BRUSSELS — EU leaders meeting this week will remain locked in talks until they
find a solution to Ukraine’s funding crisis, Cyprus said, insisting the issue
won’t be kicked to Jan. 1 when it takes over the EU’s legislative agenda.
Cypriot Deputy EU Minister Marilena Raouna told POLITICO on Monday that leaders
have “a critical decision to make at the upcoming European Council,” which
begins Thursday. Discussions over how to ensure Kyiv does not run out of money
by the middle of next year have been “challenging,” she went on, but “there is a
readiness by all to stay in Brussels until we are able to have a decision on
this issue of financing.”
European officials have repeatedly warned Thursday’s negotiations could take
hours, or even days, to produce a result and may run into the weekend despite
pressures on leaders’ schedules. The alternative, officials say, is Ukraine
running out of money — which will not be allowed to happen.
The EU is working to agree on a plan to use frozen Russian assets to underwrite
a €210 billion loan to support Kyiv’s state budget and help repair the damage
done by Russia’s full-scale invasion. However, Belgium — which hosts the bulk of
the funds — has been joined by Italy, Malta and Bulgaria in raising legal
questions over the proposals, which are already opposed on principle by
Kremlin-friendly countries Hungary and Slovakia.
“A number of member states have said we need to ensure there is legal certainty;
I think safeguards are being put in place in this regard. And that will pave the
way, I hope, for a decision,” said Raouna. “I think we need to exhaust all
possibilities … We also need to be aware of what message it would send if we
don’t reach a decision.”
Talks between ambassadors on the technical framework behind the move were
canceled on Sunday and will run late into the night on Monday instead, ahead of
a summit of leaders under the auspices of the European Council on Thursday.
Four diplomats told POLITICO they remain convinced the plan is workable and no
alternative exists given capitals’ opposition to borrowing the money directly.
Despite that, there are growing concerns that failing to consider other options
would mean major delays if the assets plan is rejected.
“I think we are on the right path. I am cautiously optimistic that we will be
able to deliver at the European Council,” Raouna said.
Cyprus takes over the six-month rotating presidency of the Council of the
European Union from the beginning of next year, giving one of the smallest
countries in the bloc an influential role overseeing diplomatic talks. Along
with Ireland, it is one of two militarily neutral countries to take on the role
in 2026.
Tag - Crisis
Mathias Döpfner is chair and CEO of Axel Springer, POLITICO’s parent company.
America and Europe have been transmitting on different wavelengths for some time
now. And that is dangerous — especially for Europe.
The European reactions to the new U.S. National Security Strategy paper and to
Donald Trump’s recent criticism of the Old Continent were, once again,
reflexively offended and incapable of accepting criticism: How dare he, what an
improper intrusion!
But such reactions do not help; they do harm. Two points are lost in these sour
responses.
First: Most Americans criticize Europe because the continent matters to them.
Many of those challenging Europe — even JD Vance or Trump, even Elon Musk or Sam
Altman — emphasize this repeatedly. The new U.S. National Security Strategy,
scandalized above all by those who have not read it, states explicitly: “Our
goal should be to help Europe correct its current trajectory. We will need a
strong Europe to help us successfully compete, and to work in concert with us to
prevent any adversary from dominating Europe.” And Trump says repeatedly,
literally or in essence, in his interview with POLITICO: “I want to see a strong
Europe.”
The transatlantic drift is also a rupture of political language. Trump very
often simply says what he thinks — sharply contrasting with many European
politicians who are increasingly afraid to say what they believe is right.
People sense the castration of thought through a language of evasions. And they
turn away. Or toward the rabble-rousers.
My impression is that our difficult American friends genuinely want exactly what
they say they want: a strong Europe, a reliable and effective partner. But we do
not hear it — or refuse to hear it. We hear only the criticism and dismiss it.
Criticism is almost always a sign of involvement, of passion. We should worry
far more if no criticism arrived. That would signal indifference — and therefore
irrelevance. (By the way: Whether we like the critics is of secondary
importance.)
Responding with hauteur is simply not in our interest. It would be wiser — as
Kaja Kallas rightly emphasized — to conduct a dialogue that includes
self-criticism, a conversation about strengths, weaknesses and shared interests,
and to back words with action on both sides.
Which brings us to the second point: Unfortunately, much of the criticism is
accurate. Anyone who sees politics as more than a self-absorbed administration
of the status quo must concede that for decades Europe has delivered far too
little — or nothing at all. Not in terms of above-average growth and prosperity,
nor in terms of affordable energy. Europe does not deliver on deregulation or
debureaucratization; it does not deliver on digitalization or innovation driven
by artificial intelligence. And above all: Europe does not deliver on a
responsible and successful migration policy.
The world that wishes Europe well looked to the new German government with great
hope. Capital flows on the scale of trillions waited for the first positive
signals to invest in Germany and Europe. For it seemed almost certain that the
world’s third-largest economy would, under a sensible, business-minded and
transatlantic chancellor, finally steer a faltering Europe back onto the right
path. The disappointment was all the more painful. Aside from the interior
minister, the digital minister and the economics minister, the new government
delivers in most areas the opposite of what had been promised before the
election. The chancellor likes to blame the vice chancellor. The vice chancellor
blames his own party. And all together they prefer to blame the Americans and
their president.
Instead of a European fresh start, we see continued agony and decline. Germany
still suffers from its National Socialist trauma and believes that if it remains
pleasantly average and certainly not excellent, everyone will love it. France is
now paying the price for its colonial legacy in Africa and finds itself — all
the way up to a president driven by political opportunism — in the chokehold of
Islamist and antisemitic networks.
In Britain, the prime minister is pursuing a similar course of cultural and
economic submission. And Spain is governed by socialist fantasists who seem to
take real pleasure in self-enfeeblement and whose “genocide in Gaza” rhetoric
mainly mobilizes bored, well-heeled daughters of the upper middle class.
Hope comes from Finland and Denmark, from the Baltic states and Poland, and —
surprisingly — from Italy. There, the anti-democratic threats from Russia, China
and Iran are assessed more realistically. Above all, there is a healthy drive to
be better and more successful than others. From a far weaker starting point,
there is an ambition for excellence.
What Europe needs is less wounded pride and more patriotism defined by
achievement. Unity and decisive action in defending Ukraine would be an obvious
example — not merely talking about European sovereignty but demonstrating it,
even in friendly dissent with the Americans. (And who knows, that might
ultimately prompt a surprising shift in Washington’s Russia policy.) That,
coupled with economic growth through real and far-reaching reforms, would be a
start. After which Europe must tackle the most important task: a fundamental
reversal of a migration policy rooted in cultural self-hatred that tolerates far
too many newcomers who want a different society, who hold different values, and
who do not respect our legal order.
If all of this fails, American criticism will be vindicated by history. The
excuses for why a European renewal is supposedly impossible or unnecessary are
merely signs of weak leadership. The converse is also true: where there is
political will, there is a way.
And this way begins in Europe — with the spirit of renewal of a well-understood
“Europe First” (what else?) — and leads to America. Europe needs America.
America needs Europe. And perhaps both needed the deep crisis in the
transatlantic relationship to recognize this with full clarity. As surprising as
it may sound, at this very moment there is a real opportunity for a renaissance
of a transatlantic community of shared interests. Precisely because the
situation is so deadlocked. And precisely because pressure is rising on both
sides of the Atlantic to do things differently.
A trade war between Europe and America strengthens our shared adversaries. The
opposite would be sensible: a New Deal between the EU and the U.S. Tariff-free
trade as a stimulus for growth in the world’s largest and third-largest
economies — and as the foundation for a shared policy of interests and,
inevitably, a joint security policy of the free world.
This is the historic opportunity that Friedrich Merz could now negotiate with
Donald Trump. As Churchill said: “Never waste a good crisis!”
LONDON — The U.K. has imposed new sanctions on senior commanders of the Rapid
Support Forces (RSF) amid escalating atrocities in Sudan.
The move aims at key figures accused of mass killings, sexual violence and
targeted attacks on civilians in El Fasher, including Abdul Rahim Hamdan Dagalo,
the RSF’s deputy leader and brother of commander Mohamed “Hemedti” Dagalo.
Three other senior RSF officers will also now face asset freezes and travel bans
to the U.K.
Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper said the sanctions sent a message that
atrocities “cannot and will not go unpunished.”
While the U.K. has targeted other RSF figures before, the paramilitary group’s
recent sharing of footage of their own alleged crimes has made it easier to
establish the basis for sanctions.
The penalties announced Friday coincide with a fresh £21 million aid package
intended to provide food, clean water, healthcare and protection for tens of
thousands caught in what the U.K. government has termed the world’s worst
humanitarian crisis. The administration in London has been under pressure from
lawmakers to do more to stop the bloodshed.
The U.K.’s action follows the U.S. decision this week to sanction a network it
says is recruiting former Colombian soldiers to fight in Sudan’s civil war,
while the European Union has also targeted RSF leadership for alleged crimes in
Darfur.
Sudan has been locked in a civil war for two and a half years, with the Sudanese
Armed Forces pitted against the Rapid Support Forces paramilitary group, which
international institutions have accused the United Arab Emirates of backing.
Since becoming foreign secretary, Cooper has sought to place particular emphasis
on the conflict in Sudan and has discussed it with her U.S. counterpart Marco
Rubio on several occasions.
Donald Trump signaled a new interest in ending the violence in Sudan after
meeting Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman in November, but it’s not yet
clear if that will be sustained.
President Donald Trump intends for the U.S. to keep a bigger military presence
in the Western Hemisphere going forward to battle migration, drugs and the rise
of adversarial powers in the region, according to his new National Security
Strategy.
The 33-page document is a rare formal explanation of Trump’s foreign policy
worldview by his administration. Such strategies, which presidents typically
release once each term, can help shape how parts of the U.S. government allocate
budgets and set policy priorities.
The Trump National Security Strategy, which the White House quietly released
Thursday, has some brutal words for Europe, suggesting it is in civilizational
decline, and pays relatively little attention to the Middle East and Africa.
It has an unusually heavy focus on the Western Hemisphere that it casts as
largely about protecting the U.S. homeland. It says “border security is the
primary element of national security” and makes veiled references to China’s
efforts to gain footholds in America’s backyard.
“The United States must be preeminent in the Western Hemisphere as a condition
of our security and prosperity — a condition that allows us to assert ourselves
confidently where and when we need to in the region,” the document states. “The
terms of our alliances, and the terms upon which we provide any kind of aid,
must be contingent on winding down adversarial outside influence — from control
of military installations, ports, and key infrastructure to the purchase of
strategic assets broadly defined.”
The document describes such plans as part of a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe
Doctrine. The latter is the notion set forth by President James Monroe in 1823
that the U.S. will not tolerate malign foreign interference in its own
hemisphere.
Trump’s paper, as well as a partner document known as the National Defense
Strategy, have faced delays in part because of debates in the administration
over elements related to China. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent pushed for some
softening of the language about Beijing, according to two people familiar with
the matter who were granted anonymity to describe internal deliberations.
Bessent is currently involved in sensitive U.S. trade talks with China, and
Trump himself is wary of the delicate relations with Beijing.
The new National Security Strategy says the U.S. has to make challenging choices
in the global realm. “After the end of the Cold War, American foreign policy
elites convinced themselves that permanent American domination of the entire
world was in the best interests of our country. Yet the affairs of other
countries are our concern only if their activities directly threaten our
interests,” the document states.
In an introductory note to the strategy, Trump called it a “roadmap to ensure
that America remains the greatest and most successful nation in human history,
and the home of freedom on earth.”
But Trump is mercurial by nature, so it’s hard to predict how closely or how
long he will stick to the ideas laid out in the new strategy. A surprising
global event could redirect his thinking as well, as it has done for recent
presidents from George W. Bush to Joe Biden.
Still, the document appears in line with many of the moves he’s taken in his
second term, as well as the priorities of some of his aides.
That includes deploying significantly more U.S. military prowess to the Western
Hemisphere, taking numerous steps to reduce migration to America, pushing for a
stronger industrial base in the U.S. and promoting “Western identity,” including
in Europe.
The strategy even nods to so-called traditional values at times linked to the
Christian right, saying the administration wants “the restoration and
reinvigoration of American spiritual and cultural health” and “an America that
cherishes its past glories and its heroes.” It mentions the need to have
“growing numbers of strong, traditional families that raise healthy children.”
As POLITICO has reported before, the strategy spends an unusual amount of space
on Latin America, the Caribbean and other U.S. neighbors. That’s a break with
past administrations, who tended to prioritize other regions and other topics,
such as taking on major powers like Russia and China or fighting terrorism.
The Trump strategy suggests the president’s military buildup in the Western
Hemisphere is not a temporary phenomenon. (That buildup, which has
included controversial military strikes against boats allegedly carrying drugs,
has been cast by the administration as a way to fight cartels. But the
administration also hopes the buildup could help pressure Venezuelan leader
Nicolas Maduro to step down.)
The strategy also specifically calls for “a more suitable Coast Guard and Navy
presence to control sea lanes, to thwart illegal and other unwanted migration,
to reduce human and drug trafficking, and to control key transit routes in a
crisis.”
The strategy says the U.S. should enhance its relationships with governments in
Latin America, including working with them to identify strategic resources — an
apparent reference to materials such as rare earth minerals. It also declares
that the U.S. will partner more with the private sector to promote “strategic
acquisition and investment opportunities for American companies in the region.”
Such business-related pledges, at least on a generic level, could please many
Latin American governments who have long been frustrated by the lack of U.S.
attention to the region. It’s unclear how such promises square with Trump’s
insistence on imposing tariffs on America’s trade partners, however.
The National Security Strategy spends a fair amount of time on China, though it
often doesn’t mention Beijing directly. Many U.S. lawmakers — on a bipartisan
basis — consider an increasingly assertive China the gravest long-term threat to
America’s global power. But while the language the Trump strategy uses is tough,
it is careful and far from inflammatory.
The administration promises to “rebalance America’s economic relationship with
China, prioritizing reciprocity and fairness to restore American economic
independence.”
But it also says “trade with China should be balanced and focused on
non-sensitive factors” and even calls for “maintaining a genuinely mutually
advantageous economic relationship with Beijing.”
The strategy says the U.S. wants to prevent war in the Indo-Pacific — a nod to
growing tensions in the region, including between China and U.S. allies such as
Japan and the Philippines.
“We will also maintain our longstanding declaratory policy on Taiwan, meaning
that the United States does not support any unilateral change to the status quo
in the Taiwan Strait,” it states. That may come as a relief to Asia watchers who
worry Trump will back away from U.S. support for Taiwan as it faces ongoing
threats from China.
The document states that “it is a core interest of the United States to
negotiate an expeditious cessation of hostilities in Ukraine,” and to mitigate
the risk of Russian confrontation with other countries in Europe.
But overall it pulls punches when it comes to Russia — there’s very little
criticism of Moscow.
Instead, it reserves some of its harshest remarks for U.S.-allied nations in
Europe. In particular, the administration, in somewhat veiled terms, knocks
European efforts to rein in far-right parties, calling such moves political
censorship.
“The Trump administration finds itself at odds with European officials who hold
unrealistic expectations for the [Ukraine] war perched in unstable minority
governments, many of which trample on basic principles of democracy to suppress
opposition,” the strategy states.
The strategy also appears to suggest that migration will fundamentally change
European identity to a degree that could hurt U.S. alliances.
“Over the long term, it is more than plausible that within a few decades at the
latest, certain NATO members will become majority non-European,” it states. “As
such, it is an open question whether they will view their place in the world, or
their alliance with the United States, in the same way as those who signed the
NATO charter.”
Still, the document acknowledges Europe’s economic and other strengths, as well
as how America’s partnership with much of the continent has helped the U.S. “Not
only can we not afford to write Europe off — doing so would be self-defeating
for what this strategy aims to achieve,” it says.
“Our goal should be to help Europe correct its current trajectory,” it says.
Trump’s first-term National Security Strategy focused significantly on the U.S.
competition with Russia and China, but the president frequently undercut it by
trying to gain favor with the leaders of those nuclear powers.
If this new strategy proves a better reflection of what Trump himself actually
believes, it could help other parts of the U.S. government adjust, not to
mention foreign governments.
As Trump administration documents often do, the strategy devotes significant
space to praising the commander-in-chief. It describes him as the “President of
Peace” while favorably stating that he “uses unconventional diplomacy.”
The strategy struggles at times to tamp down what seem like inconsistencies. It
says the U.S. should have a high bar for foreign intervention, but it also says
it wants to “prevent the emergence of dominant adversaries.”
It also essentially dismisses the ambitions of many smaller countries. “The
outsized influence of larger, richer, and stronger nations is a timeless truth
of international relations,” the strategy states.
The National Security Strategy is the first of several important defense and
foreign policy papers the Trump administration is due to release. They include
the National Defense Strategy, whose basic thrust is expected to be similar.
Presidents’ early visions for what the National Security Strategy should mention
have at times had to be discarded due to events.
After the 9/11 attacks, George W. Bush’s first-term strategy ended up focusing
heavily on battling Islamist terrorism. Biden’s team spent much of its first
year working on a strategy that had to be rewritten after Russia moved toward a
full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
LONDON — In February Britain’s cash-strapped Labour government cut international
development spending — and barely anyone made a noise.
The center-left party announced it would slice the country’s spending on aid
down to only 0.3 percent of gross domestic income — from 0.5 percent — in order
to fund a hike in defense spending.
MPs, aid experts and officials have told POLITICO that the scale of the cuts is
on a par with — or even exceeding — those of both the previous center-right
Conservative government or the United States under Donald Trump. This leaves
Britain’s development arm, once globally envied as a vehicle for poverty
alleviation, a shadow of its former self.
The move — prompted by U.S. demands to up its NATO spending, and mirroring the
Trump administration’s move to gut its own USAID development budget — shocked
Labour’s progressive MPs, supporters and backers in the aid sector.
But unlike attempted cuts to British welfare spending, the real-world backlash
was muted, with the resignation of Britain’s development minister prompting
little further dissent or change in policy. There was no mutiny in parliament,
and only limited domestic and international condemnation outside of an aid
sector torn between making their voices heard — and keeping in Whitehall’s good
books over slices of the shrinking pie.
Some fear a return grab over the aid budget could still be on the cards — but
that the government will find that there is little left to cut.
Gideon Rabinowitz, director of policy and advocacy at Bond, the U.K. network for
NGOs, warned that, instead of “reversing the cuts by the previous Conservative
government, Labour has compounded them, and lives will be lost as a result.”
“These cuts will further tarnish the U.K.’s reputation as it continues to be
known as an unreliable global partner, breaking Labour’s manifesto commitment,”
he warned. “The Conservatives started the fire, but instead of putting it out,
this Labour government threw petrol on it.”
‘IT WAS THE PERFECT TIME TO DO IT’
When Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced the cut to international aid — a bid
to save over £6 billion by 2027 — Labour MPs, including those who worked in the
sector before being elected, were notably silent.
The move followed a 2021 Conservative cut to aid spending — from 0.7 percent in
the Tory brand-rebuilding David Cameron years down to 0.5 percent. At the time,
Labour MPs had met that Tory cut with howls of outrage. This time it was
different.
Some were genuinely shocked, while others feared retribution from a Downing
Street that had flexed its muscles at MPs who rebelled on what they saw as
points of conscience.
“No one was expecting it, so there was no opportunity to campaign around it,”
said one Labour MP. “Literally none of us had any idea it was coming.”
Remaining spending is largely mandatory contributions to organizations such as
the World Bank. | Daniel Slim/AFP via Getty Images
The same MP noted that there are around 50 Labour MPs from the new 2024 intake
who had some form of development background before coming into parliament. Yet
they were put “completely under the cosh” by Downing Street and government
whips. “It was the perfect time to do it,” the MP said.
A number of MPs who might have been vocal have since been made parliamentary
private secretaries — the most junior government role. “They have basically
gagged the people who would be most likely to be outspoken on it,” the MP above
said. The department’s ministerial team is now more likely to be loyal to the
Starmer project.
“I just felt hurt, and wounded. We were stunned. None of us saw it coming,” said
one MP from the 2024 cohort, adding: “They priced in that backlash wouldn’t
come.” But they added: “If we were culpable so were NGOs, too inward-looking and
focused on peripheral issues.”
The lack of outcry from MPs would, however, seem to put them largely in step
with the wider British public. Polling and focus groups from think tank More in
Common suggest that despite the majority of voters thinking spending on
international aid is the right thing to do in a variety of circumstances, only
around 20 percent of the public think the budget was cut too much.
The second new-intake Labour MP quoted above said the policy was therefore an
“easy thing to sell on the doorstep,” and “in my area, there’s not going to be
shouting from the rooftops to spend more money on aid.”
DIMINISHED AND DEMORALIZED
The cuts to aid come at a time when Britain’s Foreign Office is undergoing a
radical overhaul.
While the department describes its plans as “more agile,” staff, programs and
entire areas of focus are all ripe for cuts to save money. The department is
looking to make redundancies for around 25 percent of staff based in the U.K.
MPs have voiced concern that development staff will be among the first to make
the jump due to the government’s shift away from aid.
The department insists that no final decisions have been taken over the size and
shape of the organization.
Major cuts are expected across work on education, conflict, and WASH (Water,
Sanitation, and Hygiene.) The government’s Integrated Security Fund — which
funds key counter-terror programs abroad — is also looking to scale back work
abroad which does not have a clear link to Britain’s national security.
The British Council — a key soft-power organization viewed as helping combat
Chinese and Russian reach across the world — told MPs it is in “real financial
peril” and would be cutting its presence in 35 of the 97 countries it operates.
The BBC’s World Service is seeing similar cuts to its global reach. The
Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI), the watchdog for aid spending, is
also not safe from the ax as the government continues its bonfire of regulators.
The FCDO did not refute the expected pathway of cuts. Published breakdowns of
spending allocations for the next three years are due to be published in the
coming months, an official said.
A review of Britain’s development and diplomacy policies conducted by economist
Minouche Shafik — who has since been moved into Downing Street — sits discarded
in the department. The government refuses to publish its findings.
Aid spending was spared a repeat visit by Chancellor Rachel Reeves in her
government-wide budget last month — but that hasn’t stopped MPs worrying about a
second bite. | Pool Photo by Adrian Dennis via Getty Images
The second 2024 intake MP quoted earlier in the piece said that following the
U.S. decisions on aid and foreign policy “there was an expectation that the
U.K., as a responsible international partner, as a leader on a lot of this
stuff, would fill the gap to some extent, and then take more of a leadership
role on it, and we’ve done the opposite.”
NOTHING LEFT TO CUT
Aid spending was spared a repeat visit by Chancellor Rachel Reeves in her
government-wide budget last month — but that hasn’t stopped MPs worrying about a
second bite. While few MPs or those in the aid sector feel Britain will ever
return to the lofty heights of its 0.7 percent commitment, they predict there
will be harder resistance if the government comes back for more.
“I don’t think they’re going to try and do it again, as there’s no money left,”
the second 2024 intake MP said. But they pointed out that a large portion of the
remaining aid budget is spent on in-country costs such as accommodation for
asylum seekers. Savings identified from the asylum budget would be sent back to
the Treasury, rather than put back into the aid budget, they noted.
Remaining spending is largely mandatory contributions to organizations such as
the World Bank or the United Nations and would, they warned, involve “getting
rid of international agreements and chopping up longstanding influence at big
international institutions that we are one of the leading people in.”
The United Nations is already facing its own funding crisis as it struggles to
adjust to the global downturn in aid spending. British diplomat Tom Fletcher —
who leads the UN’s humanitarian response — said earlier this year that the
organization has been “forced into a triage of human survival,” adding: “The
math is cruel, and the consequences are heartbreaking.”
The government still has a commitment to returning to 0.7 percent of GNI “as
soon as the fiscal circumstances allow.” The tests for this ramp back up were
set out four years ago. Britain must not be borrowing for day-to-day spending
and underlying debt must be falling. The last two budgets have forecast that the
government will not meet these tests in this parliament.
FARAGE CIRCLES
In the meantime, Labour’s opponents feel emboldened to go further.
Both the Conservatives and Reform UK have said that they would further cut the
aid budget. The Tories have vowed to slice it down to 0.1 percent of GNI, while
Nigel Farage’s Reform UK is eyeing fresh cuts of at least by £7-8 billion a
year. A third 2024 Labour MP said that there was a degree of pressure among some
colleagues to match the Conservatives’ 0.1 percent pledge.
Though no country has gone as far as Uganda’s Idi Amin in setting up a “save
Britain fund” for its “former colonial masters,” Britain’s departure on
international aid gives space for other countries wanting to step up to further
their own foreign policy aims.
The space vacated by Britain and America has prompted warnings that China will
step in, while countries newer to international development such as Gulf states
could try and fill the void. Many of these nations are unlikely to ever fund the
same projects as the U.K. and the U.S., forcing NGOs to look to alternate donors
such as philanthropists to fund their work.
“There’ll be a big, big gap, and it won’t be completely filled,” the second new
intake MP said.
An FCDO spokesperson said the department was undergoing “an unprecedented
transformation,” and added: “We remain resolutely committed to international
development and have been clear we must modernize our approach to development to
reflect the changing global context. We will bring U.K. expertise and investment
to where it is needed most, including global health solutions and humanitarian
support.”
BRUSSELS — The EU will start using high-resolution satellites and the latest
drone technology to crack down on drugs smuggled through its borders, as cocaine
and synthetic drugs swarm European capitals and the bloc grapples with growing
drug trafficking violence.
“When it comes to illegal drugs, Europe is reaching a crisis point,” said
European Commissioner for Internal Affairs and Migration Magnus Brunner on
Thursday, while presenting the new EU Drugs Strategy and action plan against
drug trafficking.
They lay out actions to boost international cooperation, stop the import of
illicit drugs, dismantle production sites, curb recruitment of young people to
criminal networks and tackle the growing drug-related violence that has taken
capitals hostage.
As gang networks evolve and drug traffickers constantly find new “loopholes” to
bring their drugs into Europe, the EU and countries will work with customs,
agencies and the private sector to better monitor and disrupt trafficking routes
across land, sea or air.
This includes using the latest technologies and artificial intelligence to find
drugs sent via mail, monitoring aviation and publishing its upcoming EU Ports
Strategy for port security.
EU border security agency Frontex will get “state of the art resources,” said
Brunner, including high-resolution satellites and drones.
“Drug traffickers use the latest technologies, which means we need innovation to
beat them,” Brunner said. To stay up to date, the European Commission is
establishing a Security and Innovation Campus to boost research and test
cutting-edge technologies in 2026.
“We send the drug lords and their organizations a clear message: Europe is
fighting back,” Brunner said.
On top of the increased import of illegal drugs, Europe is grappling with the
growing in-house production of synthetic drugs, with authorities dismantling up
to 500 labs every year. To tackle this, the European Union Drugs Agency will
develop a European database on drug production incidents and an EU-wide
substance database to help countries identify synthetic drugs and precursor
chemicals.
The EU is also looking at its existing laws, evaluating the current rules
against organized crime and the existing Framework Decision on drug trafficking
by 2026.
The EUDA’s new European drug alert system, launched a couple of weeks ago, will
also help issue alerts on serious drug-related risks, such as highly potent
synthetic drugs; while its EU early warning system will help identify new
substances and quickly inform the capitals.
Europe is grappling with a surge in the availability of cocaine, synthetic
stimulants and potent opioids, alongside increasingly complex trafficking
networks and rising drug-related violence, particularly in Belgium and the
Netherlands.
The quantity of drugs seized in the EU has increased dramatically between 2013
and 2023, the commissioner said, with authorities seizing 419 metric tons of
cocaine in 2023 — six times more than the previous decade.
But it’s not just the drugs — illicit drug trafficking comes with “bloodshed,
violence, corruption, and social harm,” Brunner said.
Criminal networks are increasingly recruiting young and vulnerable people, often
using social media platforms. To fight this, the EU will launch an EU-wide
platform to “stop young people being drawn into drug trafficking,” connecting
experts across Europe.
“I think that is key — to get engaged with the young people at an early stage,
to prevent them getting into the use of drugs,” Brunner said.
The new strategy — and accompanying action plan — will define how Europe should
tackle this escalating crisis from 2026 to 2030.
“Already too many have been lost to death, addiction and violence caused by
traffickers. Now is the time for us to turn the tides,” he added.
LONDON — The British government dismissed on Wednesday Vladimir Putin’s claim
that Europe wanted a war with Russia as “Kremlin claptrap.”
The Russian president accused Europe on Tuesday of being “on the side of war”
and made clear Moscow was “ready right now” to fight a war just hours before
peace talks with U.S. special envoy Steve Witkoff and Donald Trump’s son-in-law
Jared Kushner.
But Keir Starmer’s spokesperson dismissed Putin’s comments as “yet more
rhetoric” that was “as dangerous as it is wrong.” They said “European nations
are united in supporting Ukraine’s right to self-defense under international
law” and “NATO’s ready to respond to any threats with unity and strength.”
NATO foreign ministers are meeting in Brussels to discuss support for Ukraine
after U.S.-Russia talks in Moscow failed to reach any breakthrough.
“This is yet more Kremlin claptrap from a president who isn’t serious about
peace,” the No 10 spokesperson added.
Starmer was asked at Prime Minister’s Questions in the House of Commons on
Wednesday whether the U.K. was ready for war.
“We all know that Putin is the aggressor here,” the prime minister told MPs. “We
all know that Putin is dragging his feet, not wanting to come to the table, not
wanting to reach an agreement.”
He said NATO members “have to continue to put pressure on in every conceivable
way,” which included “supporting Ukraine with capability and resource.”
Talks between Moscow and Washington, D.C. on Tuesday evening were “extremely
useful, constructive, and informed,” Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov said, though he
added the two sides were left “neither further nor closer to resolving the
crisis.”
When the Franco-German summit concluded in Berlin, Europe’s leaders issued a
declaration with a clear ambition: strengthen Europe’s digital sovereignty in an
open, collaborative way. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s
call for “Europe’s Independence Moment” captures the urgency, but independence
isn’t declared — it’s designed.
The pandemic exposed this truth. When Covid-19 struck, Europe initially
scrambled for vaccines and facemasks, hampered by fragmented responses and
overreliance on a few external suppliers. That vulnerability must never be
repeated.
True sovereignty rests on three pillars: diversity, resilience and autonomy.
> True sovereignty rests on three pillars: diversity, resilience and autonomy.
Diversity doesn’t mean pulling every factory back to Europe or building walls
around markets. Many industries depend on expertise and resources beyond our
borders.
The answer is optionality, never putting all our eggs in one basket.
Europe must enable choice and work with trusted partners to build capabilities.
This risk-based approach ensures we’re not hostage to single suppliers or
overexposed to nations that don’t share our values.
Look at the energy crisis after Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. Europe’s
heavy reliance on Russian oil and gas left economies vulnerable. The solution
wasn’t isolation, it was diversification: boosting domestic production from
alternative energy sources while sourcing from multiple markets.
Optionality is power. It lets Europe pivot when shocks hit, whether in energy,
technology, or raw materials.
Resilience is the art of prediction. Every system inevitably has
vulnerabilities. The key is pre-empting, planning, testing and knowing how to
recover quickly.
Just as banks undergo stress tests, Europe needs similar rigor across physical
and digital infrastructure. That also means promoting interoperability between
networks, redundant connectivity links (including space and subsea cables),
stockpiling critical components, and contingency plans. Resilience isn’t
theoretical. It’s operational readiness.
Finally, Europe must exercise authority through robust frameworks, such as
authorization schemes, local licensing and governance rooted in EU law.
The question is how and where to apply this control. On sensitive data, for
example, sovereignty means ensuring it’s held in Europe under European
jurisdiction, without replacing every underlying technology component.
Sovereign solutions shouldn’t shut out global players. Instead, they should
guarantee that critical decisions and compliance remain under European
authority. Autonomy is empowerment, limiting external interference or denial of
service while keeping systems secure and accountable.
But let’s be clear: Europe cannot replicate world-leading technologies,
platforms or critical components overnight. While we have the talent, innovation
and leading industries, Europe has fallen significantly behind in a range of key
emerging technologies.
> While we have the talent, innovation and leading industries, Europe has fallen
> significantly behind in a range of key emerging technologies.
For example, building fully European alternatives in cloud and AI would take
decades and billions of euros, and even then, we’d struggle to match Silicon
Valley or Shenzhen.
Worse, turning inward with protectionist policies would only weaken the
foundations that we now seek to strengthen. “Old wines in new bottles” — import
substitution, isolationism, picking winners — won’t deliver competitiveness or
security.
Contrast that with the much-debated US Inflation Reduction Act. Its incentives
and subsidies were open to EU companies, provided they invest locally, develop
local talent and build within the US market.
It’s not about flags, it’s about pragmatism: attracting global investments,
creating jobs and driving innovation-led growth.
So what’s the practical path? Europe must embrace ‘sovereignty done right’,
weaving diversity, resilience and autonomy into the fabric of its policies. That
means risk-based safeguards, strategic partnerships and investment in European
capabilities while staying open to global innovation.
Trusted European operators can play a key role: managing encryption, access
control and critical operations within EU jurisdiction, while enabling managed
access to global technologies. To avoid ‘sovereignty washing’, eligibility
should be based on rigorous, transparent assessments, not blanket bans.
The Berlin summit’s new working group should start with a common EU-wide
framework defining levels of data, operational and technological sovereignty.
Providers claiming sovereign services can use this framework to transparently
demonstrate which levels they meet.
Europe’s sovereignty will not come from closing doors. Sovereignty done right
will come from opening the right ones, on Europe’s terms. Independence should be
dynamic, not defensive — empowering innovation, securing prosperity and
protecting freedoms.
> Europe’s sovereignty will not come from closing doors. Sovereignty done right
> will come from opening the right ones, on Europe’s terms.
That’s how Europe can build resilience, competitiveness and true strategic
autonomy in a vibrant global digital ecosystem.
BRUSSELS ― Ursula von der Leyen is facing the starkest challenge to the EU’s
accountability in a generation ― with a fraud probe ensnaring two of the biggest
names in Brussels and threatening to explode into a full-scale crisis.
Exactly a year into her second term as Commission president, von der Leyen,
already plagued by questions over her commitment to transparency and amid
simmering tension with the bloc’s foreign policy wing, must now find a way to
avoid being embroiled in a scandal that dates back to her first years in office.
An announcement by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office that the EU’s former
foreign affairs chief and a senior diplomat currently working in von der Leyen’s
Commission had been detained on Tuesday was seized on by her critics, with
renewed calls that she face a fourth vote of no confidence.
“The credibility of our institutions is at stake,” said Manon Aubry, co-chair of
The Left in the European Parliament.
If proven, the allegations would set in motion the biggest scandal to engulf
Brussels since the mass resignation of the Jacques Santer Commission in 1999
over allegations of financial mismanagement.
Police detained former Commission Vice President Federica Mogherini, a
center-left Italian politician who headed the EU’s foreign policy wing, the
European External Action Service, from 2014-2019, and Stefano Sannino, an
Italian civil servant who was the EEAS secretary-general from 2021 until he was
replaced earlier this year.
The European Public Prosecutor’s Office said it had “strong suspicions” that a
2021-2022 tendering process to set up a diplomatic academy attached to the
College of Europe, where Mogherini is rector, hadn’t been fair and that the
facts, if proven, “could constitute procurement fraud, corruption, conflict of
interest and violation of professional secrecy.”
The saga looks set to inflame already strained relations between von der Leyen
and the current boss of the EEAS, EU High Representative Kaja Kallas, four EU
officials told POLITICO. Earlier this year Sannino left his secretary-general
job and took up a prominent role in von der Leyen’s Commission.
An EU official defended von der Leyen, instead blaming the EEAS, an autonomous
service under the EU treaties that operates under the bloc’s high
representative, Kallas — who is one of the 27 European commissioners.
“I know the people who don’t like von der Leyen will use this against her, but
they use everything against her,” the official said.
Police detained former Commission Vice President Federica Mogherini, a
center-left Italian politician who headed the EU’s foreign policy wing, the
European External Action Service, from 2014-2019. | Christoph Gollnow/Getty
Images
“Because President von der Leyen is the most identifiable leader in Brussels, we
lay everything at her door,” the official added. “And it’s not fair that she
would face a motion of censure for something the External Action Service may
have done. She’s not accountable for all of the institutions.”
Mogherini, Sannino and a third person have not been charged and their detention
does not imply guilt. An investigative judge has 48 hours from the start of
their questioning to decide on further action.
When contacted about Sannino, the Commission declined to comment. When contacted
about Mogherini, the College of Europe declined to answer specific questions. In
a statement it said it remained “committed to the highest standards of
integrity, fairness, and compliance — both in academic and administrative
matters.”
‘CRIME SERIES’
The investigation comes as Euroskeptic, populist and far-right parties ride a
wave of voter dissatisfaction and at a time when the EU is pressuring countries
both within and outside the bloc over their own corruption scandals.
“Funny how Brussels lectures everyone on ‘rule of law’ while its own
institutions look more like a crime series than a functioning union,” Zoltan
Kovacs, spokesperson for the government of Hungary, which has faced EU
criticism, said on X.
Romanian MEP Gheorghe Piperea, a member of the right-wing European Conservatives
and Reformists group, who was behind a failed no-confidence vote in von der
Leyen in July, told POLITICO he was considering trying to trigger a fresh
motion.
Russian foreign ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova told state media that EU
officials “prefer to ignore their own problems, while constantly lecturing
everyone else.”
The EU has struggled to shake off a series of corruption scandals since this
decade began. Tuesday’s raids come on the back of the 2022 “Qatargate” scandal,
when the Gulf state was accused of seeking to influence MEPs through bribes and
gifts, as well as this year’s bribery probe into Chinese tech giant Huawei’s
lobbying activities in Europe.
Those investigations implicated members of the European Parliament, and at the
time Commission officials were quick to point the finger at lawmakers and
distance themselves from the scandals.
But the Commission hasn’t been immune to allegations of impropriety. In 2012,
then-Health Commissioner John Dalli resigned over a tobacco lobbying scandal.
Von der Leyen herself was on the receiving end of a slap-down by the EU’s
General Court, which ruled earlier this year that she shouldn’t have withheld
from the public text messages that she exchanged with the CEO of drug giant
Pfizer during the Covid-19 pandemic.
Tuesday’s revelations are far more dangerous for the Commission, given the high
profile of the suspects and the gravity of the allegations they face.
‘DISASTROUS IMPACT’
After serving as a European Commission vice president and head of the EEAS,
Mogherini was appointed rector of the College of Europe in 2020, amid criticism
she wasn’t qualified for the post, didn’t meet the criteria, and had entered the
race months after the deadline. In 2022 she became the director of the European
Union Diplomatic Academy, the project at the heart of Tuesday’s dawn raids.
Sannino, a former Italian diplomat, was the EEAS’s top civil servant and is now
the director-general for the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf department
in the Commission.
Stefano Sannino, a former Italian diplomat, was the EEAS’s top civil servant and
is now the director-general for the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf
department in the Commission. | Pool Photo by Johanna Geron via Getty Images
Cristiano Sebastiani, the staff representative of one of the EU’s major trade
unions, Renouveau & Démocratie, said that if proven, the allegations would have
“a disastrous impact on the credibility of the institutions concerned, and more
broadly on citizens’ perception of all European institutions.” He said he had
received “tens of messages” from EU staff concerned about reputational damage.
“This is not good for EU institutions and for the Commission services. It is not
good for Europe, it steers attention away from other things,” said a Commission
official granted anonymity to speak freely. “It conveys this idea of elitism, of
an informal network doing favors. Also, Mogherini was one of the most successful
[EU high representatives], it’s not good in terms of public diplomacy.”
BRUSSELS — The military should get involved in the green transition to ensure
that Russia doesn’t exploit new vulnerabilities brought about by the move to
renewable energy sources, a top EU body said in a document obtained by POLITICO.
The bloc has made efforts in recent years to end dependence on Russian fuels and
move toward cleaner technology, and is set to ban Russian gas imports entirely
under its broader REPowerEU roadmap.
However, a letter drafted by the Danish presidency of the Council of the EU and
sent on Nov. 28 to EU ambassadors argued that the transition also introduces
“new layers of complexity” as Europe’s old energy architecture — including
petrol stations, pipelines, refineries and other infrastructure — is phased out.
That complicates supply chains on which militaries depend, requiring “enhanced
energy independence and engagement in the green transition” by the transatlantic
military alliance NATO.
The letter, first reported on by Contexte, also calls for stronger coordination
between NATO and the EU on energy policy.
In particular, officials ought to look at how to protect Europe’s energy
infrastructure amid an increase in “physical sabotage and cyberattacks targeting
pipelines, cables, ports, and power grids,” it said.
The digitization of many energy sources, it added, also requires “strong
security measures throughout all phases of infrastructure planning, design, and
operation.”
The initiative will be discussed by energy ministers on Dec. 15.