BRUSSELS ― European governments and corporations are racing to reduce their exposure to U.S. technology, military hardware and energy resources as transatlantic relations sour.  For decades, the EU relied on NATO guarantees to ensure security in the bloc, and on American technology to power its business. Donald Trump’s threats to take over Greenland, and aggressive comments about Europe by members of his administration, have given fresh impetus to European leaders’ call for “independence.” “If we want to be taken seriously again, we will have to learn the language of power politics,” German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said last week. From orders banning civil servants from using U.S.-based videoconferencing tools to trade deals with countries like India to a push to diversify Europe’s energy suppliers, efforts to minimize European dependence on the U.S. are gathering pace. EU leaders warn that transatlantic relations are unlikely to return to the pre-Trump status quo. EU officials stress that such measures amount to “de-risking” Europe’s relationship with the U.S., rather than “decoupling” — a term that implies a clean break in economic and strategic ties. Until recently, both expressions were mainly applied to European efforts to reduce dependence on China. Now, they are coming up in relation to the U.S., Europe’s main trade partner and security benefactor. The decoupling drive is in its infancy. The U.S. remains by far the largest trading partner for Europe, and it will take years for the bloc to wean itself off American tech and military support, according to Jean-Luc Demarty, who was in charge of the European Commission’s trade department under the body’s former president, Jean-Claude Juncker. Donald Trump’s threats to take over Greenland, and aggressive comments about Europe by members of his administration, have given fresh impetus to European leaders’ call for “independence.” | Kristian Tuxen Ladegaard Berg/NurPhoto via Getty Images “In terms of trade, they [the U.S.] represent a significant share of our exports,” said Demarty. “So it’s a lot, but it’s not a matter of life and death.” The push to diversify away from the U.S. has seen Brussels strike trade deals with the Mercosur bloc of Latin American countries, India and Indonesia in recent months. The Commission also revamped its deal with Mexico, and revived stalled negotiations with Australia. DEFENDING EUROPE: FROM NATO TO THE EU Since the continent emerged from the ashes of World War II, Europe has relied for its security on NATO — which the U.S. contributes the bulk of funding to. At a weekend retreat in Zagreb, Croatia, conservative European leaders including Merz said it was time for the bloc to beef up its homegrown mutual-defense clause, which binds EU countries to an agreement to defend any EU country that comes under attack. While it has existed since 2009, the EU’s Article 42.7 mutual defense clause was rarely seen as necessary because NATO’s Article 5 served a similar purpose. But Europe’s governments have started to doubt whether the U.S. really would come to Europe’s rescue. In Zagreb, the leaders embraced the EU’s new role as a security actor, tasking two leaders, as yet unnamed, with rapidly cooking up plans to turn the EU clause from words to an ironclad security guarantee. “For decades, some countries said ‘We have NATO, why should we have parallel structures?’” said a senior EU diplomat who was granted anonymity to talk about confidential summit preparations. After Trump’s Greenland saber-rattling, “we are faced with the necessity, we have to set up military command structures within the EU.” At a weekend retreat in Zagreb, Croatia, conservative European leaders including Merz said it was time for the bloc to beef up its homegrown mutual-defense clause, which binds EU countries to an agreement to defend any EU country that comes under attack. | Marko Perkov/AFP via Getty Images In comments to EU lawmakers last week, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte said that anyone who believes Europe can defend itself without the U.S. should “keep on dreaming.” Europe remains heavily reliant on U.S. military capabilities, most notably in its support for Ukraine’s fight against Russia. But some Europeans are now openly talking about the price of reducing exposure to the U.S. — and saying it’s manageable. TECHNOLOGY: TEAMS OUT, VISIO IN The mood shift is clearest when it comes to technology, where European reliance on platforms such as X, Meta and Google has long troubled EU voters, as evidenced by broad support for the bloc’s tech legislation. French President Emmanuel Macron’s government is planning to ban officials from using U.S.-based videoconferencing tools. Other countries like Germany are contemplating similar moves. “It’s very clear that Europe is having our independence moment,” EU tech czar Henna Virkkunen told a POLITICO conference last week. “During the last year, everybody has really realized how important it is that we are not dependent on one country or one company when it comes to some very critical technologies.” France is moving to ban public officials from using American platforms including Google Meet, Zoom and Teams, a government spokesperson told POLITICO. Officials will soon make the switch to Visio, a videoconferencing tool that runs on infrastructure provided by French firm Outscale. In the European Parliament, lawmakers are urging its president, Roberta Metsola, to ditch U.S. software and hardware, as well as a U.S.-based travel booking tool. In Germany, politicians want a potential German or European substitute for software made by U.S. data analysis firm Palantir. “Such dependencies on key technologies are naturally a major problem,” Sebastian Fiedler, an SPD lawmaker and expert on policing, told POLITICO. Even in the Netherlands, among Europe’s more pro-American countries, there are growing calls from lawmakers and voters to ring-fence sensitive technologies from U.S. influence. Dutch lawmakers are reviewing a petition signed by 140,000 people calling on the state to block the acquisition of a state identity verification tool by a U.S. company. At the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in late January, German entrepreneur Anna Zeiter announced the launch of a Europe-based social media platform called W that could rival Elon Musk’s X, which has faced fines for breaching the EU’s content moderation rules. W plans to host its data on “European servers owned by European companies” and limits its investors to Europeans, Zeiter told Euronews. So far, Brussels has yet to codify any such moves into law. But upcoming legislation on cloud and AI services are expected to send signals about the need to Europeanize the bloc’s tech offerings. ENERGY: TIME TO DIVERSIFY On energy, the same trend is apparent. The United States provides more than a quarter of the EU’s gas, a share set to rise further as a full ban on Russian imports takes effect. But EU officials warn about the risk of increasing Europe’s dependency on the U.S. in yet another area. Trump’s claims on Greenland were a “clear wake-up call” for the EU, showing that energy can no longer be seen in isolation from geopolitical trends, EU Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen said last Wednesday. The Greenland crisis reinforced concerns that the bloc risks “replacing one dependency with another,” said Jørgensen, adding that as a result, Brussels is stepping up efforts to diversify, deepening talks with alternative suppliers including Canada, Qatar and North African countries such as Algeria. FINANCE: MOVING TO EUROPEAN PAYMENTS Payment systems are also drawing scrutiny, with lawmakers warning about over-reliance on U.S. payment systems such as Mastercard and Visa. The digital euro, a digital version of cash that the European Central Bank is preparing to issue in 2029, aims to cut these dependencies and provide a pan-European sovereign means of payment. “With the digital euro, Europeans would remain in control of their money, their choices and their future,” ECB President Christine Lagarde said last year. In Germany, some politicians are sounding the alarm about 1,236 tons of gold reserves that Germany keeps in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. “In a time of growing global uncertainty and under President Trump’s unpredictable U.S. policy, it’s no longer acceptable” to have that much in gold reserves in the U.S., Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, the German politician from the liberal Free Democratic Party, who chairs the Parliament’s defense committee, told Der Spiegel. Several European countries are pushing the EU to privilege European manufacturers when it comes to spending EU public money via “Buy European” clauses. Until a few years ago, countries like Poland, the Netherlands or the Baltic states would never have agreed on such “Buy European” clauses. But even those countries are now backing calls to prioritize purchases from EU-based companies. MILITARY INVESTMENT: BOOSTING OWN CAPACITY A €150 billion EU program to help countries boost their defense investments, finalized in May of last year, states that no more than 35 percent of the components in a given purchase, by cost, should originate from outside the EU and partner states like Norway and Ukraine. The U.S. is not considered a partner country under the scheme. For now, European countries rely heavily on the U.S. for military enablers including surveillance and reconnaissance, intelligence, strategic lift, missile defense and space-based assets. But the powerful conservative umbrella group, the European People Party, says these are precisely the areas where Europe needs to ramp up its own capacities. When EU leaders from the EPP agreed on their 2026 roadmap in Zagreb, they stated that the “Buy European” principle should apply to an upcoming Commission proposal on joint procurement. The title of the EPP’s 2026 roadmap? “Time for independence.” Camille Gijs, Jacopo Barigazzi, Mathieu Pollet, Giovanna Faggionato, Eliza Gkritsi, Elena Giordano, Ben Munster and Sam Clark contributed reporting from Brussels. James Angelos contributed reporting from Berlin.

Belgium is not heading to Greenland to pick a fight with Washington, Defense Minister Theo Francken said Friday, pushing back against suggestions that a growing European military presence on the Arctic island amounts to a show of force against the United States. “It now looks as if we’re going there to say: come on, Uncle Sam, let’s have a good fight and see who wins,” Francken said in a television interview with VRT. “That is absolutely not the intention,” he added. Francken said Belgium will send a single officer as part of a Danish-led reconnaissance mission to Greenland, aimed at assessing logistics, operational options and conditions on the ground.  “This is a reconnaissance mission,” he said, stressing there is no permanent deployment or combat posture planned. The move comes as Denmark and a growing group of European allies step up military activity in and around Greenland, expanding exercises and troop presence at Copenhagen’s request.  Denmark has said the goal is to strengthen Arctic security and allies’ ability to operate in extreme conditions, with officers and small detachments already arriving from several European countries. But the deployments are unfolding against an unusually volatile political backdrop. U.S. President Donald Trump has repeatedly raised the prospect of taking control of Greenland, and earlier this month he said it “may be a choice” for Washington between seizing the island and preserving NATO.  Trump also dismissed international law constraints, saying he did not “need” them. Francken framed Europe’s response as reassurance rather than deterrence. The message to Washington, he said, is that Europeans are prepared to take responsibility for Greenland’s security, officially citing concerns about Russian and Chinese activity in the Arctic, and would prefer to do so under a NATO umbrella that includes the United States. He added that the deployment was “not about telling the Americans: come here, let’s start a war, because we would not win.”

LONDON — Britain stepped up a promise to send troops into Ukraine — and left open a host of questions about how it will all work in practice. At a meeting of the “coalition of the willing” in Paris this week, the U.K. and France signed a “declaration of intent” to station forces in Ukraine as part of a multinational bid to support any ceasefire deal with Russia. It builds on months of behind-the-scenes planning by civil servants and military personnel eager to put heft behind any agreement. Despite promising a House of Commons vote, U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer has so far shared very little information publicly about how the operation might work and what its terms of engagement will be, at a time when Britain’s armed forces are already under significant strain. This lack of transparency has begun to raise alarm bells in defense circles. Ed Arnold of think tank the Royal United Services Institute has described the U.K. as being in “a really dangerous position,” while retired commander Tim Collins said any peacekeeping mission would not be credible without higher defense spending. Even Nigel Farage was in on the action Wednesday — the populist leader of Britain’s Reform UK party said he couldn’t sign up to the plan in its current form, and predicted the country could only keep its commitments going “for six or eight weeks.” Here are the key questions still lingering for Starmer’s government. HAS THE UK GOT ENOUGH TROOPS? In France, Emmanuel Macron is at least starting to get into the numbers. The French president gave a televised address Tuesday in which he said France envisaged sending “several thousands” of troops to Ukrainian territory. But Starmer has given no equivalent commitment. Under pressure in the House of Commons, the British prime minster defended that position Wednesday, saying the size of the deployment would depend on the nature of the ceasefire agreed between Russia and Ukraine. However, analysts say it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which a deployment does not place a genuine strain on the U.K.’s military. The country’s strategic defense review, published last year, stressed that the Britain’s armed forces have dwindled in strength since the Cold War, leaving “only a small set of forces ready to deploy at any given moment. The latest figures from the Ministry of Defence put the number of medically-deployable troops at 99,162. Figures including former head of the army Richard Dannatt and Matthew Savill, director of military sciences at RUSI, have warned that a new deployment in Ukraine would mean pulling away from existing operations. There is also a hefty question mark over how long troops might be deployed for, and whether they might be taking on an open-ended commitment of the kind that snarled Britain for years in Afghanistan. RUSI’s Arnold said positioning troops in Ukraine could be “bigger” than deployments in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo and Libya, “not necessarily in numbers, but in terms of the consequences… This mission absolutely can’t fail. And if it’s a mission that can’t fail, it needs to be absolutely watertight.” WHAT HAPPENS IF RUSSIA ACTUALLY ATTACKS? Ministers have refused to be drawn so far on the expectations placed on troops who might be stationed in Ukraine as part of the plan. They have instead placed an emphasis on the U.K.’s role as part of a “reassurance” force, providing air and maritime support, with ground activity focused on training Ukrainian soldiers, and have not specified what would happen if British troops came under direct threat. The latest figures from the Ministry of Defence put the number of medically-deployable troops at 99,162. | Pool photo by Jason Alden/EPA That’s already got Kyiv asking questions. “Would all the COW partners give a strong response if Russia attacks again? That’s a hard question. I ask all of them, and I still have not gotten a clear answer,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told reporters via WhatsApp chat on Wednesday. “I see political will. I see partners being ready to give us strong sanctions, security guarantees. But until we have legally binding security guarantees, approved by parliaments, by the U.S. Congress, we cannot answer the question if partners are ready to protect us,” Zelenskyy added. Richard Shirreff, former deputy supreme commander of NATO in Europe, told LBC: “This can’t be a lightly armed ‘blue beret’-type peacekeeping force … enforcing peace means being prepared to overmatch the Russians, and that means also being prepared to fight them if necessary.” A U.K. military official, granted anonymity to speak candidly, said: “There is no point in troops being there if they’re not prepared to fight.” Asked if British troops could return fire if they came under attack from Russia, a Downing Street spokesman said Wednesday afternoon that they would not comment on “operational hypothetical scenarios.”  Ministers have refused to be drawn so far on the expectations placed on troops who might be stationed in Ukraine as part of the plan. | Tolga Akmen/EPA Returning fire might even be one of the simpler possibilities for the army to contemplate, with less clarity over how peacekeeping forces could respond to other types of hostile activity designed to destabilize a ceasefire, such as drone incursions or attempted hacking. WILL THE US REALLY PROVIDE A BACKSTOP? Starmer has long stressed that U.K. military involvement will depend on the U.S. offering back-up. John Foreman, a former British defense attaché in Moscow and Kyiv, said it was right for the multinational force to focus on support for Ukraine’s own forces, pointing out: “It was never going to be able to provide credible security guarantees — only the U.S. with perhaps key allies can do this.” While Washington has inched forward in its apparent willingness to provide security guarantees — including warm words from Donald Trump’s top envoys in Paris Tuesday — they are by no means set in stone.  The final statement, which emerged from Tuesday’s meeting, was watered down from an earlier draft, removing references to American participation in the multinational force for Ukraine, including with “U.S. capabilities such as intelligence and logistics, and with a U.S. commitment to support the force if it is attacked.” This will only add to fears that the U.K. is talking beyond its capabilities and is overly optimistic about the behavior of its allies. Government officials pushed back against the accusation that British military plans lack substance, arguing that it would be “irresponsible” to share specific operational details prematurely. That position could be difficult to maintain for long.

PARIS — Europe and the U.S. presented a united front for Ukraine in Paris on Tuesday, hailing security guarantees with American backing and laying out a detailed plan for bolstering Kyiv long-term. In a notable show of support, U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff and Donald Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner praised European work to hash out a plan that would provide a security guarantee to ongoing peace talks with Russia.  “We have largely finished the security protocols,” said Witkoff, standing alongside the leaders of France, Germany, the U.K. and Ukraine at the Elysée Palace. “This is important so that when this war ends, it ends forever,” he added, after praising Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his “outstanding team.” Europeans, Americans and Ukrainians had agreed on “robust” security guarantees for Ukraine, French President Emmanuel Macron said. Those guarantees include the U.S.-led monitoring of a ceasefire and the deployment of a multinational force in Ukraine in case of a peace deal with Russia, according to the joint statement put out by the so-called coalition of the willing — a loose group of Ukraine allies that doesn’t include Washington. Security guarantees are “the key to ensuring that a peace agreement can never mean a Ukrainian surrender and that a peace agreement can never mean a new threat to Ukraine,” Macron said.  But the upbeat declarations in Paris will not allay the doubts swirling over the U.S. commitment to supporting Ukraine and the European continent. While it was initially hoped that Washington would commit to a joint statement on the security guarantees, the final declaration was ultimately only signed by the coalition of the willing. Details of American participation in the multinational force for Ukraine were removed from an earlier draft, seen by POLITICO. That version had stipulated the U.S. would commit to “support the force if it is attacked” and assist with intelligence and logistics. Leaders also did not want to be drawn on the credibility of U.S. commitments in the wake of the capture by U.S. forces of Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro and President Donald Trump’s threat to seize Greenland.  Europeans, Americans and Ukrainians had agreed on “robust” security guarantees for Ukraine, French President Emmanuel Macron said. | Ludovic Marin/Getty Images Witkoff refused to comment on Greenland, instead turning his focus to Kyiv and insisting that Trump “strongly stands behind security protocols.” “The president does not back down from his commitments … we will be there for Ukraine,” he said.   Responding to a question on Washington’s credibility, Zelenskyy said the security guarantees must be backed by the U.S. Congress. “We are counting a lot on that, the documents are ready,” he said. A PLAN FOR UKRAINE The statement from Kyiv’s European allies says they stand ready to commit to “legally binding” security guarantees to support Ukraine in the event of a peace deal with Russia. Crucially, the monitoring and verification of a future ceasefire would be led by the U.S., with contributions from countries including the U.K. and Germany.  The plan also sets out security guarantees that would include long-term support for the Ukrainian armed forces, the deployment of a European-led multinational force in Ukraine in case of a peace settlement, and “binding” commitments to support Ukraine should there be a future Russian attack.  “The coalition of the willing declaration for a solid and lasting peace … for the first time recognizes an operational convergence between the 35 countries, Ukraine and the U.S. to build robust security guarantees,” Macron told reporters. Washington will participate in those guarantees, including with the “backstop” that Europeans wanted, he added.  British Prime Minister Keir Starmer said that after a ceasefire, the U.K. and France will set up military hubs across Ukraine and “build protected facilities for weapons and military equipment to support Ukraine’s defense needs.” France, the U.K. and Ukraine signed a separate declaration on Tuesday laying out these commitments. The European-led multinational force will cover land, air and sea and will be stationed in Western Ukraine, far from the contact line, Macron said. France and the U.K. have previously said they would be willing to put boots on the ground — but most other coalition members, including Germany, have so far shied away from joining that commitment. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said Berlin was open to deploying its troops in a neighboring NATO country that would act in case of Russian aggression. | Tom Nicholson/Getty Images Other nations have suggested deploying aircraft based in neighboring NATO countries to monitor Ukrainian skies, and Turkey has agreed to lead the coalition’s maritime segment to secure the Black Sea.  German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said Berlin was open to deploying its troops in a neighboring NATO country that would act in case of Russian aggression, telling reporters “we are not ruling anything out.” But he stressed that the final decision would be up to Germany’s parliament. “I will only make proposals to the Bundestag once there is a ceasefire and the coalition of the willing has agreed on the procedure to be followed,” he told reporters. “The prerequisite is a ceasefire.” Some European countries, however, remain reluctant to deploy military assets in a post-war Ukraine. Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis repeated that Greece will not participate in a European military force in Ukraine. However, Greek government officials said Mitsotakis has not ruled out other forms of assistance, such as in maritime surveillance. Nektaria Stamouli contributed reporting.

BERLIN — Germany’s military planners are warning that recent cyberattacks, sabotage and disinformation campaigns could be the opening salvo in a new war, according to a confidential government document seen by POLITICO. That assessment is set out in the Operational Plan for Germany (OPLAN), a blueprint for how Berlin would organize the defense of German territory in a major NATO conflict. The planning reflects a broader shift in Germany — which has assumed a central role in logistics and reinforcement planning for the alliance — as Russia has grown increasingly belligerent toward European NATO countries following the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine almost four years ago. The document states that hybrid measures “can fundamentally serve to prepare a military confrontation.” Rather than treating cyber operations or influence campaigns as background pressure, the plan places them directly within the logic of military escalation. The assumption has concrete consequences for how Germany plans its role in a future conflict. The document frames Germany as an operational base and transit corridor for NATO troops that would come under pressure early, particularly because of its role as the alliance’s main hub for moving and sustaining forces. The 24-page document is classified as a so-called light version of the plan, which aims to coordinate civilian and military actors to define Germany’s role as a transit hub for allied forces.  In a conflict scenario, Germany would become “a prioritized target of conventional attacks with long-range weapon systems” directed against both military and civilian infrastructure, the document states. OPLAN lays out a five-phase escalation model, ranging from early threat detection and deterrence to national defense, NATO collective defense and post-conflict recovery. The document notes that Germany is currently operating in the first phase, where it is focused on building a shared threat picture, coordinating across government, and preparing logistics and protection measures. The plan also assigns a significantly expanded role to domestic military forces. Homeland security units are tasked with protecting critical infrastructure, securing troop movements across German territory, and supporting the maintenance of state functions while combat forces deploy elsewhere. Civilian structures are treated as essential to military success, with transport networks, energy supply, health services and private contractors repeatedly cited as required enablers. The document states that “numerous tasks require civilian support,” without which the plan can’t be implemented. In recent months, Germany and its allies have faced a stream of hybrid attacks that mirror the scenarios the planners describe in OPLAN. Federal authorities have documented rising Russian espionage, cyberattacks and influence efforts targeting political institutions, critical infrastructure and public opinion, with Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt describing the country as a “daily target of hybrid warfare.”

Poland has signed a multi-billion euro contract to develop domestic capacity for manufacturing precision-guided rockets for its HOMAR-K multiple rocket launcher program, the state-run Armament Agency said Monday. The 14 billion złoty (€3.3 billion) deal, which expands on a series of major defense contracts with Warsaw’s South Korean partners, covers the delivery of 239-mm CGR-080 precision-guided rockets with a range of 80 kilometers. The missiles will be produced in a newly-built facility in Poland starting in 2030 by a consortium led by Polish-Korean joint-venture Hanwha WB Advanced System together with Korea’s Hanwha Aerospace.  The deal is the third in a sequence linked to the HOMAR-K program. The first contract, signed in November 2022, covered the supply of 218 Korean K239 Chunmoo launcher modules, along with their integration onto the Polish-made Jelcz truck chassis. The pact also included logistics and training packages, a stock of missiles (including larger 607-mm tactical weapons with a range of 290 km) and technical support. The second contract, signed in April 2024, provided for 72 additional launcher modules, logistics and training, integration work, more missiles and further technical support. Poland has earmarked 4.8 percent of its GDP for defense spending in 2026, making it NATO’s top spender relative to the size of its economy.

KYIV — Russia attacked Ukraine with dozens of cruise missiles and kamikaze drones in the early hours of Tuesday morning, with strikes reported in Kyiv and in 13 other regions, after the U.S. mediators hosted what they called “constructive” peace talks in Florida last weekend. Moscow launched more than 650 drones and more than 30 missiles at Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in a morning statement. “This Russian strike sends a clear signal about Russian priorities. A strike before Christmas, when people want to be with their families, at home, safe. A strike in the midst of negotiations to end this war. Putin can’t accept that the killing has to stop. And that means the world isn’t putting enough pressure on Russia,” Zelenskyy added. After Russia last week brushed off German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s call for a Christmas сeasefire, Zelenskyy warned that Moscow is planning massive attacks over the holiday period. “The military must pay attention directly, protect as best they can — it’s not easy, because there is a shortage of air defense [equipment], unfortunately. And people need to pay attention — a lot of attention these days, because these ‘comrades’ can strike: nothing is sacred,” Zelenskyy said in an evening post on Telegram on Monday. The strikes on Tuesday morning injured five people in the capital Kyiv, reported Tymur Tkachenko, the head of the local military administration.  In the Kyiv region, one person was killed and three were wounded, the State Emergency Service of Ukraine said in a statement. Another person was killed in the western region of Khmelnytskyi. In the nearby Chernihiv region, first responders were fighting fires caused by drone attacks that lasted all night. The Odesa region, where Russian attacks on Dec. 13 knocked out power for thousands of residents, was attacked again on Tuesday morning. The Russian strikes damaged more than 120 buildings, as well as energy and port infrastructure, including a civilian vessel, the State Emergency Service said. In the western region of Zhytomyr, Russian drones injured six people, Governor Vitaly Bunechko said in a Telegram post. Later, the authorities reported that a child had died in the attack.

One trillion US dollars of gross domestic product (GDP) has been surpassed. Poland has entered the ranks of the world’s 20 largest economies, symbolically ending a phase of chasing the West that has lasted more than three decades. The Polish Development Fund’s (PFR) new strategy seeks to address the challenge of avoiding the medium-level development trap and transitioning from the role of subcontractor to that of investor. This year marks a turning point in Polish economic history. After years of transformation, reforms and overcoming civilizational deficits, Poland has reached a point that the generation of ‘89 could only dream of. GDP crossed the symbolic barrier of US$1 trillion, and we proudly enter the exclusive club of the world’s 20 largest economies. Diversified Polish exports are breaking records, and innovative companies are conquering global markets. Sound like a happy ending? Not necessarily. Via PFR Investing for future generations Poland’s past success invites tougher challenges in a brutal world. The cheap labor growth model is dead; demographics are relentless. PFR analyses highlight declining employment as a core issue — without bold changes, stagnation looms. Piotr Matczuk, PFR president, says Poland needs an impetus for resilience, innovation and growth. PFR’s 2026-2030 strategy is that roadmap, urging a shift to high gear. On Dec. 10, it unveiled investments for future generations. Geopolitics enters the balance sheet PFR’s strategy marks a paradigm shift: integrating economics with security. Business now anchors state security, with “economic and defence resilience” as a core pillar — viewing security spending as essential insurance, not cost. > The PFR’s strategy is clear: the competitiveness of the Polish economy depends > directly on access to cheap and clean energy. PFR has invested in WB Electronics, Poland’s defense leader in command systems and drones. It expands beyond arms via dual-use tech: algorithms, encrypted communications and autonomous drones often from civilian startups. This spring’s PFR Deep Tech program backs venture capital (VC) for scaling these firms; IDA targets innovations for logistics, cybersecurity and future defense. The focus is Poland’s technological sovereignty. Controlling key security links — from ammo to artificial intelligence — ensures economic maturity resilient to geopolitical shocks. > Poland needs a boost to our resilience, innovation and growth rate. That is > why the new strategy emphasizes investment in new technologies, infrastructure > and the financial security of Poles. We want the PFR to be a catalyst for > change and a partner of choice — an institution that invests for future > generations, sets quality standards in development financing and supports > Polish entrepreneurs in boosting their international presence. > > Piotr Matczuk, President, PFR Piotr Matczuk, President, PFR / Via PFR Energy: to be or not to be for the industry If defense is the shield, then energy is the bloodstream. The PFR’s strategy is clear: the competitiveness of the Polish economy depends directly on access to cheap and clean energy. Without accelerating the transformation, Polish companies, instead of increasing their share in foreign markets, may lose their position. This is why the fund wants to enter the game as an investor where the risks are high, but the stakes are even higher — into an investment gap that the commercial market alone will not fill.  The concept of local content, in other words the participation of domestic companies in the supply chain, is key to the new strategy. This is where the circle closes. The Baltic Hub is not just a container terminal. Investment in the T5 installation terminal is the foundation, as the Polish offshore will not be built with the appropriate participation of a domestic port. This is a classic example of how the PFR works: building ‘hard’ infrastructure that becomes a springboard for a whole new sector of the economy.  The end of being a subcontractor: capital emancipation Taking inspiration from, among others, France’s Tibi Initiative, in mid-November 2025 the Polish minister of finance and economy, Andrzej Domański, announced the Innovate Poland program. The PFR plays a leading role in what will be the largest initiative in the history of the Polish economy to invest in innovative projects. Thanks to cooperation with Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK), PZU and the European Investment Fund, Innovate Poland is already worth 4 billion złoty, and the program multiplier may reach as much as 3-4. The combined development and private capital will be invested by experienced VC and private equity funds. The aim is to further Poland’s economic development — driven by innovative companies that make a profit. In the first phase, it is expected to finance up to 250 companies at various stages of development. Via PFR The expansion of Polish companies abroad is also part of the effort for advancement in the global hierarchy. Their support is one of the pillars of the new PFR strategy. For three decades, Poland has played the role of the assembly plant of Europe — solid, cheap and hard-working. However, the highest margins, flowing from having a global brand and market control, went overseas. Polish companies need to stop being anonymous subcontractors and become owners of assets in foreign markets.  Here, the PFR acts as financial leverage. The support for the Trend Group is a prime example of this maturing process. This is a transaction with a symbolic dimension: it reverses the investment vector of the 1990s, when German capital was consolidating Polish assets. Today, it is Polish entities that are increasingly becoming leaders in offering industrial solutions in the European Union. > Polish companies need to stop being anonymous subcontractors and become owners > of assets in foreign markets. However, these ambitions extend beyond the Western direction. The strategy strongly emphasizes Poland’s role in the future reconstruction of Ukraine and the consolidation of the Central and Eastern European region. The involvement of the PFR in the operations of the Euvic Group on the Ukrainian IT market is a good example. In the digital world, big players have more power, and the PFR strives to ensure that the decision-making centers of those growing giants remain in Poland. Most importantly, Polish businesses are no longer alone in this struggle. The strategy institutionalizes the concept of ‘Team Poland’. In this initiative, the PFR provides capital; BGK, a state development bank, offers debt solutions; the KUKE, an insurance company, insures the risk; and the Polish Investment and Trade Agency provides promotional support. Acting like a one-stop shop, all these institutions enable Polish capital to compete as a partner in the global league. This is part of the Polish government’s modern economic diplomacy strategy, led by Domański. Capital for generations. From an employee to a stakeholder in the economy  All grand plans need fuel. Mature economies like the Netherlands and the United Kingdom harness citizens’ savings via capital markets. PFR’s strategy boldly demands Poland’s success create generational wealth: turning the average Kowalski from an employee into a stakeholder. Diagnosis is brutal: Poles save little (6.38 percent compared with the EU’s 14.32 percent in Q1 2024) and inefficiently, favoring low-interest deposits. Employee Capital Plans (PPK) drive cultural change. Hard data demonstrate this: 67 percent average returns over five years crush traditional savings. It’s a virtuous cycle — PPK capital feeds stock markets, finances company growth and loops profits back to future pensioners. An architect, not a firefighter  The new PFR strategy for 2026-30 is a clear signal of a paradigm shift. The company, which many Polish entrepreneurs still see as a firefighter extinguishing the flames of the pandemic with billions from the Anti-Covid Financial Shields, is definitively taking off its helmet and putting on an engineer’s hard hat. It is shifting from interventionist to creator mode, abandoning the role of ‘night watchman’ of the Polish economy to that of its ‘chief architect’. This is an ambitious attempt to establish an institution in Poland that not only provides capital, but also actively shapes the country’s economic landscape, setting the direction for development for decades to come.

Europe’s security does not depend solely on our physical borders and their defense. It rests on something far less visible, and far more sensitive: the digital networks that keep our societies, economies and democracies functioning every second of the day. > Without resilient networks, the daily workings of Europe would grind to a > halt, and so too would any attempt to build meaningful defense readiness. A recent study by Copenhagen Economics confirms that telecom operators have become the first line of defense in Europe’s security architecture. Their networks power essential services ranging from emergency communications and cross-border healthcare to energy systems, financial markets, transport and, increasingly, Europe’s defense capabilities. Without resilient networks, the daily workings of Europe would grind to a halt, and so too would any attempt to build meaningful defense readiness. This reality forces us to confront an uncomfortable truth: Europe cannot build credible defense capabilities on top of an economically strained, structurally fragmented telecom sector. Yet this is precisely the risk today. A threat landscape outpacing Europe’s defenses The challenges facing Europe are evolving faster than our political and regulatory systems can respond. In 2023 alone, ENISA recorded 188 major incidents, causing 1.7 billion lost user-hours, the equivalent of taking entire cities offline. While operators have strengthened their systems and outage times fell by more than half in 2024 compared with the previous year, despite a growing number of incidents, the direction of travel remains clear: cyberattacks are more sophisticated, supply chains more vulnerable and climate-related physical disruptions more frequent. Hybrid threats increasingly target civilian digital infrastructure as a way to weaken states. Telecom networks, once considered as technical utilities, have become a strategic asset essential to Europe’s stability. > Europe cannot deploy cross-border defense capabilities without resilient, > pan-European digital infrastructure. Nor can it guarantee NATO > interoperability with 27 national markets, divergent rules and dozens of > sub-scale operators unable to invest at continental scale. Our allies recognize this. NATO recently encouraged members to spend up to 1.5 percent of their GDP on protecting critical infrastructure. Secretary General Mark Rutte also urged investment in cyber defense, AI, and cloud technologies, highlighting the military benefits of cloud scalability and edge computing – all of which rely on high-quality, resilient networks. This is a clear political signal that telecom security is not merely an operational matter but a geopolitical priority. The link between telecoms and defense is deeper than many realize. As also explained in the recent Arel report, Much More than a Network, modern defense capabilities rely largely on civilian telecom networks. Strong fiber backbones, advanced 5G and future 6G systems, resilient cloud and edge computing, satellite connectivity, and data centers form the nervous system of military logistics, intelligence and surveillance. Europe cannot deploy cross-border defense capabilities without resilient, pan-European digital infrastructure. Nor can it guarantee NATO interoperability with 27 national markets, divergent rules and dozens of sub-scale operators unable to invest at continental scale. Fragmentation has become one of Europe’s greatest strategic vulnerabilities. The reform Europe needs: An investment boost for digital networks At the same time, Europe expects networks to become more resilient, more redundant, less dependent on foreign technology and more capable of supporting defense-grade applications. Security and resilience are not side tasks for telecom operators, they are baked into everything they do. From procurement and infrastructure design to daily operations, operators treat these efforts as core principles shaping how networks are built, run and protected. Therefore, as the Copenhagen Economics study shows, the level of protection Europe now requires will demand substantial additional capital. > It is unrealistic to expect world-class, defense-ready infrastructure to > emerge from a model that has become structurally unsustainable. This is the right ambition, but the economic model underpinning the sector does not match these expectations. Due to fragmentation and over-regulation, Europe’s telecom market invests less per capita than global peers, generates roughly half the return on capital of operators in the United States and faces rising costs linked to expanding security obligations. It is unrealistic to expect world-class, defense-ready infrastructure to emerge from a model that has become structurally unsustainable. A shift in policy priorities is therefore essential. Europe must place investment in security and resilience at the center of its political agenda. Policy must allow this reality to be reflected in merger assessments, reduce overlapping security rules and provide public support where the public interest exceeds commercial considerations. This is not state aid; it is strategic social responsibility. Completing the single market for telecommunications is central to this agenda. A fragmented market cannot produce the secure, interoperable, large-scale solutions required for modern defense. The Digital Networks Act must simplify and harmonize rules across the EU, supported by a streamlined governance that distinguishes between domestic matters and cross-border strategic issues. Spectrum policy must also move beyond national silos, allowing Europe to avoid conflicts with NATO over key bands and enabling coherent next-generation deployments. Telecom policy nowadays is also defense policy. When we measure investment gaps in digital network deployment, we still tend to measure simple access to 5G and fiber. However, we should start considering that — if security, resilience and defense-readiness are to be taken into account — the investment gap is much higher that the €200 billion already estimated by the European Commission. Europe’s strategic choice The momentum for stronger European defense is real — but momentum fades if it is not seized. If Europe fails to modernize and secure its telecom infrastructure now, it risks entering the next decade with a weakened industrial base, chronic underinvestment, dependence on non-EU technologies and networks unable to support advanced defense applications. In that scenario, Europe’s democratic resilience would erode in parallel with its economic competitiveness, leaving the continent more exposed to geopolitical pressure and technological dependency. > If Europe fails to modernize and secure its telecom infrastructure now, it > risks entering the next decade with a weakened industrial base, chronic > underinvestment, dependence on non-EU technologies and networks unable to > support advanced defense applications. Europe still has time to change course and put telecoms at the center of its agenda — not as a technical afterthought, but as a core pillar of its defense strategy. The time for incremental steps has passed. Europe must choose to build the network foundations of its security now or accept that its strategic ambitions will remain permanently out of reach. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is Connect Europe AISBL * The ultimate controlling entity is Connect Europe AISBL * The political advertisement is linked to advocacy on EU digital, telecom and industrial policy, including initiatives such as the Digital Networks Act, Digital Omnibus, and connectivity, cybersecurity, and defence frameworks aimed at strengthening Europe’s digital competitiveness. More information here.

BELÉM, Brazil — Turkey will host next year’s U.N. climate conference after Australia’s bid imploded. Turkey and Australia had faced off for more than a year over the talks’ location, an impasse that extended almost until the final day of the current climate summit in Belém, Brazil. If no resolution had emerged, next year’s summit would have defaulted to Germany, which has said it wouldn’t have time to plan the event properly. While Turkey will provide the venue for the 2026 talks, Australia will hold the presidency — and therefore the diplomacy, said Chris Bowen, Australia’s minister for climate change and energy. That means that “I would have all the powers of the COP presidency,” he said. A Turkish official, who did not give his name, said the final deal would be announced on Thursday. Turkey had proposed hosting the talks in the Mediterranean city of Antalya. It is a highly unusual arrangement for the annual climate conference, which normally has a single host and presidency. But it’s not unprecedented: In 2017, Germany hosted a Fijian-led conference. “Obviously it would be great if Australia could have it all. But we can’t have it all,” Bowen said. “It’s also a significant concession for Turkey.” He added that before the summit, separate talks will occur in the Pacific where money would be raised to help that region cope with climate change. German State Secretary Jochen Flasbarth, whose country chairs the Western Europe and Others Group from which the host of next year’s talks is due to be selected based on the rotating system of the U.N., put a positive spin on the discussions. “There was a positive spirit,” he said. “It’s something extraordinary that two countries from very different sides of the planet but being in one group reached an agreement.” But others were more candid. “It’s an ugly solution,” said a European diplomat who was granted anonymity to discuss the confidential discussions. “Turkey just wants to showboat and don’t care about content really, and Aussies do but they don’t control the event and logistics.” The new host country’s climate track record is mixed. Turkey aims to reach net-zero greenhouse gas emissions in 2053, a date chosen more for its symbolism — 600 years after the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople — than science. This year, it presented a new climate target that will see its emissions increase by around 16 percent until 2035. The country overtook Poland last year as Europe’s top coal user, and harbors ambitions of stepping up gas exploration to become a regional transit hub. Australia had secured the backing of the U.K. and some European countries, as well as the Pacific region, with which it planned to co-host the summit. But during a series of long meetings on Wednesday, Australia failed to persuade Turkey to back down. Australia had been favored to host the talks in the city of Adelaide. But on Tuesday, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese blinked, saying his country would not block Turkey as host country if Ankara were to prevail. His office later clarified the statement to indicate he meant that he expected Turkey to do the same if Australia won the competition. But by then, news stories had circulated around the world that Australia had backed down.