BRUSSELS — Belgium on Monday pushed back against the European Commission’s proposed concessions to unblock a €210 billion loan to Ukraine funded by frozen Russian assets — dashing EU hopes of securing a deal in time for Thursday’s leaders’ summit. With two days to go, the Commission is making a last push to convince EU member countries to back the loan so that billions of euros in Russian reserves held at the Euroclear bank in Brussels can be freed up to support Kyiv’s war-battered economy. The EU’s 27 envoys will continue discussions on the scheme later Tuesday, as talks to end Russia’s almost four-year all-out war in Ukraine achieved some progress during a meeting of Western leaders and U.S. envoys in Berlin on Monday. After days of negotiations on the assets, the Commission on Monday suggested legal changes to its proposal to secure political buy-in from Belgium. It gave legal assurances that, under any scenario, Belgium could tap into as much as €210 billion if it faces legal claims or retaliation by Russia, according to the latest text seen by POLITICO. It also stated that no money should be given to Ukraine before EU countries provide financial guarantees covering at least 50 percent of the payout. In a further concession, the Commission instructed all EU countries to end their bilateral investment treaties with Russia to ensure Belgium isn’t left alone to deal with retaliation from Moscow. But Belgium said that the reassurances were not enough during a meeting of EU ambassadors on Monday evening, four EU diplomats told POLITICO. “There will be no deal until EUCO [European Council],” said an EU diplomat who, like others quoted in this article, was granted anonymity to speak freely. The Belgian government is holding out against using the Russian assets over fears that it will be on the hook to repay the full amount if Russia attempts to claw back the money. But in a further complication, four other countries — Italy, Malta, Bulgaria and Czechia — backed Belgium’s demand to explore alternative financing for Ukraine, such as joint debt. While France continues to publicly back the frozen assets plan — the country’s Europe Minister Benjamin Haddad said in Brussels on Tuesday that Paris supports it — a person close to French President Emmanuel Macron said Paris was “neutral” on whether Europe should tap Moscow’s billions, or turn to Eurobonds to keep Ukraine from going bankrupt. Supporters of the scheme — such as Germany — insist there is no real alternative to using the Russian assets. They say that joint debt isn’t feasible because it requires unanimity — meaning that Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who has long been skeptical of support for Ukraine, could block the initiative. “Let us not deceive ourselves. If we do not succeed in this, the European Union’s ability to act will be severely damaged for years, if not for a longer period,” German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said Monday. But that isn’t convincing for all EU countries. Critics claim that Germany insists on using Russian assets because it is ideologically opposed to EU common debt. “The narrative is that Hungary is against common debt [for Ukraine]. The reality is that the frugals are against common debt,” said an EU diplomat. Clea Caulcutt contributed to this report from Paris.

Thirty-six million Europeans — including more than one million in the Nordics[1] — live with a rare disease.[2] For patients and their families, this is not just a medical challenge; it is a human rights issue. Diagnostic delays mean years of worsening health and needless suffering. Where treatments exist, access is far from guaranteed. Meanwhile, breakthroughs in genomics, AI and targeted therapies are transforming what is possible in health care. But without streamlined systems, innovations risk piling up at the gates of regulators, leaving patients waiting. Even the Nordics, which have some of the strongest health systems in the world, struggle to provide fair and consistent access for rare-disease patients. Expectations should be higher. THE BURDEN OF DELAY The toll of rare diseases is profound. People living with them report health-related quality-of-life scores 32 percent lower than those without. Economically, the annual cost per patient in Europe — including caregivers — is around €121,900.[3] > Across Europe, the average time for diagnosis is six to eight years, and > patients continue to face long waits and uneven access to medications. In Sweden, the figure is slightly lower at €118,000, but this is still six times higher than for patients without a rare disease. Most of this burden (65 percent) is direct medical costs, although non-medical expenses and lost productivity also weigh heavily. Caregivers, for instance, lose almost 10 times more work hours than peers supporting patients without a rare disease.[4] This burden can be reduced. European patients with access to an approved medicine face average annual costs of €107,000.[5] Yet delays remain the norm. Across Europe, the average time for diagnosis is six to eight years, and patients continue to face long waits and uneven access to medications. With health innovation accelerating, each new therapy risks compounding inequity unless access pathways are modernized. PROGRESS AND REMAINING BARRIERS Patients today have a better chance than ever of receiving a diagnosis — and in some cases, life-changing therapies. The Nordics in particular are leaders in integrated research and clinical models, building world-class diagnostics and centers of excellence. > Without reform, patients risk being left behind. But advances are not reaching everyone who needs them. Systemic barriers persist: * Disparities across Europe: Less than 10 percent of rare-disease patients have access to an approved treatment.[6] According to the Patients W.A.I.T. Indicator (2025), there are stark differences in access to new orphan medicines (or drugs that target rare diseases).[7] Of the 66 orphan medicines approved between 2020 and 2023, the average number available across Europe was 28. Among the Nordics, only Denmark exceeded this with 34. * Fragmented decision-making: Lengthy health technology assessments, regional variation and shifting political priorities often delay or restrict access. Across Europe, patients wait a median of 531 days from marketing authorization to actual availability. For many orphan drugs, the wait is even longer. In some countries, such as Norway and Poland, reimbursement decisions take more than two years, leaving patients without treatment while the burden of disease grows.[8] * Funding gaps: Despite more therapies on the market and greater technology to develop them, orphan medicines account for just 6.6 percent of pharmaceutical budgets and 1.2 percent of health budgets in Europe. Nordic countries — Sweden, Norway and Finland — spend a smaller share than peers such as France or Belgium. This reflects policy choices, not financial capacity.[9] If Europe struggles with access today, it risks being overwhelmed tomorrow. Rare-disease patients — already facing some of the longest delays — cannot afford for systems to fall farther behind. EASING THE BOTTLENECKS Policymakers, clinicians and patient advocates across the Nordics agree: the science is moving faster than the systems built to deliver it. Without reform, patients risk being left behind just as innovation is finally catching up to their needs. So what’s required? * Governance and reforms: Across the Nordics, rare-disease policy remains fragmented and time-limited. National strategies often expire before implementation, and responsibilities are divided among ministries, agencies and regional authorities. Experts stress that governments must move beyond pilot projects to create permanent frameworks — with ring-fenced funding, transparent accountability and clear leadership within ministries of health — to ensure sustained progress. * Patient organizations: Patient groups remain a driving force behind awareness, diagnosis and access, yet most operate on short-term or volunteer-based funding. Advocates argue that stable, structural support — including inclusion in formal policy processes and predictable financing — is critical to ensure patient perspectives shape decision-making on access, research and care pathways. * Health care pathways: Ann Nordgren, chair of the Rare Disease Fund and professor at Karolinska Institutet, notes that although Sweden has built a strong foundation — including Centers for Rare Diseases, Advanced Therapy (ATMP) and Precision Medicine Centers, and membership in all European Reference Networks — front-line capacity remains underfunded. “Government and hospital managements are not providing  resources to enable health care professionals to work hands-on with diagnostics, care and education,” she explains. “This is a big problem.” She adds that comprehensive rare-disease centers, where paid patient representatives collaborate directly with clinicians and researchers, would help bridge the gap between care and lived experience. * Research and diagnostics: Nordgren also points to the need for better long-term investment in genomic medicine and data infrastructure. Sweden is a leader in diagnostics through Genomic Medicine Sweden and SciLifeLab, but funding for advanced genomic testing, especially for adults, remains limited. “Many rare diseases still lack sufficient funding for basic and translational research,” she says, leading to delays in identifying genetic causes and developing targeted therapies. She argues for a national health care data platform integrating electronic records, omics (biological) data and patient-reported outcomes — built with semantic standards such as openEHR and SNOMED CT — to enable secure sharing, AI-driven discovery and patient access to their own data DELIVERING BREAKTHROUGHS Breakthroughs are coming. The question is whether Europe will be ready to deliver them equitably and at speed, or whether patients will continue to wait while therapies sit on the shelf. There is reason for optimism. The Nordic region has the talent, infrastructure and tradition of fairness to set the European benchmark on rare-disease care. But leadership requires urgency, and collaboration across the EU will be essential to ensure solutions are shared and implemented across borders. The need for action is clear: * Establish long-term governance and funding for rare-disease infrastructure. * Provide stable, structural support for patient organizations. * Create clearer, better-coordinated care pathways. * Invest more in research, diagnostics and equitable access to innovative treatments. Early access is not only fair — it is cost-saving. Patients treated earlier incur lower indirect and non-medical costs over time.[10] Inaction, by contrast, compounds the burden for patients, families and health systems alike. Science will forge ahead. The task now is to sustain momentum and reform systems so that no rare-disease patient in the Nordics, or anywhere in Europe, is left waiting. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [1] https://nordicrarediseasesummit.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/25.02-Nordic-Roadmap-for-Rare-Diseases.pdf [2] https://nordicrarediseasesummit.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/25.02-Nordic-Roadmap-for-Rare-Diseases.pdf [3] https://media.crai.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/28114611/CRA-Alexion-Quantifying-the-Burden-of-RD-in-Europe-Full-report-October2024.pdf [4] https://media.crai.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/28114611/CRA-Alexion-Quantifying-the-Burden-of-RD-in-Europe-Full-report-October2024.pdf [5] https://media.crai.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/28114611/CRA-Alexion-Quantifying-the-Burden-of-RD-in-Europe-Full-report-October2024.pdf [6] https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/partner/article/a-competitive-and-innovationled-europe-starts-with-rare-diseases? [7] https://www.iqvia.com/-/media/iqvia/pdfs/library/publications/efpia-patients-wait-indicator-2024.pdf [8] https://www.iqvia.com/-/media/iqvia/pdfs/library/publications/efpia-patients-wait-indicator-2024.pdf [9] https://copenhageneconomics.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Copenhagen-Economics_Spending-on-OMPs-across-Europe.pdf [10] https://media.crai.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/28114611/CRA-Alexion-Quantifying-the-Burden-of-RD-in-Europe-Full-report-October2024.pdf Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is Alexion Pharmaceuticals * The entity ultimately controlling the sponsor: AstraZeneca plc * The political advertisement is linked to policy advocacy around rare disease governance, funding, and equitable access to diagnosis and treatment across Europe More information here.

A fair, fast and competitive transition begins with what already works and then rapidly scales it up.  Across the EU commercial road transport sector, the diversity of operations is met with a diversity of solutions. Urban taxis are switching to electric en masse. Many regional coaches run on advanced biofuels, with electrification emerging in smaller applications such as school services, as European e-coach technologies are still maturing and only now beginning to enter the market. Trucks electrify rapidly where operationally and financially possible, while others, including long-haul and other hard-to-electrify segments, operate at scale on HVO (hydrotreated vegetable oil) or biomethane, cutting emissions immediately and reliably. These are real choices made every day by operators facing different missions, distances, terrains and energy realities, showing that decarbonization is not a single pathway but a spectrum of viable ones.  Building on this diversity, many operators are already modernizing their fleets and cutting emissions through electrification. When they can control charging, routing and energy supply, electric vehicles often deliver a positive total cost of ownership (TCO), strong reliability and operational benefits. These early adopters prove that electrification works where the enabling conditions are in place, and that its potential can expand dramatically with the right support. > Decarbonization is not a single pathway but a spectrum of viable ones chosen > daily by operators facing real-world conditions. But scaling electrification faces structural bottlenecks. Grid capacity is constrained across the EU, and upgrades routinely take years. As most heavy-duty vehicle charging will occur at depots, operators cannot simply move around to look for grid opportunities. They are bound to the location of their facilities.  The recently published grid package tries, albeit timidly, to address some of these challenges, but it neither resolves the core capacity deficiencies nor fixes the fundamental conditions that determine a positive TCO: the predictability of electricity prices, the stability of delivered power, and the resulting charging time. A truck expected to recharge in one hour at a high-power station may wait far longer if available grid power drops. Without reliable timelines, predictable costs and sufficient depot capacity, most transport operators cannot make long-term investment decisions. And the grid is only part of the enabling conditions needed: depot charging infrastructure itself requires significant additional investment, on top of vehicles that already cost several hundreds of thousands of euros more than their diesel equivalents.  This is why the EU needs two things at once: strong enablers for electrification and hydrogen; and predictability on what the EU actually recognizes as clean. Operators using renewable fuels, from biomethane to advanced biofuels and HVO, delivering up to 90 percent CO2 reduction, are cutting emissions today. Yet current CO2 frameworks, for both light-duty vehicles and heavy-duty trucks, fail to recognize fleets running on these fuels as part of the EU’s decarbonization solution for road transport, even when they deliver immediate, measurable climate benefits. This lack of clarity limits investment and slows additional emission reductions that could happen today. > Policies that punish before enabling will not accelerate the transition; a > successful shift must empower operators, not constrain them. The revision of both CO2 standards, for cars and vans, and for heavy-duty vehicles, will therefore be pivotal. They must support electrification and hydrogen where they fit the mission, while also recognizing the contribution of renewable and low-carbon fuels across the fleet. Regulations that exclude proven clean options will not accelerate the transition. They will restrict it.  With this in mind, the question is: why would the EU consider imposing purchasing mandates on operators or excessively high emission-reduction targets on member states that would, in practice, force quotas on buyers? Such measures would punish before enabling, removing choice from those who know their operations best. A successful transition must empower operators, not constrain them.  The EU’s transport sector is committed and already delivering. With the right enablers, a technology-neutral framework, and clarity on what counts as clean, the EU can turn today’s early successes into a scalable, fair and competitive decarbonization pathway.  We now look with great interest to the upcoming Automotive Package, hoping to see pragmatic solutions to these pressing questions, solutions that EU transport operators, as the buyers and daily users of all these technologies, are keenly expecting. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is IRU – International Road Transport Union  * The ultimate controlling entity is IRU – International Road Transport Union  More information here.

Europe’s chemical industry has reached a breaking point. The warning lights are no longer blinking — they are blazing. Unless Europe changes course immediately, we risk watching an entire industrial backbone, with the countless jobs it supports, slowly hollow out before our eyes. Consider the energy situation: this year European gas prices have stood at 2.9 times higher than in the United States. What began as a temporary shock is now a structural disadvantage. High energy costs are becoming Europe’s new normal, with no sign of relief. This is not sustainable for an energy-intensive sector that competes globally every day. Without effective infrastructure and targeted energy-cost relief — including direct support, tax credits and compensation for indirect costs from the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) — we are effectively asking European companies and their workers to compete with their hands tied behind their backs. > Unless Europe changes course immediately, we risk watching an entire > industrial backbone, with the countless jobs it supports, slowly hollow out > before our eyes. The impact is already visible. This year, EU27 chemical production fell by a further 2.5 percent, and the sector is now operating 9.5 percent below pre-crisis capacity. These are not just numbers, they are factories scaling down, investments postponed and skilled workers leaving sites. This is what industrial decline looks like in real time. We are losing track of the number of closures and job losses across Europe, and this is accelerating at an alarming pace. And the world is not standing still. In the first eight months of 2025, EU27 chemicals exports dropped by €3.5 billion, while imports rose by €3.2 billion. The volume trends mirror this: exports are down, imports are up. Our trade surplus shrank to €25 billion, losing €6.6 billion in just one year. Meanwhile, global distortions are intensifying. Imports, especially from China, continue to increase, and new tariff policies from the United States are likely to divert even more products toward Europe, while making EU exports less competitive. Yet again, in 2025, most EU trade defense cases involved chemical products. In this challenging environment, EU trade policy needs to step up: we need fast, decisive action against unfair practices to protect European production against international trade distortions. And we need more free trade agreements to access growth market and secure input materials. “Open but not naïve” must become more than a slogan. It must shape policy. > Our producers comply with the strictest safety and environmental standards in > the world. Yet resource-constrained authorities cannot ensure that imported > products meet those same standards. Europe is also struggling to enforce its own rules at the borders and online. Our producers comply with the strictest safety and environmental standards in the world. Yet resource-constrained authorities cannot ensure that imported products meet those same standards. This weak enforcement undermines competitiveness and safety, while allowing products that would fail EU scrutiny to enter the single market unchecked. If Europe wants global leadership on climate, biodiversity and international chemicals management, credibility starts at home. Regulatory uncertainty adds to the pressure. The Chemical Industry Action Plan recognizes what industry has long stressed: clarity, coherence and predictability are essential for investment. Clear, harmonized rules are not a luxury — they are prerequisites for maintaining any industrial presence in Europe. This is where REACH must be seen for what it is: the world’s most comprehensive piece of legislation governing chemicals. Yet the real issues lie in implementation. We therefore call on policymakers to focus on smarter, more efficient implementation without reopening the legal text. Industry is facing too many headwinds already. Simplification can be achieved without weakening standards, but this requires a clear political choice. We call on European policymakers to restore the investment and profitability of our industry for Europe. Only then will the transition to climate neutrality, circularity, and safe and sustainable chemicals be possible, while keeping our industrial base in Europe. > Our industry is an enabler of the transition to a climate-neutral and circular > future, but we need support for technologies that will define that future. In this context, the ETS must urgently evolve. With enabling conditions still missing, like a market for low-carbon products, energy and carbon infrastructures, access to cost-competitive low-carbon energy sources, ETS costs risk incentivizing closures rather than investment in decarbonization. This may reduce emissions inside the EU, but it does not decarbonize European consumption because production shifts abroad. This is what is known as carbon leakage, and this is not how EU climate policy intends to reach climate neutrality. The system needs urgent repair to avoid serious consequences for Europe’s industrial fabric and strategic autonomy, with no climate benefit. These shortcomings must be addressed well before 2030, including a way to neutralize ETS costs while industry works toward decarbonization. Our industry is an enabler of the transition to a climate-neutral and circular future, but we need support for technologies that will define that future. Europe must ensure that chemical recycling, carbon capture and utilization, and bio-based feedstocks are not only invented here, but also fully scaled here. Complex permitting, fragmented rules and insufficient funding are slowing us down while other regions race ahead. Decarbonization cannot be built on imported technology — it must be built on a strong EU industrial presence. Critically, we must stimulate markets for sustainable products that come with an unavoidable ‘green premium’. If Europe wants low-carbon and circular materials, then fiscal, financial and regulatory policy recipes must support their uptake — with minimum recycled or bio-based content, new value chain mobilizing schemes and the right dose of ‘European preference’. If we create these markets but fail to ensure that European producers capture a fair share, we will simply create new opportunities for imports rather than European jobs. > If Europe wants a strong, innovative resilient chemical industry in 2030 and > beyond, the decisions must be made today. The window is closing fast. The Critical Chemicals Alliance offers a path forward. Its primary goal will be to tackle key issues facing the chemical sector, such as risks of closures and trade challenges, and to support modernization and investments in critical productions. It will ultimately enable the chemical industry to remain resilient in the face of geopolitical threats, reinforcing Europe’s strategic autonomy. But let us be honest: time is no longer on our side. Europe’s chemical industry is the foundation of countless supply chains — from clean energy to semiconductors, from health to mobility. If we allow this foundation to erode, every other strategic ambition becomes more fragile. If you weren’t already alarmed — you should be. This is a wake-up call. Not for tomorrow, for now. Energy support, enforceable rules, smart regulation, strategic trade policies and demand-driven sustainability are not optional. They are the conditions for survival. If Europe wants a strong, innovative resilient chemical industry in 2030 and beyond, the decisions must be made today. The window is closing fast. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is CEFIC- The European Chemical Industry Council  * The ultimate controlling entity is CEFIC- The European Chemical Industry Council  More information here.

This article is presented by EFPIA with the support of AbbVie I made a trip back to Europe recently, where I spent the vast majority of my pharmaceutical career, to share my perspectives on competitiveness at the European Health Summit. Now that I work in a role responsible for supporting patient access to medicine globally, I view Europe, and how it compares internationally, through a new lens, and I have been reflecting further on why the choices made today will have such a critical impact on where medicines are developed tomorrow. Today, many patients around the world benefit from medicines built on European science and breakthroughs of the last 20 years. Europeans, like me, can be proud of this contribution. As I look forward, my concern is that we may not be able to make the same claim in the next 20 years. It’s clear that Europe has a choice. Investing in sustainable medicines growth and other enabling policies will, I believe, bring significant benefits. Not doing so risks diminishing global influence. > Today, many patients around the world benefit from medicines built on European > science and breakthroughs of the last 20 years I reflect on three important points: 1) investment in healthcare benefits individuals, healthcare and society, but the scale of this benefit remains underappreciated; 2) connected to this, the underpinning science for future innovation is increasingly happening elsewhere; and 3) this means the choices we make today must address both of these trends. First, let’s use the example of migraine. As I have heard a patient say, “Migraine will not kill you but neither [will they] let you live.”[1] Individuals can face being under a migraine attack for more than half of every month, unable to leave home, maintain a job and engage in society.[2] It is the second biggest cause of disability globally and the first among young women.[3] It affects the quality of life of millions of Europeans.[4] From 2011-21 the economic burden of migraine in Europe due to the loss of working days ranged from €35-557 billion, depending on the country, representing 1-2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).[5]   Overall socioeconomic burden of migraine as percentage of the country’s GDP in 2021 Source: WifOR, The socioeconomic burden of migraine. The case of 6 European Countries.5 Access to effective therapies could radically improve individuals’ lives and their ability to return to work.[6] Yet, despite the staggering economic and personal impacts, in some member states the latest medicines are either not reimbursed or only available after several treatment failures.[7] Imagine if Europe shifted its perspective on these conditions, investing to improve not only health but unlocking the potential for workforce and economic productivity? Moving to my second point, against this backdrop of underinvestment, where are scientific advances now happening in our sector? In recent years it is impressive to see China has become the second-largest drug developer in the world,[8] and within five years it may lead the innovative antibodies therapeutics sector,[9] which is particularly promising for complex areas like oncology. Cancer is projected to become the leading cause of death in Europe by 2035,[10] yet the continent’s share of the number of oncology trials dropped from 41 percent in 2013 to 21 percent in 2023.10 Today, antibody-drug conjugates are bringing new hope in hard-to-treat tumor types,[11] like ovarian,[12] lung[13] and colorectal[14] cancer, and we hope to see more of these advances in the future. Unfortunately, Europe is no longer at the forefront of the development of these innovations. This geographical shift could impact high-quality jobs, the vitality of Europe’s biotech sector and, most importantly, patients’ outcomes. [15] > This is why I encourage choices to be made that clearly signal the value > Europe attaches to medicines This is why I encourage choices to be made that clearly signal the value Europe attaches to medicines. This can be done by removing national cost-containment measures, like clawbacks, that are increasingly eroding the ability of companies to invest in European R&D. To provide a sense of their impact, between 2012 and 2023, clawbacks and price controls reduced manufacturer revenues by over €1.2 billion across five major EU markets, corresponding to a loss of 4.7 percent in countries like Spain.[16] Moreover, we should address health technology assessment approaches in Europe, or mandatory discount policies, which are simply not adequately accounting for the wider societal value of medicines, such as in the migraine example, and promoting a short-term approach to investment. By broadening horizons and choosing a long-term investment strategy for medicines and the life science sector, Europe will not only enable this strategic industry to drive global competitiveness but, more importantly, bring hope to Europeans suffering from health conditions. AbbVie SA/NV – BE-ABBV-250177 (V1.0) – December 2025 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [1] The Parliament Magazine, https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/partner/article/unmet-medical-needs-and-migraine-assessing-the-added-value-for-patients-and-society, Last accessed December 2025. [2] The Migraine Trust; https://migrainetrust.org/understand-migraine/types-of-migraine/chronic-migraine/, Last accessed December 2025. [3] Steiner TJ, et al; Lifting The Burden: the Global Campaign against Headache. Migraine remains second among the world’s causes of disability, and first among young women: findings from GBD2019. J Headache Pain. 2020 Dec 2;21(1):137 [4] Coppola G, Brown JD, Mercadante AR, Drakeley S, Sternbach N, Jenkins A, Blakeman KH, Gendolla A. The epidemiology and unmet need of migraine in five european countries: results from the national health and wellness survey. BMC Public Health. 2025 Jan 21;25(1):254. doi: 10.1186/s12889-024-21244-8. [5] WifOR. Calculating the Socioeconomic Burden of Migraine: The Case of 6 European Countries. Available at: [https://www.wifor.com/en/download/the-socioeconomic-burden-of-migraine-the-case-of-6-eu­ropean-countries/?wpdmdl=358249&refresh=687823f915e751752703993]. Accessed June 2025. [6] Seddik AH, Schiener C, Ostwald DA, Schramm S, Huels J, Katsarava Z. Social Impact of Prophylactic Migraine Treatments in Germany: A State-Transition and Open Cohort Approach. Value Health. 2021 Oct;24(10):1446-1453. doi: 10.1016/j.jval.2021.04.1281 [7] Moisset X, Demarquay G, et al., Migraine treatment: Position paper of the French Headache Society. Rev Neurol (Paris). 2024 Dec;180(10):1087-1099. doi: 10.1016/j.neurol.2024.09.008. [8] The Economist, https://www.economist.com/china/2025/11/23/chinese-pharma-is-on-the-cusp-of-going-global, Last accessed December 2025. [9] Crescioli S, Reichert JM. Innovative antibody therapeutic development in China compared with the USA and Europe. Nat Rev Drug Discov. Published online November 7, 2025. [10] Manzano A., Svedman C., Hofmarcher T., Wilking N.. Comparator Report on Cancer in Europe 2025 – Disease Burden, Costs and Access to Medicines and Molecular Diagnostics. EFPIA, 2025. [IHE REPORT 2025:2, page 20] [11] Armstrong GB, Graham H, Cheung A, Montaseri H, Burley GA, Karagiannis SN, Rattray Z. Antibody-drug conjugates as multimodal therapies against hard-to-treat cancers. Adv Drug Deliv Rev. 2025 Sep;224:115648. doi: 10.1016/j.addr.2025.115648. Epub 2025 Jul 11. PMID: 40653109.. [12] Narayana, R.V.L., Gupta, R. Exploring the therapeutic use and outcome of antibody-drug conjugates in ovarian cancer treatment. Oncogene 44, 2343–2356 (2025). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41388-025-03448-3 [13] Coleman, N., Yap, T.A., Heymach, J.V. et al. Antibody-drug conjugates in lung cancer: dawn of a new era?. npj Precis. Onc. 7, 5 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41698-022-00338-9 [14] Wang Y, Lu K, Xu Y, Xu S, Chu H, Fang X. Antibody-drug conjugates as immuno-oncology agents in colorectal cancer: targets, payloads, and therapeutic synergies. Front Immunol. 2025 Nov 3;16:1678907. doi: 10.3389/fimmu.2025.1678907. PMID: 41256852; PMCID: PMC12620403. [15] EFPIA, Improving EU Clinical Trials: Proposals to Overcome Current Challenges and Strengthen the Ecosystem, efpias-list-of-proposals-clinical-trials-15-apr-2025.pdf, Last accessed December 2025. [16] The EU General Pharmaceutical Legislation & Clawbacks, © Vital Transformation BVBA, 2024.

BRUSSELS — Europe needs to get its “act together” and unleash its potential in the pharmaceutical sector, supporting it with better incentives and ensuring access to innovation for patients, urged Stefan Oelrich, president of Bayer’s pharmaceuticals division. “Europe used to be the pharmacy of the world. Nine out of 10 new medicines were discovered in Europe. That’s no longer the case,” Oelrich, who is also president of the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA), said at the POLITICO 28 Gala Dinner. “We’re losing competitiveness rather than gaining.” China and the U.S. are pulling ahead on pharmaceutical innovation and clinical trials. About one third of medicines approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) don’t make it to Europe, Oelrich said. And amid the U.S. tariffs threat, companies are increasingly looking outside of Europe for investments. But there is hope — both for the pharmaceutical industry and beyond. Per Franzén, CEO and managing partner at EQT, a global investment organization, said he is seeing “an unprecedented interest to invest into Europe.” “It’s a real window of opportunity, a unique moment in time for Europe,” he said. “In order to make the most out of that opportunity, what we need to do is really to drive a more business-friendly, more innovation-friendly agenda,” he said. But with the pace of change, driven by artificial intelligence, “time is of the essence,” he added. Over-regulation isn’t holding Europe back in medicines innovation, it’s a lack of substantial incentives for companies to invest in Europe, Oelrich said. But it doesn’t have to be this way, he said: “We have some of the best universities in the world that publish some of the coolest science in the world. So there is no reason why this wouldn’t work. And we need to get our act together,” he said. “Instead of trying to complicate our lives and come up with a new bureaucratic idea, we should come up with with ways of how we unleash our forces.”

ATHENS — The country that almost got kicked out of the eurozone is now running the powerful EU body that rescued it from bankruptcy. Greece’s finance minister, Kyriakos Pierrakakis, on Thursday beat Belgian Deputy Prime Minister Vincent Van Peteghem in a two-horse race for the Eurogroup presidency. Although an informal forum for eurozone finance ministers, the post has proved pivotal in overcoming crises — notably the sovereign debt crisis, which resulted in three bailouts of the Greek government. That was 10 years ago, when Pierrakakis’ predecessor described the Eurogroup as a place fit only for psychopaths. Today, Athens presents itself as a poster child of fiscal prudence after dramatically reducing its debt pile to around 147 percent of its economic output — albeit still the highest tally in the eurozone. “My generation was shaped by an existential crisis that revealed the power of resilience, the cost of complacency, the necessity of reform, and the strategic importance of European solidarity,” Pierrakakis wrote in his motivational letter for the job. “Our story is not only national; it is deeply European.” Few diplomats initially expected the 42-year-old computer scientist and political economist to win the race to lead the Eurogroup after incumbent Paschal Donohoe’s shock resignation last month. Belgium’s Van Peteghem could boast more experience and held a great deal of respect within the eurozone, setting him up as the early favorite to win. But Belgium’s continued reluctance to back the European Commission’s bid to use the cash value of frozen Russian assets to finance a €165 billion reparations loan to Ukraine ultimately contributed to Van Peteghem’s defeat. NOT TYPICAL Pierrakakis isn’t a typical member of the center-right ruling New Democracy party, which belongs to the European People’s Party. His political background is a socialist one, having served as an advisor to the centre-left PASOK party from 2009, when Greece plunged into financial crisis. He was even one of the Greek technocrats negotiating with the country’s creditors. The Harvard and MIT graduate joined New Democracy to support Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ bid for the party leadership in 2015, because he felt that they shared a political vision. Pierrakakis got his big political break when New Democracy won the national election in 2019, after four years of serving as a director of the research and policy institute diaNEOsis. He was named minister of digital governance, overseeing Greece’s efforts to modernize the country’s creaking bureaucracy, adopting digital solutions for everything from Cabinet meetings to medical prescriptions. Those efforts made him one of the most popular ministers in the Greek cabinet — so much so that Pierrakakis is often touted as Mitsotakis’ likely successor for the party leadership in the Greek press. Few diplomats initially expected the 42-year-old computer scientist and political economist to win the race to lead the Eurogroup after incumbent Paschal Donohoe’s shock resignation last month. | Nicolas Economou/Getty Images After the re-election of New Democracy in 2023, Pierrakakis took over the Education Ministry, where he backed controversial legislation that paved the way for the establishment of private universities in Greece. A Cabinet reshuffle in March placed him within the finance ministry, where he has sped up plans to pay down Greece’s debt to creditors and pledged to bring the country’s debt below 120 percent of GDP before 2030.

LONDON — The British government is working to give its trade chief new powers to move faster in imposing higher tariffs on imports, as it faces pressure from Brussels and Washington to combat Chinese industrial overcapacity. Under new rules drawn up by British officials, Trade Secretary Peter Kyle will have the power to direct the Trade Remedies Authority (TRA) to launch investigations and give ministers options to set higher duty levels to protect domestic businesses. The trade watchdog will be required to set out the results of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations within a year, better monitor trade distortions and streamline processes for businesses to prompt trade probes. The U.K. is in negotiations with the U.S. and the EU to forge a steel alliance to counter Chinese overcapacity as the bloc works to introduce its own updated safeguards regime. The EU is the U.K.’s largest market and Brussels is creating a new steel protection regime that is set to slash Britain’s tariff-free export quotas and place 50 percent duties on any in excess. The government said its directive to the TRA will align the U.K. with similar powers in the EU and Australia, and follow World Trade Organization rules. It is set out in a Strategic Steer to the watchdog and will be introduced as part of the finance bill due to be wrapped up in the spring. “We are strengthening the U.K.’s system for tackling unfair trade to give our producers and manufacturers — especially SMEs who have less capacity and capability — the backing they need to grow and compete,” Business and Trade Secretary Peter Kyle said in a statement. “By streamlining processes and aligning our framework with international peers, we are ensuring U.K. industry has the tools to protect jobs, attract investment and thrive in a changing global economy,” Kyle added. These moves come after the government said on Wednesday that its Steel Strategy, which plots the future of the industry in Britain and new trade protections for the sector, will be delayed until next year. The Trump administration has been concerned about the U.K.’s steps to counter China’s steel overcapacity and refused to lower further a 25 percent tariff carve-out for Britain’s steel and aluminum exports from the White House’s 50 percent global duties on the metals. Trade Secretary Kyle discussed lowering the Trump administration’s tariffs on U.K. steel with senior U.S. Cabinet members in Washington on Wednesday.  “We are very much on the case of trying to sort out precisely where we land with the EU safeguard,” Trade Minister Chris Bryant told parliament Thursday, after meeting with EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič on Wednesday for negotiations. “We will do everything we can to make sure that we have a strong and prosperous steel sector across the whole of the U.K.,” Bryant said. The TRA has also launched a new public-facing Import Trends Monitor tool to help firms detect surges in imports that could harm their business and provide evidence that could prompt an investigation by the watchdog. “We welcome the government’s strategic steer, which marks a significant milestone in our shared goal to make the U.K.’s trade remedies regime more agile, accessible and assertive, as well as providing greater accountability,” said the TRA’s Co-Chief Executives Jessica Blakely and Carmen Suarez. Sophie Inge and Jon Stone contributed reporting.

BRUSSELS — The EU has struck a political agreement to overhaul the bloc’s foreign direct investment screening rules, the Council of the EU announced on Thursday, in a move to prevent strategic technology and critical infrastructure from falling into the hands of hostile powers. The updated rules — the first major plank of European Commission President’s Ursula von der Leyen’s economic security strategy — would require all EU countries to systematically monitor investments and further harmonize the way those are screened within the bloc. The agreement comes just over a week after Brussels unveiled a new economic security package. Under the new rules, EU countries would be required to screen investments in dual-use items and military equipment; technologies like artificial intelligence, quantum technologies and semiconductors; raw materials; energy, transport and digital infrastructure; and election infrastructure, such as voting systems and databases. As previously reported by POLITICO, foreign entities investing into specific financial services must also be subject to screening by EU capitals. “We achieved a balanced and proportionate framework, focused on the most sensitive technologies and infrastructures, respectful of national prerogatives and efficient for authorities and businesses alike,” said Morten Bødskov, Denmark’s minister for industry, business and financial affairs. It took three round of political talks between the three institutions to seal the update, which was a key priority for the Danish Presidency of the Council of the EU. One contentious question was which technologies and sectors should be subject to mandatory screening. Another was how capitals and the European Commission should coordinate — and who gets the final say — when a deal raises red flags. Despite a request from the European Parliament, the Commission will not get the authority to arbitrate disputes between EU countries on specific investment cases. Screening decisions will remain firmly in the purview of national governments. “We’re making progress. The result of our negotiations clearly strengthens the EU’s security while also making life easier for investors by harmonising the Member States’ screening mechanism,” said the lead lawmaker on the file, French S&D Raphaël Glucksmann. “Yet more remains to be done to ensure that investments bring real added value to the EU, so that our market does not become a playground for foreign companies exploiting our dependence on their technology. The Commission has committed to take an initiative; it must now act quickly,” he said in a statement to POLITICO. This story has been updated.

The discussion surrounding the digital euro is strategically important to Europe. On Dec. 12, the EU finance ministers are aiming to agree on a general approach regarding the dossier. This sets out the European Council’s official position and thus represents a major political milestone for the European Council ahead of the trilogue negotiations. We want to be sure that, in this process, the project will be subject to critical analysis that is objective and nuanced and takes account of the long-term interests of Europe and its people. > We do not want the debate to fundamentally call the digital euro into question > but rather to refine the specific details in such a way that opportunities can > be seized. We regard the following points as particularly important: * maintaining European sovereignty at the customer interface; * avoiding a parallel infrastructure that inhibits innovation; and * safeguarding the stability of the financial markets by imposing clear holding limits. We do not want the debate to fundamentally call the digital euro into question but rather to refine the specific details in such a way that opportunities can be seized and, at the same time, risks can be avoided. Opportunities of the digital euro:  1. European resilience and sovereignty in payments processing: as a public-sector means of payment that is accepted across Europe, the digital euro can reduce reliance on non-European card systems and big-tech wallets, provided that a firmly European design is adopted and it is embedded in the existing structures of banks and savings banks and can thus be directly linked to customers’ existing accounts. 2. Supplement to cash and private-sector digital payments: as a central bank digital currency, the digital euro can offer an additional, state-backed payment option, especially when it is held in a digital wallet and can also be used for e-commerce use cases (a compromise proposed by the European Parliament’s main rapporteur for the digital euro, Fernando Navarrete). This would further strengthen people’s freedom of choice in the payment sphere. 3. Catalyst for innovation in the European market: if integrated into banking apps and designed in accordance with the compromises proposed by Navarrete (see point 2), the digital euro can promote innovation in retail payments, support new European payment ecosystems, and simplify cross-border payments. > The burden of investment and the risk resulting from introducing the digital > euro will be disproportionately borne by banks and savings banks. Risks of the current configuration: 1. Risk of creating a gateway for US providers: in the configuration currently planned, the digital euro provides US and other non-European tech and payment companies with access to the customer interface, customer data and payment infrastructure without any of the regulatory obligations and costs that only European providers face. This goes against the objective of digital sovereignty. 2. State parallel infrastructures weaken the market and innovation: the European Central Bank (ECB) is planning not just two new sets of infrastructure but also its own product for end customers (through an app). An administrative body has neither the market experience nor the customer access that banks and payment providers do. At the same time, the ECB is removing the tried-and-tested allocation of roles between the central bank and private sector. Furthermore, the Eurosystem’s digital euro project will tie up urgently required development capacity for many years and thereby further exacerbate Europe’s competitive disadvantage. The burden of investment and the risk resulting from introducing the digital euro will be disproportionately borne by banks and savings banks. In any case, the banks and savings banks have already developed a European market solution, Wero, which is currently coming onto the market. The digital euro needs to strengthen rather than weaken this European-led payment method. 3. Risks for financial stability and lending: without clear holding limits, there is a risk of uncontrolled transfers of deposits from banks and savings banks into holdings of digital euros. Deposits are the backbone of lending; large-scale outflows would weaken both the funding of the real economy – especially small and medium-sized enterprises – and the stability of the system. Holding limits must therefore be based on usual payment needs and be subject to binding regulations. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is Bundesverband der Deutschen Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken e.V. , Schellingstraße 4, 10785 Berlin, Germany * The ultimate controlling entity is Bundesverband der Deutschen Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken e.V. , Schellingstraße 4, 10785 Berlin, Germany More information here.