Many describe our geopolitical moment as one of instability, but that word feels too weak for what we are living through. Some, like Mark Carney, argue that we are facing a rupture: a break with assumptions that anchored the global economic and political order for decades. Others, like Christine Lagarde, see a profound transition, a shift toward a new configuration of power, technology and societal expectations. Whichever perception we adopt, the implication is clear: leaders can no longer rely on yesterday’s mental models, institutional routines or governance templates. Johanna Mair is the Director of the Florence School of Transnational Governance at the European University Institute in Florence, where she leads education, training and research on governance beyond the nation state. Security, for example, is no longer a discrete policy field. It now reaches deeply into energy systems, artificial intelligence, cyber governance, financial stability and democratic resilience, all under conditions of strategic competition and mistrust. At the same time, competitiveness cannot be reduced to productivity metrics or short-term growth rates. It is about a society’s capacity to innovate, regulate effectively and mobilize investment toward long-term objectives — from the green and digital transitions to social cohesion. This dense web of interdependence is where transnational governance is practiced every day. The European Union illustrates this reality vividly. No single member state can build the capacity to manage these transformations on its own. EU institutions and other regional bodies shape regulatory frameworks and collective responses; corporations influence infrastructure and supply chains; financial institutions direct capital flows; and civic actors respond to social fragmentation and governance gaps. Effective leadership has become a systemic endeavour: it requires coordination across these levels, while sustaining public legitimacy and defending liberal democratic principles. > Our mission is to teach and train current and future leaders, equipping them > with the knowledge, skills and networks to tackle global challenges in ways > that are both innovative and grounded in democratic values. The Florence School of Transnational Governance (STG) at the European University Institute was created precisely to respond to this need. Located in Florence and embedded in a European institution founded by EU member states, the STG is a hub where policymakers, business leaders, civil society, media and academia meet to work on governance beyond national borders. Our mission is to teach and train current and future leaders, equipping them with the knowledge, skills and networks to tackle global challenges in ways that are both innovative and grounded in democratic values. What makes this mission distinctive is not only the topics we address, but also how and with whom we address them. We see leadership development as a practice embedded in real institutions, not a purely classroom-based exercise. People do not come to Florence to observe transnational governance from a distance; they come to practice it, test hypotheses and co-create solutions with peers who work on the frontlines of policy and politics. This philosophy underpins our portfolio of programs, from degree offerings to executive education. With early career professionals, we focus on helping them understand and shape governance beyond the state, whether in international organizations, national administrations, the private sector or civil society. We encourage them to see institutions not as static structures, but as arrangements that can and must be strengthened and reformed to support a liberal, rules-based order under stress. At the same time, we devote significant attention to practitioners already in positions of responsibility. Our Global Executive Master (GEM) is designed for experienced professionals who cannot pause their careers, but recognize that the governance landscape in which they operate has changed fundamentally. Developed by the STG, the GEM convenes participants from EU institutions, national administrations, international organizations, business and civil society — professionals from a wide range of nationalities and institutional backgrounds, reflecting the coalitions required to address complex problems. The program is structured to fit the reality of leadership today. Delivered part time over two years, it combines online learning with residential periods in Florence and executive study visits in key policy centres. This blended format allows participants to remain in full-time roles while advancing their qualifications and networks, and it ensures that learning is continuously tested against institutional realities rather than remaining an abstract exercise. Participants specialize in tracks such as geopolitics and security, tech and governance, economy and finance, or energy and climate. Alongside this subject depth, they build capabilities more commonly associated with top executive programs than traditional public policy degrees: change management, negotiations, strategic communication, foresight and leadership under uncertainty. These skills are essential for bridging policy design and implementation — a gap that is increasingly visible as governments struggle to deliver on ambitious agendas. Executive study visits are a core element of this practice-oriented approach. In a recent Brussels visit, GEM participants engaged with high-level speakers from the European Commission, the European External Action Service, the Council, the European Parliament, NATO, Business Europe, Fleishman Hillard and POLITICO itself. Over several days, they discussed foreign and security policy, industrial strategy, strategic foresight and the governance of emerging technologies. These encounters do more than illustrate theory; they give participants a chance to stress-test their assumptions, understand the constraints facing decision-makers and build relationships across institutional boundaries. via EUI Throughout the program, each participant develops a capstone project that addresses a strategic challenge connected to a policy organization, often their own employer. This ensures that executive education translates into institutional impact: projects range from new regulatory approaches and partnership models to internal reforms aimed at making organizations more agile and resilient. At the same time, they help weave a durable transnational network of practitioners who can work together beyond the programme. Across our activities at the STG, a common thread runs through our work: a commitment to defending and renewing the liberal order through concrete practice. Addressing the rupture or transition we are living through requires more than technical fixes. It demands leaders who can think systemically, act across borders and design governance solutions that are both unconventional and democratically legitimate. > Across our activities at the STG, a common thread runs through our work: a > commitment to defending and renewing the liberal order through concrete > practice. In a period defined by systemic risk and strategic competition, leadership development cannot remain sectoral or reactive. It must be interdisciplinary, practice-oriented and anchored in real policy environments. At the Florence School of Transnational Governance, we aim to create precisely this kind of learning community — one where students, fellows and executives work side by side to reimagine how institutions can respond to global challenges. For policymakers and professionals who recognize themselves in this moment of rupture, our programs — including the GEM — offer a space to step back, learn with peers and return to their institutions better equipped to lead change. The task is urgent, but it is also an opportunity: by investing in transnational governance education today, we can help lay the foundations for a more resilient and inclusive order tomorrow.

Voter turnout in Italy’s referendum on judicial reform reached nearly 15 percent by noon on Sunday, signaling a stronger-than-expected start to a vote seen as a key test for Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni. Recent polling indicated that higher turnout could improve the chances of the “Yes” camp backed by Meloni’s government, while lower participation would make a “No” victory more likely. Government data put participation at 14.92 percent at midday. The early figure marks a stronger start than in comparable recent referendums, with turnout at noon standing at just 12.24 percent in the 2020 vote on cutting the number of MPs and 10.1 percent in the 2006 constitutional referendum. Regional data shows northern and central regions leading participation, with Emilia-Romagna, Friuli Venezia Giulia and Lombardy recording the highest turnout so far. Southern regions including Calabria, Basilicata and Sicily are trailing in turnout. At the heart of the vote is a deeply contested reform of the Italian judiciary. The most controversial element is a proposal to overhaul how members of the Superior Council of the Judiciary (CSM) — the body that governs judges’ careers — are selected. Instead of being elected, most members would be chosen by lottery under the proposal. Supporters of the reform argue the change would break the influence of internal factions within the judiciary and reduce politicization. Critics say it risks undermining merit and representation, potentially allowing underqualified and political candidates to oversee key decisions on appointments and discipline. Two further turnout updates are scheduled for 7 p.m. and 11 p.m. Sunday, with final results expected after polls close on Monday at 3 p.m. The referendum does not require a minimum turnout, meaning the reform will be approved or rejected based solely on the majority of votes cast.

BERLIN — German Defense Minister Boris Pistorus will spend next week touring the Indo-Pacific with a passel of corporate chiefs in tow to make deals across the region. It’s part of an effort to mark a greater impact in an area where Berlin’s presence has been minor, but whose importance is growing as Germany looks to build up access to natural resources, technology and allies in a fracturing world. “If you look at the Indo-Pacific, Germany is essentially starting from scratch,” said Bastian Ernst, a defense lawmaker from Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s Christian Democrats. “We don’t have an established role yet, we’re only just beginning to figure out what that should be.” Pistorius leaves Friday on an eight-day tour to Japan, Singapore and Australia where he’ll be aiming to build relations with other like-minded middle powers — mirroring countries from France to Canada as they scramble to figure out new relationships in a world destabilized by Russia, China and a United States led by Donald Trump. “Germany recognizes this principle of interconnected theaters,” said Elli-Katharina Pohlkamp, visiting fellow of the Asia Programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations. Berlin, she said, “increasingly sees Europe’s focus on Russia and Asia’s focus on China and North Korea as security issues that are linked.” The military and defense emphasis of next week’s trip marks a departure from Berlin’s 2020 Indo-Pacific guidelines, which laid a much heavier focus on trade and diplomacy. Pistorius’ outreach will be especially important as Germany rapidly ramps up military spending at home. Berlin is on track to boost its defense budget to around €150 billion a year by the end of the decade and is preparing tens of billions in new procurement contracts. But not everything Germany needs can be sourced in Europe. Australia is one of the few alternatives to China in critical minerals essential to the defense industry. It’s a leading supplier of lithium and one of the only significant producers of separated rare earth materials outside China. Australia also looms over a key German defense contract. Berlin is considering whether to stick with a naval laser weapon being developed by homegrown firms Rheinmetall and MBDA, or team up with Australia’s EOS instead. That has become a more sensitive political question in Berlin. WELT, owned by POLITICO’s parent company Axel Springer, reported that lawmakers had stopped the planned contract for the German option, reflecting wider concern over whether Berlin should back a domestic system or move faster with a foreign one. That means what Pistorius sees in Australia could end up shaping a decision back in Germany. TALKING TO TOKYO Japan offers something different — not raw materials but military integration, logistics and technology.  Pohlkamp said the military side of the relationship with Japan is now “very much about interoperability and compatibility, built through joint exercises, mutual visits, closer staff work, expanded information exchange and mutual learning.” She described Japan as “a kind of yardstick for Germany,” a country that lives with “an enormous threat perception” not only militarily but also economically, because it is surrounded by pressure from China, North Korea and Russia.  The Japan-Germany Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement took effect in July 2024, giving the two militaries a framework for reciprocal supplies and services and making future port calls for naval vessels, exercises and recurring cooperation easier to sustain.  Pohlkamp said what matters most to Tokyo are not headline-grabbing deployments but “plannable, recurring contributions, which are more valuable than big, one-off shows of force.” But that ambition only goes so far if Germany’s presence remains sporadic. Bundeswehr recruits march on the market square to take their ceremonial oath in Altenburg on March 19, 2026. | Bodo Schackow/picture alliance via Getty Images Berlin has sent military assets to the region for training exercises in recent years — a frigate in 2021, combat aircraft in 2022, army participation in 2023, and a larger naval mission in 2024. But as pressure grows on Germany to beef up its military to hold off Russia, along with its growing presence in Lithuania and its effort to keep supplying Ukraine with weapons, the attention given to Asia is shrinking. The government told parliament last year it sent no frigate in 2025, plans none in 2026 and has not yet decided on 2027. Germany’s current military engagement in the Indo-Pacific consists of a single P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, sent to India in February as part of the Indo-Pacific Deployment 2026 exercises.  Germany, according to Ernst, is still “relatively blank” in the region. What it can contribute militarily remains narrow: “A bit of maritime patrol, a frigate, mine clearance.” Pohlkamp said Germany’s role in Asia is still being built “in small doses” and is largely symbolic. But what matters is whether Berlin can turn occasional visits and deployments into something steadier and more predictable. The defense ministry insists that is the point of Pistorius’s trip. Ministry spokesperson Mitko Müller said Wednesday that Europe and the Indo-Pacific are “inseparably linked,” citing the rules-based order, sea lanes, international law and the role of the two regions in global supply and value chains.  The new P-8A Poseidon reconnaissance aircraft stands in front of a technical hangar at Nordholz airbase on Nov. 20, 2025. | Christian Butt/picture alliance via Getty Images The trip is meant to focus on the regional security situation, expanding strategic dialogue, current and possible military cooperation, joint exercises including future Indo-Pacific deployments, and industrial cooperation. That explains why industry is traveling with Pistorius.  Müller said executives from Airbus, TKMS, MBDA, Quantum Systems, Diehl and Rohde & Schwarz are coming along, suggesting Berlin sees the trip as a chance to widen defense ties on the ground. But any larger German role in Asia would have to careful calibrated to avoid angering China — a key trading partner that is very wary of European powers expanding their regional presence. “That leaves Germany trying to do two things at once,” Pohlkamp said. “First, show up often enough to matter, but not so forcefully that it gets dragged into a confrontation it is neither politically nor militarily prepared to sustain.”

Biotechnology is central to modern medicine and Europe’s long-term competitiveness. From cancer and cardiovascular disease to rare conditions, it is driving transformative advances for patients across Europe and beyond . 1         Yet innovation in Europe is increasingly shaped by regulatory fragmentation, procedural complexity and uneven implementation across  m ember s tates. As scientific progress accelerates, policy frameworks must evolve in parallel, supporting the full lifecycle of innovation from research and clinical development to manufacturing and patient access.  The proposed EU Biotech Act seeks to address these challenges. By streamlining regulatory procedures, strengthening coordination  and supporting scale-up and manufacturing, it aims to reinforce Europe’s position in a highly competitive global biotechnology landscape .2       Its success, however, will depend less on ambition than on delivery. Consistent implementation, proportionate oversight and continued global openness will determine whether the  a ct translates into faster patient access, sustained investment and long-term resilience.  Q: Why is biotechnology increasingly seen as a strategic pillar for Europe’s competitiveness, resilience and long-term growth?  Gilles Marrache, SVP and regional general manager, Europe, Latin America, Middle East, Africa and Canada, Amgen:  Biotechnology sits at the intersection of health, industrial policy and economic competitiveness. The sector is one of Europe’s strongest strategic assets and a leading contributor to  research and development  growth . 3    At the same time, Europe’s position is under increasing pressure. Over the past two decades, the EU has lost approximately 25  percent of its global share of pharmaceutical investment to other regions, such as the  United States  and China.   The choices made today will shape Europe’s long-term strength in the sector, influencing not only competitiveness and growth, but also how quickly patients can benefit from new treatments.  > Europe stands at a pivotal moment in biotechnology. Our life sciences legacy > is strong, but maintaining global competitiveness requires evolution .” 4   > >  Gilles Marrache, SVP and regional general manager, Europe, Latin America, > Middle East, Africa and Canada, Amgen. Q: What does the EU Biotech Act aim to do  and why is it considered an important step forward for patients and Europe’s innovation ecosystem?  Marrache: The EU Biotech Act represents a timely opportunity to better support biotechnology products from the laboratory to the market. By streamlining medicines’ pathways and improving conditions for scale-up and investment, it can help strengthen Europe’s innovation ecosystem and accelerate patient access to breakthrough therapies. These measures will help anchor biotechnology as a strategic priority for Europe’s future  —  and one that can deliver earlier patient benefit  —  so long as we can make it work in practice.  Q: How does the EU Biotech Act address regulatory fragmentation, and where will effective delivery and coordination be most decisive? Marrache: Regulatory fragmentation has long challenged biotechnology development in Europe, particularly for multinational clinical trials and innovative products. The Biotech Act introduces faster, more coordinated trials, expanded regulatory sandboxes and new investment and industrial capacity instruments.   The proposed EU Health Biotechnology Support Network and a  u nion-level regulatory status repository would strengthen transparency and predictability. Together, these measures would support earlier regulatory dialogue, help de-risk development   and promote more consistent implementation across  m ember  s tates.   They also create an opportunity to address complexities surrounding combination products  —  spanning medicines, devices and diagnostics  —  where overlapping requirements and parallel assessments have added delays.5 This builds on related efforts, such as the COMBINE programme,6 which seeks to streamline the navigation of the In Vitro Diagnostic Regulation , 7 Clinical Trials Regulation8 and the Medical Device Regulation9 through a single, coordinated assessment process. Continued clarity and coordination will be essential to reduce duplication and accelerate development timelines .10 Q: What conditions will be most critical to support biotech scale-up, manufacturing  and long-term investment in Europe?  Marrache: Europe must strike the right balance between strategic autonomy and openness to global collaboration. Any new instruments under the Biotech Act mechanisms should remain open and supportive of all types of biotech investments, recogni z ing that biotech manufacturing operates through globally integrated and highly speciali z ed value chains.   Q: How can Europe ensure faster and more predictable pathways from scientific discovery to patient access, while maintaining high standards of safety and quality?   Marrache: Faster and more predictable patient access depends on strengthening end-to-end pathways across the lifecycle.  The Biotech Act will help ensure continuity of scientific and regulatory experti z e, from clinical development through post-authori z ation. It will also support stronger alignment with downstream processes, such as health technology assessments, which  are  critical to success.   Moreover, reducing unnecessary delays or duplication in approval processes can set clearer expectations, more predictable development timelines and earlier planning for scale-up.    Gilles Marrache, SVP and regional general manager, Europe, Latin America, Middle East, Africa and Canada, Amgen. Via Amgen. Finally, embedding a limited number of practical tools (procedural, digital or governance-based) and ensuring they are integrated within existing  European Medicines Agency and EU regulatory structures can help achieve faster patient access . 11 Q: What role can stronger regulatory coordination, data use and public - private collaboration play in strengthening Europe’s global position in biotechnology?  Marrache: To unlock biotechnology’s full potential, consistent implementation is essential. Fragmented approaches to secondary data use, divergent  m ember   state interpretations and uncertainty for data holders still limit access to high-quality datasets at scale. The Biotech Act introduces key building blocks to address this.   These include Biotechnology Data Quality Accelerators to improve interoperability, trusted testing environments for advanced innovation, and alignment with the EU AI Act ,12  European Health Data Space13 and wider EU data initiatives. It also foresees AI-specific provisions and clinical trial guidance to provide greater operational clarity.  Crucially, these structures must simplify rather than add further layers of complexity.   Addressing remaining barriers will reduce legal uncertainty for AI deployment, support innovation and strengthen Europe’s competitiveness.  > These reforms will create a moderni z ed biotech ecosystem, healthier > societies, sustainable healthcare systems and faster patient access to the > latest breakthroughs in Europe .” 14 > > Gilles Marrache, SVP and regional general manager, Europe, Latin America, > Middle East, Africa and Canada, Amgen.  Q: As technologies evolve and global competition intensifies, how can policymakers ensure the Biotech Act remains flexible and future-proof?  Marrache:  To remain future-proof, the Biotech Act must be designed to evolve alongside scientific progress, market dynamics and patient needs. Clear objectives, risk-based requirements, regular review mechanisms and timely updates to guidance will enhance regulatory agility without creating unnecessary rigidity or administrative burden.  Continuous stakeholder dialogue combined with horizon scanning will be essential to sustaining innovation, resilience and timely patient access over the long term. Preserving regulatory openness and international cooperation will be critical in avoiding fragmentation and maintaining Europe’s credibility as a global biotech hub.  Q: Looking ahead, what two or three priorities should policymakers focus on to ensure the EU Biotech Act delivers meaningful impact in practice?  Marrache: Looking ahead, policymakers should focus on three priorities for the Biotech Act:    First, implementation must deliver real regulatory efficiency, predictability and coordination in practice. Second, Europe must sustain an open and investment-friendly framework that reflects the global nature of biotechnology.  And third, policymakers should ensure a clear and coherent legal framework across the lifecycle of innovative medicines, providing certainty for the use of  artificial intelligence   —  as a key driver of innovation in health biotechnology.  In practical terms, the EU Biotech Act will be judged not by the number of new instruments it creates, but by whether it reduces complexity, increases predictability and shortens the path from scientific discovery to patient benefit. An open, innovation-friendly framework that is competitive at the global level will help sustain investment, strengthen resilient supply chains and deliver better outcomes for patients across Europe and beyond. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- References 1. Amgen Europe, The EU Biotech Act Unlocking Europe’s Potential, May 2025. Retrieved from https://www.amgen.eu/media/press-releases/2025/05/The_EU_Biotech_Act_Unlocking_Europes_Potential 2. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation to establish measures to strengthen the Union’s biotechnology and biomanufacturing sectors, December 2025. Retrieved from https://health.ec.europa.eu/publications/proposal-regulation-establish-measures-strengthen-unions-biotechnology-and-biomanufacturing-sectors_en 3. EFPIA, The pharmaceutical sector: A catalyst to foster Europe’s competitiveness, February 2026. Retrieved from https://www.efpia.eu/media/zkhfr3kp/10-actions-for-competitiveness-growth-and-security.pdf 4. The Parliament, Investing in healthy societies by boosting biotech competitiveness, November 2024. Retrieved from https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/partner/article/investing-in-healthy-societies-by-boosting-biotech-competitiveness#_ftn4 5. Amgen Europe, The EU Biotech Act Unlocking Europe’s Potential, May 2025. Retrieved from https://www.amgen.eu/docs/BiotechPP_final_digital_version_May_2025.pdf   6. European Commission, combine programme, June 2023. Retrieved from https://health.ec.europa.eu/medical-devices-topics-interest/combine-programme_en  7. European Commission. Medical Devices – In Vitro Diagnostics, March 2026. Retrieved from https://health.ec.europa.eu/medical-devices-vitro-diagnostics_en 8. European Commission, Clinical trials – Regulation EU No 536/2014, January 2022. Retrieved from https://health.ec.europa.eu/medicinal-products/clinical-trials/clinical-trials-regulation-eu-no-5362014_en 9. European Commission, Simpler and more effective rules for medical devices – Commission proposal for a targeted revision of the medical devices regulations, December 2025. Retrieved from https://health.ec.europa.eu/medical-devices-sector/new-regulations_en#mdr 10. Amgen Europe, The EU Biotech Act Unlocking Europe’s Potential, May 2025. Retrieved from https://www.amgen.eu/docs/BiotechPP_final_digital_version_May_2025.pdf   11. AmCham, EU position on the Commission Proposal for an EU Biotech Act 12. European Commission, AI Act | Shaping Europe’s digital future, June 2024. Retrieved from https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/regulatory-framework-ai 13. European Commission, European Health Data Space, March 2025. Retrieved from https://health.ec.europa.eu/ehealth-digital-health-and-care/european-health-data-space-regulation-ehds_en 14. The Parliament, Why Europe needs a Biotech Act, October 2025. Retrieved from https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/partner/article/why-europe-needs-a-biotech-act -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is Amgen Inc * The ultimate controlling entity is Amgen Inc * The political advertisement is linked to advocacy on the EU Biotech Act. More information here.

BRUSSELS — The European Union and Australia are expected to conclude talks on a long-awaited trade deal early next week, with Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on Wednesday announcing she would visit from March 23-25.  Von der Leyen will meet Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese in Canberra, according to a Commission statement. Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič is also expected to join the trip, although planning might yet change due to flight disruptions in the Middle East. Albanese confirmed the visit, saying in a statement that he would meet both von der Leyen and Šefčovič on March 24. Brussels and Canberra relaunched trade negotiations after Donald Trump’s return to the White House last year. They had collapsed amid acrimony at the end of 2023 amid disagreements over quotas on beef and lamb. The breakthrough comes as the EU looks to get closer to the Pacific-centered CPTPP trade bloc through its deepening bonds with Australia. In a letter to EU leaders shared Monday, von der Leyen said the EU and Australia were in “the final stretch towards concluding” their trade agreement.  “In addition to removing trade barriers, it will also facilitate access to critical raw materials — such as lithium, cobalt, rare earth elements, and hydrogen — and strengthen Europe’s presence in one of the world’s most dynamic economic regions,” she wrote, as part of a list on the Commission’s efforts to boost competitiveness. Negotiators had grappled in the home stretch to close the gap on access for Australian beef and lamb to the European market; EU trade protections on specialty foods; critical minerals; and an Australian tax on luxury cars. Canberra and Brussels are also looking to seal a security and defense partnership, which is finalized.  The EU top diplomat Kaja Kallas, who would be signing the defense deal, known as Security and Defense Partnership, is however not expected to be part of the trip. The pace would come on the heels of similar partnerships signed with the U.K., Canada and most recently India. Speaking last week at at the annual gathering of diplomats with the External Action Service, the EU’s diplomatic body, Kallas said that the deal was coming as she announced that “later this week, I will sign the tenth [SDP] with Australia and subsequent ones with Iceland and Ghana in the coming days.”     James Panichi, Zoya Sheftalovich, Sebastian Starcevic and Nette Nöstlinger contributed reporting.

Anton, a 44-year-old Russian soldier who heads a workshop responsible for repairing and supplying drones, was at his kitchen table when he learned last month that Elon Musk’s SpaceX had cut off access to Starlink terminals used by Russian forces. He scrambled for alternatives, but none offered unlimited internet, data plans were restrictive, and coverage did not extend to the areas of Ukraine where his unit operated. It’s not only American tech executives who are narrowing communications options for Russians. Days later, Russian authorities began slowing down access nationwide to the messaging app Telegram, the service that frontline troops use to coordinate directly with one another and bypass slower chains of command. “All military work goes through Telegram — all communication,” Anton, whose name has been changed because he fears government reprisal, told POLITICO in voice messages sent via the app. “That would be like shooting the entire Russian army in the head.” Telegram would be joining a home screen’s worth of apps that have become useless to Russians. Kremlin policymakers have already blocked or limited access to WhatsApp, along with parent company Meta’s Facebook and Instagram, Microsoft’s LinkedIn, Google’s YouTube, Apple’s FaceTime, Snapchat and X, which like SpaceX is owned by Musk. Encrypted messaging apps Signal and Discord, as well as Japanese-owned Viber, have been inaccessible since 2024. Last month, President Vladimir Putin signed a law requiring telecom operators to block cellular and fixed internet access at the request of the Federal Security Service. Shortly after it took effect on March 3, Moscow residents reported widespread problems with mobile internet, calls and text messages across all major operators for several days, with outages affecting mobile service and Wi-Fi even inside the State Duma. Those decisions have left Russians increasingly cut off from both the outside world and one another, complicating battlefield coordination and disrupting online communities that organize volunteer aid, fundraising and discussion of the war effort. Deepening digital isolation could turn Russia into something akin to “a large, nuclear-armed North Korea and a junior partner to China,” according to Alexander Gabuev, the Berlin-based director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. In April, the Kremlin is expected to escalate its campaign against Telegram — already one of Russia’s most popular messaging platforms, but now in the absence of other social-media options, a central hub for news, business and entertainment. It may block the platform altogether. That is likely to fuel an escalating struggle between state censorship and the tools people use to evade it, with Russia’s place in the world hanging in the balance. “It’s turned into a war,” said Mikhail Klimarev, executive director of the internet Protection Society, a digital rights group that monitors Russia’s censorship infrastructure. “A guerrilla war. They hunt down the VPNs they can see, they block them — and the ‘partisans’ run, build new bunkers, and come back.” THE APP THAT RUNS THE WAR On Feb. 4, SpaceX tightened the authentication system that Starlink terminals use to connect to its satellite network, introducing stricter verification for registered devices. The change effectively blocked many terminals operated by Russian units relying on unauthorized connections, cutting Starlink traffic inside Ukraine by roughly 75 percent, according to internet traffic analysis by Doug Madory, an analyst at the U.S. network monitoring firm Kentik. The move threw Russian operations into disarray, allowing Ukraine to make battlefield gains. Russia has turned to a workaround widely used before satellite internet was an option: laying fiber-optic lines, from rear areas toward frontline battlefield positions. Until then, Starlink terminals had allowed drone operators to stream live video through platforms such as Discord, which is officially blocked in Russia but still sometimes used by the Russian military via VPNs, to commanders at multiple levels. A battalion commander could watch an assault unfold in real time and issue corrections — “enemy ahead” or “turn left” — via radio or Telegram. What once required layers of approval could now happen in minutes. Satellite-connected messaging apps became the fastest way to transmit coordinates, imagery and targeting data. But on Feb. 10, Roskomnadzor, the Russian communications regulator, began slowing down Telegram for users across Russia, citing alleged violations of Russian law. Russian news outlet RBC reported, citing two sources, that authorities plan to shut down Telegram in early April — though not on the front line. In mid-February, Digital Development Minister Maksut Shadayev said the government did not yet intend to restrict Telegram at the front but hoped servicemen would gradually transition to other platforms. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said this week the company could avoid a full ban by complying with Russian legislation and maintaining what he described as “flexible contact” with authorities. Roskomnadzor has accused Telegram of failing to protect personal data, combat fraud and prevent its use by terrorists and criminals. Similar accusations have been directed at other foreign tech platforms. In 2022, a Russian court designated Meta an “extremist organization” after the company said it would temporarily allow posts calling for violence against Russian soldiers in the context of the Ukraine war — a decision authorities used to justify blocking Facebook and Instagram in Russia and increasing pressure on the company’s other services, including WhatsApp. Telegram founder Pavel Durov, a Russian-born entrepreneur now based in the United Arab Emirates, says the throttiling is being used as a pretext to push Russians toward a government-controlled messaging app designed for surveillance and political censorship. That app is MAX, which was launched in March 2025 and has been compared to China’s WeChat in its ambition to anchor a domestic digital ecosystem. Authorities are increasingly steering Russians toward MAX through employers, neighborhood chats and the government services portal Gosuslugi — where citizens retrieve documents, pay fines and book appointments — as well as through banks and retailers. The app’s developer, VK, reports rapid user growth, though those figures are difficult to independently verify. “They didn’t just leave people to fend for themselves — you could say they led them by the hand through that adaptation by offering alternatives,” said Levada Center pollster Denis Volkov, who has studied Russian attitudes toward technology use. The strategy, he said, has been to provide a Russian or state-backed alternative for the majority, while stopping short of fully criminalizing workarounds for more technologically savvy users who do not want to switch. Elena, a 38-year-old Yekaterinburg resident whose surname has been withheld because she fears government reprisal, said her daughter’s primary school moved official communication from WhatsApp to MAX without consulting parents. She keeps MAX installed on a separate tablet that remains mostly in a drawer — a version of what some Russians call a “MAXophone,” gadgets solely for that app, without any other data being left on those phones for the (very real) fear the government could access it. “It works badly. Messages are delayed. Notifications don’t come,” she said. “I don’t trust it … And this whole situation just makes people angry.” THE VPN ARMS RACE Unlike China’s centralized “Great Firewall,” which filters traffic at the country’s digital borders, Russia’s system operates internally. Internet providers are required to route traffic through state-installed deep packet inspection equipment capable of controlling and analyzing data flows in real time. “It’s not one wall,” Klimarev said. “It’s thousands of fences. You climb one, then there’s another.” The architecture allows authorities to slow services without formally banning them — a tactic used against YouTube before its web address was removed from government-run domain-name servers last month. Russian law explicitly provides government authority for blocking websites on grounds such as extremism, terrorism, illegal content or violations of data regulations, but it does not clearly define throttling — slowing traffic rather than blocking it outright — as a formal enforcement mechanism. “The slowdown isn’t described anywhere in legislation,” Klimarev said. “It’s pressure without procedure.” In September, Russia banned advertising for virtual private network services that citizens use to bypass government-imposed restrictions on certain apps or sites. By Klimarev’s estimate, roughly half of Russian internet users now know what a VPN is, and millions pay for one. Polling last year by the Levada Center, Russia’s only major independent pollster, suggests regular use is lower, finding about one-quarter of Russians said they have used VPN services. Russian courts can treat the use of anonymization tools as an aggravating factor in certain crimes — steps that signal growing pressure on circumvention technologies without formally outlawing them. In February, the Federal Antimonopoly Service opened what appears to be the first case against a media outlet for promoting a VPN after the regional publication Serditaya Chuvashiya advertised such a service on its Telegram channel. Surveys in recent years have shown that many Russians, particularly older citizens, support tighter internet regulation, often citing fraud, extremism and online safety. That sentiment gives authorities political space to tighten controls even when the restrictions are unpopular among more technologically savvy users. Even so, the slowdown of Telegram drew criticism from unlikely quarters, including Sergei Mironov, a longtime Kremlin ally and leader of the Just Russia party. In a statement posted on his Telegram channel on Feb. 11, he blasted the regulators behind the move as “idiots,” accusing them of undermining soldiers at the front. He said troops rely on the app to communicate with relatives and organize fundraising for the war effort, warning that restricting it could cost lives. While praising the state-backed messaging app MAX, he argued that Russians should be free to choose which platforms they use. Pro-war Telegram channels frame the government’s blocking techniques as sabotage of the war effort. Ivan Philippov, who tracks Russia’s influential military bloggers, said the reaction inside that ecosystem to news about Telegram has been visceral “rage.” Unlike Starlink, whose cutoff could be blamed on a foreign company, restrictions on Telegram are viewed as self-inflicted. Bloggers accuse regulators of undermining the war effort. Telegram is used not only for battlefield coordination but also for volunteer fundraising networks that provide basic logistics the state does not reliably cover — from transport vehicles and fuel to body armor, trench materials and even evacuation equipment. Telegram serves as the primary hub for donations and reporting back to supporters. “If you break Telegram inside Russia, you break fundraising,” Philippov said. “And without fundraising, a lot of units simply don’t function.” Few in that community trust MAX, citing technical flaws and privacy concerns. Because MAX operates under Russian data-retention laws and is integrated with state services, many assume their communications would be accessible to authorities. Philippov said the app’s prominent defenders are largely figures tied to state media or the presidential administration. “Among independent military bloggers, I haven’t seen a single person who supports it,” he said. Small groups of activists attempted to organize rallies in at least 11 Russian cities, including Moscow, Irkutsk and Novosibirsk, in defense of Telegram. Authorities rejected or obstructed most of the proposed demonstrations — in some cases citing pandemic-era restrictions, weather conditions or vague security concerns — and in several cases revoked previously issued permits. In Novosibirsk, police detained around 15 people ahead of a planned rally. Although a small number of protests were formally approved, no large-scale demonstrations ultimately took place. THE POWER TO PULL THE PLUG The new law signed last month allows Russia’s Federal Security Service to order telecom operators to block cellular and fixed internet access. Peskov, the Kremlin spokesman, said subsequent shutdowns of service in Moscow were linked to security measures aimed at protecting critical infrastructure and countering drone threats, adding that such limitations would remain in place “for as long as necessary.” In practice, the disruptions rarely amount to a total communications blackout. Most target mobile internet rather than all services, while voice calls and SMS often continue to function. Some domestic websites and apps — including government portals or banking services — may remain accessible through “whitelists,” meaning authorities allow certain services to keep operating even while broader internet access is restricted. The restrictions are typically localized and temporary, affecting specific regions or parts of cities rather than the entire country. Internet disruptions have increasingly become a tool of control beyond individual platforms. Research by the independent outlet Meduza and the monitoring project Na Svyazi has documented dozens of regional internet shutdowns and mobile network restrictions across Russia, with disruptions occurring regularly since May 2025. The communications shutdown, and uncertainty around where it will go next, is affecting life for citizens of all kinds, from the elderly struggling to contact family members abroad to tech-savvy users who juggle SIM cards and secondary phones to stay connected. Demand has risen for dated communication devices — including walkie-talkies, pagers and landline phones — along with paper maps as mobile networks become less reliable, according to retailers interviewed by RBC. “It feels like we’re isolating ourselves,” said Dmitry, 35, who splits his time between Moscow and Dubai and whose surname has been withheld to protect his identity under fear of governmental reprisal. “Like building a sovereign grave.” Those who track Russian public opinion say the pattern is consistent: irritation followed by adaptation. When Instagram and YouTube were blocked or slowed in recent years, their audiences shrank rapidly as users migrated to alternative services rather than mobilizing against the restrictions. For now, Russia’s digital tightening resembles managed escalation rather than total isolation. Officials deny plans for a full shutdown, and even critics say a complete severing would cripple banking, logistics and foreign trade. “It’s possible,” Klimarev said. “But if they do that, the internet won’t be the main problem anymore.”

A senior figure in Iran’s Kurdish opposition has tied any potential ground incursion into Iran to a major U.S. military decision: the establishment of a no-fly zone over Kurdish areas in western Iran. This was necessary “so that the Islamic Republic cannot attack from the air and use its military superiority,” Reza Kaabi said in an interview in Erbil with WELT, which is — as is POLITICO — part of the Axel Springer Global Reporters Network. Kaabi is the secretary-general of the Komala of the Toilers of Kurdistan, an armed Iranian Kurdish party based in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. The party maintains its own Peshmerga units and is among the Kurdish groups that could provide ground troops in the event of an escalation. For further developments, “on the one hand the policy of President Trump, and on the other the Kurds themselves” would be decisive, he said. There have been no direct talks with the Trump administration, but the demand for a no-fly zone has been “conveyed,” he added. “The demand is clear,” he said. “We expect it to be implemented.” Whether and when Iranian Kurdish forces from Iraq “return to their own territory depends on the situation. I believe we are approaching such conditions,” Kaabi said. Such a step would depend on several factors, according to him. In addition to the readiness of the Peshmerga, political cohesion among the Kurdish parties would have to be strengthened, the population prepared, and above all international support secured. Kaabi also referred to the period after the 1991 Gulf War. At that time, the United States, Britain and France established a no-fly zone in northern Iraq to protect Kurdish areas from air attacks by Saddam Hussein. As a result, the militarily secured space enabled the Kurdish autonomous region to develop. Kaabi is one of the central leaders of a recently formed alliance of Iranian Kurdish opposition parties that has repeatedly been mentioned in connection with a possible ground offensive in Iran. “We (…) are fighting for the overthrow of the Islamic Republic,” Kaabi said about the alliance’s objectives. “We are calling for a democratic, secular and federal Iran.” The Komala party in Iraq is part of this alliance and maintains its own military structures. “We have three camps,” Kaabi said. “In these three camps our Peshmerga are stationed, trained and ready. At present around one thousand fighters are ready for deployment.” The other groups in the alliance also maintain armed forces. They are led in a decentralized manner; according to Kaabi, a central command structure is not currently planned. The U.S. position regarding a possible Kurdish ground offensive in Iran has so far been contradictory. On Thursday, Trump told the Reuters news agency it would be “wonderful” if Iranian Kurdish militias in Iraq crossed the border to Iran. On Saturday, however, he said: “I don’t want the Kurds to go into Iran.” Turkey had previously warned that “the instrumentalization of ethnic or religious groups” could trigger a civil war in Iran, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said on Saturday in Istanbul. He added he had also discussed the issue with his U.S. counterpart Marco Rubio. The Kurdish minority in Iraq has come under Iranian fire in recent days. In Erbil, the capital of the autonomous Kurdistan Region of Iraq, the airport was attacked by drones. There were also numerous attacks in Sulaymaniyah near the Iranian border.

LONDON — Britain’s center-left government is taking direct inspiration from Denmark’s hardline treatment of migrants — and leaving some of its own MPs feeling queasy. Home Secretary Shabana Mahmood will face down assembled critics from refugee charities and beyond in a speech in London Thursday morning, making what she calls the “progressive,” Labour case for overhauling Britain’s asylum system. Mahmood is fresh from a fact-finding mission to Copenhagen — and wants to import many of the policies that helped Danish premier Mette Frederiksen see off a threat from the right. Frederiksen, head of Labour’s sister party, the Social Democrats, drove asylum claims to a forty-year low. At the 2022 election, she pushed back the radical right and bagged her party’s best result in decades. But at the same time, she has seen losses of socially liberal voters in cities — and faces a fresh test in a snap election later this month. Mahmood will on Thursday try to take on complaints from her own more liberal-minded colleagues, as the struggling Labour Party tries to halt the rise of the right-wing, poll-topping Nigel Farage in the U.K. She will lay out two nightmare visions, in her eyes, of where Britain could go if left-wing Labour MPs don’t hold their noses and back her changes on an issue that animates the British public. On one side is “Farage’s nightmare pulling up the drawbridge,” and on the other is the new left-wing kids on the block: the Greens. She describes leader Zack Polanski as conjuring a “fairy-tale of open borders.” On top of dramatic changes to only grant refugees temporary stay in Britain, Mahmood will announce harsher conditions for asylum seekers who break the law or can support themselves financially. New legislation will make welfare payments and accommodation rights conditional “only to those who play by our rules,” as Mahmood puts it. A senior Home Office official, granted anonymity to discuss sensitive policy details, estimates the changes could extend to thousands of individuals. They would not rule out asylum seekers deemed to have broken the law being forced into destitution and rough sleeping in the process. Mahmood will address critics who will balk at this by arguing that if citizens don’t trust the state to fix what is one of their top priorities then “there is no space for Labour values” to be realized. “Restoring order and control at our border is not a betrayal of Labour values, it is an embodiment of them, and it is the necessary condition for a Labour government to achieve anything it hopes to,” Mahmood is expected to tell the center-left IPPR think tank, according to extracts released in advance. Mahmood will on Thursday try to take on complaints from her own more liberal-minded colleagues, as the struggling Labour Party tries to halt the rise of the right-wing, poll-topping Nigel Farage in the U.K. | Rasid Necati Aslim/Anadolu via Getty Images She will add: “A loss of control breeds fear, and when fearful people turn inwards their vision of this country narrows. Their patriotism turns into something smaller, something darker, an ethno-nationalism emerges. The idea of a greater Britain gives way to the lure of a littler England. And other voices – voices to the far right – take hold.” ‘SOFT-LEFT’ JITTERS But Mahmood’s pitch may fall on unreceptive ears in her own party. The bulk of Labour MPs on the party’s so-called “soft-left” have only been made more jittery by the catastrophic defeat inflicted on them from the left in the Gorton and Denton by-election last week. In that contest, the triumphant Greens appealed to younger progressives as well as Muslim voters to overturn nearly a century of Labour representation in the south Manchester seat. Even worse, Farage’s Reform came second, pushing Keir Starmer’s ruling party into a distant third. Some Labour MPs responded to that loss by calling for Mahmood to water down her existing policies on migration — though whether this was really a salient issue in the campaign was disputed by a senior Labour activist involved. “The brand just isn’t in a good place at the minute. I think that was the key thing really,” was their diagnosis. “Gaza came up far more with that kind of crowd than indefinite leave to remain.” But the same activist did offer a word of caution: “The reforms need to be done in a way that bring people with them — which a lot of progressive voters don’t necessarily feel at the minute.” Even worse, Nigel Farage’s Reform came second, pushing Keir Starmer’s ruling party into a distant third. | Jonathan Brady/PA Images via Getty Images Unhappy Labour MPs are increasingly making their views on Mahmood’s Danish turn known. Former immigration barrister and leading critic of her approach Tony Vaughan wrote to Starmer this week expressing in detail his concerns that Mahmood’s settlement restrictions will damage the economy, while posing serious dangers to women, children and community cohesion.  Vaughan has also been approaching colleagues for backing, and has received support from some senior colleagues, according to two MPs. The Unison public services union — a key funder of Labour — has been organizing another letter among parliamentarians that has grown from an initial 40 signatuories. Sarah Owen, the Labour MP who chairs the Women and Equalities Committee, told POLITICO: “The letters are a sign of a failure of engagement from the department and the secretary of state and relevant ministers.” Another left-wing MP fears Mahmood’s pitch is simply “another attempt to chase Reform down a cul-de-sac.” They flagged vast differences between Denmark and Britain, arguing it is far larger and more diverse, with deep appeals based on family ties and language. LESSONS TO LEARN Those to the right of Labour strongly disagree — and back Mahmood’s Copenhagen inspiration. “Illegal immigration continues to be a major concern in constituencies like mine,” said Jo White, who leads the Red Wall caucus representing Labour’s former heartlands in England’s North and Midlands. “I am listening to my voters and where lessons can be learnt from countries like Denmark, we should take them.” Mahmood describes leader Zack Polanski as conjuring a “fairy-tale of open borders.” | Paul Ellis/AFP via Getty Images White added: “Shabana has recently visited Denmark, and seen their immigration system operating at first hand and she is right to look at what will work on British soil.” Indeed, Mahmood has put distance between herself and some aspects of the Frederiksen plan. The Home Office ruled out copying a jewelry law, which would see valuable items seized to cover the cost of asylum support, and will not follow Copenhagen’s “ghetto” demolition law targeting “parallel societies.” The senior British official quoted above said internal polling suggests “we’re exactly where the vast majority of the public are.” Luke Tryl, of the More in Common think tank, agreed on the possible success among voters for following the “Danish model.” “I very much think it can be a winner,” he said. “When we polled on asylum reforms even Green voters tended to back most of them.” Polling of Mahmood’s last round of hardline reforms in November, by the More in Common think tank, found that they were popular among Labour voters — and that most even went down well with Greens. ‘SAVE PUBLIC CONSENT’ There is one possibly uniting approach that Mahmood has touted, but is yet to outline: an expansion of Britain’s extremely limited legal routes for claiming asylum. On top of dramatic changes to only grant refugees temporary stay in Britain, Mahmood will announce harsher conditions for asylum seekers who break the law or can support themselves financially. | Ben Stansall/AFP via Getty Images “A huge part of this is to save public consent for the asylum system and to restore order and control so we can get the space to increase the number of safe and legal routes for those genuine refugees fleeing war and persecution,” said the senior official. There are plans underway to open new community sponsorship routes, an approach that proved popular in response to the invasion of Ukraine. Tryl said: “What we’ve found is the sponsorship models which do appear to be at the heart of their safe routes things are immensely popular — they particularly reduce opposition among conservative groups.”  Progressive observers will watch Mahmood closely to see if she twins her Danish-style hardline approach with a softer offering.

Belgian authorities have arrested four people over suspected links to war crimes and crimes against humanity tied to Cameroon’s ongoing separatist conflict, federal prosecutors said Tuesday. The Federal Prosecutor’s Office said in a press statement that since last summer it has been probing “possible crimes against humanity and war crimes allegedly committed in Cameroon since 2020” following a tip from Norwegian judicial authorities. The investigation targets individuals in Belgium who are suspected of belonging to the leadership of the Ambazonia Defence Forces (ADF), an armed separatist movement. Four suspects were picked up during coordinated searches in the town of Londerzeel, 20 kilometers north of Brussels, and Antwerp on Sunday, three of whom were placed in pre-trial detention. Prosecutors said “money is reportedly being raised for the armed struggle and for the purchase of arms and ammunition,” adding that “instructions for attacks and liquidations are said to be given from Belgium.” Cameroon’s conflict pits French-speaking forces loyal to the government in the capital Yaoundé against English-speaking separatists seeking to create the breakaway state of Ambazonia in northwest Cameroon. The violence, which erupted in 2017 after protests over the perceived marginalization of the country’s anglophone regions, has killed at least 6,000 people and displaced hundreds of thousands. Prosecutors said they continue to work with authorities in Norway and the United States, where parallel probes into suspected ADF members are underway. U.S. prosecutors indicted two alleged ADF leaders in Minnesota last September, accusing them of financing and directing attacks in Cameroon. In 2024, Norwegian authorities arrested prominent Ambazonian separatist figure Ayaba Cho Lucas in Norway on suspicion of inciting crimes against humanity.

Today, cancer remains one of Europe’s leading causes of death and disability, accounting for 23 percent of all deaths in 2022 and 17 percent of disability-adjusted life years in 2021. Four Europeans are diagnosed with cancer every minute, a number that is expected to rise over the next several decades due to population aging. As the EU Beating Cancer Plan reaches the end of its initial phase, Europe now stands at a critical moment. The question is not whether progress has been made, but whether Europe will build on that momentum or allow it to stall, with consequences not only for health outcomes, but also for economic growth and scientific leadership. Gilles Marrache At this juncture, cancer care must be understood not as a cost to be contained, but also as a strategic investment that delivers measurable returns in survival, productivity and Europe’s global competitiveness. > Continued investment in oncology is therefore not only a moral imperative but > also a proven economic and social multiplier. Cancer innovation delivers proven returns Investment in cancer innovation has already delivered extraordinary value for European patients and societies. Since 1989, advances in oncology have helped prevent an estimated 5.4 million deaths. More recently, since 2012, innovative cancer medicines have generated approximately 1.1 million quality-adjusted life years, all while accounting for just 6.6 percent of total health budgets. These gains are not abstract. They represent longer lives, improved quality of life, and the ability for people to remain active contributors to their families, workplaces and communities. Continued investment in oncology is therefore not only a moral imperative but also a proven economic and social multiplier. Delayed access is holding Europe back Despite these returns, Europe continues to struggle with timely access to innovative cancer medicines and diagnostics. According to EFPIA’s 2025 W.A.I.T. data, only 46 percent of centrally approved innovative medicines are available to patients on average across Europe, with a mean delay of 578 days between EU approval and patient access. In oncology, these waits have grown since 2023, which undermines patient outcomes and weakens Europe’s competitiveness in health innovation. Europe’s innovation edge is at risk Without decisive action, Europe risks falling further behind other regions. High-income European countries currently invest roughly half as much per capita in innovative medicines as the United States. This gap is driven largely by differences in how new therapies are valued, assessed and reimbursed. The impact of this underinvestment is already visible. Over the past two decades, Europe has lost around a quarter of its global share of biopharmaceutical research and development. Along with that loss comes fewer high-quality jobs, reduced private investment and weakened strategic autonomy in a sector that is increasingly central to economic and health security. > evidence suggests that every euro invested in health can generate up to four > euros in economic value, unlocking an estimated €10 trillion in GDP and saving > up to 60 million lives. Smart health investment drives growth and resilience By increasing targeted investment in innovative medicines, including in oncology, Europe can improve health outcomes for citizens, support workforce participation  and stimulate sustainable economic growth. Globally, evidence suggests that every euro invested in health can generate up to four euros in economic value, unlocking an estimated €10 trillion in GDP and saving up to 60 million lives. What European policymakers should do next To support oncology patients and safeguard innovation, regional and national governments must act across policy, funding and access: — Value what matters: modernize health technology assessment frameworks to better capture the full societal and economic benefits of innovation, while reducing duplicative and inefficient evidence requirements. This is particularly important as oncology products begin going through the new EU Joint Clinical Assessment. — Accelerate access: introduce time-bound, predictable pricing and reimbursement pathways; address regional and formulary-level delays; and invest in diagnostic and biomarker testing capacity to ensure patients receive the right treatment at the right time. — Back prevention and screening: fully finance the EU Beating Cancer Plan’s screening ambitions and scale proven pilot programmes that detect cancer earlier and improve outcomes. — Invest in innovation: increase public spending on innovative medicines in line with their true societal impact, while eliminating clawbacks and other cost-containment measures that disproportionately undermine the value of these therapies. A defining choice for Europe Europe stands at a crossroads. It can choose to invest now in cancer innovation, which would help to close survival gaps, strengthen competitiveness and deliver long-term value for citizens. Or it can allow delays, underinvestment and fragmented policies to widen those gaps further. Aligning policy, funding and access around innovation would not only improve cancer outcomes but make health one of Europe’s most powerful and sustainable investments for the future.     -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) * The political advertisement is linked to advocacy on securing a technology-neutral EU road-transport decarbonisation framework through recognition of renewable fuels, strengthened grid and infrastructure enablers, and avoiding mandates that limit operators’ choice and competitiveness. * The ultimate controlling entity is European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) More information here.