HELSINKI — Europe’s easternmost countries have a blunt message for Brussels: Russia is testing their borders, and the EU needs to start paying for the response. Leaders from eight EU states bordering Russia will use a summit in Helsinki on Tuesday to press for dedicated defense funding in the bloc’s next long-term budget, arguing that frontline security can no longer be treated as a national expense alone, according to three European government officials. “Strengthening Europe’s eastern flank must become a shared responsibility for Europe,” Estonian Prime Minister Kristen Michal said Monday. The first-of-its-kind summit, spearheaded by Finnish Premier Petteri Orpo, underscores a growing anxiety among the EU’s so-called Eastern flank countries about Russia’s increasingly brazen efforts to test their defenses and stir panic among their populations. In recent months Russia has flown fighter jets into Estonian airspace and sent dozens of drones deep into Polish and Romanian territory. Its ally Belarus has repeatedly brought Lithuanian air traffic to a standstill by allowing giant balloons to cross its borders. And last week, Moscow’s top envoy Sergey Lavrov issued a veiled threat to Finland to exit NATO.  “Russia is a threat to Europe … far into the future,” Orpo told Finnish daily Helsingin Sanomat on Saturday. “There is always a competition for resources in the EU, but [defense funding] is not something that is taken away from anyone.” Tuesday’s confab, attended by Finland, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria, comes during a critical week for Europe. On Monday several EU leaders met with U.S. officials as they strain to hammer out a peace deal in Ukraine, just three days before all 27 EU countries reconvene for a crucial summit that will determine whether they unlock €210 billion in frozen Russian cash for Kyiv. OPEN THE VAULTS At the heart of Tuesday’s discussion will be unblocking EU money.  The frontline countries want the EU to “propose new financial possibilities for border countries and solidarity-based financial tools,” said one of the government officials. As part of its 2028-2034 budget proposal, the European Commission plans to raise its defense spending fivefold to €131 billion. Frontline countries would like some of that cash to be earmarked for the region, two of the government officials said, a message they are likely to reiterate during Thursday’s European Council summit in Brussels. “Strengthening Europe’s eastern flank must become a shared responsibility for Europe,” Estonian Prime Minister Kristen Michal said. | Hendrik Schmidt/Getty Images In the meantime, the EU should consider new financial instruments similar to the bloc’s €150 billion loans-for-weapons program, called the Security Action For Europe, the same two officials said. European Commission chief Ursula von der Leyen told POLITICO last week she had received calls to set up a “second SAFE” after the first iteration was oversubscribed. The frontline countries also want to throw their political weight behind two upcoming EU projects to buttress the bloc’s anti-drone and broader defenses, the two officials said. EU leaders refused to formally endorse the Eastern Flank Watch and European Drone Defense Initiative at a summit in October amid opposition by countries like Hungary, France and Germany, who saw them as overreach by Brussels on defense, two EU diplomats said at the time. A request to reserve part of the EU budget for a specific region may also face opposition from other countries. To get around this, Eastern flank countries should link defense “infrastructure improvements to overall [EU] economic development,” said Jamie Shea, a senior defense fellow at the Friends of Europe think tank and a former NATO spokesperson. Frontline capitals should also look at “opening up [those infrastructure projects] for competitive bidding” to firms outside the region, he added. DIFFERENT REGION, DIFFERENT VIEW Cash won’t be the only divisive issue in the shadows of Tuesday’s gathering. In recent weeks Donald Trump’s administration has repeatedly rebuked Europe, with the U.S. president branding the continent’s leaders “weak” in an interview with POLITICO. Countries like Germany and Denmark have responded to growing U.S. admonishments by directly rebutting recent criticisms and formally branding Washington a “security risk”.  But that approach has rankled frontline countries, conscious of jeopardizing Washington’s commitment to NATO’s collective defense pledge, which they see as a last line of protection against Moscow. This view also reflects a growing worry inside NATO that a peace deal in Ukraine will give Moscow more bandwidth to rearm and redirect its efforts toward frontline countries. “If the war stops in Ukraine … [Russia’s] desire is to keep its soldiers busy,” said one senior NATO diplomat, arguing those troops are likely to be “relocated in our direction.” “Europe should take over [its own] defenses,” the diplomat added. But until the continent becomes militarily independent, “we shouldn’t talk like this” about the U.S., they argued. “It’s really dangerous [and] it’s stupid.” Jacopo Barigazzi contributed to this report from Brussels.

This article is presented by EFPIA with the support of AbbVie I made a trip back to Europe recently, where I spent the vast majority of my pharmaceutical career, to share my perspectives on competitiveness at the European Health Summit. Now that I work in a role responsible for supporting patient access to medicine globally, I view Europe, and how it compares internationally, through a new lens, and I have been reflecting further on why the choices made today will have such a critical impact on where medicines are developed tomorrow. Today, many patients around the world benefit from medicines built on European science and breakthroughs of the last 20 years. Europeans, like me, can be proud of this contribution. As I look forward, my concern is that we may not be able to make the same claim in the next 20 years. It’s clear that Europe has a choice. Investing in sustainable medicines growth and other enabling policies will, I believe, bring significant benefits. Not doing so risks diminishing global influence. > Today, many patients around the world benefit from medicines built on European > science and breakthroughs of the last 20 years I reflect on three important points: 1) investment in healthcare benefits individuals, healthcare and society, but the scale of this benefit remains underappreciated; 2) connected to this, the underpinning science for future innovation is increasingly happening elsewhere; and 3) this means the choices we make today must address both of these trends. First, let’s use the example of migraine. As I have heard a patient say, “Migraine will not kill you but neither [will they] let you live.”[1] Individuals can face being under a migraine attack for more than half of every month, unable to leave home, maintain a job and engage in society.[2] It is the second biggest cause of disability globally and the first among young women.[3] It affects the quality of life of millions of Europeans.[4] From 2011-21 the economic burden of migraine in Europe due to the loss of working days ranged from €35-557 billion, depending on the country, representing 1-2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).[5]   Overall socioeconomic burden of migraine as percentage of the country’s GDP in 2021 Source: WifOR, The socioeconomic burden of migraine. The case of 6 European Countries.5 Access to effective therapies could radically improve individuals’ lives and their ability to return to work.[6] Yet, despite the staggering economic and personal impacts, in some member states the latest medicines are either not reimbursed or only available after several treatment failures.[7] Imagine if Europe shifted its perspective on these conditions, investing to improve not only health but unlocking the potential for workforce and economic productivity? Moving to my second point, against this backdrop of underinvestment, where are scientific advances now happening in our sector? In recent years it is impressive to see China has become the second-largest drug developer in the world,[8] and within five years it may lead the innovative antibodies therapeutics sector,[9] which is particularly promising for complex areas like oncology. Cancer is projected to become the leading cause of death in Europe by 2035,[10] yet the continent’s share of the number of oncology trials dropped from 41 percent in 2013 to 21 percent in 2023.10 Today, antibody-drug conjugates are bringing new hope in hard-to-treat tumor types,[11] like ovarian,[12] lung[13] and colorectal[14] cancer, and we hope to see more of these advances in the future. Unfortunately, Europe is no longer at the forefront of the development of these innovations. This geographical shift could impact high-quality jobs, the vitality of Europe’s biotech sector and, most importantly, patients’ outcomes. [15] > This is why I encourage choices to be made that clearly signal the value > Europe attaches to medicines This is why I encourage choices to be made that clearly signal the value Europe attaches to medicines. This can be done by removing national cost-containment measures, like clawbacks, that are increasingly eroding the ability of companies to invest in European R&D. To provide a sense of their impact, between 2012 and 2023, clawbacks and price controls reduced manufacturer revenues by over €1.2 billion across five major EU markets, corresponding to a loss of 4.7 percent in countries like Spain.[16] Moreover, we should address health technology assessment approaches in Europe, or mandatory discount policies, which are simply not adequately accounting for the wider societal value of medicines, such as in the migraine example, and promoting a short-term approach to investment. By broadening horizons and choosing a long-term investment strategy for medicines and the life science sector, Europe will not only enable this strategic industry to drive global competitiveness but, more importantly, bring hope to Europeans suffering from health conditions. AbbVie SA/NV – BE-ABBV-250177 (V1.0) – December 2025 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [1] The Parliament Magazine, https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/partner/article/unmet-medical-needs-and-migraine-assessing-the-added-value-for-patients-and-society, Last accessed December 2025. [2] The Migraine Trust; https://migrainetrust.org/understand-migraine/types-of-migraine/chronic-migraine/, Last accessed December 2025. [3] Steiner TJ, et al; Lifting The Burden: the Global Campaign against Headache. Migraine remains second among the world’s causes of disability, and first among young women: findings from GBD2019. J Headache Pain. 2020 Dec 2;21(1):137 [4] Coppola G, Brown JD, Mercadante AR, Drakeley S, Sternbach N, Jenkins A, Blakeman KH, Gendolla A. The epidemiology and unmet need of migraine in five european countries: results from the national health and wellness survey. BMC Public Health. 2025 Jan 21;25(1):254. doi: 10.1186/s12889-024-21244-8. [5] WifOR. Calculating the Socioeconomic Burden of Migraine: The Case of 6 European Countries. Available at: [https://www.wifor.com/en/download/the-socioeconomic-burden-of-migraine-the-case-of-6-eu­ropean-countries/?wpdmdl=358249&refresh=687823f915e751752703993]. Accessed June 2025. [6] Seddik AH, Schiener C, Ostwald DA, Schramm S, Huels J, Katsarava Z. Social Impact of Prophylactic Migraine Treatments in Germany: A State-Transition and Open Cohort Approach. Value Health. 2021 Oct;24(10):1446-1453. doi: 10.1016/j.jval.2021.04.1281 [7] Moisset X, Demarquay G, et al., Migraine treatment: Position paper of the French Headache Society. Rev Neurol (Paris). 2024 Dec;180(10):1087-1099. doi: 10.1016/j.neurol.2024.09.008. [8] The Economist, https://www.economist.com/china/2025/11/23/chinese-pharma-is-on-the-cusp-of-going-global, Last accessed December 2025. [9] Crescioli S, Reichert JM. Innovative antibody therapeutic development in China compared with the USA and Europe. Nat Rev Drug Discov. Published online November 7, 2025. [10] Manzano A., Svedman C., Hofmarcher T., Wilking N.. Comparator Report on Cancer in Europe 2025 – Disease Burden, Costs and Access to Medicines and Molecular Diagnostics. EFPIA, 2025. [IHE REPORT 2025:2, page 20] [11] Armstrong GB, Graham H, Cheung A, Montaseri H, Burley GA, Karagiannis SN, Rattray Z. Antibody-drug conjugates as multimodal therapies against hard-to-treat cancers. Adv Drug Deliv Rev. 2025 Sep;224:115648. doi: 10.1016/j.addr.2025.115648. Epub 2025 Jul 11. PMID: 40653109.. [12] Narayana, R.V.L., Gupta, R. Exploring the therapeutic use and outcome of antibody-drug conjugates in ovarian cancer treatment. Oncogene 44, 2343–2356 (2025). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41388-025-03448-3 [13] Coleman, N., Yap, T.A., Heymach, J.V. et al. Antibody-drug conjugates in lung cancer: dawn of a new era?. npj Precis. Onc. 7, 5 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41698-022-00338-9 [14] Wang Y, Lu K, Xu Y, Xu S, Chu H, Fang X. Antibody-drug conjugates as immuno-oncology agents in colorectal cancer: targets, payloads, and therapeutic synergies. Front Immunol. 2025 Nov 3;16:1678907. doi: 10.3389/fimmu.2025.1678907. PMID: 41256852; PMCID: PMC12620403. [15] EFPIA, Improving EU Clinical Trials: Proposals to Overcome Current Challenges and Strengthen the Ecosystem, efpias-list-of-proposals-clinical-trials-15-apr-2025.pdf, Last accessed December 2025. [16] The EU General Pharmaceutical Legislation & Clawbacks, © Vital Transformation BVBA, 2024.

The discussion surrounding the digital euro is strategically important to Europe. On Dec. 12, the EU finance ministers are aiming to agree on a general approach regarding the dossier. This sets out the European Council’s official position and thus represents a major political milestone for the European Council ahead of the trilogue negotiations. We want to be sure that, in this process, the project will be subject to critical analysis that is objective and nuanced and takes account of the long-term interests of Europe and its people. > We do not want the debate to fundamentally call the digital euro into question > but rather to refine the specific details in such a way that opportunities can > be seized. We regard the following points as particularly important: * maintaining European sovereignty at the customer interface; * avoiding a parallel infrastructure that inhibits innovation; and * safeguarding the stability of the financial markets by imposing clear holding limits. We do not want the debate to fundamentally call the digital euro into question but rather to refine the specific details in such a way that opportunities can be seized and, at the same time, risks can be avoided. Opportunities of the digital euro:  1. European resilience and sovereignty in payments processing: as a public-sector means of payment that is accepted across Europe, the digital euro can reduce reliance on non-European card systems and big-tech wallets, provided that a firmly European design is adopted and it is embedded in the existing structures of banks and savings banks and can thus be directly linked to customers’ existing accounts. 2. Supplement to cash and private-sector digital payments: as a central bank digital currency, the digital euro can offer an additional, state-backed payment option, especially when it is held in a digital wallet and can also be used for e-commerce use cases (a compromise proposed by the European Parliament’s main rapporteur for the digital euro, Fernando Navarrete). This would further strengthen people’s freedom of choice in the payment sphere. 3. Catalyst for innovation in the European market: if integrated into banking apps and designed in accordance with the compromises proposed by Navarrete (see point 2), the digital euro can promote innovation in retail payments, support new European payment ecosystems, and simplify cross-border payments. > The burden of investment and the risk resulting from introducing the digital > euro will be disproportionately borne by banks and savings banks. Risks of the current configuration: 1. Risk of creating a gateway for US providers: in the configuration currently planned, the digital euro provides US and other non-European tech and payment companies with access to the customer interface, customer data and payment infrastructure without any of the regulatory obligations and costs that only European providers face. This goes against the objective of digital sovereignty. 2. State parallel infrastructures weaken the market and innovation: the European Central Bank (ECB) is planning not just two new sets of infrastructure but also its own product for end customers (through an app). An administrative body has neither the market experience nor the customer access that banks and payment providers do. At the same time, the ECB is removing the tried-and-tested allocation of roles between the central bank and private sector. Furthermore, the Eurosystem’s digital euro project will tie up urgently required development capacity for many years and thereby further exacerbate Europe’s competitive disadvantage. The burden of investment and the risk resulting from introducing the digital euro will be disproportionately borne by banks and savings banks. In any case, the banks and savings banks have already developed a European market solution, Wero, which is currently coming onto the market. The digital euro needs to strengthen rather than weaken this European-led payment method. 3. Risks for financial stability and lending: without clear holding limits, there is a risk of uncontrolled transfers of deposits from banks and savings banks into holdings of digital euros. Deposits are the backbone of lending; large-scale outflows would weaken both the funding of the real economy – especially small and medium-sized enterprises – and the stability of the system. Holding limits must therefore be based on usual payment needs and be subject to binding regulations. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is Bundesverband der Deutschen Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken e.V. , Schellingstraße 4, 10785 Berlin, Germany * The ultimate controlling entity is Bundesverband der Deutschen Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken e.V. , Schellingstraße 4, 10785 Berlin, Germany More information here.

President Donald Trump’s latest round of Europe-bashing has the U.S.’s allies across the Atlantic revisiting a perennial question: Why does Trump hate Europe so much? Trump’s disdain for America’s one-time partners has been on prominent display in the past week — first in Trump’s newly released national security strategy, which suggested that Europe was suffering from civilizational decline, and then in Trump’s exclusive interview with POLITICO, where he chided the “decaying” continent’s leaders as “weak.” In Europe, Trump’s criticisms were met with more familiar consternation — and calls to speed up plans for a future where the continent cannot rely on American security support. But where does Trump’s animosity for Europe actually come from? To find out, I reached out to a scholar who’d been recommended to me by sources in MAGA world as someone who actually understands their foreign policy thinking (even if he doesn’t agree with it). “He does seem to divide the world into strength and weakness, and he pays attention to strength, and he kind of ignores weakness,” said Jeremy Shapiro, the research director at the European Council on Foreign Relations and an expert on Trump’s strained relations with the continent. “And he has long characterized the Europeans as weak.” Shapiro explained that Trump has long blamed Europe’s weakness on its low levels of military spending and its dependence on American security might. But his critique seems to have taken on a new vehemence during his second term thanks to input from new advisers like Vice President JD Vance, who have successfully cast Europe as a liberal bulwark in a global culture war between MAGA-style “nationalists” and so-called globalists. Like many young conservatives, Shapiro explained, Vance has come to believe that “it was these bastions of liberal power in the culture and in the government that stymied the first Trump term, so you needed to attack the universities, the think tanks, the foundations, the finance industry, and, of course, the deep state.” In the eyes of MAGA, he said, “Europe is one of these liberal bastions.” This conversation was edited for length and clarity. Trump’s recent posture toward Europe brings to mind the old adage that the opposite of love isn’t hate, it’s indifference. Do you think Trump hates Europe, or does he just think it’s irrelevant? My main impression is that he’s pretty indifferent toward it. There are moments when specific European countries or the EU really pisses him off and he expresses something that seems close to hatred, but mostly he doesn’t seem very focused on it. Why do you think that is? He does seem to divide the world into strength and weakness, and he pays attention to strength, and he kind of ignores weakness. And he has long characterized the Europeans as weak for a bunch of different reasons having to do with what seems to him to be a decadence in their society, their immigration, their social welfare states, their lack of apparent military vigor. All of those things seem to put them in the weak category, and in Trump’s world, if you’re in the weak category, he doesn’t pay much attention to you. What about more prosaic things like the trade imbalance and NATO spending? Do those contribute to his disdain, or does it originate from a more guttural place? I get the impression that it is more at a guttural level. It always seemed to me that the NATO spending debate was just a stick with which to beat the NATO allies. He has long understood that that’s something that they felt a little bit guilty about, and that’s something that American presidents had beat them about for a while, so he just sort of took it to an 11. The trade deficit is something that’s more serious for him. He’s paid quite a bit of attention to that in every country, so it’s in the trade area where he takes Europeans most seriously. But because they’re so weak and so dependent on the United States for security, he hasn’t had to deal with their trade problems in the same way. He’s able to threaten them on security, and they have folded pretty quickly. Does some of his animosity originate from his pre-presidency when he did business in Europe? He likes to blame Europeans for nixing some of his business transactions, like a golf course in Ireland. How serious do you think that is? I think that’s been important in forming his opinion of the EU rather than of Europe as a whole. He never seems to refer to the EU without referring to the fact that they blocked his golf course in Ireland. It wasn’t even the EU that blocked it, actually — it was an Irish local government authority — but it conforms to the general MAGA view of the EU as overly bureaucratic, anti-development and basically as an extension of the American liberal approach to development and regulation, which Trump certainly does hate. That’s part of what led Trump and his movement more generally to put the EU in the category of supporters of liberal America. In that sense, the fight against the EU in particular — but also against the other liberal regimes in Europe — became an extension of their domestic political battle with liberals in America. That effort to pull Europe as a whole into the American culture war by positioning it as a repository of all the liberal pieties that MAGA has come to hate — that seems kind of new. That is new for the second term, yeah. Where do you think that’s coming from? It definitely seems to be coming from [Vice President] JD Vance and the sort of philosophers who support him — the Patrick Deneens and Yoram Hazonys. Those types of people see liberal Europe as quite decadent and as part of the overall liberal problem in the world. You can also trace some of it back to Steve Bannon, who has definitely been talking about this stuff for a while. There does seem to be a real preoccupation with the idea that Europe is suffering from some sort of civilizational decline or civilization collapse. For instance, in both the new national security strategy and in his remarks to POLITICO this week, Trump has suggested that Europe is “decaying.” What do you make of that? This is a bit of a projection, right? If you look at the numbers in terms of immigration and diversity, the United States is further ahead in that decay — if you want to call it that — than Europe. There was this view that emerged among MAGA elites in the interregnum that it wasn’t enough to win the presidency in order to successfully change America. You had to attack all of the bastions of liberal power. It was these bastions of liberal power in the culture and in the government that stymied the first Trump term, so you needed to attack the universities, the think tanks, the foundations, the finance industry and, of course, the deep state, which is the first target. It was only through attacking these liberal bastions and conquering them to your cause that you could have a truly transformative effect. One of the things that they seem to have picked up while contemplating this theory is that Europe is one of these liberal bastions. Europe is a support for liberals in the United States, in part because Europe is the place where Americans get their sense of how the world views them. It’s ironic that that image of a decadent Europe coexists with the rise of far-right parties across the continent. Obviously, the Trump administration has supported those parties and allied with them, but at least in France and Germany, the momentum seems to be behind these parties at the moment. That presents them with an avenue to destroy liberal Europe’s support for liberal America by essentially transforming Europe into an illiberal regime. That is the vector of attack on liberal Europe. There has been this idea that’s developed amongst the populist parties in Europe since Brexit that they’re not really trying to leave the EU or destroy the EU; they’re trying to remake the EU in their nationalist and sovereigntist image. That’s perfect for what the Trump people are trying to do, which is not destroy the EU fully, but destroy the EU as a support for liberal ideas in the world and the United States. You mentioned the vice president, who has become a very prominent mouthpiece for this adversarial approach to Europe — most obviously in his speech at Munich earlier this year. Do you think he’s just following Trump’s guttural dislike of Europe or is he advancing his own independent anti-European agenda? A little of both. I think that Vance, like any good vice president, is very careful not to get crosswise with his boss and not contradict him in any way. So the fact that Trump isn’t opposed to this and that he can support it to a degree is very, very important. But I think that a lot of these ideas come from Vance independently, at least in detail. What he’s doing is nudging Trump along this road. He’s thinking about what will appeal to Trump, and he’s mostly been getting it right. But I think that especially when it comes to this sort of culture war stuff with Europe, he’s more of a source than a follower. During this latest round of Trump’s Euro-bashing, did anything stand out to you as new or novel? Or was it all of a piece with what you had heard before? It was novel relative to a year ago, but not relative to February and since then. But it’s a new mechanism of describing it — through a national security strategy document and through interviews with the president. The same arguments have achieved a sort of higher status, I would say, in the last week or so. You could sit around in Europe — as I did — and argue about the degree to which this really was what the Trump administration was doing, or whether this was just a faction — and you can still have that argument, because the Trump administration is generally quite inconsistent and incoherent when it comes to this kind of thing — but I think it’s undoubtedly achieved a greater status in the last week or two. How do you think Europe should deal with Trump’s recurring animosity towards the continent? It seems they’ve settled on a strategy of flattery, but do you think that’s effective in the long run? No, I think that’s the exact opposite of effective. If you recall what I said at the beginning, Trump abhors weakness, and flattery is the sort of ultimate manifestation of weakness. Every time the Europeans show up and flatter Trump, it enables them to have a good meeting with him, but it conveys the impression to him that they are weak, and so it increases his policy demands against them. We’ve seen that over and over again. The Europeans showed up and thought they had changed his Ukraine position, they had a great meeting, he said good things about them, they went home and a few weeks later, he had a totally different Ukraine position that they’re now having to deal with. The flattery has achieved the sense in the Trump administration that they can do anything they want to the Europeans, and they’ll basically swallow it. They haven’t done what some other countries have done, like the Chinese or the Brazilians, or even the Canadians to some degree, which is to stand up to Trump and show him that he has to deal with them as strong actors. And that’s a shame, because the Europeans — while they obviously have an asymmetric dependence on the United States, and they have some weaknesses — are a lot stronger than a lot of other countries, especially if they were working together. I think they have some capacity to do that, but they haven’t really managed it as of yet. Maybe this will be a wake-up call to do that.

LONDON — Scandal-hit Japanese tech firm Fujitsu has lost its grip on a lucrative contract to keep running Great Britain’s post-Brexit border with Northern Ireland, following mounting public pressure, two people with knowledge of the bidding process have told POLITICO. The firm at the center of the Post Office scandal — which saw faulty data from Fujitsu’s Horizon software lead to wrongful theft and fraud convictions of hundreds of innocent Post Office workers — had spearheaded a consortium bid for the £370 million contract to continue running the Trader Support Service (TSS), as reported earlier this year. The contract was awarded to another consortium late last month, according to the two people cited above. The 10-day cooling-off period after the contract was awarded ends on Tuesday. The Fujitsu-led consortium, which includes Liz Truss ally Shanker Singham’s firm Competere, has raked in more than £500 million since 2020 developing and operating the platform, which helps firms navigate the complicated post-Brexit customs arrangements between Great Britain and Northern Ireland under the Windsor Framework. While a new supplier will be taking control of TSS, Fujitsu retains the intellectual property rights to a core part of the existing platform, four people with knowledge of the process — including those cited above — confirmed. This means the new system will have to be built from scratch.  All of those cited in this story were granted anonymity to speak freely. There have been calls for Fujitsu to be stripped of its public contracts while sub postmasters affected by the scandal await full compensation. In August, more than 32 MPs and 44 peers wrote to U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer, urging him to block the firm from bidding for control of the TSS platform. In October, the government accepted all but one of the recommendations from Wyn Williams’ inquiry into the scandal, published in July, which concluded that at least 13 people may have taken their own lives after being accused of wrongdoing.  There has also been public scrutiny over the running of TSS. Cabinet Office Minister Nick Thomas-Symonds told lawmakers earlier this year he was investigating industry concerns about the service. “We are concerned to hear reports that the Trader Support Service is not providing a good quality of service,” cross-party peers on the Northern Ireland Scrutiny Committee wrote in an October report. Meanwhile, a report by the Federation of Small Businesses found current support relating to the Windsor Framework — including the TSS — was “falling short of expectations,” with 78 percent of Northern Irish businesses surveyed rating it as either “very poor” or “poor.” A spokesperson for HMRC, which awarded the contract, said: “We follow government procurement rules when awarding contracts, ensuring value for money for taxpayers. All bids underwent a robust evaluation and assurance process, and we will confirm the award in due course.” Fujitsu and Competere did not respond to requests for comment.

Sprawling defense legislation set for a vote as soon as this week would place new restrictions on reducing troop levels in Europe, a bipartisan rebuke of Trump administration moves that lawmakers fear would limit U.S. commitments on the continent. A just-released compromise version of the National Defense Authorization Act — which puts Congress’ stamp on Pentagon programs and policy each year — has been in the works for months. The measure stands in stark contrast to President Donald Trump’s new national security strategy, which sharply criticizes European allies and suggests the continent is in cultural decline. Lawmakers also endorsed a slight increase in the Pentagon budget with a price tag that is $8 billion more than Trump requested. And it would repeal decades-old Middle East war powers, a small win for lawmakers who’ve been fighting to reclaim a sliver of Congress’ war-declaring prerogatives. The final bill is the result of weeks of negotiations between House and Senate leadership in both parties, heads of the Armed Services panels and the White House. The measure had been slowed in recent days by talks on issues unrelated to defense, including a major Senate-backed housing package and greater scrutiny of U.S. investment in China. The defense bill typically passes with broad bipartisan support. Speaker Mike Johnson will likely need to win back some Democrats who opposed the House GOP’s hard-right initial bill in September. And the speaker will have to contend with fellow Republicans upset that their priorities weren’t included. But both House and Senate-passed defense bills reflected bipartisan concerns that the Trump administration would seek to significantly reduce the U.S. military footprint in Europe. Both measures included language that imposes requirements the Pentagon must meet before trimming military personnel levels on the continent below certain thresholds. Republicans, led by Senate Armed Services Chair Roger Wicker (R-Miss.) and House Armed Services Chair Mike Rogers (R-Ala.), broke with the Trump administration, arguing that troop reductions — such as a recent decision to remove a rotational Army brigade from Romania — would invite aggression from Russia. The final bill blocks the Pentagon from reducing the number of troops permanently stationed or deployed to Europe below 76,000 for longer than 45 days until Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and the head of U.S. European Command certify to Congress that doing so is in U.S. national security interests and that NATO allies were consulted. They would also need to provide assessments of that decision’s impact. The legislation applies the same conditions to restrict the U.S. from vacating the role of NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, a role that the U.S. officer who leads European Command chief has held simultaneously for decades. Negotiators included similar limitations on reducing the number of troops on the Korean Peninsula below 28,500, a provision originally approved by the Senate. Lawmakers agreed to a slight increase to the bill’s budget topline, reflecting some momentum on Capitol Hill for more military spending. The final agreement recommends an $8 billion hike to Trump’s $893 billion flat national defense budget, for a total of roughly $901 billion for the Pentagon, nuclear weapons development and other national security programs. The House-passed defense bill matched Trump’s budget request while the Senate bill proposed a $32 billion boost. Republicans separately approved a $150 billion multi-year boost for the Pentagon through their party-line tax cut and spending megabill earlier this year. Regardless of the signal the topline budget agreement sends, the defense policy bill does not allocate any money to the Pentagon. Lawmakers must still pass annual defense spending legislation to fund Pentagon programs. House Armed Services ranking member Adam Smith (D-Wash.) described the agreement as a “placeholder” that would allow lawmakers to finish the NDAA, while congressional appropriators continue their talks on a separate full-year Pentagon funding measure. A House Republican leadership aide who, like others, was granted anonymity to discuss details of the bill ahead of its release, said the revised topline is a “fiscally responsible increase that meets our defense needs.” The bill also would repeal a pair of old laws that authorize military action in the Middle East, including 2002 legislation that preceded the invasion of Iraq and the 1991 Gulf War. Those repeals were included in both the House and Senate defense bills as bipartisan support for scrubbing the old laws — which critics contend could be abused by a president — overcame opposition from some top Republicans. Repealing those decades-old measures is a win for critics of expansive presidential war powers, who argued the measures aren’t needed anymore. They point to the potential for abuses — citing Trump’s use of the 2002 Iraq authorization to partly justify a strike that killed Iranian military commander Qasem Soleimani in Iraq in 2020. A second House GOP leadership aide said the repeal of the two Iraq authorizations won’t impact Trump’s authority as commander-in-chief. But the repeal is ultimately a minor win for lawmakers seeking to reclaim congressional power. The 2001 post-9/11 authorization that undergirds much of the U.S. counterterrorism operations around the world remains on the books. And the bill is silent on Trump’s ongoing campaign against alleged drug smuggling vessels in the Caribbean. Many lawmakers — including some Republicans — have questioned the administration’s legal justification for the lethal strikes. The final bill also doesn’t include an expansion of coverage for in-vitro fertilization and other fertility services for military families under the Tricare health system. The provision, backed by Sen. Tammy Duckworth (D-Ill.), Rep. Sara Jacobs (D-Calif.) and others, was included in both Senate and House bills before it was dropped. Johnson reportedly was seeking to remove the provision, which similarly was left out of last year’s bill.

Soccer may be the world’s most popular pastime, but much about Friday’s lottery draw setting the match schedule for next summer’s World Cup has been programmed with just one fan in mind. Never before has the sports governing body given out a peace prize to a politician eager for one, or booked the Village People and Andrea Bocelli to play alongside. President Donald Trump’s appearance on the Kennedy Center stage will be at least his seventh encounter this year with FIFA President Gianni Infantino, who has logged more face time with Trump this year than any world leader. Infantino’s savvy navigation of the American political scene has helped FIFA build institutional support for a tournament facing unprecedented logistical complications. But that success is beginning to weaken Infantino, as the third-term FIFA president faces newfound internal opposition for his over-the-top courtship of Trump. Our interviews with six international soccer officials across three continents reveal widespread frustration with Infantino’s decision to side with Trump even as White House policies cause chaos for World Cup-bound teams, fans and local organizers, clashing with Infantino’s promise to have a tournament that welcomes the world. “[FIFA] has always promoted a very cozy, close relationship with politicians and political actors in a variety of ways, including by having them in their bodies or running the National Football Associations, for example,” said Miguel Maduro, the chairman of FIFA’s governance and review committee between 2016 and 2017. “This said, the extent of this cozy relationship that we’ve seen and and the public character that has been assumed between Mr. Infantino and Mr. Trump is different even from what we saw in the past,” said Maduro. “It’s not that things like that didn’t happen in the past, but it didn’t happen so obviously and so emphatically as they do now.” Our reporting found that Infantino did not inform his 37-member FIFA Council before creating the FIFA Peace Prize this year, three people familiar with the matter told POLITICO. Over the past year, at least three of FIFA’s eight vice presidents have publicly or privately expressed their concerns about the lengths Infantino is willing to go to please Trump. While Infantino has won his last two terms unopposed, when he stands next for reelection in 2027 he will likely have to answer to FIFA’s 211 member federations for his willing entanglement in the controversies of American politics. Infantino’s allies say that those opposed to many of his soccer-related initiatives — focused on growing the game in emerging markets and expanding FIFA’s flagship tournaments — are using his Trump ties to exploit differences on unrelated issues. “If a challenger to Gianni for the 2027 election emerges, it will be in the next six to eight months and the World Cup will be a litmus test,” said a person involved with World Cup planning granted anonymity to characterize private conversations with top soccer officials. “If something goes off the rails or somebody decides they want to make a run against him, they’re going to use his relationship with Trump to exploit the cracks.” THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENTS Infantino launched his first campaign for FIFA’s presidency as an underdog. A corruption scandal had toppled much of FIFA’s leadership in 2015, forcing a so-called “extraordinary congress” the next year in which members would vote to decide who would complete the unfinished term vacated by the newly suspended president Sepp Blatter. FIFA, comprised of national soccer federations, picks its president through a secret ballot of those members — one nation, one vote. To win in a multi-candidate field, one must capture two-thirds of the total ballots cast, with rounds of voting until a single candidate locks in a two-way majority. The favorite to succeed Blatter was Sheik Salman Bin Ebrahim Al Khalifa, a Bahraini royal who headed the Asian Football Confederation and appeared to have stitched together a coalition of Asian and African nations. Infantino, a polyglot Swiss-Italian lawyer who had spent seven years as secretary general of European confederation UEFA, pitched himself as someone who could disperse the organization’s wealth back to member countries. “The money of FIFA is your money,” Infantino said in a speech shortly before the vote. “It is not the money of the FIFA president. It’s your money.” Infantino and Al Khalifa ran neck-in-neck in the first round. With a clear two-person race, the United States — which had been supporting Prince Ali bin Al-Hussein of Jordan, who finished a distant third — switched its vote to Infantino in the second round, triggering a rush of support from the Western Hemisphere that gave Infantino a conclusive 115-vote total. A fourth candidate, former French diplomat Jérome Champagne, credited Infantino’s victory to “a strong alliance between Europe and North America and the Anglo-Saxon world.” “Prepare yourself well but be vigilant,” Blatter warned Infantino upon his election in a public letter. “While everyone supports you and tells you nice words, know that once you are the president, friends become rare.” Once in office, Infantino’s initiatives were focused on expanding FIFA’s most valuable properties. He converted a ten-day, exhibition-like competition among seven regional club champions into the month-long FIFA Club World Cup. He also pushed, with mixed success, to grow the size and scope of the World Cup and increase its frequency. In 2017, Infantino announced that the first World Cup under an expanded format — up from 32 countries participating to 48, adding a week of matches to the schedule — would take place in the United States, Canada and Mexico. Facing the first tournament in which hosting responsibilities would be shared by three countries, Infantino visited Trump to secure assurances of government support. Infantino went on to win subsequent terms in 2019 and 2023, and when Trump returned to the White House for his second, in 2025, their political trajectories became permanently intertwined. Infantino set out to raise his profile in American life and his relationships with the country’s political class, including through a campaign-style tour through many of the American cities hosting matches for the inaugural Club World Cup in 2025 and the World Cup the following summer. Infantino sat next to Trump at the tournament’s final, held at New Jersey’s MetLife Stadium in July, dragging him onto the winners’ platform as Infantino went to award a trophy and medals to champions Chelsea. Trump lingered awkwardly on stage to the befuddlement of Chelsea’s players, who had not expected they would share the moment with an American politician. Other appearances with Trump placed Infantino squarely between a president intent on solving overseas conflicts and punishing foes, while closing American borders to visitors and trade, and FIFA member nations who may hold starkly different views, or worse. Infantino stood quietly in the Oval Office as he said he would not rule out strikes against fellow World Cup co-host Mexico to target drug cartels, and joined Trump’s entourage on a trip designed to cultivate investment opportunities in the Persian Gulf. When FIFA had to delay the opening of its annual congress in Asuncion, Paraguay, to accommodate Infantino’s travel from a Saudi-U.S. Investment Forum in Riyadh, two FIFA vice presidents were among those who joined English Football Association chairwoman Debbie Hewitt and other federation heads exiting in protest. European confederation UEFA — with 55 member nations, FIFA’s largest — attacked him with unusually pointed language. “To have the timetable changed at the last minute for what appears to be simply to accommodate private political interests,” UEFA wrote in its statement, “does the game no service and appears to put its interests second.” GIANNI ON THE SPOT In September, Trump said he would try to move scheduled World Cup matches out of Democratic-run jurisdictions that are “even a little bit dangerous.” Infantino, whose organization had spent years vetting and preparing those cities for the tournament, said nothing. But a potential rival to Infantino’s leadership took issue with both the American president’s threat — since repeated but not acted upon — and the FIFA president’s silence. “It’s FIFA’s tournament, FIFA’s jurisdiction, FIFA makes those decisions,” FIFA vice president Victor Montagliani, the organization’s leading figure from North America, said at a sports-business conference in London six days later. While president of the Canadian Soccer Association, Montagliani helped to secure his country’s participation in the three-way so-called “United Bid” for next summer’s World Cup. (The Vancouver insurance executive also helped bring the Women’s World Cup to Canada in 2015.) He now serves as president of CONCACAF, the 41-member regional federation encompassing the 41 nations of North America, Central America and the Caribbean. Close to Prime Minister Mark Carney, Montagliani has come to believe Infantino has catered too much to Trump for a tournament realized through the cooperation of three nations, according to three of the people familiar with the dynamics of FIFA’s leadership. (Montagliani declined an interview request.) The leaders of the United States, Mexico and Canada will all participate in a ceremonial ball draw in today’s draw. “With all due respect to current world leaders, football is bigger than them and football will survive their regime and their government and their slogans,” Montagliani told an interviewer at the London conference in late September. “That’s the beauty of our game, is that it is bigger than any individual and bigger than any country.” Montagliani’s “FIFA’s jurisdiction” remarks did not land well with Infantino’s inner sanctum. “It is ultimately the government’s responsibility to decide what’s in the best interest of public safety,” FIFA said in a statement to POLITICO in October after Trump’s next round of threats to relocate matches. The relationship between Infantino and Montagliani has further soured in recent months as Trump reignited tensions between Washington and Ottawa over an anti-tariff ad taking aim at U.S. trade policy, according to a person close to Montagliani granted anonymity to candidly characterize his thinking. Montagliani has his own thoughts on how far relationships with government figures should go but respects Infantino’s perspective, that person said, maintaining the two men had a good relationship despite occasional differences. Others around FIFA have their own parochial concerns with Trump. Despite being among the first teams to qualify for the tournament, Iran threatened to boycott Friday’s draw because some members of its delegation were denied visas for travel to Washington. According to a FIFA official, Iran ultimately reversed course and sent Iranian head coach Ardeshir Ghalenoy after FIFA worked closely with the U.S. government and Iran’s soccer federation. Another qualifying team, Haiti, is also covered by the 19-country travel ban that Trump signed in June. The State Department said that while the policy has a specific carveout for World Cup competitors and their families, the exception will not be applied to fans or spectators. The president of the Japanese Football Association, Tsuneyasu Miyamoto, told POLITICO in an interview last month that he was worried that Trump’s immigration policies could subject Japanese travelers to “deportations happening unnecessarily.” Infantino has stopped short of pressuring Trump to make exceptions to immigration policy for the sake of soccer. FIFA officials have said that when it chooses a tournament location it does not expect that country to significantly alter its immigration laws or vetting standards for the tournament, although many past hosts have chosen to relax visa requirements for World Cup ticketholders. Many European countries’ soccer federations, led by Ireland and Norway, have pushed to ban Israel from international soccer due to its military invasion of Gaza. The movement received an apparent boost from UEFA President Aleksander Čeferin, who supported unfurling a banner that read “Stop Killing Children; Stop Killing Civilians” on the field before a UEFA Super Cup match in August. “If such a big thing is going on, such a terrible thing that doesn’t allow me to sleep — not me, all my colleagues,” — nobody in this organization said we shouldn’t do it. No one,” Čeferin told POLITICO in August. “Then you have to do what is the right thing to do.” European countries were set on a collision with Trump, whose State Department indicated it would work to “fully stop any effort to attempt to ban Israel’s national soccer team from the World Cup.” UEFA pulled back on a planned vote over Israel’s place as a Trump-negotiated peace agreement took hold. Infantino joined Trump and other heads of state in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, for a summit to implement the agreement’s first phase. Nothing threatens to awaken opposition to Infantino as much as his decision to invent a FIFA Peace Prize just as Trump began to complain in October about being passed over for one from the Norwegian Nobel Committee. According to a draft run-of-show for Friday’s draw, Trump is scheduled to speak for two minutes today after receiving the Peace Prize. “He is just implementing what he said he would do,” Infantino said at an American Business Forum in Miami, also attended by Trump, on the day news of the prize was made public. “So I think we should all support what he’s doing because I think it’s looking pretty good.” According to FIFA rules, the organization’s president needs sign-off from the 37-member FIFA council on certain items like the international match calendar, host designations for upcoming FIFA tournaments, and financial matters. FIFA’s charter does not contemplate the creation of a new prize specifically to award a world leader, but those familiar with the organization’s governance say it may violate an ethics policy that requires officers “remain politically neutral.” (In 2019, FIFA honored Argentina’s President Mauricio Macri, who previously led venerable club Boca Juniors, with its first-ever Living Football Award.) “Giving this award to someone that is an active political actor, by itself, is, at least in my opinion, likely a violation of the principle of political neutrality,” said Maduro, a Portuguese legal scholar appointed to oversee FIFA’s governance in the wake of the corruption scandal that helped bring Infantino to office. “We need to know two things: how the award was created and who then took the decision to whom the award was to be given. Both of these decisions should not be taken by the president himself.” Infantino fully bypassed the FIFA Council in deciding to create and award the prize to Trump, according to three people familiar with conversations between Infantino and the council’s members. Even the vice presidents who were given a heads-up ahead of time say they were simply being told after the decision was made. FOUR MORE YEARS? Infantino, a quintessential European first elected with support from his home continent, now sees his strongest base of support in Asia, Africa, and the Gulf countries. He won his last two terms by acclamation, after delivering on his promises to disperse the $11 billion FIFA takes in each World Cup cycle. The FIFA Forward program, launched in 2016, sent $2.8 billion back to member federations and regional confederations in its first six years, funding everything from the development of Papua New Guinea’s women’s squad to an air dome for winter training in Mongolia. But Infantino’s political choices may be costing him in Europe, where the sport is more established and national federations are less dependent on FIFA’s largesse. Infantino’s defenders say that European soccer officials, including Čeferin, have turned against him because they see his attempts to expand the World Cup and institute the Club World Cup as a threat to the primacy of their regional competitions. Many in international soccer see Montagliani as the most viable potential challenger, although a person close to him says he has no intention of seeking FIFA’s presidency in 2027 and instead plans to seek reelection that year to what would have to be his final term as CONCACAF’s president. But he fits the profile of someone best positioned to dethrone the incumbent, ironically by stitching together the type of trans-Atlantic alliance that lifted Infantino to his first victory. “Mexico is not happy. Canada is not happy, and that’s because they’re politically not happy with Trump,” said a senior national-federation official, granted anonymity to candidly discuss dynamics within CONCACAF. “There’s that direct tension.”

LONDON — In February Britain’s cash-strapped Labour government cut international development spending — and barely anyone made a noise. The center-left party announced it would slice the country’s spending on aid down to only 0.3 percent of gross domestic income — from 0.5 percent — in order to fund a hike in defense spending. MPs, aid experts and officials have told POLITICO that the scale of the cuts is on a par with — or even exceeding — those of both the previous center-right Conservative government or the United States under Donald Trump. This leaves Britain’s development arm, once globally envied as a vehicle for poverty alleviation, a shadow of its former self. The move — prompted by U.S. demands to up its NATO spending, and mirroring the Trump administration’s move to gut its own USAID development budget — shocked Labour’s progressive MPs, supporters and backers in the aid sector. But unlike attempted cuts to British welfare spending, the real-world backlash was muted, with the resignation of Britain’s development minister prompting little further dissent or change in policy. There was no mutiny in parliament, and only limited domestic and international condemnation outside of an aid sector torn between making their voices heard — and keeping in Whitehall’s good books over slices of the shrinking pie. Some fear a return grab over the aid budget could still be on the cards — but that the government will find that there is little left to cut. Gideon Rabinowitz, director of policy and advocacy at Bond, the U.K. network for NGOs, warned that, instead of “reversing the cuts by the previous Conservative government, Labour has compounded them, and lives will be lost as a result.” “These cuts will further tarnish the U.K.’s reputation as it continues to be known as an unreliable global partner, breaking Labour’s manifesto commitment,” he warned. “The Conservatives started the fire, but instead of putting it out, this Labour government threw petrol on it.” ‘IT WAS THE PERFECT TIME TO DO IT’ When Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced the cut to international aid — a bid to save over £6 billion by 2027 — Labour MPs, including those who worked in the sector before being elected, were notably silent. The move followed a 2021 Conservative cut to aid spending — from 0.7 percent in the Tory brand-rebuilding David Cameron years down to 0.5 percent. At the time, Labour MPs had met that Tory cut with howls of outrage. This time it was different. Some were genuinely shocked, while others feared retribution from a Downing Street that had flexed its muscles at MPs who rebelled on what they saw as points of conscience. “No one was expecting it, so there was no opportunity to campaign around it,” said one Labour MP. “Literally none of us had any idea it was coming.” Remaining spending is largely mandatory contributions to organizations such as the World Bank. | Daniel Slim/AFP via Getty Images The same MP noted that there are around 50 Labour MPs from the new 2024 intake who had some form of development background before coming into parliament. Yet they were put “completely under the cosh” by Downing Street and government whips. “It was the perfect time to do it,” the MP said. A number of MPs who might have been vocal have since been made parliamentary private secretaries — the most junior government role. “They have basically gagged the people who would be most likely to be outspoken on it,” the MP above said. The department’s ministerial team is now more likely to be loyal to the Starmer project. “I just felt hurt, and wounded. We were stunned. None of us saw it coming,” said one MP from the 2024 cohort, adding: “They priced in that backlash wouldn’t come.” But they added: “If we were culpable so were NGOs, too inward-looking and focused on peripheral issues.” The lack of outcry from MPs would, however, seem to put them largely in step with the wider British public. Polling and focus groups from think tank More in Common suggest that despite the majority of voters thinking spending on international aid is the right thing to do in a variety of circumstances, only around 20 percent of the public think the budget was cut too much.  The second new-intake Labour MP quoted above said the policy was therefore an “easy thing to sell on the doorstep,” and “in my area, there’s not going to be shouting from the rooftops to spend more money on aid.” DIMINISHED AND DEMORALIZED The cuts to aid come at a time when Britain’s Foreign Office is undergoing a radical overhaul. While the department describes its plans as “more agile,” staff, programs and entire areas of focus are all ripe for cuts to save money. The department is looking to make redundancies for around 25 percent of staff based in the U.K. MPs have voiced concern that development staff will be among the first to make the jump due to the government’s shift away from aid. The department insists that no final decisions have been taken over the size and shape of the organization. Major cuts are expected across work on education, conflict, and WASH (Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene.) The government’s Integrated Security Fund — which funds key counter-terror programs abroad — is also looking to scale back work abroad which does not have a clear link to Britain’s national security. The British Council — a key soft-power organization viewed as helping combat Chinese and Russian reach across the world — told MPs it is in “real financial peril” and would be cutting its presence in 35 of the 97 countries it operates. The BBC’s World Service is seeing similar cuts to its global reach. The Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI), the watchdog for aid spending, is also not safe from the ax as the government continues its bonfire of regulators. The FCDO did not refute the expected pathway of cuts. Published breakdowns of spending allocations for the next three years are due to be published in the coming months, an official said. A review of Britain’s development and diplomacy policies conducted by economist Minouche Shafik — who has since been moved into Downing Street — sits discarded in the department. The government refuses to publish its findings. Aid spending was spared a repeat visit by Chancellor Rachel Reeves in her government-wide budget last month — but that hasn’t stopped MPs worrying about a second bite. | Pool Photo by Adrian Dennis via Getty Images The second 2024 intake MP quoted earlier in the piece said that following the U.S. decisions on aid and foreign policy “there was an expectation that the U.K., as a responsible international partner, as a leader on a lot of this stuff, would fill the gap to some extent, and then take more of a leadership role on it, and we’ve done the opposite.” NOTHING LEFT TO CUT Aid spending was spared a repeat visit by Chancellor Rachel Reeves in her government-wide budget last month — but that hasn’t stopped MPs worrying about a second bite. While few MPs or those in the aid sector feel Britain will ever return to the lofty heights of its 0.7 percent commitment, they predict there will be harder resistance if the government comes back for more. “I don’t think they’re going to try and do it again, as there’s no money left,” the second 2024 intake MP said. But they pointed out that a large portion of the remaining aid budget is spent on in-country costs such as accommodation for asylum seekers. Savings identified from the asylum budget would be sent back to the Treasury, rather than put back into the aid budget, they noted. Remaining spending is largely mandatory contributions to organizations such as the World Bank or the United Nations and would, they warned, involve “getting rid of international agreements and chopping up longstanding influence at big international institutions that we are one of the leading people in.” The United Nations is already facing its own funding crisis as it struggles to adjust to the global downturn in aid spending. British diplomat Tom Fletcher — who leads the UN’s humanitarian response — said earlier this year that the organization has been “forced into a triage of human survival,” adding: “The math is cruel, and the consequences are heartbreaking.” The government still has a commitment to returning to 0.7 percent of GNI “as soon as the fiscal circumstances allow.” The tests for this ramp back up were set out four years ago. Britain must not be borrowing for day-to-day spending and underlying debt must be falling. The last two budgets have forecast that the government will not meet these tests in this parliament. FARAGE CIRCLES In the meantime, Labour’s opponents feel emboldened to go further. Both the Conservatives and Reform UK have said that they would further cut the aid budget. The Tories have vowed to slice it down to 0.1 percent of GNI, while Nigel Farage’s Reform UK is eyeing fresh cuts of at least by £7-8 billion a year. A third 2024 Labour MP said that there was a degree of pressure among some colleagues to match the Conservatives’ 0.1 percent pledge. Though no country has gone as far as Uganda’s Idi Amin in setting up a “save Britain fund” for its “former colonial masters,” Britain’s departure on international aid gives space for other countries wanting to step up to further their own foreign policy aims. The space vacated by Britain and America has prompted warnings that China will step in, while countries newer to international development such as Gulf states could try and fill the void. Many of these nations are unlikely to ever fund the same projects as the U.K. and the U.S., forcing NGOs to look to alternate donors such as philanthropists to fund their work. “There’ll be a big, big gap, and it won’t be completely filled,” the second new intake MP said. An FCDO spokesperson said the department was undergoing “an unprecedented transformation,” and added: “We remain resolutely committed to international development and have been clear we must modernize our approach to development to reflect the changing global context. We will bring U.K. expertise and investment to where it is needed most, including global health solutions and humanitarian support.”

BRUSSELS — The European Union has approved a proposal to curb trade benefits for developing countries that refuse to take back migrants whose stay in the bloc has been denied. Low-tariff access to the EU’s market will be reviewed in the context of “the readmission of that country’s own nationals” who have been identified as “irregular migrants to the Union,” a document seen by POLITICO confirms. Negotiators from the Council of the EU, the European Parliament and the European Commission agreed to the draft text late Monday night. The push to link trade measures to migration policy comes amid major advances by far-right parties across Europe and calls for governments to get tougher on enforcing returns. Currently, only a small share of those eligible for removal from the EU are actually deported — many because their home countries refuse to cooperate. “In case of serious and systematic shortcomings related to the international obligation to readmit a beneficiary country’s own nationals, the preferential arrangements … may be withdrawn temporarily, in respect of all or of certain products originating in that beneficiary country, where the Commission considers that an insufficient level of cooperation on readmission persists,” it reads. The readmission clause will be applied with more or less stringent conditions depending on a country’s development level, the document also says. The measures, which would only be invoked after dialog with countries, are being included in an overhaul of the so-called Generalized Scheme of Preferences, a 50-year old program that enables poorer countries to export goods to EU countries at lower tariff rates. The review of the program, which has been under negotiation for over three years, is designed to help these nations build their economies and is tied to the implementation of human rights, labor and environmental reforms. However, the issue of cheap rice imports from Pakistan or Bangladesh threatened to collapse the talks before the eventual agreement on Monday, amid concerns from EU producers like Spain and Italy that want to ensure their own farmers are not outcompeted. EU countries have long been considering the idea of using trade, development and visa policies to ensure third countries agree to take back failed migrants, amid growing public discontent that has driven victories for far-right parties at the ballot box. However, the proposals had faced opposition from the Parliament, as well as the Commission and a handful of capitals that feared this would upend relations with key partner countries. Denmark’s center-left government set its sights on migration as a key issue for its presidency, which ends on Dec. 31. Justice and home affairs ministers will meet next Monday to discuss ways to ensure more people leave the EU after their applications to stay are rejected, including through so-called return hubs in third countries.

Donald Trump’s drive to secure peace in Ukraine must not let Vladimir Putin off the hook for war crimes committed by Russian forces, a top EU official has warned, effectively setting a new red line for a deal.  In an interview with POLITICO, Michael McGrath, the European commissioner for justice and democracy, said negotiators must ensure the push for a ceasefire does not result in Russia escaping prosecution.  His comments reflect concerns widely held in European capitals that the original American blueprint for a deal included the promise of a “full amnesty for actions committed during the war,” alongside plans to reintegrate Russia into the world economy. The Trump team’s push to rehabilitate the Kremlin chief comes despite international condemnation of Russia for alleged crimes including the abduction of 20,000 Ukrainian children and attacks targeting civilians in Bucha, Mariupol and elsewhere.  “I don’t think history will judge kindly any effort to wipe the slate clean for Russian crimes in Ukraine,” McGrath said. “They must be held accountable for those crimes and that will be the approach of the European Union in all of these discussions. “Were we to do so, to allow for impunity for those crimes, we would be sowing the seeds of the next round of aggression and the next invasion,” he added. “And I believe that that would be a historic mistake of huge proportions.” Protesters in London, June 2025. There has been international condemnation of Russia for alleged crimes including the abduction of 20,000 Ukrainian children and attacks targeting civilians. | Vuk Valcic/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images Ukrainian authorities say they have opened investigations into more than 178,000 alleged Russian crimes since the start of the war. Last month, a United Nations commission found Russian authorities had committed crimes against humanity in targeting Ukrainian residents through drone attacks, and the war crimes of forcible transfer and deportation of civilians.  “We cannot give up on the rights of the victims of Russian aggression and Russian crimes,” McGrath said. “Millions of lives have been taken or destroyed, and people forcibly removed, and we have ample evidence.”  The EU and others have worked to set up a new special tribunal for the crime of aggression with the aim of bringing Russian leaders to justice for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which began in February 2022. In March 2023, judges at the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Putin, naming him “allegedly responsible for the war crime of unlawful deportation of population [children]” from Ukraine. But Trump and his team have so far shown little interest in prosecuting Putin. In fact, the U.S. president has consistently described his Russian counterpart in positive terms, often talking about how he is able to have a “good conversation” with Putin. Trump has expressed the hope of building new economic and energy partnerships with Russia, and the pair have even discussed organizing ice hockey matches in Russia and the U.S. once the war is over.   The draft 28-point peace plan that Trump’s team circulated last week continues in a similar vein.  It states that “Russia will be reintegrated into the global economy” and invited to rejoin the G8 after being expelled in 2014 following Moscow’s annexation of Crimea. “The United States will enter into a long-term economic cooperation agreement for mutual development in the areas of energy, natural resources, infrastructure, artificial intelligence, data centers, rare earth metal extraction projects in the Arctic, and other mutually beneficial corporate opportunities,” the document said. The U.S. peace plan proposes to lift sanctions against Russia in stages, though European leaders have pushed back to emphasize that the removal of EU sanctions will be for them to decide. Not everyone in Europe wants to maintain the squeeze on Moscow, however. Hungary has repeatedly stalled new sanctions, especially on oil and gas, for which it relies on Russia. Senior politicians in Germany, too, have floated the idea of lifting sanctions on the Nord Stream gas pipeline from Russia.