BRUSSELS — European banks and other finance firms should decrease their reliance on American tech companies for digital services, a top national supervisor has said. In an interview with POLITICO, Steven Maijoor, the Dutch central bank’s chair of supervision, said the “small number of suppliers” providing digital services to many European finance companies can pose a “concentration risk.” “If one of those suppliers is not able to supply, you can have major operational problems,” Maijoor said. The intervention comes as Europe’s politicians and industries grapple with the continent’s near-total dependence on U.S. technology for digital services ranging from cloud computing to software. The dominance of American companies has come into sharp focus following a decline in transatlantic relations under U.S. President Donald Trump. While the market for European tech services isn’t nearly as developed as in the U.S. — making it difficult for banks to switch — the continent “should start to try to develop this European environment” for financial stability and the sake of its economic success, Maijoor said. European banks being locked in to contracts with U.S. providers “will ultimately also affect their competitiveness,” Maijoor said. Dutch supervisors recently authored a report on the systemic risks posed by tech dependence in finance. Dutch lender Amsterdam Trade Bank collapsed in 2023 after its parent company was placed on the U.S. sanctions list and its American IT provider withdrew online data storage services, in one of the sharpest examples of the impact on companies that see their tech withdrawn. Similarly a 2024 outage of American cybersecurity company CrowdStrike highlighted the European finance sector’s vulnerabilities to operational risks from tech providers, the EU’s banking watchdog said in a post-mortem on the outage. In his intervention, Maijoor pointed to an EU law governing the operational reliability of banks — the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) — as one factor that may be worsening the problem. Those rules govern finance firms’ outsourcing of IT functions such as cloud provision, and designate a list of “critical” tech service providers subject to extra oversight, including Amazon Web Services, Google Cloud, Microsoft and Oracle. DORA, and other EU financial regulation, may be “inadvertently nudging financial institutions towards the largest digital service suppliers,” which wouldn’t be European, Maijoor said. “If you simply look at quality, reliability, security … there’s a very big chance that you will end up with the largest digital service suppliers from outside Europe,” he said. The bloc could reassess the regulatory approach to beat the risks, Maijoor said. “DORA currently is an oversight approach, which is not as strong in terms of requirements and enforcement options as regular supervision,” he said. The Dutch supervisors are pushing for changes, writing that they are examining whether financial regulation and supervision in the EU creates barriers to choosing European IT providers, and that identified issues “may prompt policy initiatives in the European context.” They are asking EU governments and supervisors “to evaluate whether DORA sufficiently enhances resilience to geopolitical risks and, if not, to consider issuing further guidance,” adding they “see opportunities to strengthen DORA as needed,” including through more enforcement and more explicit requirements around managing geopolitical risks. Europe could also set up a cloud watchdog across industries to mitigate the risks of dependence on U.S. tech service providers, which are “also very important for other parts of the economy like energy and telecoms,” Maijoor said. “Wouldn’t there be a case for supervision more generally of these hyperscalers, cloud service providers, as they are so important for major parts of the economy?” The European Commission declined to respond.

The discussion surrounding the digital euro is strategically important to Europe. On Dec. 12, the EU finance ministers are aiming to agree on a general approach regarding the dossier. This sets out the European Council’s official position and thus represents a major political milestone for the European Council ahead of the trilogue negotiations. We want to be sure that, in this process, the project will be subject to critical analysis that is objective and nuanced and takes account of the long-term interests of Europe and its people. > We do not want the debate to fundamentally call the digital euro into question > but rather to refine the specific details in such a way that opportunities can > be seized. We regard the following points as particularly important: * maintaining European sovereignty at the customer interface; * avoiding a parallel infrastructure that inhibits innovation; and * safeguarding the stability of the financial markets by imposing clear holding limits. We do not want the debate to fundamentally call the digital euro into question but rather to refine the specific details in such a way that opportunities can be seized and, at the same time, risks can be avoided. Opportunities of the digital euro:  1. European resilience and sovereignty in payments processing: as a public-sector means of payment that is accepted across Europe, the digital euro can reduce reliance on non-European card systems and big-tech wallets, provided that a firmly European design is adopted and it is embedded in the existing structures of banks and savings banks and can thus be directly linked to customers’ existing accounts. 2. Supplement to cash and private-sector digital payments: as a central bank digital currency, the digital euro can offer an additional, state-backed payment option, especially when it is held in a digital wallet and can also be used for e-commerce use cases (a compromise proposed by the European Parliament’s main rapporteur for the digital euro, Fernando Navarrete). This would further strengthen people’s freedom of choice in the payment sphere. 3. Catalyst for innovation in the European market: if integrated into banking apps and designed in accordance with the compromises proposed by Navarrete (see point 2), the digital euro can promote innovation in retail payments, support new European payment ecosystems, and simplify cross-border payments. > The burden of investment and the risk resulting from introducing the digital > euro will be disproportionately borne by banks and savings banks. Risks of the current configuration: 1. Risk of creating a gateway for US providers: in the configuration currently planned, the digital euro provides US and other non-European tech and payment companies with access to the customer interface, customer data and payment infrastructure without any of the regulatory obligations and costs that only European providers face. This goes against the objective of digital sovereignty. 2. State parallel infrastructures weaken the market and innovation: the European Central Bank (ECB) is planning not just two new sets of infrastructure but also its own product for end customers (through an app). An administrative body has neither the market experience nor the customer access that banks and payment providers do. At the same time, the ECB is removing the tried-and-tested allocation of roles between the central bank and private sector. Furthermore, the Eurosystem’s digital euro project will tie up urgently required development capacity for many years and thereby further exacerbate Europe’s competitive disadvantage. The burden of investment and the risk resulting from introducing the digital euro will be disproportionately borne by banks and savings banks. In any case, the banks and savings banks have already developed a European market solution, Wero, which is currently coming onto the market. The digital euro needs to strengthen rather than weaken this European-led payment method. 3. Risks for financial stability and lending: without clear holding limits, there is a risk of uncontrolled transfers of deposits from banks and savings banks into holdings of digital euros. Deposits are the backbone of lending; large-scale outflows would weaken both the funding of the real economy – especially small and medium-sized enterprises – and the stability of the system. Holding limits must therefore be based on usual payment needs and be subject to binding regulations. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is Bundesverband der Deutschen Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken e.V. , Schellingstraße 4, 10785 Berlin, Germany * The ultimate controlling entity is Bundesverband der Deutschen Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken e.V. , Schellingstraße 4, 10785 Berlin, Germany More information here.

LONDON — A British police force investigating bribery and money laundering will be expanded amid fears corruption is threatening U.K. national security. The U.K. government on Monday pledged £15 million to expand its “Domestic Corruption Unit” — a body which investigates corruption in local authorities and banks. The announcement came as ministers published a new U.K. anti-corruption strategy setting out more than 100 measures to tackle bribery, money laundering and intimidation. “Corruption threatens our national security, undermines legitimate business and steals money from working people’s pockets,” Security Minister Dan Jarvis said in a press statement issued alongside the anti-corruption document. “Our landmark strategy will take on the rogue actors and insiders who often exploit their positions of power and manipulate the public purse for personal gain,” he added.   The U.K. government wants to crackdown on what it calls “professional enablers” of corruption and crime, which it claims are sometimes working for the benefit of hostile states, such as Russia, or criminal gangs overseas. A plan to strengthen sanctions against bad actors in banking, accountancy and the law were also set out Monday. There will also be increased vetting for new police, prison officer and border security recruits, and staff moving between organizations to stop organized crime groups infiltrating Britain’s frontline services. Ministers are also considering payments for whistleblowers. The U.K. government will host an illicit finance summit next year to tackle the flow of dirty money. It will examine tools such cryptocurrency, which are being used by criminals, those evading sanctions and hostile states. Margaret Hodge, the government’s anti-corruption champion, will also lead a review into asset ownership in Britain, which will aim to track the flow of dirty money into the country. Transparency campaigners and MPs have tentatively supported the strategy, but some have warned that there are glaring omissions. Andrew Mitchell, the former Tory minister who chairs the APPG on Anti-Corruption and Responsible Tax, said that without “full and proper financial transparency” in Britain’s overseas tax havens, “[the] U.K.’s credibility as a global leader on anti-corruption and economic crime will continue to be undermined.”

BRUSSELS — The U.S. must preserve and grow the dominance of its financial sector worldwide, President Donald Trump argues in his new National Security Strategy. The 33-page document is a rare formal explanation of Trump’s foreign policy worldview by his administration, and can shape U.S. policy priorities. “The United States boasts the world’s leading financial and capital markets, which are pillars of American influence that afford policymakers significant leverage and tools to advance America’s national security priorities,” the document states. “But our leadership position cannot be taken for granted,” it continues, calling on America to leverage “our dynamic free market system and our leadership in digital finance and innovation to ensure that our markets continue to be the most dynamic, liquid, and secure and remain the envy of the world.” The strategy lists the “world’s leading financial system and capital markets, including the dollar’s global reserve currency status” as one of the U.S. key levers of power. Trump’s comments come as Europe looks to grow its own finance system to reduce the continent’s dependence on Wall Street. The EU has put forward a broad plan to boost its own finance industry by strengthening its single market for investment, and it will draft policy plans in the coming months aiming to boost its banks’ ability to compete globally. It is also creating a digital version of the euro currency, which would reduce its reliance on the dollar and on U.S. payment giants.

LONDON — The British government is considering a ban on cryptocurrency donations to political parties — in a move that could set off alarm bells in Nigel Farage’s Reform UK. Farage’s populist party — surging ahead in U.K. opinion polls — opened the door to digital asset donations earlier this year as part of a promised “crypto revolution” in Britain, and has already accepted its first donations in the digital assets. A clampdown by the British government was absent from a policy paper outlining its upcoming Elections Bill, which is being billed as a plan to shore up British democracy. But officials are now considering measures to outlaw the use of crypto to fund U.K. politicians, according to three people familiar with recent discussions on the bill. The government did not deny that the move was under consideration, saying it would “set out further details in our Elections Bill.” Reform UK became the first British political party to accept crypto donations earlier this year. Farage told Reuters in October that his party had received “a couple” of donations in the form of crypto assets after the Electoral Commission — which regulates U.K. political donations — confirmed it had been notified of the first crypto donation in British politics. Reform has set up its own crypto donations portal and promised “enhanced” controls to avoid any misuse. Reform has set up its own crypto donations portal and promised “enhanced” controls to avoid any misuse. | Dan Kitwood/Getty Images Farage, who holds some long-term crypto assets, has told the sector he is the “only hope” for Britain’s crypto business as he seeks to emulate his long-term ally U.S. President Donald Trump’s wide embrace of digital currencies. Farage has stressed he was “way before Trump” in publicly backing cryptocurrencies. HARD TO TRACK Despite the absence of a clampdown from initial public plans for the government’s elections bill — which included measures ranging from lowering the voting age to 16 to strengthened powers for the electoral commission — the British government, which is trailing Reform in the polls, has been under pressure to adopt a ban on the practice. Among those who have floated a clampdown are then-Cabinet Office Minister Pat McFadden, Business Select Committee Chair Liam Byrne, and Phil Brickell, the Labour MP who chairs the All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Anti-Corruption and Fair Tax. Transparency experts have warned that the source of cryptocurrency donations can be difficult to track. That raises concerns that foreign donations to political parties and candidates — banned in almost all circumstances under British law — as well as the proceeds of crime and money laundering could slip through the net. Labour’s elections bill is also expected to place new requirements on political parties and their donors. It is set to include a clampdown on donations from shell companies and unincorporated associations, and could force parties to record and keep a risk assessment of donations that could pose a risk of foreign interference. Crypto is an emerging battleground of foreign interference, with Russia and its intelligence services increasingly embracing digital currencies to evade sanctions and finance destabilization — such as in Moldovan elections — after being cut off from the global banking system following Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian involvement in British politics has come under fresh scrutiny in recent months after Nathan Gill — the former head of Reform in Wales who was also an MEP in Farage’s Brexit Party — was jailed last month for over 10 years after being paid to make pro-Russian statements in the European Parliament. Farage has strongly distanced himself from Gill, describing the former MEP as a “bad apple” who had betrayed him. Nevertheless, Labour has since gone on the offensive, with Prime Minister Keir Starmer urging Farage to launch an internal investigation into Gill’s activities. According to a spokesperson for the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, which has responsibility for the bill, “The political finance system we inherited has left our democracy vulnerable to foreign interference.  “Our tough new rules on political donations, as set out in our Elections Strategy, will protect U.K. elections while making sure parties can continue to fund themselves.”

BRUSSELS — Platforms including Meta and TikTok will be held liable for financial fraud for the first time under new rules agreed by EU lawmakers in the early hours of Thursday. The Parliament and Council agreed on the package of rules after eight hours of negotiations to strengthen safeguards against payment fraud. The deal adds another layer of EU regulatory risk for U.S. tech giants, which have lobbied the White House to confront Brussels’ anti-monopoly and content moderation rules. “This is a big win. A big, big step forward. We are coming from a reality where platforms are not liable under any law,” Morten Løkkegaard, the Danish Renew MEP who shepherded part of the package through Parliament, told POLITICO. “It is a historical moment.” Social media has become rife with financial scams, and MEPs pushed hard to hold both Big Tech and banks liable during legislative negotiations. EU governments, meanwhile, believed banks should be held responsible if their safeguards aren’t strong enough. As a compromise, lawmakers agreed that banks should reimburse victims if a scammer, impersonating the bank, swindles them out of their money, or if payments are processed without consent. But social media companies will have to compensate banks if it’s clear that they failed to remove an online scam that had been reported. Some MEPs had called for more amid concerns that EU consumer safeguards on social platforms have proven insufficient. “Especially, as AI and social-engineering fuel an unprecedented rise in scams,” said Lithuanian Greens lawmaker Virginijus Sinkevičius. The new rules build on the EU’s Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act, which respectively limit the spread of illegal content and prevent large online platforms, such as Google, Amazon and Meta, from overextending their online empires. Breaching the DSA and DMA can come with huge fines, triggering pushback from the tech sector and U.S. President Donald Trump, who has accused the EU of discriminating against American companies. U.S. Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick has threatened to keep 50 percent tariffs on European exports of steel and aluminum unless the EU loosens its digital rules. Thursday’s deal triggered immediate criticism from the tech industry. “This convoluted framework undermines simplification efforts and conflicts with the Digital Services Act’s ban on general monitoring — ignoring multiple studies warning it will be counterproductive,” said CCIA Europe Policy Manager Leonardo Veneziani, whose trade body represents Amazon, Google, Meta and Apple. “Instead of protecting consumers, today’s outcome sets a dangerous precedent and shifts responsibility away from those best placed to prevent fraud,” he said.

When Goldman Sachs boss David Solomon met with Chancellor Rachel Reeves in October, he was given a list of prepared talking points by colleagues to discuss with Britain’s top finance minister. With only one thing on his mind, he ripped up the notes and warned her: Don’t hike bank taxes in the budget. Six weeks on, after Reeves delivered her second fiscal statement on Nov. 26 with no such tax increases, he needn’t have worried too much. Taxing Britain’s mammoth lenders could have raised £8 billion for the exchequer, a huge amount which would have gone a long way to plug the £30 billion hole Reeves needed to fill to stabilize the U.K.’s finances. But while some in the ruling Labour Party would have loved to see financial institutions taxed more, Reeves was never actually going to pull the trigger. Publicly and privately, the lobbying efforts by banks were intense. The CEOs of Lloyds, HSBC, and NatWest all spoke out openly against the suggestion, while other leaders, such as Solomon, issued their warnings behind closed doors. Banks couldn’t rule out a tax hike, particularly after a leaked memo revealed that former Deputy Prime Minister Angela Rayner had urged Reeves to raise the bank surcharge, an extra tax paid by banks on top of corporation tax. Certain think tanks, too, called on Reeves to go big on fat cats. But behind closed doors, as the budget approached, City figures weren’t so concerned. Many cautioned against believing stories that a bank tax was imminent, while others said they simply hadn’t been told either way — therefore weren’t expecting a surprise in the budget. Ultimately, they believed their lobbying was hugely successful toward a government intent on achieving growth and fearful of sending wealth out of the country. One senior bank executive, granted anonymity to speak freely, said bank chiefs “care about two things: How easy is it to hire and fire people in the U.K, and how much tax do we pay in this country?” For banks, their winning arguments were twofold: One, lenders pay £43.3 billion in tax every year at a 46.4 percent tax rate, higher than any other global financial center, according to data from lobby group UK Finance. Two, Reeves has been on a mission of financial deregulation since her party entered No. 10 last year. Banks argued that giving with one hand, by loosening rules, but taking away with the other, by hiking taxes, was contradictory and wouldn’t achieve the growth she so desperately wants. “Reeves has been consistent with her messaging during her tenure,” said Benjamin Toms, bank analyst at RBC Capital Markets. “The government wants to stimulate growth, and Reeves realizes that U.K. banks are the conduit for that growth.” MOVING MARKETS The message appeared to get through to Reeves, even though she declined to publicly rule out hiking bank taxes. That left rumors to intensify over the summer. Two think tanks, Positive Money and IPPR, issued reports backing a tax hike, with both recommending a windfall-style levy on bank profits. The former delivered a petition with 68,749 signatures calling for the move to the chancellor earlier this week. The IPPR report, published at the end of August, was the most impactful, knocking £8 billion off the share prices of FTSE 100 banks the day it was published, with NatWest losing £2.5 billion alone in market cap. The Treasury worked hard to separate itself from the report, with a spokesperson saying afterward that “the chancellor has been clear that the financial services sector is at the heart of our plans to grow the economy,” but it wasn’t enough to quell rumors. “Ultimately, negative press around banks slamming a bank tax and its effect on growth is considered more damaging to the economy than the taxes collected from the banks would bring in,” said Niklas Kammer, equity analyst at Morningstar. Later, it emerged that Reeves “ripped into” members of the think tank after the report was published, per one person in the room at the time. She told the IPPR to think before they publish a report next time, in front of dozens of attendees at a meeting in No. 11 Downing Street in September. While it seemed that gossip around a surcharge hike quietened down after the summer, it was immediately thrust back into the spotlight after the chancellor’s decision to rule out any income tax hikes in the budget, as Reeves began searching around for sources of income to pad her fiscal headroom. Lobbying efforts intensified after the news on income tax broke, causing banks to panic that the move would be back on the table and warn that they’d move business elsewhere. “We suggested in our conversation with government that if the surcharge was to go up, we might be able to move things to the EU,” added the bank executive. After Brexit, banks have been forced to move more of their operations to the continent, buying new offices and hiring further staff, leaving greater possibilities to shift operations away from the U.K. “It’s much easier to move at the margins now than it would have been just five years ago,” they said. But the possibility of raising taxes on banks in Britain was officially ruled out after reports circulated in the days leading up to the budget that Reeves would let them off the hook — if they praise the chancellor’s decisions. Will Howlett, financials analyst at Quilter Cheviot, said it would be a “stretch” to see banks showering the budget with praise given the other tax rises that Reeves did pursue in the fiscal event, along with the cuts to cash ISA limits. But Toms said it was likely “more accurate” that the government was requesting banks not criticize the budget rather than actively praise it. For banks reeling from a huge win, staying quiet won’t be too hard.

The European Central Bank is hatching a plan to boost the use of the euro around the world, hoping to turn the world’s faltering confidence in U.S. political and financial leadership to Europe’s advantage. Liquidity lines — agreements to lend at short notice to other central banks — have long been a standard part of the crisis-fighting toolkits of central banks, but the ECB is now thinking of repurposing them to further Europe’s political aims, four central bank officials told POLITICO. One aim of the plan is to absorb any shocks if the U.S. — which has backstopped the global financial system with dollars for decades — suddenly decides not to, or attaches unacceptable conditions to its support. The other goal is to underpin its foreign trade more actively and, ultimately, grab some of the benefits that the U.S. has historically enjoyed from controlling the world’s reserve currency. Officials were granted anonymity because the discussions are private. Bruegel fellow Francesco Papadia, who was previously director-general for the ECB’s market operations, told POLITICO that such efforts are sensible and reflect an increasing willingness among European authorities to see the euro used more widely around the world. WHAT’S A LIQUIDITY LINE? Central banks typically use two types of facilities to lend to each other: either by swapping one currency for another (swap lines) or by providing funds against collateral denominated in the lender’s currency (repo lines). The ECB currently maintains standing, unlimited swap lines with the U.S. Federal Reserve, the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the Swiss National Bank, and the Bank of Japan, as well as standing but capped lines with the Danish and Swedish central banks. It also operates a facility with the People’s Bank of China, capped in both volume and duration. Other central banks seeking euro liquidity must rely on repo lines known as EUREP, under which they can borrow limited amounts of euros for a limited period against high-quality euro-denominated collateral. At present, only Hungary, Romania, Albania, Andorra, San Marino, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Kosovo have such lines in place. But these active lines have sat untouched since Jan. 2, 2024 — and even at the height of the Covid crisis, their use peaked at a mere €3.6 billion. For the eurozone’s international partners, the knowledge that they can access the euro in times of stress is valuable in itself, helping to pre-empt self-fulfilling fears of financial instability. But some say that if structured generously enough, the facilities can also reduce concerns about exchange rate fluctuations or liquidity shortages. Such details may sound academic, but the availability of liquidity lines has real impacts on business: A Romanian carmaker whose bank has trouble securing euros may fail to make payments to a supplier in Germany, disrupting its production and raising its costs.  “The knowledge that foreign commercial banks can borrow in euros while being assured that they have access to euro liquidity [as a backstop] encourages the use of the euro,” one ECB rate-setter explained.  French central bank chief François Villeroy de Galhau suggested that Europe could at least take a leaf out of China’s book, noting that the Eurosystem “can make euro invoicing more attractive” by expanding the provision of euro liquidity lines. | Kirill Kudryavtsev/Getty Images “Liquidity lines, in particular EUREP, should be flexible, simple and easy to activate,” he argued. One option, he said, would be to extend them to more countries. Another could be to make EUREP a standing facility — removing any doubts about whether, and under what conditions, euro access would be granted. Papadia added that the ECB could also ease access to EUREP by cutting its cost, boosting available volumes or extending the timeframe for use. NOT JUST AN ACADEMIC QUESTION French central bank chief François Villeroy de Galhau suggested in a recent speech that Europe could at least take a leaf out of China’s book, noting that the Eurosystem “can make euro invoicing more attractive” by expanding the provision of euro liquidity lines. China has established around 40 swap lines with trading partners worldwide to underpin its burgeoning foreign trade, especially with poorer and less stable countries. By contrast, the ECB — a historically cautious animal — “is not marketing the euro to the same extent that the Chinese market the renminbi,” according to Papadia.  Another policymaker told POLITICO that while there is a broad consensus that liquidity lines should be made more widely available, the Governing Council had not yet hashed out the details. Austrian National Bank Governor Martin Kocher told POLITICO in a recent interview that there has been “no deeper discussion” on the Council, adding that he sees no reason to promote euro liquidity lines actively. “I’m not arguing that you should incentivize or create a demand. Rather, if there is demand, we should be prepared for it,” he said, acknowledging that “preparation is very important.” He noted that erratic U.S. policies could force the euro “to take on a stronger role in the international sphere” — both as a reserve currency and in transactions. According to a Reuters report earlier this month, similar concerns among central banks worldwide have sparked a debate over creating an alternative to Federal Reserve funding backstops by pooling their own dollar reserves. The ECB declined to comment for this article. RISK AVERSION AND OTHER OBSTACLES  However, swap lines in particular don’t come without risks. “The main risk is that the country would use a swap and then would not be able to return the drawn euros,” said Papadia. “And then you will be left with foreign currency you don’t really know what to do with.” That is exactly the kind of trap some economists warn the U.S. is stumbling into with its $20 billion swap line to Argentina. “The United States doesn’t really want Argentina’s currency,” the Council on Foreign Relations’ Brad Setser wrote in a blog post. “It expects to be repaid in dollars, so it would be a massive failure if the swap was never unwound and the U.S. Treasury was left holding a slug of pesos.” Austrian National Bank Governor Martin Kocher said there has been “no deeper discussion” on the Council, adding that he sees no reason to promote euro liquidity lines actively. | Heinz-Peter Bader/Getty Images Such thinking, another central bank official said, will incline the ECB to focus first on reforming the EUREP lines, which have always been its preferred tool. The trouble with that, however, is that EUREP use may be limited by a lack of safe assets denominated in euros to serve as collateral. Papadia noted that the Fed’s network of liquidity lines works because “the Fed has the U.S.  Treasury as a kind of partner in granting these swaps.” So long as Europe fails to create a joint debt instrument, this may put a natural cap on such lines.  Even with a safe asset, focusing on liquidity lines first could be putting the cart before the horse, said Gianluca Benigno, professor of economics at the University of Lausanne and former head of the New York Fed’s international research department. Europe’s diminishing geopolitical relevance means that the ECB is unlikely to see much demand — deliberately engineered or not — for its liquidity outside Europe without much broader changes, Benigno told POLITICO. Liquidity lines can be used to advance your goals if you already have power — but they can’t create it. For that, he argued, Europe first needs a clear political vision for its role in the global economy, alongside a Capital Markets Union and the creation of a common European safe asset — issues that only politicians can address.

The starter’s gun is about to fire on the race to succeed Christine Lagarde as European Central Bank president in 2027, and two heavyweight countries who have never held the position look likely to make the running: Spain and Germany. Madrid has been conspicuously silent on nominating a replacement for its current representative on the board, Luis de Guindos, who is preparing to leave the vice presidency in June. That has fueled speculation in markets and policy circles that the eurozone’s fourth-largest member is eyeing a bigger prize. The ECB is set for a major leadership reshuffle over the next two years, creating a rare opportunity for national governments to install trusted figures at the top of one of the EU’s most powerful institutions. De Guindos’ post is up for grabs in May next year, while the chief economist role, the presidency and the important markets division will all become vacant in 2027. While Germany, France and Italy have always held one of the six coveted Executive Board seats, Spain has endured a six-year gap without representation. Should it remain silent as the other board seats fill up, this would be a clear indication that Spain wants the top spot. The Spanish economy ministry declined to comment directly, but stressed that “Spain remains firmly committed to having a meaningful and influential presence in key European institutions, as it has consistently done.” Betting on the presidency is a gamble for Madrid, and the competition is fierce — not least because Germany, which has never held the top ECB post, may also want to seize the chance. For once, Spain has a strong candidate in Pablo Hernández de Cos, the former Bank of Spain governor who is now general manager at the Bank for International Settlements. Groomed by former ECB President Mario Draghi, de Cos restored the Bank of Spain’s reputation after a series of missteps before and during the financial crisis. His achievement was implicitly acknowledged by his appointment to two terms as chair of the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS), the global standard-setter for bank regulation. But inevitably, the shadow of U.S. President Donald Trump looms over the issue. De Cos moving to the ECB could cost Europe the BIS leadership. Given Europe’s fading relevance to the global economy, Trump may persuade others that — with the IMF, BCBS and the Financial Stability Board already headed by Europeans — the Old Continent has more than its fair share of top jobs. While not powerful, the BIS is a highly prestigious institution commanding a unique overview of global financial flows. Two people familiar with the ECB’s thinking told POLITICO that its current top management is concerned about the risk of losing a slot that has traditionally been held by a European. GERMANY’S MOMENT Much will depend on Germany, which, like Spain, has never held the ECB presidency. The German government will form an opinion “in due course” but will refrain from speculation today, a spokesperson said. The country’s previous contenders — Axel Weber and Jens Weidmann — both fell victim to their unbending faith in conservative monetary orthodoxy in times of crisis. But today, after the worst bout of inflation in Europe for over half a century, the climate looks far more welcoming for a more hawkish leader. As the current Bundesbank president, Joachim Nagel would be the obvious choice. | Pool photo by Maxim Shemetov via Getty Images As the current Bundesbank president, Joachim Nagel would be the obvious choice. A more moderate voice than either Weber or Weidmann, Nagel may be more acceptable to other member states. However, Nagel — a member of the SPD junior coalition partner — has more than once stepped on the toes of German Chancellor Friedrich Merz — most recently by expressing support for joint European debt issuance to finance defense projects. Like de Cos, Nagel could also face competition within his own country. Lars-Hendrik Röller, formerly chief economic advisor to then-Chancellor Angela Merkel and still a heavyweight in Berlin policy circles, has floated Jörg Kukies, who was finance minister under Olaf Scholz. While also a social democrat, Kukies is clearly associated with the right wing of the party and has not recently opposed Merz in public. Kukies may well be an acceptable candidate for the chancellor, a person close to Merz told POLITICO. His impeccable English, PhD in finance from the University of Chicago and a spell leading Goldman Sachs’s German operations would also help his candidacy. But intriguingly, at a recent public event in Berlin, Bank of France Governor François Villeroy de Galhau appeared to suggest that Röller has also been touting a German woman — rather than Nagel — for the presidency. That woman could be the ECB’s current head of markets, Isabel Schnabel, who is said to be eyeing the post. Ordinarily, however, no one is allowed to serve more than one term on the Executive Board, meaning a legal loophole would need to be found to accommodate her. Given the presence of alternative candidates, and given that other member states may view her as excessively hawkish, one former board member said there’s no obvious reason why Germany should risk advancing her. In any case, Berlin may prefer to support a hawk from another country, to avoid pressure to give up the European Commission presidency early: Ursula von der Leyen’s term expires in 2029. GOING DUTCH? Enter Klaas Knot, who stepped down as president of the Dutch central bank in June after 14 years. Knot, like Draghi, a former chair of the Financial Stability Board, would bring deep institutional experience and monetary policy expertise. He also drew conspicuously supportive comments last month from Lagarde, who said he “has the intellect” as well as the stamina and the “rare” and “very necessary” ability to include people. Most of the obstacles in Knot’s way look surmountable: While he took a clearly hawkish line throughout the eurozone crisis, he became a far more nuanced team player during his second term. And while the Netherlands would still have a representative — Frank Elderson — on its board when the presidency comes up, a similar situation was dealt with easily enough in 2011, when Lorenzo Bini Smaghi left early to make room for Draghi. Knot’s only real problem is that he is currently out of the policy circus. “He will need to find a way to stay visible and relevant to bridge the time,” the former Executive Board member said. Knot is still tending potentially important connections: He is advising the European Stability Mechanism (the EU’s bailout fund) on strategic positioning, and the European Commission on central bank independence in potential accession countries. He also remains an avid public speaker — with no less than five engagements at the International Monetary Fund’s annual meeting last month.  But two years can be a long time in European politics. Carlo Boffa contributed reporting.

BRUSSELS — The European Commission appears to be slow-walking a decision to take action against Italy over its controversial use of national security powers to stall a banking merger between UniCredit, the Milan-based bank, and its crosstown rival BPM.  Officials at the competition and financial services directorates handed in their assessment of the case weeks ago to President Ursula von der Leyen’s Cabinet, but have yet to hear back, five people familiar with the matter told POLITICO. The assessment is not in favor of Rome, said one of the people, granted anonymity to discuss a private matter.  Commission insiders speculate that the delay has to do with broader political bargaining at the highest level between Brussels and Rome. According to another of the people, von der Leyen is taking care not to annoy Giorgia Meloni because she needs the Italian premier’s support to shore up the increasingly shaky political coalition that backed her for a second term last year. Earlier this year, Italy decided that UniCredit’s €10 billion takeover of BPM was a threat to national security. Under the government’s rules on screening foreign direct investments — known as its “golden power” — Rome imposed conditions on April 18 that effectively prevented UniCredit from completing the deal. The Commission opened a so-called EU Pilot procedure — carried out by its financial services directorate — to determine whether the use of national security measures in a bank merger is in line with EU banking regulations and single-market freedoms. The process can ultimately lead to an infringement procedure — as happened when the Spanish government obstructed BBVA’s acquisition of Catalan bank Banco Sabadell. The Commission’s competition directorate gave a conditional green light to the deal on June 19. A month later it warned Italy that by applying the golden power to a domestic deal, Italy may have violated merger rules as well as other provisions of EU law. The Commission is currently assessing Italy’s replies in both investigations, a spokesperson for the EU executive said. GOLDEN POWER The golden power equips Italy with wide-ranging screening tools to curb bids on national champions by foreign investors that are deemed risks to national security, such as those from China. The use of the tool to derail a domestic merger appeared to flout the EU’s push for greater banking consolidation across Europe — which it sees as necessary for the continent’s financial sector and for the economy more broadly — to compete with U.S. rivals. The largest American bank, JP Morgan, has a market capitalization more than four times that of its nearest European counterpart, Santander. Banking and Financial Services Commissioner Maria Luís Albuquerque has repeatedly spoken out in favor of banking consolidation across the bloc.  The competition and financial services teams had their assessment of the case ready shortly after Italy submitted its last round of responses to the Commission in August, said one of the people who spoke to POLITICO. But von der Leyen’s Cabinet, which ultimately has to sign off on a decision, has taken no action so far, they added. According to Italian media reports, Italy has been trying to buy more time and stave off an infringement procedure by suggesting it could amend its golden power legislation. Financial daily Milano Finanza reported on Tuesday that the Commission has set Nov. 13 for a decision. An Italian official with knowledge of the file said the Commission could very well be slow-walking action against Italy given that Unicredit’s withdrawal from the deal is by now irreversible. | Emanuele Cremaschi/Getty Images An Italian official with knowledge of the file said the Commission could very well be slow-walking action against Italy given that Unicredit’s withdrawal from the deal is by now irreversible. That would allow time to review whether Italy’s golden power is in line with EU competition rules without the pressure of a live deal. “A medium-term, out-of-the-spotlight agreement on golden power could be the best outcome,” this official explained. Reuters, citing sources familiar with the matter, reported last week that Italy could be willing to amend its golden power to address the Commission’s concerns over how it was used in the Unicredit-BPM case. All matters pertaining to the golden power are steered from von der Leyen’s office, said another Commission official who is not directly involved in the matter and was also granted anonymity to speak candidly. It is usually quite simple to perform a technical analysis of such files, but “politics always trumps it,” they added.  Spokespeople for Meloni and Italy’s economy ministry declined to comment.