the chain. Customs officers can’t keep up;
buyers end up with useless products; children are put at risk; and EU makers of
similar items are undercut by unfair and untaxed competition.
With the situation on the ground becoming unmanageable, the EU agreed this month
to charge a €3 fixed fee on all such packages. This will effectively remove a
tax-free exemption on packages worth €150 — but only from July of next year.
It’s a crude, and temporary, fix because existing customs IT systems can’t yet
tax items according to their actual value.
ALL I WANT …
Which is why all European lawmaker Anna Cavazzini wants for next year’s holiday
season is “better rules.”
Cavazzini is a key player in a push to harmonize the EU’s 27 national customs
regimes. A proposed reform, now being discussed by the EU institutions, would
create a central data hub and an EU Customs Agency, or EUCA, with oversight
powers.
As is so often the case in the EU, though, the customs reform is only
progressing slowly. The EUCA will be operational only from late 2026. And the
data hub probably won’t be up and running until the next decade.
“We need a fundamental discussion on the Europeanization of customs,” Cavazzini
told POLITICO.
As chair of the European Parliament’s Internal Market and Consumer Protection
Committee (IMCO), the lawmaker from the German Greens has been pushing the
Council, the EU’s intergovernmental branch, to allow the customs reform to make
the bloc’s single market more of a unified reality.
European lawmaker Anna Cavazzini. | Martin Bertrand and Hans Lucas/AFP via Getty
Images
EU capitals worry — as always — about handing over too much power to the
eurocrats in Brussels. But the main outstanding issue where negotiators disagree
is more prosaic: it’s about whether the law should include an explicit list of
offences, such making false declarations to customs officers.
While the last round of negotiations in early December brought some progress on
other areas, the unsolved penalties question has kicked the reform into 2026.
With the millions of boxes, packages and parcels inbound, regardless, individual
countries are also considering handling fees, beside the €3 tax that all have
agreed on. France has already proposed a solo fee with revenues flowing into its
national budget, and Belgium and the Netherlands will probably follow suit.
RACE TO THE BOTTOM
Customs reform is what’s needed, not another round of fragmented fees and a race
to the bottom, said Dirk Gotink, the European Parliament’s lead negotiator on
the customs reform.
“Right now, the ideas launched by France and others are not meant to stem the
flow of packages. They are just meant to earn money,” the Dutch center-right
lawmaker told a recent briefing.
To inspect the myriad ways in which they are a risk, Gotink’s team bought a few
items from dubious-looking web shops. “With this one, the eyes are coming off
right away,” he warned before handing a plush toy to a reporter.
The reporter almost succeeded in separating the head from the creature’s body
without too much effort. And thin, plastic eyes trailed the toy as it was passed
around the room.
“On the box it says it’s meant for people over 15 years old…” one reporter
commented. But the cute creature is clearly targeted at far younger audiences.
Adding to the craze, K-pop stars excitedly unbox new characters in online
promotional videos.
The troubles aren’t limited to toys. A jar of cosmetics showed by Gotink had
inscriptions on its label that didn’t resemble any known alphabet.
Individual products aside, the deluge of cheap merchandise also creates unfair
competition, said Cavazzini: “A lot of European companies of course also fulfill
the environmental obligations and the imports don’t,” she said. “This is also
creating a huge unlevel playing field.”
After the holidays, Gotink and Cavazzini will pick up negotiations on the
customs reform with Cyprus, which from Jan. 1 takes over the rotating presidency
of the Council of the EU from Denmark.
“This file will be a priority during our presidency,” a Cypriot official told
POLITICO, adding that Denmark had completed most of the technical work. “We aim
to conclude this important file, hoping to reach a deal with the Parliament
during the first months of the Cyprus Presidency.”
Despite the delays, an EU diplomat working on customs policy told POLITICO that
the current speed of the policy process is unprecedented: “This huge ecommerce
pressure has really made all the difference. A year ago, this would have been
unimaginable.”
Elisabeth Braw is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, the author of the
award-winning “Goodbye Globalization” and a regular columnist for POLITICO.
Russia’s shadow fleet just won’t go away.
Countries in the Baltic Sea region have tried virtually every legal means of
stopping this gnawing headache for every country whose waters have been
traversed by these mostly dilapidated vessels — and yes, sinking them would be
illegal.
Now, these rust buckets are starting to cause an additional headache. Because
they’re usually past retirement age, these vessels don’t last long before they
need to be scrapped. This has opened a whole shadow trade that’s bound to cause
serious harm to both humans and the environment.
Earlier this month, the globally infamous Eagle S ship met its end in the
Turkish port of Aliağa. The bow of the 229-meter oil tanker was on shore, its
stern afloat, with cranes disassembling and moving its parts into a sealed area.
The negative environmental impact of this landing method “is no doubt higher
than recycling in a fully contained area,” noted the NGO Shipbreaking Platform
on its website.
But in the grand scheme of things, the Eagle S’s end was a relatively clean one.
The 19-year-old Cook Islands-flagged oil tanker is a shadow vessel that had been
transporting sanctioned Russian oil since early 2023. It then savaged an
astonishing five undersea cables in the Gulf of Finland on Christmas Day last
year, before being detained by the Finnish authorities.
People are willing to own shadow vessels because they can make a lot of money
transporting sanctioned cargo. However, as the tiny, elusive outfits that own
them would struggle to buy shiny new vessels even if they wanted to, these ships
are often on their last legs — different surveys estimate that shadow vessels
have an average age of 20 years or more.
Over the last few years, Russia’s embrace of the shadow fleet for its oil export
has caused the fleet to grow dramatically, as tanker owners concluded they can
make good money by selling their aging ships into the fleet. (They’d make less
selling the vessels to shipbreakers.) Today, the shadow fleet encompasses the
vast majority of retirement-age oil tankers. But after a few years, these
tankers and ships are simply too old to sail, especially since shadow vessels
undergo only the most cursory maintenance.
To get around safely rules, less-than-scrupulous owners often sell their nearly
dead ships to “final journey” firms, which have the sole purpose of disposing of
them. | Ole Berg-Rusten/EPA
For aged ships, the world of official shipping has what one might call a funeral
process: a scrapping market.
In 2024, 409 ships were scrapped through this official market, though calling it
“official” makes it sound clean and safe, which, for the most part, it isn’t. A
few of the ships scrapped last year were disassembled in countries like Denmark,
Norway and the Netherlands, which follow strict rules regarding human and
environmental safety. A handful of others were scrapped in Turkey, which has an
OK record. But two-thirds were scrapped in Southeast Asia, where the
shipbreaking industry is notoriously unsafe.
To get around safely rules, less-than-scrupulous owners often sell their nearly
dead ships to “final journey” firms, which have the sole purpose of disposing of
them. These companies and their middlemen then make money by selling the ships’
considerable amount of steel to metal companies. But in India, Pakistan and
Bangladesh — the latter is the world’s most popular shipbreaking country —
vessels are disassembled on beaches rather than sealed facilities, and by
workers using little more than their hands.
Of course, this makes the process cheap, but it also makes it dangerous.
According to the NGO Shipbreaking Platform, last year, 15 South Asian
shipbreaking workers lost their lives on the job and 45 were injured. Just one
accident involving an oil tanker claimed the lives of six workers and injured
another six.
This brings us to the shadow fleet and its old vessels, as they, too, need to be
scrapped. But many of them are under Western sanctions, which presents a
challenge to their owners since international financial transactions are
typically conducted in U.S. dollars.
Initially, I had suspected that coastal nations would start finding all manner
of shadow vessels abandoned in their waters and would be left having to arrange
the scrapping. But as owners want to make money from the ships’ metal, this
frightening scenario hasn’t come to pass. Instead, a shadow shipbreaking market
is emerging.
Open-source intelligence research shows that shadow vessel owners are now
selling their sanctioned vessels to final-journey firms or middlemen in a
process that mirror the official one. Given that these are mostly sanctioned
vessels, the buyers naturally get a discount, which the sellers are more than
willing to provide. After all, selling a larger shadow tanker for scrap value
and making something to the tune of $10 to $15 million is more profitable than
abandoning it.
And how are the payments made? We don’t know for sure, but they’re likely in
crypto or a non-U.S. dollar currency.
These shady processes make the situation even more perilous for the workers
doing the scrapping, not to mention for the environment. “Thanks to a string of
new rules and regulations over the past five decades, shipping has become much
safer, and that has reduced the number of accidents significantly in recent
decades,” explained Mats Saether, a lawyer at the Nordisk legal services
association in Oslo. “It’s regrettable that the shadow fleet is reversing this
trend.” It certainly is.
Indeed, the scrapping of shadow vessels is a practice that demands serious
scrutiny. Greenpeace, Human Rights Watch and other NGOs could do a good deed for
the environment and unfortunate shipbreaking workers by conducting
investigations. And surely the Bangladeshi government wouldn’t want to see
Bangladeshi lives lost because Russia needs oil for war?
Greenpeace, Human Rights Watch and other NGOs could do a good deed for the
environment and unfortunate shipbreaking workers by conducting investigations. |
Ole Berg-Rusten/EPA
There’s an opportunity here for Western governments to help too. They could
offer shadow vessel owners legal leniency and a way to sell their ships back
into the official fleet — if the owners provide the authorities with details
about the fleet’s inner workings and vow to leave the business.
Does that sound unlikely to succeed? Possibly. But that’s what people said about
Italy’s pentiti system, and they were proven wrong. Besides, the shadow fleet is
such a tumor on the shipping industry and the world’s waterways that almost any
measure is worth a try.
BRUSSELS — When the colonial governments of Belgium and Portugal ordered the
construction of a railway connecting oil- and mineral-rich regions in the
African interior to the Atlantic, their primary objective was to plunder
resources such as rubber, ivory and minerals for export to Western countries.
Today, that same stretch of railway infrastructure, snaking through Zambia, the
Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola to the port of Lobito, is being
modernized and extended with U.S. and EU money to facilitate the transport of
sought-after minerals like cobalt and copper. Just this month, Jozef Síkela, the
EU commissioner for international partnerships, signed a €116 million investment
package for the corridor, often hailed as a model initiative under Global
Gateway, the bloc’s infrastructure development program.
This time around, however, Brussels says it’s committed to resetting its
historically tainted relationship with the region — a message European
Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António
Costa will stress when they address African and EU leaders at a Nov. 24-25
summit in Luanda, Angola, which is this year celebrating 50 years of
independence from Portuguese rule.
“Global Gateway is about mutual benefits,” von der Leyen said in a keynote
speech in October. The program should “focus even more on key value chains,”
including the metals and minerals needed in everything from smartphones to wind
turbines and defense applications.
The aim, she said, is to “build up resilient value chains together. With local
infrastructure, but also local jobs, local skills and local industries.”
Yet Brussels is scrambling to enter a region only to find that China got there
first.
Batches of copper sheets are stored in a warehouse and wait to be loaded on
trucks in Zambia. | Per-Anders Pettersson/Getty Images
African countries are already the primary suppliers of minerals to Beijing,
which has secured access to their resource wealth — unhindered by any historical
baggage of colonial exploitation — and is now the world’s dominant processor.
Europe’s emphasis on retaining economic value in host countries — rather than
merely extracting resources for export — answers calls by African leaders for a
more equitable and sustainable approach to developing their countries’ natural
resources.
“The EU has been quite vocal, since the beginning of the raw minerals diplomacy
two years ago, saying: We want to be the ethical partner,” said Martina
Matarazzo, international and EU advocacy coordinator at Resource Matters, a
Belgian NGO focusing on resource extraction, which also has an office in
Kinshasa, DRC.
But “there is a big gap” between what’s being said and what’s being done, she
added, pointing out that it is still unclear how the Lobito Corridor can be a
“win-win” project, rather than just facilitating the shipping of minerals
abroad.
Brussels finds itself under growing pressure to diversify its supply chains of
lithium, rare earths and other raw materials away from China — which has
demonstrated time and again it is ready to weaponize its market dominance. To
that end, it is drafting a new plan, due on Dec. 3, to accelerate the bloc’s
diversification efforts.
In African countries, however, Brussels is still struggling to establish itself
as an attractive, ethical alternative to Beijing, which has long secured vast
access to the continent’s resources through large-scale investments in mining,
processing and infrastructure.
To enter the minerals space, the EU needs to walk the talk in close cooperation
with African leaders — doing so may be its only chance to secure resources while
moving away from its extractivist past, POLITICO has found in conversations with
researchers, policymakers and civil society.
RESOURCE RUSH
Appetite for Africa’s vast natural riches first drew colonizers to the continent
— and laid “the foundation for post-independence resource dependency and
external interference,” according to the Africa Policy Research Institute. Now,
the continent’s deposits of vital minerals have turned it into a strategic
player, with Zambian President Hakainde Hichilema last year setting a goal of
tripling copper output by the end of the decade, for instance.
Beijing has often used Belt and Road, its international development initiative,
to secure mining rights in exchange for infrastructure projects.
Washington, which lags far behind Beijing, is also stepping up its game, with
investments into Africa quietly overtaking China’s. President Donald Trump has
extended the U.S. security umbrella to war-torn areas in exchange for access to
resources, for example brokering a — shaky — peace deal between Rwanda and the
DRC.
EU companies are “really trying to catch up,” said Christian Géraud Neema
Byamungu, an expert on China-Africa relations and the Francophone Africa editor
of the China Global South Project. “They left Africa when there was a sense that
Africa is not really a place to do business.”
DOING THINGS DIFFERENTLY
Against this backdrop, the key question for the EU is: What can it offer to set
itself apart from other partners?
On paper, the answer is clear: a responsible approach to resource extraction
that prioritizes creating local economic value, along with high environmental
and social standards.
“We want to focus on the sustainable development of value chains and how to work
with our African partners to support their rise of the value chains,” said an EU
official ahead of the Luanda summit, where minerals will be a key topic. “This
is not about extraction only,” they added.
But so far, that still has to translate into a concrete impact on the ground.
“We are not at the point where we can see how really the EU is trying to change
things on the ground in terms of value addition in DRC,” said Emmanuel Umpula
Nkumba, executive director of NGO Afrewatch.
“I am not naïve, they are coming to make money, not to help us,” he added.
Not only has offtake from the Lobito Corridor been slow, but the project has
also come under fire for prioritizing Western interests over African development
and agency, and for potentially leading to the destruction of local forests,
community displacement and an overall lack of benefits for local populations.
The 2024 Lobito Corridor Trans-Africa Summit | Andrew Caballero-Reynolds/AFP via
Getty Images
The EU, however, views the corridor as “a symbol of the partnership between the
African and European continent and an example of our shared investment
agenda,” according to a Commission spokesperson, who called it “a lifeline
towards sustainable development and shared prosperity.”
Finally, while “value addition” has become a catchphrase, it’s unclear whether
EU and African leaders see eye to eye on what the term means.
African industry representatives and officials often point to building a
domestic supply chain up to the final product. EU officials, by contrast, tend
to envision refining minerals in the country of origin and then exporting them,
according to a report published by the European Council on Foreign Relations.
A SUSTAINABLE BUSINESS CASE?
The second component of the EU’s approach — strong sustainability and human
rights safeguards — faces major trouble, not least in the name of making the EU
more competitive.
In Brussels, proposed rules that would require companies to police their supply
chains for environmental harm and human rights violations are dying a slow
death, as conservative politicians channel complaints from businesses that they
can’t bear the cost of complying.
An investigation by the Business & Human Rights Resource Centre of the 13
mining, refining and recycling projects outside the bloc labeled “strategic” by
the EU executive — including four in Africa — identified “an inconsistent
approach to key human rights policies.”
However, under pressure from African leaders, stricter safeguards are slowly
becoming more important in the sector: “high [environmental, social and
governance] standards” are a core component of the African Union’s mining
strategy published in 2024.
The Chinese, too, are adapting quickly.
“China’s also getting good with standards,” said Sarah Logan, a visiting fellow
at the European Council on Foreign Relations who co-authored the assessment of
African and European interpretations of value addition. “If they are made to,
Chinese mining companies are very capable of adhering to ESG standards.”
Therefore, besides massively scaling up investment, the EU and European
companies will need to turn their promise of being a reliable and ethical
partner into reality — sooner rather than later.
“The only way to distinguish ourselves from the Chinese is to guarantee these
benefits for communities,” Spanish Green European lawmaker Ana Miranda Paz told
a panel discussion on the Lobito Corridor in Brussels.
This story has been updated with comment from the European Commission.
LONDON — Criminal networks are “weaponizing children” to commit torture and
murder by recruiting them through multiplayer video games and smartphones — and
parents often have no idea what’s happening, the boss of Europe’s law
enforcement agency warns.
These groups now pose the greatest single criminal threat to the European Union
because they destabilize society by targeting children and destroying families,
said Catherine De Bolle, executive director of Europol.
“The weaponization of children for organized crime groups is what is going on at
the moment on European soil,” she said in a joint interview with POLITICO and
Welt. “They weaponize the children to torture or to kill. It’s not about petty
theft anymore. It’s about big crimes.”
The “worst case” Europol has seen was of a young boy who was ordered “to kill
his younger sister, which happened,” she said. “It’s cruel, we have never seen
this before.”
She even suggested that children and young people are being used by hostile
states and hybrid threat perpetrators as unwitting spies to eavesdrop on
government buildings.
The Europol chief is in a unique position to describe the criminal landscape
threatening European security, as head of the EU agency responsible for
intelligence coordination and supporting national police.
In a wide-ranging discussion, De Bolle also cautioned that the growth of
artificial intelligence is having a dramatic impact, multiplying online crime,
described how drug smugglers are now using submarines to ship cocaine from South
America to Europe, and described an increasing threat to European society from
Russia’s hybrid war.
De Bolle’s comments come amid an ongoing debate about how to police the internet
and social media to prevent young and vulnerable people from coming to harm. The
greatest threat facing the EU from organized crime right now comes from groups
that have “industrialized” the recruitment of children, she said: “Because [they
are] the future of the European Union. If you lose them, you lose everything.”
FROM GAMING TO GROOMING
Criminals often begin the process of grooming children by joining their
multiplayer video games, which have a chat function, and gaining their trust by
discussing seemingly harmless topics like pets and family life.
Then, they will switch to a closed chat where they will move on to discussing
more sinister matters, and persuade the child to share personal details like
their address. At that point, the criminals can bribe or blackmail the child
into committing violence, including torture, self-harm, murder and even
suicide.
Europol is aware of 105 instances in which minors were involved in violent
crimes “performed as a service” — including 10 contract killings. Many attempted
murders fail because children are inexperienced, the agency said.
“We also have children who do not execute the order and then, for instance, [the
criminals] kill the pet of the child, so that the child knows very well, ‘We
know where you live, we know who you are, you will obey, and if you don’t, we
will go even further to kill your mother or your father,’” De Bolle warned.
Criminals will also offer children money to commit a crime — as much as $20,000
for a killing, sometimes they pay and sometimes they don’t. While these networks
often target children who are vulnerable because they have psychological
problems or are bullied at school, healthy and happy children are also at risk,
De Bolle said. “It’s also about others, youngsters who are not vulnerable but
just want new shoes — shoes that are very expensive.”
Sometimes young people are even recruited for hybrid war by state actors, she
said. “You also have it with hybrid threat actors that are looking for the crime
as a service model — the young perpetrators to listen to the foreign state, to
listen to the communication around buildings.”
Once police catch a child, the criminals abandon them and move to groom a new
child to turn into a remote-operated weapon.
“Parents blame themselves in a lot of cases. They do not understand how it is
possible,” she said. “The problem is you don’t have access to everything your
child does and you respect also the privacy of your children. But as a parent,
you need to talk about the dangers of the internet.”
DRUGS AND AI ARE ALSO A PROBLEM
Among the new criminal methods crossing Europol’s desks, two stand out: The use
of so-called narco-submarines to smuggle drugs like cocaine from South America
into the EU and the growth in AI technology fueling an explosion in online fraud
that enforcement agencies are virtually powerless to stop.
Instead of shipping cocaine into the ports of Hamburg, Rotterdam and Antwerp
through containers, criminals have diversified their methods, De Bolle said. One
key route is to sail semi-submersible vessels from South America to Europe’s
North Atlantic coast, where speedboats meet them and offload the illegal cargo
via Portugal, according to Europol’s information.
While Europe now is “overflooded with drugs,” criminal organizations may make
more money, more easily through online fraud, she said. “Artificial intelligence
is a multiplier for crime,” she said. “Everything is done a thousand times more
and faster. The abuse of artificial intelligence lies in phishing emails — you
do not recognize it very easily with phishing emails anymore because the
language is correct.”
She said “romance fraud” is also “booming,” as “people look for love, also
online.”
“With deepfakes and with voice automation systems, it’s very difficult for a law
enforcement authority to recognise that from a genuine picture. The technology
is not there yet to [tell] the difference,” De Bolle added.
De Bolle said Europol needed to be able to access encrypted phone messages with
a judge’s authorization to disrupt these criminal networks. “When a judge
decides that we need to have access to data, the online providers should be
forced to give us access to this encrypted communication,” she said.
Otherwise, “we will be blind and then we cannot do our job.”
By ALEX PERRY in Paris
Illustrations by Julius Maxim for POLITICO
This article is also available in French
When Patrick Pouyanné decided to spend billions on a giant natural gas field in
a faraway warzone, he made the call alone, over a single dinner, with the head
of a rival energy company.
Pouyanné, the chairman and CEO of what was then called Total, was dining with
Vicki Hollub, CEO of Houston-based Occidental Petroleum. It was late April 2019,
and Hollub was in a David and Goliath battle with the American energy behemoth
Chevron to buy Anadarko, like Occidental a mid-sized Texan oil and gas explorer.
The American investor Warren Buffett was set to back Hollub with $10 billion,
but it wasn’t enough. So Hollub flew to Paris to meet Pouyanné.
Hollub’s proposal: Pouyanné would pitch in $8.8 billion in exchange for
Anadarko’s four African gas fields, including a vast deep-sea reserve off
northern Mozambique, an area in the grip of an Islamist insurgency.
The Frenchman, who had previously approached Anadarko about the same assets,
said yes in a matter of minutes.
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“What are the strengths of Total?” Pouyanné explained to an Atlantic Council
event in Washington a few weeks later. “LNG,” he went on, and the “Middle East
and Africa,” regions where the company has operated since its origin in the
colonial era. “So it’s just fitting exactly and perfectly.”
Total, “a large corporation,” could be “so agile,” he said, because of the
efficacy of his decision-making, and the clarity of his vision to shift from oil
to lower-emission gas, extracted from lightly regulated foreign lands.
In the end, “it [was] just a matter of sending an email to my colleague
[Hollub],” he added. “This is the way to make good deals.”
Six years later, it’s fair to ask if Pouyanné was a little hasty.
On Nov. 17, a European human rights NGO filed a criminal complaint with the
national counterterrorism prosecutor’s office in Paris accusing TotalEnergies of
complicity in war crimes, torture and enforced disappearances, all in northern
Mozambique.
The allegations turn on a massacre, first reported by POLITICO last year, in
which Mozambican soldiers crammed about 200 men into shipping containers at the
gatehouse of a massive gas liquefaction plant TotalEnergies is building in the
country, then killed most of them over the next three months.
The complaint, submitted by the nonprofit European Centre for Constitutional and
Human Rights (ECCHR), alleges that TotalEnergies became an accomplice in the
“so-called ‘container massacre’” because it “directly financed and materially
supported” the Mozambican soldiers who carried out the executions, which took
place between June and September 2021.
“TotalEnergies knew that the Mozambican armed forces had been accused of
systematic human rights violations, yet continued to support them with the only
objective to secure its facility,” said Clara Gonzales, co-director of the
business and human rights program at ECCHR, a Berlin-based group specializing in
international law that has spent the past year corroborating the atrocity.
In response to the complaint, a company spokesperson in Paris said in a written
statement: “TotalEnergies takes these allegations very seriously” and would
“comply with the lawful investigation prerogatives of the French authorities.”
Last year, in response to questions by POLITICO, the company — through its
subsidiary Mozambique LNG — said it had no knowledge of the container killings,
adding that its “extensive research” had “not identified any information nor
evidence that would corroborate the allegations of severe abuses and torture.”
This week, the spokesperson repeated that position.
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Asked in May in the French National Assembly about the killings, Pouyanné
dismissed “these false allegations” and demanded the company’s accusers “put
their evidence on the table.” Questioned about the complaint on French
television this week, he again rejected the allegations and described them as a
“smear campaign” motivated by the fact that TotalEnergies produces fossil fuels.
The war crimes complaint is based on POLITICO’s reporting and other open-source
evidence. In the last year, the container killings have been confirmed by the
French newspaper Le Monde and the British journalism nonprofit Source Material.
The British Mozambique expert Professor Joseph Hanlon also said the atrocity was
“well known locally,” and an investigation carried out by UK Export Finance
(UKEF) — the British state lender, which is currently weighing delivery of a
$1.15 billion loan to Total’s project — has heard evidence from its survivors.
The massacre was an apparent reprisal for a devastating attack three months
earlier by ISIS-affiliated rebels on the nearby town of Palma, just south of the
border with Tanzania, which killed 1,354 civilians, including 55 of Total’s
workforce, according to a house-to-house survey carried out by POLITICO. Of
those ISIS murdered, it beheaded 330. TotalEnergies has previously noted that
Mozambique has yet to issue an official toll for the Palma massacre.
In March, a French magistrate began investigating TotalEnergies for involuntary
manslaughter over allegations that it abandoned its contractors to the
onslaught.
After the jihadis left the area in late June, Mozambican commandos based at
Total’s gas concession rounded up 500 villagers and accused them of backing the
rebels. They separated men from women and children, raped several of the women,
then forced the 180-250 men into two metal windowless shipping containers that
formed a rudimentary fortified entrance to Total’s plant.
There, the soldiers kept their prisoners in 30-degree-Celsius heat for three
months. According to eleven survivors and two witnesses, some men suffocated.
Fed handfuls of rice and bottle caps of water, others starved or died of thirst.
The soldiers beat and tortured many of the rest. Finally, they began taking them
away in groups and executing them.
Only 26 men survived, saved when a Rwandan intervention force, deployed to fight
ISIS, discovered the operation. A second house-to-house survey conducted by
POLITICO later identified by name 97 of those killed or disappeared.
Along with the new ECCHR complaint and the British inquiry, the killings are the
subject of three other separate investigations: by the Mozambican Attorney
General, the Mozambican National Human Rights Commission, and the Dutch
government, which is probing $1.2 billion in Dutch state financing for
TotalEnergies’ project.
This week’s complaint was lodged with the offices of the French National
Anti-Terrorism Prosecutor, whose remit includes war crimes. The prosecutor will
decide whether to open a formal inquiry and appoint an investigating
magistrate.
Should the case move ahead, TotalEnergies will face the prospect of a war crimes
trial.
Such an eventuality would represent a spectacular fall from grace for a business
that once held a central place in French national identity and a CEO whose
hard-nosed resolve made him an icon of global business.
Should a French court eventually find the company or its executives liable in
the container killings, the penalties could include fines and, possibly, jail
terms for anybody indicted.
How did TotalEnergies get here? How did Patrick Pouyanné?
‘POUYANNÉ PETROLEUM’
Born in Normandy in 1963, the son of a provincial customs official and a post
office worker, Pouyanné elevated himself to the French elite by winning
selection to the École Polytechnique, the country’s foremost engineering
university, and then the École des Mines, where France’s future captains of
industry are made.
Following a few years in politics as a minister’s aide, he joined the French
state petroleum company Elf as an exploration manager in Angola in 1996. After
moving to Qatar in 1999 as Elf merged with Total, Pouyanné ascended to the top
job at Total in 2014 after his predecessor, Christophe de Margerie, was killed
in a plane crash in Moscow.
Pouyanné led by reason, and force of will. “To be number one in a group like
Total … is to find yourself alone,” he said in 2020. “When I say ‘I don’t
agree,’ sometimes the walls shake. I realize this.”
A decade at the top has seen Pouyanné, 62, transform a company of 100,000
employees in 130 countries into a one-man show — “Pouyanné Petroleum,” as the
industry quip goes.
His frequent public appearances, and his unapologetically firm hand, have made
him a celebrated figure in international business.
“Patrick Pouyanné has done an extraordinary job leading TotalEnergies in a
complex environment, delivering outstanding financial results and engaging the
company in the energy transition quicker and stronger than its peers,” Jacques
Aschenbroich, the company’s lead independent director, said in 2023.
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Marc-Antoine Eyl-Mazzega, director of energy and climate at the French Institute
of International Relations, agreed. “His involvement is his strength,” he said.
“He’s able to take a decision quickly, in a much more agile and rapid way.”
Still, Eyl-Mazzega said, “I’m not sure everyone is happy to work with him. You
have to keep up the pace. There are often departures. He’s quite direct and
frank.”
Among employees, Pouyanné’s lumbering frame and overbearing manner has earned
him a nickname: The Bulldozer.
The moniker isn’t always affectionate. A former Total executive who dealt
regularly with him recalled him as unpleasantly aggressive, “banging fists on
the table.”
The effect, the executive said, has been to disempower the staff: “The structure
of Total is trying to guess what Pouyanné wants to do. You can’t make any
decisions unless it goes to the CEO.”
In a statement to POLITICO, TotalEnergies called such depictions “misplaced and
baseless.”
‘DON’T ASK US TO TAKE THE MORAL HIGH GROUND’
What’s not in dispute is how Pouyanné has used his authority to shape Total’s
answer to the big 21st-century oil and gas puzzle: how to square demand for
fossil fuels with simultaneous demands from politicians and climate campaigners
to eliminate them.
His response has been diversification, moving the company away from
high-emission fuels towards becoming a broad-based, ethical energy supplier,
centered on low-carbon gas, solar and wind, and pledging to reach net-zero
emissions by 2050. The change was symbolized by Pouyanné’s renaming of the
company TotalEnergies in 2021.
A second, more unsung element of Pouyanné’s strategy has been moving much of his
remaining fossil fuel operation beyond Western regulation.
Speaking to an audience at Chatham House in London in 2017, he said the catalyst
for his move to favor reserves in poorer, less tightly policed parts of the
planet was the penalties imposed on the British energy giant BP in the United
States following the 2010 Deepwater Horizon blowout, in which 11 men died and an
oil slick devastated the Gulf of Mexico coast.
Pouyanné declared that the fines — between $62 billion and $142 billion,
depending on the calculation used — represented an excessive “legal risk” to oil
and gas development in the West.
While other, more troubled territories came with their share of dangers,
Pouyanné put the cost of failure of any project outside the West at a more
manageable $2 to $3 billion, according to his Chatham House remarks.
As a way of assessing risk, it was efficient.
“Other players would spend a lot of money on consultancies and write 70 reports
to conclude that a project is risky,” Eyl-Mazzega said. “Pouyanné, on the other
hand, is prepared to take risks.”
Asked by the French Senate in 2024 how he chose where to invest, however,
Pouyanné admitted that his math was strictly about the bottom line.
“Don’t ask us to take the moral high ground,” he said.
‘A COLLAPSE WILL NOT PUT TOTAL IN DANGER’
The first oil and gas prospectors arrived in northern Mozambique in 2006 as part
of a Western effort to broaden supply beyond the Middle East. When Anadarko
found gas 25 miles out to sea in 2010, the talk was of Mozambique as the new
Qatar.
At 2.6 million acres, or about a third of the size of Belgium, Rovuma Basin Area
1 was a monster, thought to hold 75 trillion cubic feet of gas, or 1 percent of
all global reserves. An adjacent field, Area 4, quickly snapped up by
ExxonMobil, was thought to hold even more.
To cope with the volume of production, Anadarko’s Area 1 consortium drew up a
plan for a $20 billion onshore liquefaction plant. Together with ExxonMobil’s
field, the cost of developing Mozambique’s gas was estimated at $50 billion,
which would make it the biggest private investment ever made in Africa.
But in 2017, an ISIS insurgency emerged to threaten those ambitions.
By the time Pouyanné was preparing to buy Anadarko’s 26.5 percent share in Area
1 two years later, what had begun as a ragtag revolt against government
corruption in the northern province of Cabo Delgado had become a full-scale
Islamist rebellion.
Insurgents were taking ever more territory, displacing hundreds of thousands of
people and regularly staging mass beheadings.
Even under construction, the gas plant was a regular target. It was run by
Europeans and Americans, intending to make money for companies thousands of
miles away while displacing 2,733 villagers to build their concession and
banning fishermen from waters around their drill sites. After several attacks on
plant traffic to and from the facility, in February 2019, the militants killed
two project workers in a village attack and dismembered a contract driver in the
road.
A further risk had its origins in a ban on foreigners carrying guns. That made
the plant reliant for security on the Mozambican army and police, both of which
had a well-documented record of criminality and repression.
Initially, Pouyanné seemed unconcerned. The gas field was outside international
law, as Mozambique had not ratified the Rome Statute setting up the
International Criminal Court. And Pouyanné appeared to see the pursuit of
high-risk, high-reward projects almost as an obligation for a deep-pocketed
corporation, telling the Atlantic Council in May 2019, soon after he agreed the
Mozambique deal, that Total was so big, it didn’t need to care — at least, not
in the way of other, lesser companies or countries.
“We love risk, so we have decided to embark on the Mozambique story,” he said.
“Even if there is a collapse, [it] will [not] put Total in danger.”
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In September 2019, when Total’s purchase was formally completed, the company
declared in a press release: “The Mozambique LNG project is largely derisked.”
In one of several statements to POLITICO, TotalEnergies explained the term
echoed the boss’s focus on “the project’s commercial and financial fundamentals.
To infer this was a dismissal of security concerns amounts to a fundamental
misunderstanding of the way the sector operates.”
Still, for workers at the project, it was an arresting statement, given that a
Mozambique LNG worker had recently been chopped to pieces.
Around the same time, the project managers at Anadarko, many of whom were now
working for Total, tried to warn their new CEO of the danger posed by the
insurgency.
It was when they met Pouyanné, however, that “things then all started to
unwind,” said one.
Pouyanné regaled the team who had worked on the Mozambique project for years
with a speech “on how brilliant Total was, and how brilliantly Total was going
to run this project,” a second executive added.
Pouyanné added he had “a French hero” running the company’s security: Denis
Favier who, as a police commander, led a team of police commandos as they
stormed a hijacked plane on the tarmac at Marseille in 1994, and in 2015, as
France’s most senior policeman, commanded the operation to hunt and kill the
Islamist brothers who shot dead 12 staff at the Charlie Hebdo newspaper in
Paris.
“This is easy for him,” Pouyanné said.
Asked about the transition from Anadarko to Total, the company maintained it was
responsive to all concerns expressed by former Anadarko workers. “We are not
aware of any such dismissal of security concerns by TotalEnergies or its senior
management,” the company said. “It is incorrect to state that advice from the
ground was not listened to.”
Still, after meeting Pouyanné, the old Anadarko team called their Mozambique
staff together to brief them on their new boss.
“Well, holy shit,” one manager began, according to a person present. “We’ve got
a problem.”
‘VERY VULNERABLE’
A third former Anadarko staffer who stayed on to work for Total said that on
taking over, the company also put on hold a decision to move most contractors
and staff from hotels and compounds in Palma to inside its fortified camp — a
costly move that Anadarko was planning in response to deteriorating security.
“This was a danger I had worked so hard to eliminate,” the staffer said. “Palma
was very vulnerable. Almost nobody was supposed to be [there]. But Total
wouldn’t listen to me.”
Other measures, such as grouping traffic to and from the plant in convoys and
flanking them with drones, also ended. One project contractor who regularly made
the run through rebel territory described the difference between Anadarko and
Total as “night and day.”
Then in June 2020, the rebels captured Mocimboa da Praia, the regional hub, and
killed at least eight subcontractors. In late December that year, they staged
another advance that brought them to Total’s gates.
At that, Pouyanné reversed course and assumed personal oversight of the security
operation, the first Anadarko manager said. Despite no expertise in security,
“[he] had to get into every little last possible detail.”
The second executive concurred. “It went from, ‘I don’t care, we’ve got the best
security people in the business to run this’ to ‘Oh my God, this is a disaster,
let me micromanage it and control it,’” he said.
The company was “not aware of any … criticism that Mr. Pouyanné lacks the
necessary expertise,” TotalEnergies said, adding the CEO had “first-hand
experience of emergency evacuation … [from] when Total had to evacuate its staff
from Yemen in 2015.”
The insurgents’ advance prompted Pouyanné to order the evacuation of all
TotalEnergies staff. By contrast, many contractors and subcontractors, some of
them behind schedule because of Covid, were told to keep working, according to
email exchanges among contractors seen by POLITICO.
“Mozambique LNG did not differentiate between its own employees, its contractors
or subcontractors when giving these instructions,” the company said, but added
that it was not responsible for the decisions of its contractors.
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Then, in February 2021, Pouyanné flew to Maputo, the Mozambican capital, to
negotiate a new security deal with then Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi.
Afterward, the two men announced the creation of the Joint Task Force, a
1,000-man unit of soldiers and armed police to be stationed inside the
compound.
The deal envisaged that the new force would protect a 25-kilometer radius around
the gas plant, including Palma and several villages. In practice, by
concentrating so many soldiers and police inside the wire, it left Palma
comparatively exposed.
“It is incorrect to allege that Palma was left poorly defended,” the company
said. “However, it is a fact that these security forces were overwhelmed by the
magnitude and violence of the terrorist attacks in March 2021.” TotalEnergies
added it is not correct to say that “Mr. Pouyanné personally managed the
security deal setting up the Joint Task Force.”
‘TRAIN WRECK’
By this time, the company’s own human rights advisers were warning that by
helping to create the Joint Task Force — to which the company agreed to pay what
it described as “hardship payments” via a third party, as well as to equip it
and accommodate it on its compound — Pouyanné was effectively making
TotalEnergies a party to the conflict, and implicating it in any human rights
abuses the soldiers carried out.
Just as worrying was TotalEnergies’ insistence — according to a plant security
manager, and confirmed by minutes of a Total presentation on security released
under a Dutch freedom of information request — that all major security decisions
be handled by a 20-man security team 5,000 miles away in Paris.
That centralization seemed to help explain how, when the Islamists finally
descended on Palma on March 24, 2021, Total was among the last to know.
One Western security contractor told POLITICO he had pulled his people out 10
days before the assault, based on intelligence he had on guns and young men
being pre-positioned in town.
In the days immediately preceding the attack, villagers around Palma warned
friends and relatives in town that they had seen the Islamists advancing.
WhatsApp messages seen by POLITICO indicate contractors reported the same
advance to plant security on March 22 and March 23.
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Nonetheless, at 9 a.m. on March 24, TotalEnergies in Paris announced that it was
safe for its staff to return.
Hours later, the Islamists attacked.
“Neither Mozambique LNG nor TotalEnergies received any specific ‘advance
warnings’ of an impending attack prior to March 24,” the company said.
Faced with a three-pronged advance by several hundred militants, the plant
security manager said TotalEnergies’ hierarchical management pyramid was unable
to cope.
Ground staff could not respond to evolving events, paralyzed by the need to seek
approval for decisions from Paris.
Total’s country office in Maputo was also in limbo, according to the security
manager, neither able to follow what was happening in real-time, nor authorized
to respond.
‘WHO CAN HELP US?!’
Two decisions, taken as the attack unfolded, compounded the havoc wreaked by the
Islamists.
The first was Total’s refusal to supply aviation fuel to the Dyck Advisory Group
(DAG), a small, South African private military contractor working with the
Mozambican police.
With the police and army overrun, DAG’s small helicopters represented the only
functional military force in Palma and the only unit undertaking humanitarian
rescues.
But DAG’s choppers were limited by low supplies of jet fuel, forcing them to fly
an hour away to refuel, and to ground their fleet intermittently.
Total, as one of the world’s biggest makers of aviation fuel, with ample stocks
at the gas plant, was in a position to help. But when DAG asked Total in Paris
for assistance, it refused. “Word came down from the mountain,” DAG executive
Max Dyck said, “and that was the way it was going to be.”
Total has conceded that it refused fuel to DAG — out of concern for the
rescuers’ human rights record, the company said — but made fuel available to the
Mozambican security services. DAG later hired an independent lawyer to
investigate its record, who exonerated the company.
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A second problematic order was an edict, handed down by Pouyanné’s executives in
Paris in the months before the massacre, according to the plant security
manager, that should the rebels attack, gate security guards at the gas plant
were to let no one in.
It was an instruction that could only have been drawn up by someone ignorant of
the area’s geography, the man said.
If the Islamists blocked the three roads in and out of Palma, as conventional
tactics would prescribe, the only remaining ways out for the population of
60,000 would be by sea or air — both routes that went through TotalEnergies’s
facility, with its port and airport. By barring the civilians’ way, the company
would be exposing them.
So it proved. TotalEnergies soon had 25,000 fleeing civilians at its gates,
according to an internal company report obtained under a freedom of information
request by an Italian NGO, Recommon. Among the crowd were hundreds of project
subcontractors and workers.
Witnesses described to POLITICO how families begged TotalEnergies’ guards to let
them in. Mothers were passing their babies forward to be laid in front of the
gates. But TotalEnergies in Paris refused to allow its guards on the ground to
open up.
On March 28, the fifth day of the attack, Paris authorized a ferry to evacuate
1,250 staff and workers from the gas plant, and make a single return trip to
pick up 1,250 civilians, who had sneaked inside the perimeter. That still left
tens of thousands stranded at its gates.
On March 29, a TotalEnergies community relations manager in Paris made a
panicked call to Caroline Brodeur, a contact at Oxfam America.
“He’s like, ‘There’s this huge security situation in Mozambique!’” Brodeur said.
“An escalation of violence! We will need to evacuate people! Who can help us?
Which NGO can support us with logistics?’”
Thirty minutes later, the man called back. “Wait,” he told Brodeur. “Don’t do
anything.” TotalEnergies’ senior managers had overruled him, the man said. No
outsiders were to be involved.
“I think he was trying to do the right thing,” Brodeur said in an interview with
POLITICO. “But after that, Total went silent.”
Over the next two months, the jihadis killed hundreds of civilians in and around
Palma and the gas plant before the Rwandan intervention force pushed them out.
The second former Anadarko and Total executive said the rebels might have
attacked Palma, whoever was in charge at the gas project. But Total’s distant,
centralized management made a “train wreck … inevitable.”
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TotalEnergies said its response to the attack “mitigated as much as was
reasonably possible the consequences.” Confirming the phone call to Oxfam, it
added: “There was no effort by whoever within TotalEnergies to shut any
possibility for external assistance down.”
The company was especially adamant that Pouyanné was not at fault.
“The allegation that Mr. Pouyanné’s management of TotalEnergies exacerbated the
devastation caused by the attacks in Mozambique is entirely unsubstantiated,” it
said. “Mr. Pouyanné takes the safety and security of the staff extremely
seriously.”
In his television appearance this week, Pouyanné defended the company’s
performance. “We completely evacuated the site,” he said. “We were not present
at that time.”
He said he considered that TotalEnergies, whose security teams had helped “more
than 2,000 civilians evacuate the area,” “had carried out heroic actions.”
‘AN ALMOST PERFECT DINNER PARTY’
TotalEnergies’ troubles in Mozambique have come amid a wider slump in the
country’s fortunes and reputation.
Years of climate protests outside the company’s annual general meetings in
central Paris peaked in 2023 when police dispersed activists with batons and
tear gas. For the last two years, TotalEnergies has retreated behind a line of
security checks and riot police at its offices in Défense, in the western part
of Paris.
Though the company intended 2024, its centenary year, as a celebration, the
company succeeded mostly in looking past its prime. When Pouyanné took over in
2014, Total was France’s biggest company, and 37th in the world. Today, it is
France’s seventh largest and not even in the global top 100.
Several French media houses chose the occasion of TotalEnergies’ 100th birthday
to declare open season on the company, portraying it as a serial offender on
pollution, corruption, worker safety, and climate change.
Pouyanné has also presided over a rift with the French establishment. Last year,
when he suggested listing in New York to boost the stock, French President
Emmanuel Macron berated him in public.
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The division grew wider a few weeks later when the French Senate concluded a
six-month inquiry into the company with a recommendation that the formerly
state-owned enterprise be partly taken back into public ownership.
The company has faced five separate lawsuits, civil and criminal, claiming it is
breaking French law on climate protection and corporate conduct.
In a sixth case, brought by environmentalists in Paris last month, a judge
ordered TotalEnergies to remove advertising from its website claiming it was
part of the solution to climate change. Given the company’s ongoing investments
in fossil fuels, that was misleading, the judge said, decreeing that
TotalEnergies take down its messaging and upload the court’s ruling instead.
The Swedish activist Greta Thunberg has also led protests against TotalEnergies’
East Africa Crude Oil Pipeline. That project, intended to pump oil 1,000 miles
from Uganda across Tanzania to the Indian Ocean, is similarly embroiled in
accusations of human rights abuses, drawing criticism from the European
Parliament plus 28 banks and 29 insurance companies who have refused to finance
it.
Pouyanné has also taken hits to his personal brand. A low point came in 2022
when he chose the moment his countrymen were recovering from Covid and
struggling with soaring fuel prices to defend his salary of €5,944,129 a year.
He was “tired” of the accusation that he had received a 52 percent rise, he
wrote on Twitter. His pay, he added, had merely been restored to pre-pandemic
levels.
Overnight, the CEO became the unacceptable face of French capitalism. “Pouyanné
lives in another galaxy, far, far away,” said one TV host. Under a picture of
the CEO, an MP from the leftist France Unbowed movement wrote: “A name, a face.
The obstacle in the way of a nation.”
So heated and widely held is the contempt that in 2023 the company produced a
guide for its French employees on how to handle it. Titled “An Almost Perfect
Dinner Party,” the booklet lays out arguments and data that staff might use to
defend themselves at social occasions.
“Have you ever been questioned, during a dinner with family or friends, about a
controversy concerning the Company?” it asked. “Did you have the factual
elements to answer your guests?”
‘FALSE ALLEGATIONS’
The war crimes case lodged this week against TotalEnergies was filed in France,
despite the alleged crimes occurring in Mozambique, because, it argues,
TotalEnergies’ nationality establishes jurisdiction.
The case represents a dramatic example of the extension of international justice
— the prosecution in one country of crimes committed in another. A movement
forged in Nuremberg and Tokyo in the wake of World War II, the principles of
international justice have been used more recently by national and international
courts to bring warlords and dictators to trial — and by national courts to
prosecute citizens or companies implicated in abuses abroad where local justice
systems are weak.
U.S. courts have ordered ExxonMobil and banana giant Chiquita to stand trial for
complicity in atrocities committed in the late 1990s and early 2000s by soldiers
or militias paid to protect their premises in Indonesia and Colombia,
respectively.
Exxon settled a week before the case opened in 2023. A Florida court ordered
Chiquita to pay $38 million to the families of eight murdered Colombian men in
June 2024; Chiquita’s appeal was denied that October.
In Sweden, two executives from Lundin Oil are currently on trial for complicity
in war crimes after Sudanese troops and government militias killed an estimated
12,000 people between 1999 and 2003 as they cleared the area around a company
drill site. The executives deny the accusations against them.
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ECCHR has initiated several international justice cases. Most notably, in 2016,
it and another legal non-profit, Sherpa, filed a criminal complaint in Paris
against the French cement maker Lafarge, accusing its Syrian plant of paying
millions of dollars in protection money to ISIS. Earlier this month, Lafarge and
eight executives went on trial in Paris, accused of funding terrorism and
breaking international sanctions — charges they deny.
The war crimes complaint against TotalEnergies cites internal documents,
obtained under freedom of information requests in Italy and the Netherlands,
that show staff at the site knew the soldiers routinely committed human rights
abuses against civilians while working for the company.
There were “regular community allegations of JTF [Joint Task Force] human rights
violations,” read one, including “physical violence, and
arrests/disappearances.” The report also referred to “troops who were allegedly
involved in a [human rights] case in August [2021].” These were deemed so
serious that TotalEnergies suspended pay to all 1,000 Joint Task Force soldiers
and the army expelled 200 from the region, according to the internal document.
The ECCHR complaint accuses TotalEnergies and “X”, a designation leaving open
the possibility for the names of unspecified company executives to be added.
Among those named in the document’s 56 pages are Pouyanné and five other
TotalEnergies executives and employees. Favier, the company’s security chief, is
not among them.
TotalEnergies declined to make any of its executives or security managers
available for interviews.
In April 2024, when Pouyanné was questioned about his company’s Mozambique
operation by the French Senate, he stated that while the government was
responsible for the security of Cabo Delgado, “I can ensure the security of
whichever industrial premises on which I might operate.”
Asked about the container executions before the National Assembly this May,
Pouyanné reaffirmed his faith in the Mozambican state, saying: “I think we help
these countries progress if we trust their institutions and don’t spend our time
lecturing them.”
Apparently forgetting how he helped negotiate a security deal to place
Mozambican soldiers on Total’s premises, however, he then qualified this
statement, saying: “I can confirm that TotalEnergies has nothing to do with the
Mozambican army.”
A company spokesperson clarified this week: “TotalEnergies is not involved in
the operations, command or conduct of the Mozambican armed forces.”
In addition to the war crimes complaint, TotalEnergies’ Mozambique operation is
already the subject of a criminal investigation opened in March by French state
prosecutors. The allegation against the company is that it committed involuntary
manslaughter by failing to protect or rescue workers left in Palma when ISIS
carried out its massacre.
Though POLITICO’s previous reporting found that 55 project workers were killed,
TotalEnergies — through its subsidiary, Mozambique LNG — initially claimed it
lost no one. “All the employees of Mozambique LNG, its contractors and
subcontractors were safely evacuated from the Mozambique LNG Project site,”
Maxime Rabilloud, Mozambique LNG’s managing director, told POLITICO last year.
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That assertion notwithstanding, the death of at least one British subcontractor,
Philip Mawer, is the subject of a formal inquest in the U.K.
In December 2024, the company’s Paris press office adjusted its position on the
Palma attack. “TotalEnergies has never denied the tragedy that occurred in Palma
and has always acknowledged the tragic loss of civilian lives,” it told
POLITICO. For the first time, it also admitted “a small number” of project
workers had been stationed outside its secure compound during the attack and
exposed to the bloodbath.
A resolution to the French manslaughter investigation will take years. A
decision on whether to open a formal investigation into the new claims against
TotalEnergies for complicity in war crimes, let alone to bring the case to
trial, is not expected until 2026, at the earliest.
Should anyone eventually be tried for involuntary manslaughter, a conviction
would carry a penalty of three years in prison and a €45,000 fine in France,
escalating to five years and €75,000 for “a manifestly deliberate violation of a
particular obligation of prudence or safety.”
For complicity in war crimes, the sentence is five years to life.
‘CAN YOU ACTUALLY LOOK AT YOURSELF IN THE MIRROR?’
The war crimes accusation adds new uncertainty to the 20-year effort to develop
Mozambique’s gas fields.
In the aftermath of the 2021 Palma massacre, TotalEnergies declared a state of
“force majeure,” a legal measure suspending all contracted work due to
exceptional events.
The following four and a half years of shutdown have cost TotalEnergies $4.5
billion, in addition to the $3.9 billion that Pouyanné originally paid Anadarko
for the Mozambique operation. Billions more in costs can be expected before the
plant finally pumps gas, which Total now predicts will happen in 2029.
The manslaughter case and the war crimes complaint have the potential to cause
further holdups by triggering due diligence obligations from TotalEnergies’
lenders, preventing them from delivering loans of $14.9 billion — without which
Pouyanné has said his star project will collapse.
Total also faces a Friends of the Earth legal challenge to a $4.7 billion U.S.
government loan to the project.
A TotalEnergies spokesperson said this week that the project was able to “meet
due diligence requirements by lenders.”
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All this comes as the situation on the ground remains unstable. After a
successful Rwandan counter-attack from 2021 to 2023, the insurgency has
returned, with the Islamists staging raids across Cabo Delgado, including Palma
and the regional hub of Mocimboa da Praia.
The International Organization for Migration says 112,185 people fled the
violence between September 22 and October 13. Among those killed in the last few
months were two gas project workers — a caterer, murdered in Palma, and a
security guard, beheaded in a village south of town.
TotalEnergies has consistently said that neither recent legal developments nor
the upsurge in ISIS attacks will affect its plans to formally reopen its
Mozambique operation by the end of the year.
“This new complaint has no connection with the advancement of the Mozambique LNG
project,” a spokesperson said this week.
Pouyanné himself has spent much of this year insisting the project is “back on
track” and its financing in place. In October, in a move to restart the project,
the company lifted the force majeure.
Still, in a letter seen by POLITICO, Pouyanné also wrote to Mozambican President
Daniel Chapo asking for 10 more years on its drilling license and $4.5 billion
from the country to cover its cost overruns.
Mozambique, whose 2024 GDP was $22.42 billion — around a tenth of TotalEnergies’
revenues for the year of $195.61 billion — has yet to respond.
A final issue for TotalEnergies’ CEO is whether a formal accusation of war
crimes will fuel opposition to his leadership among shareholders.
At 2024’s annual general meeting, a fifth of stockholders rejected the company’s
climate transition strategy as too slow, and a quarter declined to support
Pouyanné for a fourth three-year term. In 2025, several institutional investors
expressed their opposition to Pouyanné by voting against his remuneration.
In the statement, the TotalEnergies spokesperson pointed to the 2023 comments by
Aschenbroich, the independent board member: “The Board unanimously looks forward
to his continued leadership and his strategic vision to continue TotalEnergies’
transition.”
Yet, there seems little prospect that his popularity will improve, inside or
outside the company. “Patrick Pouyanné is everyone’s best enemy,” says Olivier
Gantois, president of the French oil and gas lobby group UFIP-EM, “the scapegoat
we love to beat up on.”
Recently, the 62-year-old Pouyanné has begun to sound uncharacteristically
plaintive. At TotalEnergies’ 2022 shareholder meeting, he grumbled that the
dissidents might not like CO2 emissions, “but they sure like dividends.”
At last year’s, he complained that TotalEnergies was in an impossible position.
“We are trying to find a balance between today’s life and tomorrow’s,” he said.
“It’s not because TotalEnergies stops producing hydrocarbons that demand for
them will disappear.”
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TotalEnergies’ articles of association require Pouyanné to retire before he
reaches 67, in 2030, around the time that TotalEnergies currently forecasts gas
production to begin in Mozambique.
Henri Thulliez, the lawyer who filed both criminal complaints against
TotalEnergies in Paris, predicts Pouyanné’s successors will be less attached to
the project — for the simple reason that Mozambique turned out to be bad
business.
“You invest billions in the project, and the project has been completely
suspended for four years now,” Thulliez says. “All your funders are hesitating.
You’re facing two potential litigations in France, maybe at some point
elsewhere, too. You have to ask: what’s the point of all of this?”
As for Pouyanné, two questions will haunt his final years at TotalEnergies, he
suggests.
First, “Can shareholders afford to keep you in your job?”
Second, “Can you actually look at yourself in the mirror?”
Aude Le Gentil and Alexandre Léchenet contributed to this report.
ATHENS — The Chinese embassy in Athens lashed out against U.S. Ambassador
Kimberly Guilfoyle on Wednesday over her recent criticism of Beijing’s
investments in Greece.
Guilfoyle’s comments were a “malicious slander” against Sino-Greek trade
relations and a “serious interference in Greek internal affairs,” an embassy
spokesperson said in a written statement.
Last week Guilfoyle said China’s state ownership of the Port of Piraeus,
Greece’s largest such facility, was “unfortunate” and suggested it could be
circumvented. “Something could be worked out, whether you pursue a path of
enhancing output in other areas or perhaps that Piraeus could be for sale,” she
opined.
The Chinese embassy was unimpressed. “The port of Piraeus belongs to the Greek
people; it is not a tool for undermining regional prosperity and stability, and
under no circumstances should it fall victim to geopolitical confrontation,” the
statement read.
“At a time when the port of Piraeus is undergoing rapid development, the US with
self-serving intentions, is encouraging Greece to terminate its contractual
obligations and sell the port — this practice is a typical example of imposing
its own thinking on others and reveals a mindset that attempts to undermine
stability.”
China invested heavily in debt-ridden Greece during the country’s lengthy
economic crisis, a decade-long saga that started in 2009, with the goal of
making it a hub for Chinese exports. At the time, companies from other Western
countries were turning away from Athens, spooked by its financial woes and
infamous bureaucracy.
Cosco, China’s state-owned shipping company, secured a majority stake in the
Port of Piraeus in 2016. Beijing intended that Piraeus become a key part — the
so-called dragon’s head — of its Belt and Road global infrastructure project.
“The port of Piraeus was handed over to the Chinese during the financial crisis
in Greece, as they were the only ones who submitted a bid,” Greek Foreign
Ministry spokesperson Lana Zochiou said during a Tuesday briefing in
Athens. “Greece respects the agreements that have been conducted in the past.”
Guilfoyle, a one-time conservative pundit on U.S.-based network Fox News,
suggested Beijing’s current influence might be offset by increasing American
investment in other infrastructure projects.
Indeed, Athens is accelerating plans to develop a new port in Elefsina, a
U.S.-backed project that officials say could serve as a counterweight to China’s
presence in Piraeus. The idea was discussed on Tuesday at a meeting between
Guilfoyle and Greek Development Minister Takis Theodorikakos, after which Athens
moved to implement the plan.
“We look forward to seeing Elefsina Port evolve into a logistics hub for the
region,” Guilfoyle said after the meeting.
ATHENS — Athens and Kyiv signed an agreement on Sunday for Ukraine to import
liquified natural gas to help meet the country’s winter energy needs, as Greece
becomes the first EU country to actively participate in the U.S. plan to replace
“every last molecule of Russian gas” with American LNG.
The plan calls for U.S. LNG deliveries routed through Greece from next month to
March 2026 via the vertical gas corridor, a newly activated pipeline system for
natural gas that includes pipelines, LNG terminals and storage facilities.
The project — actively lobbied by the U.S. — is intended to provide energy to
Eastern Europe, including Ukraine, with Greece being the entry point for U.S.
gas going up to Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and farther north to Ukraine and
Moldova.
“Ukraine gains direct access to diversified and reliable energy sources, while
Greece becomes a hub for supplying Central and Eastern Europe with American
liquefied natural gas,” Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis said, emphasizing
Greece’s growing role as an energy hub.
The agreement will “cover nearly €2 billion needed for gas imports to compensate
for the losses in Ukrainian production caused by Russian strikes,” Zelenskyy
said in a statement Sunday.
The deal was signed during a visit by Zelenskyy to Athens, attended by
Mitsotakis, Greek Energy Minister Stavros Papastavrou and U.S. Ambassador
Kimberly Guilfoyle. The agreement signed on Sunday formalized a declaration of
intent between Greece’s gas company DEPA Commercial and Ukraine’s Naftogaz.
Greece aims to showcase its importance as an entry point for American LNG,
bolstering Europe’s independence from Russian gas. Athens last week signed a
20-year deal to import 700 million cubic meters of U.S. LNG a year starting in
2030, aiming to boost U.S. LNG shipments from Greece to its northern European
neighbors.
“What we see for the future of Greece and the United States is Greece being an
energy hub and showing this energy dominance that both of our countries can
experience and work together cooperatively to achieve tremendous outcomes,”
Ambassador Guilfoyle said in an interview with Antenna TV on Thursday.
The deal was signed during a visit by Zelenskyy to Athens, attended by
Mitsotakis, Greek Energy Minister Stavros Papastavrou and U.S. Ambassador
Kimberly Guilfoyle. | Clive Brunskill/Getty Images
“Cooperation within the framework of the ‘vertical corridor’ may prove to be
more decisive for peace and prosperity in the region than NATO,” Energy Minister
Papastavrou told a conference in Athens on Tuesday.
In addition to the U.S. LNG deal, Greece has opened its waters to gas
exploration for the first time in more than four decades, with American help,
under an agreement signed with ExxonMobil, the U.S.’s biggest oil company, along
with Greece’s Energean and HelleniQ Energy.
“This is understood and portrayed to be significantly adding to Greece’s value
added as a commercial partner and geopolitical ally,” said Harry Tzimitras,
director of the Peace Research Institute Oslo Cyprus Centre.
But he also noted criticisms of Greece’s energy push, including environmental
consequences, financial challenges and geopolitical risks.
“These span the whole gamut of the project’s aspects: Greece would have to
double its storage capacity … requiring extensive construction of depots and LNG
facilities with serious potential environmental footprint,” Tzimitras said.
“U.S. LNG is currently very expensive, straining energy budgets; the likelihood
of geopolitical antagonisms is heightened; and the whole project is identified
as going against the efforts to achieve environmental targets, contributing to
the delay in transitioning to renewable energy sources,” he said.