5 TIMES THE WINTER OLYMPICS GOT SUPER POLITICAL Invasions, nuclear crises and Nazi propaganda: The Games have seen it all. By SEBASTIAN STARCEVIC Illustration by Natália Delgado /POLITICO The Winter Olympics return to Europe this week, with Milan and Cortina d’Ampezzo set to host the world’s greatest athletes against the snowy backdrop of the Italian Alps. But beyond the ice rinks and ski runs, the Games have long doubled as a stage for global alliances, heated political rivalries and diplomatic crises.  “An event like the Olympics is inherently political because it is effectively a competition between nations,” said Madrid’s IE Assistant Professor Andrew Bertoli, who studies the intersection of sport and politics. “So the Games can effectively become an arena where nations compete for prestige, respect and soft power.” If history is any guide, this time won’t be any different. From invasions to the Nazis to nuclear crises, here are five times politics and the Winter Olympics collided. 1980: AMERICA’S “MIRACLE ON ICE” One of the most iconic moments in Olympic history came about amid a resurgence in Cold War tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The USSR had invaded Afghanistan only months earlier, and Washington’s rhetoric toward Moscow had hardened, with Ronald Reagan storming to the presidency a month prior on an aggressive anti-Soviet platform. At the 1980 Winter Games in Lake Placid, New York, that superpower rivalry was on full display on the ice. The U.S. men’s ice hockey team — made up largely of college players and amateurs — faced off against the Soviet squad, a battle-hardened, gold medal-winning machine. The Americans weren’t supposed to stand a chance. Then the impossible happened. In a stunning upset, the U.S. team skated to a 4-3 victory, a win that helped them clinch the gold medal. As the final seconds ticked away, ABC broadcaster Al Michaels famously cried, “Do you believe in miracles? Yes!” The impact echoed far beyond the rink. For many Americans, the victory was a morale boost in a period marked by geopolitical anxiety and division. Reagan later said it was proof “nice guys in a tough world can finish first.” The miracle’s legacy has endured well into the 21st century, with U.S. President Donald Trump awarding members of the hockey team the Congressional Gold Medal in December last year. 2014: RUSSIA INVADES CRIMEA AFTER SOCHI Four days. That’s how long Moscow waited after hosting the Winter Olympics in the Russian resort city of Sochi before sending troops into Crimea, occupying and annexing the Ukrainian peninsula. Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych had fled to Moscow days earlier, ousted by protesters demanding democracy and closer integration with the EU. As demonstrators filled Kyiv’s Independence Square, their clashes with government forces played on television screens around the world alongside highlights from the Games, in which Russia dominated the medal tally. Vladimir Putin poses with Russian athletes while visiting the Coastal Cluster Olympic Village ahead of the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics. | Pascal Le Segretain/Getty Images No sooner was the Olympic flame extinguished in Sochi on Feb. 23 than on Feb. 27 trucks and tanks rolled into Crimea. Soldiers in unmarked uniforms set up roadblocks, stormed Crimean government buildings and raised the Russian flag high above them. Later that year, Moscow would face allegations of a state-sponsored doping program and many of its athletes were ultimately stripped of their gold medals. 2022: RUSSIA INVADES UKRAINE … AGAIN There’s a theme here. Russian President Vladimir Putin made an appearance at the opening ceremony of Beijing’s Winter Games in 2022, meeting on the sidelines with Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping and declaring a “no limits” partnership. Four days after the end of the Games, on Feb. 24, Putin announced a “special military operation,” declaring war on Ukraine. Within minutes, Russian troops flooded into Ukraine, and missiles rained down on Kyiv, Kharkiv and other cities across the country. According to U.S. intelligence, The New York Times reported, Chinese officials asked the Kremlin to delay launching its attack until after the Games had wrapped up. Beijing denied it had advance knowledge of the invasion. 2018: KOREAN UNITY ON DISPLAY As South Korea prepared to host the Winter Games in its mountainous Pyeongchang region, just a few hundred kilometers over the border, the North Koreans were conducting nuclear missile tests, sparking global alarm and leading U.S. President Donald Trump to threaten to strike the country. The IOC said it was “closely monitoring” the situation amid concerns about whether the Games could be held safely on the peninsula. South Korean Vice Unification Minister Chun Hae-Sung, shakes hands with the head of North Korean delegation Jon Jong-Su after their meeting on January 17, 2018 in Panmunjom, South Korea. | South Korean Unification Ministry via Getty Images But then in his New Year’s address, North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un signaled openness to participating in the Winter Olympics. In the end, North Korean athletes not only participated in the Games, but at the opening ceremony they marched with their South Korean counterparts under a single flag, that of a unified Korea. Pyongyang and Seoul also joined forces in women’s ice hockey, sending a single team to compete — another rare show of unity that helped restart diplomatic talks between the capitals, though tensions ultimately resumed after the Games and continue to this day. 1936: HITLER INVADES THE RHINELAND Much has been said about the 1936 Summer Olympics in Berlin, in which the Nazi regime barred Jewish athletes from participating and used the Games to spread propaganda. But a few months earlier Germany also hosted the Winter Olympics in the town of Garmisch-Partenkirchen, allowing the Nazis to project an image of a peaceful, prosperous Germany and restore its global standing nearly two decades after World War I. A famous photograph from the event even shows Adolf Hitler and Joseph Goebbels signing autographs for the Canadian figure skating team. Weeks after the Games ended, Hitler sent troops into the Rhineland, a major violation of the Treaty of Versailles that was met with little pushback from France and Britain, and which some historians argue emboldened the Nazis to eventually invade Poland, triggering World War II.

LONDON — Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney left Beijing and promptly declared the U.S.-led “world order” broken. Don’t expect his British counterpart to do the same. Keir Starmer will land in the Chinese capital Wednesday for the first visit by a U.K. prime minister since 2018. By meeting President Xi Jinping, he will end what he has called an “ice age” under the previous Conservative administration, and try to win deals that he can sell to voters as a boost to Britain’s sputtering economy. Starmer is one of a queue of leaders flocking to the world’s second-largest economy, including France’s Emmanuel Macron in December and Germany’s Friedrich Merz next month. Like Carney did in Davos last week, the British PM has warned the world is the most unstable it has been for a generation. Yet unlike Carney, Starmer is desperate not to paint this as a rupture from the U.S. — and to avoid the criticism Trump unleashed on Carney in recent days over his dealings with China. The U.K. PM is trying to ride three horses at once, staying friendly — or at least engaging — with Washington D.C., Brussels and Beijing.  It is his “three-body problem,” joked a senior Westminster figure who has long worked on British-China relations. POLITICO spoke to 22 current and former officials, MPs, diplomats, industry figures and China experts, most of whom were granted anonymity to speak frankly. They painted a picture of a leader walking the same tightrope he always has surrounded by grim choices — from tricky post-Brexit negotiations with the EU, to Donald Trump taking potshots at British policies and freezing talks on a U.K.-U.S. tech deal. Starmer wants his (long-planned) visit to China to secure growth, but be cautious enough not to compromise national security or enrage Trump. He appears neither to have ramped up engagement with Beijing in response to Trump, nor reduced it amid criticism of China’s espionage and human rights record. In short, he doesn’t want any drama. “Starmer is more managerial. He wants to keep the U.K.’s relationships with big powers steady,” said one person familiar with planning for the trip. “You can’t really imagine him doing a Carney or a Macron and using the trip to set out a big geopolitical vision.” An official in 10 Downing Street added: “He’s clear that it is in the U.K.’s interests to have a relationship with the world’s second biggest economy. While the U.S. is our closest ally, he rejects the suggestion that means you can’t have pragmatic dealings with China.” He will be hoping Trump — whose own China visit is planned for April — sees it that way too. BRING OUT THE CAVALRY Starmer has one word in his mind for this trip — growth, which was just 0.1 percent in the three months to September. The prime minister will be flanked by executives from City giants HSBC, Standard Chartered, Schroders and the London Stock Exchange Group; pharmaceutical company AstraZeneca; car manufacturer Jaguar Land Rover; energy provider Octopus; and Brompton, the folding bicycle manufacturer. The priority in Downing Street will be bringing back “a sellable headline,” said the person familiar with trip planning quoted above. The economy is the overwhelming focus. While officials discussed trying to secure a political win, such as China lifting sanctions it imposed on British parliamentarians in 2021, one U.K. official said they now believe this to be unlikely. Between them, five people familiar with the trip’s planning predicted a large number of deals, dialogues and memorandums of understanding — but largely in areas with the fewest national security concerns. These are likely to include joint work on medical, health and life sciences, cooperation on climate science, and work to highlight Mandarin language schemes, the people said.  Officials are also working on the mutual recognition of professional qualifications and visa-free travel for short stays, while firms have been pushing for more expansive banking and insurance licences for British companies operating in China. The U.K. is meanwhile likely to try to persuade Beijing to lower import tariffs on Scotch whisky, which doubled in February 2025. A former U.K. official who was involved in Britain’s last prime ministerial visit to China, by Theresa May in 2018, predicted all deals will already be “either 100 or 99 percent agreed, in the system, and No. 10 will already have a firm number in its head that it can announce.” THREADING THE NEEDLE Yet all five people agreed there is unlikely to be a deal on heavy energy infrastructure, including wind turbine technology, that could leave Britain vulnerable to China. The U.K. has still not decided whether to let Ming Yang, a Chinese firm, invest £1.5 billion in a wind farm off the coast of Scotland. And while Carney agreed to ease tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles (EVs), three of the five people familiar with the trip’s planning said that any deep co-operation on EV technology is likely to be off the table. One of them predicted: “This won’t be another Canada moment. I don’t see us opening the floodgates on EVs.” Britain is trying to stick to “amber and green areas” for any deals, said the first person familiar with the planning. The second of the five people said: “I think they‘re going for the soft, slightly lovey stuff.” Britain has good reason to be reluctant, as Chinese-affiliated groups have long been accused of hacking and espionage, including against MPs and Britain’s Electoral Commission. Westminster was gripped by headlines in December about a collapsed case against two men who had been accused of spying for China. Chinese firm Huawei was banned from helping build the U.K.’s 5G phone network in 2020 after pressure from Trump. Even now, Britain’s security agencies are working on mitigations to telecommunications cables near the Tower of London. They pass close to the boundary of China’s proposed embassy, which won planning approval last week. Andrew Small, director of the Asia Programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations, a think tank working on foreign and security policy, said: “The current debate about how to ‘safely’ increase China’s role in U.K. green energy supplies — especially through wind power — has serious echoes of 5G all over again, and is a bigger concern on the U.S. side than the embassy decision.”  Starmer and his team also “don’t want to antagonize the Americans” ahead of Trump’s own visit in April, said the third of the five people familiar with trip planning. “They’re on eggshells … if they announce a new dialogue on United Nations policy or whatever bullshit they can come up with, any of those could be interpreted as a broadside to the Trump administration.” All these factors mean Starmer’s path to a “win” is narrow. Tahlia Peterson, a fellow working on China at Chatham House, the international affairs think tank, said: “Starmer isn’t going to ‘reset’ the relationship in one visit or unlock large-scale Chinese investment into Britain’s core infrastructure.” Small said foreign firms are being squeezed out of the Chinese market and Xi is “weaponizing” the dependency on Chinese supply chains. He added: “Beijing will likely offer extremely minor concessions in areas such as financial services, [amounting to] no more than a rounding error in economic scale.” Chancellor Rachel Reeves knows the pain of this. Britain’s top finance minister was mocked when she returned with just £600 million of agreements from her visit to China a year ago. One former Tory minister said the figure was a “deliberate insult” by China. Even once the big win is in the bag, there is the danger of it falling apart on arrival. Carney announced Canada and China would expand visa-free travel, only for Beijing’s ambassador to Ottawa to say that the move was not yet official. Despite this, businesses have been keen on Starmer’s re-engagement.  Rain Newton-Smith, director-general of the Confederation of British Industry, said firms are concerned about the dependence on Chinese rare earths but added: “If you map supply chains from anywhere, the idea that you can decouple from China is impossible. It’s about how that trade can be facilitated in the best way.” EMBASSY ROW Even if Starmer gets his wins, this visit will bring controversies that (critics say) show the asymmetry in Britain’s relationship with China. A tale of two embassies serves as a good metaphor.  Britain finally approved plans last week for China’s new outpost in London, despite a long row over national security. China held off formally confirming Starmer’s visit until the London embassy decision was finalized, the first person familiar with planning for the trip said. (Others point out Starmer would not want to go until the issue was resolved.) The result was a scramble in which executives were only formally invited a week before take-off. And Britain has not yet received approval to renovate its own embassy in Beijing. Officials privately refer to the building as “falling down,” while one person who has visited said construction materials were piled up against walls. It is “crumbling,” added another U.K. official: “The walls have got cracks on them, the wallpaper’s peeling off, it’s got damp patches.” British officials refused to give any impression of a “quid pro quo” for the two projects under the U.K.’s semi-judicial planning system. But that means much of Whitehall still does not know if Britain’s embassy revamp in Beijing will be approved, or held back until China’s project in London undergoes a further review in the courts. U.K. officials are privately pressing their Chinese counterparts to give the green light. One of the people keenest on a breakthrough will be Britain’s new ambassador to Beijing Peter Wilson, a career diplomat described by people who have met him as “outstanding,” “super smart” and “very friendly.”  For Wilson, hosting Starmer will be one of his trickiest jobs yet. The everyday precautions when doing business in China have made preparations for this trip more intense. Government officials and corporate executives are bringing secure devices and will have been briefed on the risk of eavesdropping and honeytraps. One member of Theresa May’s 2018 delegation to China recalled opening the door of what they thought was their vehicle, only to see several people with headsets on, listening carefully and typing. They compared it to a scene in a spy film. Activists and MPs will put Starmer under pressure to raise human rights issues — including what campaigners say is a genocide against the Uyghur people in Xinjiang province — on a trip governed by strict protocol where one stray word can derail a deal.  Pro-democracy publisher Jimmy Lai, who has British nationality, is facing sentencing in Hong Kong imminently for national security offenses. During the PM’s last meeting with Xi in 2024, Chinese officials bundled British journalists out of the room when he raised the case. Campaigners had thought Lai’s sentencing could take place this week. All these factors mean tension in the British state — which has faced a tussle between “securocrats” and departments pushing for growth — has been high ahead of the trip. Government comments on China are workshopped carefully before publication. Earlier this month, Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper told POLITICO her work on Beijing involves looking at “transnational repression” and “espionage threats.” But when Chancellor Rachel Reeves met China’s Finance Minister He Lifeng in Davos last week to tee up Starmer’s visit, the U.K. Treasury did not publicize the meeting — beyond a little-noticed photo on its Flickr account. SLOW BOAT TO CHINA Whatever the controversies, Labour’s China stance has been steadily taking shape since before Starmer took office in 2024. Labour drew inspiration from its sister party in Australia and the U.S. Democrats, both of which had regular meetings with Beijing. Party aides argued that after a brief “golden era” under Conservative PM David Cameron, Britain engaged less with China than with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The result of Labour’s thinking was the policy of “three Cs” — “challenge, compete, and cooperate.” A procession of visits to Beijing followed, most notably Reeves last year, culminating in Starmer’s trip. His National Security Adviser Jonathan Powell was involved in planning across much of 2025, even travelling to meet China’s top diplomat, Wang Yi, in November. Starmer teed up this week’s visit with a December speech arguing the “binary” view of China had persisted for too long. He promised to engage with Beijing carefully while taking a “more transactional approach to pretty well everything.”  The result was that this visit has long been locked in; just as Labour aides argue the London embassy decision was set in train in 2018, when the Tory government gave diplomatic consent for the site. Labour ministers “just want to normalize” the fact of dealing with China, said the senior Westminster figure quoted above. Newton-Smith added: “I think the view is that the government’s engagement with eyes wide open is the right strategy. And under the previous government, we did lose out.” But for each person who praises the re-engagement, there are others who say it has left Britain vulnerable while begging for scraps at China’s table. Hawks argue the hard details behind the “three Cs” were long nebulous, while Labour’s long-awaited “audit” of U.K.-China relations was delayed before being folded briefly into a wider security document. “Every single bad decision now can be traced back to the first six months,” argued the third person familiar with planning quoted above. “They were absolutely ill-prepared and made a series of decisions that have boxed them into a corner.” They added: “The government lacks the killer instinct to deal with China. It’s not in their DNA.” Luke de Pulford, a human rights campaigner and director of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, argued the Tories had engaged with China — Foreign Secretary James Cleverly visited in 2023 — and Labour was simply going much further. “China is pursuing an enterprise to reshape the global order in its own image, and to that end, to change our institutions and way of life to the extent that they’re an obstacle to it,” he said. “That’s what they’re up to — and we keep falling for it.” END OF THE OLD ORDER? His language may be less dramatic, but Starmer’s visit to China does have some parallels with Canada. Carney’s trip was the first by a Canadian PM since 2017, and he and Xi agreed a “new strategic partnership.” Later at Davos, the Canadian PM talked of “the end of a pleasant fiction” and warned multilateral institutions such as the United Nations are under threat. One British industry figure who attended Davos said of Carney’s speech: “It was great. Everyone was talking about it. Someone said to me that was the best and most poignant speech they’d ever seen at the World Economic Forum. That may be a little overblown, but I guess most of the speeches at the WEF are quite dull.” The language used by Starmer, a former human rights lawyer devoted to multilateralism, has not been totally dissimilar. Britain could no longer “look only to international institutions to uphold our values and interests,” he said in December. “We must do it ourselves through deals and alliances.” But while some in the U.K. government privately agree with Carney’s point, the real difference is the two men’s approach to Trump. Starmer will temper his messaging carefully to avoid upsetting either his Chinese hosts or the U.S., even as Trump throws semi-regular rocks at Britain. To Peterson, this is unavoidable. “China, the U.S. and the EU are likely to continue to dominate global economic growth for the foreseeable future,” she said. “Starmer’s choice is not whether to engage, but how.” Esther Webber contributed reporting.

The Trump administration is weighing new tactics to drive regime change in Cuba, including imposing a total blockade on oil imports to the Caribbean country, three people familiar with the plan said Thursday. That escalation has been sought by some critics of the Cuban government in the administration and backed by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, according to two of the three people, who were granted anonymity to discuss the sensitive discussions. No decision has been made on whether to approve that move, but it could be among the suite of possible actions presented to President Donald Trump to force the end of Cuba’s communist government, these people added. Preventing shipments of crude oil to the island would be a step-up from Trump’s statement last week that the U.S. would halt Cuba’s imports of oil from Venezuela, which had been its main crude supplier. But there are ongoing debates within the administration about whether it is even necessary to go that far, according to all three people. The loss of Venezuelan oil shipments — and the resale of some of those cargoes that Havana used to obtain foreign currency — has already throttled Cuba’s laggard economy. A total blockade of oil imports into Cuba could then spark a humanitarian crisis, a possibility that has led some in the administration to push back against it. The discussions, however, show the extent to which people inside the Trump administration are considering deposing leaders in Latin America they view as adversaries. “Energy is the chokehold to kill the regime,” said one person familiar with the plan who was granted anonymity to describe the private discussions. Deposing the country’s communist government – in power since the Cuban revolution in 1959 – is “100 percent a 2026 event” in the administration’s eyes, this person added. The effort would be justified under the 1994 LIBERTAD Act, better known as the Helms-Burton Act, this person added. That law codifies the U.S. embargo on Cuban trade and financial transactions. Cuba’s embassy in Washington did not respond to a request for comment. A White House spokesperson did not address a question on whether the administration was considering blocking all oil imports into Cuba. Cuba imports about 60 percent of its oil supply, according to the International Energy Agency. It was heavily dependent on Venezuela for those imports until the Trump administration started seizing sanctioned shipments from that country. Mexico has more recently become the main supplier as Venezuelan crude shipments have dried up. Mexico, however, charges Cuba for imported oil and its shipments are not expected to fully ameliorate Cuba’s worsening energy shortage. Since the U.S. operation that captured Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro, the administration has turned its attention on Cuba, arguing that the island’s economy is at its weakest point, making it ripe for regime change soon. Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the son of Cuban immigrants, have each voiced their optimism that the island’s communist government will fall in short time given the loss of Venezuela’s economic support. Toppling the communist regime in Cuba would fulfill a nearly seven-decade political project for Cuban exiles in Miami, who have pushed for democracy on the island since Fidel Castro took power after ousting the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista in 1959. Rubio has long been an advocate for tough measures against Havana in the hopes of securing the fall of the regime. Conditions on the island have indeed worsened, triggering blackouts and shortages of basic goods and food products. But the regime has weathered harsh U.S. sanctions — and the sweeping trade embargo — for decades and survived the fall of the Soviet Union after the Cold War. Meanwhile, concerns remain that the sudden collapse of the Cuban government would trigger a regional migration crisis and destabilize the Caribbean. Critics of the Cuban government will likely celebrate the proposal if implemented by the White House. Hawkish Republicans had already embraced the idea of completely blocking Cuba’s access to oil. “There should be not a dime, no petroleum. Nothing should ever get to Cuba,” said Sen. Rick Scott (R-Fla.) in a brief interview last week.

CAMP VIKING, Norway — In the deep snow of the Arctic mountains, Britain’s Royal Marines are readying for war with Russia. The elite troops are introduced to the wilderness by camping in the snow in temperatures below minus 20C. They finish by jumping through ice holes and shouting their name, rank and number before they can be pulled out of the water. Then they roll in the snow, drink a tot of rum, and toast King Charles III. Britain’s extreme weather training in this area dates to the Cold War, but Camp Viking — its facility in Skjold, northern Norway — is new and growing. It opened in 2023 after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and is due to reach a peak of 1,500 personnel this spring, followed by 2,000 next year. Britain is “effectively doubling” the number of its Royal Marines in Norway over three years, Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper told POLITICO in an interview. Exercises mirror missions the troops would conduct if NATO’s Article 5 on collective defense was triggered — reflecting the reality that “we are no longer at peace,” Brigadier Jaimie Norman, commander of the U.K. Commando Forces, told Cooper and her Norwegian counterpart Espen Barth Eide on a visit to the site Thursday. “We see ourselves on a continuum that has war on one end to peace on the other, and we are somewhere on that continuum.” Yet this is only one hemisphere of the Arctic. On the other, U.S. President Donald Trump is stoking a very different crisis by pushing for ownership of Greenland. The risks that link the two regions — which have shipping lanes busier than ever with Russian and Chinese vessels as the polar ice caps melt — are similar, albeit less immediate for Greenland than Norway. Yet Greenland is consuming huge global bandwidth. It is little wonder that Eide, greeting Cooper after he spent two days in Ukraine, lamented that they could not focus more on Ukraine and “less on other things.” Trump has left them with no other choice. FIRE UP THE ‘ARCTIC SENTRY’ Cooper and Eide’s response is to publicly back the idea of an “Arctic Sentry” NATO mission, a military co-operation that would aim to counter Russian threats — while reassuring Trump of Europe’s commitment to the region. Details of the mission — including the number of troops it would involve and whether it would comprise land, sea or air deployments — remain hazy. It could mean that exercises like those in northern Norway are deployed in Greenland too, as well as the shipping lanes around them. Lanes in northern Europe have seen a rise in shadow fleets carrying sanctioned oil and alleged sabotage of communications cables. Yvette Cooper’s message to Trump, and everyone else, was to insist there is no real division between the eastern and western Arctic. | Stefan Rousseau/Getty Images But as with so many issues, they have yet to discover whether Trump will take heed. Cooper’s intervention came one day after U.S. Vice President JD Vance met Danish and Greenlandic representatives at the White House amid growing tensions over Trump’s repeatedly stated intention to take control of Greenland. Cooper’s message to Trump, and everyone else, was to insist there is no real division between the eastern and western Arctic. “The security of the Arctic is all linked,” she said — citing Russia’s northern fleet, shadow fleet, oil tankers, non-military assets, spy ships and threats to undersea cables.  “Look at the map of the Arctic and where you have the sea channels,” she added. “You can’t look at any one bit of Arctic security on its own, because the whole point of the Arctic security is it has an impact on our transatlantic security as a whole. “Some of the Russian threat is through its Northern Fleet and into the Atlantic. That is a transatlantic threat. That is something where clearly you can’t simply revert to Europe’s defense on its own.” Yet in parts of Britain and Europe, there are plenty of people who fear Trump is asking Europe to do exactly that. European allies have long pushed the U.S. president to nail down commitments to Ukraine. A mere hint of this frustration is visible in Eide. He was keen to point out that the risk to his end of the Arctic is more immediate. “Just to the east of our eastern border, you come to the Kola Peninsula and Murmansk,” he said, standing on a snowy outcrop. “That region has the largest conglomeration of nuclear weapons in the world — and particularly, the second strike capability of Russia is there. They need access to the open oceans, and in a wartime situation, we don’t want them to have that access.” He added: “If there is a crisis, this area will immediately be a center of gravity because of the importance of the nuclear capabilities of Russia, the submarine base and so on. It will go from low tension to being in the midst of it in a very short time. That’s why we need to plan for rapid reinforcement, for rapid stepping up, and also to have a constant military pressure presence in this area.”  Managing this Trump reassurance is a tricky balance. Rachel Ellehus, director general of the non-partisan foreign affairs think tank RUSI and a former U.S. representative at NATO, said: “You want to signal solidarity and presence and engagement, and send a message that Europe is stepping up for this alleged Russian and Chinese threat in and around Greenland.  “But you don’t want to kind of stick your finger in the eye of the United States or signal that you’re looking for some sort of confrontation.” Perhaps for this reason, Ellehus suggested NATO itself is holding back. “The one voice that has been quite silent is that of NATO,” she said. “It’s quite odd that Mark Rutte has not issued a secretary general statement expressing solidarity with Denmark and underscoring that any security concerns that the United States might have could legitimately be addressed through the NATO alliance, because both Denmark and Greenland are members of their territories covered by the Article Five guarantee. “I think it does have consequences in terms of the credibility of the alliance, and I think we could see an intensification of the practice whereby allies are turning to bilateral or regional relationships, score and meet their security to meet their security needs, rather than relying on multinational alliances like NATO.” A NEW ERA A reminder of how fast multilateralism is changing hangs on the library wall in the quaint, pink and white British embassy in Helsinki. The photo, dated July 1975, shows British Prime Minister Harold Wilson in the embassy garden with U.S. President Gerald Ford, Henry Kissinger and others on the cusp of signing the Helsinki Accords. The agreement, emphasizing the rights of sovereignty and territorial integrity, was part of a drumbeat toward the end of the Cold War. Britain’s extreme weather training in this area dates to the Cold War, but Camp Viking — its facility in Skjold, northern Norway — is new and growing. | Ben Dance / FCDO Across the street in Helsinki is the fortress-like embassy of the U.S. — where Trump is one of those calling the shots on territorial integrity these days. As well as his designs on Greenland, the president recently said NATO “would not be an effective force or deterrent” without American military power and said he did not need international law. Britain and many of its allies are loath to accept any suggestion of any cracks in the alliance. Asked by POLITICO if NATO was in crisis, Finland’s Foreign Minister Elisa Valtonen insisted: “NATO is stronger than it’s ever been.” Cooper, too, said NATO is “extremely strong” — and argued that those who describe his administration as a destabilising force are being too simplistic. She pointed to the presence of Marco Rubio, a more traditional Republican than Trump who Europeans have found easier to work with than the president, along with work on security guarantees for Ukraine, collaboration on “Five Eyes” intelligence and the plan for Gaza, much of which was led by the U.S. “Of course, everyone can see this administration operates in a different way,” she said, but “in every discussion I’ve had with … Rubio, there has always been a really strong commitment to NATO.” The Gaza plan, she added pointedly, “was actually drawing on international law, the UN framework.” But one U.K. official, not authorized to speak publicly, said there were three schools of thought about Trump’s comments on Greenland. The first is the president’s stated aim that he is concerned about security threats to the Arctic; the second is that he is seeking business opportunities there. And then “there is one school of thought that ultimately, he just wants to take it … he just wants to make America bigger,” they said.

LONDON — Britain stepped up a promise to send troops into Ukraine — and left open a host of questions about how it will all work in practice. At a meeting of the “coalition of the willing” in Paris this week, the U.K. and France signed a “declaration of intent” to station forces in Ukraine as part of a multinational bid to support any ceasefire deal with Russia. It builds on months of behind-the-scenes planning by civil servants and military personnel eager to put heft behind any agreement. Despite promising a House of Commons vote, U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer has so far shared very little information publicly about how the operation might work and what its terms of engagement will be, at a time when Britain’s armed forces are already under significant strain. This lack of transparency has begun to raise alarm bells in defense circles. Ed Arnold of think tank the Royal United Services Institute has described the U.K. as being in “a really dangerous position,” while retired commander Tim Collins said any peacekeeping mission would not be credible without higher defense spending. Even Nigel Farage was in on the action Wednesday — the populist leader of Britain’s Reform UK party said he couldn’t sign up to the plan in its current form, and predicted the country could only keep its commitments going “for six or eight weeks.” Here are the key questions still lingering for Starmer’s government. HAS THE UK GOT ENOUGH TROOPS? In France, Emmanuel Macron is at least starting to get into the numbers. The French president gave a televised address Tuesday in which he said France envisaged sending “several thousands” of troops to Ukrainian territory. But Starmer has given no equivalent commitment. Under pressure in the House of Commons, the British prime minster defended that position Wednesday, saying the size of the deployment would depend on the nature of the ceasefire agreed between Russia and Ukraine. However, analysts say it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which a deployment does not place a genuine strain on the U.K.’s military. The country’s strategic defense review, published last year, stressed that the Britain’s armed forces have dwindled in strength since the Cold War, leaving “only a small set of forces ready to deploy at any given moment. The latest figures from the Ministry of Defence put the number of medically-deployable troops at 99,162. Figures including former head of the army Richard Dannatt and Matthew Savill, director of military sciences at RUSI, have warned that a new deployment in Ukraine would mean pulling away from existing operations. There is also a hefty question mark over how long troops might be deployed for, and whether they might be taking on an open-ended commitment of the kind that snarled Britain for years in Afghanistan. RUSI’s Arnold said positioning troops in Ukraine could be “bigger” than deployments in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo and Libya, “not necessarily in numbers, but in terms of the consequences… This mission absolutely can’t fail. And if it’s a mission that can’t fail, it needs to be absolutely watertight.” WHAT HAPPENS IF RUSSIA ACTUALLY ATTACKS? Ministers have refused to be drawn so far on the expectations placed on troops who might be stationed in Ukraine as part of the plan. They have instead placed an emphasis on the U.K.’s role as part of a “reassurance” force, providing air and maritime support, with ground activity focused on training Ukrainian soldiers, and have not specified what would happen if British troops came under direct threat. The latest figures from the Ministry of Defence put the number of medically-deployable troops at 99,162. | Pool photo by Jason Alden/EPA That’s already got Kyiv asking questions. “Would all the COW partners give a strong response if Russia attacks again? That’s a hard question. I ask all of them, and I still have not gotten a clear answer,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told reporters via WhatsApp chat on Wednesday. “I see political will. I see partners being ready to give us strong sanctions, security guarantees. But until we have legally binding security guarantees, approved by parliaments, by the U.S. Congress, we cannot answer the question if partners are ready to protect us,” Zelenskyy added. Richard Shirreff, former deputy supreme commander of NATO in Europe, told LBC: “This can’t be a lightly armed ‘blue beret’-type peacekeeping force … enforcing peace means being prepared to overmatch the Russians, and that means also being prepared to fight them if necessary.” A U.K. military official, granted anonymity to speak candidly, said: “There is no point in troops being there if they’re not prepared to fight.” Asked if British troops could return fire if they came under attack from Russia, a Downing Street spokesman said Wednesday afternoon that they would not comment on “operational hypothetical scenarios.”  Ministers have refused to be drawn so far on the expectations placed on troops who might be stationed in Ukraine as part of the plan. | Tolga Akmen/EPA Returning fire might even be one of the simpler possibilities for the army to contemplate, with less clarity over how peacekeeping forces could respond to other types of hostile activity designed to destabilize a ceasefire, such as drone incursions or attempted hacking. WILL THE US REALLY PROVIDE A BACKSTOP? Starmer has long stressed that U.K. military involvement will depend on the U.S. offering back-up. John Foreman, a former British defense attaché in Moscow and Kyiv, said it was right for the multinational force to focus on support for Ukraine’s own forces, pointing out: “It was never going to be able to provide credible security guarantees — only the U.S. with perhaps key allies can do this.” While Washington has inched forward in its apparent willingness to provide security guarantees — including warm words from Donald Trump’s top envoys in Paris Tuesday — they are by no means set in stone.  The final statement, which emerged from Tuesday’s meeting, was watered down from an earlier draft, removing references to American participation in the multinational force for Ukraine, including with “U.S. capabilities such as intelligence and logistics, and with a U.S. commitment to support the force if it is attacked.” This will only add to fears that the U.K. is talking beyond its capabilities and is overly optimistic about the behavior of its allies. Government officials pushed back against the accusation that British military plans lack substance, arguing that it would be “irresponsible” to share specific operational details prematurely. That position could be difficult to maintain for long.

LONDON — Kemi Badenoch on Tuesday praised the capture of Nicolás Maduro by U.S. troops as the moral course of action claiming the Venezuelan president ran a “gangster state.” Britain’s opposition leader, who heads up the center-right Conservatives, said her experience growing up under a dictatorship in Nigeria made her sympathetic to those celebrating the removal of Maduro. “What’s happened is quite extraordinary, but I understand why America has done it,” Badenoch told the BBC. “Where the legal certainty is not yet clear, morally, I do think it was the right thing to do,” she said. Badenoch was born in the U.K. in 1980, but grew up in Nigeria. She returned to the U.K. aged 16 in 1996. “I am different from other party leaders and other people in the House of Commons,” she said. “I grew up under a military dictatorship, so I know what it’s like to have someone like Maduro in charge.” Badenoch, whose Conservative party has been closely aligned with the Republicans for decades, did say Maduro’s capture raises “serious questions about the rules based order.” “We act as if it is still 1995 where we’re living off the peace dividend of the Cold War and World War Two,” she said. “The world has changed.” The Tory leader echoed U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s Greenland warning to Donald Trump after the U.S. president suggested the Arctic territory is required for U.S. security. “It is not for sale. What happens in Greenland is up to Denmark and the people of Greenland,” Badenoch said. The deposed Venezuelan leader and his wife Cilia Flores pleaded not guilty in New York Monday to drug trafficking charges. Their next court date is set for March 17.

LONDON — The U.K.’s top military brass are not pulling their punches with a flurry of interventions in recent weeks, warning just how stark the threat from Russia is for Europe, well beyond Ukraine’s borders. British military chiefs have been hammering home just what is at stake as European leaders gather in Berlin for the latest round of talks, hoping to break the stalemate in peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. They have also been speaking out as the Ministry of Defence and U.K. Treasury hammer out the details of a landmark investment plan for defense. Here are 5 of the most striking warnings about the threats from Russia. 1. RUSSIA’S ‘EXPORT OF CHAOS’ WILL CONTINUE Intelligence chief Blaise Metreweli called out the acute threat posed by an “aggressive, expansionist, and revisionist” Russia in a speech on Monday.   “The export of chaos is a feature not a bug in the Russian approach to international engagement; and we should be ready for this to continue until Putin is forced to change his calculus,” the new boss of MI6 said.  That warning also comes with some fighting talk. “Putin should be in no doubt, our support is enduring. The pressure we apply on Ukraine’s behalf will be sustained,” Metreweli added. 2. BRITAIN WON’T RULE THE WAVES WITHOUT WORKING FOR IT Navy boss Gwyn Jenkins used a conference in London last week to draw attention to the rising threat of underwater attack. “The advantage that we have enjoyed in the Atlantic since the end of the Cold War, the Second World War, is at risk. We are holding on, but not by much,” Britain’s top sea lord said. In what appeared to be a message to spendthrift ministers, he warned: “There is no room for complacency. Our would-be opponents are investing billions. We have to step up or we will lose that advantage. We cannot let that happen.” 3. SPY GAMES EVERYWHERE U.K. Defense Secretary John Healey called reporters to Downing Street last month to condemn the “deeply dangerous” entry of the Russian spy ship — the Yantar — into U.K. waters.  Britain deployed a Royal Navy frigate and Royal Air Force P8 planes to monitor and track the vessel, Healey said. After detailing the incursion, the U.K. Cabinet minister described it as a “stark reminder” of the “new era of threat.”  “Our world is changing. It is less predictable, more dangerous,” he said.   4. NO WAY OUT Healey’s deputy, Al Carns, followed up with his own warning last week that Europe must be prepared for war on its doorstep.   Europe is not facing “wars of choice” anymore, but “wars of necessity” which will come with a high human cost, Carns said, citing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as an example. He was speaking at the launch of the U.K.’s new British Military Intelligence Service, which will bring together units from the Royal Navy, British Army and Royal Air Force in a bid to speed up information sharing. 5. EVERYONE’S GOT TO BE READY TO STEP UP U.K. Chief of Defence Staff Richard Knighton is set to call on Monday for the “whole nation” to step up as the Russian threat to NATO intensifies. “The war in Ukraine shows Putin’s willingness to target neighboring states, including their civilian populations, potentially with such novel and destructive weapons, threatens the whole of NATO, including the UK,” Knighton is due to say at the defense think tank RUSI on Monday evening, according to prepared remarks. “The situation is more dangerous than I have known during my career and the response requires more than simply strengthening our armed forces. A new era for defense doesn’t just mean our military and government stepping up — as we are — it means our whole nation stepping up,” he’ll also note.

Germany’s Chancellor Friedrich Merz compared Russian President Vladimir Putin to Adolf Hitler in a speech Saturday evening, warning that the Kremlin leader’s ambitions won’t stop with Ukraine. “Just as the Sudetenland was not enough in 1938, Putin will not stop,” Merz said, referring to a part of Czechoslovakia that the Allies ceded to the Nazi leader with an agreement. Hitler continued his expansion into Europe after that. “If Ukraine falls, he won’t stop there,” Merz said, referring to Putin. German, British and French officials are set to meet in Berlin this weekend to discuss proposals to end the war in Ukraine. U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff is also expected to meet with Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The talks are in preparation for a planned summit of leaders including Merz, Britain’s Keir Starmer, France’s Emmanuel Macron and Zelenskyy on Monday over stopping Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. A U.S.-backed 20-point peace plan is in the works, which includes territorial concessions on Ukraine’s part. Under one proposal being discussed, the Donbas region would be made into a free-trade zone were American companies can freely operate. Merz was speaking at a party conference of the Christian Social Union of Bavaria, which is closely aligned with his own party, the Christian Democrats.

President Donald Trump intends for the U.S. to keep a bigger military presence in the Western Hemisphere going forward to battle migration, drugs and the rise of adversarial powers in the region, according to his new National Security Strategy. The 33-page document is a rare formal explanation of Trump’s foreign policy worldview by his administration. Such strategies, which presidents typically release once each term, can help shape how parts of the U.S. government allocate budgets and set policy priorities. The Trump National Security Strategy, which the White House quietly released Thursday, has some brutal words for Europe, suggesting it is in civilizational decline, and pays relatively little attention to the Middle East and Africa. It has an unusually heavy focus on the Western Hemisphere that it casts as largely about protecting the U.S. homeland. It says “border security is the primary element of national security” and makes veiled references to China’s efforts to gain footholds in America’s backyard. “The United States must be preeminent in the Western Hemisphere as a condition of our security and prosperity — a condition that allows us to assert ourselves confidently where and when we need to in the region,” the document states. “The terms of our alliances, and the terms upon which we provide any kind of aid, must be contingent on winding down adversarial outside influence — from control of military installations, ports, and key infrastructure to the purchase of strategic assets broadly defined.” The document describes such plans as part of a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. The latter is the notion set forth by President James Monroe in 1823 that the U.S. will not tolerate malign foreign interference in its own hemisphere. Trump’s paper, as well as a partner document known as the National Defense Strategy, have faced delays in part because of debates in the administration over elements related to China. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent pushed for some softening of the language about Beijing, according to two people familiar with the matter who were granted anonymity to describe internal deliberations. Bessent is currently involved in sensitive U.S. trade talks with China, and Trump himself is wary of the delicate relations with Beijing. The new National Security Strategy says the U.S. has to make challenging choices in the global realm. “After the end of the Cold War, American foreign policy elites convinced themselves that permanent American domination of the entire world was in the best interests of our country. Yet the affairs of other countries are our concern only if their activities directly threaten our interests,” the document states. In an introductory note to the strategy, Trump called it a “roadmap to ensure that America remains the greatest and most successful nation in human history, and the home of freedom on earth.” But Trump is mercurial by nature, so it’s hard to predict how closely or how long he will stick to the ideas laid out in the new strategy. A surprising global event could redirect his thinking as well, as it has done for recent presidents from George W. Bush to Joe Biden. Still, the document appears in line with many of the moves he’s taken in his second term, as well as the priorities of some of his aides. That includes deploying significantly more U.S. military prowess to the Western Hemisphere, taking numerous steps to reduce migration to America, pushing for a stronger industrial base in the U.S. and promoting “Western identity,” including in Europe. The strategy even nods to so-called traditional values at times linked to the Christian right, saying the administration wants “the restoration and reinvigoration of American spiritual and cultural health” and “an America that cherishes its past glories and its heroes.” It mentions the need to have “growing numbers of strong, traditional families that raise healthy children.” As POLITICO has reported before, the strategy spends an unusual amount of space on Latin America, the Caribbean and other U.S. neighbors. That’s a break with past administrations, who tended to prioritize other regions and other topics, such as taking on major powers like Russia and China or fighting terrorism. The Trump strategy suggests the president’s military buildup in the Western Hemisphere is not a temporary phenomenon. (That buildup, which has included controversial military strikes against boats allegedly carrying drugs, has been cast by the administration as a way to fight cartels. But the administration also hopes the buildup could help pressure Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro to step down.) The strategy also specifically calls for “a more suitable Coast Guard and Navy presence to control sea lanes, to thwart illegal and other unwanted migration, to reduce human and drug trafficking, and to control key transit routes in a crisis.” The strategy says the U.S. should enhance its relationships with governments in Latin America, including working with them to identify strategic resources — an apparent reference to materials such as rare earth minerals. It also declares that the U.S. will partner more with the private sector to promote “strategic acquisition and investment opportunities for American companies in the region.” Such business-related pledges, at least on a generic level, could please many Latin American governments who have long been frustrated by the lack of U.S. attention to the region. It’s unclear how such promises square with Trump’s insistence on imposing tariffs on America’s trade partners, however. The National Security Strategy spends a fair amount of time on China, though it often doesn’t mention Beijing directly. Many U.S. lawmakers — on a bipartisan basis — consider an increasingly assertive China the gravest long-term threat to America’s global power. But while the language the Trump strategy uses is tough, it is careful and far from inflammatory. The administration promises to “rebalance America’s economic relationship with China, prioritizing reciprocity and fairness to restore American economic independence.” But it also says “trade with China should be balanced and focused on non-sensitive factors” and even calls for “maintaining a genuinely mutually advantageous economic relationship with Beijing.” The strategy says the U.S. wants to prevent war in the Indo-Pacific — a nod to growing tensions in the region, including between China and U.S. allies such as Japan and the Philippines. “We will also maintain our longstanding declaratory policy on Taiwan, meaning that the United States does not support any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait,” it states. That may come as a relief to Asia watchers who worry Trump will back away from U.S. support for Taiwan as it faces ongoing threats from China. The document states that “it is a core interest of the United States to negotiate an expeditious cessation of hostilities in Ukraine,” and to mitigate the risk of Russian confrontation with other countries in Europe. But overall it pulls punches when it comes to Russia — there’s very little criticism of Moscow. Instead, it reserves some of its harshest remarks for U.S.-allied nations in Europe. In particular, the administration, in somewhat veiled terms, knocks European efforts to rein in far-right parties, calling such moves political censorship. “The Trump administration finds itself at odds with European officials who hold unrealistic expectations for the [Ukraine] war perched in unstable minority governments, many of which trample on basic principles of democracy to suppress opposition,” the strategy states. The strategy also appears to suggest that migration will fundamentally change European identity to a degree that could hurt U.S. alliances. “Over the long term, it is more than plausible that within a few decades at the latest, certain NATO members will become majority non-European,” it states. “As such, it is an open question whether they will view their place in the world, or their alliance with the United States, in the same way as those who signed the NATO charter.” Still, the document acknowledges Europe’s economic and other strengths, as well as how America’s partnership with much of the continent has helped the U.S. “Not only can we not afford to write Europe off — doing so would be self-defeating for what this strategy aims to achieve,” it says. “Our goal should be to help Europe correct its current trajectory,” it says. Trump’s first-term National Security Strategy focused significantly on the U.S. competition with Russia and China, but the president frequently undercut it by trying to gain favor with the leaders of those nuclear powers. If this new strategy proves a better reflection of what Trump himself actually believes, it could help other parts of the U.S. government adjust, not to mention foreign governments. As Trump administration documents often do, the strategy devotes significant space to praising the commander-in-chief. It describes him as the “President of Peace” while favorably stating that he “uses unconventional diplomacy.” The strategy struggles at times to tamp down what seem like inconsistencies. It says the U.S. should have a high bar for foreign intervention, but it also says it wants to “prevent the emergence of dominant adversaries.” It also essentially dismisses the ambitions of many smaller countries. “The outsized influence of larger, richer, and stronger nations is a timeless truth of international relations,” the strategy states. The National Security Strategy is the first of several important defense and foreign policy papers the Trump administration is due to release. They include the National Defense Strategy, whose basic thrust is expected to be similar. Presidents’ early visions for what the National Security Strategy should mention have at times had to be discarded due to events. After the 9/11 attacks, George W. Bush’s first-term strategy ended up focusing heavily on battling Islamist terrorism. Biden’s team spent much of its first year working on a strategy that had to be rewritten after Russia moved toward a full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

THE WEST’S NEW ARMS RACE: SELLING PEACE TO BUY WAR Military spending is rising faster than at any time since the Cold War, but the retreat from diplomacy and foreign aid will come with a price. By TIM ROSS in London Illustrations by Nicolás Ortega for POLITICO In 1958, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan observed that “jaw, jaw is better than war, war.” Talking, he meant, is preferable to fighting.  Macmillan knew the realities of both diplomacy and military action: He was seriously wounded as a soldier in World War I, and as prime minister, he had to grapple with the nuclear threats of the Cold War, including most critically the Cuban missile crisis. John F. Kennedy, the U.S. president during that near-catastrophic episode of atomic brinkmanship, also understood the value of diplomatic channels, as well as the brutality of conflict: He severely injured his back serving in the U.S. Navy in 1943. Andrew Mitchell, a former Cabinet minister in the British government, worries that the wisdom of leaders like Kennedy and Macmillan gained from war has faded from memory just when it is most needed.  Advertisement “The world has forgotten the lessons of the first World War, when millions of people were slaughtered and our grandfathers’ generation said we can’t allow this to happen again,” he said. One school of academic theory holds that era-defining wars recur roughly every 85 years, as generations lose sight of their forebears’ hard-won experience. That would mean we should expect another one anytime now. And yet, as Mitchell sees it, even as evidence mounts that the world is headed in the wrong direction, governments have lost sight of the value of “jaw-jaw.” The erosion of diplomatic instinct is showing up not just in rhetoric but in budgets. The industrialized West is rapidly scaling back investment in soft power — slashing foreign aid and shrinking diplomatic networks — even as it diverts resources to defense.  U.S. aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford, the world’s largest warship, makes its way into Oslo’s fjord in September. | Lise Åserud/NTB via AFP/Getty Images At no point since the end of the Cold War has military spending surged as fast as it did in 2024, when it rose 9.4 percent to reach the highest global total ever recorded by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. By contrast, a separate report from the Paris-based Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development found a 9 percent drop in official development assistance that same year among the world’s richest donors. The OECD forecast cuts of at least another 9 percent and potentially as much as 17 percent this year.  “For the first time in nearly 30 years, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States all cut their ODA in 2024,” the OECD said in its study. “If they proceed with announced cuts in 2025, it will be the first time in history that all four have cut ODA simultaneously for two consecutive years.”  Diplomatic corps are also shrinking, with U.S. President Donald Trump setting the tone by slashing jobs in the U.S. State Department.  Advertisement Global figures are hard to come by, and anyway go out of date quickly; one of the most extensive surveys is based on data from 2023. But authorities in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the European Union’s headquarters are among those who have warned that their diplomatic staff face cuts.  Analysts fear that as industrialized economies turn their backs on aid and diplomacy to build up their armies, hostile and unreliable states like Russia, China and Turkey will step in to fill the gaps in these influence networks, turning once friendly nations in Africa and Asia against the West.  And that, they warn, risks making the world a far more dangerous place. If the geopolitical priorities of governments operate like a market, the trend is clear: Many leaders have decided it’s time to sell peace and buy war.  SELLING PEACE, BUYING WAR Military spending is climbing worldwide. The Chinese defense budget, second only to that of the U.S., grew 7 percent between 2023 and 2024, according to SIPRI. Russia’s military expenditure ballooned by 38 percent. Spurred in part by fears among European countries that Trump might abandon their alliance, NATO members agreed in June to a new target of spending 5 percent of gross domestic product on defense and security infrastructure by 2035. The U.S. president — cast in the role of “daddy” — was happy enough that his junior partners across the Atlantic would be paying their way.  In reality, the race to rearm pre-dates Trump’s return to the White House. The war in Ukraine made military buildup an urgent priority for anxious Northern and Eastern European states living in the shadow of President Vladimir Putin’s Russia. According to SIPRI, military spending in Europe rocketed 17 percent in 2024, reaching $693 billion — before Trump returned to office and demanded that NATO up its game. Since 2015, defense budgets in Europe have expanded by 83 percent. One argument for prioritizing defense over funding aid or diplomacy is that military muscle is a powerful deterrent against would-be attackers. As European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen put it when she announced her plan to rearm Europe in March: “This is the moment for peace through strength.” Some of von der Leyen’s critics argue that an arms race inevitably leads to war — but history does not bear that out, according to Greg Kennedy, professor of strategic foreign policy at King’s College London. “Arms don’t kill. Governments kill,” he said. “The problem is there are governments out there that are willing to use military power and to kill people to get their objective.”  Ideally a strong military would go hand in hand with so-called soft power in the form of robust diplomatic and foreign aid networks, Kennedy added. But if Europe has to choose, it should rebuild its depleted hard power first, he said. The risk to peace lies in how the West’s adversaries — like China — might respond to a new arms race.  Advertisement Few serious politicians in Europe, the U.K. or the U.S. dispute the need for military investment in today’s era of instability and conflict. The question, when government budgets are squeezed, is how to pay for it.  Here, again, Trump’s second term has set the tone. Within days of taking office, the U.S. president froze billions of dollars in foreign aid. And in February he announced he would be cutting 90 percent of the U.S. Agency for International Development’s contracts. The move — billed as part of Trump’s war on “woke” — devastated humanitarian nongovernmental organizations, many of which relied on American funding to carry out work in some of the poorest parts of the world. According to one estimate, Trump’s aid cuts alone could cause 14 million premature deaths over the next five years, one-third of them children. That’s a decision that Trump’s critics say won’t be forgotten in places like sub-Saharan Africa, even before cuts from other major donors like Germany and the U.K. take effect. Diplomatic corps are also shrinking, with U.S. President Donald Trump setting the tone by slashing jobs in the U.S. State Department. | Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images In London, British leader Keir Starmer and his team had prepared for the whirlwind of Trump’s return by devising a strategy aimed at appealing to the American leader’s self-interest, rather than values they weren’t sure he shared.  As Starmer got ready to visit the White House, he and his team came up with a plan to flatter Trump with the unprecedented honor of a second state visit to the U.K. Looking to head off a sharp break between the U.S. and Ukraine, Starmer also sought to show the U.K. was taking Trump seriously on the need for Europe (including Britain) to pay for its own defenses.  On the eve of his trip to Washington in February, Starmer announced he would raise defense spending — as Trump had demanded allies must — and that he would pay for it in part by cutting the U.K.’s budget for foreign aid from 0.5 percent of gross national income to 0.3 percent.  For a center-left leader like Starmer, whose Labour predecessors Gordon Brown and Tony Blair had championed the moral obligation to spend big on foreign development, it was a wrenching shift of gear.  Advertisement “That is not an announcement that I am happy to make,” he explained. “However, the realities of our dangerous new era mean that the defense and national security of our country must always come first.” The U.S. government welcomed Starmer’s move as “a strong step from an enduring partner.” But Starmer returned home to political revolt. His international aid minister Anneliese Dodds quit, warning Starmer his decision would “remove food and health care from desperate people — deeply harming the U.K.’s reputation.”  She lamented that Britain appeared to be “following in President Trump’s slipstream of cuts to USAID.”  EASY TARGETS  In the months that followed, other major European governments made similar calculations, some citing the U.K. as a sign that times had changed. For cash-poor governments in the era of Trumpian nationalism, foreign aid is an easy target for savings. The U.K. was once a world leader in foreign aid and a beacon for humanitarian agencies, enshrining in law its commitment to spend 0.7 percent of gross national income on ODA, according to Mitchell, the former Cabinet minister responsible for the policy. “But now Britain is being cited in Germany as, ‘Well, the Brits are cutting their development money, we can do the same.’”  In Sweden, the defense budget is due to rise by 18 percent between 2025 and 2026, in what the government hailed as a “historic” investment plan. “The prevailing security situation is more serious than it has been in several decades,” Sweden’s ministry of defense said, “and Russia constitutes a multi-dimensional threat.”  But Sweden’s international development cooperation budget, which was worth around €4.5 billion last year, will fall to €4 billion by 2026.  In debt-ridden France, plans were announced earlier this year to slash the ODA budget by around one-third, though its spending decisions have been derailed by a spiraling political crisis that has so far prevented it from passing a budget. Money for defense was due to rise dramatically, despite the overall squeeze on France’s public finances.  In Finland, which shares an 800-mile border with Putin’s Russia, the development budget also fell, while defense spending escaped cuts.  The country’s Development Minister Ville Tavio, from the far-right populist Finns Party, says the cuts provided a chance to rethink aid altogether. Instead of funding humanitarian programs, he wants to give private businesses opportunities to invest to create jobs in poorer countries. That, he believes, will help prevent young people from heading to Europe as illegal migrants.  Advertisement “If they don’t have jobs, the countries will become unstable, and the young people will radicalize. Some of them will start trying to get to Europe,” he said. “It’s a complete win-win if we can help the developing countries to industrialize and create those jobs they need.” Not all countries are cutting back. Ireland plans to increase its ODA budget, while Denmark has pledged to keep spending 0.7 percent of its gross national income on foreign aid even as it boosts investment in defense. But Ireland has enjoyed enviable economic growth in recent years and Denmark will pay for its spending priorities by raising the retirement age to 70. In any case, these are not giant economies that can sustain Europe’s reputation as a soft power superpower on their own.  STAFF CUTS The retreat from foreign aid is only part of a broader withdrawal from diplomacy itself. Some wealthy Western nations have trimmed their diplomatic corps, even closing embassies and bureaus.  Again, Trump’s America provides the most dramatic example. In July, the U.S. State Department fired more than 1,300 employees, among them foreign service officers and civil servants. In the eyes of European officials watching from afar, Trump’s administration just doesn’t seem to care about nurturing established relations with the rest of the world.  According to the American Foreign Service Association’s ambassador tracker, 85 out of 195 American ambassador roles were vacant as of Oct. 23. Part of this reflects confirmation delays in the U.S. Senate, but nine months in office, the administration had not even nominated candidates for more than 60 of the empty posts.  The result is a system stretched to the breaking point, with some of the most senior officials doing more than one job. Marco Rubio, the secretary of state, is still doubling up as Trump’s national security adviser (and he’s also been tapped to head the national archives). With key posts left open, Trump has turned to loyalists. Instead of drawing on America’s once-deep pool of diplomatic expertise, the president sent his friend Steve Witkoff, a lawyer and real estate investor, to negotiate personally with Putin and to act as his envoy to the Middle East.  In Brussels, EU officials have been aghast at Witkoff’s lack of understanding of the complexities of the Russia-Ukraine war. One senior European official who requested anonymity to speak candidly about diplomatic matters said they have zero confidence that Witkoff can even relay messages between Moscow and Washington reliably and accurately.  That’s partly why European leaders are so keen to speak directly to Trump, as often and with as many of them present as they can, the senior European official said. And while Washington’s diplomatic corps is hollowed out in plain sight, other governments in the West follow Trump’s lead, only more quietly. Advertisement British diplomats face staff cuts of 15 percent to 25 percent. The Netherlands is reducing its foreign missions budget by 10 percent (while boosting defense) and plans to close at least five embassies and consulates, with more likely to follow.  Even the EU’s flagship foreign department — the European External Action Service, led by the former Prime Minister of Estonia Kaja Kallas, a Russia hawk — is reducing its network of overseas offices. The changes, which POLITICO revealed in May, are expected to result in 10 EU delegations being downsized and 100 to 150 local staff losing their jobs.  “European diplomacy is taking a back seat to priorities such as border control and defense, which are getting increased budget allocations,” one EU official said. The person insisted the EU is not “cutting diplomacy” — but “the resources are going elsewhere.” Privately, diplomats and other officials in Europe confess they are deeply concerned by the trend of reducing diplomatic capacity while military budgets soar.  “We should all be worried about this,” one said.  JAW-JAW OR WAR-WAR? Mitchell, the former British Cabinet minister, warned that the accelerating shift from aid to arms risks ending in catastrophe. “At a time when you really need the international system … you’ve got the massive resurgence of narrow nationalism, in a way that some people argue you haven’t really seen since before 1914,” he said.  Mitchell, who was the U.K.’s international development minister until his Conservative Party lost power last year, said cutting aid to pay for defense was “a terrible, terrible mistake.” He argued that soft power is much cheaper, and often more effective, than hard power on its own. “Development is so often the other side of the coin to defense,” Mitchell said. It helps prevent wars, end fighting and rebuild nations afterward.  At no point since the end of the Cold War has military spending surged as fast as it did in 2024. | Federico Gambarini/picture alliance via Getty Images Many ambassadors, officials, diplomats and analysts interviewed for this article agree. The pragmatic purpose of diplomatic networks and development programs is to build alliances that can be relied on in times of trouble. “Any soldier will tell you that responding to international crises or international threats, isn’t just about military responses,” said Kim Darroch, who served as British ambassador to the U.S. and as the U.K.’s national security adviser. “It’s about diplomacy as well, and it’s about having an integrated strategy that takes in both your international strategy and your military response, as needed.” Hadja Lahbib, the European commissioner responsible for the EU’s vast humanitarian aid program, argues it’s a “totally” false economy to cut aid to finance military budgets. “We have now 300 million people depending on humanitarian aid. We have more and more war,” she told POLITICO.  The whole multilateral aid system is “shaking” as a result of political attacks and funding cuts, she said. The danger is that if it fails, it will trigger fresh instability and mass migration. “The link is quite vicious but if we are not helping people where they are, they are going to move — it’s obvious — to find a way to survive,” Lahbib said. “Desperate people are more [willing] to be violent because they just want to save their lives, to save their family.” Advertisement Countries that cut their outreach programs also face paying a political price for the long term. When a wealthy government closes its embassy or reduces aid to a country needing help, that relationship suffers, potentially permanently, according to Cyprien Fabre, a policy specialist who studies peace and instability at the OECD.  “Countries remember who stayed and who left,” he said.  Vacating the field clears space for rivals to come in. Turkey increased its diplomatic presence in Africa from 12 embassies in 2002 to 44 in 2022, Fabre said. Russia and China are also taking advantage as Europe retreats from the continent. “The global bellicose narrative sees big guns and big red buttons as the only features of power,” Fabre said.  Politicians tend to see the “soft” in “soft power,” he added. “You realize it’s not soft when you lose it.”  Nicholas Vinocur contributed to this report.