A fair, fast and competitive transition begins with what already works and then rapidly scales it up.  Across the EU commercial road transport sector, the diversity of operations is met with a diversity of solutions. Urban taxis are switching to electric en masse. Many regional coaches run on advanced biofuels, with electrification emerging in smaller applications such as school services, as European e-coach technologies are still maturing and only now beginning to enter the market. Trucks electrify rapidly where operationally and financially possible, while others, including long-haul and other hard-to-electrify segments, operate at scale on HVO (hydrotreated vegetable oil) or biomethane, cutting emissions immediately and reliably. These are real choices made every day by operators facing different missions, distances, terrains and energy realities, showing that decarbonization is not a single pathway but a spectrum of viable ones.  Building on this diversity, many operators are already modernizing their fleets and cutting emissions through electrification. When they can control charging, routing and energy supply, electric vehicles often deliver a positive total cost of ownership (TCO), strong reliability and operational benefits. These early adopters prove that electrification works where the enabling conditions are in place, and that its potential can expand dramatically with the right support. > Decarbonization is not a single pathway but a spectrum of viable ones chosen > daily by operators facing real-world conditions. But scaling electrification faces structural bottlenecks. Grid capacity is constrained across the EU, and upgrades routinely take years. As most heavy-duty vehicle charging will occur at depots, operators cannot simply move around to look for grid opportunities. They are bound to the location of their facilities.  The recently published grid package tries, albeit timidly, to address some of these challenges, but it neither resolves the core capacity deficiencies nor fixes the fundamental conditions that determine a positive TCO: the predictability of electricity prices, the stability of delivered power, and the resulting charging time. A truck expected to recharge in one hour at a high-power station may wait far longer if available grid power drops. Without reliable timelines, predictable costs and sufficient depot capacity, most transport operators cannot make long-term investment decisions. And the grid is only part of the enabling conditions needed: depot charging infrastructure itself requires significant additional investment, on top of vehicles that already cost several hundreds of thousands of euros more than their diesel equivalents.  This is why the EU needs two things at once: strong enablers for electrification and hydrogen; and predictability on what the EU actually recognizes as clean. Operators using renewable fuels, from biomethane to advanced biofuels and HVO, delivering up to 90 percent CO2 reduction, are cutting emissions today. Yet current CO2 frameworks, for both light-duty vehicles and heavy-duty trucks, fail to recognize fleets running on these fuels as part of the EU’s decarbonization solution for road transport, even when they deliver immediate, measurable climate benefits. This lack of clarity limits investment and slows additional emission reductions that could happen today. > Policies that punish before enabling will not accelerate the transition; a > successful shift must empower operators, not constrain them. The revision of both CO2 standards, for cars and vans, and for heavy-duty vehicles, will therefore be pivotal. They must support electrification and hydrogen where they fit the mission, while also recognizing the contribution of renewable and low-carbon fuels across the fleet. Regulations that exclude proven clean options will not accelerate the transition. They will restrict it.  With this in mind, the question is: why would the EU consider imposing purchasing mandates on operators or excessively high emission-reduction targets on member states that would, in practice, force quotas on buyers? Such measures would punish before enabling, removing choice from those who know their operations best. A successful transition must empower operators, not constrain them.  The EU’s transport sector is committed and already delivering. With the right enablers, a technology-neutral framework, and clarity on what counts as clean, the EU can turn today’s early successes into a scalable, fair and competitive decarbonization pathway.  We now look with great interest to the upcoming Automotive Package, hoping to see pragmatic solutions to these pressing questions, solutions that EU transport operators, as the buyers and daily users of all these technologies, are keenly expecting. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is IRU – International Road Transport Union  * The ultimate controlling entity is IRU – International Road Transport Union  More information here.

BRUSSELS — European banks and other finance firms should decrease their reliance on American tech companies for digital services, a top national supervisor has said. In an interview with POLITICO, Steven Maijoor, the Dutch central bank’s chair of supervision, said the “small number of suppliers” providing digital services to many European finance companies can pose a “concentration risk.” “If one of those suppliers is not able to supply, you can have major operational problems,” Maijoor said. The intervention comes as Europe’s politicians and industries grapple with the continent’s near-total dependence on U.S. technology for digital services ranging from cloud computing to software. The dominance of American companies has come into sharp focus following a decline in transatlantic relations under U.S. President Donald Trump. While the market for European tech services isn’t nearly as developed as in the U.S. — making it difficult for banks to switch — the continent “should start to try to develop this European environment” for financial stability and the sake of its economic success, Maijoor said. European banks being locked in to contracts with U.S. providers “will ultimately also affect their competitiveness,” Maijoor said. Dutch supervisors recently authored a report on the systemic risks posed by tech dependence in finance. Dutch lender Amsterdam Trade Bank collapsed in 2023 after its parent company was placed on the U.S. sanctions list and its American IT provider withdrew online data storage services, in one of the sharpest examples of the impact on companies that see their tech withdrawn. Similarly a 2024 outage of American cybersecurity company CrowdStrike highlighted the European finance sector’s vulnerabilities to operational risks from tech providers, the EU’s banking watchdog said in a post-mortem on the outage. In his intervention, Maijoor pointed to an EU law governing the operational reliability of banks — the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) — as one factor that may be worsening the problem. Those rules govern finance firms’ outsourcing of IT functions such as cloud provision, and designate a list of “critical” tech service providers subject to extra oversight, including Amazon Web Services, Google Cloud, Microsoft and Oracle. DORA, and other EU financial regulation, may be “inadvertently nudging financial institutions towards the largest digital service suppliers,” which wouldn’t be European, Maijoor said. “If you simply look at quality, reliability, security … there’s a very big chance that you will end up with the largest digital service suppliers from outside Europe,” he said. The bloc could reassess the regulatory approach to beat the risks, Maijoor said. “DORA currently is an oversight approach, which is not as strong in terms of requirements and enforcement options as regular supervision,” he said. The Dutch supervisors are pushing for changes, writing that they are examining whether financial regulation and supervision in the EU creates barriers to choosing European IT providers, and that identified issues “may prompt policy initiatives in the European context.” They are asking EU governments and supervisors “to evaluate whether DORA sufficiently enhances resilience to geopolitical risks and, if not, to consider issuing further guidance,” adding they “see opportunities to strengthen DORA as needed,” including through more enforcement and more explicit requirements around managing geopolitical risks. Europe could also set up a cloud watchdog across industries to mitigate the risks of dependence on U.S. tech service providers, which are “also very important for other parts of the economy like energy and telecoms,” Maijoor said. “Wouldn’t there be a case for supervision more generally of these hyperscalers, cloud service providers, as they are so important for major parts of the economy?” The European Commission declined to respond.

The discussion surrounding the digital euro is strategically important to Europe. On Dec. 12, the EU finance ministers are aiming to agree on a general approach regarding the dossier. This sets out the European Council’s official position and thus represents a major political milestone for the European Council ahead of the trilogue negotiations. We want to be sure that, in this process, the project will be subject to critical analysis that is objective and nuanced and takes account of the long-term interests of Europe and its people. > We do not want the debate to fundamentally call the digital euro into question > but rather to refine the specific details in such a way that opportunities can > be seized. We regard the following points as particularly important: * maintaining European sovereignty at the customer interface; * avoiding a parallel infrastructure that inhibits innovation; and * safeguarding the stability of the financial markets by imposing clear holding limits. We do not want the debate to fundamentally call the digital euro into question but rather to refine the specific details in such a way that opportunities can be seized and, at the same time, risks can be avoided. Opportunities of the digital euro:  1. European resilience and sovereignty in payments processing: as a public-sector means of payment that is accepted across Europe, the digital euro can reduce reliance on non-European card systems and big-tech wallets, provided that a firmly European design is adopted and it is embedded in the existing structures of banks and savings banks and can thus be directly linked to customers’ existing accounts. 2. Supplement to cash and private-sector digital payments: as a central bank digital currency, the digital euro can offer an additional, state-backed payment option, especially when it is held in a digital wallet and can also be used for e-commerce use cases (a compromise proposed by the European Parliament’s main rapporteur for the digital euro, Fernando Navarrete). This would further strengthen people’s freedom of choice in the payment sphere. 3. Catalyst for innovation in the European market: if integrated into banking apps and designed in accordance with the compromises proposed by Navarrete (see point 2), the digital euro can promote innovation in retail payments, support new European payment ecosystems, and simplify cross-border payments. > The burden of investment and the risk resulting from introducing the digital > euro will be disproportionately borne by banks and savings banks. Risks of the current configuration: 1. Risk of creating a gateway for US providers: in the configuration currently planned, the digital euro provides US and other non-European tech and payment companies with access to the customer interface, customer data and payment infrastructure without any of the regulatory obligations and costs that only European providers face. This goes against the objective of digital sovereignty. 2. State parallel infrastructures weaken the market and innovation: the European Central Bank (ECB) is planning not just two new sets of infrastructure but also its own product for end customers (through an app). An administrative body has neither the market experience nor the customer access that banks and payment providers do. At the same time, the ECB is removing the tried-and-tested allocation of roles between the central bank and private sector. Furthermore, the Eurosystem’s digital euro project will tie up urgently required development capacity for many years and thereby further exacerbate Europe’s competitive disadvantage. The burden of investment and the risk resulting from introducing the digital euro will be disproportionately borne by banks and savings banks. In any case, the banks and savings banks have already developed a European market solution, Wero, which is currently coming onto the market. The digital euro needs to strengthen rather than weaken this European-led payment method. 3. Risks for financial stability and lending: without clear holding limits, there is a risk of uncontrolled transfers of deposits from banks and savings banks into holdings of digital euros. Deposits are the backbone of lending; large-scale outflows would weaken both the funding of the real economy – especially small and medium-sized enterprises – and the stability of the system. Holding limits must therefore be based on usual payment needs and be subject to binding regulations. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is Bundesverband der Deutschen Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken e.V. , Schellingstraße 4, 10785 Berlin, Germany * The ultimate controlling entity is Bundesverband der Deutschen Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken e.V. , Schellingstraße 4, 10785 Berlin, Germany More information here.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen is “buying into [Donald] Trump’s agenda” by slashing regulations on businesses, according to the head of the Socialists & Democrats group in the European Parliament. Iratxe García slammed the “absolute deregulation zeal” being shown by the Commission as it pushes through omnibus simplification packages — revising laws spanning green, agriculture, digital and defense rules — saying it was straight out of the Trump playbook. García argued that von der Leyen and her European People’s Party are pushing for a major backtracking on EU laws, disguised as simplification. “Until now, there has been a dynamic of presenting [an] omnibus every 15 days … suddenly they appear on the table, like mushrooms.” Many top Socialist lawmakers asked García during an S&D retreat in Antwerp on Monday to demand that the Commission stop putting forward any more omnibuses, according to two people present, granted anonymity to speak freely. But the group is not united on the issue — some factions want simplification to keep rolling on. Instead, the retreat’s draft conclusions, seen by POLITICO, ask the Commission to consult with political groups before proposing further omnibus packages, and to conduct impact assessments for every omnibus, past and future. The EU Ombudsman said two weeks ago the Commission’s handling of omnibuses has had “procedural shortcomings” amounting to “maladministration,” opening the door for a court case. Asked about such a possibility, García said that “if the Commission does not respond as we expect, then we will have to take measures, but right now I want to give them the benefit of the doubt and see if the Commission understands the message we are sending them.” PRECOOKING DEALS García added that the basics of any future omnibuses, and other legislative files, should be “shared and worked on” in advance with von der Leyen’s centrist majority — EPP, S&D, and Renew — which could stop the EPP allying with the far-right, as happened with the first omnibus on slashing green rules. “This group has been the one that has guaranteed political and institutional stability in Europe in recent months, but what we are not prepared to do is to be the ones who guarantee stability while policies are negotiated with others,” she said. “Today’s message to the European Commission is clear: if you want the Group of Socialists and Democrats to continue to guarantee Europe’s political and institutional stability, you must involve us from the outset of the process,” said García.  On the looming battle over Parliament President Roberta Metsola’s potential third term, García reiterated that there is a written agreement covering the distribution of top posts, but declined to show the document or discuss its exact terms. “There is an agreement at the beginning of the legislative term on the distribution of responsibilities at the beginning [of the term] and at the mid-term,” repeated García. Asked if she will step down as S&D leader and hand the leadership to an Italian or German lawmaker for the second half of the mandate, as some lawmakers claim she promised to do, García refused to comment. Socialist MEPs expect her to push to remain in the job. “Obviously, there were discussions at the beginning of the legislative session, but I also want to emphasize that whatever is decided in this group will be a discussion shared with the entire group.”

DOHA, Qatar — Inside the U.S., President Donald Trump is dogged by rising consumer prices, the Epstein files debacle, and Republicans’ newfound willingness to defy him. But go 100 miles, 1,000 miles, or, as I recently did, 7,000 miles past U.S. borders, and Trump’s domestic challenges — and the sinking poll numbers that accompany them — matter little. The U.S. president remains a behemoth in the eyes of the rest of the world. A person who could wreck another country. Or perhaps the only one who can fix another country’s problems. That’s the sense I got this weekend from talking to foreign officials and global elites at this year’s Doha Forum, a major international gathering focused on diplomacy and geopolitics. Over sweets, caffeine and the buzz of nearby conversations, some members of the jet set wondered if Trump’s domestic struggles will lead him to take more risks abroad — and some hope he does. This comes as Trump faces criticism from key MAGA players who say he’s already too focused on foreign policy. “He doesn’t need Capitol Hill to get work done from a foreign policy standpoint,” an Arab official said of Trump, who, let’s face it, has made it abundantly clear he cares little about Congress. Vuk Jeremic, a former Serbian foreign minister, told me that whether people like Trump or not, “I don’t think that there is any doubt that he is a very, very consequential global actor.” He wasn’t the only one who used the term “consequential.” The word doesn’t carry a moral judgment. A person can be consequential whether they save the world or destroy it. What the word does indicate in this context is the power of the U.S. presidency. The weakest U.S. president is still stronger than the strongest leader of most other countries. America’s wealth, weapons and global reach ensure that. U.S. presidents have long had more latitude and ability to take direct action on foreign policy than domestic policy. They also often turn to the global stage when their national influence fades in their final years in office, when they don’t have to worry about reelection. There’s a reason Barack Obama waited until his final two years in office to restore diplomatic ties with Cuba. In the first year of his second term, Trump has stunned the world repeatedly, on everything from gutting U.S. foreign aid to bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities. He remains as capricious as ever, shifting sides on everything from Russia’s war on Ukraine to whether he wants to expel Palestinians from Gaza. He seeks a Nobel Peace Prize but is threatening a potential war with Venezuela. Trump managed to jolt the gathering at the glitzy Sheraton resort in Doha by unveiling his National Security Strategy — which astonished foreign onlookers on many levels — in the run-up to the event. The part that left jaws on the floor was its attack on America’s allies in Europe, which it claimed faces “civilizational erasure.” The strategy’s release led one panel moderator to ask the European Union’s top diplomat, Kaja Kallas, whether Trump sees Europe as “the enemy.” Yet, some foreign officials praised Trump’s disruptive moves and said they hope he will keep shaking up a calcified international order that has left many countries behind. Several African leaders in particular said they wanted Trump to get more involved in ending conflicts on their continent, especially Sudan. They don’t care about the many nasty things Trump has said about Africa, waving that off as irrelevant political rhetoric. Trump claims to have already ended seven or eight wars. It’s a wild assertion, not least because some of the conflicts he’s referring to weren’t wars and some of the truces he’s brokered are shaky. When I pointed this out, foreign officials told me to lower my bar. Peace is a process, they stressed. If Trump can get that process going or rolling faster, it’s a win. Maybe there are still clashes between Rwanda and Congo. But at least Trump is forcing the two sides to talk and agree to framework deals, they suggested. “You should be proud of your president,” one African official said. (I granted him and several others anonymity to candidly discuss sensitive diplomatic issues involving the U.S.) Likewise, there’s an appreciation in many diplomatic corners about the economic lens Trump imposes on the world. Wealthy Arab states, such as Qatar, already are benefiting from such commercial diplomacy. Others want in, too. “He’s been very clear that his Africa policy should focus on doing business with Africa, and to me, that’s very progressive,” said Mthuli Ncube, Zimbabwe’s finance minister. He added that one question in the global diplomatic community is whether the next U.S. president — Democrat or Republican — will adopt Trump’s “creativity.” The diplomats and others gathered in Doha were well-aware that Trump appreciates praise but also sometimes respects those who stand up to him. So one has to tread carefully. Kallas, for instance, downplayed the Trump team’s broadsides against Europe in the National Security Strategy. Intentionally or not, her choice reflected the power differential between the U.S. and the EU. “The U.S. is still our biggest ally,” Kallas insisted. Privately, another European official I spoke to was fuming. The strategy’s accusations were “very disturbing,” they said. The official agreed, nonetheless, that Trump is too powerful for European countries to do much beyond stage some symbolic diplomatic protests. Few Trump administration officials attended the Doha Forum. The top names were Matt Whitaker, the U.S. ambassador to NATO, and Tom Barrack, the U.S. ambassador to Turkey. Donald Trump Jr. — not a U.S. official, but certainly influential — also made an appearance. Several foreign diplomats expressed optimism that Trump’s quest for a Nobel Peace Prize will guide him to take actions on the global stage that will ultimately bring more stability in the world — even if it is a rocky ride. A British diplomat said they were struck by Trump’s musings about gaining entry to heaven. Maybe a nervousness about the afterlife could induce Trump to, say, avoid a conflagration with Venezuela? “He’s thinking about his legacy,” the diplomat said. Even Hillary Clinton, the former secretary of State whom Trump defeated in the 2016 presidential race, was measured in her critiques. Clinton said “there’s something to be said for the dramatic and bold action” Trump takes. But she warned that the Trump team doesn’t do enough to ensure his efforts, including peace deals, have lasting effect. “There has to be so much follow-up,” she said during one forum event. “And there is an aversion within the administration to the kind of work that is done by Foreign Service officers, diplomats, others who are on the front lines trying to fulfill these national security objectives.” Up until the final minute of his presidency, Trump will have extraordinary power that reaches far past America’s shores. That’s likely to be the case even if the entire Republican Party has turned on him. At the moment, he has more than three years to go. Perhaps he will end immigration to the U.S., abandon Ukraine to Russia’s aggression or strike a nuclear deal with Iran. After all, Trump is, as Zimbabwe’s Ncube put it, not lacking in “creativity.”

Rick Pazdur, the FDA’s top drug regulator, told staff Tuesday he submitted his resignation to the agency, an abrupt departure weeks after he was convinced by Commissioner Marty Makary to take the post to help bring stability to an agency reeling from months of upheaval, according to four people familiar with the decision granted anonymity to discuss the move. The decision — which comes days after top vaccine regulator Vinay Prasad said the agency would ratchet up regulatory requirements for new vaccines — is almost certain to raise new questions about Makary’s leadership of the FDA. Pazdur in recent weeks clashed with Makary over the Commissioner’s National Priority Voucher program, according to media reports. That program — which aims to speed final review of drugs that address health priorities, pose a transformative innovative impact, address an unmet medical need, help onshoring efforts or increase affordability — was also criticized by Pazdur’s predecessor, George Tidmarsh. FDA experts have worried the involvement of political appointees in the process of choosing which firms receive a voucher could raise questions about the program’s integrity. STAT first reported the news of Pazdur’s decision to retire. It is unclear if the decision is final — one person familiar with the decision said the longtime cancer drug regulator has 30 days to change his decision. “We respect Dr. Pazdur’s decision to retire and honor his 26 years of distinguished service at the FDA,” an FDA spokesperson said in a statement. “As the founding director of the Oncology Center of Excellence, he leaves a legacy of cross-center regulatory innovation that strengthened the agency and advanced care for countless patients. His leadership, vision, and dedication will continue to shape the FDA for years to come.” The White House and Pazdur did not immediately respond to requests for comment. Pazdur, a 26-year agency veteran, initially rebuffed efforts by Makary to convince him to assume leadership of the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research — but ultimately agreed to take the job after being assured he would be given autonomy in the role free from political influence and the ability to rehire staff.

Europe’s security does not depend solely on our physical borders and their defense. It rests on something far less visible, and far more sensitive: the digital networks that keep our societies, economies and democracies functioning every second of the day. > Without resilient networks, the daily workings of Europe would grind to a > halt, and so too would any attempt to build meaningful defense readiness. A recent study by Copenhagen Economics confirms that telecom operators have become the first line of defense in Europe’s security architecture. Their networks power essential services ranging from emergency communications and cross-border healthcare to energy systems, financial markets, transport and, increasingly, Europe’s defense capabilities. Without resilient networks, the daily workings of Europe would grind to a halt, and so too would any attempt to build meaningful defense readiness. This reality forces us to confront an uncomfortable truth: Europe cannot build credible defense capabilities on top of an economically strained, structurally fragmented telecom sector. Yet this is precisely the risk today. A threat landscape outpacing Europe’s defenses The challenges facing Europe are evolving faster than our political and regulatory systems can respond. In 2023 alone, ENISA recorded 188 major incidents, causing 1.7 billion lost user-hours, the equivalent of taking entire cities offline. While operators have strengthened their systems and outage times fell by more than half in 2024 compared with the previous year, despite a growing number of incidents, the direction of travel remains clear: cyberattacks are more sophisticated, supply chains more vulnerable and climate-related physical disruptions more frequent. Hybrid threats increasingly target civilian digital infrastructure as a way to weaken states. Telecom networks, once considered as technical utilities, have become a strategic asset essential to Europe’s stability. > Europe cannot deploy cross-border defense capabilities without resilient, > pan-European digital infrastructure. Nor can it guarantee NATO > interoperability with 27 national markets, divergent rules and dozens of > sub-scale operators unable to invest at continental scale. Our allies recognize this. NATO recently encouraged members to spend up to 1.5 percent of their GDP on protecting critical infrastructure. Secretary General Mark Rutte also urged investment in cyber defense, AI, and cloud technologies, highlighting the military benefits of cloud scalability and edge computing – all of which rely on high-quality, resilient networks. This is a clear political signal that telecom security is not merely an operational matter but a geopolitical priority. The link between telecoms and defense is deeper than many realize. As also explained in the recent Arel report, Much More than a Network, modern defense capabilities rely largely on civilian telecom networks. Strong fiber backbones, advanced 5G and future 6G systems, resilient cloud and edge computing, satellite connectivity, and data centers form the nervous system of military logistics, intelligence and surveillance. Europe cannot deploy cross-border defense capabilities without resilient, pan-European digital infrastructure. Nor can it guarantee NATO interoperability with 27 national markets, divergent rules and dozens of sub-scale operators unable to invest at continental scale. Fragmentation has become one of Europe’s greatest strategic vulnerabilities. The reform Europe needs: An investment boost for digital networks At the same time, Europe expects networks to become more resilient, more redundant, less dependent on foreign technology and more capable of supporting defense-grade applications. Security and resilience are not side tasks for telecom operators, they are baked into everything they do. From procurement and infrastructure design to daily operations, operators treat these efforts as core principles shaping how networks are built, run and protected. Therefore, as the Copenhagen Economics study shows, the level of protection Europe now requires will demand substantial additional capital. > It is unrealistic to expect world-class, defense-ready infrastructure to > emerge from a model that has become structurally unsustainable. This is the right ambition, but the economic model underpinning the sector does not match these expectations. Due to fragmentation and over-regulation, Europe’s telecom market invests less per capita than global peers, generates roughly half the return on capital of operators in the United States and faces rising costs linked to expanding security obligations. It is unrealistic to expect world-class, defense-ready infrastructure to emerge from a model that has become structurally unsustainable. A shift in policy priorities is therefore essential. Europe must place investment in security and resilience at the center of its political agenda. Policy must allow this reality to be reflected in merger assessments, reduce overlapping security rules and provide public support where the public interest exceeds commercial considerations. This is not state aid; it is strategic social responsibility. Completing the single market for telecommunications is central to this agenda. A fragmented market cannot produce the secure, interoperable, large-scale solutions required for modern defense. The Digital Networks Act must simplify and harmonize rules across the EU, supported by a streamlined governance that distinguishes between domestic matters and cross-border strategic issues. Spectrum policy must also move beyond national silos, allowing Europe to avoid conflicts with NATO over key bands and enabling coherent next-generation deployments. Telecom policy nowadays is also defense policy. When we measure investment gaps in digital network deployment, we still tend to measure simple access to 5G and fiber. However, we should start considering that — if security, resilience and defense-readiness are to be taken into account — the investment gap is much higher that the €200 billion already estimated by the European Commission. Europe’s strategic choice The momentum for stronger European defense is real — but momentum fades if it is not seized. If Europe fails to modernize and secure its telecom infrastructure now, it risks entering the next decade with a weakened industrial base, chronic underinvestment, dependence on non-EU technologies and networks unable to support advanced defense applications. In that scenario, Europe’s democratic resilience would erode in parallel with its economic competitiveness, leaving the continent more exposed to geopolitical pressure and technological dependency. > If Europe fails to modernize and secure its telecom infrastructure now, it > risks entering the next decade with a weakened industrial base, chronic > underinvestment, dependence on non-EU technologies and networks unable to > support advanced defense applications. Europe still has time to change course and put telecoms at the center of its agenda — not as a technical afterthought, but as a core pillar of its defense strategy. The time for incremental steps has passed. Europe must choose to build the network foundations of its security now or accept that its strategic ambitions will remain permanently out of reach. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is Connect Europe AISBL * The ultimate controlling entity is Connect Europe AISBL * The political advertisement is linked to advocacy on EU digital, telecom and industrial policy, including initiatives such as the Digital Networks Act, Digital Omnibus, and connectivity, cybersecurity, and defence frameworks aimed at strengthening Europe’s digital competitiveness. More information here.

PARIS — France’s business community is rushing to make inroads with the National Rally, the far-right party tipped to win the Elysée Palace in 2027. Their goal is to establish a direct line with the likes of Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella, who have at times struggled to articulate a coherent economic vision for France, the eurozone’s second-biggest economy. The lobbying effort represents a marked change of heart for France’s entrepreneurial elite, who for years have been deeply suspicious of a populist party they saw as economically illiterate rabble-rousers. Give the National Rally’s robust showing in polls, France Inc. now feels it has little choice but to bend the ears of the anti-immigration party, pressing it to adopt more a market-friendly agenda. It’s a charm offensive that has played out both behind closed doors and at high-profile events like the Paris Air Show, the influential business lobby Medef’s conference on Roland Garros’ center court and at a lunch with the entrepreneurial association Ethic. The business community’s strategy offers a strong sign of how far France’s political fault lines have shifted. The National Rally is no longer a fringe player, so business leaders are now making a concerted effort to sound them out and, hopefully, influence their economic worldview, said a former government adviser now working in the private sector. And the party itself is keen to beef up its ties and bona fides with the business community. “The last year has been a real tipping point,” said a senior manager at a French firm listed on the benchmark CAC40 stock index who, like others quoted in this piece, was granted anonymity to candidly discuss private discussions. “Business leaders, industry lobbies suddenly thought they are on the threshold of power. Let’s meet them and perhaps convert them,” the manager said. Some entrepreneurs have pinned their hopes on Bardella, the National Rally’s plan B candidate for the 2027 presidential election for if an appeal court fails to overturn Le Pen’s ban from standing in elections after being found guilty of embezzlement. Bardella is seen as being more pro-business than Le Pen, even if his recent comments opening talks with the European Central Bank to buy French debt raised eyebrows. Last week, for the first time, a poll showed Bardella would win both rounds of a presidential election against any other candidate. BUDGETARY JEKYLL AND HYDE  Bardella may be doing his best, in the words of the former government adviser, to “polish” the National Rally’s muddled economic platform, but the business community’s concerns have been exacerbated by the party’s actions during France’s ongoing budget negotiations. At times, the National Rally has tried to play the role of conservative adult in the room during the messy legislative process by calling for spending cuts and lowering public debt, but it has also voted for billions in tax hikes and for lowering the retirement age. National Rally lawmakers on Thursday effectively helped pass a bill authored by the far left to nationalize steel giant ArcelorMittal by abstaining from the vote. And before budget talks began, both Le Pen and Bardella were calling for new snap elections that were anathema to the business community. This week, for the first time, a poll showed Bardella winning both rounds of the presidential election against any other candidate. | Carl Court/Getty Images “The National Rally is reckless,” said the chief executive of a French company listed on the CAC40. “What’s really important for us is stability.” The zigzagging of the far right reflects a deep split within the party. Though the National Rally has gone to great lengths to tamp down any hint of a rift, Le Pen and Bardella clearly represent different camps. Le Pen is the anti-immigration, protectionist champion of disaffected voters from France’s northern rust belt, while Bardella is the slick, polished, more economically liberal but equally anti-immigration option who appeals more to those on the French Riviera. “As the National Rally tries to make these two lines coexist, their position on the economics is not very clear,” said Mathieu Gallard, a pollster at Ipsos. The hope among some business leaders is that the National Rally is posturing ahead of the 2027 presidential election, but that once in power would take a less explosive course, following in the footsteps of Italy’s Giorgia Meloni or Greece’s Alexis Tsipras after he was elected on an anti-austerity platform in 2015. “The National Rally is reckless,” said the CEO of a French company listed on the CAC40. “What’s really important for us is stability.” | Jean-François Monier/AFP via Getty Images “What he [Tsipras] had defended during the campaign was untenable, and very quickly, he had to do a sharp U-turn,” said the boss of another CAC40 company.  The National Rally has proven similarly malleable at times, for example, dropping its support for exiting the eurozone after an election defeat in 2017. Figures like Renaud Labaye, a National Rally heavyweight and close ally of Le Pen, offer some suggestion that a French president from the National Rally would follow the Meloni model. “We need a balanced budget,” Labaye told POLITICO. “We want the lowest possible deficit because it’s good for the country and because our sovereignty is at stake.”  Influential figures like François Durvye, a financier who is the right-hand man of far-right billionaire Pierre-Édouard Stérin, and Le Pen’s chief of staff, Ambroise de Rancourt, a former far-left activist who flipped to the far right last year, have been facilitating behind-closed-doors meetings with the business world. According to the previously quoted senior manager at a CAC40 company, in some of those meetings, the National Rally tries to reassure the entrepreneurs that they would be economically reasonable in government.  But business leaders who think they’ll be able to influence the far right if it wins the next presidential election are going to be in for a rough surprise if Bardella or Le Pen win in 2027, respected political commentator Alain Minc warned. “They don’t grasp the sense of power that comes when 15 million people vote for you,” Minc said. Pauline de Saint Remy and Sarah Paillou contributed reporting.

The European Central Bank is hatching a plan to boost the use of the euro around the world, hoping to turn the world’s faltering confidence in U.S. political and financial leadership to Europe’s advantage. Liquidity lines — agreements to lend at short notice to other central banks — have long been a standard part of the crisis-fighting toolkits of central banks, but the ECB is now thinking of repurposing them to further Europe’s political aims, four central bank officials told POLITICO. One aim of the plan is to absorb any shocks if the U.S. — which has backstopped the global financial system with dollars for decades — suddenly decides not to, or attaches unacceptable conditions to its support. The other goal is to underpin its foreign trade more actively and, ultimately, grab some of the benefits that the U.S. has historically enjoyed from controlling the world’s reserve currency. Officials were granted anonymity because the discussions are private. Bruegel fellow Francesco Papadia, who was previously director-general for the ECB’s market operations, told POLITICO that such efforts are sensible and reflect an increasing willingness among European authorities to see the euro used more widely around the world. WHAT’S A LIQUIDITY LINE? Central banks typically use two types of facilities to lend to each other: either by swapping one currency for another (swap lines) or by providing funds against collateral denominated in the lender’s currency (repo lines). The ECB currently maintains standing, unlimited swap lines with the U.S. Federal Reserve, the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the Swiss National Bank, and the Bank of Japan, as well as standing but capped lines with the Danish and Swedish central banks. It also operates a facility with the People’s Bank of China, capped in both volume and duration. Other central banks seeking euro liquidity must rely on repo lines known as EUREP, under which they can borrow limited amounts of euros for a limited period against high-quality euro-denominated collateral. At present, only Hungary, Romania, Albania, Andorra, San Marino, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Kosovo have such lines in place. But these active lines have sat untouched since Jan. 2, 2024 — and even at the height of the Covid crisis, their use peaked at a mere €3.6 billion. For the eurozone’s international partners, the knowledge that they can access the euro in times of stress is valuable in itself, helping to pre-empt self-fulfilling fears of financial instability. But some say that if structured generously enough, the facilities can also reduce concerns about exchange rate fluctuations or liquidity shortages. Such details may sound academic, but the availability of liquidity lines has real impacts on business: A Romanian carmaker whose bank has trouble securing euros may fail to make payments to a supplier in Germany, disrupting its production and raising its costs.  “The knowledge that foreign commercial banks can borrow in euros while being assured that they have access to euro liquidity [as a backstop] encourages the use of the euro,” one ECB rate-setter explained.  French central bank chief François Villeroy de Galhau suggested that Europe could at least take a leaf out of China’s book, noting that the Eurosystem “can make euro invoicing more attractive” by expanding the provision of euro liquidity lines. | Kirill Kudryavtsev/Getty Images “Liquidity lines, in particular EUREP, should be flexible, simple and easy to activate,” he argued. One option, he said, would be to extend them to more countries. Another could be to make EUREP a standing facility — removing any doubts about whether, and under what conditions, euro access would be granted. Papadia added that the ECB could also ease access to EUREP by cutting its cost, boosting available volumes or extending the timeframe for use. NOT JUST AN ACADEMIC QUESTION French central bank chief François Villeroy de Galhau suggested in a recent speech that Europe could at least take a leaf out of China’s book, noting that the Eurosystem “can make euro invoicing more attractive” by expanding the provision of euro liquidity lines. China has established around 40 swap lines with trading partners worldwide to underpin its burgeoning foreign trade, especially with poorer and less stable countries. By contrast, the ECB — a historically cautious animal — “is not marketing the euro to the same extent that the Chinese market the renminbi,” according to Papadia.  Another policymaker told POLITICO that while there is a broad consensus that liquidity lines should be made more widely available, the Governing Council had not yet hashed out the details. Austrian National Bank Governor Martin Kocher told POLITICO in a recent interview that there has been “no deeper discussion” on the Council, adding that he sees no reason to promote euro liquidity lines actively. “I’m not arguing that you should incentivize or create a demand. Rather, if there is demand, we should be prepared for it,” he said, acknowledging that “preparation is very important.” He noted that erratic U.S. policies could force the euro “to take on a stronger role in the international sphere” — both as a reserve currency and in transactions. According to a Reuters report earlier this month, similar concerns among central banks worldwide have sparked a debate over creating an alternative to Federal Reserve funding backstops by pooling their own dollar reserves. The ECB declined to comment for this article. RISK AVERSION AND OTHER OBSTACLES  However, swap lines in particular don’t come without risks. “The main risk is that the country would use a swap and then would not be able to return the drawn euros,” said Papadia. “And then you will be left with foreign currency you don’t really know what to do with.” That is exactly the kind of trap some economists warn the U.S. is stumbling into with its $20 billion swap line to Argentina. “The United States doesn’t really want Argentina’s currency,” the Council on Foreign Relations’ Brad Setser wrote in a blog post. “It expects to be repaid in dollars, so it would be a massive failure if the swap was never unwound and the U.S. Treasury was left holding a slug of pesos.” Austrian National Bank Governor Martin Kocher said there has been “no deeper discussion” on the Council, adding that he sees no reason to promote euro liquidity lines actively. | Heinz-Peter Bader/Getty Images Such thinking, another central bank official said, will incline the ECB to focus first on reforming the EUREP lines, which have always been its preferred tool. The trouble with that, however, is that EUREP use may be limited by a lack of safe assets denominated in euros to serve as collateral. Papadia noted that the Fed’s network of liquidity lines works because “the Fed has the U.S.  Treasury as a kind of partner in granting these swaps.” So long as Europe fails to create a joint debt instrument, this may put a natural cap on such lines.  Even with a safe asset, focusing on liquidity lines first could be putting the cart before the horse, said Gianluca Benigno, professor of economics at the University of Lausanne and former head of the New York Fed’s international research department. Europe’s diminishing geopolitical relevance means that the ECB is unlikely to see much demand — deliberately engineered or not — for its liquidity outside Europe without much broader changes, Benigno told POLITICO. Liquidity lines can be used to advance your goals if you already have power — but they can’t create it. For that, he argued, Europe first needs a clear political vision for its role in the global economy, alongside a Capital Markets Union and the creation of a common European safe asset — issues that only politicians can address.

LONDON — U.K. Energy Secretary Ed Miliband was on the world stage last week demanding high-polluting fossil fuels are phased out of global energy systems.  “This is an issue that cannot be ignored,” he told the COP climate summit in Brazil.  Yet this week could see his own government water down commitments to phase out fossil fuels. Insiders say a drawn-out fight over the future of drilling in the U.K.’s Scottish oil and gas heartlands is finally reaching its conclusion.  It is a row which has split the governing Labour Party, pitted Miliband against the all-powerful Treasury, and will, some of Labour’s own MPs fear, undermine the government’s climate credentials and expose the party to even more political pain.  “If a progressive government with a big majority, in the country that started the Industrial Revolution, can’t hold firm on new fossil fuel drilling,” worried one Labour MP, “how can we expect developing countries to do what’s needed to tackle climate change?”  The MP, along with other officials and experts in this piece, was granted anonymity to give a frank view on sensitive political planning.  The decisions follow months of full-throated lobbying by fossil fuel companies, who argue tough action against high-polluting oil and gas firms will hit jobs and derail the wider economy — but also by green campaigners, desperate to hold Labour to its promises to make the U.K. a global climate leader.  And there is a growing risk for ministers that, as the government searches for a compromise to satisfy the party and balance fiscal demands with net-zero ambitions, it will land on a solution which pleases no one at all.  LICENSES, TAXES, ELECTIONS Two government figures and three figures from industry told POLITICO they expect minsters to announce a decision on North Sea licenses on Wednesday, to coincide with the Budget.  Labour swept to power last year on a promise to ban new oil and gas exploration licenses in the declining basin, as well as maintaining taxes on high polluters in the North Sea.  But there is likely to be a “pragmatic” shift on North Sea policy, one of the government figures said. Officials are looking at allowing oil and exploration on existing fields (so-called “tiebacks”) and potentially loosening rules on investment relief, they said.  Fossil fuel lobbyists argue that, without this sort of help, thousands of jobs and billions in investment are at risk.  “There is a sense that the industry are not crying wolf this time,” the same government figure said.  The tax is currently set to remain until 2030, but Chancellor Rachel Reeves is considering scrapping it earlier, in a bid to drive the U.K.’s stalling economy. | Pool photo by Leon Neal via Getty Images They added that ministers will likely be making decisions with Scottish elections in May firmly in mind — conscious that the future of the oil and gas sector is a priority for many Scottish voters already worried about the decline of the North Sea economy, embodied in the closure of Grangemouth refinery.  Approving tiebacks would allow Miliband to say he has stuck to his election pledge while still expanding opportunities for oil and gas producers.  The Treasury is also due to decide the future of the Windfall Tax on oil and gas companies before the end of the year — a levy on profits hated by the industry but used to fund Miliband’s rush to move the U.K. to a cleaner energy system.   The tax is currently set to remain until 2030, but Chancellor Rachel Reeves is considering scrapping it earlier, in a bid to drive the U.K.’s stalling economy.  Lobby group Offshore Energies UK (OEUK) claims the country could enjoy a £40 billion economic boost if the Windfall Tax was ditched as soon as next year.   A fourth industry figure said a decision on whether to approve drilling on the controversial Rosebank gas field — which already holds a license — could also come this week, although the field’s developers think it is more likely in the new year. Officials from Miliband’s Department for Energy Security and Net Zero summoned OEUK for a meeting Friday in Whitehall, according to two of the industry figures. ‘POLITICALLY STUPID’  The idea of softening fossil fuel policy is alarming some on Labour’s backbenches.  Referencing the pledge not to allow new drilling licenses, Barry Gardiner, an environment minister under Tony Blair and now a member of parliament’s Environmental Audit Committee, said: “It is a commitment that I am sure the chancellor will wish to honor, given that yet another broken promise or U-turn would be as politically stupid as it would be environmentally illiterate.”  The pledge, he said, had “sat happily with the U.K’s commitment at the last COP to phase out fossil fuels.” Fellow Labour MP Clive Lewis said any watering-down would be a “mistake.”   “It would signal that the government is more focused on reassuring fossil-fuel interests than giving the public a credible plan for energy security and climate stability. Voters aren’t blind to that,” he said.  But their views are not shared across the party.  Mary Glindon, a Labour MP in the former industrial city of Newcastle, hosted OEUK in parliament earlier this month.  “The truth is that our once proud North Sea energy industry is shedding about one thousand jobs a month. … Without renewed investment, I fear for our communities and the prosperity of our young people,” she told an audience of MPs, lobbyists and business leaders.  OEUK, in a letter to Prime Minister Keir Starmer this September, seen by POLITICO, said that “without fiscal reform, changes to the regulatory framework and licensing will be insufficient on their own to transform the outlook for the industry.” | Pool Photo by Henry Nicholls via Getty Images Policy in the North Sea must show workers “that we are on their side,” Scottish Labour MP Torcuil Crichton told POLITICO earlier this year.   Gary Smith, general secretary of GMB Union — traditionally a champion of Labour which represents thousands of oil and gas workers — told the same OEUK event: “This is a crucial moment in terms of the Budget, and if the government gets this wrong on the future that the North Sea, it will be a strategic, long-term disaster for this country.”   A DESNZ spokesperson said: “We will implement our manifesto position in full to not issue new licences to explore new oil and gas fields. “Our priority is to deliver a fair, orderly and prosperous transition in line with our climate and legal obligations, with the biggest ever investment in offshore wind and first of a kind carbon capture and storage clusters.” PRESSURE ALL AROUND Even if the government is willing to upset its greenest backbenchers, it still won’t be enough to win round the biggest backers of oil and gas.  OEUK, in a letter to Prime Minister Keir Starmer this September, seen by POLITICO, said that “without fiscal reform, changes to the regulatory framework and licensing will be insufficient on their own to transform the outlook for the industry.” Robin Allan, chairman of the lobby group BRINDEX, also argues potential changes to the industry’s fiscal and licensing regimes would do little to revive the industry.  “The tweaking and tinkering of existing policies will not make the North Sea an investable basin,” he said. To restore business confidence, he argued, “wholesale reform is needed.”  There is nervousness inside Labour that attempts to navigate these pressures will leave the government, already struggling with voters, even more vulnerable.  The Green Party, helmed by media-savvy new leader Zack Polanski, is rising in the polls.   Labour would be “wriggling out” of their climate commitments if they pushed ahead with tiebacks and Windfall Tax reforms, argued Green MP and the party’s Westminster leader Ellie Chowns. It would be “politically mad to allow new drilling licences when the Greens are surging in the polls,” argued the same Labour MP quoted at the top of this article.  “The growing support for the [Green Party] shows that people want honesty, consistency and a transition [to net zero] that protects workers and communities rather than corporate profits,” said Clive Lewis.  And the pressure would not just come from the left.   Nigel Farage’s poll-topping Reform UK has promised to let oil and gas companies drill the North Sea basin until it is dry.  The Conservatives, too, are staking out a much stronger line backing fossil fuels.  “Anything short of an overturn of the [Windfall Tax] and … a complete overturn of the [licensing] ban is going to fall far short of what the industry needs at this time,” said Tory Shadow Energy Minister Andrew Bowie.  Think tanks close to Miliband’s own left flank of politics are getting restless.   Softening the regime in the North Sea might appear to have political dividends by heading off the Tories and Reform, said Alex Chapman, senior economist at the New Economics Foundation, but Labour should resist it. “I think it would be a terrible, terrible decision,” he said.