BRUSSELS — America’s ambassador to the EU called on the European Parliament to
back the trade deal struck with President Donald Trump, arguing it would unlock
deeper transtlantic cooperation on energy, tech and AI.
Speaking to POLITICO on Monday, Andrew Puzder cautioned that it would be a
mistake to allow a further delay of the deal reached last July at Trump’s
Turnberry golf resort in Scotland, but has still to be implemented on by the EU
side.
“All of the signals are good, but you never know. We’re hopeful, but we want to
be careful and make sure that we don’t take anything for granted,” Puzder said
in an interview at the U.S. mission in Brussels.
“It’s in the best interest of the European Union and the United States that it
passes,” he added. “Some people might think that politically, it might give them
an advantage to vote against. I hope that’s not the case. But economically, it’d
be malpractice not to vote for this in the EU.”
Puzder highlighted the importance of the EU’s commitment to spend $750 billion
on U.S. energy under the Turnberry deal.
“Europe’s going to need that energy,” he said. “So we need to cut back on the
regulatory restrictions to our shipping them the energy and also the regulatory
restrictions that make that energy more expensive once it gets here.”
IT’S BEEN LONG ENOUGH
Puzder, a former fast food executive nominated by Trump, started the role last
September and made an early impression in Brussels with his plain speaking. He
told POLITICO in December that the EU should stop trying to be the world’s
regulator and get on instead with being one of its innovators.
His latest remarks came amid mounting U.S. frustration over the EU’s slow pace
in keeping its side of the bargain, under which it would scrap import duties on
U.S. industrial goods.
The enabling legislation is now up for a plenary vote in the European Parliament
on Thursday. If it passes, talks between EU lawmakers, governments and the
Commission would then begin on finally implementing the tariff changes.
“We’re anxious to get this through the process. We understood they had to go
through a process, but it’s been long enough. And hopefully we’ll get through it
on Thursday and we can both move on to more economically beneficial endeavors,”
Puzder stressed.
Trade lawmakers backed amendments at the committee stage to strengthen the EU’s
protections in case Washington doesn’t respect its side of the deal.
They for instance introduced a suspension clause if Trump threatens the EU’s
territorial sovereignty, as he did earlier this year when he pushed to annex
Greenland. MEPs also added another provision that foresees that the deal would
expire in March 2028.
Puzder declined to speculate on whether the deal could unravel altogether if the
U.S. president were to launch any renewed threats.
“I hate to prejudge where this is going to go,” he said. “What everybody’s been
saying on both sides is a deal is a deal. We had a deal; hopefully we still have
a deal.”
The ambassador stressed there had been a “very good two-way communication”
between Trump’s team of Trade Representative Jamieson Greer and Commerce
Secretary Howard Lutnick, and the European Commission, as well as with Bernd
Lange, who chairs the European Parliament’s Trade Committee.
“I’ve also had a number of meetings with Bernd Lange and members of parliament
on these issues. So the communication has been very good and very open
throughout this process,” Puzder said.
Tag - Exports
The Trump administration is telling foreign officials and others that it will
not reschedule a summit between the U.S. president and Chinese leader Xi Jinping
until the Iran war ends.
A Washington-based diplomat privy to U.S.-China summit planning confirmed that
the administration has made clear “the next dates for the Trump-Xi summit will
only be proposed after the active part of the Iran conflict is over.” A
Washington-based individual close to the administration also briefed on White
House summit planning confirmed the administration shared that timeline.
POLITICO granted both the people anonymity because they were not authorized to
speak publicly about sensitive diplomatic discussions.
The U.S. State Department directed queries to the White House. The White House
denied the summit timeline was tied to the Iran war.
“This is fake news. The United States and China are having productive
discussions about rescheduling President Trump’s visit — announcements are
forthcoming,” White House spokesperson Anna Kelly said.
The Chinese embassy said it had “no information to provide” about the possible
delay in summit scheduling.
The long-anticipated meeting between Trump and Xi had originally been planned
for the end of March, but Trump said Monday the meeting would be pushed back “a
month or so” because “we’ve got a war going on.” On Thursday, he said it would
happen in “about a month and a half.”
Speaking to reporters on Wednesday, White House spokesperson Karoline Leavitt
suggested the meeting might not take place until after May. “The president has
some things here at home in May that he has to attend to, and I’m sure President
Xi is a very busy man, as well, so we’ll get the dates on the books as soon as
we can,” Leavitt said.
Tying the summit preparations to the end of the Iran conflict could mean
additional delays to a meeting intended to maintain stability in a fragile
U.S.-China trade truce.
As the war on Iran enters its fourth week, the Trump administration appears to
be preparing for a longer conflict. The U.S. has made detailed plans for the
deployment of ground troops onto Iranian soil, CBS News reported Friday. The
administration is also moving to dispatch thousands of troops to the region.
Trump told reporters Thursday he’s “not putting troops anywhere” but then added:
“If I were, I certainly wouldn’t tell you.”
“There are operational constraints to managing a war from a foreign country —
particularly a hostile one like China,” said the person close to the
administration. “It would be terribly awkward for Trump and Xi to transact in
this climate.”
On Friday, Trump signaled a potential wind-down in the Iran conflict in a Truth
Social post, suggesting the U.S. could scale back its role while pushing allies
to take on more responsibility in securing the Strait of Hormuz, the major
commercial waterway that connects the Persian Gulf to the Arabian Sea.
“We are getting very close to meeting our objectives as we consider winding down
our great military efforts in the Middle East,” Trump wrote.
Trump and Xi made progress toward heading off an intensified trade war in an
October meeting in South Korea. During that meeting, Xi committed to Chinese
purchases of U.S. agricultural products like soybeans and the elimination of
many of Beijing’s restrictions on critical minerals exports. In return, Trump
agreed to extend a pause on triple-digit tariffs on Chinese goods.
Wendy Cutler, a former negotiator in the U.S. Trade Representative’s office,
argued this work can continue even if Trump and Xi don’t meet again in person.
“The stabilization part of this won’t necessarily be jeopardized without a
meeting,” she said. “Now, if something happens in the war, either foreseen or
unforeseen, there’s just lots of flash points that can threaten this truce,
which are unforeseeable at this period.”
Rush Doshi, former senior director for China and Taiwan in the Biden
administration, said a meeting between the two leaders is important to
strengthening and maintaining the bilateral relationship.
“Without leader-to-leader communication to manage a relationship of this
complexity until the war is over — and there’s no sense of when the war is going
to be over — there’s a real risk the relationship is going to be less stable
than people might have expected,” said Doshi, now at the Council on Foreign
Relations.
Switzerland said it won’t allow weapons exports to the U.S. as long as
Washington is involved in its ongoing military campaign against Iran.
The Swiss government said on Friday that it will not sign off on any new
licenses for the export of war materiel to countries involved in the conflict,
citing Switzerland’s commitment to neutrality.
Switzerland said that it has not issued new export licenses to send weapons to
the U.S. since the U.S. and Israel launched strikes on Tehran on Feb. 28.
Existing licenses to export weapons to the U.S. can continue as they are not
relevant “to the war at present,” but they will be kept under review in case
they conflict with Swiss neutrality laws, it said.
Exports of other dual-use and military goods, and other goods affected by
sanctions against Iran, will also be kept under review, it added.
Switzerland has not granted weapons export licenses for Israel or Iran for a
“number of years,” the government said.
BRUSSELS ― Two wars on Europe’s doorstep loomed over a 12-hour summit of EU
leaders ― and for very different reasons they found themselves paralyzed rather
than able to do much about either.
Rarely has the bloc’s inability to take a lead on international affairs been so
obvious. Between Germany’s Friedrich Merz, France’s Emmanuel Macron and Italy’s
Giorgia Meloni ― heads of three of the world’s top 10 economies ― and the other
24 in attendance, they could only look the other way, squabble with each other,
or offer little but words as the bombing, missile-firing and killing continued.
“In these very troubled moments in which we are living, more than ever it’s
decisive to uphold the international rules-based order,” European Council
President António Costa, who chaired the gathering in Brussels, told reporters.
“The alternative is chaos. The alternative is the war in Ukraine. The
alternative is the war in the Middle East.”
And that speech was about as far as it went.
As Tehran pounded its neighbors, disrupting Europe’s energy supplies, Kyiv
attacked Russian factories repairing military planes, and Donald Trump in
Washington joked about the Pearl Harbor attack alongside the Japanese prime
minister, European leaders used their talks to tinker with the bloc’s carbon
permit scheme, the Emissions Trading System. It’s not a wholly unrelated matter
to the global energy shock, but hardly an issue where the continent could
demonstrate its geopolitical might.
On Iran, leaders found they had little leverage or will to make any significant
intervention. On Ukraine, more than four years after Russia’s full-scale
invasion ― a conflict where they do have leverage and they do have will ― they
were unable to overcome internal divisions to approve sending €90 billion Kyiv’s
way.
There was “no willingness to get involved across the table” on the Iran
conflict, said a senior European government official, granted anonymity like
others quoted in this article to discuss the talks behind closed doors.
German Chancellor Merz even complained that focusing on Iran risked shifting
attention away from measures to boost Europe’s flagging economy — the summit’s
original raison d’être before would affairs got in the way — according to three
officials.
“The world looked very different at Alden Biesen,” an EU official said,
referring to last month’s competitiveness-focused meeting in a Belgian castle
that was meant to set the stage for this summit. That was before Iran’s war and
Ukraine’s funding dilemma, brought about by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor
Orbán going back on his promise to approve the loan, radically reshaped the
agenda.
NOT OUR WAR
That’s not to say Iran was ignored completely.
There was some renewed discussion about sending French warships to protect the
Strait of Hormuz, the vital oil transit point that Tehran has effectively shut
down by threatening to strike ships, potentially with backing from the U.N.
Security Council. “We have begun an exploratory process, and we will see in the
coming days if it has a chance of succeeding,” Macron said.
But the summit’s final statement stopped short of pledging any new mission,
referring only to strengthening existing EU naval operations in the region.
Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni at a press conference at the end of the
European Council summit on March 19, 2026 in Brussels. | Pier Marco Tacca/Getty
Images
By the end of the talks, the EU’s leaders reached a sobering conclusion: Europe
has little power or inclination to shape events.
“Middle East impacts us a lot — but are we a player in the game?” an EU official
who was party to the leaders’ discussions asked. “They’re trying to find a place
in this debate and we have a lot of statements and positions [but] is there a
role for Europeans for solving this process?”
Evidently not, according to Kaja Kallas, the EU’s foreign policy chief, who
warned leaders that “starting war is like a love affair — it’s easy to get in
and difficult to get out,” according to two diplomats briefed on her remarks.
Translation: This is not Europe’s war — and it’s not going to be.
The EU was left with doing “what we always do,” an EU official said, writing
“nice statements.”
BURNING GAS FIELDS
Europe already angered U.S. President Trump earlier this week when its top
envoys rejected his call to secure the Strait of Hormuz. The summit’s final
conclusions leaned heavily on familiar calls for “de-escalation” and
“restraint,” without proposing concrete action, sticking to that earlier
position.
That’s despite Qatar warning Thursday it would not be able to fulfill its
liquefied natural gas contracts with Belgium and Italy after Iran directed its
wrath — and its ballistic missiles — over U.S.-Israeli strikes at the Gulf
country, knocking out almost a fifth of its LNG export capacity.
Yet rather than grapple head-on with the rapidly expanding energy shock,
Europe’s leaders spent hours debating the bloc’s climate policy, including its
ETS, which a group of countries are eager to reform.
“To say ETS is the biggest issue when big gas fields are burning is a bit
weird,” an EU official said.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said the consequences of the
war extended far beyond the Middle East, adding its most “immediate impact” was
on energy supply and prices. She announced a slate of emergency measures to
lower costs, from lowering taxes to boosting investment in ETS.
‘JUST CRAZY’
If anything, the summit exposed where the wars in Iran and Ukraine overlap.
In what could be his final EU gathering after 16 years if he loses next month’s
election, Hungary’s Orbán slammed Europe’s approach to the unfolding energy
crisis.
“The behavior and the strategy that the Europeans have here is just crazy,” he
said — adding the EU needed to buy Russian oil to “survive.”
Orbán has blocked a €90 billion EU loan to Kyiv because of a dispute about a
damaged pipeline carrying Russian oil through Ukraine to Hungary and other
central European countries.
For that reason, the bloc was similarly unable to offer much more than
assurances on the Ukraine war either.
Orbán maintained his opposition on Thursday and even won the sympathy of Meloni,
who told leaders she understood his position.
As frustration inside the room boiled over, many leaders sharply criticized the
Hungarian premier, according to Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson.
“I have never heard such hard-hitting criticism of anyone, ever,” he told
reporters during a break in the talks.
Merz concurred that leaders were “deeply upset” at Orbán. “I am firmly convinced
that this will leave a lasting mark,” he said.
But the pressure from his peers failed to sway Orbán and questions of the EU
loan will roll on to another summit next month ― by which time Hungary could
have a new leader, or at least an old one not desperate for votes.
On Iran and on Ukraine, the EU didn’t get anywhere. Earlier predictions by
diplomats that leaders might continue discussions through the night or even
reconvene for a second day as the urgency of a world in turmoil forced them to
face up to the challenges before them failed to materialize. Things were done
and dusted before midnight.
After 12 hours of few decisions, leaders were left with little new to tell
people back home.
“There are many things worrying about this war” in the Middle East, while
Orban’s veto of the loan to Kyiv “is still there and we are extremely unhappy
about this, and so of course is Ukraine,” Sweden’s Kristersson told reporters
upon leaving the summit.
And that was that.
Zoya Sheftalovich, Nette Nöstlinger, Nicholas Vinocur, Gerardo Fortuna, Gabriel
Gavin, Hans von der Burchard, Sonja Rijnen, Zia Weise, Seb Starcevic, Giorgio
Leali, Hanne Cokelaere, Ferdinand Knapp, Milena Wälde, Aude van den Hove,
Gregorio Sorgi, Koen Verhelst, Victor Jack, Ben Munster, Jacopo Barigazzi and
Bartosz Brzezińksi contributed reporting.
BRUSSELS — Europe’s insistence that it doesn’t face an energy supply crisis took
a blow Thursday when Qatar warned it would have to scrap contracts with Italy
and Belgium following a massive Iranian attack.
QatarEnergy CEO Saad al-Kaabi told Reuters on Thursday it would have to cancel
long-term liquefied natural gas supply contracts for up to five years after an
Iranian ballistic missile knocked out a significant share of its production
capacity in the Persian Gulf.
The state-owned company, which produces a fifth of the world’s LNG, said the
damage could impact deliveries to Italy, Belgium, South Korea and China.
“These are long-term contracts that we have to declare force majeure,” al-Kaabi
said.
On Wednesday Iran bombed the Ras Laffan gas plant in Qatar. The ballistic
missile attack, which followed an Israeli attack on Iran’s South Pars gas
field, caused “sizeable fires and extensive further damage,” QatarEnergy said in
a post on X.
The strikes damaged two of Qatar’s 14 liquefied natural gas trains and one
gas-to-liquids facility, QatarEnergy said Thursday. The outages will remove
around 12.8 million tons of LNG annually from the market, roughly 17 percent of
Qatar’s total export capacity and around 3 percent of global supply, for an
estimated three to five years.
The strikes mark a major escalation in regional tensions. Qatar’s LNG plant had
already been offline following a previous drone strike, but the latest damage is
expected to significantly prolong the disruption.
Gas markets reacted sharply on Thursday, with European futures jumping as much
as 35 percent to more than double pre-conflict levels, underscoring the risk of
a prolonged supply shock.
The outage leaves major buyers in Europe and Asia scrambling to replace lost
volumes, raising concerns over energy security and the potential for sustained
price pressure as competition for alternative LNG cargoes intensifies.
NOTHING TO SEE HERE
Earlier on Thursday German Energy Minister Katherina Reiche had downplayed the
impact of the war, saying: “What we in Europe don’t have is a physical
bottleneck.” She insisted the EU’s gas supplies are still flowing from Norway,
the U.S., Kazakhstan and other countries.
But Reiche said while she doesn’t believe the current situation is as serious as
the 2022 shock following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, “the current situation is
also causing us concern,” and that it’s critical for Europe to continue to
“monitor this crisis and make careful decisions.”
Her comments came as EU leaders met for high-level talks in Brussels on
Thursday, with energy one of the top issues.
In 2022 Germany depended on Russia for more than half of its gas, but now relies
on Norway and the Netherlands for the majority, importing some LNG from the U.S.
It is not dependent on Qatari LNG.
Other EU countries including Poland, Italy and Belgium depend on the Middle East
country for a larger percentages of their LNG.
Poland said Thursday its gas supplies “are secured,” adding Qatari LNG only
accounts for 10 percent of the country’s total gas supply. “[T]his volume can be
gradually supplemented with supplies from other sources, if necessary,” said
Grzegorz Łaguna, a spokesperson for Poland’s Ministry of Energy.
“Deliveries for March are being made, and there is currently no information
indicating any significant risks to meeting current demand for natural gas,
including the continued restrictions on supplies from Qatar,” he added.
The U.K. government and regulators also played down fears of a supply shock.
“The U.K. has very strong energy supplies from a diverse range of sources,” said
Energy Minister Michael Shanks on Tuesday. But the country has just two
days’ worth of gas supplies currently in storage, according to reports based on
National Gas data.
U.K. Green Party leader Zack Polanski has demanded the government freeze
bills in July, when the cap is set to jump hundreds of pounds. Chancellor Rachel
Reeves insists support should be “targeted” only at the poorest families,
wanting to avoid a rerun of the eye-watering sums spent by the last government
to protect all households and businesses after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in
2022.
India and China’s reliance on disrupted Middle East gas supplies has already
caused price hikes and questions about European gas reserves.
“Geopolitics continue shaping gas and LNG markets, and despite the industry’s
large scale, it lacks flexibility to absorb major disruptions, creating market
volatility,” said Kristy Kramer, head of LNG strategy and market development at
Wood Mackenzie. “How the industry responds to this event will vary, but we
expect buyers to prioritise LNG supply security with a renewed focus on
diversity.”
The European liberal political family is urging EU leaders to form a pact with
Japan, Canada, and South Korea to deter U.S. President Donald Trump and China
from exerting undue pressure on trade partners, according to a paper seen by
POLITICO.
In what is dubbed a “Geoeconomic Deterrence Pact” addressed to EU leaders ahead
of a summit in Brussels on Thursday, the liberal Renew Europe group in the
European Parliament asks the Commission “to identify and negotiate joint export
control agreements” by the end of 2026. The paper will be published late
Wednesday and sent to EU leaders.
“This pact will map shared critical dependencies (e.g., semiconductors, rare
earths) and propose mutual response clauses in trade deals to deter coercion
from the US or China. If one country is attacked by aggressive tariffs, all
countries should react,” the paper reads.
Renew Europe is home to French President Emmanuel Macron as well as the leaders
of Estonia, Ireland, Slovenia and the Netherlands.
The idea is the liberal group’s response to Canadian Prime Minister Mark
Carney’s call for what he called “middle powers” to come together to “build
something bigger, better, stronger, more just” during a speech at the World
Economic Forum in Davos.
“This is the task of the middle powers, the countries that have the most to lose
from a world of fortresses and most to gain from genuine cooperation,” Carney
said.
Thursday’s summit was meant to discuss European ways to boost the bloc’s economy
but that has been sidelined by the war in Iran driving up energy costs, and
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán continuing to veto a €90 billion EU loan
for Ukraine.
The EU is exploring options to protect the Strait of Hormuz including by
changing the mandate of its naval missions in the region, top EU diplomat Kaja
Kallas said Monday after U.S. President Donald Trump threatened NATO allies if
they don’t help.
But some EU states are already pushing back, with Luxembourg’s Deputy Prime
Minister Xavier Bettel saying that his country would not give in to “blackmail”
from the United States to participate in the Iran war.
“With satellites, with communications, we are very happy to be useful. But don’t
ask us with troops and with machines,” Bettel, who is also foreign minister,
said on his way into a gathering of foreign envoys in Brussels on Monday.
“Blackmail is also not what I wish for,” Bettel added.
The EU is under growing pressure from Washington to help secure freedom of
navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, with Trump telling the Financial Times over
the weekend that it would “very bad for the future of NATO” if European allies
fail to respond to his appeals or refuse to participate.
“It is in our interest to keep the Strait of Hormuz open,” Kallas told
journalists. “That’s why we are also discussing what we can do from the EU side.
We have been in touch with the U.S. on many levels, but of course the situation
is very volatile.”
Among the options, Kallas said she was discussing with United Nations
Secretary-General António Guterres whether the U.N. and the EU could work
together on a plan to secure navigation through the strait, a vital artery for
trade through which 20 percent of the world’s oil transits.
The mission could echo the Black Sea Grain Initiative between Turkey, Russia,
Ukraine and the U.N. to allow Ukrainian crops to be safely exported despite an
ongoing war, she added.
ASPIDES AND ATALANTA
Kallas also said that EU foreign ministers would look into changing the mandate
of two ongoing EU-backed naval protection missions — Operations Aspides and
Atalanta — so that they could help to open the Strait of Hormuz.
Currently those missions — originally conceived to protect EU commercial vessels
from attacks by Houthi rebels in Yemen — are not operating in the strait and are
bound by rules of engagement that would limit their effectiveness, a senior EU
diplomat said.
“We will discuss with the member states whether it’s possible to really change
the mandate of this mission,” said Kallas. “We have proposals on the table … The
point is whether the member states are willing to use this mission.”
“If the member states are not doing anything with this then of course it’s their
decision, but we have to discuss to show we help to keep the Strait of Hormuz
open,” Kallas said.
In her remarks, Kallas blasted Trump’s decision to lift sanctions on Russian oil
exports as a “dangerous precedent,” saying it was important that the ongoing war
in the Middle East did not overshadow Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Washington
lifted the sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil exports for one month to alleviate
pressure on global oil markets amid a surge in the price of oil to more than
$100 per barrel following the attacks on Iran.
Even so, the top EU diplomat underscored European efforts to help clear the
Strait of Hormuz. Another possibility, she said, was to use a so-called
coalition of the willing to secure the strait. This refers to a group of
countries rather than the entire 27-member bloc.
“But of course you can see it’s difficult,” she said.
Indeed, no sooner had Kallas spoken than EU foreign ministers started pouring
cold water on the idea of joining any mission to clear the strait, with
Romania’s foreign minister arguing that NATO was a defensive alliance that had
no immediate duty to act in the Middle Eastern war.
Milena Wälde contributed to this report.
Dr. Daniel Steiners
This is not an obituary for Germany’s economic standing. It is an invitation to
shift perspective: away from the language of crisis and toward a clearer view of
our opportunities — and toward the confidence that we have more capacity to
shape our future than the mood indicators might suggest.
For years, Germany seemed to be traveling along a self-evident path of success:
growth, prosperity, the title of export champion. But that framework is
beginning to fray. Other countries are catching up. Parts of our industrial base
appear vulnerable to the pressures of transformation. And global dependencies
are turning into strategic vulnerabilities. In short, the German model of
success is under strain.
Yet a glance at Europe’s economic history suggests that moments like these can
also contain enormous potential — if strategic thinking and decisive action come
together. One example, which I find particularly striking, takes us back to
1900. At the time, André and Édouard Michelin were producing tires in a
relatively small market, when the automobile itself was still a niche product.
They could have focused simply on improving their product. Instead, they thought
bigger; not in silos, but in systems.
With the Michelin Guide, they created incentives and orientation for greater
mobility: workshop directories, road maps, and recommendations for hotels and
restaurants made travel more predictable and attractive. What began as a service
booklet for motorists gradually evolved into an entire ecosystem — and
eventually into a globally recognized benchmark for quality.
> In times of change, those who recognize connections and are willing to shape
> them strategically can transform uncertainty into lasting strength.
What makes this example remarkable is that the real innovation did not lie in
the tire itself or merely even a clever marketing idea to boost sales. It lay in
something more fundamental: connected thinking and ecosystem thinking. The
decision to see mobility as a broad space for value creation. It was the courage
to break out of silos, to recognize strategic connections, to deepen value
chains — and to help define the standards of an emerging market.
That is precisely the lesson that remains relevant today, including for
policymakers. In times of change, those who recognize connections and are
willing to shape them strategically can transform uncertainty into lasting
strength.
Germany’s industrial health economy is still too often viewed in public debate
in narrowly sectoral terms — primarily through the lens of health care provision
and costs. Strategically, however, it has long been an industrial ecosystem that
spans research, development, manufacturing, digital innovation, exports and
highly skilled employment. Just as Michelin helped shape the ecosystem of
mobility, Germany can think of health as a comprehensive domain of value
creation.
The industrial health economy: cost driver or engine of growth?
Yes, medicines cost money. In 2024, Germany’s statutory health insurance system
spent around €55 billion on pharmaceuticals. But much of that increase reflects
medical progress and the need for appropriate care in an aging society with
changing disease patterns.
Innovative therapies benefit both patients and the health system. They can
improve quality and length of life while shifting treatment from hospitals into
outpatient care or even into patients’ homes. They raise efficiency in the
system, reduce downstream costs and support workforce participation.
> In short, the industrial health economy is not merely part of our health care
> system. It is a key industry, underpinning economic strength, prosperity and
> the financing of our social security systems.
Despite public perception, pharmaceutical spending has remained remarkably
stable for years, accounting for roughly 12 percent of total expenditures in the
statutory health insurance system. That figure also includes generics —
medicines that enter the ‘world heritage of pharmacy’ after patent protection
expires and remain available at low cost. Truly innovative, patent-protected
medicines account for only about seven percent of total spending.
Against these costs stands an economic sector in which Germany continues to hold
a leading international position. With around 1.1 million employees and value
creation exceeding €190 billion, the industrial health economy is among the
largest sectors of the German economy. Its high-tech products, bearing the Made
in Germany label, are in demand worldwide and contribute significantly to
Germany’s export surplus.
In short, the industrial health economy is not merely part of our health care
system. It is a key industry, underpinning economic strength, prosperity and the
financing of our social security systems. Its overall balance is positive.
The central question, therefore, is this: how can we unlock its untapped
potential? And what would it mean for Germany if we fail to recognize these
opportunities while economic and innovative capacity increasingly shifts
elsewhere?
Global dynamics leave little room for hesitation
Governments around the world have long recognized the strategic importance of
the industrial health economy — for health care, for economic growth and for
national security.
China is demonstrating remarkable speed in scaling and implementing
biotechnology. The United States, meanwhile, illustrates how determined
industrial policy can look in practice. Regulatory authorities are being
modernized, approval procedures accelerated and bureaucratic barriers
systematically reduced. At the same time, domestic production is being
strategically strengthened. Speed and market size act as magnets for capital —
especially in a sector where research is extraordinarily capital-intensive and
requires long-term planning security.
When innovation-friendly conditions and economic recognition of innovation meet
a large, well-funded market, global shifts follow. Today roughly 50 percent of
the global pharmaceutical market is located in the United States, about 23
percent in Europe — and only 4 to 5 percent in Germany. This distribution is no
coincidence; it reflects differences in economic and regulatory environments.
At the same time, political pressure is growing on countries that benefit from
the American innovation engine without offering an equally attractive home
market or recognizing the value of innovation in comparable ways. Discussions
around a Most Favored Nation approach or other trade policy instruments are
moving in precisely that direction — and they affect Europe and Germany
directly.
For Germany, the implications are clear.
Those who want to attract investment must strengthen their competitiveness.
Those who want to ensure reliable health care must appropriately reward new
therapies.
Otherwise, these global dynamics will inevitably affect both the economy and
health care at home. Already today, roughly one in four medicines introduced in
the United States between 2014 and 2023 is not available in Europe. The gap is
even larger for gene and cell therapies.
The primacy of industrial policy: from consensus to action — now
Germany does not lack potential or substance. We still have a strong industrial
base, a tradition of invention, outstanding universities and research
institutions, and a private sector willing to invest. Political initiatives such
as the coalition agreement, the High-Tech Agenda and plans for a future strategy
in pharmaceuticals and medical technology provide important impulses, which I
strongly welcome.
> A fair market environment without artificial price caps or rigid guardrails is
> the strongest magnet for private capital, long-term investment and a resilient
> health system.
But programs must now translate into a coherent action plan for growth.
We need innovation-friendly and stable framework conditions that consider health
care, economic strength and national security together — as a strategic
ecosystem, not as separate silos.
The value of medical innovation must also be recognized in Germany. A fair
market environment without artificial price caps or rigid guardrails is the
strongest magnet for private capital, long-term investment and a resilient
health system.
Faster approval procedures, consistent digitalization and a determined reduction
of bureaucracy are essential if speed is once again to become a competitive
advantage and a driver of innovation.
Germany can reinvent itself, of that I am convinced. With courage, strategic
determination and an ambitious push for innovation.
The choice now lies with us: to set the right course and unlock the potential
that is already there.
The 21st century is more likely to belong to Beijing than to Washington — at
least that’s the view from four key U.S. allies.
Swaths of the public in Canada, Germany, France and the U.K. have soured on the
U.S., driven by President Donald Trump’s foreign policy decisions, according to
recent results from The POLITICO Poll.
Respondents in these countries increasingly see China as a more dependable
partner than the U.S. and believe the Asian economic colossus is leading on
advanced technologies, including artificial intelligence. Critically, Europeans
surveyed see it as possible to reduce reliance on the U.S. but harder to reduce
reliance on China — suggesting newfound entanglements that could drastically tip
the balance of global power away from the West.
Here are five key takeaways from the poll highlighting the pivot from the U.S.
to China.
The POLITICO Poll — in partnership with U.K. polling firm Public First — found
that respondents in those four allied countries believe it is better to depend
on China than the U.S. following Trump’s turbulent return to office.
That appears to be driven by Trump’s disruption, not by a newfound stability in
China: In a follow-up question, a majority of respondents in both Canada and
Germany agreed that any attempts to get closer to China are because the U.S. has
become harder to depend on — not because China itself has become a more reliable
partner. Many respondents in France (38 percent) and the U.K. (42 percent) also
shared that sentiment.
Under Trump’s “America First” ethos, Washington has upended the “rules-based
international order” of the past with sharp-elbowed policies that have isolated
the U.S. on the global stage. This includes slow-walking aid to
Ukraine, threatening NATO allies with economic punishment and withdrawing from
major international institutions, including the World Health Organization and
the United Nations Human Rights Council. His punitive liberation day tariffs, as
well as threats to annex Greenland and make Canada “the 51st state,” have only
further strained relationships with top allies.
Beijing has seized the moment to cultivate better business ties with European
countries looking for an alternative to high U.S. tariffs on their exports. Last
October, Beijing hosted a forum aimed at shoring up mutual investments with
Europe. More recently, senior Chinese officials described EU-China ties as a
partnership rather than a rivalry.
“The administration has assisted the Chinese narrative by acting like a bully,”
Mark Lambert, former deputy assistant secretary of State for China and Taiwan in
the Biden administration, told POLITICO. “Everyone still recognizes the
challenges China poses — but now, Washington no longer works in partnership and
is only focused on itself.”
These sentiments are already being translated into action.
Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney declared a “rupture” between Ottawa and
Washington in January and backed that rhetoric by sealing a trade deal with
Beijing that same month. The U.K. inked several high-value export deals with
China not long after, while both French President Emmanuel Macron and German
Chancellor Friedrich Merz have returned from recent summits in Beijing
with Chinese purchase orders for European products.
Respondents across all four allied countries are broadly supportive of efforts
to create some distance from the U.S. — and say they’re also more dependent on
China. In Canada, 48 percent said it would be possible to reduce reliance on the
U.S. and believe their government should do so. In the U.K., 42 percent said
reducing reliance on the U.S. sounded good in theory, but were skeptical it
could happen in practice.
By contrast, fewer respondents across those countries believe it would actually
be possible to reduce reliance on China — a testament to Beijing’s dominance of
global supply chains.
Young adults may be drawn to China as an alternative to U.S. cultural hegemony.
Respondents between the ages of 18 and 24 were significantly more supportive
than their older peers of building a closer relationship with China.
A recent study commissioned by the Institute of European Studies at the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences — a Beijing-based think tank — suggests most young
Europeans get their information about China and Chinese life through social
media. Nearly 70 percent of those aged 18 to 25 said they rely on social media
and other short-form video platforms for information on China.
And the media they consume is likely overwhelmingly supportive of China, as
TikTok, one of the most popular social media platforms in the world, was built
by Chinese company ByteDance and has previously been accused of suppressing
content deemed negative toward China.
According to Alicja Bachulska, a policy fellow at the European Council on
Foreign Relations, younger generations believe the U.S. has led efforts to
depict China as an authoritarian regime and a threat to democracy, while
simultaneously degrading its own democratic values.
The trend “pushes a narrative that ‘we’ve been lied to’ about what China is,”
said Bachulska, as “social sentiment among the youth turns against the U.S.”
“It’s an expression of dissatisfaction with the state of U.S. politics,” she
added.
There’s a clear consensus among those surveyed in Europe and Canada that China
is winning the global tech race — a coveted title central to Chinese leader Xi
Jinping’s grand policy vision.
China is leading the U.S. and other Western nations in the development of
electric batteries and robotics, while Chinese designs have also become the
global standard in electric vehicles and solar panels.
“There has been a real vibe shift in global perception of Chinese tech and
innovation dominance,” said Sarah Beran, who served as deputy chief of mission
in the U.S. embassy in Beijing during the Biden administration.
This digital rat race is most apparent in the fast-paced development of
artificial intelligence. China has poured billions of dollars into research
initiatives, poaching top tech talent from U.S. universities and funding
state-backed tech firms to advance its interests in AI.
The investment appears to be paying off — a plurality of respondents from
Canada, Germany, France and the U.K. believe that China is more likely to
develop the first superintelligent AI.
But these advancements have done little to change American minds. A majority of
respondents in the U.S. still see American-made tech as superior to Chinese
tech, even in the realm of AI.
As Washington and its allies grow more estranged, the perception of the U.S. as
the dominant world power is in retreat — though most Americans don’t see it that
way.
About half of all respondents in Canada, Germany, France and the U.K. believe
that China is rapidly becoming a more consequential superpower. This is
particularly true among those who say the U.S. is no longer a positive force for
the world.
By contrast, 63 percent of respondents in the U.S. believe their nation will
maintain its dominance in 10 years — reflecting major disparities in beliefs
about global power dynamics between the U.S. and its European allies.
This view of China as the world’s power center may not have been entirely
organic. The U.S. has accused Beijing of pouring billions of dollars into
international information manipulation efforts, including state-backed media
initiatives and the deployment of tools to stifle online criticism of China and
its policies.
Some fear that a misplaced belief among U.S. allies in the inevitability of
China surpassing the U.S. as a global superpower could be helping accelerate
Beijing’s rise.
“Europe is capable of defending itself against threats from China and contesting
China’s vision of a more Sinocentric, authoritarian-friendly world order,” said
Henrietta Levin, former National Security Council director for China in the
Biden administration. “But if Europe believes this is impossible and does not
try to do so, the survey results may become a self-fulfilling prophecy.”
METHOLODGY
The POLITICO Poll was conducted from Feb. 6 to Feb. 9, surveying 10,289 adults
online, with at least 2,000 respondents each from the U.S., Canada, U.K., France
and Germany. Results for each country were weighted to be representative on
dimensions including age, gender and geography, and have an overall margin of
sampling error of ±2 percentage points for each country. Smaller subgroups have
higher margins of error.
BRUSSELS — The European Union’s anti-deforestation law will put United States
producers off exporting to the European market, harming EU competitiveness, a
senior official with the U.S. Department of Agriculture told reporters in
Brussels Friday.
The law, also called EUDR, is “going to discourage us from looking at the
European market” and from “paying attention to any European rules [linked to
deforestation],” the official said. The law as it stands would affect $9 billion
of U.S. trade to the EU annually, added the official, who spoke to journalists
on condition that he was not named.
A delegation of U.S. government representatives is finishing a tour of EU
capitals — including Madrid, Rome, Paris, Berlin and Brussels — to lobby
governments to simplify the EUDR ahead of an upcoming review of the rules next
month.
One example of a sector that could be affected is livestock farming, the
official said, arguing these farmers depend on soybeans to feed their animals,
and Europe does not produce enough protein feed.
“It needs to import from countries that are better at it, like us,” he said,
warning that the U.S. stopping that export “will drive up their costs, hurt
their competitiveness.”
The EU’s anti-deforestation law requires that companies police their supply
chains to ensure that any commodities they use, such as palm oil, beef or
coffee, have not contributed to deforestation. After complaints from industry
groups and trade partners, EU institutions in December agreed to put off
implementation of the law by a year — until Dec. 2026 — and mandated the
Commission to present a review of the rules by April.
“It’s particularly difficult for us because these [compliance] costs will be
borne by our producers,” said the official. U.S. farmers also don’t want to
share information on their farms with foreign governments, he said.
Washington’s main qualms with the law include the fact that there’s no category
of “negligible” risk in the EU’s ranking of countries by risk of deforestation.
The U.S. — like all EU member countries as well as China, Canada, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Vietnam and others — has been labeled “low
risk” under the EU’s deforestation classification system.
Members of the European Parliament in the center-right European People’s Party
have also backed the introduction of a “no risk” category, “for countries with
stable or expanding forest areas.”
The senior official also complained about a stipulation in the law that if the
level of deforestation in any country exceeds 70,000 hectares annually, that
country cannot be considered “low risk.” That standard “just doesn’t work for
us,” they said. “It’s not fair.”
Representatives from the European Commission are meeting with members of the
delegation on Friday “at technical level” to discuss the law, a spokesperson for
the European Commission confirmed to POLITICO. European Environment Commissioner
Jessika Roswall told reporters in January that there would be no new legislative
proposal come April, saying businesses need “predictability.”
A 2024 report from the U.S. Congressional Research Service estimated that, in
2023, U.S. exports of the seven commodities under the EUDR accounted for
approximately 3 percent of the value of U.S. exports to the EU, “so overall the
EUDR may not significantly affect U.S. trade.”
European Environment Commissioner Jessika Roswall told reporters in January that
there would be no new legislative proposal come April, saying businesses need
“predictability.” | Gabriel Luengas/Europa Press via Getty Images
Still, the authors wrote, the law could affect U.S. producers of specific
commodities covered by the law. In 2023, the highest value of covered
commodities exported to the EU from the U.S. were wood and wood products ($4.5
billion), soybeans ($4 billion), rubber ($1.1 billion), and cattle, such as beef
and related products ($409 million).
Environmental groups are calling on EU governments and the Commission to stick
by the EUDR and keep the rules intact.
“Misleading and self-serving foreign pressure on the EU should not distract
policy-makers from staying focused on facts,” said Anke Schulmeister-Oldenhove,
manager for forests at WWF EU, in an emailed statement. “Every year the EUDR is
postponed results in the loss of nearly 50 million trees and the release of 16.8
million tonnes of CO₂ into the atmosphere.”