BERLIN — Friedrich Merz embarks on his first trip to the Persian Gulf region as chancellor on Wednesday in search of new energy and business deals he sees as critical to reducing Germany’s dependence on the U.S. and China. The three-day trip with stops in Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates illustrates Merz’s approach to what he calls a dangerous new epoch of “great power politics” — one in which the U.S. under President Donald Trump is no longer a reliable partner. European countries must urgently embrace their own brand of hard power by forging new global trade alliances, including in the Middle East, or risk becoming subject to the coercion of greater powers, Merz argues. Accompanying Merz on the trip is a delegation of business executives looking to cut new deals on everything from energy to defense. But one of the chancellor’s immediate goals is to reduce his country’s growing dependence on U.S. liquefied natural gas, or LNG, which has replaced much of the Russian gas that formerly flowed to Germany through the Nord Stream pipelines. Increasingly, German leaders across the political spectrum believe they’ve replaced their country’s unhealthy dependence on Russian energy with an increasingly precarious dependence on the U.S. Early this week, Merz’s economy minister, Katherina Reiche, traveled to Saudi Arabia ahead of the chancellor to sign a memorandum to deepen the energy ties between both countries, including a planned hydrogen energy deal. “When partnerships that we have relied on for decades start to become a little fragile, we have to look for new partners,” Reiche said in Riyadh. ‘EXCESSIVE DEPENDENCE’ Last year, 96 percent of German LNG imports came from the U.S, according to the federal government. While that amount makes up only about one-tenth of the country’s total natural gas imports, the U.S. share is set to rise sharply over the next years, in part because the EU agreed to purchase $750 billion worth of energy from the U.S. by the end of 2028 as part of its trade agreement with the Trump administration. The EU broadly is even more dependent on U.S. LNG, which accounted for more than a quarter of the bloc’s natural gas imports in 2025. This share is expected to rise to 40 percent by 2030. German politicians across the political spectrum are increasingly pushing for Merz’s government to find new alternatives. “After Russia’s war of aggression, we have learned the hard way that excessive dependence on individual countries can have serious consequences for our country,” said Sebastian Roloff, a lawmaker focusing on energy for the center-left Social Democrats, who rule in a coalition with Merz’s conservatives. Roloff said Trump’s recent threat to take over Greenland and the new U.S. national security strategy underscored the need to “avoid creating excessive dependence again” and diversify sources of energy supply. The Trump administration’s national security strategy vows to use “American dominance” in oil, gas, coal and nuclear energy to “project power” globally, raising fears in Europe that the U.S. will use energy exports to gain leverage over the EU. Last year, 96 percent of German LNG imports came from the U.S, according to the federal government. | Pool photo by Lars-Josef Klemmer/EPA That’s why Merz and his delegation are also seeking closer ties to Qatar, one of the world’s largest producers and exporters of natural gas as well as the United Arab Emirates, another major LNG producer. Last week, the EU’s energy chief, Dan Jørgensen, said the bloc would step up efforts to to reduce it’s dependence on U.S. LNG., including by dealing more with Qatar. One EU diplomat criticised Merz for seeking such cooperation on a national level. Germany is going “all in on gas power, of course, but I can’t see why Merz would be running errands on the EU’s behalf,” said the diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity. ‘AUTHORITARIAN STRONGMEN’ Merz will also be looking to attract more foreign investment and deepen trade ties with the Gulf states as part of a wider strategy of forging news alliances with “middle powers” globally and reduce dependence on U.S. and Chinese markets. The EU initiated trade talks with the United Arab Emirates last spring. Gulf states like Saudi Arabia also have their own concerns about dependencies on the U.S., particularly in the area of arms purchases. Germany’s growing defense industry is increasingly seen as promising partner, particularly following Berlin’s loosening of arms export restrictions. “For our partners in the region, cooperation in the defense industry will certainly also be an important topic,” a senior government official with knowledge of the trip said.  But critics point out that leaders of autocracies criticized for human rights abuses don’t make for viable partners on energy, trade and defense. Last week, the EU’s energy chief, Dan Jørgensen, said the bloc would step up efforts to to reduce it’s dependence on U.S. LNG., including by dealing more with Qatar. | Jose Sena Goulao/EPA “It’s not an ideal solution,” said Loyle Campbell, an expert on climate and energy policy for the German Council on Foreign Relations. “Rather than having high dependence on American LNG, you’d go shake hands with semi-dictators or authoritarian strongmen to try and reduce your risk to the bigger elephant in the room.” Merz, however, may not see a moral contradiction. Europe can’t maintain its strength and values in the new era of great powers, he argues, without a heavy dollop of Realpolitik. “We will only be able to implement our ideas in the world, at least in part, if we ourselves learn to speak the language of power politics,” Merz recently said. Ben Munster contributed to this report.

MARSEILLE, France — Violence at a drug trafficking hotspot in the social housing complex next to Orange’s headquarters in Marseille forced the telecoms giant to lock its forest-green gates and order its thousands of employees to work from home. The disruption to such a recognizable company — one that gives its name to the city’s iconic football venue — became a fresh symbol of how drug trafficking and insecurity are reshaping politics ahead of municipal elections. In a recent poll, security ranked among voters’ top concerns, forcing candidates across the spectrum to pitch competing responses to the drug trade. “The number one theme is security,” center-right candidate Martine Vassal told POLITICO. “In the field, what I hear most often are people who tell me that they no longer travel in the heart of the city for that reason.” French political parties are watching the contest closely for clues about the broader battles building toward the 2027 presidential race. In many ways, Marseille is a microcosm of France as a whole, reflecting the country’s wider demographics and its biggest political battles. The city is diverse. Multicultural and low-income neighborhoods that tend to support the hard left abut conservative suburbs that have swung to the far right in recent years. As in much of France, support for the political center in Marseille is wobbling.  The left-wing incumbent Benoît Payan remains a slight favorite in the March contest, but Franck Allisio, the candidate for the far-right National Rally, is just behind, with both men polling at around 30 percent. The issues at play strike at the heart of Marseille’s identity: its notorious drug trade, entrenched poverty and failure to seize on the competitive advantages of a young, sun-drenched city strategically perched on the Mediterranean. Whichever candidate can articulate a platform that speaks to Marseille’s local realities while addressing anxieties shared across France will be well positioned to take city hall — and to provide their party with a potential blueprint for the 2027 presidential campaign.  SECOND CITY  Marseille has always had something of a little-brother complex with Paris, a resentment that goes beyond the football rivalry of Paris Saint-Germain and Olympique de Marseille. Many in the city regard the French capital as a distant power center that tries to impose its own solutions on Marseille without sufficiently consulting local experts.   People in Marseilles pay tribute to murdered Mehdi Kessaci. 20, whose brother is a prominent anti drug trafficking campaigner, and protest against trafficking, Nov. 22, 2025. | Clement Mahoudeau/AFP via Getty Images “Paris treats Marseille almost like a colony,” said Allisio. “A place you visit, make promises to — without any guarantee the money will ever be spent.”  When it comes to drug trafficking and security, leaders across the political spectrum agree that Paris is prescribing medicine that treats the symptoms of the crisis, not the cause.  Violence associated with the drug trade was thrust back in the spotlight in November with the killing of 20-year-old Mehdi Kessaci. Authorities are investigating the crime as an act of intimidation. Mehdi’s brother Amine Kessaci is one of the city’s most prominent anti-trafficking campaigners, rising to prominence after their half-brother — who was involved in the trade — was killed several years earlier.  President Emmanuel Macron, Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez and Justice Minister Gérald Darmanin all visited Marseille in the wake of Kessaci’s killing, outlining a tough-on-crime agenda to stop the violence and flow of drugs.  Locals stress that law-and-order investments must be matched with funding for public services. Unless authorities improve the sluggish economy that has encouraged jobless youths to turn to the drug trade, the problem will continue.  “Repression alone is not efficient,” said Kaouther Ben Mohamed, a former social worker turned activist. “If that was the case, the drug trade wouldn’t have flourished like it did.” Housing is another issue, with many impoverished residents living in dangerous, dilapidated buildings. “We live in a shit city,” said Mahboubi Tir, a tall, broad-shouldered young man with a rugby player’s physique. “We’re not safe here.”   Tir spent a month in a coma and several more in a hospital last April after he was assaulted during a parking dispute. His face was still swollen and distorted when he spoke to POLITICO in December about how the incident reshaped his relationship with the city he grew up in.  “I almost died, and I was angry at the city,” said Tir, who suffers from memory loss and has only a vague recollection of what led to the assault, as he sipped coffee in the backroom office of a tiny, left-leaning grassroots political party where he volunteers, Citizen Ambition.  SECURITY PROBLEM To what extent Marseille’s activist groups can bring about change in a city whose struggles have lasted for decades remains to be seen, but the four leading candidates for mayor share a similar diagnosis. They all believe the lurid crime stories making national headlines are a byproduct of a lack of jobs and neglected public services — and that the French state’s responses miss the mark. Rather than relying on harsher punishments as a deterrent, they argue the state should prioritize local policing and public investment. When Payan announced his candidacy for reelection, he pledged free meals for 15,000 students to get them back in school and to double the number of local cops as part of a push for more community policing. Allisio’s platform puts the emphasis on security-related spending: increased video surveillance, more vehicles for local police and the creation of “specialized units to combat burglary and public disorder.” Vassal — the center-right backed by the conservative Les Républicains and parties aligned with Macron — has similarly put forward a proposal to arm fare enforcers in public transport. Both Allisio and Vassal are calling for unspecified spending cuts while preserving basic services provided at the local level like schools, public transportation and parks and recreation. Vassal, who is polling third, said she would make public transportation free for residents younger 26 to travel across the spread-out city. She accuses the current administration of having delivered an insufficient number of building permits, slowing the development of new housing and office buildings and thus the revitalization of Marseille’s most embattled areas — a trend she pledged to reverse. Both Vassal and Allisio are advocating for less local taxes on property to boost small businesses and create new jobs. Allisio has also put forward a proposal to make parking for less 30 minutes free to facilitate deliveries and quick stops to buy products. The outlier — at least when it comes to public safety — is Sébastien Delogu, a disciple of three-time hard-left presidential candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon. Though Delogu is polling fourth at 14 percent, he can’t be counted out, given that Mélenchon won Marseille in the first round of the last two presidential elections. Though Delogu acknowledges that crime is a problem, he doesn’t want to spend more money on policing. He instead proposes putting money that other candidates want to spend on security toward poverty reduction, housing supply and the local public health sector. Whoever wins, however, will have to grapple with an uncomfortable truth. Aside from local police responsible for public tranquility and health, policing and criminal justice matters are largely managed at the national level. The solution to Marseille’s problems will depend, to no small extent, on the outcome of what happens next year in Paris.

It seems impossible to have a conversation today without artificial intelligence (AI) playing some role, demonstrating the massive power of the technology. It has the potential to impact every part of business, and European policymakers are on board. In February 2025, Ursula von der Leyen, the European Commission president, said, “We want Europe to be one of the leading AI continents … AI can help us boost our competitiveness, protect our security, shore up public health, and make access to knowledge and information more democratic.” Research from Nokia suggests that businesses share this enthusiasm and ambition: 84 percent of more than 1,000 respondents said AI features in the growth strategy of their organization, while 62 percent are directing at least 20 percent of ICT capex budgets toward the technology. However, the equation is not yet balanced. Three-quarters of survey respondents state that current telecom infrastructure limits the ability to deliver on those ambitions. Meanwhile, 45 percent suggest these limitations would delay, constrain or entirely limit investments. There is clearly a disconnect between the ambition and the ability to deliver. At present, Europe lags the United States and parts of Asia in areas such as network deployment, related investment levels and scale. > If AI does not reach its full potential, EU competitiveness will suffer, > economic growth will have a ceiling, the creation of new jobs will have a > limit and consumers will not see the benefits. What we must remember primarily is that AI does not happen without advanced, trusted and future-proofed networks. Infrastructure is not a ‘nice to have’ it is a fundamental part. Simply put, today’s networks in Europe require more investments to power the AI dream we all have. If AI does not reach its full potential, EU competitiveness will suffer, economic growth will have a ceiling, the creation of new jobs will have a limit and consumers will not see the benefits. When we asked businesses about the challenge of meeting AI demands during our research, the lack of adequate connectivity infrastructure was the fourth common answer out of 15 potential options. Our telecom connectivity regulatory approach must be more closely aligned with the goal of fostering AI. That means progressing toward a genuine telecom single market, adopting a novel approach to competition policy to allow market consolidation to lead to more investments, and ensuring connectivity is always secure and trusted. Supporting more investments in next-generation networks through consolidation AI places heavy demands on networks. It requires low latency, high bandwidth and reliability, and efficient traffic management. To deliver this, Europe needs to accelerate investment in 5G standalone, fiber to enterprises, edge data centers and IP-optical backbone networks optimized for AI. > As industry voices such as Nokia have emphasized, the networks that power AI > must themselves make greater use of automation and AI. Consolidation (i.e. reducing the number of telecom operators within the national telecom markets of EU member states) is part of the solution. Consolidation will allow operators to achieve economies of scale and improve operating efficiency, therefore encouraging investment and catalyzing innovation. As industry voices such as Nokia have emphasized, the networks that power AI must themselves make greater use of automation and AI. Policy support should therefore extend to both network innovation and deployment. Trust: A precondition for AI adoption Intellectual property (IP) theft is a threat to Europe’s industrial future and only trusted technology should be used in core functions, systems and sectors (such as energy, transport and defense). In this context, the underlying connectivity should always be secure and trusted. The 5G Security Toolbox, restricting untrusted technology, should therefore be extended to all telecom technologies (including fiber, optics and IP) and made compulsory in all EU member states. European governments must make protecting their industries and citizens a high priority. Completing the digital single market Although the single market is one of Europe’s defining projects, the reality in telecoms — a key part of the digital single market — is still fragmented. As an example, different spectrum policies create barriers across borders and can limit network roll outs. Levers on top of advanced connectivity To enable the AI ecosystem in Europe, there are several different enabling levers European policymakers should advance on top of fostering advanced and trusted connectivity: * The availability of compute infrastructure. The AI Continent Action Plan, as well as the IPCEI Compute Infrastructure Continuum, and the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking should facilitate building AI data centers in Europe.   * Leadership in edge computing. There should also be clear support for securing Europe’s access to and leadership in edge solutions and building out edge capacity. Edge solutions increase processing speeds and are important for enabling AI adoption, while also creating a catalyst for economic growth. With the right data center capacity and edge compute capabilities available, European businesses can meet the new requirements of AI use cases.  * Harmonization of rules. There are currently implications for AI in several policy areas, including the AI Act, GDPR, Data Act, cybersecurity laws and sector-specific regulations. This creates confusion, whereas AI requires clarity. Simplification and harmonization of these regulations should be pursued.  * AI Act implementation and simplification. There are concerns about the implementation of the AI Act. The standards for high-risk AI may not be available before the obligations of the AI act enter into force, hampering business ambitions due to legal uncertainty. The application date of the AI Act’s provisions on high-risk AI should be postponed by two years to align with the development of standards. There needs to be greater clarity on definitions and simplification measures should be pursued across the entire ecosystem. Policies must be simple enough to follow, otherwise adoption may falter. Policy needs to act as an enabler, not a barrier to innovation.  * Upskilling and new skills. AI will require new skills of employees and users, as well as creating entirely new career paths. Europe needs to prepare for this new world.  If Europe can deliver on these priorities, the benefits will be tangible: improved services, stronger industries, increased competitiveness and higher economic growth. AI will deliver to those who best prepare themselves. We must act now with the urgency and consistency that the moment demands. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Author biography: Marc Vancoppenolle is leading the geopolitical and government relations EU and Europe function at Nokia. He and his team are working with institutions and stakeholders in Europe to create a favorable political and regulatory environment fostering broadband investments and cross sectoral digitalization at large. Vancoppenolle has over 30 years of experience in the telecommunication industry. He joined Alcatel in 1991, and then Alcatel-Lucent, where he took various international and worldwide technical, commercial, marketing, communication and government affairs leadership roles. Vancoppenolle is a Belgian and French national. He holds a Master of Science, with a specialization in telecommunication, from the University of Leuven complemented with marketing studies from the University of Antwerp. He is a member of the DIGITALEUROPE Executive Board, Associate to Nokia’s CEO at the ERT (European Round Table for Industry), and advisor to FITCE Belgium (Forum for ICT & Media professionals). He has been vice-chair of the BUSINESSEUROPE Digital Economy Taskforce as well as a member of the board of IICB (Innovation & Incubation Center Brussels).

LONDON — British politicians condemned Donald Trump’s assertion that fellow NATO members stayed away from the frontlines during the war in Afghanistan. In his latest swipe at European allies, the U.S. president told Fox News he wasn’t “sure” the alliance would “be there if we ever needed them.” And he added: “We’ve never needed them. They’ll say they sent some troops to Afghanistan … and they did, they stayed a little back, a little off the front lines.” Britain lost 457 troops in Afghanistan, while 165 Canadians died and Denmark lost 44 soldiers, the highest per-head death toll during the two decade war. NATO invoked its Article 5 on collective security for the first and only time in its history after the 9/11 attacks against the U.S. Health Minister Stephen Kinnock told Sky News Friday Trump’s remarks were “deeply disappointing, there is no other way to say that.” Kinnock said he did not believe “there’s any basis for him to make those comments.” The minister added that “anybody who seeks to criticize what they [British troops] have done and the sacrifices that they make is plainly wrong.” He told the BBC it was “best at this time not to be distracted by comments that simply don’t really bear any resemblance to the reality.” BACKBENCHER BACKLASH The remarks cap a difficult week for transatlantic relations, with Trump threatening to impose trade tariffs on Britain over its support for Greenland before retreating, and also attacking London’s deal over the future of the Chagos Islands. Emily Thornberry, the Labour chair of the Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, called Trump’s words on Afghanistan “so much more than a mistake,” branding them an “absolute insult” to the bereaved families of victims. Lib Dem Leader Ed Davey, one of the U.S. president’s fiercest critics, said Trump “avoided military service five times,” and asked “how dare he question their sacrifice?” MPs who formerly served in Afghanistan also weighed. Labour MP Calvin Bailey, previously a Royal Air Force officer, said the comment “bears no resemblance to the reality experienced by those of us who served there.” Conservative parliamentarian Ben Obese-Jecty, a former British Army captain, said he was “sad to see our nation’s sacrifice, and that of our NATO partners, held so cheaply by the president of the United States.”

urope has spent the last week rummaging around for leverage that would force U.S. President Donald Trump to back off his threats to seize Greenland from Denmark. While Trump now says he will not be imposing planned tariffs on European allies, some politicians think they’ve found the answer if he changes his mind again: boycott the 2026 FIFA World Cup. The quadrennial soccer jamboree, which will be hosted in the U.S., Mexico and Canada this summer, is a major soft-power asset for Trump — and an unprecedented European boycott would diminish the tournament beyond repair. “Leverage is currency with Trump, and he clearly covets the World Cup,” said Adam Hodge, a former National Security Council official during the Biden administration. “Europe’s participation is a piece of leverage Trump would respect and something they could consider using if the transatlantic relationship continues to swirl down the drain.” With Trump’s Greenland ambitions putting the world on edge, key political figures who’ve raised the idea say that any decision on a boycott would — for now, at least — rest with national sport authorities rather than governments. “Decisions on participation in or boycott of major sport events are the sole responsibility of the relevant sports associations, not politicians,” Christiane Schenderlein, Germany’s state secretary for sport, told AFP on Tuesday. The French sport ministry said there are “currently” no government plans for France to boycott. That means, for the moment, a dozen soccer bureaucrats around Europe — representing the countries that have so far qualified for the tournament — have the power to torpedo Trump’s World Cup, a pillar of his second term in office like the 2028 Olympics in Los Angeles. (Another four European countries will be added in spring after the European playoffs are completed.) While they may not be household names, people like Spain’s Rafael Louzán, England’s Debbie Hewitt and the Netherlands’ Frank Paauw may now have more leverage over Trump than the European Commission with its so-called trade bazooka. “I think it is obvious that a World Cup without the European teams would be irrelevant in sports terms — with the exceptions of Brazil and Argentina all the other candidates in a virtual top 10 will be European — and, as a consequence, it would also be a major financial blow to FIFA,” said Miguel Maduro, former chair of FIFA’s Governance Committee. Several of the European soccer chiefs have already shown their willingness to enter the political fray. Norwegian Football Federation president Lise Klaveness has been outspoken on LGBTQ+ issues and the use of migrant labor in preparations for the 2022 World Cup. The Football Association of Ireland pushed to exclude Israel from international competition before the country signed the Gaza peace plan in October. “Football has always been far more than a sport,” Turkish Football Federation President Ibrahim Haciosmanoglu, whose team is still competing for one of the four remaining spots, wrote in an open letter to his fellow federation presidents in September calling for Israel’s removal. Trump attempted Wednesday in Davos to cool tensions over Greenland by denying he would use military force to capture the massive, mineral-rich Arctic island. But during the same speech he firmly reiterated his desire to obtain it and demanded “immediate negotiations” with relevant European leaders toward that goal. Later in the day, in a social media post, Trump said he reached an agreement with NATO on a Greenland framework. His Davos remarks are unlikely to pacify European politicians across the political spectrum who want to see a tougher stance against the White House. “Seriously, can we imagine going to play the World Cup in a country that attacks its ‘neighbors,’ threatens to invade Greenland, destroys international law, wants to torpedo the UN, establishes a fascist and racist militia in its country, attacks the opposition, bans supporters from about 15 countries from attending the tournament, plans to ban all LGBT symbols from stadiums, etc.?” wondered left-wing French lawmaker Eric Coquerel on social media. Influential German conservative Roderich Kiesewetter also told the Augsburger Allgemeine news outlet: “If Donald Trump carries out his threats regarding Greenland and starts a trade war with the EU, I find it hard to imagine European countries participating in the World Cup.” Russia’s World Cup in 2018 faced similar calls for a boycott over the Kremlin’s illegal annexation of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula, as did Qatar’s 2022 tournament over the Gulf petromonarchy’s dismal human rights record. While neither mooted boycott came to pass — indeed, the World Cup and the Olympics haven’t faced a major diplomatic cold shoulder since retaliatory snubs by countries for the Moscow 1980 and Los Angeles 1984 Summer Olympics — Trump’s seizure of Greenland would put Europe in a position with no recent historical parallel. Neither FIFA, the world governing body that organizes the tournament, nor four national associations contacted by POLITICO immediately responded to requests for comment. Tom Schmidtgen and Ferdinand Knapp contributed to this report.

In the desolate Arctic desert of Kangerlussuaq, Greenland, Europeans are building defenses against a new, up-and-coming security threat: space hacks. A Lithuanian company called Astrolight is constructing a ground station, with support from the European Space Agency, that will use laser beams to download voluminous data from satellites in a fast and secure manner, it announced last month.  It’s just one example of how Europe is moving to harden the security of its satellites, as rising geopolitical tensions and an expanding spectrum of hybrid threats are pushing space communications to the heart of the bloc’s security plans. For years, satellite infrastructure was treated by policymakers as a technical utility rather than a strategic asset. That changed in 2022, when a cyberattack on the Viasat satellite network coincided with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.   Satellites have since become popular targets for interference, espionage and disruption. The European Commission in June warned that space was becoming “more contested,” flagging increasing cyberattacks and attempts at electronic interference targeting satellites and ground stations. Germany and the United Kingdom warned earlier this year of the growing threat posed by Russian and Chinese space satellites, which are regularly spotted spying on their satellites.  EU governments are now racing to boost their resilience and reduce reliance on foreign technology, both through regulations like the new Space Act and investments in critical infrastructure. The threat is crystal clear in Greenland, Laurynas Mačiulis, the chief executive officer of Astrolight, said. “The problem today is that around 80 percent of all the [space data] traffic is downlinked to a single location in Svalbard, which is an island shared between different countries, including Russia,” he said in an interview. Europe’s main Arctic ground station sits in Svalbard and supports both the navigation systems of Galileo and Copernicus. While the location is strategic, it is also extremely sensitive due to nearby Russian and Chinese activities. Crucially, the station relies on a single undersea cable to connect to the internet, which has been damaged several times. “In case of intentional or unintentional damage of this cable, you lose access to most of the geo-intelligence satellites, which is, of course, very critical. So our aim is to deploy a complementary satellite ground station up in Greenland,” Mačiulis said. THE MUSK OF IT ALL A centerpiece of Europe’s ambitions to have secure, European satellite communication is IRIS², a multibillion-euro secure connectivity constellation pitched in 2022 and designed to rival Elon Musk’s Starlink system. “Today, communications — for instance in Ukraine — are far too dependent on Starlink,” said Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the founding chairman of political consultancy Rasmussen Global, speaking at an event in Brussels in November. “That dependence rests on the shifting ideas of an American billionaire. That’s too risky. We have to build a secure communications system that is independent of the United States.” The European system, which will consist of 18 satellites operating in low and medium Earth orbit, aims to provide Europe with fast and encrypted communication. “Even if someone intercepts the signal [of IRIS² ], they will not be able to decrypt it,” Piero Angeletti, head of the Secure Connectivity Space Segment Office at the European Space Agency, told POLITICO. “This will allow us to have a secure system that is also certified and accredited by the national security entities.” The challenge is that IRIS² is still at least four years away from becoming operational. WHO’S IN CHARGE? While Europe beefs up its secure satellite systems, governments are still streamlining how they can coordinate cyber defenses and space security. In many cases, that falls to both space or cyber commands, which, unlike traditional military units, are relatively new and often still being built out. Clémence Poirier, a cyberdefense researcher at the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich, said that EU countries must now focus on maturing them. “European states need to keep developing those commands,” she told POLITICO. “Making sure that they coordinate their action, that there are clear mandates and responsibilities when it comes to cyber security, cyber defensive operations, cyber offensive operations, and also when it comes to monitoring the threat.” Industry, too, is struggling to fill the gaps. Most cybersecurity firms do not treat space as a sector in its own right, leaving satellite operators in a blind spot. Instead, space systems are folded into other categories: Earth-observation satellites often fall under environmental services, satellite TV under media, and broadband constellations like Starlink under internet services. That fragmentation makes it harder for space companies to assess risk, update threat models or understand who they need to defend against. It also complicates incident response: while advanced tools exist for defending against cyberattacks on terrestrial networks, those tools often do not translate well to space systems. “Cybersecurity in space is a bit different,” Poirier added. “You cannot just implement whatever solution you have for your computers on Earth and just deploy that to your satellite.”

A fair, fast and competitive transition begins with what already works and then rapidly scales it up.  Across the EU commercial road transport sector, the diversity of operations is met with a diversity of solutions. Urban taxis are switching to electric en masse. Many regional coaches run on advanced biofuels, with electrification emerging in smaller applications such as school services, as European e-coach technologies are still maturing and only now beginning to enter the market. Trucks electrify rapidly where operationally and financially possible, while others, including long-haul and other hard-to-electrify segments, operate at scale on HVO (hydrotreated vegetable oil) or biomethane, cutting emissions immediately and reliably. These are real choices made every day by operators facing different missions, distances, terrains and energy realities, showing that decarbonization is not a single pathway but a spectrum of viable ones.  Building on this diversity, many operators are already modernizing their fleets and cutting emissions through electrification. When they can control charging, routing and energy supply, electric vehicles often deliver a positive total cost of ownership (TCO), strong reliability and operational benefits. These early adopters prove that electrification works where the enabling conditions are in place, and that its potential can expand dramatically with the right support. > Decarbonization is not a single pathway but a spectrum of viable ones chosen > daily by operators facing real-world conditions. But scaling electrification faces structural bottlenecks. Grid capacity is constrained across the EU, and upgrades routinely take years. As most heavy-duty vehicle charging will occur at depots, operators cannot simply move around to look for grid opportunities. They are bound to the location of their facilities.  The recently published grid package tries, albeit timidly, to address some of these challenges, but it neither resolves the core capacity deficiencies nor fixes the fundamental conditions that determine a positive TCO: the predictability of electricity prices, the stability of delivered power, and the resulting charging time. A truck expected to recharge in one hour at a high-power station may wait far longer if available grid power drops. Without reliable timelines, predictable costs and sufficient depot capacity, most transport operators cannot make long-term investment decisions. And the grid is only part of the enabling conditions needed: depot charging infrastructure itself requires significant additional investment, on top of vehicles that already cost several hundreds of thousands of euros more than their diesel equivalents.  This is why the EU needs two things at once: strong enablers for electrification and hydrogen; and predictability on what the EU actually recognizes as clean. Operators using renewable fuels, from biomethane to advanced biofuels and HVO, delivering up to 90 percent CO2 reduction, are cutting emissions today. Yet current CO2 frameworks, for both light-duty vehicles and heavy-duty trucks, fail to recognize fleets running on these fuels as part of the EU’s decarbonization solution for road transport, even when they deliver immediate, measurable climate benefits. This lack of clarity limits investment and slows additional emission reductions that could happen today. > Policies that punish before enabling will not accelerate the transition; a > successful shift must empower operators, not constrain them. The revision of both CO2 standards, for cars and vans, and for heavy-duty vehicles, will therefore be pivotal. They must support electrification and hydrogen where they fit the mission, while also recognizing the contribution of renewable and low-carbon fuels across the fleet. Regulations that exclude proven clean options will not accelerate the transition. They will restrict it.  With this in mind, the question is: why would the EU consider imposing purchasing mandates on operators or excessively high emission-reduction targets on member states that would, in practice, force quotas on buyers? Such measures would punish before enabling, removing choice from those who know their operations best. A successful transition must empower operators, not constrain them.  The EU’s transport sector is committed and already delivering. With the right enablers, a technology-neutral framework, and clarity on what counts as clean, the EU can turn today’s early successes into a scalable, fair and competitive decarbonization pathway.  We now look with great interest to the upcoming Automotive Package, hoping to see pragmatic solutions to these pressing questions, solutions that EU transport operators, as the buyers and daily users of all these technologies, are keenly expecting. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is IRU – International Road Transport Union  * The ultimate controlling entity is IRU – International Road Transport Union  More information here.

The Radio Spectrum Policy Group’s (RSPG) Nov. 12 opinion on the upper 6-GHz band is framed as a long-term strategic vision for Europe’s digital future. But its practical effect is far less ambitious: it grants mobile operators a cost-free reservation of one of Europe’s most valuable spectrum resources, without deployment obligations, market evidence or a realistic plan for implementation. > At a moment when Europe is struggling to accelerate the deployment of digital > infrastructure and close the gap with global competitors, this decision > amounts to a strategic pause dressed up as policy foresight. The opinion even invites the mobile industry to develop products for the upper 6-GHz band, when policy should be guided by actual market demand and product deployment, not the other way around. At a moment when Europe is struggling to accelerate the deployment of digital infrastructure and close the gap with global competitors, this decision amounts to a strategic pause dressed up as policy foresight. The cost of inaction is real. Around the world, advanced 6-GHz Wi-Fi is already delivering high-capacity, low-latency connectivity. The United States, Canada, South Korea and others have opened the 6-GHz band for telemedicine, automated manufacturing, immersive education, robotics and a multitude of other high-performance Wi-Fi connectivity use cases. These are not experimental concepts; they are operational deployments generating tangible socioeconomic value. Holding the upper 6- GHz band in reserve delays these benefits at a time when Europe is seeking to strengthen competitiveness, digital inclusion, and digital sovereignty. The opinion introduces another challenge by calling for “flexibility” for member states. In practice, this means regulatory fragmentation across 27 markets, reopening the door to divergent national spectrum policies — precisely the outcome Europe has spent two decades trying to avert with the Digital Single Market. > Without a credible roadmap, reserving the band for hypothetical cellular > networks only exacerbates policy uncertainty without delivering progress. Equally significant is what the opinion does not address. The upper 6-GHz band is already home to ‘incumbents’: fixed links and satellite services that support public safety, government operations and industrial connectivity. Any meaningful mobile deployment would require refarming these incumbents — a technically complex, politically sensitive and financially burdensome process. To date, no member state has proposed a viable plan for how such relocation would proceed, how much it would cost or who would pay. Without a credible roadmap, reserving the band for hypothetical cellular networks only exacerbates policy uncertainty without delivering progress. There is, however, a pragmatic alternative. The European Commission and the member states committed to advancing Europe’s connectivity can allow controlled Wi-Fi access to the upper 6-GHz band now — bringing immediate benefits for citizens and enterprises — while establishing clear, evidence-based criteria for any future cellular deployments. Those criteria should include demonstrated commercial viability, validated coexistence with incumbents, and fully funded relocation plans where necessary. This approach preserves long-term policy flexibility for member states and mobile operators, while ensuring that spectrum delivers measurable value today rather than being held indefinitely in reserve. > Spectrum is not an abstract asset. RSPG itself calls it a scarce resource that > must be used efficiently, but this opinion falls short of that principle. Spectrum is not an abstract asset. RSPG itself calls it a scarce resource that must be used efficiently, but this opinion falls short of that principle. Spectrum underpins Europe’s competitiveness, connectivity, and digital innovation. But its value is unlocked through use, not by shelving it in anticipation that hypothetical future markets might someday justify withholding action now. To remain competitive in the next decade, Europe needs a 6-GHz policy grounded in evidence, aligned with the single market, and focused on real-world impact. The upper 6-GHz band should be a driver of European innovation, not the latest casualty of strategic hesitation. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is Wi-Fi Alliance * The ultimate controlling entity is Wi-Fi Alliance More information here.

BRUSSELS — After years of being treated as an outlier for its hardline stance on migration, Denmark says it has finally brought the rest of the EU on board with its tough approach. Europe’s justice and home affairs ministers on Monday approved new measures allowing EU countries to remove failed asylum seekers, set up processing centers overseas and create removal hubs outside their borders — measures Copenhagen has long advocated. The deal was “many years in the making,” said Rasmus Stoklund, Denmark’s center-left minister for integration who has driven migration negotiations during his country’s six-month presidency of the Council of the EU. Stoklund told POLITICO that when he first started working on the migration brief a decade ago in the Danish parliament, his fellow left-wingers around the bloc viewed his government’s position as so egregious that “other social democrats wouldn’t meet with me.” Over the last few years, “there’s been a huge change in perception,” Stoklund said. When the deal was done Monday, the “sigh of relief” from ministers and their aides was palpable, with people embracing one another and heaping praise on both the Danish brokers and Ursula von der Leyen’s European Commission that put forward the initial proposal, according to a diplomat who was in the room. Sweden’s Migration Minister Johan Forssell, a member of the conservative Moderate party, told POLITICO Monday’s deal was vital “to preserve, like, any public trust at all in the migration system today … we need to show that the system is working.” Stockholm, which has in the past prided itself on taking a liberal approach to migration, has recently undergone a Damascene conversion to the Danish model, implementing tough measures to limit family reunification, tightening rules around obtaining Swedish citizenship, and limiting social benefits for new arrivals. Forssell said the deal was important because “many people” around Europe criticize the EU over inaction on migration “because they cannot do themselves what [should be done] on the national basis.” The issue, he said, is a prime example of “why there must be a strong European Union.” SEALING THE DEAL Monday’s deal — whose impact will “hopefully be quite dramatic,” Stoklund said — comes two years after the EU signed off on a new law governing asylum and migration, which must be implemented by June. Voters have “made clear to governments all over the European Union, that they couldn’t accept that they weren’t able to control the access to their countries,” Stoklund said. “Governments have realized that if they didn’t take this question seriously, then [voters] would back more populist movements that would take it seriously — and use more drastic measures in order to find new solutions.” Stockholm has recently undergone a Damascene conversion to the Danish model, implementing tough measures to limit family reunification, tightening rules around obtaining Swedish citizenship, and limiting social benefits for new arrivals. | Henrick Montgomery/EPA Migration Commissioner Magnus Brunner, the Danish Council presidency and ministers were at pains to point out that Monday’s agreement showed the EU could get deals done. After the last EU election in 2024, the new Commission’s “first task” was to “bring our European house in order,” Brunner said. “Today we’re showing that Europe can actually deliver and we delivered quite a lot.” WHAT’S NEW The ministers backed new rules to detain and deport migrants, including measures that would allow the bloc and individual countries to cut deals to set up migration processing hubs in other nations, regardless of whether the people being moved there have a connection with those countries. Ministers supported changes that will allow capitals to reject applications if asylum seekers, prior to first entering the EU, could have received international protection in a non-EU country the bloc deems safe, and signed off on a common list of countries of origin considered safe. Bangladesh, Colombia, Egypt, India, Kosovo, Morocco and Tunisia are on that latter list, as are countries that are candidates to join the EU. But the deal also leaves room for exceptions — such as Ukraine, which is at war. Asylum seekers won’t automatically have the right to remain in the EU while they appeal a ruling that their refuge application was inadmissible. The next step for the measures will be negotiations with the European Parliament, once it has decided its position on the proposals. Max Griera contributed reporting.

Europe’s security does not depend solely on our physical borders and their defense. It rests on something far less visible, and far more sensitive: the digital networks that keep our societies, economies and democracies functioning every second of the day. > Without resilient networks, the daily workings of Europe would grind to a > halt, and so too would any attempt to build meaningful defense readiness. A recent study by Copenhagen Economics confirms that telecom operators have become the first line of defense in Europe’s security architecture. Their networks power essential services ranging from emergency communications and cross-border healthcare to energy systems, financial markets, transport and, increasingly, Europe’s defense capabilities. Without resilient networks, the daily workings of Europe would grind to a halt, and so too would any attempt to build meaningful defense readiness. This reality forces us to confront an uncomfortable truth: Europe cannot build credible defense capabilities on top of an economically strained, structurally fragmented telecom sector. Yet this is precisely the risk today. A threat landscape outpacing Europe’s defenses The challenges facing Europe are evolving faster than our political and regulatory systems can respond. In 2023 alone, ENISA recorded 188 major incidents, causing 1.7 billion lost user-hours, the equivalent of taking entire cities offline. While operators have strengthened their systems and outage times fell by more than half in 2024 compared with the previous year, despite a growing number of incidents, the direction of travel remains clear: cyberattacks are more sophisticated, supply chains more vulnerable and climate-related physical disruptions more frequent. Hybrid threats increasingly target civilian digital infrastructure as a way to weaken states. Telecom networks, once considered as technical utilities, have become a strategic asset essential to Europe’s stability. > Europe cannot deploy cross-border defense capabilities without resilient, > pan-European digital infrastructure. Nor can it guarantee NATO > interoperability with 27 national markets, divergent rules and dozens of > sub-scale operators unable to invest at continental scale. Our allies recognize this. NATO recently encouraged members to spend up to 1.5 percent of their GDP on protecting critical infrastructure. Secretary General Mark Rutte also urged investment in cyber defense, AI, and cloud technologies, highlighting the military benefits of cloud scalability and edge computing – all of which rely on high-quality, resilient networks. This is a clear political signal that telecom security is not merely an operational matter but a geopolitical priority. The link between telecoms and defense is deeper than many realize. As also explained in the recent Arel report, Much More than a Network, modern defense capabilities rely largely on civilian telecom networks. Strong fiber backbones, advanced 5G and future 6G systems, resilient cloud and edge computing, satellite connectivity, and data centers form the nervous system of military logistics, intelligence and surveillance. Europe cannot deploy cross-border defense capabilities without resilient, pan-European digital infrastructure. Nor can it guarantee NATO interoperability with 27 national markets, divergent rules and dozens of sub-scale operators unable to invest at continental scale. Fragmentation has become one of Europe’s greatest strategic vulnerabilities. The reform Europe needs: An investment boost for digital networks At the same time, Europe expects networks to become more resilient, more redundant, less dependent on foreign technology and more capable of supporting defense-grade applications. Security and resilience are not side tasks for telecom operators, they are baked into everything they do. From procurement and infrastructure design to daily operations, operators treat these efforts as core principles shaping how networks are built, run and protected. Therefore, as the Copenhagen Economics study shows, the level of protection Europe now requires will demand substantial additional capital. > It is unrealistic to expect world-class, defense-ready infrastructure to > emerge from a model that has become structurally unsustainable. This is the right ambition, but the economic model underpinning the sector does not match these expectations. Due to fragmentation and over-regulation, Europe’s telecom market invests less per capita than global peers, generates roughly half the return on capital of operators in the United States and faces rising costs linked to expanding security obligations. It is unrealistic to expect world-class, defense-ready infrastructure to emerge from a model that has become structurally unsustainable. A shift in policy priorities is therefore essential. Europe must place investment in security and resilience at the center of its political agenda. Policy must allow this reality to be reflected in merger assessments, reduce overlapping security rules and provide public support where the public interest exceeds commercial considerations. This is not state aid; it is strategic social responsibility. Completing the single market for telecommunications is central to this agenda. A fragmented market cannot produce the secure, interoperable, large-scale solutions required for modern defense. The Digital Networks Act must simplify and harmonize rules across the EU, supported by a streamlined governance that distinguishes between domestic matters and cross-border strategic issues. Spectrum policy must also move beyond national silos, allowing Europe to avoid conflicts with NATO over key bands and enabling coherent next-generation deployments. Telecom policy nowadays is also defense policy. When we measure investment gaps in digital network deployment, we still tend to measure simple access to 5G and fiber. However, we should start considering that — if security, resilience and defense-readiness are to be taken into account — the investment gap is much higher that the €200 billion already estimated by the European Commission. Europe’s strategic choice The momentum for stronger European defense is real — but momentum fades if it is not seized. If Europe fails to modernize and secure its telecom infrastructure now, it risks entering the next decade with a weakened industrial base, chronic underinvestment, dependence on non-EU technologies and networks unable to support advanced defense applications. In that scenario, Europe’s democratic resilience would erode in parallel with its economic competitiveness, leaving the continent more exposed to geopolitical pressure and technological dependency. > If Europe fails to modernize and secure its telecom infrastructure now, it > risks entering the next decade with a weakened industrial base, chronic > underinvestment, dependence on non-EU technologies and networks unable to > support advanced defense applications. Europe still has time to change course and put telecoms at the center of its agenda — not as a technical afterthought, but as a core pillar of its defense strategy. The time for incremental steps has passed. Europe must choose to build the network foundations of its security now or accept that its strategic ambitions will remain permanently out of reach. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is Connect Europe AISBL * The ultimate controlling entity is Connect Europe AISBL * The political advertisement is linked to advocacy on EU digital, telecom and industrial policy, including initiatives such as the Digital Networks Act, Digital Omnibus, and connectivity, cybersecurity, and defence frameworks aimed at strengthening Europe’s digital competitiveness. More information here.