Kosovo will head back to the polls for the second time in just a few months after the country’s parliament failed to elect a president. President Vjosa Osmani dissolved parliament Friday morning after lawmakers failed to reach the quorum required to vote for a new head of state before the constitutional deadline, paving the way for triggering new parliamentary elections. The opposition boycotted the vote as Kosovo’s Prime Minister Albin Kurti and his ruling Vetëvendosje party put forward their own presidential candidate, Kosovo’s Foreign Minister Glauk Konjufca, instead of agreeing on a consensus name for the post with the opposition. Osmani proposed herself for a second presidential term but was not backed by Vetëvendosje or the opposition, and declined to run after the ruling party nominated Konjufca and later offered to support her candidacy against him. She also submitted constitutional amendments that would allow Kosovars to elect the president directly rather than through parliament, but the proposal failed to secure the needed support due to the absence of Serbian MPs. “Naturally, citizens did not want elections. This situation was created by the failure of the Assembly to fulfill its constitutional duty,” Osmani said. “No one should wish for another political cycle, especially at a moment when the country needs stability. But the country was brought here by irresponsible people with dangerous intentions,” she added. “With this decision, I am returning the final word in a democracy to those who ultimately hold it — the citizens of Kosovo,” Osmani said. She will now meet with party leaders on Friday to set an election date, which must occur within 45 days after the dissolution of parliament. However, the move may still face legal challenges after the parliamentary speaker, Albulena Haxhiu, asked the Constitutional Court for clarity on the election procedure, requesting a suspension of the deadline. The vote will mark the Western Balkan country’s third election in just over a year, after spending much of 2025 in political deadlock as Kurti’s Vetëvendosje struggled to secure a governing majority. Kurti’s decision not to back Osmani for president marks the end of a key political alliance in Kosovo, after the prime minister supported her in the last presidential election in 2021 but chose not to do so this time.

BRUSSELS — When it comes to letting new members into the EU, the European Commission has one main priority: making sure no hopeful turns into the next Hungary. To achieve that, the plan is to use Montenegro, which is close to completing its membership negotiations, as a guinea pig. Montenegrin President Jakov Milatović told POLITICO he was discussing what this would look like with the EU and member countries, including during a recent visit to Ireland, which will hold the presidency of the Council of the EU in the second half of this year. The Commission wants to put “long-term safeguards” in Montenegro’s accession treaty to ensure the bloc can respond if the small Balkan country backslides on democracy or rule of law, a Commission official told POLITICO. The official was granted anonymity to speak about sensitive negotiations, as were others quoted in this piece. This “will be the accession treaty defining future accession treaties,” the EU official said. Montenegro is not the only country jostling join the EU; Ukraine has been pushing for EU membership in 2027 to be included in a peace deal with the Kremlin, and Iceland is to hold a referendum on restarting EU membership talks. But Milatović said that “nobody really knows” what the text will ultimately look like. Podgorica is waiting for the Commission to provide more information, he added. The debate in the Commission’s Berlaymont headquarters is about what “the lessons we have learned from the 2004 enlargement” are, the Commission official said, referring to when Hungary, Slovakia and eight other countries joined the bloc. “Does our Union have the ability to respond to backwards steps? Not really.” Hungary has proven to be something of a cautionary tale for the EU. Budapest under Viktor Orbán has been a thorn in the bloc’s side and last month blocked the EU’s 20th round of sanctions against Russia and a €90 billion lifeline for Kyiv. The Commission’s priority now is to ensure Montenegro and other new joiners don’t turn into Hungary 2.0. Montenegro’s accession treaty — effectively the rules under which countries join the EU — will be drafted by a working group organized by the Cypriot Council presidency, with input from all EU member countries. A spokesperson for the Cypriot presidency declined to say when the working group would be formed. But the Commission official told POLITICO it would be within “weeks” and two European diplomats confirmed it was expected this month. Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos told POLITICO the Commission “is currently in the final phase of preparing a draft treaty,” without giving a timeline. The lone holdout is France, one of the diplomats said. Paris is refusing to greenlight drafting the accession treaty and is taking an ultra-cautious approach to EU enlargement ahead of presidential elections in 2027, another senior EU diplomat told POLITICO. The Commission’s priority now is to ensure Montenegro and other new joiners don’t turn into Hungary 2.0. Jonathan Raa/NurPhoto via Getty images “Everyone is trying to persuade France to be okay with it,” a third diplomat said. THE VETO QUESTION There’s little clarity on what form the EU’s safeguards will take. “There are some ideas flying around but no one has come up with an actual proposal,” a European diplomat involved in the discussions told POLITICO. Some of the early suggestions include suspending veto rights if Montenegro and other new joiners violate fundamental EU values, especially the rule of law, the diplomat said. Another topic of discussion behind the scenes is how long the safeguards should remain in place. There were safeguard clauses in place for the countries that joined in 2004, on topics such as failure to implement internal market rules, but they could only be activated for three years after accession and were not very robust, the diplomat said. The only red line for Montenegro is limitations on its voting rights, a Montenegrin official told POLITICO. Podgorica is fine if the EU imposes other safeguards on it but it would not want to give up its voice at the decision-making table. A dinner in Brussels on Wednesday between EU ambassadors and Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s chief of staff, Bjoern Seibert, saw them discuss enlargement. However, a Commission proposal to speed up membership for candidate countries via a process dubbed “reverse enlargement” — granting EU membership with limited privileges and voting rights — was forcefully rejected, according to three EU diplomats. DOMESTIC STRIFE All of this is contingent on Montenegro meeting its ambitious target to become the 28th member of the bloc by 2028. To do that, it has to pass a lot of laws to align with the EU rulebook. But the lightning-fast pace of reforms is causing some internal political strife. Last month, the Montenegrin president criticized MPs for waving laws through without properly reading or debating them, initially refusing to sign them before relenting. “It’s not the European standard that you basically just sort of raise your hand [and] get the salary,” Milatović told POLITICO, adding that even if the legislation was required to join the EU, lawmakers should still do their due diligence. “It’s true that Montenegro is effectively outsourcing its democracy to Brussels,” said another European diplomat. “But it has no choice if it wants to join the EU by 2028.” Despite the pace at which Montenegro is moving, whether it can join by 2028 is a big question mark. Podgorica has 20 of 33 accession chapters left to close and is set to close its next one — Chapter 21, on Trans-European Networks— in March, a Montenegrin official said. Hungary has proven to be something of a cautionary tale for the EU. | Nicolas Economou/NurPhoto via Getty Images Another four are expected to be closed in June. That would give it six months to achieve its goal of closing the remaining 15 chapters by the end of 2026, at which point all 27 current EU countries — including Hungary — would need to ratify its membership, a lengthy process in itself. The Commission official affirmed Montenegro’s ambitious membership target is “technically possible,” especially with Podgorica’s firm commitment. “But there is politics and then there is life,” the official said. Milatović agreed that the task ahead is a big one. “It’s not that easy to finish 20 chapters in the next less than 10 months,” the Montenegrin president said. “And this is where we really need to work even more than what is being done now.” Nick Vinocur contributed to this report.

The European Union should not be pressured into admitting new members based on pressure from Russia, the United States or any foreign power, France’s Europe minister told POLITICO. “No power outside the EU should decide on enlargement in place of the Member States,” said Benjamin Haddad, who represents France at meetings on enlargement with other EU countries. Haddad’s comments coincide with a push by the European Commission and some EU states to bring Ukraine into the bloc on a much shorter timeline than has been normal for countries seeking membership in the bloc.  The push from Brussels is partly motivated by the fact that EU membership is a bargaining chip in ongoing U.S.-led peace talks between Ukraine and Russia, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy seeking EU membership by 2027. Accession is a carrot for Ukrainians who may be called upon to accept difficult compromises in any peace deal. But Haddad’s comments suggest that France does not want the EU’s enlargement schedule to be dictated by foreign powers or geopolitical circumstances. “Neither the United States nor Russia” should have any influence over EU enlargement policy, he added. Paris is in favor of Ukraine joining the bloc. Ukraine, Moldova and Western Balkan countries — widely seen as part of a future enlargement wave — should not be left “in a gray zone, vulnerable to foreign influence and aggression,” added the centrist minister, whose office sits in the foreign ministry. However, France is less favorable to proposals to change the way Europe admits new members, for example by granting them fewer privileges upon entry and then building them up in a phased accession process. “This enlargement must remain demanding and merit-based to ensure its success and credibility,” said Haddad. BUY EUROPEAN The 40-year-old minister also weighed into a debate about how the EU should allocate resources as part of a push to bolster competitiveness, endorsing the idea of a “European preference” for future investments in the EU’s long-term budget, known as the Multiannual Financial Framework. “Why should we be more naive than the Americans, who have long implemented Buy American policies?” he asked. “European preference should be a cross-cutting rule of the MFF.” He also threw his weight behind the idea of EU countries borrowing money jointly to support innovation and back industrial champions — a subject of disagreement with so-called “frugal” countries, including Germany, which argue that investment needs can be met via the MFF. “We must … consider a new targeted common borrowing capacity focused on investment in disruptive innovation, in particular in defense or AI/quantum capabilities,” Haddad said, adding that joint borrowing would be an ideal way to get around fiscal constraints facing many EU states. “In a constrained budgetary context, this is a way to invest without immediately increasing national contributions,” he added, recalling that a landmark report by former European Central Bank chief Mario Draghi called for €800 billion per year in public and private investment to help Europe catch up with technologically-advanced rivals. Haddad also criticized European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen for moving ahead with the Mercosur trade deal, which is opposed by France. “This move disregards the members of the European Parliament and the interinstitutional agreement,” he said. “This is a bad signal from the Commission for both our farmers and European citizens at large.” 

Bulgaria’s former President Rumen Radev will run to be prime minister in April’s snap election and has registered a new coalition called “Progressive Bulgaria,” he announced Monday. Seen as Bulgaria’s most popular politician, polls predict he will come first in an election on April 19 that looks to break the Balkan country’s long political impasse. POLITICO’s Poll of Polls puts Radev’s formation at 33 percent — 12 points clear of his closest rivals. In a Facebook post, Radev said the alliance is “the answer to the expectations of Bulgarians to dismantle the oligarchic corruption model.” Registration is “the first step towards victory,” he added. “We are ready, we can and we will succeed.” Radev, a former air force commander who served two presidential terms, the most recent of which he ended early in January, has cast himself as an opponent of the country’s entrenched mafia, which is intimately linked to top politicians. He has, however, faced criticism from pro-Western rivals over positions they say were sympathetic to Moscow, particularly on military aid to Ukraine. Progressive Bulgaria brings together three center-left formations — the Political Movement Social Democrats, the Social Democratic Party and the Our People Movement. The bloc is closely associated with Radev but is formally co-led by his allies: Galab Donev, a former caretaker prime minister, and Dimitar Stoyanov, an ex-defense minister. His move comes after years of tumultuous political instability in the country of 6.4 million people. Prime Minister Rosen Zhelyazkov resigned in December 2025 following mass protests and corruption allegations. His Cabinet, which took office in January 2025, survived six no-confidence votes before collapsing. The April ballot will be Bulgaria’s eighth election in four years, with no prime minister since 2021 completing a full term.

Zoja Surroi is political advisor to the prime minister of Kosovo. Prime Minister Albin Kurti’s second majority win in Kosovo shows it’s possible to inspire through governance. To understand how he won his second mandate, one has to understand why he won his first — and that is the desire for change. To correct a political course before it becomes irreversible and to move toward something better. At the time, I was filled with such hope, watching the results from the Harvard Kennedy School library, yet to join his cabinet. For decades, Kosovo — like much of the Balkans — had succumbed to the cliches of the region: Corruption was treated as inevitable, stability was prioritized over accountability, and the implicit assumption was that it was naïve to expect more from a post-conflict Balkan state than just free trade. But this felt genuinely new. It seemed Kurti was in politics for the right reasons — and he had the past to prove it. A former political prisoner under Serbian rule, he spent years in opposition as one of the only credible voices speaking for true independence in Kosovo. And the promise he represented was different: prosperity, modernity, non-corruption. The kind of politics that increases turnout and pulls back those who had disengaged. Kosovo had declared independence, but it had never quite received a fresh start — until then. Kosovo became an independent country in the 21st century. Its political identity has never been about settling for the crumbs of the 20th. And Kurti avoided the fate of many first-term reformers because he delivered. Fulfilling the promises you’ve set out for the people that count on you the most isn’t just the right thing to do — it’s also good politics. That mandate wasn’t built on spectacle or shiny mega-projects. It focused on the unglamorous work of governance: building a non-corrupt government, expanding social protection, making public higher education free and strengthening government institutions. These things don’t go viral, but they’re felt: Kosovo’s standing in international transparency indices has markedly improved. The World Bank removed Kosovo from its list of fragile and conflict-affected situations, and projected it as the fastest-growing economy in its region. In Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, Kosovo rose 28 places during Kurti’s tenure. However, governing isn’t just about domestic reform, and Serbia remains the main external complication. As Kosovo reached its adulthood as a state this month, continued denial of its sovereignty looks increasingly anachronistic — and yet, it persists. And while Kosovo remains firmly pro-EU, Serbia has leaned in the opposite direction, deepening ties with Russia and tightening internal political control. This dynamic has real consequences: Belgrade’s influence over Kosovo’s Serb minority — roughly 4 percent of the population, one-third of which is concentrated around the north border — has worked against integration in the country. Political pluralism has been constrained, with one party effectively monopolizing the political field. And the dangers of this became brutally clear with the armed attack in Banjska in September of 2023. To that end, Kurti’s most ambitious — and controversial — policy has been his effort to close institutional vacuums in the north by extending the reach of Kosovo’s administrative authority. To some international partners, this appeared hasty, and the EU responded with punitive measures it has now lifted. But for many Kosovars, it was long overdue. Indeed, it’s difficult to convince a Kosovar that the threat Serbia represents is overstated. This is where Kurti’s victory takes on broader meaning. Whether in Kosovo or elsewhere, politics requires the courage to move beyond the center. It rewards those who stand for something — consistently and over time. Kosovo today exceeds many of the expectations once placed upon it. Its success is also the success of the U.S. and the EU, both of which helped shape its post-war institutions and remain deeply popular among its citizens. The question now isn’t if Kosovo belongs in the European project — it’s about Europe’s willingness to uphold its own values.

BRUSSELS — The U.S. under Donald Trump is pushing NATO to slash many of its foreign activities including ending a key alliance mission in Iraq, four NATO diplomats told POLITICO. The U.S. has also in recent months lobbied to scale down NATO’s peacekeeping operation in Kosovo and keep Ukraine and Indo-Pacific allies from formally participating in the alliance’s July annual summit in Ankara. The effort reflects a White House drive to treat NATO as a strictly Euroatlantic defense pact and roll back decades of expansion into crisis management, global partnerships and values-driven initiatives that have long irritated the U.S. president and his MAGA base. Under the drive from Washington, NATO would curtail so-called “out-of-area activities” that are beyond the alliance’s core tasks of defense and deterrence. The push has become known internally as a “return to factory settings,” the four diplomats said, all of whom were granted anonymity to speak freely on the sensitive internal matter. The effort could see a rapid scale back of NATO’s activities in former war zones, as well as shutting out capitals including Kyiv and Canberra from formal discussions this summer. The White House declined to comment publicly on NATO’s partnership programs and global operations when contacted by POLITICO. The fresh details come after U.S. deputy Pentagon chief Elbridge Colby recently spelled out the administration’s thinking behind what he called “NATO 3.0.” “Not every mission can be the top priority. Not every capability can be gold-plated,” Colby told alliance defense ministers last week, while reiterating that the U.S. was still committed to European security. “The measure of seriousness is whether European forces can fight, sustain, and prevail in the scenarios that matter most for the defense of the alliance.” The U.S. campaign is prompting blowback from some allies. Dropping the alliance’s overseas initiatives is “not the right approach,” said one of the four diplomats. “Partnerships are crucial to deterrence and defense.” Since Trump returned to the White House last year, he has slashed U.S. commitments abroad, pulled troops and NATO personnel out of Europe and handed some of the alliance’s top commands to Europeans as he seeks to refocus his foreign policy around “core national security.” OUT OF IRAQ NATO maintains an advisory mission aimed at strengthening Iraq’s security institutions like its police and stymying the return of the Islamic State group. The operation was set up under Trump’s first term in 2018 and repeatedly expanded since 2021, at Baghdad’s request. Washington has asked allies to end the mission as early as September, the first diplomat quoted above and a second diplomat said. Separately, the U.S. is also set to withdraw around 2,500 soldiers from Iraq under a 2024 deal with the Iraqi government, something a U.S. administration official told POLITICO is part of Trump’s “commitment to ending forever wars,” while stressing that the move is happening in “close coordination” with Baghdad. Tamer Badawi, an Iraq expert and associate fellow with the Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient think tank, said the NATO mission itself is not “crucial” for the country’s security. But scrapping it alongside a U.S. pullback could empower militia groups, he said, and be “destabilizing” for the northern Kurdistan Regional Government. The U.S. request is also facing pushback inside the alliance. “It’s not the moment to get out of Iraq … the government wants us there,” said the first diplomat.  The second diplomat said “the majority” of allies agree the Iraq mission should be scaled back but over a longer timeframe, while keeping a smaller operation in place. KOSOVO DRAWDOWN The U.S. has also signaled it wants to wind down the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR), according to the four diplomats, which is even more concerning for European allies, even if discussions on that remain at a very early stage. The U.N.-authorized international peacekeeping mission, which debuted in 1999 after the Yugoslav wars, currently includes around 4,500 troops. Engjellushe Morina, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, said the mission remains “indispensable” for regional security. If NATO pulls out, it could embolden Serbian separatists in northern Kosovo, she said, creating a copycat effect among ethnic Serbs in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska region. “We’re quite concerned” about attempts to wind down the mission, said a fifth senior NATO diplomat, since “things in the western Balkans can escalate quickly.” Contacted by POLITICO, a NATO official speaking on behalf of the organization said there is “no timeline associated with NATO Mission Iraq … or with KFOR,” adding: “These missions are based on need, undergo periodic review, and are adjusted as circumstances evolve.” For now, no decision has been taken on ending either operation. All 32 allies must approve the start and end of missions, a process that typically involves jockeying and pressure campaigns from multiple allies and not just the U.S. NO EXTRA ALLIES The U.S. is also pressing allies not to invite Ukraine and the alliance’s four official Indo-Pacific partners — Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea — to the formal meetings at NATO’s July summit in Ankara, the four diplomats said.  The countries could still be invited to side events, they added, with the request partly justified as reducing the number of summit meetings. Keeping NATO partner countries on the sidelines of the summit “would send a signal that perhaps the focus is much more on core NATO issues,” said Oana Lungescu, a former NATO spokesperson and a senior fellow at London’s Royal United Services Institute. The official speaking for NATO said the alliance would “communicate on participation of partners at the summit in due course.” Meanwhile, NATO staff have also proposed cutting a public forum from this year’s gathering, a side-event hosting country leaders, defense experts and government officials on various discussion panels that typically boost the visibility of the yearly summit.  The NATO official said: “NATO has chosen not to organize a Public Forum this year but will host a NATO Summit Defence Industry Forum in the margins of the Ankara Summit.” NATO civil servants have told capitals the move is designed to cut costs amid a lack of resources. But the first and second diplomats said they believe it could also be driven indirectly by U.S. pressure, given Washington’s broader crusade to slash funding for international organizations. Lungescu said scrapping the forum was in line with the “downgrading of the public diplomacy division,” under NATO chief Mark Rutte, who has sought to slim down and restructure the department since taking office in late 2024. But at a time when the alliance is trying to persuade the wider public of the merits of its activities and increased defense spending, that’s “very harmful,” said a third diplomat.  “NATO has to communicate what’s happening — and what it’s going to do,” they said.

BRUSSELS — After years of looking at Turkey as a problem, the European Union is now viewing it as part of the solution. As negotiations for peace in Ukraine gather momentum, Turkey’s potential role in the post-war order — particularly as a peacekeeper and regional powerbroker in the Black Sea —makes it a critical partner for the EU. However, Brussels is taking baby steps with a country that has been backsliding on democracy and whose Islamist leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has jailed high-profile political opponents. In an attempt to thaw relations, Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos will visit Turkey on Friday. Ahead of her trip, Kos told POLITICO in a written statement: “Peace in Ukraine will change the realities in Europe, especially in the Black Sea region. Türkiye will be a very important partner for us.” “Preparing for peace and stability in Europe implies preparing a strong partnership with Türkiye,” she added. Turkey is a military heavyweight. It has the second-largest armed forces in NATO and holds a crucial strategic position in the Mediterranean and Middle East. Ankara’s control of the Bosphorus gives it immense sway over regional security, and it played a key role in brokering the Black Sea deal in July 2022 that granted safe passage to ships carrying Ukrainian grain. The country of 88 million people has also said it is willing to send peacekeeping troops to Ukraine if a deal is struck with Russia, and that it would take a leading role in Black Sea security.  However, relations between the EU and Turkey have deteriorated over the years, and have hardly been helped by Erdoğan’s lurch to autocracy and his crackdown on opposition mayors. Although officially a candidate to join the EU, the negotiations have been frozen since 2018. “In the latest EU enlargement reports we have seen steps away from EU standards, especially on the rule of law and democracy,” Kos said. “I know Türkiye has a very long democratic tradition and also a strong civil society, and this is what we need to see strengthened to build trust between the EU and Türkiye.” In Ankara, to take the first steps to a rapprochement, Kos will attend a ceremony in which the European Investment Bank and Turkey will sign off on €200 million in loans for renewable energy projects. The EIB suspended new lending to Turkey in 2019 because of a dispute over oil and gas drilling off Cyprus. Also on Friday, the Commission will unveil a study on “advancing a cross-regional connectivity agenda” with Turkey, Central Europe and the South Caucasus. The study, seen by POLITICO, maps out how investment is needed to strengthen transport, trade, energy and digital connections along the Trans-Caspian Corridor, which links China, Central Asia, the South Caucasus and the Black Sea. These are symbolic first steps toward bringing Ankara back into the fold, but they’re not what Turkey really wants from the EU — that would be an updated customs union agreement. The old deal was signed in 1995. New trade agreements signed by Brussels with India and the Mercosur group of South American countries put Turkey at a competitive disadvantage. Once they’re in place, Ankara will be forced to grant tariff-free access to goods from those countries, but that benefit won’t be reciprocated. Even Ekrem İmamoğlu, the democratically elected mayor of Istanbul, whose arrest last March triggered massive nationwide protests and international condemnation, weighed in in favor of upgrading the customs union deal. In a plea sent from his prison cell to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, European Council chief António Costa and Parliament President Roberta Metsola, İmamoğlu asked the EU to modernize the customs agreement with Turkey. “The Customs Union remains the only rules-based and normative framework underpinning Türkiye–EU relations,” İmamoğlu said in a social media post Thursday. “In the wake of EU free trade agreements with Mercosur and India, the asymmetrical consequences for Türkiye have become increasingly visible.” Updating Turkey’s deal would require buy-in from the European Council. However, Greece and Cyprus are staunchly opposed to warming relations without a goodwill gesture first from Ankara. Cyprus wants Ankara to allow its ships into Turkish ports, according to an EU official. Ankara does not recognize Cyprus due to the 1974 division of the island following a Turkish military invasion. “The strength of any future partnership needs to be underpinned by good political relations with our member states, and especially good neighbourly relations and relations with Cyprus,” Kos said. Cyprus’ deputy minister for European affairs, Marilena Raouna, told POLITICO that the country’s presidency of the Council of the EU “can be an opportunity” for EU-Turkey relations. She said Cyprus “has been constructive. And we look to Türkiye to also engage constructively.” So far, Ankara has shown little appetite to extend an olive branch. Last year it rejected Cyprus President Nikos Christodoulides’ proposal that Turkey open its ports to Cypriot-flagged ships in exchange for easier access to European visas for Turkish businesspeople. But U.S. President Donald Trump’s reshaping of geopolitical and trade relationships could push Europe and Turkey back toward one another. “The world is changing and history is accelerating. Türkiye-EU relations also need to adapt,” Turkey’s ambassador to the EU, Yaprak Balkan, told POLITICO. “The way these relations can become stronger is by building on mutual interests. We hope that we can build upon this philosophy in a very concrete manner. Türkiye’s strategic objective continues to be accession to the European Union and this should be the guiding light in our relations.” Restarting EU membership negotiations is not in the EU’s thinking just yet. Still, Kos said that “we need to look with fresh eyes at our relations” with the country. “My visit to Ankara … is about rebuilding trust and exploring how we can make our economic relationship work better for both sides.”

Bulgaria will once again hold a snap parliamentary election, a month after the country’s last government collapsed, President Rumen Radev announced Friday. He had most recently tasked the centrist Alliance for Rights and Freedoms (APS) group with forming a government, but it rejected the chance to nominate a prime ministerial candidate. This marks the third time a party has rejected the president’s request this week alone. APS Chairman Hayri Sadakov said Friday: “Our parliamentary group authorized me to return the third exploratory mandate unfulfilled, so that through our joint efforts we can bring about honest, free, transparent and democratic elections.” Radev’s mandate to form a new government was rejected by the conservative GERB-SDS group Monday and by pro-EU PP-DB group Wednesday. “We are heading to elections,” Radev said, according to local media. Under the country’s constitution, the president must now appoint a caretaker prime minister after consultations with the parliamentary groups and schedule new polls. The last prime minister, Rosen Zhelyazkov resigned in December, following weeks of anti-corruption protests against his government. His Cabinet, which took office in January 2025, survived six votes of no confidence before collapsing. The vote will be Bulgaria’s eighth election in four years. No prime minister since 2021 has managed to serve a full four-year term.

SERBIA LET PUTIN’S SPIES ZAP DOGS WITH ‘SOUND CANNONS’ Documents show Belgrade brought in Russia’s FSB to conduct experiments on animals. By UNA HAJDARI in Belgrade, Serbia Illustration by Natália Delgado/ POLITICO Serbian intelligence officers tested sound cannons on dogs in collaboration with Russia’s notorious security service, according to government documents seen by POLITICO. The Serbian documents confirm that President Aleksandar Vučić’s administration carried out experiments with high-powered loudspeakers colloquially known as sound cannons, two weeks after an anti-government demonstration in Belgrade was disrupted by what protesters described as a crippling sonic blast. The joint testing of sonic weapons on animals highlights the depth of security cooperation between Russia — the EU’s most belligerent adversary — and Serbia, a stalled EU candidate whose government is facing a serious challenge. The Long-Range Acoustic Devices (LRAD) devices are marketed for long-distance communication, but when used at close range, they can risk hearing damage. They have also been reported to cause headaches, dizziness and nausea. The government has denied deploying sound cannons on demonstrators. Serbia is in the grip of its largest protest movement in decades. For more than a year, tens of thousands of people — occasionally hundreds of thousands of citizens — have poured into the streets across the country, staging regular nationwide rallies that reflect deepening anger at the government. On March 15, 2025, during one of the biggest demonstrations, a sudden, ear-splitting noise ripped down Belgrade’s main boulevard, prompting a wave of people to duck for cover. Videos filmed from multiple angles show the disturbance rippling through the tightly packed crowd before people bolted in panic. Demonstrators arriving at Belgrade emergency rooms reported nausea, vomiting, headaches and dizziness. They reported hearing a sound like “a group of motorcyclists” or a “locomotive” headed in their direction. After initially dismissing allegations that authorities had deployed a sound cannon, Vučić said “a complete investigation will be conducted within 48 hours, and then all those responsible for such brutal fabrications and lies will be held accountable to the authorities.” Interior Minister Ivica Dačić also denied any wrongdoing, insisting Serbia “did not use any illegal means, including a so-called sound cannon.” A month after the protest, Serbia’s intelligence agency, the BIA, published a report that they had commissioned from Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) asserting that the high-decibel devices were “not used during the protests,” and concluding there had been no mass “psychological, moral and physical impact on people.” The Serbian Ministry of Interior did not reply to a request for comment. ANIMAL TESTING The animal tests were conducted as part of the post-protest inquiry, according to the documents seen by POLITICO, which were produced by the BIA and a government ministry. The intention was to assess whether the symptoms described by protesters were consistent with the effects of sound cannons, which Serbian officials had previously acknowledged the police possess. About two weeks after the protest, Serbian and Russian intelligence specialists gathered a group of dogs at a BIA testing site to evaluate the “effect of the emitters on biological objects.” Dogs were chosen as the test subjects because of “their high sensitivity to acoustic effects.” The animals were blasted with two LRAD models — LRAD 100X MAG-HS and LRAD 450XL — made by the California-based company Genasys, at “ranges of 200, 150, 100, 50 and 25 meters,” according to the documents. Datasheets for the models deployed indicate they can emit sounds at up to 150 decibels, the equivalent of a jet engine at takeoff. The documents also suggest the tests may have been carried out without the approvals required for animal experiments. “The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Management… does not have information on whether tests of the effects of the LRAD 100H and LRAD 450XL, as well as other tests of the effects of other devices on dogs, have been conducted,” the documents state. “This Ministry has never received a request for approval to conduct tests on animals, and therefore no decision has been issued approving the test in question, as well as other similar tests,” they continued. Danilo Ćurčić, a Serbian human rights lawyer, said the dogs were “subjected to either experiments or abuse,” as defined under Serbia’s Animal Welfare Act. He said Serbian law requires animal experiments to be registered in advance and cleared through the competent bodies — including review by an ethics commission — and it explicitly bars animal testing for the “testing of weapons and military equipment.” Radomir Lazović, an opposition politician, described the tests as “part of a campaign by Aleksandar Vučić to cover up the use of sound cannons against his own people at the protests in March.” “Thousands of people felt the massive effects of this sonic weapon on their skins last year,” he said.   In their report about the canine experiments, the FSB insisted: “When transmitting the basic and test signals, biological objects (dogs) did not feel discomfort (changes in behavior) at the distance under investigation. The dogs were checked 3 days after the tests and did not show any changes in their condition.”

Croatian President Zoran Milanović has slammed France for selling Zagreb secondhand fighter jets while providing its rival Serbia with a brand-new fleet. “We look like fools,” he raged last week, “because the French sell new Rafales to the Serbs and used ones to us.” Zagreb finalized a government-to-government deal with Paris in 2021 to modernize its air force by purchasing a dozen Rafale fighters valued at €999 million. The final aircraft, which were procured from France’s own stocks, were delivered last April, replacing Croatia’s outdated Soviet-era MiG-21 fleet. In August 2024, Serbia signed a deal to buy 12 Rafale jets from French manufacturer Dassault Aviation fresh from the factory. That transaction has enraged the Croatian president. Croatia fought Serbia in the 1990s in the bloody wars that followed Yugoslavia’s disintegration. While relations between the two countries have improved dramatically since then, non-NATO Serbia’s close ties with Moscow are a worry to Zagreb, which joined the Atlantic alliance in 2009 and the EU in 2013. Serbia’s own EU candidacy has largely stalled, with Belgrade ditching a Western Balkans summit in Brussels last month. Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos called on Serbia in November to “urgently reverse the backsliding on freedom of expression.” French Europe Deputy Minister Benjamin Haddad, who was in Zagreb on Monday to discuss defense cooperation, defended the Serbia contract, saying Croatia should be pleased Belgrade was “gradually freeing itself from dependence on Russia and strengthening its ties with Western countries.” But Milanović hit back that the deal was “implemented behind Croatia’s back and to the detriment of Croatia’s national interests,” and showed “that every country takes care of its own interests, including profits, first and foremost.” The left-wing president added that the Croatian government, led by center-right Prime Minister Andrej Plenković, had erred by not confirming “whether France would sell the same or even more advanced aircraft models to one of our neighboring countries outside NATO.” DOMESTIC SQUABBLES Croatian officials are split over whether the president was right to react the way he did. One Croatian diplomat told POLITICO that Milanović had a point and that France was wrong to sell the newer jets to Serbia after fobbing off Croatia with an older model. But a second Croatian official said the deal was a good one for Zagreb and noted that the Croatian government had signed a letter of intent in December with Paris to upgrade its Rafale jets to the latest F4 standard. “From France’s point of view, the signing of the letter of intent on December 8 in France by the minister [Catherine Vautrin] and her Croatian counterpart aims to support the partner in modernizing its Rafale fleet to the highest standard currently in service in France,” an official from the French armed forces ministry echoed. “The defense relationship with Croatia is dynamic and not set in stone in 2021.” Croatia’s defense ministry said Milanović’s remarks “show elementary ignorance of how the international arms trade works.” “Great powers — the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom, Russia, China — have been selling the same or similar weapons to countries that are in tense and even openly antagonistic relations for decades,” the ministry added. “The USA is simultaneously arming Israel and Egypt, Russia [is arming] India and Pakistan, while the West is simultaneously arming Greece and Turkey. This is the rule, not the exception.” In Croatia, the president is also the commander-in-chief of the military but shares jurisdiction over defense policy with the government, which is responsible for the budget and the day-to-day management of the armed forces. Milanović and Plenković are often at odds, a third Croatian official said, arguing the president was using the issue to hammer his political rival. DIRT-CHEAP FIGHTER JETS France has looked to strengthen defense ties with Croatia, which spends over 2 percent of its GDP on defense and is transitioning its Soviet-era military stocks to Western arms. Some of those purchases are coming from France. Plenković was in Paris in December to sign a separate deal with KNDS France for 18 Caesar self-propelled howitzers and 15 Serval armored vehicles, with the equipment to be purchased with the EU’s loans-for-weapons SAFE money.  In the original fighter jet deal, Croatia bought airplanes that were being used by the French air force, meaning they were cheaper than new stock and were available quickly. At the time the decision was criticized in Paris by parliamentarians arguing France was weakening its own air force to seal export contracts. Serbia, meanwhile, reportedly paid €2.7 billion for the same number of jets, which are expected to be delivered as of 2028. China and Russia provide the vast majority of Belgrade’s weapons, with France a distant third.