BRUSSELS — An industry petition criticizing the European Union’s core climate policy implied its demands were supported by some 1,350 companies and associations. Now some firms deny they signed up. Last month, a number of EU leaders — including European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and French President Emmanuel Macron — joined hundreds of industry representatives for a get-together in Antwerp.  There, they were presented with a letter that demanded, among other things, lower “carbon costs” — a call widely interpreted as asking for a weaker price signal under the Emissions Trading System, the bloc’s main tool for reducing planet-warming emissions.  Merz jumped on the demands to suggest he was open to weakening the policy, comments he later rowed back on but not before they crashed the carbon price. Ever since, attacks on the ETS, which obliges factories to pay for their pollution, have escalated, with Italy recently calling for a suspension pending an upcoming reform.  The letterhead on top of the petition, which asked the EU to “bring energy and carbon costs down,” read: “Presented to EU leaders at the European Industry Summit in Antwerp on 11 February 2026 on behalf of the signatories of the Antwerp Declaration.” The 2024 Antwerp Declaration, which called for a European “Industrial Deal” and did not mention carbon costs, was backed by nearly 1,350 signatories, including more than 900 companies ranging from steel giant ArcelorMittal to fertilizer producer Yara.  An emailed press release linking to the petition similarly stated that “the Antwerp Declaration Community — representing more than 1,300 companies, associations and trade unions across Europe — called on EU Heads of State and Government to take urgent and bold action.”  But some of those companies now say they didn’t support the missive — and even the organizers admitted to POLITICO that they do not know the actual number of backers for this year’s petition, dubbed the Antwerp Call to Alden-Biesen in reference to the Belgian chateau where EU leaders met the day after the industry summit.  The findings throw a spotlight on a lobbying practice starting to spread through Europe: Letters demanding controversial policy changes in the name of companies loosely associated with the organizers to boost their influence.  Last October, two CEOs demanded the EU scrap or weaken key environmental laws while claiming to speak on behalf of 46 companies, some of which later distanced themselves.  The European chemicals lobby association Cefic, which organizes the annual Antwerp summits, did not directly respond to a question asking whether describing the letter as sent “on behalf of” the original signatories was misleading.  A spokesperson insisted all signatories of the 2024 declaration were invited to give input into this year’s petition and that the text was shown to companies that joined consultation calls ahead of the summit.  But Cefic acknowledged that there was no specific number of backers. “As the text builds on the existing Antwerp Declaration, signatories were not asked [to] sign, and no additional signatory list was created,” the spokesperson said, adding: “The Call was a political reminder, not a new Antwerp Declaration, as the text itself specifically states.”  DEFENDING THE ETS The discrepancies in support for the Antwerp Call were first noticed by NGO Finnwatch, which checked with Finnish companies that signed the 2024 declaration. Of the seven that responded, three distanced themselves from the call for slashing the carbon price. Finnwatch also writes that after it published a blogpost with the companies’ responses, the summit website’s Antwerp Call page started returning an error, and a different PDF deleting the “on behalf of” language was uploaded.  The new document only lists 16 industry lobby groups as backers for this year’s call. Cefic acknowledged that the website had been “updated.” POLITICO this week contacted 20 companies listed as signatories of the 2024 declaration. Of the 12 that responded, seven said they did not support this year’s petition.  Among the companies that distanced themselves were French energy major EDF, Norwegian aluminum and energy company Norsk Hydro, fertilizer giant Yara, and Holcim, one of the world’s largest cement producers.  Holcim supported the original declaration but said that it was “not involved in the Alden-Biesen call for action.” A spokesperson said that “Holcim remains steadfast in its commitment to decarbonization” and that it welcomed “long-term predictability” in EU policy, including a “stable” carbon price. Norsk Hydro said it did not even participate in this year’s Antwerp summit, adding: “Hydro supports the EU ETS, but the system needs reform.”  EDF said it supported “the continuity” of the ETS. A spokesperson wrote: “To our knowledge the final Antwerp statement was not shared with past signatories before the day of the event, so it was not possible to assess its content beforehand.”  Swedish mining company LKAB also said that “there was no signing process” for the petition, adding that the company does “not support an ask [to] ‘bring carbon cost down’ — energy prices yes, but carbon costs no.”  DEFENDING THE PETITION Similarly, Yara “does not call for lower carbon prices,” the company’s vice president for European government relations, Tiffanie Stephani, said in an email. “Carbon prices provide the most suitable market signal to drive decarbonization of production and products.”  But, she added, “carbon prices and carbon costs are not one and the same… A high carbon cost without enabling conditions to decarbonize, and without demand for the more sustainable products, is destructive to industrial competitiveness.”  Cefic made a similar argument. “Please note that the text on purpose references the impact of carbon costs, not on the ETS as a tool, nor on the carbon price itself,” the association’s spokesperson said.  The companies that told POLITICO they supported this year’s call were paper manufacturer Sappi and Belgian oil and gas infrastructure provider Fluxys, as well as two Cefic members: chemicals giants Bayer and Solvay.  Steel giant ArcelorMittal also said they did support this year’s call as a whole, but that they weren’t asking for a lower carbon price.  Solvay insisted it was in favor of “long‑term clarity and predictability” of the ETS, adding: “European industry currently faces significantly higher energy and carbon‑related costs than global competitors operating under less stringent frameworks. Our support for the call should be read in that context: It is not about reducing ambition, but about ensuring Europe can deliver both decarbonization and industrial resilience.”  Cefic said that the petition presented to EU leaders last month “reflects the many opinions” heard in consultation calls.  At an EU leaders’ meeting on March 19-20, energy costs and carbon pricing are once again on the agenda, draft conclusions show.

Europe enters a more contested decade than any since the end of the Cold War. Yet the frontline shaping its security is no longer limited to land, sea, air or even space.   It runs directly through the digital backbone that powers modern life: the networks, data infrastructures and connectivity systems on which governments, economies and armed forces depend.  But Europe will not be secure until it takes this digital backbone’s security seriously, and governs its openness through risk-based, verifiable sovereignty rather than isolationism or complacency.  >  Europe will not be secure until it takes this digital backbone’s security > seriously, and governs its openness through risk-based, verifiable sovereignty A digital frontline that remains dangerously exposed  Hybrid threats no longer sit at the margins of European security. In reality, they cut straight through its core systems. Hospitals, energy grids, transport networks, financial markets and military command-and-control all rely on constant, resilient connectivity.   Via Vodafone. Joakim Reiter, group chief external and corporate affairs officer, Vodafone. And when those systems falter, nations falter. Recent blackouts in Portugal and Spain revealed what this means in practice. A ‘digital failure’ is not an IT incident. It is a national security event.   Adversaries have already drawn the lesson. Subsea cables carrying 95 percent of the world’s internet traffic face mounting sabotage risks. Satellites have become open theatres of geopolitical competition. And cyberattacks now routinely target both critical national infrastructure and the commercial networks that underpin defense readiness.   Despite this, much of Europe’s digital backbone is still approached as a utility, not a strategic asset. Market forces, on their own, cannot deliver the resilience, redundancy and diversity that modern deterrence requires. Piecemeal upgrades and fragmented responsibilities across civil, military and regulatory silos leave avoidable gaps that adversaries will inevitably exploit.  > A ‘digital failure’ is not an IT incident. It is a national security event.   Europe must therefore elevate secure connectivity to the level of defense preparedness — politically, financially and operationally. It requires moving beyond incrementalism to a coordinated framework that fosters and defends critical digital infrastructure — one that enables governments and operators to plan, train and respond together before, not during, the next crisis.  Sovereignty is about control, not isolation  Connectivity alone is not the issue. Europe’s strategic vulnerability also stems from how it governs the technologies on which its digital backbone depends.  And while digital sovereignty is one pillar of Europe’s wider resilience agenda — spanning critical value chains such as defense, automotive, chemicals and energy — it is the pillar without which none of the others can function.  Europe cannot attain digital sovereignty by continuing excessive dependence on a small number of non-European providers. But it also cannot achieve it by walling itself off from global innovation. Both extremes weaken resilience.  That’s why sovereignty done right means governing openness on Europe’s terms. Europe must keep critical operations in trusted European hands while maintaining access to the scale, performance and innovation that global platforms can provide.   This approach starts with understanding sovereignty across three dimensions:  — Data sovereignty: who has lawful access to information.  — Operational sovereignty: who runs and can intervene in critical systems.  — Technological sovereignty: which capabilities Europe must own or control.  The false choice between ‘ban foreign tech’ and ‘do nothing’ is a trap. The real path forward is risk-based, proportionate and verifiable. We must define what truly requires European control and work with like-minded international partners to build a trusted technology ecosystem. Sovereignty needs to be demonstrated in practice, not merely asserted in policy.  This approach would also enable Europe to pool industrial capacity with trusted partners such as Japan, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom and South Korea. This is cooperation that strengthens Europe rather than diluting control.   From principles to verifiable control  Europe should reject blanket bans based on EU borders that raise costs, slow next-generation deployment and fail to deliver true control. Instead, sovereignty must be translated into concrete, auditable mechanisms that strengthen resilience.   To deliver it, Europe should follow four core principles:   1. Harden the backbone: Europe must create a much better business case for investing in resilient fiber, advanced 5G technologies and future networks built with defense-grade security. And it must fortify subsea cables, satellite systems and cross-border infrastructure against hybrid threats. This is defense spending by another name.  2. Engineer sovereignty into operations: ensure Europe retains verifiable control over access to sensitive systems and require European oversight of critical operations. Authorities must be able to verify who operates critical systems, where data is processed and which legal jurisdiction applies.  3. Certify ‘Trusted European Operators’: establish an EU-wide certification enabling European-anchored providers to manage access to global platforms within EU-governed environments. Make interoperability and portability mandatory to prevent lock-in and ensure resilience.  4. End ‘sovereignty washing’: providers claiming sovereign capabilities must prove it. Europe must require auditable disclosures and rigorous, risk-based assessments. If claims cannot be verified, they should not determine Europe’s critical infrastructure decisions.  In parallel, Europe should adopt a single EU framework defining practical levels across the data, operational and technological dimensions. This would give CIOs, regulators and public bodies clarity and consistency.   From doctrine to delivery  As the dust settles on the annual Munich Security Conference, Europe faces a defining choice. It can carry on treating its digital backbone as regulatory plumbing and watch vulnerabilities compound. Or it can recognise this backbone for what it is — a core line of defence.  > The real test of seriousness is whether governments and operators can plan > together, train together and respond together when systems are stressed.  The real test of seriousness is whether governments and operators can plan together, train together and respond together when systems are stressed. And this depends on whether investment, procurement and certification systems finally move at the speed security demands.  The way forward lies neither in dependence nor in fantasies of self-sufficiency. It must be grounded in risk-based sovereignty, delivered through verifiable control, modernized infrastructure and deeper public–private cooperation, aligned with trustworthy allies.  Ultimately, Europe cannot defend what it cannot connect, and it cannot compete if it closes itself off. Europe will fail this critical strategic test if the regulatory agenda for connectivity — the Digital Networks Act, Cybersecurity Act and merger guidelines revisions — does little to strengthen the very networks its security depends on.  If Europe gets this right, it can build a digital backbone capable of deterring adversaries, supporting allies, protecting citizens and powering innovation for decades to come.  -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is Vodafone Group plc * The ultimate controlling entity is Vodafone Group plc * The political advertisement is linked to EU-level security and digital policy with particular focus on the Digital Networks Act, Cybersecurity Act, merger guidelines and broader digital sovereignty strategy. More information here.

BRUSSELS — Italy is pushing to suspend the European Union’s most important climate policy until it undergoes a “deep revision,” arguing the carbon market has become a burden on European industry. The move is an extraordinary attack on the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) and suggests the consensus that has made the bloc among the world’s most climate-friendly jurisdictions is fraying. Other countries have also signaled waning support for the carbon price in recent weeks, but Italy’s position is the biggest assault yet from one of Europe’s biggest economies. Speaking at the Competitiveness Council in Brussels on Thursday, Minister for Enterprises Adolfo Urso said the ETS, “as currently designed, represents an additional tax on European companies,” raising costs and undermining competitiveness. Rome, he said, will formally ask the European Commission to pause the system until changes are made to emissions benchmarks and allowance allocation rules, including delaying the phase-out of free allowances. Urso also called for the introduction of a stable support mechanism for exporting companies, arguing that this element was not fully defined in the recent reform of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). He stressed that the ETS and CBAM must be aligned and geared toward protecting Europe’s industrial base. “Chemicals, the industry of industries, is under pressure from high energy costs,” he said, warning that the ETS in its current form is “ineffective and harmful” because it erodes margins without providing sufficient safeguards against competitive distortions.  “We need clear rules and reliable monitoring tools to prevent distortions along value chains. CBAM and ETS must become instruments that support industry, not factors that weaken its competitiveness,” he added.

Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music * Amazon Music Droht ein neuer Handelskrieg zwischen der EU und den USA? Nachdem der Supreme Court zentrale US-Zölle für rechtswidrig erklärt hat, steht der sogenannte 15-Prozent-Deal zwischen Brüssel und Washington erneut auf der Kippe. Joana Lehner und Jürgen Klöckner besprechen, warum ein Plan B zum bisherigen Deal keine Option ist. Im Policy Talk spricht Evonik-Vorstandsmitglied und Interims-CFO Claus Rettig über die Folgen der US-Zölle für die Chemieindustrie, wie sie sich an einer Stelle positiv auswirken und warum er nicht an eine Neuverhandlung des Zoll-Deals zwischen der EU und den USA glaubt. Außerdem geht es mit Rettig auch um die China-Reise von Friedrich Merz. Außerdem berichtet ⁠Gordon Repinski⁠, der den Kanzler in China begleitet, wie der dort wirtschaftliche Kooperation stärker in den Vordergrund rückt. Trotz Kritik an unfairem Wettbewerb und wachsendem Handelsbilanzdefizit. „Power & Policy“ zeigt jede Woche, wo und wie die Entscheidungen in der Wirtschaftspolitik fallen. ⁠Jürgen Klöckner⁠ und ⁠Joana Lehner⁠ von POLITICO sprechen mit Top-Entscheidern und liefern Off-the-Record-Einblicke aus der Redaktion und Machtzentren. Präzise Analysen, lange bevor Gesetze beschlossen sind. Der Podcast für alle in Wirtschaft und Politik, die einen Wissensvorsprung brauchen — immer donnerstags. Für Policy-Profis: Abonnieren und die Pro-Newsletter ⁠Industrie & Handel⁠, ⁠Energie & Klima ⁠und ⁠Gesundheit⁠. Jetzt kostenlos testen. Fragen und Feedback gern an ⁠powerandpolicy@politico.eu⁠ **(Anzeige) Eine Nachricht von Fuchs & Cie.: Bei Fuchs & Cie. zählen Leistung und Erfolg. Im Interesse unserer Klienten und ihrer Themen. Deswegen jetzt bewerben. Gerne mit einem Hintergrund aus den Bereichen Defence, Finance, Data oder Energy. Bewerbung per Mail an karriere@fuchs-cie.de. Wir verstärken unsere Teams in Berlin, München und Frankfurt.** POLITICO Deutschland – ein Angebot der Axel Springer Deutschland GmbH Axel-Springer-Straße 65, 10888 Berlin Tel: +49 (30) 2591 0 ⁠information@axelspringer.de⁠ Sitz: Amtsgericht Berlin-Charlottenburg, HRB 196159 B USt-IdNr: DE 214 852 390 Geschäftsführer: Carolin Hulshoff Pol, Mathias Sanchez Luna

Belgium’s Prime Minister Bart De Wever said the Port of Antwerp-Bruges will get its own anti-aircraft defenses by next year, as the Belgian government moves to fortify one of Europe’s most critical trade gateways. De Wever also confirmed that Belgium has ordered a separate anti-drone system after multiple drone sightings last year forced the temporary closure of Belgian airports and a military airbase, the Gazet van Antwerpen reported. “An air-defense system is coming to the port of Antwerp. It’s a NASAMS type and has already been ordered,” De Wever said at the port, according to the Gazet report. Belgium said last October that it had purchased NASAMS systems without disclosing where they would be deployed. De Wever had already pushed for air defenses at the Antwerp port in 2024, warning that “if you want peace, prepare for war.” NASAMS — a Norwegian-American medium-range air-defense system — is built to intercept aircraft and drones, and is typically used to shield high-value infrastructure. The Antwerp port, Europe’s second-largest, is a petrochemical powerhouse and a key NATO logistics hub, including for the flow of U.S. military equipment into Europe. Drone incursions last year caused major disruptions in Belgium and other NATO countries, with drones spotted over the Port of Antwerp — including the BASF chemical site and the Europa terminal — as well as over nuclear facilities elsewhere in the country. The move to boost defenses in Antwerp comes amid Belgium’s effort to strengthen ground-based air defenses after decades of underinvestment. NATO allies including Spain and the Netherlands have fielded NASAMS for years. With Russia’s war in Ukraine having just entered its fifth year and transatlantic nerves fraying, EU capitals are increasingly preparing to protect critical infrastructure themselves rather than assuming Washington will step in.

Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music * Amazon Music Einmal mehr hat der US-Präsident klar gemacht: Er ist offen für einen Deal, und doch scheut er nicht die militärische Konfrontation mit dem Mullah-Regime. Rixa Fürsen bespricht mit Hans von der Burchard, wie Deutschland und die EU auf Trumps Strategie reagieren, worauf sie hoffen und was sie befürchten. Im 200-Sekunden-Interview ist Bundestags-Vizepräsident Omid Nouripour von den Grünen zu Gast. Er ist in Teheran geboren und ordnet aus seiner Sicht ein, warum es mit einem Verzicht des Iran auf nukleare Waffen allein nicht getan ist und warum er fürchtet, die USA könnten es sich zu einfach machen. Außerdem berichtet Gordon Repinski aus China von der Reise des Kanzlers, die zumindest öffentlich ganz unter wirtschaftspolitischen Aspekten zu stehen scheint. Unseren neuen Wirtschafts-Podcast „Power & Policy“ gibt es hier zu hören. Das Berlin Playbook als Podcast gibt es jeden Morgen ab 5 Uhr. Gordon Repinski und das POLITICO-Team liefern Politik zum Hören – kompakt, international, hintergründig. Für alle Hauptstadt-Profis: Der Berlin Playbook-Newsletter bietet jeden Morgen die wichtigsten Themen und Einordnungen. ⁠Jetzt kostenlos abonnieren.⁠ Mehr von Host und POLITICO Executive Editor Gordon Repinski: Instagram: ⁠@gordon.repinski⁠ | X: ⁠@GordonRepinski⁠. POLITICO Deutschland – ein Angebot der Axel Springer Deutschland GmbH Axel-Springer-Straße 65, 10888 Berlin Tel: +49 (30) 2591 0 ⁠information@axelspringer.de⁠ Sitz: Amtsgericht Berlin-Charlottenburg, HRB 196159 B USt-IdNr: DE 214 852 390 Geschäftsführer: Carolin Hulshoff Pol, Mathias Sanchez Luna **(Anzeige) Eine Nachricht von Roche Deutschland: Deutschlands Zukunft entscheidet sich bei Innovation. Darum investieren wir heute Milliarden in Forschung, Produktion und Wertschöpfung in Deutschland – für Souveränität, Sicherheit und Unabhängigkeit. Denn klar ist: Wo Innovation ausgebremst wird, verliert eine Schlüsselindustrie an Tempo. Und Deutschland an gesunder Zukunft.**

BERLIN — China was once the promised land for German industry. Now it’s a massive strategic headache for Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who departs on his inaugural visit to Beijing on Tuesday. For years, Berlin was the driving force behind closer EU relations with China — brushing aside human rights concerns to lobby for a landmark investment deal in 2020. Closer trade relations with China, German leaders argued, would have a moderating effect on the regime in Beijing, a justification encapsulated with the mantra Wandel durch Handel, or change through trade. For a long time, it was also good for business. Germany was one of the few EU countries to run surpluses with Beijing, supplying the vital components and machinery that fueled China’s economic ascent. Its industrial giants like carmaker Volkswagen and chemical company like BASF made huge investments to harness the Chinese market. But that all-in approach to China now increasingly appears to be a historic policy miscalculation on par with Germany’s misguided energy dependence on Russia before the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine four years ago. In public, Merz hasn’t admitted the scale of the challenge. Last week, he told fellow conservatives that he is traveling to China to forge closer cooperation. “We have a strategic interest in finding partners around the world who think like us, who act like us,” he said. But many German industry leaders are now urging the chancellor to take a far tougher line and are howling over what they call the “China shock.” Since the Covid pandemic, the trade relationship has flipped to an eye-watering deficit — €90 billion in 2025 — and China is widely blamed for much of the hemorrhaging of jobs in Germany’s all-important manufacturing sector — now running at roughly 10,000 job losses per month. Frustratingly for the reflexive transatlanticist Merz, pivoting to President Donald Trump’s U.S., which is locked in an unpredictable tariff showdown with Europe, is hardly a viable option. That means Merz has to find some way to engage with Chinese leader Xi Jinping. Jörg Wuttke, a long-time China watcher who briefed the chancellor on Feb. 17 ahead of his visit, said he was surprised by how “well prepared he was.” For close to two hours, Merz took notes from a group of six China experts, saying little beyond asking questions. His priority, Wuttke said, was conveying the problems in a way that would connect with Xi. “He realizes he is possibly the most important politician for China in Europe,” Wuttke said. But China seems to have the best cards. Germany has over time become reliant on critical raw materials imported from China, giving Beijing the power to shut down German plants almost at will even as Berlin tries to pursue a longer term policy of reducing such dependencies or “de-risking.” That goal will take years to realize, however. By then, a growing number of German industry leaders are arguing, much of the damage will have been inflicted as German companies buckle due to massive Chinese price advantages resulting from subsidies, deliberate dumping and an undervalued currency. Merz himself admits that Germany should hold no “illusions” about China and its ambition to “define a new multilateral order according to its own rules.” “Merz is going at the worst possible time in terms of the impact of the China shock on the German economy,” said Andrew Small, director of the Asia program at the European Council on Foreign Relations. “The numbers are obviously absolutely horrible, with no projection that they’ll get better.” WHO HAS THE LEVERAGE? In many ways, the trip will look like those taken by chancellors in the past, when China’s vast and fast-growing market was considered the hope of German industry. Merz is traveling with a delegation of some two-dozen business executives. Over the course of three days, with stops in Beijing and the tech hub of Hangzhou, he will dine with Xi and visit the Forbidden City as well as outposts of Mercedes Benz and Siemens Energy. But few expect any sweeping deals will be reached. German industry leaders are instead calling for more concrete and immediate progress to improve their circumstances. “Our companies are coming under increasing pressure because key competitive conditions are being systematically distorted,” Thilo Brodtmann, the managing director of VDMA, said in a statement ahead of Merz’s trip. As a consequence, he said, German machinery exports to China fell by 8.5 percent during the first 11 months of last year, while machinery imports from China rose by 12.5 percent. Brodtmann called on the chancellor to address Chinese export controls on rare earths and to end China’s practice of subsidizing loss-making “zombie companies” that offer cut-rate prices. “German companies are not competing with other companies, but with the Chinese treasury,” he said of subsidies more broadly. The most powerful tool Merz has at his disposal is China’s growing dependence on the European market, which only increased as Chinese domestic demand has fallen. For Merz, a longtime free-trade purist, a push to threaten defensive tariffs within the framework of the EU is not only anathema — it’s potentially reckless at time when Germany is also dealing with the fallout of Trump’s trade wars. Trump’s attempt to confront China also provides something of a cautionary tale. In the midst of a trade feud between the U.S and China last year, Beijing announced sweeping export controls on rare-earth magnets and the raw materials needed to make them. Weeks later, Trump and Xi reached a detente, with Beijing agreeing to delay rare earth export restrictions for one year. But Nicolas Zippelius, a lawmaker focusing on China relations for Merz’s conservatives, said Merz may be more forceful than he lets on in public. “I would say that China and Germany can hurt each other very badly,” said Zippelius. “We must not underestimate Germany’s strong voice within the EU. And the EU has shown in the past that it has power, for example through tariffs and other measures.” Such conversations would happen in private, Zippelius added. “I don’t think it helps to take risks against each other in the open,” he said. “But in closed-door talks, you can communicate that very clearly. And there you definitely have leverage.” To that end, Merz could choose to ally itself more closely with France, which has emerged as one of the loudest voices warning that China is steadily hollowing out Europe’s industrial base while the continent is distracted by Trump. The only question is whether China would take Merz’s warnings seriously. “The leverage is there,” said Small of the European Council on Foreign Relations. “But on the Chinese side, the assessment is that Europe is not willing to use it.” Indeed, China knows the EU has backed off in the past over potential trade conflicts with Beijing in sectors such as solar panels and telecommunications due to fear of Chinese retaliation. As Merz and other European leaders look for an answer, time is on China’s side, added Small. “Unless there is more serious concerted action on the European side, China will calculate that it can get away with exactly what it’s doing at the moment and all of these problems will continue,” he said. Nette Nöstlinger contributed to this report.

Russia poisoned opposition politician Alexei Navalny with a toxin from a poison dart frog, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom said on Saturday. The five governments said their analyses of samples from Navalny’s body “conclusively confirmed” the presence of a toxin called epibatidine, which is found in poison dart frogs in South America and is not found naturally in Russia. “Navalny died while held in prison, meaning Russia had the means, motive and opportunity to administer this poison to him,” they said. “There is no innocent explanation for its presence in Navalny’s body,” the U.K. said in a statement on Saturday.  Navalny died in a Russian penal colony in February 2024. The Russian authorities said he died of natural causes. But poisoning was “highly likely the cause of his death,” the five countries said in a joint statement on Saturday. Sky News reported that British scientists from Porton Down, the U.K.’s top secret laboratory, played a key role in the findings. Navalny, a longtime thorn in the side of Russian President Vladimir Putin, was filmed the day before his death at a court hearing cracking jokes and seemingly in high spirits. Yulia Navalnaya, his widow, announced the finding at a press conference Saturday at the Munich Security Conference, alongside foreign ministers from the European countries. The U.K., in a separate statement, said that the circumstances of Navalny’s death were “brutal and barbaric.”  The five countries’ representatives to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons have written to its Director General to inform him of the alleged Russian breach of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the countries said.  The U.K. said Navalny’s death is part of an “alarming pattern” of behavior by Russia, including its use of Novichok in the U.K. in 2018, which led to the death of a British woman, and Russian troops’ “frequent use of chemical weapons on the battlefield in Ukraine.” Russia’s foreign ministry did not immediately respond to a request for comment. 

BRUSSELS — Chinese goods continue to flood into the European Union as the bloc’s manufacturing base struggles to cope. The EU’s trade deficit in goods with China widened to €359.3 billion in 2025, up nearly a fifth from €304.5 billion in 2024, according to data published by Eurostat on Friday. The figure is the total value of all goods imported from China, minus the goods exported to the country. The widening deficit was the driven both by a 6.3 percent increase in imports from China, and a 6.5 percent decline in EU exports to China. The widening deficit exposes Europe’s inability to compete in industries ranging from basic chemicals to cars. In 2025, China’s global trade surplus in goods hit a record of nearly $1.2 trillion — with Donald Trump’s U.S. tariffs redirecting its export glut to more open economies like Europe. China has been on an inexorable economic ascent since joining the World Trade Organization in 2001. Neither the 2008 financial crisis, nor the recent deflation of a vast real estate bubble, has been enough to knock it off course. While Chinese businesses used to occupy the bottom of the value chain — assembling electronics, producing basic chemicals, or manufacturing low-end consumer goods — they’ve steadily moved to the technology frontier. Chinese champions operate in everything from electric vehicles to artificial intelligence and robotics. EU leaders are alert to the threat. Speaking at an EU industry summit in Antwerp on Wednesday, French President Emmanuel Macron called on the European Commission to act more swiftly to erect trade protections when China uses subsidies to give an unfair leg-up to its industry. “We have a big issue today. We are too slow,” said the French leader talking about the Commission’s lengthy probe into Chinese electric vehicles that resulted in the imposition of duties in late 2024. It was useless, Macron said, if the European Commission takes two years to find out that a Chinese company was relying on state aid to undercut its European competitors. “I mean, thank you, happy I was right, but it’s over. So we have to accelerate much more swiftly the process for these inquiries, clearly,” Macron added. France’s High Commission for Strategy and Planning estimates that a quarter of the country’s exports are “directly threatened” by Chinese competition. For Germany, that number rises to a third. The advisory body has recommended that the EU retaliate with a weaker euro — which would give exporters a boost — and across-the-board tariffs. Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng seemed to offer an olive branch at the World Economic Forum in Switzerland last month. In a speech made in the wake of U.S. President Donald Trump’s threat to annex Greenland, He promised that China would uphold the international trade order and “open its door still wider to the world.” He also said that the government would move to fix economic imbalances that had sapped domestic demand and added to the export glut. But policymakers, both in EU capitals and the Berlaymont, are skeptical that China is serious about any shift toward household consumption. French Finance Minister Roland Lescure said this week that Chinese officials have been “saying the right things” with talk of “rebalancing of the Chinese economy with more consumption.” But, he told reporters: “We feel that so far, there’s been a lot of talk, but not many results yet.” It’s an attitude shared by top Commission trade official Joanna Szychowska who, at a conference last month, said the EU should not “all of a sudden become friends with China today because we have a shift in U.S. policy.” “China is very much focused on transactions. Now we have to ask ourselves the question of what transactions we can make — so what is our leverage, what is our strength?” added Szychowska, who is director for Asia, services and digital trade. Additional reporting by Zia Weise and Geoffrey Smith.

Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music * Amazon Music European leaders have spent the week talking about how to make the EU more competitive — first with industry heavyweights in Antwerp, then behind closed doors at a leaders’ retreat in Belgium. On this episode of EU Confidential, host Sarah Wheaton digs into what’s really behind the latest push to revive Europe’s economy. Are calls for deregulation and lower energy costs a genuine course correction — or another round of diagnosis without delivery? POLITICO’s Zia Weise, fresh from the industry summit in Antwerp, joins the discussion on how chemical giants and other industrial players are pressing for relief from climate and energy rules. Marianne Gros examines the backlash over Brussels’ simplification drive and growing concerns about transparency and democratic safeguards. And Carlo Martuscelli breaks down the political fault lines exposed at the Alden Biesen retreat — and why so much of Mario Draghi’s reform agenda remains stalled. Plus, Aitor Hernández-Morales joins us with the latest on political developments in Portugal.