Many describe our geopolitical moment as one of instability, but that word feels too weak for what we are living through. Some, like Mark Carney, argue that we are facing a rupture: a break with assumptions that anchored the global economic and political order for decades. Others, like Christine Lagarde, see a profound transition, a shift toward a new configuration of power, technology and societal expectations. Whichever perception we adopt, the implication is clear: leaders can no longer rely on yesterday’s mental models, institutional routines or governance templates. Johanna Mair is the Director of the Florence School of Transnational Governance at the European University Institute in Florence, where she leads education, training and research on governance beyond the nation state. Security, for example, is no longer a discrete policy field. It now reaches deeply into energy systems, artificial intelligence, cyber governance, financial stability and democratic resilience, all under conditions of strategic competition and mistrust. At the same time, competitiveness cannot be reduced to productivity metrics or short-term growth rates. It is about a society’s capacity to innovate, regulate effectively and mobilize investment toward long-term objectives — from the green and digital transitions to social cohesion. This dense web of interdependence is where transnational governance is practiced every day. The European Union illustrates this reality vividly. No single member state can build the capacity to manage these transformations on its own. EU institutions and other regional bodies shape regulatory frameworks and collective responses; corporations influence infrastructure and supply chains; financial institutions direct capital flows; and civic actors respond to social fragmentation and governance gaps. Effective leadership has become a systemic endeavour: it requires coordination across these levels, while sustaining public legitimacy and defending liberal democratic principles. > Our mission is to teach and train current and future leaders, equipping them > with the knowledge, skills and networks to tackle global challenges in ways > that are both innovative and grounded in democratic values. The Florence School of Transnational Governance (STG) at the European University Institute was created precisely to respond to this need. Located in Florence and embedded in a European institution founded by EU member states, the STG is a hub where policymakers, business leaders, civil society, media and academia meet to work on governance beyond national borders. Our mission is to teach and train current and future leaders, equipping them with the knowledge, skills and networks to tackle global challenges in ways that are both innovative and grounded in democratic values. What makes this mission distinctive is not only the topics we address, but also how and with whom we address them. We see leadership development as a practice embedded in real institutions, not a purely classroom-based exercise. People do not come to Florence to observe transnational governance from a distance; they come to practice it, test hypotheses and co-create solutions with peers who work on the frontlines of policy and politics. This philosophy underpins our portfolio of programs, from degree offerings to executive education. With early career professionals, we focus on helping them understand and shape governance beyond the state, whether in international organizations, national administrations, the private sector or civil society. We encourage them to see institutions not as static structures, but as arrangements that can and must be strengthened and reformed to support a liberal, rules-based order under stress. At the same time, we devote significant attention to practitioners already in positions of responsibility. Our Global Executive Master (GEM) is designed for experienced professionals who cannot pause their careers, but recognize that the governance landscape in which they operate has changed fundamentally. Developed by the STG, the GEM convenes participants from EU institutions, national administrations, international organizations, business and civil society — professionals from a wide range of nationalities and institutional backgrounds, reflecting the coalitions required to address complex problems. The program is structured to fit the reality of leadership today. Delivered part time over two years, it combines online learning with residential periods in Florence and executive study visits in key policy centres. This blended format allows participants to remain in full-time roles while advancing their qualifications and networks, and it ensures that learning is continuously tested against institutional realities rather than remaining an abstract exercise. Participants specialize in tracks such as geopolitics and security, tech and governance, economy and finance, or energy and climate. Alongside this subject depth, they build capabilities more commonly associated with top executive programs than traditional public policy degrees: change management, negotiations, strategic communication, foresight and leadership under uncertainty. These skills are essential for bridging policy design and implementation — a gap that is increasingly visible as governments struggle to deliver on ambitious agendas. Executive study visits are a core element of this practice-oriented approach. In a recent Brussels visit, GEM participants engaged with high-level speakers from the European Commission, the European External Action Service, the Council, the European Parliament, NATO, Business Europe, Fleishman Hillard and POLITICO itself. Over several days, they discussed foreign and security policy, industrial strategy, strategic foresight and the governance of emerging technologies. These encounters do more than illustrate theory; they give participants a chance to stress-test their assumptions, understand the constraints facing decision-makers and build relationships across institutional boundaries. via EUI Throughout the program, each participant develops a capstone project that addresses a strategic challenge connected to a policy organization, often their own employer. This ensures that executive education translates into institutional impact: projects range from new regulatory approaches and partnership models to internal reforms aimed at making organizations more agile and resilient. At the same time, they help weave a durable transnational network of practitioners who can work together beyond the programme. Across our activities at the STG, a common thread runs through our work: a commitment to defending and renewing the liberal order through concrete practice. Addressing the rupture or transition we are living through requires more than technical fixes. It demands leaders who can think systemically, act across borders and design governance solutions that are both unconventional and democratically legitimate. > Across our activities at the STG, a common thread runs through our work: a > commitment to defending and renewing the liberal order through concrete > practice. In a period defined by systemic risk and strategic competition, leadership development cannot remain sectoral or reactive. It must be interdisciplinary, practice-oriented and anchored in real policy environments. At the Florence School of Transnational Governance, we aim to create precisely this kind of learning community — one where students, fellows and executives work side by side to reimagine how institutions can respond to global challenges. For policymakers and professionals who recognize themselves in this moment of rupture, our programs — including the GEM — offer a space to step back, learn with peers and return to their institutions better equipped to lead change. The task is urgent, but it is also an opportunity: by investing in transnational governance education today, we can help lay the foundations for a more resilient and inclusive order tomorrow.

NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte on Sunday offered a full-throated endorsement of President Donald Trump’s military efforts against Iran and also said he expects the nations of NATO to come together to support Trump. “What I know is that we always come together,” Rutte told host Margaret Brennan on CBS’ “Face the Nation.” Rutte has consistently been supportive of Trump even as some of the leading European powers — noting that NATO is intended to be a defensive alliance — have expressed reluctance to help Trump with the Iran war, including with U.S. efforts to make the Strait of Hormuz safe for the passage of oil tankers. Trump, for his part, has lashed out at NATO. “Without the U.S.A., NATO IS A PAPER TIGER! They didn’t want to join the fight to stop a Nuclear Powered Iran,” he wrote on Truth Social on Friday. “Now that fight is Militarily WON, with very little danger for them, they complain about the high oil prices they are forced to pay, but don’t want to help open the Strait of Hormuz, a simple military maneuver that is the single reason for the high oil prices. So easy for them to do, with so little risk. COWARDS, and we will REMEMBER!” Rutte, while expressing reluctance to criticize the European leaders, said of Trump: “He’s doing this to make the whole world safe.” A former prime minister of the Netherlands, Rutte told Brennan it was taking the European powers some time to come around because they had been left out of the initial planning in an effort to preserve the element of surprise of the American and Israeli attacks. “I understand the president’s frustration that it takes some time, but again I also ask for some understanding because nations had to prepare for this not knowing,” Rutte said. In supporting the current military campaign, Rutte contrasted the military actions against Iran with the world’s efforts to prevent North Korea from acquiring a nuclear weapon. “We have seen with North Korea if we negotiate for too long, you might pass the moment when you can still get this thing done and North Korea now has the nuclear capability,” he said, saying a nuclear-armed Iran would be a clear threat to Israel, Europe and the stability of the world.

The Trump administration is telling foreign officials and others that it will not reschedule a summit between the U.S. president and Chinese leader Xi Jinping until the Iran war ends. A Washington-based diplomat privy to U.S.-China summit planning confirmed that the administration has made clear “the next dates for the Trump-Xi summit will only be proposed after the active part of the Iran conflict is over.” A Washington-based individual close to the administration also briefed on White House summit planning confirmed the administration shared that timeline. POLITICO granted both the people anonymity because they were not authorized to speak publicly about sensitive diplomatic discussions. The U.S. State Department directed queries to the White House. The White House denied the summit timeline was tied to the Iran war. “This is fake news. The United States and China are having productive discussions about rescheduling President Trump’s visit — announcements are forthcoming,” White House spokesperson Anna Kelly said. The Chinese embassy said it had “no information to provide” about the possible delay in summit scheduling. The long-anticipated meeting between Trump and Xi had originally been planned for the end of March, but Trump said Monday the meeting would be pushed back “a month or so” because “we’ve got a war going on.” On Thursday, he said it would happen in “about a month and a half.” Speaking to reporters on Wednesday, White House spokesperson Karoline Leavitt suggested the meeting might not take place until after May. “The president has some things here at home in May that he has to attend to, and I’m sure President Xi is a very busy man, as well, so we’ll get the dates on the books as soon as we can,” Leavitt said. Tying the summit preparations to the end of the Iran conflict could mean additional delays to a meeting intended to maintain stability in a fragile U.S.-China trade truce. As the war on Iran enters its fourth week, the Trump administration appears to be preparing for a longer conflict. The U.S. has made detailed plans for the deployment of ground troops onto Iranian soil, CBS News reported Friday. The administration is also moving to dispatch thousands of troops to the region. Trump told reporters Thursday he’s “not putting troops anywhere” but then added: “If I were, I certainly wouldn’t tell you.” “There are operational constraints to managing a war from a foreign country — particularly a hostile one like China,” said the person close to the administration. “It would be terribly awkward for Trump and Xi to transact in this climate.” On Friday, Trump signaled a potential wind-down in the Iran conflict in a Truth Social post, suggesting the U.S. could scale back its role while pushing allies to take on more responsibility in securing the Strait of Hormuz, the major commercial waterway that connects the Persian Gulf to the Arabian Sea. “We are getting very close to meeting our objectives as we consider winding down our great military efforts in the Middle East,” Trump wrote. Trump and Xi made progress toward heading off an intensified trade war in an October meeting in South Korea. During that meeting, Xi committed to Chinese purchases of U.S. agricultural products like soybeans and the elimination of many of Beijing’s restrictions on critical minerals exports. In return, Trump agreed to extend a pause on triple-digit tariffs on Chinese goods. Wendy Cutler, a former negotiator in the U.S. Trade Representative’s office, argued this work can continue even if Trump and Xi don’t meet again in person. “The stabilization part of this won’t necessarily be jeopardized without a meeting,” she said. “Now, if something happens in the war, either foreseen or unforeseen, there’s just lots of flash points that can threaten this truce, which are unforeseeable at this period.” Rush Doshi, former senior director for China and Taiwan in the Biden administration, said a meeting between the two leaders is important to strengthening and maintaining the bilateral relationship. “Without leader-to-leader communication to manage a relationship of this complexity until the war is over — and there’s no sense of when the war is going to be over — there’s a real risk the relationship is going to be less stable than people might have expected,” said Doshi, now at the Council on Foreign Relations.

BRUSSELS — The European Parliament will hold a committee vote on the EU-U.S. trade deal this week, top lawmakers decided on Tuesday, in a step that will be met with relief in Washington.  Lawmakers from the Parliament’s trade committee will vote on Thursday on legislation to scrap tariffs on U.S. industrial goods — representing the backbone of the EU’s pledge in the trade deal reached at President Donald Trump’s Turnberry golf resort in Scotland last summer. Bernd Lange, chair of the trade committee, said Tuesday’s discussion had been “quite smooth” and had achieved a broad understanding. “Therefore we will go for the vote on Thursday,” he told POLITICO. The decision unblocks a weeks-long deadlock, as EU lawmakers balked at approving a deal that appeared at risk of unraveling. First, the U.S. Supreme Court in February struck down most of the tariffs on which the Turnberry accord was based. Then Trump’s threats to annex Greenland and slap an embargo on Spain further soured sentiment. Lawmakers from Socialists & Democrats, liberals and Greens have pushed for reassurances from Washington before moving to a vote, while the center-right European People’s Party (EPP) is adamant that the deal must be approved quickly to avoid retaliation by Trump and bring stability to businesses. “We have a big majority today,” said EPP negotiator Željana Zovko.  A date for a final plenary vote will be determined on Wednesday, said Lange, adding that this could take place in March or April. Only then would the European Parliament enter negotiations with EU capitals and the European Commission on a compromise that would finally implement the deal.  Lange, a veteran German Social Democrat who is also the lead lawmaker on the file, proposed new amendments to the legislation that won the backing of the EPP. He has said that his changes mainly included stronger language on the EU’s own protections in case Washington fails to keep its side of the deal. “Sunrise clause, and sunset, and suspension, and so on, some fine-tuning,” Lange had told POLITICO on Monday.  Lange will travel to Washington after the vote on Thursday, and is expected to meet Trade Representative Jamieson Greer on Friday, along with a delegation of EU lawmakers.

Netflix co-CEO Ted Sarandos arrives in Brussels on Tuesday with a clear message for EU regulators ahead of a looming review of Europe’s streaming rules: Don’t overcomplicate them. In an exclusive interview with POLITICO, Sarandos said Netflix can live with regulation — but warned the EU not to fracture the single market with a patchwork of national mandates as officials prepare to reopen the Audiovisual Media Services Directive. “It doesn’t make it a very healthy business environment if you don’t know if the rules are going to change midway through production,” Sarandos said. He also warned regulators are underestimating YouTube as a direct competitor for TV viewing, too often treating it like a social media platform with “a bunch of cat videos” than a massive streaming rival. Sarandos’ effort to win over European regulators comes soon after the collapse of Netflix’s bid to buy Warner Bros. Discovery — but Sarandos maintained that the political dynamics around the deal only “complicated the narrative, not the actual outcomes.” He added that there was no political interference in the deal, and he shrugged off President Donald Trump’s demand to remove Susan Rice, a former national security adviser under President Barack Obama, from the Netflix board. “It was a social media post,” Sarandos said. “It was not ideal, but he does a lot of things on social media.” This conversation has been edited for length and clarity. What’s bringing you back to Brussels now? Well, we have ongoing meetings with regulators around Europe all the time. We have so much business in Europe, obviously, and so this has been on the books for quite a while. Can you give me a little bit of a sense of who you’re meeting with, and what is the focus? I think one of the things to keep in mind is that we’ve become such an important part, I’d think, of the European audiovisual economy. We’ve spent, in the last decade, over $13 billion in creating content in Europe. It makes us one of the leading producers and exporters of European storytelling. First of all, we’ve got a lot of skin in the game in Europe, obviously. We work with over 600 independent European producers. We created about 100,000 cast and crew jobs in Europe from our productions. So we talk to folks who are interested in all the elements of that — how to keep it, how to maintain it, how to grow it and how to protect it. In terms of regulation in the EU, Netflix is governed by a directive here. The commission is looking to reopen that this year. There seems to be a sense here from regulators that the current rules don’t create a level playing field between the broadcasters, the video on demand, the video sharing, and so they may look to put more requirements on that. How steeped in the details are you there? And how would Netflix react to more rules put on Netflix at this moment? Well, first and foremost, we comply with all the rules that apply to us in terms of how we’re regulated today. We have seen by operating around the world that those countries where they lean more into incentives than the strict regulatory scheme, that the incentives pay off. We’ve got multibillion dollar investments in Spain and the UK, where they have really leaned into attracting production through incentives versus regulatory mandates, so we find that that’s a much more productive environment to work in. But the core for me is that obviously they’re going to evolve the regulatory models, but as long as they remain simple, predictable, consistent — the single market, the benefit of the single-market is this — as long as these rules remain simple, predictable and consistent, it’s a good operating model. I think the more that it gets broken up by individual countries and individual mandates, you lose all the benefits of the single market. There’s a lot of talk in Brussels right now about simplification, getting rid of a lot of red tape. Do you think the rules that you’re governed by would benefit from a similar kind of effort to simplify, of pulling back on a lot of these patchwork of rules, even at the EU? Look, I think it doesn’t make it a very healthy business environment if you don’t know if the rules are going to change midway through production, so for me, having some stability is really important, and I understand that we’re in a dynamic market and a dynamic business, and they should reflect the current operating models that we’re in too. We want to work closely with the regulators to make sure that what they’re doing and what we’re doing kind of reflect each other, which is trying to protect the healthy work environment for folks in Europe. When you meet with regulators here, is there a message you’re going to be delivering to them or what do you want them to walk away with in terms of the bottom line for you in terms of your business at this moment in the EU? I think some things are well understood and other things I think are less so. I think our commitment to European production is unique in the world. Both in our original production but also in our investment in second right’s windows that we pre-invest in films that compel production. Tens of millions of dollars’ worth of film production is compelled by our licensing agreements as well beyond our original production. And the fact that we work with local European producers on these projects — I think there’s a misconception that we don’t. And the larger one is the economic impact that that brings to Europe and to the world with our original program strategy that supports so many, not just the productions themselves but even tourism in European countries. Think about President [Emmanuel] Macron pointing out that 38 percent of people who went to France last year cited “Emily in Paris” as one of the top reasons they went. We’ve seen that in other countries. We saw it in Madrid with the “Casa de Papel.” And so it’s one of those things where it really raises all boats across the economies of these countries. Regulators often focus on the competition between streaming services, but as you know very well, younger audiences are spending more time on platforms like YouTube. Do you think policymakers are underestimating that shift? Would you like to see that taken into account more in the regulatory landscape? One of the things that we saw in recent months with the Warner Brothers transaction is a real deep misunderstanding about what YouTube is and isn’t. YouTube is a straightforward direct competitor for television, either a local broadcaster or a streamer like Netflix. The connected television market is a zero-sum screen. So whichever one you choose, that’s what you’re watching tonight. And you monetize through subscription or advertising or both, but at the end of the day, it’s that choosing to engage in how you give them and how, and how that programming is monetized is a very competitive landscape and it includes YouTube. I think what happens is people think of YouTube as a bunch of cat videos and maybe some way to, to promote your stuff by putting it on there for free. But it turns out it is a zero-sum game. You’re going to be choosing at the expense of an RTL or Netflix. I think in this case it’s one of these things where recognizing and understanding that YouTube is in the same exact game that we are. Do you feel like you’re on different planes though, in the eyes of regulators at this moment? I don’t think that they see them as a direct competitor in that way. I think they think of that as an extension of social media. And the truth is when we talk about them as a competitor, we’re only talking about them on the screen. I’m not talking about their mobile usage or any of that. You know, about 55 percent of all YouTube engagement now is on the television through their app. So to me, that’s the thing to keep an eye on. As you get into this, it’s a pretty straightforward, competitive model and we think probably should have a level playing field relative to everybody else. Who do you view as Netflix’s main competitors today? Look, our competitive space is really the television screen. When people pick up the remote and pick what to watch, everyone is in that mix. We identified YouTube — this isn’t new for us — we identified YouTube as a competitor in the space 10 years ago, even before they moved to the television. And I think, for the most part, TikTok forced their hand to move to the television because they were kind of getting chased off the phone more or less by TikTok. I think that’s the other one that regulators should pay a lot of attention to is what’s happening with the rise of TikTok engagement as well. It’s not directly competitive for us, but it is for attention and time and to your point, maybe the next generation’s consumer behavior. Last question on regulation: With the EU looking at the rules again, there’s a tendency always to look to tinker more and more and do more. Is there a point at what regulation starts affecting your willingness to invest in European production? Well, like I said, those core principles of predictability and simplicity have really got to come into play, because I think what happens is, just like any business, you have to be able to plan. So, if you make a production under one set of regs and release it under another, it’s not a very stable business environment. The topic that dominated a lot of your attention in recent months was obviously the merger talks with Warner Brothers Discovery. I know you’ve said it didn’t work for financial reasons. I want to ask you a little bit about the political dynamics. How much did the political environment, including the Susan Rice incident, how much did that complicate the calculus in your mind? I think it complicated the narrative, not the actual outcomes. I think for us it was always a business transaction, was always a well-regulated process in the U.S. The Department of Justice was handling it, everything was moving through. We were very confident we did not have a regulatory issue. Why would that be? It’s because it was very much a vertical transaction. I can’t name a transaction that was similar to this that has ever been blocked in history. We did not have duplicated assets. We did have a market concentration issue in the marketplace that we operate in. And I think that’s the feedback I was getting back from the DOJ and from regulators in general, which was, they understood that, but I do think that Paramount did a very nice job of creating a very loud narrative of a regulatory challenge that didn’t exist. But looking back to those early days of the merger discussions, did you have an appreciation for what might follow in terms of that complicated narrative? Yeah. Look, I think it opens up the door to have a lot of conversations that you wouldn’t have had otherwise, but that’s okay. A lot great things came out of it, the process itself. I would say in total, we had a price for where we thought this was good for our business. We made our best and final offer back in December and it was our best and final offer. So that’s all. But what came out a bit that’s positive is, we’ve had really healthy conversations with folks who we hardly ever talked to, theater operators, as a good example. I had a great meeting in February with the International Union of Cinemas, and the heads from all the different countries about what challenges they have, how we could be more helpful, or how they could be helpful to us too. I think we’ll come out of this with a much more creative relationship with exhibitions around the world. And by way of example, doing things that we haven’t done before. I don’t recommend testifying before the Senate again, but it was an interesting experience for sure. Probably a good learning experience. Hopefully not in the future for anything that you don’t want to be there for, but yes. Yeah, exactly. We’ve always said from the beginning, the Warner transaction was a nice-to-have at the right price, not a must-have-at-any-price. The business is healthy, growing organically. We’re growing on the path that we laid out several years ago and we didn’t really need this to grow the business. These assets are out there through our growth period and they’re going to be out there and for our next cycle growth as well and we’ve got to compete with that just like we knew we had to at the beginning. This was I think something that would fortify and maybe accelerate some of our existing models, but it doesn’t change our outcome. Are there regrets or things you might have wished you’d done differently? I mean honestly we took a very disciplined approach. I think we intentionally did not get distracted by the narrative noise, because we knew, we recognized what it was right away, which is just narrative noise. This deal was very good for the industry. Very good for both companies, Warner Brothers and Netflix. Our intent was obviously to keep those businesses operating largely as they are now. All the synergies that we had in the deal were mostly technologies and managerial, so we would have kept a big growth engine going in Hollywood and around the world. The alternative, which we’ve always said, is a lot of cutting. I think regulators in Europe and regulators in the U.S. should keep an eye on horizontal mergers. They should keep a close eye on [leveraged buyouts]. They typically are not good for the economy anywhere they happen. What were you preparing for in terms of the EU regulatory scrutiny with Warner Brothers? What was your read on how that might have looked? I think we’re a known entity in Europe. Keep in mind, like in Q4 of last year, we reported $3.5 billion or $3.8 billion in European revenues. So 18 percent year-on-year growth. The EU is now our largest territory. We’re a known entity there. The reason we didn’t take out press releases, we had meetings in Europe as we know everybody. We talked to the regulators, both at the EU and at the country level. And I do think that in many of the countries that we operate in, we’re a net contributor to the local economy, which I think is really important. We’ve got 12 offices across Europe with 2,500 people. So we’re members of the local ecosystem, we’re not outsiders. With President Trump, he demanded that Netflix remove Susan Rice from the board or pay the consequences. Did that cross a line for you in terms of political interference? It was a social media post, and we didn’t, no, it did not. It was not ideal, but he does a lot of things on social media. So you didn’t interpret it as anything bigger than that. I mean, he does that one day, he could obviously weigh in on content the next day. How does somebody like you manage situations like that? I think it’s really important to be able to separate noise from signal, and I think a lot of what happens in a world where we have a lot of noise. There was so much attention to you going to the White House that day. And we didn’t learn until several days later that you didn’t actually have the meetings that were predicted. Before you arrived in Washington that day, had you already made the decision not to proceed? Not before arriving in Washington, but we knew the framework for if this, then that. So, yeah, I would say that it was interesting, but again, we don’t make a big parade about our meetings with government and with the regulators. I had a meeting on the books with the DOJ scheduled several weeks before, meeting with Susie Wiles, the president’s chief of staff, scheduled several months before, unrelated to the Warner Brothers deal. And that was just the calendar that lined up that way. We didn’t know when Warner Brothers would make the statement about the deal. It’s all very dramatic, like it belongs on Netflix as a movie. There was paparazzi outside of the White House waiting for me when I came out. I’ve never experienced that before. Yeah, it’s a remarkable story. I would tell you, and I’m being honest with you, there was no political interference in this deal. The president is interested in entertainment and interested in deals, so he was curious about the mechanics of things and how things were going to go or whatever, but he made it very clear that this was under the DOJ. So it’s just like we all spun it up from the media? How do you explain it all? First of all, Netflix is clickbait. So people write about Netflix and it gets read. And that’s a pretty juicy story. And [Trump] said, and by the way, like I said, he makes statements sometimes that lead to the beliefs of things that do and sometimes that don’t materialize at all. But I found my conversations with him were 100 percent about the industry, protecting the industry. And I think it’s very healthy that the president of the United States speaks to business leaders about industries that are important to the economy. To what degree did the narrative or the fact that David Ellison had a relationship or seemed to have a relationship with people in Washington who were in power, that that might have swayed or changed the dynamic at the end with where Warner Brothers went though? I can’t speak to what their thinking is on it. I feel like for me, it’s very important to know the folks in charge, but I wouldn’t count on it if you’re doing something that is not in the best interest of the country or the economy. You talked with Trump in the past about entertainment jobs. Were there specific policies you’ve advocated to him or anything that he brought up on that point? He has brought up tariffs for the movie and television industry many times. And I’ve hopefully talked to him the way out of them. I just said basically the same thing I said earlier. I think that incentive works much better. We’re seeing it in the U.S. things like the states compete with each other for production incentives and those states with good, healthy incentive programs attract a lot of production, and you’ve seen a lot of them move from California to Georgia to New Jersey, kind of looking for that what’s the best place to operate in, where you could put more on the screen. And I do think that having the incentives versus tariffs is much better. Netflix is now buying Ben Affleck’s AI company. What areas do you see AI having the most potential to change Netflix’s workflow? My focus is that AI should be a creator tool. But with the same way production tools have evolved over time, AI is just a rapid, important evolution of these tools. It is one of those. And the idea that the creators could use it to do things that they could never do before to do it. Potentially, they could do faster and cheaper. But the most impact will be if they can make it better. I don’t think faster and cheaper matters if it’s not better. This is the most competitive time in the history of media. So you’ve gotta be better every time out of the gate. And faster and cheaper consumers are not looking for faster and cheaper, they’re looking for better. I do think that AI, particularly InterPositive, the company we bought from Ben, will help creators make things better. Using their own dailies, using their own production materials to make the film that they’re making better. Still requires writers and actors and lighting techs and all the things that you’d use to make a movie, but be able to make the movie more effective, more efficient. Being able to do pick up shots and things like this that you couldn’t do before. It’s really remarkable. It’s a really remarkable company. As AI improves, do you see the role of human voice actors shrinking at Netflix? What’s interesting about that is if you look at the evolution of tools for dubbing and subtitling, the one for dubbing, we do a lot of A-B tests that people, if you watch something and you don’t like it, you just turn it off. The one thing that we find to be the most important part of dubbing is the performance. So good voice actors really matter. Yeah, it’s a lot cheaper to use AI, but without the performance, which is very human, it actually runs down the quality of the production. Will it evolve over time? Possibly, but it won’t evolve without the cooperation and the training of the actual voice actors themselves too. I think what will happen is you’ll be able to do things like pick up lines that you do months and months after the production. You’ll be able to recreate some of those lines in the film without having to call everybody back and redo everything which will help make a better film. You’re in the sort of early stages of a push into video podcast. What have you learned so far about what works and what doesn’t? It’s really early. The main thing is we’ve got a broad cross-section of podcasts. It’s nowhere near as complete as other podcast outlets yet. But the things that we leaned into are the things that are working. We kind of figured they would. You’ve got true crime, sports, comedy, all those things that we do well in the doc space already. And I really am excited about things where people can develop and deepen the relationship with the show itself or the [intellectual property] itself. Our Bridgerton podcast is really popular, and people really want to go deeper and we want to be able to provide that for them. I think a video podcast is just the evolution of talk shows. We have tried to and failed at many talk shows over the years, and for the most part it’s because the old days of TV, when 40 million people used to tune in to the Tonight Show every night, [are over]. What’s happened now is that it’s much smaller audiences that tune into multiple shows in the form of a podcast every day. And then they come up to be way bigger than the 40 million that Johnny Carson used to get. They’re all individual, and it’s a deeper relationship than it is a broad one. So instead of trying to make one show for the world, you might have to make hundreds or thousands of shows for the whole world.

LONDON — War in the Middle East has put Keir Starmer in a tight spot.  The U.K. government can’t afford to spend big on protecting voters from looming energy bill hikes. But politically, the British prime minister has little choice.  Starmer said Monday that his “first instinct” in responding to the Iran conflict — and the global energy price shock it has triggered — is protecting the household finances of ordinary voters.  “It’s moments like this that tell you what a government is about,” Starmer said, addressing yet another hastily-arranged Downing Street press conference.   “My answer is clear. Whatever the challenges that lie ahead, this government will always support working people.”  He was announcing £53 million in state support for low-income families already hit by a sharp rise in the cost of heating oil, a fuel that warms around one in 20 U.K. homes.    But much bigger, much pricier policy choices are coming down the track.    STRAITENED FINANCES A regulated cap on energy costs is keeping a lid on most people’s household bills. But the current cap expires in July — at which point, without intervention, bills could jump significantly. Wholesale gas prices, which significantly influence household bills, have nearly doubled since the crisis began. Starmer’s Energy Secretary Ed Miliband told The Mirror newspaper he would “keep looking at how we can do more” to protect consumers. The government must decide how big they go with any support package.  But the Institute for Fiscal Studies think tank has already sounded the alarm over the government’s fiscal wiggle room. “The public finances are in a more strained position than they were [in 2022] at the start of the Russia-Ukraine war, and a sustained increase in energy prices is likely to worsen them further,” the think tank said last week. Starmer sought to contrast the situation now with that faced by Liz Truss’s Conservative government in 2022, and her multi-billion pound energy bailout.  The policy reduced the energy bills of every family in the country. It also, coupled with sweeping tax cuts, led sterling to crash, borrowing costs to soar, and forced Truss out of her job days later.  His Labour government, Starmer said, had “brought stability back to our public finances, stability that I will never put at risk.”  Now he faces the challenge of meeting that pledge on stability, while standing by his cost-of-living guarantee to the British people.   TO TARGET To help people most exposed to rising bills, while avoiding Truss’s fate, the obvious option for Starmer is to make a targeted intervention on energy bills come July.  The heating oil policy follows this approach, aimed squarely at “people who need it most,” Chancellor Rachel Reeves said Monday. The Treasury is similarly looking at “targeted options” for any future energy support package, she told The Times at the weekend.  Starmer himself said on Monday “we’re not ruling anything out.” But the signals are that a universal offer like Truss’s — which ended up costing an eye-watering £23 billion — is unlikely.   Among Labour MPs, the penny is already dropping that not all households will benefit from government largesse.   “It’s right that the government steps in at a time of national crisis and supports those that are struggling,” Suffolk Coastal MP Jenny Riddell-Carpenter told the BBC on Monday. “But it’s complex,” she added. “There isn’t a limitless pot of money.”   And targeting the right people for help will not be straightforward. In 2022, government lacked the data required to know which households should be targeted, Reeves told MPs on the Treasury committee last week.    Work on this inside government is now “more advanced,” she insisted. But officials still lack the targeting data needed, said Ben Westerman, director of policy at the energy campaign group Electrify Britain.    Officials simply “haven’t moved on” with targeting data since the last energy crisis, Westerman said, adding: “That is a failure of governments plural to learn the lessons from last time.”   Energy companies, pushing ministers over the issue, have grown frustrated.   “Industry has called for government to provide the data so that we can target support [to] those who need it. And there’s just been little to no progress on this,” Caitlin Berridge-Dunn, head of external affairs at energy supplier Utilita, said.  NEW AND OLD IDEAS  One option, separate from bills, would be to maintain a longstanding, five pence per liter tax relief on gasoline and diesel, a fuel duty cut which expires in September. The oil price shock has driven up costs at the pump by more than eight pence per liter for gasoline and more than 18 pence for diesel. Another approach officials could opt for, according to Westerman, and reported in The Times Monday, is to expand the existing Warm Homes Discount, a one-off payment to reduce bills for the poorest households, as a vehicle for getting more support to people who need it most.  But that approach, he cautioned, would not catch the “squeezed middle” of households.   Another option is to repeat a trick Starmer and Reeves pulled off at last year’s budget — shifting green and other levies currently added to energy bills into general taxation.   Miliband hailed that move at the time — which saved around £150 on the average energy bills — as a way of “asking some of the wealthiest in our society” to subsidize everyone’s bills.  There is enthusiasm for the principle in Whitehall, even if no decisions have yet been made. A government official, granted anonymity because they were not authorized to speak on the record, said the £150 cut could be “the beginning of a big principled move” of the burden of energy costs from consumers onto tax.     A study by the industry group the MCS Foundation found that moving all such levies onto taxation could cut bills by up to £410 a year. But that, of course, would put taxpayers on the hook. MCS Foundation estimated it would cost £5.7 billion per year. The most important difference from the Truss era, argued Sam Alvis, a former Labour adviser and now a director of energy security and environment at the influential IPPR think tank, is that Starmer cannot hang around.  The government should be planning any intervention now and not allow prices to rise in July, he argued, avoiding a repeat of the last Conservative government’s mis-step, when it waited until the fall to act.  “I think the public tolerance for [energy bill] increases will be a lot lower than it was in 2022, when Liz Truss waited from February to September to react,” Alvis said. “I just don’t think we’ll have that same time.” 

The 21st century is more likely to belong to Beijing than to Washington — at least that’s the view from four key U.S. allies. Swaths of the public in Canada, Germany, France and the U.K. have soured on the U.S., driven by President Donald Trump’s foreign policy decisions, according to recent results from The POLITICO Poll. Respondents in these countries increasingly see China as a more dependable partner than the U.S. and believe the Asian economic colossus is leading on advanced technologies, including artificial intelligence. Critically, Europeans surveyed see it as possible to reduce reliance on the U.S. but harder to reduce reliance on China — suggesting newfound entanglements that could drastically tip the balance of global power away from the West. Here are five key takeaways from the poll highlighting the pivot from the U.S. to China. The POLITICO Poll — in partnership with U.K. polling firm Public First — found that respondents in those four allied countries believe it is better to depend on China than the U.S. following Trump’s turbulent return to office. That appears to be driven by Trump’s disruption, not by a newfound stability in China: In a follow-up question, a majority of respondents in both Canada and Germany agreed that any attempts to get closer to China are because the U.S. has become harder to depend on — not because China itself has become a more reliable partner. Many respondents in France (38 percent) and the U.K. (42 percent) also shared that sentiment. Under Trump’s “America First” ethos, Washington has upended the “rules-based international order” of the past with sharp-elbowed policies that have isolated the U.S. on the global stage. This includes slow-walking aid to Ukraine, threatening NATO allies with economic punishment and withdrawing from major international institutions, including the World Health Organization and the United Nations Human Rights Council. His punitive liberation day tariffs, as well as threats to annex Greenland and make Canada “the 51st state,” have only further strained relationships with top allies. Beijing has seized the moment to cultivate better business ties with European countries looking for an alternative to high U.S. tariffs on their exports. Last October, Beijing hosted a forum aimed at shoring up mutual investments with Europe. More recently, senior Chinese officials described EU-China ties as a partnership rather than a rivalry. “The administration has assisted the Chinese narrative by acting like a bully,” Mark Lambert, former deputy assistant secretary of State for China and Taiwan in the Biden administration, told POLITICO. “Everyone still recognizes the challenges China poses — but now, Washington no longer works in partnership and is only focused on itself.” These sentiments are already being translated into action. Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney declared a “rupture” between Ottawa and Washington in January and backed that rhetoric by sealing a trade deal with Beijing that same month. The U.K. inked several high-value export deals with China not long after, while both French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz have returned from recent summits in Beijing with Chinese purchase orders for European products. Respondents across all four allied countries are broadly supportive of efforts to create some distance from the U.S. — and say they’re also more dependent on China. In Canada, 48 percent said it would be possible to reduce reliance on the U.S. and believe their government should do so. In the U.K., 42 percent said reducing reliance on the U.S. sounded good in theory, but were skeptical it could happen in practice. By contrast, fewer respondents across those countries believe it would actually be possible to reduce reliance on China — a testament to Beijing’s dominance of global supply chains. Young adults may be drawn to China as an alternative to U.S. cultural hegemony. Respondents between the ages of 18 and 24 were significantly more supportive than their older peers of building a closer relationship with China. A recent study commissioned by the Institute of European Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences — a Beijing-based think tank — suggests most young Europeans get their information about China and Chinese life through social media. Nearly 70 percent of those aged 18 to 25 said they rely on social media and other short-form video platforms for information on China. And the media they consume is likely overwhelmingly supportive of China, as TikTok, one of the most popular social media platforms in the world, was built by Chinese company ByteDance and has previously been accused of suppressing content deemed negative toward China. According to Alicja Bachulska, a policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, younger generations believe the U.S. has led efforts to depict China as an authoritarian regime and a threat to democracy, while simultaneously degrading its own democratic values. The trend “pushes a narrative that ‘we’ve been lied to’ about what China is,” said Bachulska, as “social sentiment among the youth turns against the U.S.” “It’s an expression of dissatisfaction with the state of U.S. politics,” she added. There’s a clear consensus among those surveyed in Europe and Canada that China is winning the global tech race — a coveted title central to Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s grand policy vision. China is leading the U.S. and other Western nations in the development of electric batteries and robotics, while Chinese designs have also become the global standard in electric vehicles and solar panels. “There has been a real vibe shift in global perception of Chinese tech and innovation dominance,” said Sarah Beran, who served as deputy chief of mission in the U.S. embassy in Beijing during the Biden administration. This digital rat race is most apparent in the fast-paced development of artificial intelligence. China has poured billions of dollars into research initiatives, poaching top tech talent from U.S. universities and funding state-backed tech firms to advance its interests in AI. The investment appears to be paying off — a plurality of respondents from Canada, Germany, France and the U.K. believe that China is more likely to develop the first superintelligent AI. But these advancements have done little to change American minds. A majority of respondents in the U.S. still see American-made tech as superior to Chinese tech, even in the realm of AI. As Washington and its allies grow more estranged, the perception of the U.S. as the dominant world power is in retreat — though most Americans don’t see it that way. About half of all respondents in Canada, Germany, France and the U.K. believe that China is rapidly becoming a more consequential superpower. This is particularly true among those who say the U.S. is no longer a positive force for the world. By contrast, 63 percent of respondents in the U.S. believe their nation will maintain its dominance in 10 years — reflecting major disparities in beliefs about global power dynamics between the U.S. and its European allies. This view of China as the world’s power center may not have been entirely organic. The U.S. has accused Beijing of pouring billions of dollars into international information manipulation efforts, including state-backed media initiatives and the deployment of tools to stifle online criticism of China and its policies. Some fear that a misplaced belief among U.S. allies in the inevitability of China surpassing the U.S. as a global superpower could be helping accelerate Beijing’s rise. “Europe is capable of defending itself against threats from China and contesting China’s vision of a more Sinocentric, authoritarian-friendly world order,” said Henrietta Levin, former National Security Council director for China in the Biden administration. “But if Europe believes this is impossible and does not try to do so, the survey results may become a self-fulfilling prophecy.” METHOLODGY The POLITICO Poll was conducted from Feb. 6 to Feb. 9, surveying 10,289 adults online, with at least 2,000 respondents each from the U.S., Canada, U.K., France and Germany. Results for each country were weighted to be representative on dimensions including age, gender and geography, and have an overall margin of sampling error of ±2 percentage points for each country. Smaller subgroups have higher margins of error.

By Anna Wiederkehr and Erin Doherty Many Americans give their country positive reviews. Some of the United States’ closest allies give far less flattering ratings. The POLITICO Poll, conducted across five countries, reveals a stark disconnect between how Americans see their country and how several top allies do. As the Trump administration’s aggressive posture abroad disrupts the longstanding world order, the United States’ global reputation appears far worse than Americans realize. In the U.S., the divergence is especially sharp along partisan lines. Americans who voted for President Donald Trump in 2024 overwhelmingly give the country high marks on the world stage. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- This article is part of an ongoing project from POLITICO and Public First, an independent polling company headquartered in London, to measure public opinion across a broad range of policy areas. You can find new surveys and analysis each month at politico.com/poll. Have questions or comments? Ideas for future surveys? Email us at poll@politico.com. Those who backed former Vice President Kamala Harris, however, offer negative assessments far closer to America’s allies. The results paint a lopsided picture, with Americans — driven by the president’s own supporters — increasingly on an island in how they view the country. It’s not just The POLITICO Poll that reveals this growing mismatch. Leaders across Europe and Canada are increasingly voicing their concern about Trump’s efforts to upend longtime alliances. The poll was conducted Feb. 6 to Feb. 9 in the United States, Canada and the three largest economies in Europe: France, Germany and the United Kingdom. We’ve turned the results from several key questions into ratings, comparing answers across countries. Here’s America, reviewed: “THE US PROTECTS DEMOCRACY” U.S. 4.9/10 About half of Americans, 49 percent, said the U.S. protects democracy, including three in four who backed Trump in 2024. On the contrary, just 35 percent of voters who backed Harris agreed. Featured review GERMANY 1.8/10 “I see no need for the Americans to now want to save democracy in Europe. If it would need to be saved, we would manage on our own.” —German Chancellor Friedrich Merz Dec. 9, 2025 Other reviews U.K. 3.4/10 CANADA 2.5/10 FRANCE 2.1/10 Question: “Thinking about the US, do you agree or disagree with the following? The US protects democracy.” The U.S. has long seen itself as a defender of democracy — both at home and abroad. But that reputation may be fraying amid growing unease among longtime allies about whether the U.S. still protects the democratic principles it once championed. When U.S. forces captured Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro earlier this year, Trump pointed to Maduro’s disputed election as part of the rationale for the operation, even as some allies and international experts questioned the legality of Washington’s intervention. “THE US IS MOSTLY A FORCE FOR STABILITY IN THE WORLD” U.S. 3.6/10 A 36 percent plurality of Americans said the U.S. is mostly a force for stability — more than double the share of adults in the other countries who said the same. Featured review FRANCE 1.5/10 “We have the Chinese tsunami on the trade front, and we have minute-by-minute instability on the American side. These two crises amount to a profound shock — a rupture for Europeans.” — French President Emmanuel Macron February, 2026 Other reviews U.K. 1.8/10 CANADA 1.4/10 GERMANY 1.3/10 Question: “Which of the following comes closest to your view on the US’s role in the world?” Options: The US is “mostly a force for stability in the world”, “sometimes a force for stability, sometimes a threat,” “mostly a threat to global stability,” “not very important to global stability either way,” or “don’t know.” The surveyed nations have been among the hardest hit by Trump’s sweeping trade agenda, resulting in strained economic and diplomatic relationships. The steep levies — and Trump’s repeated broadsides against U.S. allies — have left them doubting Washington’s reliability as both a partner and a stabilizing force. It’s not just that allies no longer see the United States as a force for stability. Sizable shares, including a 43 percent plurality in Canada, say the country is mostly a threat to global stability. At the Munich Security Conference last month, a number of global leaders openly questioned the United States’ standing in the international order. “THE US CAN BE DEPENDED UPON IN A CRISIS” U.S. 5.7/10 A 57 percent majority of Americans said the U.S. can be depended on in a crisis, more than double the share of adults in Canada, Germany and France who agree. Featured review CANADA 2.7/10 “It is clear that the United States is no longer a reliable partner. It is possible that, with comprehensive negotiations, we will be able to restore some trust, but there will be no turning back.” —Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney March 28, 2025 Other reviews U.K. 3.8/10 FRANCE 2.7/10 GERMANY 2.5/10 Question: “How would you rate The US on the following scales? Can be depended upon in a crisis | Can not be depended upon in a crisis” with the option to choose two levels of agreement on either side or a middle point between the two. The ratings displayed are a sum of the agreement of the levels on either side. The most common view among the close allies surveyed, in fact, was that the U.S. cannot be depended on in a crisis. That’s the opinion of a 57 percent majority in Canada, 51 percent majority in Germany, and pluralities in France (47 percent) and the U.K. (42 percent). Their concerns come as the Trump administration has clashed with allies over defense spending, trade and the scope of collective security agreements. Trump has repeatedly cast doubt over America’s commitments in Europe, fueling questions about whether Washington can be relied upon. “HAS THE MOST ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY” U.S. 5.3/10 Most Americans — 53 percent — said their country has the most advanced technology in comparison to the European Union and China. But top NATO allies disagree. Featured review U.K. 3.5/10 “China is a vital player on the global stage, and it’s vital that we build a more sophisticated relationship. … “Our international partnerships help us deliver the security and prosperity the British people deserve, and that is why I’ve long been clear that the UK and China need a long term, consistent, and comprehensive strategic partnership.” — UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer January, 2026 Other reviews CANADA 3.7/10 FRANCE 3.6/10 GERMANY 3/10 Question: “Comparing China, the EU, and The US, if you had to choose, which would you say…: Has the most advanced technology” with the option to choose China, the EU or the U.S. Trump sees the U.S. in close competition with China on technological advancements, repeatedly touting America as the global leader in artificial intelligence and chip production. But a majority of respondents in the other countries said China, not the United States or the European Union, has the most advanced technology: 54 percent in Canada, 55 percent in Germany, 53 percent in the U.K. and 50 percent in France. That perception gap could have real-world consequences. If longtime allies view Beijing as the technological leader, it could complicate Trump’s ability to rally partners around policies to try to curb China’s growth. ABOUT THE SURVEY The POLITICO Poll was conducted by Public First from Feb. 6 to 9, surveying 10,289 adults online, with at least 2,000 respondents each from the U.S., Canada, U.K., France and Germany. Results for each country were weighted to be representative on dimensions including age, gender and geography. The overall margin of sampling error is ±2 percentage points for each country. Smaller subgroups have higher margins of error.

NYÍREGYHÁZA, Hungary — Hungarian Prime Viktor Orbán’s political dominance is in question for the first time in 16 years. And in his ruling party’s rural stronghold, younger voters are complaining their elderly relatives are still spellbound by him. Capitalizing on voter frustration over record inflation, economic malaise and endemic corruption, opposition figure Péter Magyar’s campaign has turned his once small center-right Tisza party into a strong anti-Orbán bloc that now holds a national lead in the polls. His promises of building a “modern, European Hungary” are resonating — particularly with the young. But not so much with the older generation who are more resistant to Magyar’s call for change. And that generational divide, younger voters worry, may be a decisive factor in what’s shaping up to be the country’s most consequential election since the end of Communism. The northeastern town of Nyíregyháza, where more than half the population is over 50 years old, is a prime example of this. Long a Fidesz fortress, town residents were hesitant to talk to media or share their last names for fear of online reprisal, particularly the older generation of ruling party supporters. However, some Tisza voters were willing to speak and lament their Orbán-supporting elders — like 27-year-old actor and former Fidesz voter Benji. Asking not to share his family name for fear of trolling on social media, “I’m rooting for Tisza, and I’m hoping there will be some change. The country is heading in the wrong direction, culturally and business-wise,” he told POLITICO. But, he added, in a conversation interrupting his short walk to the theater, “my mom is voting for Orbán because of the war. And her friends as well.” According to Benji, Orbán’s laser-like campaigning about the risks of being sucked into the war in neighboring Ukraine, and his relentless portrayal of Magyar as a Brussels stooge, is working like a spell on the elderly in Nyíregyháza, which is just 70 kilometers from the Ukrainian border. So, too, is his argument that the country needs political stability and that his is the safest pair of hands to navigate these highly dangerous times. Péter Magyar’s promises of building a “modern, European Hungary” are resonating — particularly with the young. | Ferenc Isza/AFP via Getty Images It’s not just in Nyíregyháza that the generational divide spells trouble for Magyar either. Tisza faces a similar problem in other eastern and southern towns, as Fidesz’s traditional heartland has seen a near-constant exodus of the young in search of jobs and opportunities in Budapest or overseas. This youthful flight has only buttressed Fidesz’s regional dominance over the years, and if Tisza is to oust the long-serving Hungarian leader, it will have to win at least some of these towns. And given Orbán’s incumbent advantages, dominance over government-owned airwaves and the largely obliging press controlled by his business allies, Tisza will only have a chance of unseating him if it can erode his party’s traditional vote. Nyíregyháza’s older population is particularly tight-lipped, but Katalin, a 70-year-old semi-retired credit advisor, was happy speak. Once a loyal Fidesz voter, she’s now doing her best to cajole her peers toward Tisza, though she admits whipping up support among her peers in her hometown has been tough, particularly because of the war. “I’m trying to convince everyone that I can to vote for the opposition. But, unfortunately, I have Fidesz voters in my circle. I can’t believe they’re not seeing what this filth is doing,” she said. Dotted around the town are Fidesz billboards depicting Magyar as Janus-like, with half his face transformed into the EU flag. Others group together portraits of Magyar, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, implying they’re all one and the same. “When I talk to my mom about politics, I feel like she’s brainwashed. I try to speak with her to raise her awareness and to encourage her to question things, so she could see behind what’s in the news. My mom is 64. But she and her friends are going to vote for Fidesz,” Benji similarly complained. Tisza will only have a chance of unseating Viktor Orbán if it can erode his party’s traditional vote. | Attila Kisbenedek/AFP via Getty Images Tibor, an IT worker, is encountering the same with his grandmother. “She’s a big fan of the ruling party. And one of my relatives is working for Fidesz, so they are, of course, voting for Orbán,” he explained. “I have no clue why anyone would vote for Fidesz. I feel like they’re just old and glued to watching the government TV channels. They have tunnel vision.” The last time Hungary held parliamentary elections in 2022, opposition hopes were similarly high, but that’s not how things turned out: Fidesz secured the highest vote share of any party in Hungary since the fall of Communism in 1989. “We won a victory so big that you can see it from the moon, and you can certainly see it from Brussels,” boasted an ebullient Orbán. And in the Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg region, where Nyíregyháza is the county capital, Fidesz crushed the opposition with a 61 percent vote share — 7 percent higher than the party’s national take. Yet, Tisza is sure this time will be different, partly because it’s fielding local star László Gajdos as its main candidate here. Hungarians cast two votes — one for the national party list and another for their preferred candidate in single-member district constituencies. Of the 199 seats in the National Assembly, 106 are filled by winners of the district races, while the remaining 93 seats are distributed among winners of the party lists. And Gajdos, a highly popular director of the Nyíregyháza Zoo, is running on both. Even pro-Fidesz observers like Mráz Ágoston Sámuel, director of the research consultancy Nézőpont Institute, expect Tisza to win more national list seats “because opposition voters are very much concentrated in the cities, especially in Budapest. From the party list, we estimate Fidesz will get about 40 seats,” he told POLITICO. But the real fight will be in the districts, and Fidesz will still win the majority there, he said. Tisza disagrees. Péter Lajos Szakács, one of the party’s candidates in Nyíregyháza, told POLITICO he’s confident the party will win. “In Nyíregyháza, we will win with a landslide. I’m in the second district and Gajdos is in the first. He’ll have a historic win. With me, what I can say is that right now, I’m in a tie with my opponent. But we’re working hard, so we can send him into retirement, and he can then spend time with his grandkids,” he said confidently. But local supporters POLITICO spoke to weren’t quite so convinced the electoral struggle in Nyíregyháza is over. “I wouldn’t dare make any predictions,” cautioned Benji. However, most of them did say they thought the election outcome would be close. And that in itself suggests Fidesz isn’t likely to scale the heights it did in 2022. Dotted around the town are Fidesz billboards depicting Magyar as Janus-like, with half his face transformed into the EU flag. | Artur Widak/NurPhoto via Getty Images Ultimately, in the districts outside Budapest, much will depend on whether Fidesz can once again mobilize its supporters and get out the vote. In the past, the party was highly efficient in doing so, but in a video of party workers gathered for “warrior training” in October, Orbán was seen fuming about the state of the party’s databases, complaining they were in bad shape. Even so, according to 76-year-old retail store owner Júlia, soothsaying might be a mistake. Unlike most of her contemporaries, Júlia thinks Hungary desperately needs change: “I don’t want to say who I’m voting for. My main criterion is that my kids and my grandkids get to stay here. And that they can make a living, and I don’t think that will happen unless things change. Life will then get easier here,” she mused. In the meantime, with political tensions running high, her business is being impacted. Gesturing to the empty street in downtown Nyíregyháza, she said: “Everything is so quiet. We can really feel it. People are saving up their money. They’re scared of what the future will bring.”

U.S. President Donald Trump may think his war in Iran is a boon for the oil industry — but his way of putting it is causing consternation. “The United States is the largest Oil Producer in the World, by far, so when oil prices go up, we make a lot of money,“ Trump wrote in a Truth Social post Wednesday as crude prices rose to $95 per barrel, a 40 percent increase from where they were before the U.S. and Israel attacked Iran nearly two weeks ago. Trump’s post highlights the industry’s complicated relationship with the president — and its messaging conundrum. While oil companies are benefiting financially from the nearly $30-per-barrel run up in crude prices since the war started, executives are also worried that volatile prices are making business decisions difficult, and high prices will generate public backlash. “The idea that the industry profits from war and death is not one a VP of public relations wants to promote,” said Mark Jones, political science fellow at Rice University’s Baker Institute. Trump’s post drew groans from some in the industry. “Oh, boy….” one energy industry strategist responded when shown Trump’s social media post. Trump’s message also feeds into a perception that oil companies are looking to gouge consumers, said a second industry official granted anonymity because he wasn’t authorized to speak publicly. “This highlights the complicated relationship the oil industry has with the president,” the industry official said. “President Trump’s overarching concern is always the price at the pump — and the lower the better. There is also some notion that the oil and gas industry secretly works to raise prices, which is a fundamental misunderstanding of how the industry works on a global and transparent market basis.” Trump’s post also plays into some voters’ cynicism about business in general and the oil industry in particular, said Mark Mizruchi, a University of Michigan professor who focuses on the economic and political behavior of large American corporations. “The interesting thing about Trump’s statement is that he inadvertently stated a belief that a lot of people have — that something like this happens and the oil companies will make a lot of money,” Mizruchi said. “It probably didn’t occur to him that people — including in the industry — weren’t happy about that” statement. The White House has maintained that the price of oil and gasoline — which has jumped 60 cents per gallon since the fighting started — will ultimately come down after the war because new supplies from Iran will come onto the global markets. “Ultimately, once the military objectives of Operation Epic Fury are completed and the Iranian terrorist regime is neutralized, oil and gas prices will drop rapidly again, potentially even lower than before the strikes begin,” White House spokesperson Taylor Rogers said. “As a result, American families will benefit greatly in the long term.” In the meantime, Rogers said, the administration “has and will continue working cooperatively with leaders in the energy industry to stabilize markets.” The war is already causing difficulty for the industry. Oil companies operating solely in the United States will get pure short-term profit from the spike in prices, but large international companies may have to shut down assets they’re operating in the Persian Gulf, white the supply shock afflicting Southeast Asia and Europe could also persuade countries to reduce their reliance on fossil fuels, Jones said. Andrea Woods, a spokesperson for the American Petroleum Institute, said in a statement that the industry is “focused on working with the administration to ensure safe and reliable operations in the region.” “Energy market volatility does not benefit anyone, including producers who rely on certainty and stability for long-term business decisions,” Woods said. The oil industry has had a volatile relationship with Trump since his first administration, one where they benefit from some of his policies — but also suffer under others, like tariffs. And while Trump is one of the industry’s biggest cheerleaders, he has also dragged them into politics in ways industry executives are not always comfortable with. Trump on the campaign trail made a point of asking oil industry executives for a billion dollars, but the industry overall contributed $75 million, according to an analysis of campaign contributions by the environmental communications firm Climate Power — less than Trump’s campaign received from SpaceX, the firm owned by billionaire Elon Musk. Harold Hamm, the chair and founder of oil company Continental Resources and an informal energy adviser to Trump in his first and second terms, initially backed Florida Governor Ron DeSantis in the 2024 presidential campaign. Trump also tried to push oil company executives into publicly supporting his administration’s military action against Venezuela and promising to quickly invest in drilling for oil in the country. That move met pushback from some executives who didn’t share Trump’s optimism on how easy it would be to revive Venezuela’s oil fields. Democrats and environmental groups wasted little time to use Trump’s post to slam the administration and the oil industry. “I’ve been saying forever that Donald Trump’s energy policy is to prioritize the interest of energy producers (high prices) over consumers (low prices),” Rep. Sean Casten (D-Ill.) said in an X post. “It appears he agrees with me.” “Instability makes oil prices soar,” Lorne Stockman, international research director at Oil Change International said in a press release response to the post. “As geopolitical tensions rise, Trump’s fossil fuel billionaire donors reap windfall profits while people are being killed and working people around the world face higher energy and food costs.” In Trump’s post, the president isn’t talking about families grappling with their bills, said Jesse Lee, a senior adviser at Climate Power. “Trump is talking about the people he cares about most — the oil and gas billionaires who spent millions of dollars to get him elected,” Lee said in an email. “Trump will always put his billionaire buddies first, and working families will always be left to pay the price.” Rising oil prices are expected to be a political liability for Republicans heading into midterm elections later this year. Even besides higher prices at the local gas station, the effect of increased crude costs will hit voter pocketbooks in a myriad of ways. Companies across a range of industries have started to implement energy surcharges to absorb higher fuel costs, Raymond James analyst Pavel Molchanov said in note to clients. “UPS and Maersk (shipping), Ecolab (chemicals), and Cathay Pacific (aviation) are among the firms unveiling surcharges this week,” Molchanov said in the note. “We expect more such announcements until oil prices cool meaningfully from four-year highs.”