U.S. President Donald Trump’s increasingly overt attempts to bring down the Cuban government are forcing Mexico’s President Claudia Sheinbaum into a delicate diplomatic dance. Mexico is the U.S.’s largest trading partner. It is also the primary supplier of oil to Cuba since the U.S. seized control of Venezuela’s crude. Now, Sheinbaum must manage her relationship with a mercurial Trump, who has at times both praised her leadership and threatened to send the U.S. military into her country to combat drug trafficking — all while appeasing her left-wing party Morena, factions of which have historically aligned themselves with Cuba’s communist regime. That balance became even more difficult for Sheinbaum this week following reports that Mexico’s state-run oil company, Pemex, paused a shipment of oil headed for Cuba, which is grappling with shortages following the U.S. military action earlier this month in Venezuela. Asked about the suspension, the Mexican president said only that oil shipments are a “sovereign” decision and that future action will be taken on a “humanitarian” basis. On Thursday, Trump ramped up the pressure, declared a national emergency over what he couched as threats posed by the Cuban government and authorized the use of new tariffs against any country that sells or provides oil to the island. The order gives the administration broad discretion to impose duties on imports from countries deemed to be supplying Cuba, dramatically raising the stakes for Mexico as it weighs how far it can go without triggering economic retaliation from Washington — or worse. “It’s the proverbial shit hitting the fan in terms of the spillover effects that would have,” said Arturo Sarukhán, former Mexican ambassador to the U.S., referring to the possibility of a Pemex tanker being intercepted. Sheinbaum still refuses to hit back too hard against Trump, preferring to speak publicly in diplomatic platitudes even as she faces new pressure. Her posture stands in marked contrast to Canada’s Mark Carney, whose speech at Davos, urging world leaders to stand up to Trump, went viral and drew a swift rebuke from the White House and threats of new tariffs. But the latest episode is characteristic of Sheinbaum’s approach to Trump over the last year — one that has, so far, helped her avoid the kinds of headline-grabbing public ruptures that have plagued Carney, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and French President Emmanuel Macron. Still, former Mexican officials say Trump’s threats — though not specific to Mexico — have triggered quiet debate inside the Mexican government over how much risk Sheinbaum can afford to absorb and how hard she should push back. “My sense is that right now, at least because of what’s at stake in the counter-narcotics and law enforcement agenda bilaterally, I think that neither government right now wants to turn this into a casus belli,” Sarukhán added. “But I do think that in the last weeks, the U.S. pressure on Mexico has risen to such a degree where you do have a debate inside the Mexican government as to what the hell do we do with this issue?” A White House official, granted anonymity to speak candidly about the administration’s approach, said that Trump is “addressing the depredations of the communist Cuban regime by taking decisive action to hold the Cuban regime accountable for its support of hostile actors, terrorism, and regional instability that endanger American security and foreign policy.” “As the President stated, Cuba is now failing on its own volition,” the official added. “Cuba’s rulers have had a major setback with the Maduro regime that they are responsible for propping up.” Sheinbaum, meanwhile, responded to Trump’s latest executive order during her Friday press conference by warning that it could “trigger a large-scale humanitarian crisis, directly affecting hospitals, food supplies, and other basic services for the Cuban people.” “Mexico will pursue different alternatives, while clearly defending the country’s interests, to provide humanitarian assistance to the Cuban people, who are going through a difficult moment, in line with our tradition of solidarity and respect for international norms,” Sheinbaum said. The Mexican embassy in Washington declined further comment. Cuba’s Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez, in a post on X, accused the U.S. of “resorting to blackmail and coercion in an attempt to make other countries to join its universally condemned blockade policy against Cuba.” The pressure on Sheinbaum to respond has collided with real political constraints at home. Morena has long maintained ideological and historical ties to Cuba, and Sheinbaum faces criticism from within her coalition over any move that could be seen as abandoning Havana. At the same time, she has come under growing domestic scrutiny over why Mexico should continue supplying oil abroad as fuel prices and energy concerns persist at home, making the “humanitarian” framing both a diplomatic shield and a political necessity. Amid the controversy over the oil shipment, Trump and Sheinbaum spoke by phone Thursday morning, with Trump describing the conversation afterward as “very productive” and praising Sheinbaum as a “wonderful and highly intelligent Leader.” Sheinbaum’s remarks after the call point to how she is navigating the issue through ambiguity rather than direct confrontation, noting that the two did not discuss Cuba. She described it as a “productive and cordial conversation” and that the two leaders would “continue to make progress on trade issues and on the bilateral relationship.” With the upcoming review of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement on trade looming, even the appearance of defying Trump’s push to cut off Cuba’s oil lifelines carries the potential for economic and diplomatic blowback. It also could undo the quiet partnership the U.S. and Mexico have struck on border security and drug trafficking issues. Gerónimo Gutiérrez, who served as Mexican ambassador to the U.S. during the first Trump administration, described Sheinbaum’s approach as “squish and muddle through.” “She obviously is trying to tread carefully with Trump. She doesn’t want to irritate him with this matter,” Gutiérrez said, adding that “she knows that it’s a problem.” Meanwhile, Cuba’s vulnerability has only deepened since the collapse of Venezuela’s oil support following this month’s U.S. operation that ousted President Nicolás Maduro. For years, Venezuelan crude served as a lifeline for the island, a gap Mexico has increasingly helped fill, putting the country squarely in Washington’s crosshairs as Trump squeezes Havana. With fuel shortages in Cuba triggering rolling blackouts and deepening economic distress, former U.S. officials who served in Cuba and regional analysts warn that Trump’s push to choke off remaining oil supplies could hasten a broader collapse — even as there is little clarity about how Washington would manage the political, humanitarian or regional fallout if the island tips over the edge. Trump has openly suggested that outcome is inevitable, telling reporters in Iowa on Tuesday that “Cuba will be failing pretty soon,” even as he pushed back on Thursday that the idea he was trying to “choke off” the country. “The word ‘choke off’ is awfully tough,” Trump said. “It looks like it’s not something that’s going to be able to survive. I think Cuba will not be able to survive.” The administration, however, has offered few details about what would come next, and Latin American analysts warn that the U.S. and Mexico are likely to face an influx of migrants — including to Florida and the Yucatán Peninsula — seeking refuge should Cuba collapse. There is no evidence that the Trump administration has formally asked Mexico to halt oil shipments to Cuba. Trump’s executive order leaves it to the president’s Cabinet to determine whether a country is supplying oil to Cuba and the rate at which it should be tariffed — an unusual deferral of power for a president for whom tariffs are a favorite negotiating tool. But former U.S. officials say that absence of an explicit demand to Mexico does not mean the pressure is theoretical. Lawrence Gumbiner, who served as chargé d’affaires at the U.S. embassy in Havana during the first Trump administration, believes Washington would be far more likely to lean on economic pressure than the kind of military force it has used to seize Venezuelan oil tankers. At the same time, the administration’s push on Venezuela began with a similar executive order last spring. “There’s no doubt that the U.S. is telling Mexico to just stop it,” Gumbiner said. “I think there’s a much slimmer chance that we would engage our military to actually stop Mexican oil from coming through. That would be a last resort. But with this administration you cannot completely discount the possibility of a physical blockade of the island if they decide that it’s the final step in strangling the island.”

French energy giant TotalEnergies announced Thursday that it is restarting its natural gas project in Mozambique, after a massacre at the site led to the company being accused of complicity in war crimes in November. “I am delighted to announce the full restart of the Mozambique LNG project … The force majeure is over,” TotalEnergies CEO Patrick Pouyanné said at a relaunch ceremony attended by Mozambican President Daniel Chapo. The project, billed as Africa’s largest liquefied natural gas development, was suspended in 2021 in the wake of a deadly insurgent attack. A 2024 POLITICO investigation revealed that Mozambican soldiers based inside TotalEnergies’ concession just south of the Tanzanian border, subsequently brutalized, starved, suffocated, executed or disappeared around 200 men in its gatehouse from June to September 2021. In December 2025, the British and Dutch governments withdrew some $2.2 billion in support for the project, with the Dutch releasing a report that corroborated many elements of the POLITICO investigation.  TotalEnergies has denied the allegations, saying its own “extensive research” into the allegations has “not identified any information nor evidence that would corroborate the allegations of severe abuses and torture.” The Mozambican government has also rejected claims that its forces committed war crimes. The revelations nonetheless prompted scrutiny from French lawmakers and criticism of TotalEnergies’ security arrangements in conflict zones. The Mozambique site has been plagued by an Islamist insurgency. “Companies and their executives are not neutral actors when they operate in conflict zones,” said Clara Gonzales of the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights. “If they enable or fuel crimes, they might be complicit and should be held accountable.” Speaking Thursday in Mozambique, Pouyanné said activity would now accelerate. “You will see a massive ramp-up in activity in coming months … a first offshore vessel has already been mobilized,” he said. According to a statement by the company, construction has resumed both onshore and offshore at the site, with around 4,000 workers currently mobilized. The project is roughly 40 percent complete, with the first LNG production expected in 2029. TotalEnergies holds a 26.5 percent stake in the Mozambique LNG consortium. A relaunch clears the way for billions of dollars in gas exports.

BRUSSELS — The European Union will step up efforts to diversify away from American liquefied natural gas following U.S. President Donald Trump’s threats to take control of Greenland, EU energy chief Dan Jørgensen said Wednesday. Calling the events of recent week a “clear wake-up call,” Jørgensen said growing geopolitical instability — from Russia’s war in Ukraine to rising tensions with Washington — means the EU can no longer assume energy ties are immune from security shocks. “These are very turbulent times,” Jørgensen told journalists at a briefing in Brussels. “What has made the situation more serious and complex is the strained relationship to the U.S. and the fact that we have an American president that does not exclude using force against Greenland,” he said. The U.S. already supplies more than a quarter of the EU’s gas, up from just 5 percent five years ago, with dependence set to rise further as a total ban on Russian gas takes effect. But Jørgensen said the Commission is now actively seeking alternative suppliers to the U.S. and plans to deepen energy ties with a range of countries in the coming months, including Canada, Qatar and Algeria. “Canada for sure, Qatar, North African countries,” he said, adding that Brussels is also working to secure non-Russian sources of nuclear fuel for member countries that still rely on Moscow. While stressing that Brussels does not want a trade war with Washington, Jørgensen acknowledged mounting concern inside the EU that it risks “replacing one dependency with another” after rapidly pivoting from Russian gas to U.S. LNG following Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. “It has never been our policy to start trading less with the U.S., and we don’t want trade conflicts,” he said. “But it is also clear that geopolitical turmoil … has been a wake-up call. We have to be able to take care of ourselves.” The commissioner said he had not yet spoken with his U.S. counterpart since Trump’s remarks on Greenland, and said the EU has not set a formal threshold for how much U.S. LNG would be considered too much. For now, American gas remains “essential” to replace Russian supplies, he said.

BRUSSELS — Powerful political allies helped automakers force the EU to water down climate laws for cars — and now the aviation sector is borrowing those tactics. Their big target is getting the EU to dilute its mandate forcing airlines to use increasing amounts of cleaner jet fuels, alternatives to kerosene that are also much more expensive and harder to source. Aviation is emerging as the next crucial stress test for the EU’s climate agenda, as key leaders push to do whatever it takes to help struggling European businesses. With industry and allied governments pressing for relief from costly green rules, the fight will show how far Brussels is willing to go — and what it is willing to give up — in pursuit of its climate goals. “I will make a bet today that what happened to the car regulation will happen to the SAF [Sustainable Aviation Fuels] regulation in Europe,” French energy giant TotalEnergies CEO Patrick Pouyanné predicted at the World Economic Forum in Davos earlier this month. Carmakers provide a model on how to get the EU to backtrack. The bloc mandated that no CO2-emitting cars could be sold from 2035, essentially killing the combustion engine and replacing it with batteries (possibly with a minor role for hydrogen). But many carmakers — allied with countries like Germany, Italy and automaking nations in Central Europe — pushed back, arguing that the 2035 mandate would destroy the car sector just as it is battling U.S. President Donald Trump’s tariffs, sluggish demand and a rising threat from Chinese competitors. “I will make a bet today that what happened to the car regulation will happen to the SAF [Sustainable Aviation Fuels] regulation in Europe,” Patrick Pouyanné said. | Ludovic Marin/ AFP via Getty Images In the end, the European Commission gave way and watered down the 2035 mandate, which will now only aim to cut CO2 emissions by 90 percent. AVIATION DEMANDS The aviation sector has a similar list of issues with the EU. It is taking aim at a host of other climate policies, such as including aviation in the bloc’s cap-and-trade Emissions Trading System and intervening on non-CO2 impacts of airplanes like contrails — the ice clouds produced by airplanes that have an effect on global warming. Brussels introduced several regulations over the last 15 years to address the growing climate impact of air transport, which accounts for about 3 percent of global CO2 emissions. Those policies include the obligation to use sustainable aviation fuels, to put a price on carbon emissions and to take action on non-CO2 emissions. Each of these green initiatives is now under attack. The ReFuelEU regulation requires all airlines to use SAF for at least 2 percent of their fuel mix starting this year. That mandate rises to 6 percent from 2030, 20 percent from 2035 and 70 percent by 2050. “Today, all airline companies are fighting even the 6 percent … which is easy to reach to be honest,” Pouyanné said, but then warned, “20 percent five years after makes zero sense.” He is echoed by CEOs like Ryanair’s combative Michael O’Leary, who called the SAF mandate “nonsense.” “It is all gradually dying a death, which is what it deserves to do,” O’Leary said last year. “We have just about met our 2 percent mandate. There is no possibility of meeting 6 percent by 2030; 10 percent, not a hope in hell. We’re not going to get to net zero by 2050.” Brussels-based airline lobbies are not calling for the SAF mandate to be killed, rather they are demanding a book-and-claim system. Under such a scheme, airlines could claim carbon credits for a certain amount of SAF, even if they don’t use it in their own aircraft. They would buy it at an airport where it’s available and then let other airlines use it. That would make it easier for airlines to meet the SAF mandate even if the fuel is not easily available. However, so far the Commission is opposed. LOBBYING BATTLE The car coalition only worked because industry allied with countries, and there are signs of that happening with aviation. The sector’s lobbying effort to slash the EU carbon pricing could find an ally in the new Italo-German team-up to promote competitiveness. The German government last year announced a plan to cut national aviation taxes — with the call made during the COP30 global climate conference, something that angered the German Greens. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and German Federal Chancellor Friedrich Merz attend the Italy-Germany Intergovernmental Summit at Villa Doria Pamphilj. | Vincenzo Nuzzolese/LightRocket via Getty Images Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni said Friday that she and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz wanted to start “a decisive change of pace … in terms of the competitiveness of our businesses.” “A certain ideological vision of the green transition has ended up bringing our industries to their knees, creating new dangerous strategic dependencies for Europe without, however, having any real impact on the global protection of the environment and nature,” she added. Her far-right coalition ally, Italian Transport Minister Matteo Salvini, has called the ETS and taxes on maritime transport and air transport “economic suicide” that “must be dismantled piece by piece.” COMMISSION SAYS NO As with the 2035 policy for cars, the European Commission is strongly defending its policy against those attacks. Apostolos Tzitzikostas, the transport commissioner, stressed the EU’s “firm commitment” to stick with aviation decarbonization policies. “Investment decisions and construction must start by 2027, or we will miss the 2030 targets. It is as simple as that,” the commissioner said in November when announcing the bloc’s new plans to boost investment into sustainable aviation and maritime fuels. Climate campaigners fought hard against the car sector’s efforts to gut 2035, and now they’re gearing up for another battle over aviation targets. “The airlines’ whining comes as no surprise — yet it is disappointing to see airlines come after such a fundamental piece of EU legislation,” said Marte van der Graaf, aviation policy officer at green NGO Transport & Environment. She was incensed about efforts to dodge the high prices set by the EU’s ETS in favor of the U.N.’s cheaper CORSIA emissions reduction scheme. Airline lobbyA4E said its members paid €2.3 billion for ETS permits last year. “By 2030, [the ETS cost] should rise up to €5 billion because the free allowances are phased out,” said Monika Rybakowska, the lobby’s policy director.  A recent study by the think tank InfluenceMap found that airlines are working to increase their impact on policymakers by aligning their positions on ETS. T&E also took aim at a recent position paper by A4E that asked the EU to postpone measures to curb non-CO2 pollution — such as nitrogen oxides and soot particles that, along with water vapor, contribute to contrails. The A4E paper said that “the scientific foundation for regulating non-CO2 effects remains insufficient” and “introducing financial liability risks misdirecting resources.” This is “an outdated excuse,” responded T&E, noting that the climate impact of contrails has been known for over 20 years.

Its been a bad stretch of polling for President Donald Trump. In recent weeks, a string of new polls has found Trump losing ground with key constituencies, especially the young, non-white and low-propensity voters who swung decisively in his direction in 2024. The uptick in support for Trump among those non-traditional Republican voters helped fuel chatter of an enduring “realignment” in the American electorate — but the durability of that realignment is now coming into doubt with those same groups cooling on Trump. Surveying the findings of the most recent New York Times-Siena poll, polling analyst Nate Cohn bluntly declared that “the second Trump coalition has unraveled.” Is it time to touch up the obituaries for the Trumpian realignment? To find out, I spoke with conservative pollster and strategist Patrick Ruffini, whose 2024 book “Party of the People” was widely credited with predicting the contours of Trump’s electoral realignment. Ruffini cautioned against prematurely eulogizing the GOP’s new coalition, noting that the erosion of support has so far not extended to the constituencies that have served as the primary drivers of the Trumpian realignment — particularly white working-class voters and working-class Latinos and Asian Americans. But he also acknowledged that the findings of the recent polls should raise alarms for Republicans ahead of 2026 and especially 2028. His advice to Trump for reversing the trend: a relentless focus on “affordability,” which the White House has so far struggled to muster, and which remains the key issue dragging down the president. “I think that is undeniable,” he said. “It’s the number one issue among the swing voter electorate.” This conversation has been edited for length and clarity. Based on your own polling, do you agree that “the second Trump coalition has unraveled?” It really depends on how you define the Trump coalition. The coalition that has really reshaped American politics over the last decade has been a coalition that saw voters who are aligned with a more populist view of America come into the Republican Party — in many cases, after voting for Barack Obama twice. Those shifts have proven to be pretty durable, especially among white working-class voters but also among conservative Hispanic voters and conservative Asian American voters. You have another group of voters who is younger and disconnected from politics — a group that had been really one of the core groups for Barack Obama and the Democrats back in the 2010s. They didn’t always vote, but there was really no hope or prospect for Republicans winning that group or being very competitive with that group. That happens for the first time in 2024, when that specific combination of young, minority, male voters really comes into play in a big way. But that shift right has proven to be a little bit less durable — and maybe a lot less durable — because of the nature of who those voters are. They’re not really connected to one political party, and they’re inherently non-partisan. So what you’re seeing is less of a shift among people who reliably vote in midterms, and what we are seeing is more of a shift among those infrequent voters. The question then becomes are these voters going to show up in 2026? How big of a problem is it for Republicans if they don’t? How alarmed should Republicans be by the current trends? I think they’re right to focus on affordability. You’ve seen that as an intentional effort by the White House, including what seems like embracing some Democratic policy proposals that also are in some ways an end-run around traditional Republican and conservative economics — things like a 10 percent cap on credit card interest. What’s the evidence that cost of living is the thing that’s primarily eroding Republican support among that group of voters you described? I think that is undeniable. It’s the number one issue among the swing voter electorate. However you want to define the swing voter electorate in 2024, cost of living was far and away the number one issue among the Biden-to-Trump voters in 2024. It is still the number one issue. And that’s because of demographically who they are. The profile of the voter who swung in ‘24 was not just minority, but young, low-income, who tends to be less college-educated, less married and more exposed to affordability concerns. So I think that’s obviously their north star right now. The core Democratic voter is concerned about the erosion of norms and democracy. The core Republican voter is concerned about immigration and border security. But this swing vote is very, very much concerned about the cost of living. Is there any evidence that things like Trump’s immigration crackdown or his foreign policy adventurism are contributing at all to the erosion of support among this group? I have to laugh at the idea of foreign policy being decisive for a large segment of voters. I think you could probably say that, to the extent that Trump had some non-intervention rhetoric, there might be some backlash among some of the podcast bros, or among the Tucker Carlson universe. But that is practically a non-entity when it comes to the actual electorate and especially this group that is floating between the two political parties. Maybe there’s a dissident faction on the right that is particularly focused on this, but what really matters is this cost-of-living issue, which people don’t view as having been solved by Trump coming into office. The White House would say — and Vance said recently — that it takes a while to turn the Titanic around. Which is not the most reassuring metaphor, but sure. Exactly, but nonetheless. I think a lot of these things are very interesting bait for media, but they are not necessarily what is really driving the voters who are disconnected from these narratives. What about his immigration agenda? Does that seem to be having any specific effect? I do think there’s probably some aspect of this that might be challenging with Latinos, but I think it’s very easy to fall back into the 2010 pattern of saying Latino voters are inordinately primarily focused on immigration, which has proven incorrect time after time after time. So, yes, I would say the ICE actions are probably a bit negative, but I think Latino voters primarily share the same concerns as other voters in the electorate. They’re primarily focused on cost of living, jobs and health care. How would Trump’s first year in office have looked different if he had been really laser-focused on consolidating the gains that Republicans saw among these voters in 2024? What would he have done that he didn’t do, and what shouldn’t he have done that he did do? I would first concede that the focus on affordability needed to be, like, a Day 1 concern. I will also concede how hard it is to move this group that is very, very disaffected from traditional politics and doesn’t trust or believe the promises made by politicians — even one as seemingly authentic as Trump. I go back to 2018. While in some ways you would kill for the economic perceptions that you had in 2018, that didn’t seem to help them much in the midterms. The other problem with a laser focus on affordability on Day 1 is that I don’t think it clearly aligns with what the policy demanders on the right are actually asking for. If you ask, “What is MAGA economic policy?”, for many, MAGA economic policy is tariffs — and in many ways, tariffs run up against an impulse to do something about affordability. Now, to date, we haven’t really seen that actually play out. We haven’t really seen an increase in the inflation rate, which is good. But there’s an opportunity cost to focusing on certain issues over this focus on affordability. I think the challenge is that I don’t think either party has a pre-baked agenda that is all about reducing costs. They certainly had a pre-baked agenda around immigration, and they do have a pre-baked agenda around tariffs. What else has stopped the administration from effectively consolidating this part of the 2024 coalition? It’s a very hard-to-reach group. In 2024, Trump’s team had the insight to really put him front-and-center in these non-political arenas, whether it was going to UFC matches or appearing on Joe Rogan. I think it’s very easy for any administration to come into office and pivot towards the policy demanders on the right, and I think that we’ve seen a pivot in that direction, at least on the policy. So I would say they should be doing more of that 2024 strategy of actually going into spaces where non-political voters live and talking to them. Is it possible to turn negative perception around among this group? Or is it a one-way ratchet, where once you’ve lost their support, it’s very hard to get it back? I don’t think it’s impossible. We are seeing some improvement in the economic perception numbers, but we also saw how hard it is to sustain that. I think the mindset of the average voter is just that they’re in a far different place post-Covid than they were pre-Covid. There’s just been a huge negative bias in the economy since Covid, so I think any thought that, “Oh, it would be easy that Trump gets elected, and that’s going to be the thing that restores optimism” was wrong. I think he’s taken really decisive action, and he has solved a lot of problems, but the big nut to crack is, How do you break people out of this post-Covid economic pessimism? The more critical case that could be made against Trump’s approach to economic policy is not just that he’s failed to address the cost-of-living crisis, but that he’s actively done things that run contrary to any stated vision of economic populism. The tax cuts are the major one, which included some populist components tacked on, but which was essentially a massively regressive tax cut. Do you think that has contributed to the sour feeling among this cohort at all? I think we know very clearly when red lines are crossed and when different policies really get voters writ large to sit up and take notice. For instance, it was only when you had SNAP benefits really being cut off that Congress had any impetus to actually solve the shutdown. I don’t think people are quite as tuned in to the distributional effects of tax policy. The White House would say that there were very popular parts of this proposal, like the Trump accounts and no tax on tips, that didn’t get coverage — and our polling has shown that people have barely actually heard about those things compared to some of the Democratic lines of attack. So I think that the tax policy debate is relatively overrated, because it simply doesn’t matter as much to voters as much as the cultural issues or the general sense that life is not as affordable as it was. Assuming these trends continue and this cohort of sort of young, low-propensity voters continues to shift away from Trump, what does the picture look like for Republicans in 2026 and 2028? I would say 2026 is perhaps a false indicator. In the midterms, you’re really talking about an electorate that is going to be much older, much whiter, much more college-educated. I think you really have to have a presidential campaign to test how these voters are going to behave. And presidential campaigns are also a choice between Republicans and Democrats. I think certainly Republicans would want to make it into a Republican-versus-Democrat choice, because polling is very clear that voters do not trust the Democrats either on these issues. It’s clear that a lot of these voters have actually moved away from the Democratic Party — they just haven’t necessarily moved into the Republican Party. Thinking big picture, does this erosion of support change or alter your view of the “realignment” in any respect? I’ve always said that we are headed towards a future where these groups are up for grabs, and whichever party captures them has the advantage. That’s different from the politics of the Obama era, where we were talking about an emerging Democratic majority driven by a generational shift and by the rise of non-white voters in the electorate. The most recent New York Times poll has Democrats ahead among Latino voters by 16 points, which is certainly different than 2024, when Trump lost them by just single digits, but that is a far cry from where we were in 2016 and 2018. So I think in many respects, that version of it is coming true. But if 2024 was a best-case scenario for the right, and 2026 is a worst-case scenario, we really have to wait till 2028 to see where this all shakes out.

LONDON — A sanctions loophole that allows British planes to fill up with jet fuel made using Russian oil must be closed without delay, a senior MP has warned.    Liam Byrne, Labour MP and chair of the House of Commons Business and Trade Committee, said that every month that passes without the U.K. implementing a promised ban “risks tens of millions of pounds still flowing to Russia’s war effort” against Ukraine.    The U.K. outlawed direct imports of Russian oil in December 2022, 10 months after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Since then, the country has gradually widened its sanctions regime against Vladimir Putin and his associates. Prime Minister Keir Starmer warned in April 2025 that Britain would “crack down” on “energy revenues which are still fueling Putin’s war chest.”  But according to new research, between the ban on direct imports coming into force in 2022 and the end of 2025, the U.K. has nonetheless imported £4 billion of jet fuel and other oil products made at refineries in India and Turkey, which run partially on Russian crude.   The analysis, by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), estimated that £1.6 billion worth of the products imported from these refineries would have been made with Russian oil.   India remains the second-largest international buyer of Russian crude oil after China, while Turkey is also a major importer. Both process much of the oil in refineries, producing oil products such as jet fuel, which are then sold on to other countries. This so-called “refining loophole” is one of the major weaknesses in Western efforts to reduce Russia’s fossil fuel income, CREA said.   With Putin’s war against Ukraine approaching its fifth year, ministers pledged in October to close the loophole, announcing a ban on oil products made with Russian crude in third countries. Responding to CREA’s new findings, a government spokesperson said they “expect” the ban to be introduced this spring.  But with a similar European Union ban coming into force today, the U.K. government has “dragged its feet,” said Isaac Levi, an analyst at CREA.   “Roughly one in six jet fuel shipments entering the U.K. comes from refineries running on Russian crude, and we’re buying it for a measly two percent discount,” said Levi. “The U.K. doesn’t need this fuel, but it is helping bankroll Putin’s war machine.    “If ministers won’t act, they’re effectively allowing one in six flights to continue running on Russian oil molecules.”  Prime Minister Keir Starmer warned in April 2025 that Britain would “crack down” on “energy revenues which are still fueling Putin’s war chest.” | Pool Photo by Sarmento Matos via EPA A government spokesperson gave no explanation for the delay in implementing the ban, but said that the government was monitoring the impact of its sanctions measures “with input from industry.” A government official confirmed legislation will be needed before it can happen. A spokesperson for Fuels Industry UK, which represents fuel suppliers, echoed the need for legislation, adding that companies were “in discussion” with the government on “how best to extend … measures to stop imports of Russian derived products which are refined in third countries.” “For the U.K. to make this change, there needs to be confidence that there are adequate mechanisms in place to prove where fuels are from, as well as potentially changing contracts which may already be in place,” they added. Airlines UK, an industry group representing the country’s aviation sector — one of the biggest in the world — declined to comment. However, Byrne said the government needed to implement the ban as soon as possible.  “The government is right to move to close this loophole, but speed is now critical,” he said.   “Every month the ban is delayed risks tens of millions of pounds still flowing to Russia’s war effort. Announcements need to turn into action, and fast.”   Levi, the CREA analyst, said the U.K. was lagging behind the EU.   “Every month the U.K. delays banning oil products made from Russian crude, it’s effectively writing the Kremlin a cheque for around £44 million,” he said. “That’s £44 million a month flowing into Russia’s war chest — from U.K. imports — while ministers insist they’re doing all they can to support Ukraine.”   A government spokesperson said: “We ended all imports of Russian fossil fuels following Putin’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, and have struck at the heart of his war funding by strengthening sanctions to cover Russian oil products refined in third countries. We regularly monitor the impact of these measures with input from industry and expect the ban to come into effect in spring 2026.”  

A spat over in-flight Wi-Fi has spiralled into a public verbal brawl between Elon Musk and Ryanair CEO Michael O’Leary, pitting one of the world’s richest men against Europe’s most outspoken airline boss. The clash burst into the open after O’Leary dismissed Musk and his satellite internet business in a radio interview on Ireland’s Newstalk. Responding to Musk calling him “misinformed” over Ryanair’s refusal to install Starlink Wi-Fi, O’Leary told listeners he would “pay no attention whatsoever to Elon Musk.” “He’s an idiot — very wealthy, but still an idiot,” O’Leary said. He also described Musk’s social media platform X as a “cesspit.” Musk fired back on X, writing: “Ryanair CEO is an utter idiot. Fire him.” In a follow-up post, he accused O’Leary of getting Starlink’s fuel-burn impact wrong “by a factor of 10” and added: “Fire this imbecile.” Ryanair’s official X account also joined the fray, mocking Musk during a reported outage on his platform, replying: “perhaps you need Wi-Fi @elonmusk?” Behind the insults lies a substantive dispute about costs and aircraft performance. Ryanair has publicly ruled out installing Starlink across its more than 600 Boeing 737s, arguing the external antennas would increase drag and fuel consumption. O’Leary has said the technology would impose around a 2 percent fuel penalty and could cost the airline hundreds of millions of dollars a year, a trade-off he says makes little sense on short-haul flights where passengers are unlikely to pay for connectivity. Musk disputes those figures, pointing to airlines already flying with Starlink-equipped aircraft and arguing that fast internet will increasingly shape passenger choice.

A clash between Poland’s right-wing president and its centrist ruling coalition over the European Union’s flagship social media law is putting the country further at risk of multimillion euro fines from Brussels. President Karol Nawrocki is holding up a bill that would implement the EU’s Digital Services Act, a tech law that allows regulators to police how social media firms moderate content. Nawrocki, an ally of U.S. President Donald Trump, said in a statement that the law would “give control of content on the internet to officials subordinate to the government, not to independent courts.” The government coalition led by Prime Minister Donald Tusk, Nawrocki’s rival, warned this further exposed them to the risk of EU fines as high as €9.5 million. Deputy Digital Minister Dariusz Standerski said in a TV interview that, “since the president decided to veto this law, I’m assuming he is also willing to have these costs [of a potential fine] charged to the budget of the President’s Office.” Nawrocki’s refusal to sign the bill brings back bad memories of Warsaw’s years-long clash with Brussels over the rule of law, a conflict that began when Nawrocki’s Law and Justice party rose to power in 2015 and started reforming the country’s courts and regulators. The EU imposed €320 million in penalties on Poland from 2021-2023. Warsaw was already in a fight with the Commission over its slow implementation of the tech rulebook since 2024, when the EU executive put Poland on notice for delaying the law’s implementation and for not designating a responsible authority. In May last year Brussels took Warsaw to court over the issue. If the EU imposes new fines over the rollout of digital rules, it would “reignite debates reminiscent of the rule-of-law mechanism and frozen funds disputes,” said Jakub Szymik, founder of Warsaw-based non-profit watchdog group CEE Digital Democracy Watch. Failure to implement the tech law could in the long run even lead to fines and penalties accruing over time, as happened when Warsaw refused to reform its courts during the earlier rule of law crisis. The European Commission said in a statement that it “will not comment on national legislative procedures.” It added that “implementing the [Digital Services Act] into national law is essential to allow users in Poland to benefit from the same DSA rights.” “This is why we have an ongoing infringement procedure against Poland” for its “failure to designate and empower” a responsible authority, the statement said. Under the tech platforms law, countries were supposed to designate a national authority to oversee the rules by February 2024. Poland is the only EU country that hasn’t moved to at least formally agree on which regulator that should be. The European Commission is the chief regulator for a group of very large online platforms, including Elon Musk’s X, Meta’s Facebook and Instagram, Google’s YouTube, Chinese-owned TikTok and Shein and others. But national governments have the power to enforce the law on smaller platforms and certify third parties for dispute resolution, among other things. National laws allow users to exercise their rights to appeal to online platforms and challenge decisions. When blocking the bill last Friday, Nawrocki said a new version could be ready within two months. But that was “very unlikely … given that work on the current version has been ongoing for nearly two years and no concrete alternative has been presented” by the president, said Szymik, the NGO official. The Digital Services Act has become a flashpoint in the political fight between Brussels and Washington over how to police online platforms. The EU imposed its first-ever fine under the law on X in December, prompting the U.S. administration to sanction former EU Commissioner Thierry Breton and four other Europeans. Nawrocki last week likened the law to “the construction of the Ministry of Truth from George Orwell’s novel 1984,” a criticism that echoed claims by Trump and his top MAGA officials that the law censored conservatives and right-wingers. Bartosz Brzeziński contributed reporting.

LONDON — If there’s one thing Keir Starmer has mastered in office, it’s changing his mind. The PM has been pushed by his backbenchers toward a flurry of about-turns since entering Downing Street just 18 months ago.  Starmer’s vast parliamentary majority hasn’t stopped him feeling the pressure — and has meant mischievous MPs are less worried their antics will topple the government.  POLITICO recaps 7 occasions MPs mounted objections to the government’s agenda — and forced the PM into a spin. Expect this list to get a few more updates… PUB BUSINESS RATES  Getting on the wrong side of your local watering hole is never a good idea. Many Labour MPs realized that the hard way. Chancellor Rachel Reeves used her budget last year to slash a pandemic-era discount on business rates — taxes levied on firms — from 75 percent to 40 percent. Cue uproar from publicans. Labour MPs were barred from numerous boozers in protest at a sharp bill increase afflicting an already struggling hospitality sector. A £300 million lifeline for pubs, watering down some of the changes, is now being prepped. At least Treasury officials should now have a few more places to drown their sorrows. Time to U-turn: 43 days (Nov. 26, 2025 — Jan. 8, 2026). FARMERS’ INHERITANCE TAX  Part of Labour’s electoral success came from winning dozens of rural constituencies. But Britain’s farmers soon fell out of love with the government.  Reeves’ first budget slapped inheritance tax on farming estates worth more than £1 million from April 2026. Farmers drive tractors near Westminster ahead of a protest against inheritance tax rules on Nov. 19, 2024. | Ben Stansall/AFP via Getty Images Aimed at closing loopholes wealthy individuals use to avoid coughing up to the exchequer, the decision generated uproar from opposition parties (calling the measure the “family farm tax”) and farmers themselves, who drove tractors around Westminster playing “Baby Shark.”  Campaigners including TV presenter and newfound farmer Jeremy Clarkson joined the fight by highlighting that many farmers are asset rich but cash poor — so can’t fund increased inheritance taxes without flogging off their estates altogether. A mounting rebellion by rural Labour MPs (including Cumbria’s Markus Campbell-Savours, who lost the whip for voting against the budget resolution on inheritance tax) saw the government sneak out a threshold hike to £2.5 million just two days before Christmas, lowering the number of affected estates from 375 to 185. Why ever could that have been?  Time to U-turn: 419 days (Oct. 30, 2024 — Dec. 23, 2025). WINTER FUEL PAYMENTS  Labour’s election honeymoon ended abruptly just three and a half weeks into power after Reeves made an economic move no chancellor before her dared to take.  Reeves significantly tightened eligibility for winter fuel payments, a previously universal benefit helping the older generation with heating costs in the colder months.  Given pensioners are the cohort most likely to vote, the policy was seen as a big electoral gamble. It wasn’t previewed in Labour’s manifesto and made many newly elected MPs angsty.  After a battering in the subsequent local elections, the government swiftly confirmed all pensioners earning up to £35,000 would now be eligible for the cash. That’s one way of trying to bag the grey vote. Time until U-turn: 315 days (July 29, 2024 — June 9, 2025).  WELFARE REFORM Labour wanted to rein in Britain’s spiraling welfare bill, which never fully recovered from the Covid-19 pandemic.  The government vowed to save around £5 billion by tightening eligibility for Personal Independence Payment (PIP), a benefit helping people in and out of work with long term health issues. It also said other health related benefits would be cut. However, Labour MPs worried about the impact on the most vulnerable (and nervously eyeing their inboxes) weren’t impressed. More than 100 signed an amendment that would have torpedoed the proposed reforms.  The government vowed to save around £5 billion by tightening eligibility for Personal Independence Payment. | Vuk Valcic via SOPA Images/LightRocket/Getty Images In an initial concession, the government said existing PIP claimants wouldn’t be affected by any eligibility cuts. It wasn’t enough: Welfare Minister Stephen Timms was forced to confirm in the House of Commons during an actual, ongoing welfare debate that eligibility changes for future claimants would be delayed until a review was completed.  What started as £5 billion of savings didn’t reduce welfare costs whatsoever.  Time to U-turn: 101 days (Mar. 18, 2025 — June 27, 2025).  GROOMING GANGS INQUIRY  The widescale abuse of girls across Britain over decades reentered the political spotlight in early 2025 after numerous tweets from X owner Elon Musk. It led to calls for a specific national inquiry into the scandal. Starmer initially rejected this request, pointing to recommendations left unimplemented from a previous inquiry into child sexual abuse and arguing for a local approach. Starmer accused those critical of his stance (aka Musk) of spreading “lies and misinformation” and “amplifying what the far-right is saying.” Yet less than six months later, a rapid review from crossbench peer Louise Casey called for … a national inquiry. Starmer soon confirmed one would happen. Time to U-turn: 159 days (Jan. 6, 2025 — June 14, 2025).  ‘ISLAND OF STRANGERS’ Immigration is a hot-button issue in the U.K. — especially with Reform UK Leader Nigel Farage breathing down Starmer’s neck. The PM tried reflecting this in a speech last May, warning that Britain risked becoming an “island of strangers” without government action to curb migration. That triggered some of Starmer’s own MPs, who drew parallels with the notorious 1968 “rivers of blood” speech by politician Enoch Powell. The PM conceded he’d put a foot wrong month later, giving an Observer interview where he claimed to not be aware of the Powell connection. “I deeply regret using” the term, he said. Time to U-turn: 46 days (May 12, 2025 — June 27, 2025).  Immigration is a hot-button issue in the U.K. — especially with Reform UK Leader Nigel Farage breathing down Starmer’s neck. | Tolga Akmen/EPA TWO-CHILD BENEFIT CAP  Here’s the U-turn that took the longest to arrive — but left Labour MPs the happiest. Introduced by the previous Conservative government, a two-child welfare cap meant parents could only claim social security payments such as Universal Credit or tax credits for their first two children. Many Labour MPs saw it as a relic of the Tory austerity era. Yet just weeks into government, seven Labour MPs lost the whip for backing an amendment calling for it to be scrapped, highlighting Reeves’ preference for fiscal caution over easy wins.  A year and a half later, that disappeared out the window. Reeves embracing its removal in her budget last fall as a child poverty-busty measure got plenty of cheers from Labour MPs — though the cap’s continued popularity with some voters may open up a fresh vulnerability. Time until U-turn: 491 days (July 23, 2024 — Nov. 26, 2025).

BRUSSELS — Donald Trump blew up global efforts to cut emissions from shipping, and now the EU is terrified the U.S. president will do the same to any plans to tax carbon emissions from long-haul flights. The European Commission is studying whether to expand its existing carbon pricing scheme that forces airlines to pay for emissions from short- and medium-haul flights within Europe into a more ambitious effort covering all flights departing the bloc. If that happens, all international airlines flying out of Europe — including U.S. ones — would face higher costs, something that’s likely to stick in the craw of the Trump administration. “God only knows what the Trump administration will do” if Brussels expands its own Emissions Trading System to include transatlantic flights, a senior EU official told POLITICO. A big issue is how to ensure that the new system doesn’t end up charging only European airlines, which often complain about the higher regulatory burden they face compared with their non-EU rivals. The EU official said Commission experts are now “scratching their heads how you can, on the one hand, talk about extending the ETS worldwide … [but] also make sure that you have a bit of a level playing field,” meaning a system that doesn’t only penalize European carriers. Any new costs will hit airlines by 2027, following a Commission assessment that will be completed by July 1. Brussels has reason to be worried.  “Trump has made it very clear that he does not want any policies that harm business … So he does not want any environmental regulation,” said Marina Efthymiou, aviation management professor at Dublin City University. “We do have an administration with a bullying behavior threatening countries and even entities like the European Commission.” The new U.S. National Security Strategy, released last week, closely hews to Trump’s thinking and is scathing on climate efforts. “We reject the disastrous ‘climate change’ and ‘Net Zero’ ideologies that have so greatly harmed Europe, threaten the United States, and subsidize our adversaries,” it says. In October, the U.S. led efforts to prevent the International Maritime Organization from setting up a global tax to encourage commercial fleets to go green. The no-holds-barred push was personally led by Trump and even threatened negotiators with personal consequences if they went along with the measure. In October, the U.S. led efforts to prevent the International Maritime Organization from setting up a global tax aimed at encouraging commercial fleets to go green. | Nicolas Tucat/AFP via Getty Images This “will be a parameter to consider seriously from the European Commission” when it thinks about aviation, Efthymiou said. The airline industry hopes the prospect of a furious Trump will scare off the Commission. “The EU is not going to extend ETS to transatlantic flights because that will lead to a war,” said Willie Walsh, director general of the International Air Transport Association, the global airline lobby, at a November conference in Brussels. “And that is not a war that the EU will win.” EUROPEAN ETS VS. GLOBAL CORSIA In 2012, the EU began taxing aviation emissions through its cap-and-trade ETS, which covers all outgoing flights from the European Economic Area — meaning EU countries plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. Switzerland and the U.K. later introduced similar schemes. In parallel, the U.N.’s International Civil Aviation Organization was working on its own carbon reduction plan, the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation. Given that fact, Brussels delayed imposing the ETS on flights to non-European destinations. The EU will now be examining the ICAO’s CORSIA to see if it meets the mark. “CORSIA lets airlines pay pennies for pollution — about €2.50 per passenger on a Paris-New York flight,” said Marte van der Graaf, aviation policy officer at green NGO Transport & Environment. Applying the ETS on the same route would cost “€92.40 per passenger based on 2024 traffic.” There are two reasons for such a big difference: the fourfold higher price for ETS credits compared with CORSIA credits, and the fact that “under CORSIA, airlines don’t pay for total emissions, but only for the increase above a fixed 2019 baseline,” Van der Graaf explained. “Thus, for a Paris-New York flight that emits an average of 131 tons of CO2, only 14 percent of emissions are offset under CORSIA. This means that, instead of covering the full 131 tons, the airline only has to purchase credits for approximately 18 tons.” Efthymiou, the professor, warned the price difference is projected to increase due to the progressive withdrawal of free ETS allowances granted to aviation. The U.N. scheme will become mandatory for all U.N. member countries in 2027 but will not cover domestic flights, including those in large countries such as the U.S., Russia and China. KEY DECISIONS By July 1, the Commission must release a report assessing the geographical coverage and environmental integrity of CORSIA. Based on this evaluation, the EU executive will propose either extending the ETS to all departing flights from the EU starting in 2027 or maintaining it for intra-EU flights only. Opposition to the ETS in the U.S. dates back to the Barack Obama administration. | Pete Souza/White House via Getty Images According to T&E, CORSIA doesn’t meet the EU’s climate goals. “Extending the scope of the EU ETS to all departing flights from 2027 could raise an extra €147 billion by 2040,” said Van der Graaf, noting that this money could support the production of greener aviation fuels to replace fossil kerosene. But according to Efthymiou, the Commission might decide to continue the current exemption “considering the very fragile political environment we currently have with a lunatic being in power,” she said, referring to Trump. “CORSIA has received a lot of criticism for sure … but the importance of CORSIA is that for the first time ever we have an agreement,” she added. “Even though that agreement might not be very ambitious, ICAO is the only entity with power to put an international regulation [into effect].” Regardless of what is decided in Brussels, Washington is prepared to fight. Opposition to the ETS in the U.S. dates back to the Barack Obama administration, when then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton sent a letter to the Commission opposing its application to American airlines. During the same term, the U.S. passed the EU ETS Prohibition Act, which gives Washington the power to prohibit American carriers from paying for European carbon pricing. John Thune, the Republican politician who proposed the bill, is now the majority leader of the U.S. Senate.