Iris Ferguson is a global adviser to Loom and a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for Arctic and global resilience. Ann Mettler is a distinguished visiting fellow at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy and a former director general of the European Commission. After much pressure, European leaders delayed a decision this week amid division on whether to tighten market access through a “Made in Europe” mandate and redouble efforts to reduce the bloc’s strategic dependencies — particularly on China. This decision may appear technocratic, but the hold-up signals its importance and reflects a larger strategic reality shared across the Atlantic. Security, industry and energy have all fused into a single race to control the systems that power modern economies and militaries. And increasingly, success will hinge on whether the U.S. and Europe can confront this reality together, starting with the one domain that’s shaping every other: energy. While traditional defense spending still grabs headlines, today’s battlefield is being reshaped just as profoundly by energy flows and critical inputs. Advanced batteries for drones, portable power for forward-deployed units and mineral supply chains for next-generation platforms — these all point to the simple truth that technological and operational superiority increasingly depends on who controls the next generation of energy systems. But as Europe and the U.S. look to maintain their edge, they must rethink not just how they produce and move energy, but how to secure the industrial base behind it. Energy sovereignty now sits at the center of our shared security, and in a world where adversaries can weaponize supply chains just as easily as airspace or sea lanes, the future will belong to those who build energy systems that are resilient and interoperable by design. The Pentagon already understands this. It has tested distributed power to shorten vulnerable fuel lines in war games across the Indo-Pacific; it has watched closely how mobile generation units keep the grid alive under Russian attack in Ukraine; and it is exploring ways to deliver energy without relying on exposed logistics via new research on solar power beaming. Each of these cases clearly demonstrates that strategic endurance now depends on energy agility and security. But currently, many of these systems depend on materials and manufacturing chains that are dominated by a strategic rival: From batteries and magnets to rare earth processing, China controls our critical inputs. This isn’t just an economic liability, it’s a national security vulnerability for both Europe and the U.S. We’re essentially building the infrastructure of the future with components that could be withheld, surveilled or compromised. That risk isn’t theoretical. China’s recent export controls on key minerals are already disrupting defense and energy manufacturers — a sharp reminder of how supply chain leverage can be a form of coercion, and of our reliance on a fragile ecosystem for the very technologies meant to make us more independent. So, how do we modernize our energy systems without deepening these unnecessary dependencies and build trusted interdependence among allies instead? The solution starts with a shift in mindset that must then translate into decisive policy action. Simply put, as a matter of urgency, energy and tech resilience must be treated as shared infrastructure, cutting across agencies, sectors and alliances. Defense procurement can be a catalyst here. For example, investing in dual-use technologies like advanced batteries, hardened micro-grids and distributed generation would serve both military needs and broader resilience. These aren’t just “green” tools — they’re strategic assets that improve mission effectiveness, while also insulating us from coercion. And done right, such investment can strengthen defense, accelerate innovation and also help drive down costs. Next, we need to build new coalitions for critical minerals, batteries, trusted manufacturing and cyber-secure infrastructure. Just as NATO was built for collective defense, we now need economic and technological alliances that ensure shared strategic autonomy. Both the upcoming White House initiative to strengthen the supply chain for artificial intelligence technology and the recently announced RESourceEU initiative to secure raw materials illustrate how partners are already beginning to rewire systems for resilience. Germany gave the bloc one such example by moving to reduce its reliance on Chinese-made wind components in favor of European suppliers. | Tan Kexing/Getty Images Finally, we must also address existing dependencies strategically and head-on. This means rethinking how and where we source key materials, including building out domestic and allied capacity in areas long neglected. Germany recently gave the bloc one such example by moving to reduce its reliance on Chinese-made wind components in favor of European suppliers. Moving forward, measures like this need EU-wide adoption. By contrast, in the U.S., strong bipartisan support for reducing reliance on China sits alongside proposals to halt domestic battery and renewable incentives, undercutting the very industries that enhance resilience and competitiveness. This is the crux of the matter. Ultimately, if Europe and the U.S. move in parallel rather than together, none of these efforts will succeed — and both will be strategically weaker as a result. The EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas recently warned that we must “act united” or risk being affected by Beijing’s actions — and she’s right. With a laser focus on interoperability and cost sharing, we could build systems that operate together in a shared market of close to 800 million people. The real challenge isn’t technological, it’s organizational. Whether it be Bretton Woods, NATO or the Marshall Plan, the West has strategically built together before, anchoring economic resilience with national defense. The difference today is that the lines between economic security, energy access and defense capability are fully blurred. Sustainable, agile energy is now part of deterrence, and long-term security depends on whether the U.S. and Europe can build energy systems that reinforce and secure one another. This is a generational opportunity for transatlantic alignment; a mutually reinforcing way to safeguard economic interests in the face of systemic competition. And to lead in this new era, we must design for it — together and intentionally. Or we risk forfeiting the very advantages our alliance was built to protect.

BRUSSELS — The military should get involved in the green transition to ensure that Russia doesn’t exploit new vulnerabilities brought about by the move to renewable energy sources, a top EU body said in a document obtained by POLITICO. The bloc has made efforts in recent years to end dependence on Russian fuels and move toward cleaner technology, and is set to ban Russian gas imports entirely under its broader REPowerEU roadmap. However, a letter drafted by the Danish presidency of the Council of the EU and sent on Nov. 28 to EU ambassadors argued that the transition also introduces “new layers of complexity” as Europe’s old energy architecture — including petrol stations, pipelines, refineries and other infrastructure — is phased out. That complicates supply chains on which militaries depend, requiring “enhanced energy independence and engagement in the green transition” by the transatlantic military alliance NATO. The letter, first reported on by Contexte, also calls for stronger coordination between NATO and the EU on energy policy. In particular, officials ought to look at how to protect Europe’s energy infrastructure amid an increase in “physical sabotage and cyberattacks targeting pipelines, cables, ports, and power grids,” it said. The digitization of many energy sources, it added, also requires “strong security measures throughout all phases of infrastructure planning, design, and operation.” The initiative will be discussed by energy ministers on Dec. 15.

The European Commission will present a new plan to break the EU’s dependencies on China for critical raw materials, President Ursula von der Leyen announced on Saturday. The EU executive chief warned of “clear acceleration and escalation in the way interdependencies are leveraged and weaponized,” in a speech Saturday at the Berlin Global Dialogue. In recent months, China has tightened export controls over rare earths and other critical materials. The Asian powerhouse controls close to 70 percent of the world’s rare earths production and almost all of the refining. The EU’s response “must match the scale of the risks we face in this area,” von der Leyen said, adding that “we are focusing on finding solutions with our Chinese counterparts.” Brussels and Beijing are set to discuss the export controls issue during meetings next week. “But we are ready to use all of the instruments in our toolbox to respond if needed,” the head of the EU executive warned. This suggests that the Commission could make use of the EU’s most powerful trade weapon — the Anti-Coercion Instrument. This comes after French President Emmanuel Macron called on the EU executive to trigger the trade bazooka at a meeting of EU leaders on Thursday. His push has not met with much support from the other leaders around the table. NEW BREAKAWAY PLAN To break the EU’s over-reliance on China for critical materials imports and refining, the Commission will put forward a “RESourceEU plan,” von der Leyen said. She did not provide much detail about the plan, nor when it would be presented. But she said it would follow a similar model as the REPowerEU plan that the Commission introduced in 2022 to phase out Russian fossil fuels after Moscow’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. Under REPowerEU, the Commission proposed investing €225 billion to diversify energy supply routes, accelerate the deployment of renewables, improve grids interconnections across the bloc and boost the EU hydrogen market, among other measures. The EU executive also put forward a legislative proposal, which is currently under negotiations with the European Parliament and the Council, to ban Russian gas imports by the end of 2027. The aim of RESourceEU “is to secure access to alternative sources of critical raw materials in the short, medium and long term for our European industry,” von der Leyen explained. “It starts with the circular economy. Not for environmental reasons. But to exploit the critical raw materials already contained in products sold in Europe,” she said. She added that the EU “will speed up work on critical raw materials partnerships with countries like Ukraine and Australia, Canada, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Chile and Greenland.” “Europe cannot do things the same way anymore. We learned this lesson painfully with energy; we will not repeat it with critical materials,” von der Leyen said.

BRUSSELS — After three years of reasoning, pleading and conceding, the EU has had enough. On Monday, the bloc’s 27 member countries are expected to back a new bill that will permanently cut Russian gas supplies to Hungary and Slovakia — whether they like it or not. Since Moscow launched its all-out war in Ukraine in 2022, the EU has weakened the Kremlin’s long-held grip over the bloc’s energy supply, all but eliminating its imports of Russian oil, coal and gas. But throughout that bitter energy divorce, Budapest and Bratislava have stubbornly refused to play ball. Repeatedly arguing that they have no real alternative, their Russia-friendly governments complained that quitting Moscow would mean exploding prices for consumers. Experts largely dispute those claims. And in any case, EU capitals are ready to overrule them. While Russia repeatedly pummels Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, “billions of euros have been paid … by Hungary and Slovakia to Russia,” said Lithuanian Energy Minister Žygimantas Vaičiūnas. “They are using this for their war machine … this is really not acceptable.”  “Now, it is time to demonstrate … political will on the EU level,” he told POLITICO. NO MORE EXCEPTIONS Since Vladimir Putin first ordered troops into Kyiv, Brussels has slapped an embargo on Russian crude, fuel and coal entering the bloc; it’s imposed a $47.60 per barrel price limit on Moscow’s global oil sales, below the market rate; and it’s whittled down the Kremlin’s share in the EU’s gas market from 45 percent to 13 percent.  But Hungary and Slovakia have repeatedly dug their heels in and held up sanctions, winning carve-outs that have allowed them to keep importing Russian crude via the Druzhba pipeline through Ukraine, and blocking efforts to target Moscow’s gas and nuclear sectors. In fact, the two countries are steadily increasing their fossil fuel payments to Moscow, according to Isaac Levi, Russia lead at the Helsinki-based Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air think tank. Budapest and Bratislava have paid Russia €5.58 billion for fossil fuel imports so far this year, he said, already beating the €5.56 billion they forked out last year. Realizing its consensual approach had hit a wall, the European Commission in June decided to change tack. The EU executive unveiled a legal proposal that would impose a ban on Russian gas, starting from next year for short-term contracts and ending in late 2027 for long-term deals. Unlike sanctions, which require unanimity from all EU countries, the proposal — billed as a trade measure — only needs a qualified majority of capitals to approve it, effectively removing Hungary and Slovakia’s veto power over the draft law. Since Vladimir Putin first ordered troops into Kyiv, Brussels has slapped an embargo on Russian crude, fuel and coal entering the bloc; it’s imposed a $47.60 per barrel price limit on Moscow’s global oil sales, below the market rate; and it’s whittled down the Kremlin’s share in the EU’s gas market from 45 percent to 13 percent.  | Contributor/Getty Images On Monday, EU energy ministers will rubber-stamp the bill, sending a signal that they are ready to override both nations before they enter final negotiations with the European Parliament. “We’ll reach an agreement despite their opposition,” said one senior EU diplomat, who, like others for this story, was granted anonymity to speak freely on closed-door discussions. “It’s not an easy subject, but I believe we’ll get there.” LANDLOCKED, NOT BLOCKED In the run-up to the vote, the two countries have pulled out all the stops in a bid to scupper a deal. Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico has vowed to block the EU’s 19th sanctions package against Russia unless he wins concessions on the gas ban, otherwise known as REPowerEU. But EU countries are holding strong. “That’s always the case, that they are finding ways to make their exit strategies,” Vaičiūnas said, “but now we have to really take a strong [stance] on … REPower.” In the meantime, the two countries have continued to argue the law threatens their energy security, will raise prices for consumers and hurt their heavy industry. Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico has vowed to block the EU’s 19th sanctions package against Russia unless he wins concessions on the gas ban, otherwise known as REPowerEU. | Contributor/Getty Images Hungary’s state-owned energy firm MVM currently has a long-term contract with Russia’s Gazprom until 2036, as well as shorter-term seasonal deals. Slovak firm SPP is bound by its deal with the Kremlin-controlled export monopoly until 2034.  After MEPs agreed on their negotiating stance on the bill last week, Budapest’s Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó called the text “a direct attack on Hungary’s energy security.”  It “sets back our economic performance, and threatens the low utility costs of Hungarian families,” he wrote on social platform X. “We won’t let this happen!!” “REPOWER IS A NONSENSICAL IDEOLOGICAL MOVE,” Fico fumed earlier this month. The Hungarian foreign ministry and the Slovak economy ministry did not respond to POLITICO’s requests for comment. But the industry isn’t as vociferous. The proposal is “probably not cataclysmic,” said one Hungarian oil and gas sector insider. “The government and politicians do cry wolf — let’s see if this wolf really comes.”  It is true the bill will likely raise prices in the region by “5 to 10 percent” in the midterm, said Tamás Pletser, an oil and gas analyst at Erste bank. But if the Commission works with countries to lower gas transit fees, that could eliminate “up to 40 percent” of the price hike, he added. Meanwhile, MVM is quietly signing new gas deals, Pletser added. Hungary can also find alternatives via liquefied gas from Western Europe and Greece, he said, as well as a new drilling project in Romania from mid-2027. The industry is “absolutely” ready, he said. The EU executive is nonplussed, too. “The measures have been designed to preserve the security of the EU’s energy supply while limiting any impact on prices,” said one Commission official. Whether or not it leads to price increases, EU capitals are ready to pull the trigger.  “They didn’t do much to diversify, sabotaged sanctions and had quite a lot of time,” said a second EU diplomat. “There is no other way [than] to make them.” “It’s not yesterday that we started talking about phasing out Russian gas,” said a third EU diplomat. “Russia is not a partner — it’s a problem. It’s time to stop pretending it is not.”

Mr. Marcin Laskowski | via PGE The European Union finds itself navigating an era of extraordinary challenges. From defending our shared values against authoritarian aggression to preserving unity in the face of shifting geopolitical landscapes, the EU is once again being tested. Covid-19, the energy crisis, the full-scale Russian war against Ukraine and renewed strains in international relations have taught us a simple lesson: a strong Europe needs capable leaders, resilient institutions and, above all, stable yet flexible financial frameworks. The debate on the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) is therefore not only about figures. It is, fundamentally, a debate about Europe’s security, resilience and its future. From the perspective of the power sector, the stakes are particularly high. Electricity operators live every day with the consequences of EU regulation, carrying both the costs of compliance and the opportunities of EU investment support. Data confirms that European funds channeled into the electricity sector generate immense value for the EU economy and consumers alike. Why? Because electrification is the backbone of Europe’s industrial transformation. The Clean Industrial Deal makes it clear: within a few short years, Europe must raise the electrification rate of its economy by 50 percent — from today’s 21.3 percent to 32 percent by 2030. That means the future of sectors as diverse as chemicals, steel, food processing and high-tech manufacturing is, in reality, a debate about electrification. If this transition is not cost-effective, Europe risks eroding its global competitiveness rather than strengthening it. > That means the future of sectors as diverse as chemicals, steel, food > processing and high-tech manufacturing is, in reality, a debate about > electrification. Electrification is also central to REPowerEU — Europe’s pledge to eliminate dependence on Russian fossil fuels. It is worth recalling that in 2024 the EU still paid more to Russia for oil and gas (€21 billion) than it provided in financial support to Ukraine (€19 billion). Only a massive scale-up of clean, domestic electricity can reverse this imbalance once and for all. But this requires a fresh approach. For too long, the power sector has been seen only through the lens of its own transition. Yet without power sector, no other sector will decarbonize successfully. Already today, electricity accounts for 30 percent of EU emissions but has delivered 75 percent of the reductions achieved from the Emissions Trading Scheme. As electrification accelerates, the sector — heavily reliant on weather-dependent renewables — faces growing costs in ensuring security of supply and system stability. This is why investments must also focus on infrastructure that directly enhances security and resilience, including dual-use solutions such as underground cabling of electricity distribution grids, mobile universal power supply systems for high/medium/low voltage, and advanced cyber protection. These are not luxuries, but prerequisites for a power system capable of withstanding shocks, whether geopolitical, climatic or digital. > For too long, the power sector has been seen only through the lens of its own > transition. Yet without power sector, no other sector will decarbonize > successfully. The European Commission estimates that annual investment needs in the power sector will reach €311 billion from 2031— nearly ten times more than the needs of industry sector. This is an unavoidable reality. The critical question is how to mobilize this capital in a way that is least burdensome for citizens and businesses. If mishandled, it could undermine Europe’s industrial competitiveness, growth and jobs. The MFF alone cannot deliver this transformation. Yet it can, and must, be a vital part of the solution. The European Parliament rightly underlined that completing the Energy Union and upgrading energy infrastructure requires continued EU-level financing. In its July proposal, the Commission earmarked 35 percent of the next budget — about €700 billion — for climate and environmental action. These funds must be allocated in a technology-neutral way, systematically covering generation, transmission, distribution and storage. Public-good investments such as power grids — especially local and regional distribution networks — should be treated as a top priority, enabling small and medium-sized enterprises and households to deploy renewables, access affordable energy and reduce energy poverty. > The debate is not only about money, it is also about the way it is spent. The debate is not only about money, it is also about the way it is spent.  A cautious approach is needed to the “money for reforms” mechanism. EU funds for energy transition must not be judged through unrelated conditions. Support for investments in energy projects must not be held hostage to reforms not linked to energy or climate. This caution should also apply to extending the “do no significant harm” principle to areas outside the scope of the Taxonomy Regulation, where it risks adding unnecessary complexity, administrative burden and uncertainty. The focus must remain firmly on delivering the infrastructure and investments needed for decarbonization and security. Moreover, EU budget rules must align with state aid frameworks, particularly the General Block Exemption Regulation, and reflect the long lead times required for power sector investments. At the same time, Europe cannot afford to lose public trust. The green transition will not succeed if imposed against citizens; it must be built with them. Europe needs more carrots, not more sticks. The next EU budget, therefore, must be more than a financial plan. It must be a strategic instrument to strengthen resilience, sovereignty and competitiveness, anchored in the electrification of Europe’s economy. Without it, we risk not only missing our climate targets but also undermining the very security and unity that the EU exists to defend.

Policymakers are overlooking a $370 billion market that will determine whether climate goals succeed or fail.  In the grand narrative of the clean energy transition, materials like lithium, rare earths and silicon dominate headlines. Yet the most strategically important materials for this transition may be hiding in plain sight, dismissed by policymakers as environmental villains rather than recognized as the enablers of human progress they truly are. The $370 billion blind spot Polyolefins — the family of materials that includes polyethylene and polypropylene — represent perhaps the greatest strategic oversight in contemporary clean industry policy Here is a reality check. Polyolefins represent a global market approaching $370 billion, growing at over 5 percent annually.1,2 They make up nearly half of all plastics consumed in Europe.3 By 2034, global production is expected to hit 371 million tons.4  Yet in the European Union’s Clean Industrial Deal — a €100 billion strategy for industrial competitiveness — polyolefins receive barely a mention.4 This represents a profound strategic miscalculation. While policymakers focus on securing access to exotic critical materials like lithium and cobalt, they overlook the fact that polyolefins are already critical materials— they simply happen to be abundant rather than scarce. In the infrastructure-intensive clean energy transition ahead, abundance is not a weakness; it is the ultimate strategic advantage. > While policymakers focus on securing access to exotic critical materials like > lithium and cobalt, they overlook the fact that polyolefins are already > critical materials. The EU’s REPowerEU plan calls for 1,236 GW of renewable capacity by 2030 — more than double today’s levels.4 Every offshore wind farm, solar array and electric grid connection depends on polyolefins. They insulate cables, protect components and form structural parts of turbines and solar panels. Every solar panel relies on polyolefin elastomers to protect its inner workings for up to 30 years, even in harsh weather.8 And every grid connection depends on polyethylene-insulated cables to carry electricity efficiently across long distances. 7 Multiply these requirements across thousands of installations, and the strategic importance of polyolefins becomes undeniable. Yet, currently, the policy framework treats these materials as afterthoughts, focusing instead on the relatively small quantities of rare elements in generators and inverters while ignoring the massive volumes of polyolefins that make the entire system possible. Beyond energy: the hidden dependencies The strategic importance of polyolefins extends far beyond energy infrastructure. As one example, modern medical systems depend fundamentally on polyolefin materials for syringes, IV bags, tubing and protective equipment. Global food security increasingly depends on polyolefin-based packaging systems that extend shelf life, reduce waste and enable distribution networks — feeding billions of people. Meanwhile, water infrastructure relies on polyethylene pipes engineered for 100-year lifespans. These applications are rarely considered alongside energy priorities — a dangerous fragmentation of strategic thinking. The waste challenge and a circular solution Let’s be clear, plastic waste is a real environmental challenge demanding urgent action. However, the solution is not abandoning these essential materials, it is building the infrastructure to capture their full value in circular systems. The fundamental error in current approaches is treating waste as a material problem rather than a systems problem. Europe currently captures only 23 percent of polyolefin waste for recycling, despite these materials representing nearly two-thirds of all post-consumer plastic waste.3 That’s not because the material can’t be recycled. The infrastructure to do so isn’t at the scale needed to collect, sort and recycle waste to meet future circular feedstock needs. Polyolefins are among the most recyclable materials we have. They can be mechanically recycled multiple times. And with chemical recycling, they can even be broken down to their molecular building blocks and rebuilt into virgin-quality material. That’s not just circularity, it’s circularity at scale. This matters because the EU’s target of 24 percent material circularity by 20305 is unlikely to be met without polyolefins. However, current frameworks treat them as obstacles rather than enablers of circularity. The economic transformation The transition represents an economic transformation, creating competitive advantages for regions implementing it effectively. A region processing 100,000 tons of polyolefin waste annually could capture €100-130 million in additional economic value while creating up to 1,000 jobs.6 > A region processing 100,000 tons of polyolefin waste annually could capture > €100-130 million in additional economic value while creating up to 1,000 jobs. At the end of the day, the clean energy transition must be affordable. Polyolefins help make that possible. They’re cheaper, lighter and longer lasting than many alternatives. Manufacturers with access to cost-effective recycled feedstocks can reduce input costs by 20-40 percent compared with virgin materials. Polyethylene pipes cost 60-70 percent less than steel alternatives while lasting twice as long.9 These aren’t marginal gains. They’re system-level efficiencies that make the difference between success and failure at scale. The strategic choice The real challenge isn’t technical, it’s institutional. Polyolefins sit at the crossroads of materials, environmental and industrial policy, yet these areas are treated as separate domains. There’s also a geopolitical angle. Unlike lithium or rare earths, polyolefins can be produced from diverse feedstocks — natural gas, biomass and even captured CO2 — enabling domestic production and supply chain resilience. This flexibility is a major asset, but current policies largely overlook it. > The path forward requires recognizing polyolefins as strategic assets rather > than environmental problems. The path forward requires recognizing polyolefins as strategic assets rather than environmental problems. This means including them in critical materials assessments — not because they are scarce, but because they are essential. It means coordinating research and development efforts rather than leaving them to fragmented market forces. Most importantly, it means recognizing that the clean energy transition will succeed or fail based on our ability to build infrastructure at unprecedented scale and speed. And that infrastructure will be built primarily from materials that combine performance, abundance, sustainability and cost-effectiveness in ways only polyolefins can provide. The choice facing policymakers is clear: continue treating polyolefins as problems to be managed or recognize them as strategic assets enabling the clean energy future. The regions that understand this integration first will shape the global economy for decades to come. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1. Grand View Research. (2024). Polyolefin Market Size, Share, Growth | Industry Report, 2030. Retrieved from https://www.grandviewresearch.com/industry-analysis/polyolefin-market 2. Fortune Business Insights. (2024). Polyolefin Market Size, Share & Growth | Global Report [2032]. Retrieved from https://www.fortunebusinessinsights.com/polyolefin-market-102373 3. Plastics Europe. (2025). Polyolefins. Retrieved from https://plasticseurope.org/plastics-explained/a-large-family/polyolefins-2/ 4. European Commission. (2025). Clean Industrial Deal. Retrieved from https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/clean-industrial-deal_en 5. European Commission. (2022). Circular economy action plan. Retrieved from https://environment.ec.europa.eu/strategy/circular-economy-action-plan_en 6. Watkins, E., & Schweitzer, J.P. (2018). Moving towards a circular economy for plastics in the EU by 2030. Institute for European Environmental Policy. Retrieved from https://ieep.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Think-2030-A-circular-economy-for-plastics-by-2030-1. 7. Institute of Sustainable Studies (2025). EU Circular Economy Act aims to double circularity rate by 2030 EU Circular Economy Act – Institute of Sustainability Studies 8. López-Escalante, M.C., et al. (2016). Polyolefin as PID-resistant encapsulant material in PV modules. Solar Energy Materials and Solar Cells, 144, 691-699. Retrieved from https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927024815005206 9. PE100+ Association. (2014). Polyolefin Sewer Pipes – 100 Year Lifetime Expectancy. Retrieved from https://www.pe100plus.com/PPCA/Polyolefin-Sewer-Pipes-100-Year-Lifetime-Expectancy-p1430.html --------------------------------------------------------------------------------