A fair, fast and competitive transition begins with what already works and then rapidly scales it up.  Across the EU commercial road transport sector, the diversity of operations is met with a diversity of solutions. Urban taxis are switching to electric en masse. Many regional coaches run on advanced biofuels, with electrification emerging in smaller applications such as school services, as European e-coach technologies are still maturing and only now beginning to enter the market. Trucks electrify rapidly where operationally and financially possible, while others, including long-haul and other hard-to-electrify segments, operate at scale on HVO (hydrotreated vegetable oil) or biomethane, cutting emissions immediately and reliably. These are real choices made every day by operators facing different missions, distances, terrains and energy realities, showing that decarbonization is not a single pathway but a spectrum of viable ones.  Building on this diversity, many operators are already modernizing their fleets and cutting emissions through electrification. When they can control charging, routing and energy supply, electric vehicles often deliver a positive total cost of ownership (TCO), strong reliability and operational benefits. These early adopters prove that electrification works where the enabling conditions are in place, and that its potential can expand dramatically with the right support. > Decarbonization is not a single pathway but a spectrum of viable ones chosen > daily by operators facing real-world conditions. But scaling electrification faces structural bottlenecks. Grid capacity is constrained across the EU, and upgrades routinely take years. As most heavy-duty vehicle charging will occur at depots, operators cannot simply move around to look for grid opportunities. They are bound to the location of their facilities.  The recently published grid package tries, albeit timidly, to address some of these challenges, but it neither resolves the core capacity deficiencies nor fixes the fundamental conditions that determine a positive TCO: the predictability of electricity prices, the stability of delivered power, and the resulting charging time. A truck expected to recharge in one hour at a high-power station may wait far longer if available grid power drops. Without reliable timelines, predictable costs and sufficient depot capacity, most transport operators cannot make long-term investment decisions. And the grid is only part of the enabling conditions needed: depot charging infrastructure itself requires significant additional investment, on top of vehicles that already cost several hundreds of thousands of euros more than their diesel equivalents.  This is why the EU needs two things at once: strong enablers for electrification and hydrogen; and predictability on what the EU actually recognizes as clean. Operators using renewable fuels, from biomethane to advanced biofuels and HVO, delivering up to 90 percent CO2 reduction, are cutting emissions today. Yet current CO2 frameworks, for both light-duty vehicles and heavy-duty trucks, fail to recognize fleets running on these fuels as part of the EU’s decarbonization solution for road transport, even when they deliver immediate, measurable climate benefits. This lack of clarity limits investment and slows additional emission reductions that could happen today. > Policies that punish before enabling will not accelerate the transition; a > successful shift must empower operators, not constrain them. The revision of both CO2 standards, for cars and vans, and for heavy-duty vehicles, will therefore be pivotal. They must support electrification and hydrogen where they fit the mission, while also recognizing the contribution of renewable and low-carbon fuels across the fleet. Regulations that exclude proven clean options will not accelerate the transition. They will restrict it.  With this in mind, the question is: why would the EU consider imposing purchasing mandates on operators or excessively high emission-reduction targets on member states that would, in practice, force quotas on buyers? Such measures would punish before enabling, removing choice from those who know their operations best. A successful transition must empower operators, not constrain them.  The EU’s transport sector is committed and already delivering. With the right enablers, a technology-neutral framework, and clarity on what counts as clean, the EU can turn today’s early successes into a scalable, fair and competitive decarbonization pathway.  We now look with great interest to the upcoming Automotive Package, hoping to see pragmatic solutions to these pressing questions, solutions that EU transport operators, as the buyers and daily users of all these technologies, are keenly expecting. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is IRU – International Road Transport Union  * The ultimate controlling entity is IRU – International Road Transport Union  More information here.

Ukraine will import gas from Greece to help secure its energy supply for the coming winter, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on Sunday. The Ukrainian leader said the deal “will be another gas supply route to secure imports for the winter as much as possible.” The agreement will “cover nearly €2 billion needed for gas imports to compensate for the losses in Ukrainian production caused by Russian strikes,” Zelenskyy said in a statement. Ukraine has also prepared a deal with France for “a significant strengthening of our combat aviation, air defense, and other defense capabilities,” Zelenskyy said. The Ukrainian leader is in Athens Sunday to meet with Greek President Konstantinos Tasoulas and Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis. After visting France on Monday, Zelenskyy will travel to Spain on Tuesday. Spain is “another strong country that has joined the partners in the initiatives that really help us,” Zelenskyy said, although he did not mention a specific deal with Madrid. “Our top priorities today are air defense, systems and missiles for air defense,” Zelenskyy said in the statement. “Full financing will be secured” for the Greek deal from Ukranian government funds, funding from European banks with guarantees from the European Commission, Ukranian banks, with help from  “European partners” and Norway, the statement said. The country is also undertaking “active work” with partners in the U.S., it said. Ukraine is also working with Poland and Azerbaijan on energy supplies, and “we very much count on long-term contracts,” Zelenskyy said.  

Several Ukrainian regions suffered power outages on Sunday after Russia launched what the state grid operator called the “most massive strike” against Ukraine’s power plants since the beginning of Moscow’s full-scale invasion of the country. Kyiv responded with a counterattack of drones overnight into Sunday, targeting energy infrastructure and leaving the Russian city of Voronezh and around 20,000 people without electricity, Reuters and AFP reported. Ukraine’s grid operator said the Russian strikes hit its energy plants continually from Friday into Saturday, and the country’s generation capacity was “zero” on Saturday. The Russian assault included hundreds of drones and dozens of missiles. “We lost everything we were restoring 24 hours a day! Every time the enemy strikes even more brutally, even more cynically,” the operator said in a post on Facebook. The company scheduled power cuts that can last up to 16 hours in some regions, as it works to repair the power supply. “Emergency power cuts have been introduced in a number of regions of Ukraine,” Energy Minister Svitlana Vasylivna Hrynchuk said on Telegram. They “will be canceled after the situation in the power system stabilizes.” The main targets of the attack were the Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk and Poltava regions, according to the Ukrainian air force. The Russian strikes have targeted energy, heat and water supplies in many Ukrainian cities, as well as the Khmelnytskyi and Rivne nuclear plants, Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha said. “Russia is deliberately endangering nuclear safety in Europe. We call for an urgent meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors to respond to these unacceptable risks,” Sybiha wrote on X.

BRUSSELS — A U.S. clampdown on Russian oil that threatens to strangle Hungary’s supplies is leaving Budapest no choice but to turn somewhere it’s long shunned: Croatia. For three years, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has moaned the country cannot quit Russian oil without jeopardizing its energy security and risking exploding prices at the pump. But now — as U.S. sanctions threaten to cut off one of Hungary’s key Russian suppliers and Brussels plans to propose new tariffs on Moscow’s oil — Budapest will be forced to hunt elsewhere for imports. “Orbán has done everything he could to avoid giving up Russian oil,” said Péter Krekó, director of the independent Budapest-based Political Capital think tank. “If the sanctions go ahead, Hungary will have to start taking alternatives seriously.” Shifting away from Russia will require Budapest to bury the hatchet with Zagreb. Hungary has persistently accused Croatia of imposing extortionate transit fees on its exports, arguing that prevents it from switching suppliers. The country also claims Croatia’s pipeline system is not physically able to meet its oil needs — claims its neighbor vigorously disputes. “These accusations are long-standing and … 100 percent not true,” Croatian Economy Minister Ante Šušnjar told POLITICO. “This is just an excuse for buying Russian oil.” “We have no obstacles to providing the oil,” he said. “We [can be] ready in a matter of minutes.” Hungary’s conundrum comes as U.S. President Donald Trump grows increasingly frustrated with Russia over stalling efforts to secure a ceasefire in Ukraine. The EU, too, has doubled down in recent months on its campaign to phase out Russian energy imports to the bloc. For now, Hungary is scrambling to secure an exemption to Trump’s sanctions. But if the measures go forward as planned, Budapest will have no choice but to turn to Croatia. PROFITS OR PRICES  Ever since Vladimir Putin first ordered his troops into Kyiv over three years ago, Hungary has fought hard against efforts to end the EU’s historic energy ties to Russia.  When Brussels imposed sanctions on Russian oil in 2022, Hungary leveraged its veto power over the bill until it won a carve-out for supplies coming via the Druzhba pipeline, which transports oil from Russia through Ukraine to Central Europe. Since then, it has also repeatedly obstructed attempts to target Moscow’s nuclear and gas sectors.  As the share of Russian crude in the EU’s energy imports shriveled from 26 percent in 2021 to 3 percent last year, Hungary instead deepened its dependency, moving from a prewar share of 61 percent to 86 percent in 2024.  During that time, Budapest has consistently claimed its hands are tied.   As a landlocked country, Hungary’s main alternative is the Adria pipeline that picks up imported oil at Croatian ports and snakes its way through the country and into Hungary. But Budapest alleges that Zagreb’s raising of transit fees in recent years — supposedly to five times the European benchmark — would cause prices to soar back home.  Brussels’ effort to quit Russian energy would “destroy the security of our energy supply,” Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó warned this month. And Croatia, he said, is “trying to profit from the war in Ukraine.”  But experts aren’t convinced. That’s “complete nonsense,” said Tamás Pletser, an oil and gas analyst at Erste bank, since the final cost of fuel in Hungary is set not by crude, but rather more expensive fuels like diesel by the regional Mediterranean benchmark price. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has moaned the country cannot quit Russian oil without jeopardizing its energy security and risking exploding prices at the pump. | Isabella Bonotto/Getty Images As a result, when crude prices rise, that “doesn’t have a major impact on the end product prices,” he said. What it would mean, though, is “declining profit margins” for Hungary’s main oil importer MOL, Pletser said, and fewer tax revenues for Budapest.  In reality, “the most problematic financial aspect of rejecting Russian oil is related to … the Hungarian budget,” said Ilona Gizińska, a Hungary expert at the Centre for Eastern Studies think tank, which currently faces a yawning deficit. There’s no “political will” to quit Russian oil, she said, precisely because it is up to $30 per barrel cheaper than alternative supplies.  Hungary’s foreign ministry declined to comment. A spokesperson for MOL said its “main concern was security of supply” while adding that Croatia had “nearly doubled” its transit fees at the end of 2022.   This information is a commercial secret and is therefore unverifiable; Croatia denies the allegations. “The transit fees are the same before and now,” said Šušnjar. They represent just “2 percent” of the final price of oil, he added, and apply “equally to all partners.”  Others in the bloc agree. “We often don’t get an objective representation of the facts from Hungary,” said a diplomat from an EU country, who was granted anonymity to speak freely.  CAPACITY CRUNCH In recent weeks, the feud between Hungary and Croatia has somewhat cooled.  “Hungary will always give Croatia the historic respect it deserves,” Orbán said after meeting his counterpart Andrej Plenković this month. “We are committed to de-escalating tensions.”  But the two countries continue to squabble over a more technical issue: whether the Adria pipeline can feed enough oil to Hungary.  During a pipeline test last month, oil importer MOL claimed the link was only capable of ramping up its oil flows to sufficient levels for one-to-two hours due to “technical issues.” JANAF, Croatia’s partly state-owned pipeline operator, hit back, accusing MOL of demanding that flows be decreased.  Since then, the firms have held several rounds of talks on extending their transit deal for the pipeline, which expires at the end of the year.   But “we still have no reliable information about its condition and capacity,” a MOL spokesperson said, adding that while the firm is “open to reaffirming” its relationship with JANAF, it still needed “a detailed maintenance plan” relating to the pipeline.  Stjepan Adanić, board chairman at JANAF, dismissed the allegations. “JANAF is fully prepared — in terms of technical, organizational and all other conditions — to meet MOL Group’s … total annual requirements for crude oil” equalling “14.5 million tonnes,” he said.  “The fact is that MOL Group has a certain discount when buying Russian oil,” he told POLITICO. “It is in their business interest for the exceptions to European sanctions … to continue for as long as possible.”  Commission President Ursula von der Leyen last month announced the EU executive would present new tariffs on Russian oil as it seeks to speed up its phaseout before 2027. | Nicolas Economou/Getty Images Now, Zagreb wants Brussels to help mediate.  At the next technical test, “we are requesting the presence of the European Commission” to monitor the results, Šušnjar said.   The EU executive didn’t respond to a request for comment. But Brussels’ top energy official, Dan Jørgensen, this month told POLITICO he was willing to act as a “mediator” for “the countries who will be affected the most” by the bloc’s phaseout of Russian energy.  PINCER ATTACK  Despite its protests, Budapest will now have to act fast as it increasingly looks cornered.  Orbán will head to the U.S. next week in a bid to secure an exemption from Trump’s sanctions, which kick in on Nov. 21.  But Washington’s Russia hawks are keeping the pressure high. “Hungary,” warned U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham this week, “if you think we’re not watching your efforts to undercut U.S. sanctions on Russian oil, you are mistaken.”  At the same time, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen last month announced the EU executive would present new tariffs on Russian oil as it seeks to speed up its phaseout before 2027.  “The sanction[s] … would be enough to push Hungary to decouple from Russian crude oil,” said Pletser, the analyst. And the tariffs “would make Russian hydrocarbons uncompetitive [relative] to other sources,” he added, if they are enforced.  As a result, Budapest will have to reconcile with Zagreb, which for now remains open to cooperation. “Croatia is capable and willing to support Hungary,” Šušnjar said.   But Hungarian politicians now “need to decide,” he added, “either we are members of the EU … or we are supporting the Russian aggression.”

BRUSSELS — In the midst of a geopolitical storm, Brussels is racing to put together a new plan by the end of this year to diversify European supply of so-called critical raw materials — such as lithium and copper — away from China.  The thing is: We’ve been here before. So far, the European Commission has provided few details on its new plan, beyond that it would touch upon joint purchasing, stockpiling, recycling of resources and new partnerships. It already addressed those measures two years ago in its first initiative on the issue, the Critical Raw Materials Act.  Commission chief Ursula von der Leyen has been forced to act by Beijing’s expansion and tightening of export controls on rare earths and other critical minerals this month, as trade tensions with Washington escalated. Europe was caught in the crossfire — China accounts for 99 percent of the EU’s supply of the 17 rare earths, and 98 percent of its rare earth permanent magnets. The new “RESourceEU” plan is expected to follow a similar model to the REPowerEU plan, under which the Commission in 2022 proposed investing €225 billion to diversify energy supply routes after Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine.  That has European industry daring to hope that Brussels will do more than just recycle an old initiative and address the main obstacles to diversifying the bloc’s supply chains of minerals it needs for everything from renewable energy to defense applications. The biggest of them all? A lack of cash to back new mining, processing and manufacturing initiatives, both within and outside the EU. “It’s all still very much in its infancy,” said Florian Anderhuber, deputy director general of lobby group Euromines. “We hope that there will be a bigger push that goes beyond the implementation of the Critical Raw Materials Act,” he added. “It doesn’t help anyone if this is just a label for things that are already in the pipeline.” CODEPENDENT RELATIONSHIP The EU should not count on any trade reprieve that may result from U.S. President Donald Trump’s meeting with Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping on Thursday. After all, Beijing has shown time and again that it has no reservations about weaponizing economic dependencies. The key question is whether, this time around, pressure will remain high enough for the EU to mobilize brainpower and assets at the kind of scale it did when it sought to break the bloc’s decades-old reliance on Russian oil and gas. “Europe cannot do things the same way anymore,” von der Leyen said as she announced the initiative last weekend. “We learned this lesson painfully with energy; we will not repeat it with critical materials. So it is time to speed up and take the action that is needed.” “Europe cannot do things the same way anymore,” von der Leyen said as she announced the initiative last weekend. | Costfoto/NurPhoto via Getty Images In the here and now, the EU wants to persuade a visiting Chinese delegation at talks in Brussels on Friday to speed up export approvals for its top raw materials importers. In parallel, energy and environment ministers from the G7 group of industrialized nations are slated to wargame how to de-risk their mineral supply chains in Toronto, Canada, on Thursday and Friday. MONEY, MONEY, MONEY When the Commission unveiled its first grand plan to break over-reliance on China in 2023 — the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) — industry leaders and analysts mostly lamented one thing: a lack of funding on the table.  “Money has been a real bottleneck for Europe’s raw materials agenda,” said Tobias Gehrke, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. “Mining, processing, recycling, and stockpiling all need serious financing.” If the EU fails to free up more resources, experts warn that it is bound to fall short of the goal set in the CRMA, of extracting at least 10 percent of its annual consumption of select minerals by the end of the decade, with no more than 65 percent of some raw materials coming from a single country. It’s a steep target — especially for rare earths, where Beijing has over decades built up a de facto monopoly. While the EU executive has selected strategic projects both within and outside the EU that should benefit from faster permitting than their usual lead times of 10 to 15 years to production, those efforts are yet to bear fruit. “To finance such projects, the next EU budget must provide substantial, dedicated [Critical Raw Material] funding, and financial institutions must deploy innovative de-risking and financing tools,” the European Initiative for Energy Security argues in a new report, calling for a “permanent European Minerals Investment Network.”  “To finance such projects, the next EU budget must provide substantial, dedicated [Critical Raw Material] funding, and financial institutions must deploy innovative de-risking and financing tools,” the European Initiative for Energy Security argues in a new report. | Aris Oikonomou/AFP via Getty Images The REPowerEU plan — a package of documents, including legal acts, recommendations, guidelines and strategies — was mostly financed by loans left over from the bloc’s pandemic recovery program. Similarly, RESourceEU must become “resource strategy backed by real funding,” said Hildegard Bentele, a member of the European Parliament who’s been working on critical minerals for years.  “This requires a European Raw Materials Fund, modelled on successful instruments in several Member States, to support strategic projects across the entire value chain, from extraction to recycling,” the German Christian Democrat said. THAT’LL COST YOU It’s about more than just throwing money at the problem: The Commission’s haste in rolling out its plan is raising doubts that it will meet the needs of a highly complex market — along with concerns that environmental safeguards will be neglected. “As long as European industries can buy cheaper materials from China, other producers do not stand a chance,” warned Gehrke.  In Toronto, G7 ministers will launch a new Critical Minerals Production Alliance (CMPA), a Canadian-led initiative that seeks to secure “transparent, democratic, and environmentally responsible critical minerals,” and also to counter market manipulation of supply chains, said a senior Canadian government official.  This would suggest creating so-called standards-based markets that are ring-fenced to protect critical minerals produced responsibly, to agreed environmental and social standards. A price floor would be set within that market, while minerals produced elsewhere — at lower prices but also lower standards — would face a tariff.  Beyond the immediate funding issues, ramping up mining in the EU and its neighbourhood also comes at a high societal cost. With local resistance to new mines, usually linked to environmental and social concerns, being one of the key obstacles to new projects, investors are often hesitant to pour money into a project that risks being derailed shortly after. “The EU is choosing geopolitical expediency over human rights and ecological integrity, sacrificing frontline communities for a strategy that is neither sustainable nor just, instead of building a durable and values-based autonomy that invests in systemic circularity and rights-based partnerships,” said Diego Marin, a senior policy officer for raw materials and resource justice at the European Environmental Bureau, an NGO.  Jakob Weizman and Camille Gijs contributed reporting from Brussels. Zi-Ann Lum contributed reporting from Toronto, Canada.

The European Commission will present a new plan to break the EU’s dependencies on China for critical raw materials, President Ursula von der Leyen announced on Saturday. The EU executive chief warned of “clear acceleration and escalation in the way interdependencies are leveraged and weaponized,” in a speech Saturday at the Berlin Global Dialogue. In recent months, China has tightened export controls over rare earths and other critical materials. The Asian powerhouse controls close to 70 percent of the world’s rare earths production and almost all of the refining. The EU’s response “must match the scale of the risks we face in this area,” von der Leyen said, adding that “we are focusing on finding solutions with our Chinese counterparts.” Brussels and Beijing are set to discuss the export controls issue during meetings next week. “But we are ready to use all of the instruments in our toolbox to respond if needed,” the head of the EU executive warned. This suggests that the Commission could make use of the EU’s most powerful trade weapon — the Anti-Coercion Instrument. This comes after French President Emmanuel Macron called on the EU executive to trigger the trade bazooka at a meeting of EU leaders on Thursday. His push has not met with much support from the other leaders around the table. NEW BREAKAWAY PLAN To break the EU’s over-reliance on China for critical materials imports and refining, the Commission will put forward a “RESourceEU plan,” von der Leyen said. She did not provide much detail about the plan, nor when it would be presented. But she said it would follow a similar model as the REPowerEU plan that the Commission introduced in 2022 to phase out Russian fossil fuels after Moscow’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. Under REPowerEU, the Commission proposed investing €225 billion to diversify energy supply routes, accelerate the deployment of renewables, improve grids interconnections across the bloc and boost the EU hydrogen market, among other measures. The EU executive also put forward a legislative proposal, which is currently under negotiations with the European Parliament and the Council, to ban Russian gas imports by the end of 2027. The aim of RESourceEU “is to secure access to alternative sources of critical raw materials in the short, medium and long term for our European industry,” von der Leyen explained. “It starts with the circular economy. Not for environmental reasons. But to exploit the critical raw materials already contained in products sold in Europe,” she said. She added that the EU “will speed up work on critical raw materials partnerships with countries like Ukraine and Australia, Canada, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Chile and Greenland.” “Europe cannot do things the same way anymore. We learned this lesson painfully with energy; we will not repeat it with critical materials,” von der Leyen said.

BRUSSELS — First it was telecom snooping. Now Europe is growing worried that Huawei could turn the lights off. The Chinese tech giant is at the heart of a brewing storm over the security of Europe’s energy grids. Lawmakers are writing to the European Commission to urge it to “restrict high-risk vendors” from solar energy systems, in a letter seen by POLITICO. Such restrictions would target Huawei first and foremost, as the dominant Chinese supplier of critical parts of these systems. The fears center around solar panel inverters, a piece of technology that turns solar panels’ electricity into current that flows into the grid. China is a dominant supplier of these inverters, and Huawei is its biggest player. Because the inverters are hooked up to the internet, security experts warn the inverters could be tampered with or shut down through remote access, potentially causing dangerous surges or drops in electricity in Europe’s networks. The warnings come as European governments have woken up to the risks of being reliant on other regions for critical services — from Russian gas to Chinese critical raw materials and American digital services. The bloc is in a stand-off with Beijing over trade in raw materials, and has faced months of pressure from Washington on how Brussels regulates U.S. tech giants. Cybersecurity authorities are close to finalizing work on a new “toolbox” to de-risk tech supply chains, with solar panels among its key target sectors, alongside connected cars and smart cameras. Two members of the European Parliament, Dutch liberal Bart Groothuis and Slovak center-right lawmaker Miriam Lexmann, drafted a letter warning the European Commission of the risks. “We urge you to propose immediate and binding measures to restrict high-risk vendors from our critical infrastructure,” the two wrote. The members had gathered the support of a dozen colleagues by Wednesday and are canvassing for more to join the initiative before sending the letter mid next week.   According to research by trade body SolarPower Europe, Chinese firms control approximately 65 percent of the total installed power in the solar sector. The largest company in the European market is Huawei, a tech giant that is considered a high-risk vendor of telecom equipment. The second-largest firm is Sungrow, which is also Chinese, and controls about half the amount of solar power as Huawei. Huawei’s market power recently allowed it to make its way back into SolarPower Europe, the solar sector’s most prominent lobby association in Brussels, despite an ongoing Belgian bribery investigation focused on the firm’s lobbying activities in Brussels that saw it banned from meeting with European Commission and Parliament officials. Security hawks are now upping the ante. Cybersecurity experts and European manufacturers say the Chinese conglomerate and its peers could hack into Europe’s power grid.  “They can disable safety parameters. They can set it on fire,” Erika Langerová, a cybersecurity researcher at the Czech Technical University in Prague, said in a media briefing hosted by the U.S. Mission to the EU in September.  Even switching solar installation off and on again could disrupt energy supply, Langerová said. “When you do it on one installation, it’s not a problem, but then you do it on thousands of installations it becomes a problem because the … compound effect of these sudden changes in the operation of the device can destabilize the power grid.”  Surges in electricity supply can trigger wider blackouts, as seen in Spain and Portugal in April. | Matias Chiofalo/Europa Press via Getty Images Surges in electricity supply can trigger wider blackouts, as seen in Spain and Portugal in April. Some governments have already taken further measures. Last November, Lithuania imposed a ban on remote access by Chinese firms to renewable energy installations above 100 kilowatts, effectively stopping the use of Chinese inverters. In September, the Czech Republic issued a warning on the threat posed by Chinese remote access via components including solar inverters. And in Germany, security officials already in 2023 told lawmakers that an “energy management component” from Huawei had them on alert, leading to a government probe of the firm’s equipment. CHINESE CONTROL, EU RESPONSE  The arguments leveled against Chinese manufacturers of solar inverters echo those heard from security experts in previous years, in debates on whether or not to block companies like video-sharing app TikTok, airport scanner maker Nuctech and — yes — Huawei’s 5G network equipment. Distrust of Chinese technology has skyrocketed. Under President Xi Jinping, the Beijing government has rolled out regulations forcing Chinese companies to cooperate with security services’ requests to share data and flag vulnerabilities in their software. It has led to Western concerns that it opens the door to surveillance and snooping. One of the most direct threats involves remote management from China of products embedded in European critical infrastructure. Manufacturers have remote access to install updates and maintenance. Europe has also grown heavily reliant on Chinese tech suppliers, particularly when it comes to renewable energy, which is powering an increasing proportion of European energy. Domestic manufacturers of solar panels have enough supply to fill the gap that any EU action to restrict Chinese inverters would create, Langerová said. But Europe does not yet have enough battery or wind manufacturers — two clean energy sector China also dominates. China’s dominance also undercuts Europe’s own tech sector and comes with risks of economic coercion. Until only a few years ago, European firms were competitive, before being undercut by heavily subsidized Chinese products, said Tobias Gehrke, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. China on the other hand does not allow foreign firms in its market because of cybersecurity concerns, he said. The European Union previously developed a 5G security toolbox to reduce its dependence on Huawei over these fears. It is also working on a similar initiative, known as the ICT supply chain toolbox, to help national governments scan their wider digital infrastructure for weak points, with a view to blocking or reduce the use of “high-risk suppliers.” According to Groothuis and Lexmann, “binding legislation to restrict risky vendors in our critical infrastructure is urgently required” across the European Union. Until legislation is passed, the EU should put temporary measures in place, they said in their letter.  Huawei did not respond to requests for comment before publication. This article has been updated.

BRUSSELS — After three years of reasoning, pleading and conceding, the EU has had enough. On Monday, the bloc’s 27 member countries are expected to back a new bill that will permanently cut Russian gas supplies to Hungary and Slovakia — whether they like it or not. Since Moscow launched its all-out war in Ukraine in 2022, the EU has weakened the Kremlin’s long-held grip over the bloc’s energy supply, all but eliminating its imports of Russian oil, coal and gas. But throughout that bitter energy divorce, Budapest and Bratislava have stubbornly refused to play ball. Repeatedly arguing that they have no real alternative, their Russia-friendly governments complained that quitting Moscow would mean exploding prices for consumers. Experts largely dispute those claims. And in any case, EU capitals are ready to overrule them. While Russia repeatedly pummels Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, “billions of euros have been paid … by Hungary and Slovakia to Russia,” said Lithuanian Energy Minister Žygimantas Vaičiūnas. “They are using this for their war machine … this is really not acceptable.”  “Now, it is time to demonstrate … political will on the EU level,” he told POLITICO. NO MORE EXCEPTIONS Since Vladimir Putin first ordered troops into Kyiv, Brussels has slapped an embargo on Russian crude, fuel and coal entering the bloc; it’s imposed a $47.60 per barrel price limit on Moscow’s global oil sales, below the market rate; and it’s whittled down the Kremlin’s share in the EU’s gas market from 45 percent to 13 percent.  But Hungary and Slovakia have repeatedly dug their heels in and held up sanctions, winning carve-outs that have allowed them to keep importing Russian crude via the Druzhba pipeline through Ukraine, and blocking efforts to target Moscow’s gas and nuclear sectors. In fact, the two countries are steadily increasing their fossil fuel payments to Moscow, according to Isaac Levi, Russia lead at the Helsinki-based Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air think tank. Budapest and Bratislava have paid Russia €5.58 billion for fossil fuel imports so far this year, he said, already beating the €5.56 billion they forked out last year. Realizing its consensual approach had hit a wall, the European Commission in June decided to change tack. The EU executive unveiled a legal proposal that would impose a ban on Russian gas, starting from next year for short-term contracts and ending in late 2027 for long-term deals. Unlike sanctions, which require unanimity from all EU countries, the proposal — billed as a trade measure — only needs a qualified majority of capitals to approve it, effectively removing Hungary and Slovakia’s veto power over the draft law. Since Vladimir Putin first ordered troops into Kyiv, Brussels has slapped an embargo on Russian crude, fuel and coal entering the bloc; it’s imposed a $47.60 per barrel price limit on Moscow’s global oil sales, below the market rate; and it’s whittled down the Kremlin’s share in the EU’s gas market from 45 percent to 13 percent.  | Contributor/Getty Images On Monday, EU energy ministers will rubber-stamp the bill, sending a signal that they are ready to override both nations before they enter final negotiations with the European Parliament. “We’ll reach an agreement despite their opposition,” said one senior EU diplomat, who, like others for this story, was granted anonymity to speak freely on closed-door discussions. “It’s not an easy subject, but I believe we’ll get there.” LANDLOCKED, NOT BLOCKED In the run-up to the vote, the two countries have pulled out all the stops in a bid to scupper a deal. Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico has vowed to block the EU’s 19th sanctions package against Russia unless he wins concessions on the gas ban, otherwise known as REPowerEU. But EU countries are holding strong. “That’s always the case, that they are finding ways to make their exit strategies,” Vaičiūnas said, “but now we have to really take a strong [stance] on … REPower.” In the meantime, the two countries have continued to argue the law threatens their energy security, will raise prices for consumers and hurt their heavy industry. Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico has vowed to block the EU’s 19th sanctions package against Russia unless he wins concessions on the gas ban, otherwise known as REPowerEU. | Contributor/Getty Images Hungary’s state-owned energy firm MVM currently has a long-term contract with Russia’s Gazprom until 2036, as well as shorter-term seasonal deals. Slovak firm SPP is bound by its deal with the Kremlin-controlled export monopoly until 2034.  After MEPs agreed on their negotiating stance on the bill last week, Budapest’s Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó called the text “a direct attack on Hungary’s energy security.”  It “sets back our economic performance, and threatens the low utility costs of Hungarian families,” he wrote on social platform X. “We won’t let this happen!!” “REPOWER IS A NONSENSICAL IDEOLOGICAL MOVE,” Fico fumed earlier this month. The Hungarian foreign ministry and the Slovak economy ministry did not respond to POLITICO’s requests for comment. But the industry isn’t as vociferous. The proposal is “probably not cataclysmic,” said one Hungarian oil and gas sector insider. “The government and politicians do cry wolf — let’s see if this wolf really comes.”  It is true the bill will likely raise prices in the region by “5 to 10 percent” in the midterm, said Tamás Pletser, an oil and gas analyst at Erste bank. But if the Commission works with countries to lower gas transit fees, that could eliminate “up to 40 percent” of the price hike, he added. Meanwhile, MVM is quietly signing new gas deals, Pletser added. Hungary can also find alternatives via liquefied gas from Western Europe and Greece, he said, as well as a new drilling project in Romania from mid-2027. The industry is “absolutely” ready, he said. The EU executive is nonplussed, too. “The measures have been designed to preserve the security of the EU’s energy supply while limiting any impact on prices,” said one Commission official. Whether or not it leads to price increases, EU capitals are ready to pull the trigger.  “They didn’t do much to diversify, sabotaged sanctions and had quite a lot of time,” said a second EU diplomat. “There is no other way [than] to make them.” “It’s not yesterday that we started talking about phasing out Russian gas,” said a third EU diplomat. “Russia is not a partner — it’s a problem. It’s time to stop pretending it is not.”

WARWICK, England — Jon Butterworth is the guy tasked with helping protect the country if there’s ever a major attack on Britain’s energy system. The boss of National Gas, he oversees thousands of miles of transmission pipelines, the crucial network of pressurized pipes transporting gas to power stations, heavy industry, and via local distributors to heat millions of British homes.  That’s the day job. But if Britain ever faced a gas supply emergency, Butterworth would have sweeping powers to control domestic gas flows, if necessary cutting off factories, power stations, and — in extreme scenarios — homes as well, to preserve supply for hospitals and other vital infrastructure. It’s a role that puts him on the frontline of national efforts to prepare for potential attacks on U.K. energy supplies by enemies like Vladimir Putin’s Russia.  Should such an emergency come, the government would need an Order in Council — a legal directive personally approved by the king — to overrule Butterworth, operating in his additional, little-known role as the country’s Network Emergency Coordinator.  Butterworth has barely sat down for an interview with POLITICO when, off-handedly, he starkly illustrates the major, ongoing shift in the country’s attitude toward energy security.  The National Control Centre — from where Butterworth’s team operates those critical pipelines — was sited in Warwick more than 20 years ago, he explains. The “business has grown around it” into what is now a sleek, modern technology park on the edge of town.  “In the future, we probably would not do that,” he said, with characteristic sangfroid. “We’d probably be putting it in a bunker.”  A bunker?  “That’s the government’s thinking,” Butterworth said, “about this sort of thing.”  ENERGY IN THE CROSSHAIRS  The reason for his (and the government’s) concerns are plain.   “Europe has become a bit more of a dangerous place, hasn’t it?” says Butterworth, a gas engineer by training who worked his way up from his first job, aged 17, at Rochdale gas works near Manchester.  Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and its recent incursions into NATO countries, has put Europe on high alert. Russia has repeatedly demonstrated in Ukraine that it sees energy infrastructure as “a target,” says Butterworth.   Though the U.K. Labour government wants to wean the country off gas to clean power, it remains the lifeblood of everyday life in one of Europe’s most gas-dependent countries. The pipes transporting the fuel around the country are the vital arteries.  Downstairs from Butterworth’s office, in the control room, a big screen shows a schematic map of Britain. Five thousand miles of pipeline are represented by thin yellow lines. Around the coasts, red triangles represent entry points for gas coming ashore: via pipeline from Norway, from British drilling sites in the North Sea, or from ships laden with supercooled American or Qatari liquefied natural gas landing at Milford Haven in Wales and the Isle of Grain in Essex.  Britain’s energy supply is more vulnerable to adversaries today, Butterworth believes, than in the last century.  Jon Butterworth is the person at the frontline of the U.K.’s efforts to prepare for potential attacks on the country’s energy supplies. | National Gas “[In] the 1930s, we were a mile underground digging coal. You couldn’t really get any safer. Now we’re bringing boats across the high seas and we’ve got pipelines under the ocean. So it’s different.”  One former U.K. defense secretary has termed undersea infrastructure, including pipelines bringing gas into the country, “the soft belly of British security.”  EMERGENCY COORDINATOR   It’s these vulnerabilities that now occupy Butterworth’s thinking should he be called on to exercise his powers as NEC — a position enshrined in law. If the country’s gas supply was suddenly reduced, and the usual, market-based methods for covering the shortfall failed, Butterworth would be called on to declare a “network gas supply emergency.”  That would hand him sweeping legal powers to control national supply and demand of gas, with which gas companies would be legally required to comply, powers that can be over-ruled only on the say-so of the king — a responsibility Butterworth acknowledged with a nod, saying, “I’ve always found that quite fascinating myself.”  The NEC position has existed since the 1990s. Butterworth has held it since 2022. Since the invasion of Ukraine, he has been “more cognizant of” potential scenarios involving “loss of supply from the North Sea,” he said — as might be caused by a Nord Stream-style attack on a pipeline.  For years, National Gas has held annual wargame-style exercises to practise for an emergency. The next takes place later this month, involving 50 organizations — including the government — and 400 people.   The scenario is different each year. To trigger Butterworth’s emergency powers a combination of things would likely have to go wrong: a pipeline failure, for example, combined with a reduction in LNG supply and cold weather driving up demand.  THE CHRIS WHITTY OF ENERGY  In a network emergency — something Britain has never experienced and which remains “highly unlikely,” Butterworth stresses — to preserve gas for those that need it most, like hospitals, he could make public appeals for reduced gas use, require large gas users like power stations and factories to shut down or, in the most extreme cases, cut off gas to potentially large numbers of homes. Such a step would be taken to maintain the safety of the wider pipeline system. At all costs, the goal would be to avoid an unplanned loss of pressure somewhere in the network — a highly dangerous situation that can lead to gas leaks into homes or explosions.  “It’s never happened, so it’s hard to articulate,” Butterworth says. “But what’s important is that we do not lose pressure to the cities.”  “The right thing for our country transcends everything and that means minimizing any potential loss of life, whatever actions need to be taken, however damaging it is commercially,” he added. If the worst happened, he would also have a role advising government and likely communicating with the public about what was going on — like Chief Medical Officer Chris Whitty and Chief Scientific Adviser Patrick Vallance during COVID-19.   “A bit like an aircraft simulator, we rehearse and rehearse and rehearse for this day,” Butterworth says.  THE PATRIOT There remains only “a very small risk” of a network emergency, but that risk “must have increased a little” given the geopolitical situation, Butterworth believes.  A conventional attack on gas infrastructure has a probability of one to five percent on the government’s official risk register. A cyberattack on gas infrastructure is considered more likely, at five to 25 percent. National Gas has put “a lot of thought, horsepower, money, into cyber defense,” Butterworth said.  In the scenario laid out in the risk register, is takes “several months” to restore gas to all domestic customers — a very long time, particularly in winter.   “You’ve got half a million businesses, 23 million families that would require heat, plus the power stations.  … So it’s very important that it never happens,” Butterworth said  Now 63, Butterworth considers chief executive of National Gas his “second job.” The unpaid NEC is his first.  “I didn’t really realize it probably until I was 50 … that I’m a patriot,” he says. He has been appointed a Major in the 77th Brigade, the special British army unit that describes itself as specializing in “new forms of warfare.”   “You don’t contact them, they contact you,” Butterworth says. “I have a skillset that they wanted around networks and energy.”  HOW TO BE RESILIENT While as NEC he must think the unthinkable, he is confident the U.K. gas system and its supply lines are “resilient,” thanks to multiple supply routes via pipelines from Norway and other neighbors, from LNG that comes primarily from the U.S., and from the U.K.’s own reserves in the North Sea.  National Gas’s Winter Outlook report, due later this week, is expected to forecast sufficient gas supplies over the colder months, even in the event of unforeseen outages — although with tighter supply margins than in the previous four years. Butterworth welcomes reports ministers are looking at ways to allow some new oil and gas exploration near existing fields in U.K. areas of the North Sea. “With what’s going on around the world, particularly in Ukraine and the potential lack of gas in Europe, having sovereign gas supplies is helpful,” he says.  The government will soon publish a consultation on “gas system resilience,” looking at the security of U.K. gas supply and options for ensuring the country never has to call on Butterworth’s NEC powers.  He hopes it will show a government thinking about energy supply in the context of dangerous geopolitics.   “It’s going to tease out energy resilience. Military energy resilience. Sources of supply, etc. [The Department for Energy Security and Net Zero is] particularly tuned into this as a threat going forward,” he says.  And if the worst does happen?  Being prepared is “all we can do,” Butterworth says. “I’ve been rehearsing for 46 years.” 

LONDON — The U.K. government has quietly handed ministers new powers to reverse flagship climate promises and approve new drilling for fossil fuels.  Under new guidance drawn up in Whitehall, Energy Secretary Ed Miliband can give weight to the “wider benefits to the interests of the nation,” alongside environmental concerns, when deciding the future of controversial oil and gas fields.  Miliband has long insisted the U.K. must wean itself off high-polluting fossil fuels produced in oil and gas heartlands off the Scottish coast and embrace clean energy, like solar and wind power. But experts believe the new powers, buried in guidance published this summer by Miliband’s Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, provide a loophole to approve more drilling.  The document says that, when deciding whether to approve oil and gas licenses, “the secretary of state will usually consider, amongst other matters … the government’s overall energy and environmental objectives, and the potential economic and other advantages of the project proceeding.”  This hands Miliband the power to override objections and approve schemes, even if they breach environmental regulations, at a time when ministers are desperate to stimulate economic growth and get spiraling bills under control.  Donald Trump is also piling pressure on the government to change tack, describing North Sea oil as a “phenomenal” asset while speaking alongside Prime Minister Keir Starmer during his U.K. state visit last week. The U.S. president then raised the issue in his furious tirade at the U.N. on Tuesday, claiming to have repeatedly lobbied Starmer on the matter while he was in Britain. “I told it to him three days in a row. That’s all he heard: ‘North Sea oil, North Sea,’” he said. With looming decisions on whether to allow drilling on the vast Rosebank and Jackdaw fields in the North Sea, the new powers risk setting up a row between the energy secretary, green campaigners, and his own backbenchers.  NET ZERO SUM GAME Miliband’s political rhetoric hasn’t yet shifted an inch.    “Unless we get on to clean energy, we’ll continue to be subject to that roller coaster of fossil fuels,” he told the BBC this month. Political opponents like Nigel Farage, who wants to drain the North Sea of all remaining oil and gas, are spouting “nonsense and lies to pursue their ideological agenda,” Miliband said.   But some Labour MPs have noticed the guidance, and hope Miliband will now help out the drillers.   Gregor Poynton, Labour MP for Livingston, a constituency in Scotland’s central belt, said the powers were the right option given the U.K. is set “to rely on oil and gas for some time yet.”   Ed Miliband’s political rhetoric hasn’t yet shifted an inch.  | Pool photo by Justin Tallis via Getty Images Speaking before he was appointed as a Commons whip in September’s government reshuffle, Poynton told POLITICO: “That’s why I would encourage the secretary of state to use those powers carefully, including to approve projects like Rosebank and Jackdaw, because they support thousands of good jobs, particularly in Scotland and the north east, and they help ensure that what we do use is produced here to the highest environmental and safety standards.”   Miliband is also under pressure to approve projects from other figures on the left.   Green entrepreneur Dale Vince, who has donated over £5 million to Labour, says the government should “put its arms around the North Sea and support [oil and gas] operators with existing licences,” to ease the transition to clean energy. Greg Jackson, boss of the U.K.’s largest energy supplier Octopus Energy, and a green lobbyist who advises Labour ministers, says the government should back North Sea drillers in order to limit imports of gas from other countries. Domestic production “is cleaner and it reduces the backlash against climate policy. I’ve got no problem with it,” Jackson told The Telegraph at the start of this month.   Plenty in Labour’s ranks, though, would recoil from going soft on the mass-polluting oil and gas industry.    “The path to decarbonization, energy security and not being reliant on rogue states like Russia for our energy supply is dependent on a huge expansion of domestic renewables which will create jobs in the UK and exports as a world leader. Any other path is leaving us stuck in an early 20th century paradigm,” said Alex Sobel, Labour MP for Leeds Central and Headingley. “It is a simple truth that the North Sea basin is in terminal decline. … That is why this government are right to finally draw a line under new licensing and the illusion of endless new oil and gas,” veteran MP Barry Gardiner, a member of parliament’s Environmental Audit Committee, said this spring.  The Department for Energy Security and Net Zero declined to comment. ALL ABOUT THE BILLS Ministers know that voters, while broadly supporting Labour’s net-zero push, care much more about the state of the economy and sky-high energy bills.   Polling from Merlin Strategy, conducted last month, shows 58 percent of Brits say the government should reverse any climate decisions that have led to higher energy costs. Almost two in three think the government should prioritize reducing energy costs over protecting the environment.    “The key theme is people want lower energy costs as a priority,” said Julian Gallie, Merlin’s head of research.   However, Tessa Khan, director of green campaigners Uplift, argues that, given U.K. extractions are sold on the global market, there is no direct link between drilling and bills. “There is just no reality in which we can drill our way to energy security or energy affordability,” she said.    Donald Trump is also piling pressure on the government to change tack, describing North Sea oil as a “phenomenal” asset while speaking alongside Prime Minister Keir Starmer during his U.K. state visit last week. | Ian Forsyth/Getty Images The new powers are set out in DESNZ’s guidance on how to handle so-called scope three emissions — the pollution created by fossil fuels after they have been extracted and used elsewhere.  The High Court ruled earlier this year that scope three emissions must be considered in all future oil and gas developments.  The North Sea Transition Authority (NSTA) regulator insists there is no change from current arrangements. The Offshore Petroleum Regulator for Environment and Decommissioning (OPRED), the NSTA said, will assess the environmental impact of projects as before.   That involves a parallel process, where the NSTA assesses a project’s development plan while OPRED judges its environmental statement. The NSTA can’t sign off the development plan or grant drilling consent, though, until OPRED has completed its assessment. During the OPRED process, the environmental statement has to be signed off by DESNZ, effectively giving Miliband a mechanism to overrule the regulator’s recommendations.  That would give Miliband “in theory … lots of discretion to override regulator decision-making,” said Martin Copeland, chief financial officer at Serica Energy, one of the country’s largest oil and gas companies.    Paul de Leeuw, an energy expert at Aberdeen’s Robert Gordon University, called the guidance “pragmatic” and “timely,” adding it provides “the secretary of state with the powers to make a balanced and informed decision, reflecting a wide range of considerations.”  A second senior oil and gas industry figure — who has held talks with all major parties including the government and was granted anonymity to discuss sensitive lobbying — said they sensed “a split in government along the lines of environment and economic growth.”    There are fresh political pressures on Miliband just as these new powers take effect, the same person said.   “I think there has been winds of change blowing through Westminster in recent months. I think that’s due to a number of reasons. Obviously, the ‘Trump effect’ [backing aggressive fossil fuel drilling in the U.S.] is having a significant impact and it’s galvanizing the right. It’s galvanizing Reform and it’s galvanizing the Tories.”