Europe’s chemical industry has reached a breaking point. The warning lights are no longer blinking — they are blazing. Unless Europe changes course immediately, we risk watching an entire industrial backbone, with the countless jobs it supports, slowly hollow out before our eyes. Consider the energy situation: this year European gas prices have stood at 2.9 times higher than in the United States. What began as a temporary shock is now a structural disadvantage. High energy costs are becoming Europe’s new normal, with no sign of relief. This is not sustainable for an energy-intensive sector that competes globally every day. Without effective infrastructure and targeted energy-cost relief — including direct support, tax credits and compensation for indirect costs from the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) — we are effectively asking European companies and their workers to compete with their hands tied behind their backs. > Unless Europe changes course immediately, we risk watching an entire > industrial backbone, with the countless jobs it supports, slowly hollow out > before our eyes. The impact is already visible. This year, EU27 chemical production fell by a further 2.5 percent, and the sector is now operating 9.5 percent below pre-crisis capacity. These are not just numbers, they are factories scaling down, investments postponed and skilled workers leaving sites. This is what industrial decline looks like in real time. We are losing track of the number of closures and job losses across Europe, and this is accelerating at an alarming pace. And the world is not standing still. In the first eight months of 2025, EU27 chemicals exports dropped by €3.5 billion, while imports rose by €3.2 billion. The volume trends mirror this: exports are down, imports are up. Our trade surplus shrank to €25 billion, losing €6.6 billion in just one year. Meanwhile, global distortions are intensifying. Imports, especially from China, continue to increase, and new tariff policies from the United States are likely to divert even more products toward Europe, while making EU exports less competitive. Yet again, in 2025, most EU trade defense cases involved chemical products. In this challenging environment, EU trade policy needs to step up: we need fast, decisive action against unfair practices to protect European production against international trade distortions. And we need more free trade agreements to access growth market and secure input materials. “Open but not naïve” must become more than a slogan. It must shape policy. > Our producers comply with the strictest safety and environmental standards in > the world. Yet resource-constrained authorities cannot ensure that imported > products meet those same standards. Europe is also struggling to enforce its own rules at the borders and online. Our producers comply with the strictest safety and environmental standards in the world. Yet resource-constrained authorities cannot ensure that imported products meet those same standards. This weak enforcement undermines competitiveness and safety, while allowing products that would fail EU scrutiny to enter the single market unchecked. If Europe wants global leadership on climate, biodiversity and international chemicals management, credibility starts at home. Regulatory uncertainty adds to the pressure. The Chemical Industry Action Plan recognizes what industry has long stressed: clarity, coherence and predictability are essential for investment. Clear, harmonized rules are not a luxury — they are prerequisites for maintaining any industrial presence in Europe. This is where REACH must be seen for what it is: the world’s most comprehensive piece of legislation governing chemicals. Yet the real issues lie in implementation. We therefore call on policymakers to focus on smarter, more efficient implementation without reopening the legal text. Industry is facing too many headwinds already. Simplification can be achieved without weakening standards, but this requires a clear political choice. We call on European policymakers to restore the investment and profitability of our industry for Europe. Only then will the transition to climate neutrality, circularity, and safe and sustainable chemicals be possible, while keeping our industrial base in Europe. > Our industry is an enabler of the transition to a climate-neutral and circular > future, but we need support for technologies that will define that future. In this context, the ETS must urgently evolve. With enabling conditions still missing, like a market for low-carbon products, energy and carbon infrastructures, access to cost-competitive low-carbon energy sources, ETS costs risk incentivizing closures rather than investment in decarbonization. This may reduce emissions inside the EU, but it does not decarbonize European consumption because production shifts abroad. This is what is known as carbon leakage, and this is not how EU climate policy intends to reach climate neutrality. The system needs urgent repair to avoid serious consequences for Europe’s industrial fabric and strategic autonomy, with no climate benefit. These shortcomings must be addressed well before 2030, including a way to neutralize ETS costs while industry works toward decarbonization. Our industry is an enabler of the transition to a climate-neutral and circular future, but we need support for technologies that will define that future. Europe must ensure that chemical recycling, carbon capture and utilization, and bio-based feedstocks are not only invented here, but also fully scaled here. Complex permitting, fragmented rules and insufficient funding are slowing us down while other regions race ahead. Decarbonization cannot be built on imported technology — it must be built on a strong EU industrial presence. Critically, we must stimulate markets for sustainable products that come with an unavoidable ‘green premium’. If Europe wants low-carbon and circular materials, then fiscal, financial and regulatory policy recipes must support their uptake — with minimum recycled or bio-based content, new value chain mobilizing schemes and the right dose of ‘European preference’. If we create these markets but fail to ensure that European producers capture a fair share, we will simply create new opportunities for imports rather than European jobs. > If Europe wants a strong, innovative resilient chemical industry in 2030 and > beyond, the decisions must be made today. The window is closing fast. The Critical Chemicals Alliance offers a path forward. Its primary goal will be to tackle key issues facing the chemical sector, such as risks of closures and trade challenges, and to support modernization and investments in critical productions. It will ultimately enable the chemical industry to remain resilient in the face of geopolitical threats, reinforcing Europe’s strategic autonomy. But let us be honest: time is no longer on our side. Europe’s chemical industry is the foundation of countless supply chains — from clean energy to semiconductors, from health to mobility. If we allow this foundation to erode, every other strategic ambition becomes more fragile. If you weren’t already alarmed — you should be. This is a wake-up call. Not for tomorrow, for now. Energy support, enforceable rules, smart regulation, strategic trade policies and demand-driven sustainability are not optional. They are the conditions for survival. If Europe wants a strong, innovative resilient chemical industry in 2030 and beyond, the decisions must be made today. The window is closing fast. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is CEFIC- The European Chemical Industry Council  * The ultimate controlling entity is CEFIC- The European Chemical Industry Council  More information here.

Iris Ferguson is a global adviser to Loom and a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for Arctic and global resilience. Ann Mettler is a distinguished visiting fellow at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy and a former director general of the European Commission. After much pressure, European leaders delayed a decision this week amid division on whether to tighten market access through a “Made in Europe” mandate and redouble efforts to reduce the bloc’s strategic dependencies — particularly on China. This decision may appear technocratic, but the hold-up signals its importance and reflects a larger strategic reality shared across the Atlantic. Security, industry and energy have all fused into a single race to control the systems that power modern economies and militaries. And increasingly, success will hinge on whether the U.S. and Europe can confront this reality together, starting with the one domain that’s shaping every other: energy. While traditional defense spending still grabs headlines, today’s battlefield is being reshaped just as profoundly by energy flows and critical inputs. Advanced batteries for drones, portable power for forward-deployed units and mineral supply chains for next-generation platforms — these all point to the simple truth that technological and operational superiority increasingly depends on who controls the next generation of energy systems. But as Europe and the U.S. look to maintain their edge, they must rethink not just how they produce and move energy, but how to secure the industrial base behind it. Energy sovereignty now sits at the center of our shared security, and in a world where adversaries can weaponize supply chains just as easily as airspace or sea lanes, the future will belong to those who build energy systems that are resilient and interoperable by design. The Pentagon already understands this. It has tested distributed power to shorten vulnerable fuel lines in war games across the Indo-Pacific; it has watched closely how mobile generation units keep the grid alive under Russian attack in Ukraine; and it is exploring ways to deliver energy without relying on exposed logistics via new research on solar power beaming. Each of these cases clearly demonstrates that strategic endurance now depends on energy agility and security. But currently, many of these systems depend on materials and manufacturing chains that are dominated by a strategic rival: From batteries and magnets to rare earth processing, China controls our critical inputs. This isn’t just an economic liability, it’s a national security vulnerability for both Europe and the U.S. We’re essentially building the infrastructure of the future with components that could be withheld, surveilled or compromised. That risk isn’t theoretical. China’s recent export controls on key minerals are already disrupting defense and energy manufacturers — a sharp reminder of how supply chain leverage can be a form of coercion, and of our reliance on a fragile ecosystem for the very technologies meant to make us more independent. So, how do we modernize our energy systems without deepening these unnecessary dependencies and build trusted interdependence among allies instead? The solution starts with a shift in mindset that must then translate into decisive policy action. Simply put, as a matter of urgency, energy and tech resilience must be treated as shared infrastructure, cutting across agencies, sectors and alliances. Defense procurement can be a catalyst here. For example, investing in dual-use technologies like advanced batteries, hardened micro-grids and distributed generation would serve both military needs and broader resilience. These aren’t just “green” tools — they’re strategic assets that improve mission effectiveness, while also insulating us from coercion. And done right, such investment can strengthen defense, accelerate innovation and also help drive down costs. Next, we need to build new coalitions for critical minerals, batteries, trusted manufacturing and cyber-secure infrastructure. Just as NATO was built for collective defense, we now need economic and technological alliances that ensure shared strategic autonomy. Both the upcoming White House initiative to strengthen the supply chain for artificial intelligence technology and the recently announced RESourceEU initiative to secure raw materials illustrate how partners are already beginning to rewire systems for resilience. Germany gave the bloc one such example by moving to reduce its reliance on Chinese-made wind components in favor of European suppliers. | Tan Kexing/Getty Images Finally, we must also address existing dependencies strategically and head-on. This means rethinking how and where we source key materials, including building out domestic and allied capacity in areas long neglected. Germany recently gave the bloc one such example by moving to reduce its reliance on Chinese-made wind components in favor of European suppliers. Moving forward, measures like this need EU-wide adoption. By contrast, in the U.S., strong bipartisan support for reducing reliance on China sits alongside proposals to halt domestic battery and renewable incentives, undercutting the very industries that enhance resilience and competitiveness. This is the crux of the matter. Ultimately, if Europe and the U.S. move in parallel rather than together, none of these efforts will succeed — and both will be strategically weaker as a result. The EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas recently warned that we must “act united” or risk being affected by Beijing’s actions — and she’s right. With a laser focus on interoperability and cost sharing, we could build systems that operate together in a shared market of close to 800 million people. The real challenge isn’t technological, it’s organizational. Whether it be Bretton Woods, NATO or the Marshall Plan, the West has strategically built together before, anchoring economic resilience with national defense. The difference today is that the lines between economic security, energy access and defense capability are fully blurred. Sustainable, agile energy is now part of deterrence, and long-term security depends on whether the U.S. and Europe can build energy systems that reinforce and secure one another. This is a generational opportunity for transatlantic alignment; a mutually reinforcing way to safeguard economic interests in the face of systemic competition. And to lead in this new era, we must design for it — together and intentionally. Or we risk forfeiting the very advantages our alliance was built to protect.

President Donald Trump’s pursuit of an end to the war between Russia and Ukraine is increasingly being driven by his own impatience — with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and European leaders who Trump believes are standing in the way of both peace and future economic cooperation between Washington and Moscow. Trump, who has called for Russia’s return to the G7 and spoken repeatedly about his eagerness to bring Russia back into the economic fold, laid bare his frustrations Monday at the White House with POLITICO’s Dasha Burns for a special episode of “The Conversation.” He derided European leaders as talkers who “don’t produce” and declared that Zelenskyy has “to play ball” given that, in his view, “Russia has the upper hand.” Zelenskyy, who Trump grumbled hadn’t read the latest peace proposal, spent Monday working with the leaders of France, Germany and Britain on a revision of the Americans’ 28-point proposal that he said has been shaved down to 20 points. “We took out openly anti-Ukrainian points,” Zelenskyy told a group of reporters in Kyiv, emphasizing that Ukraine still needs stronger security guarantees and that he isn’t ready to give Russia more land in the Donbas than its military currently holds. With Russia unlikely to budge from its demands, the White House-driven peace talks appear stalled. And as Trump’s irritation deepens, pressure is mounting on the Europeans backing Zelenskyy to prove Trump wrong. “He says we don’t produce, and I hate to say it, but there’s been some truth to that,” said a European official, one of three interviewed for this report who were granted anonymity because they were not authorized to speak publicly. “We are doing it now, but we have been slow to realize we are the solution to our problem.” The official pointed to NATO’s increased defense spending commitments and the PURL initiative, through which NATO allies are buying U.S. weapons to send to Ukraine, as evidence that things have started to shift. But in the near term, the European Union is struggling to convince Belgium to support a nearly $200 billion loan to Ukraine funded with seized Russian assets. “If we fail on this one, we’re in trouble,” said a second European official. Trump’s mounting pressure on Ukraine makes clear that months of careful management of the president through private texts, public flattery and general deference has gotten Europe very little. But Liana Fix, a senior fellow for Europe at the Council on Foreign Relations, said that the leaders on the other side of the Atlantic “know very well that they can’t just stand up to Trump and tell him courageously that, you know, this is not how you treat Europe, because [of] the existential dependence that is still there between Europe and the United States.” Still, some in Europe continue to express shock and revulsion over Trump’s lopsided diplomacy in favor of Russia, disputing the president’s assessment during his POLITICO interview that Putin’s army has the upper hand despite its slow advance across the Donbas, more than half of which is now in Russian control. “Our view is not that Ukraine is losing. If Russia was so powerful they would have been able to finish the war within 24 hours,” a third European diplomat said. “If you think that Russia is winning, what does that mean — you give them everything? That’s not a sustainable peace. You’ll reward the Russians for their aggression and they will look for more – not only in Ukraine but also in Europe.” Trump has refused to approve additional defense aid to Ukraine, while blasting his predecessor for sending billions in aid — approved by Democrats and many Republicans in Congress — to help the country defend itself following Russia’s Feb. 2022 invasion. Jake Sullivan, President Joe Biden’s national security adviser, said Trump’s brief that Russia is prevailing on the battlefield doesn’t match the reality. “Russia has not achieved its strategic objectives in Ukraine. It has completely failed in its initial objective to take Kyiv and subjugate the country, and it has even failed in its more limited objective in taking all of the Donbas and neutering Ukraine from a security perspective,” Sullivan said, adding that he thinks Ukraine could prevail militarily with stronger U.S. support. “But if the United States throws Ukraine under the bus and essentially takes Russia’s side functionally, then things, of course, are much more difficult for Ukraine, and that seems to be the direction of travel this administration is taking.” The White House did not respond to a request for additional comment. Clearly eager to normalize relations with Moscow, Trump appears to be motivated more by the prospect of cutting deals with Putin than maintaining a transatlantic alliance built on shared democratic principles. Fiona Hill, a Russia expert who served on Trump’s national security council in his first term, noted that the U.S.-Russia diplomacy involves three people with business backgrounds and investment portfolios: special envoy Steve Witkoff and Trump son-in-law Jared Kushner on the U.S. side and Russia’s Kirill Dmitriev, the head of Russia’s sovereign investment fund. “Putin’s always thinking about what’s the angle here? How do I approach somebody? He’s got the number of President Trump,” Hill said Monday on a Brookings Institution podcast. “He knows he wants to make a deal, and he’s emphasizing this, and all the context is business, not really as diplomacy.” Additionally, Trump is eager to end Europe’s decades-long dependence on the U.S., which he believes has been saddled with the burden of its continental security for far too long. Ending the war with a deal that largely favors Putin would not only burnish Trump’s own self-conception as a global peacemaker — it would serve final notice to Europe that many of America’s oldest and most steadfast allies are truly on their own. Trump’s new national security strategy, released last week, made that point explicit, devoting more words to the threat of Europe’s civilizational decline — castigating the entire continent over its immigration and economic policies — than to threats posed by China, Russia or North Korea. Asked by POLITICO if European countries would continue to be U.S. allies, Trump demurred: “It depends,” he said, harshly criticizing immigration policies. “They want to be politically correct, and it makes them weak.” Europe, despite years of warnings from Trump and their own growing awareness about the need for what French President Emanuel Macron has called “strategic autonomy,” has been slow to mobilize its defenses to be able to defend the continent — and Ukraine — on its own. At Trump’s behest, NATO members agreed in June to increase defense spending to 5 percent of GDP over the coming decade. And NATO is now purchasing U.S. weapons to send to Ukraine through a new NATO initiative. But it may be too little, too late as the war grinds into a fourth winter with Ukraine’s military low on ammunition, weapons and morale. “That is why they will continue to engage this administration despite the strategy,” Fix said. And while Trump sees Ukraine and European stubbornness as the primary impediment to peace, many longtime diplomats believe that it’s his own unwillingness to ratchet up pressure on Moscow — Trump imposed new sanctions on Russian oil last month, only to pull some of them back — that is rendering his peacemaking efforts so fruitless. “It’s not enough to want peace. You’ve got to create a context in which the protagonists are willing to compromise either enthusiastically or reluctantly,” said Richard Haass, the former president of the Council on Foreign Relations who served as a senior adviser to Secretary of State Colin Powell in the George W. Bush administration. “The president has totally failed to do that, so it’s not a question of wordsmithing. In order to succeed at the table, you have to succeed away from the table. And they have failed to do that.” Veronika Melkozerova, Ari Hawkins and Daniella Cheslow contributed to this report.

Jamie Dettmer is opinion editor and a foreign affairs columnist at POLITICO Europe. “It must be a policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure,” said former U.S. President Harry Truman during a speech to Congress in 1947. The Truman Doctrine, as this approach became known, saw the defense of democracy abroad as of vital interest to the U.S. — but that’s not a view shared by President Donald Trump and his acolytes. If anyone had any doubts about this — or harbored any lingering hopes that Vice President JD Vance was speaking out of turn when he launched a blistering attack on Europe at the Munich Security Conference earlier this this year — then Washington’s new National Security Strategy (NSS) should settle the matter. All U.S. presidents release such a strategy early in their terms to outline their foreign policy thinking and priorities, which in turn shapes how the Pentagon’s budget is allocated. And with all 33 pages of this NSS, the world’s despots have much to celebrate, while democrats have plenty to be anxious about — especially in Europe. Fleshing out what the Trump administration means by “America First,” the new security strategy represents an emphatic break with Truman and the post-1945 order shaped by successive U.S. presidents. It is all about gaining a mercantilist advantage, and its guiding principle is might is right. Moving forward, Trump’s foreign policy won’t be “grounded in traditional, political ideology” but guided by “what works for America.” And apparently what works for America is to go easy on autocrats, whether theocratic or secular, and to turn on traditional allies in a startling familial betrayal. Of course, the hostility this NSS displays toward Europe shouldn’t come as a surprise — Trump’s top aides have barely disguised their contempt for the EU, while the president has said he believes the bloc was formed to “screw” the U.S. But that doesn’t dull the sting. Over the weekend, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas sought to present a brave face despite the excoriating language the NSS reserves for European allies, telling international leaders at the Doha Forum: “We haven’t always seen eye-to-eye on different topics. But the overall principle is still there: We are the biggest allies, and we should stick together.” But other seasoned European hands recognize that this NSS marks a significant departure from what has come before. “The only part of the world where the new security strategy sees any threat to democracy seems to be Europe. Bizarre,” said former Swedish Prime Minister and European Council on Foreign Relations co-chair Carl Bildt. He’s right. As Bildt noted, the NSS includes no mention, let alone criticism, of the authoritarian behavior of the “axis of autocracy” — China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. It also rejects interventionist approaches to autocracies or cajoling them to adopt “democratic or other social change that differs widely from their traditions and histories.” For example, the 2017 NSS framed China as a systemic global challenger in very hostile terms. “A geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order is taking place in the Indo-Pacific region,” that document noted. But the latest version contains no such language amid clear signs that Trump wants to deescalate tensions; the new paramount objective is to secure a “mutually advantageous economic relationship.” All should be well as long as China stays away from the Western Hemisphere, which is the preserve of the U.S. — although it must also ditch any idea of invading Taiwan. “Deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority” the NSS reads. Likewise, much to Moscow’s evident satisfaction, the document doesn’t even cast Russia as an adversary — in stark contrast with the 2017 strategy, which described it as a chief geopolitical rival. No wonder Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov welcomed the NSS as a “positive step” and “largely consistent” with Russia’s vision. “Overall, these messages certainly contrast with the approaches of previous administrations,” he purred. While Beijing and Moscow appear delighted with the NSS, the document reserves its harshest language and sharpest barbs for America’s traditional allies in Europe. “The core problem of the European continent, according to the NSS, is a neglect of ‘Western’ values (understood as nationalist conservative values) and a ‘loss of national identities’ due to immigration and ‘cratering birthrates,’” noted Liana Fix of the Council on Foreign Relations. “The alleged result is economic stagnation, military weakness and civilizational erasure.” The new strategy also lambasts America’s European allies for their alleged “anti-democratic” practices,accusing them of censorship and suppressing political opposition in a dilation of Vance’s Munich criticism. Ominously, the NSS talks about cultivating resistance within European nations by endorsing “patriotic” parties — a threat that caused much consternation when Vance made it, but is now laid out as the administration’s official policy. Regime change for Europe but not for autocracies is cause for great alarm. So how will Europe react? Flatter Trump as “daddy,” like NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte did in June? Pretend the U.S. administration isn’t serious, and muddle through while overlooking slights? Take the punishment and button up as it did over higher tariffs? Or toughen up, and get serious about strategic autonomy? Europe has once again been put on the spot to make some fundamental choices — and quickly. But doing anything quickly isn’t Europe’s strong point. Admittedly, that’s no easy task for a bloc that makes decisions by consensus in a process designed to be agonizingly slow. Nor will it be an easy road at the national level, with all 27 countries facing critical economic challenges and profound political divisions that Washington has been seeking to roil. With the assistance of Trump’s ideological bedfellows like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Slovakia’s Robert Fico, the impasse will only intensify in the coming months. Trump 2.0 is clearly a disorienting step change from the president’s first term — far more triumphalist, confident, uncompromisingly mercantilist; and determined to ignore guardrails; and more revolutionary in how it implements its “America First” agenda. The NSS just makes this clearer, and the howls of disapproval from critics will merely embolden an administration that sees protest as evidence it’s on the right track. Europe’s leaders have had plenty of warnings, but apart from eye-rolling, hand-wringing and wishful thinking they failed to agree on a plan. However, trying to ride things out isn’t going to work this time around — and efforts to foist a very unfavorable “peace” deal on Ukraine may finally the trigger the great unraveling of the Western alliance. The bloc’s options are stark, to be sure. Whether it kowtows or pushes back, it’s going to cost Europe one way or another.

The Dutch government has quietly removed Google tracking tools from job listings for its intelligence services over concerns that the data would expose aspirant spies to U.S. surveillance. The intervention would put an end to Google’s processing of the data of job seekers interested in applying to spy service jobs, after members of parliament in The Hague raised security concerns. The move comes at a moment when trust between the Netherlands and the United States is fraying. It reflects wider European unease — heightened by Donald Trump’s return to the White House — about American tech giants having access to some of their most sensitive government data. The heads of the AIVD and MIVD, the Netherlands’ civilian and military intelligence services, said in October that they were reviewing how to share information with American counterparts over political interference and human rights concerns. In the Netherlands, government vacancies are listed on a central online portal, which subsequently redirects applicants to specific institutions’ or agencies’ websites, including those of the security services. The government has now quietly pulled the plug on Google Analytics for intelligence-service postings, according to security expert Bert Hubert, who first raised the alarm about the trackers earlier this year. Hubert told POLITICO the job postings for intelligence services jobs no longer contained the same Google tracking technologies at least since November. The move was first reported by Follow the Money. The military intelligence service MIVD declined to comment. The interior ministry, which oversees the general intelligence service AIVD, did not respond to a request for comment at the time of publication. In a statement, Communications Manager for Google Mathilde Méchin said: “Businesses, not Google Analytics, own and control the data they collect and Google Analytics only processes it at their direction. This data can be deleted at any time.” “Any data sent to Google Analytics for measurement does not identify individuals, and we have strict policies against advertising based on sensitive information,” Méchin said. ‘FUTURE EMPLOYEES AT RISK’ Derk Boswijk, a center-right Dutch lawmaker, raised the alarm about the tracking of job applicants in parliamentary questions to the government in January. He said that while China and Russia have traditionally been viewed as the biggest security risks, it is unacceptable for any foreign government — allied or not — to have a view into Dutch intelligence recruitment. “I still see the U.S. as our most important ally,” Boswijk told POLITICO. “But to be honest, we’re seeing that the policies of the Trump administration and the European countries no longer necessarily align, and I think we should adapt accordingly.” The government told Boswijk in February it had enabled privacy settings on data gathered by Google. The government has yet to comment on Boswijk’s latest questions submitted in November. Hubert, the cybersecurity expert, said the concerns over tracking were justified. Even highly technical data like IP addresses, device fingerprints and browsing patterns can help foreign governments, including adversaries such as China, narrow down who might be seeking a job inside an intelligence agency, he said. “By leaking job applications so broadly, the Dutch intelligence agencies put their future employees at risk, while also harming their own interests,” said Hubert, adding it could discourage sought-after cybersecurity talent that agencies are desperate to attract. Hubert previously served on a watchdog committee overseeing intelligence agencies’ requests to use hacking tools, surveillance and wiretapping.  One open question raised by Dutch parliamentarians is how to gain control over the data that Google gathered on aspiring spies in past years. “I don’t know what happens with the data Google Analytics already has, that’s still a black box to me,” said Sarah El Boujdaini, a lawmaker for the centrist-liberal Democrats 66 party who oversees digital affairs. The episode is likely to add fuel to efforts to wean off U.S. technologies — which are taking place across Europe, as part of the bloc’s “technological sovereignty” drive. European Parliament members last month urged the institution to move away from U.S. tech services, in a letter to the president obtained by POLITICO. In the Netherlands, parliament members have urged public institutions to move away from digital infrastructure run by U.S. firms like Microsoft, over security concerns. “If we can’t even safeguard applications to our secret services, how do you think the rest is going?” Hubert asked. The country also hosts the International Criminal Court, where Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan previously lost access to his Microsoft-hosted email account after he was targeted with American sanctions over issuing an arrest warrant for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The ICC in October confirmed to POLITICO it was moving away from using Microsoft Office applications to German-based openDesk.

When the Franco-German summit concluded in Berlin, Europe’s leaders issued a declaration with a clear ambition: strengthen Europe’s digital sovereignty in an open, collaborative way. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s call for “Europe’s Independence Moment” captures the urgency, but independence isn’t declared — it’s designed. The pandemic exposed this truth. When Covid-19 struck, Europe initially scrambled for vaccines and facemasks, hampered by fragmented responses and overreliance on a few external suppliers. That vulnerability must never be repeated. True sovereignty rests on three pillars: diversity, resilience and autonomy. > True sovereignty rests on three pillars: diversity, resilience and autonomy. Diversity doesn’t mean pulling every factory back to Europe or building walls around markets. Many industries depend on expertise and resources beyond our borders. The answer is optionality, never putting all our eggs in one basket. Europe must enable choice and work with trusted partners to build capabilities. This risk-based approach ensures we’re not hostage to single suppliers or overexposed to nations that don’t share our values. Look at the energy crisis after Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. Europe’s heavy reliance on Russian oil and gas left economies vulnerable. The solution wasn’t isolation, it was diversification: boosting domestic production from alternative energy sources while sourcing from multiple markets. Optionality is power. It lets Europe pivot when shocks hit, whether in energy, technology, or raw materials. Resilience is the art of prediction. Every system inevitably has vulnerabilities. The key is pre-empting, planning, testing and knowing how to recover quickly. Just as banks undergo stress tests, Europe needs similar rigor across physical and digital infrastructure. That also means promoting interoperability between networks, redundant connectivity links (including space and subsea cables), stockpiling critical components, and contingency plans. Resilience isn’t theoretical. It’s operational readiness. Finally, Europe must exercise authority through robust frameworks, such as authorization schemes, local licensing and governance rooted in EU law. The question is how and where to apply this control. On sensitive data, for example, sovereignty means ensuring it’s held in Europe under European jurisdiction, without replacing every underlying technology component. Sovereign solutions shouldn’t shut out global players. Instead, they should guarantee that critical decisions and compliance remain under European authority. Autonomy is empowerment, limiting external interference or denial of service while keeping systems secure and accountable. But let’s be clear: Europe cannot replicate world-leading technologies, platforms or critical components overnight. While we have the talent, innovation and leading industries, Europe has fallen significantly behind in a range of key emerging technologies. > While we have the talent, innovation and leading industries, Europe has fallen > significantly behind in a range of key emerging technologies. For example, building fully European alternatives in cloud and AI would take decades and billions of euros, and even then, we’d struggle to match Silicon Valley or Shenzhen. Worse, turning inward with protectionist policies would only weaken the foundations that we now seek to strengthen. “Old wines in new bottles” — import substitution, isolationism, picking winners — won’t deliver competitiveness or security. Contrast that with the much-debated US Inflation Reduction Act. Its incentives and subsidies were open to EU companies, provided they invest locally, develop local talent and build within the US market. It’s not about flags, it’s about pragmatism: attracting global investments, creating jobs and driving innovation-led growth. So what’s the practical path? Europe must embrace ‘sovereignty done right’, weaving diversity, resilience and autonomy into the fabric of its policies. That means risk-based safeguards, strategic partnerships and investment in European capabilities while staying open to global innovation. Trusted European operators can play a key role: managing encryption, access control and critical operations within EU jurisdiction, while enabling managed access to global technologies. To avoid ‘sovereignty washing’, eligibility should be based on rigorous, transparent assessments, not blanket bans. The Berlin summit’s new working group should start with a common EU-wide framework defining levels of data, operational and technological sovereignty. Providers claiming sovereign services can use this framework to transparently demonstrate which levels they meet. Europe’s sovereignty will not come from closing doors. Sovereignty done right will come from opening the right ones, on Europe’s terms. Independence should be dynamic, not defensive — empowering innovation, securing prosperity and protecting freedoms. > Europe’s sovereignty will not come from closing doors. Sovereignty done right > will come from opening the right ones, on Europe’s terms. That’s how Europe can build resilience, competitiveness and true strategic autonomy in a vibrant global digital ecosystem.

BRUSSELS — The European Commission has unveiled a new plan to end the dominance of planet-heating fossil fuels in Europe’s economy — and replace them with trees. The so-called Bioeconomy Strategy, released Thursday, aims to replace fossil fuels in products like plastics, building materials, chemicals and fibers with organic materials that regrow, such as trees and crops. “The bioeconomy holds enormous opportunities for our society, economy and industry, for our farmers and foresters and small businesses and for our ecosystem,” EU environment chief Jessika Roswall said on Thursday, in front of a staged backdrop of bio-based products, including a bathtub made of wood composite and clothing from the H&M “Conscious” range. At the center of the strategy is carbon, the fundamental building block of a wide range of manufactured products, not just energy. Almost all plastic, for example, is made from carbon, and currently most of that carbon comes from oil and natural gas. But fossil fuels have two major drawbacks: they pollute the atmosphere with planet-warming CO2, and they are mostly imported from outside the EU, compromising the bloc’s strategic autonomy. The bioeconomy strategy aims to address both drawbacks by using locally produced or recycled carbon-rich biomass rather than imported fossil fuels. It proposes doing this by setting targets in relevant legislation, such as the EU’s packaging waste laws, helping bioeconomy startups access finance, harmonizing the regulatory regime and encouraging new biomass supply. The 23-page strategy is light on legislative or funding promises, mostly piggybacking on existing laws and funds. Still, it was hailed by industries that stand to gain from a bigger market for biological materials. “The forest industry welcomes the Commission’s growth-oriented approach for bioeconomy,” said Viveka Beckeman, director general of the Swedish Forest Industries Federation, stressing the need to “boost the use of biomass as a strategic resource that benefits not only green transition and our joint climate goals but the overall economic security.” HOW RENEWABLE IS IT? But environmentalists worry Brussels may be getting too chainsaw-happy. Trees don’t grow back at the drop of a hat and pressure on natural ecosystems is already unsustainably high. Scientific reports show that the amount of carbon stored in the EU’s forests and soils is decreasing, the bloc’s natural habitats are in poor condition and biodiversity is being lost at unprecedented rates. Protecting the bloc’s forests has also fallen out of fashion among EU lawmakers. The EU’s landmark anti-deforestation law is currently facing a second, year-long delay after a vote in the European Parliament this week. In October, the Parliament also voted to scrap a law to monitor the health of Europe’s forests to reduce paperwork. Environmentalists warn the bloc may simply not have enough biomass to meet the increasing demand. “Instead of setting a strategy that confronts Europe’s excessive demand for resources, the Commission clings to the illusion that we can simply replace our current consumption with bio-based inputs, overlooking the serious and immediate harm this will inflict on people and nature,” said Eva Bille, the European Environmental Bureau’s (EEB) circular economy head, in a statement. TOO WOOD TO BE TRUE Environmental groups want the Commission to prioritize the use of its biological resources in long-lasting products — like construction — rather than lower-value or short-lived uses, like single-use packaging or fuel. A first leak of the proposal, obtained by POLITICO, gave environmental groups hope. It celebrated new opportunities for sustainable bio-based materials while also warning that the “sources of primary biomass must be sustainable and the pressure on ecosystems must be considerably reduced” — to ensure those opportunities are taken up in the longer term. It also said the Commission would work on “disincentivising inefficient biomass combustion” and substituting it with other types of renewable energy. That rankled industry lobbies. Craig Winneker, communications director of ethanol lobby ePURE, complained that the document’s language “continues an unfortunate tradition in some quarters of the Commission of completely ignoring how sustainable biofuels are produced in Europe,” arguing that the energy is “actually a co-product along with food, feed, and biogenic CO2.” Now, those lines pledging to reduce environmental pressures and to disincentivize inefficient biomass combustion are gone. “Bioenergy continues to play a role in energy security, particularly where it uses residues, does not increase water and air pollution, and complements other renewables,” the final text reads. “This is a crucial omission, given that the EU’s unsustainable production and consumption are already massively overshooting ecological boundaries and putting people, nature and businesses at risk,” said the EEB. Delara Burkhardt, a member of the European Parliament with the center-left Socialists and Democrats, said it was “good that the strategy recognizes the need to source biomass sustainably,” but added the proposal did not address sufficiency. “Simply replacing fossil materials with bio-based ones at today’s levels of consumption risks increasing pressure on ecosystems. That shifts problems rather than solving them. We need to reduce overall resource use, not just switch inputs,” she said. Roswall declined to comment on the previous draft at Thursday’s press conference. “I think that we need to increase the resources that we have, and that is what this strategy is trying to do,” she said.

With multiple legislative processes underway, we are now in an important moment for Europe’s ambition to boost access and be a global leader in innovation. An agile, modernized regulatory system — coupled with supportive intellectual property and access policies — can attract research and development and advanced manufacturing to Europe. This will contribute to the earlier availability of new cures for European patients and a healthier innovative ecosystem. Unfortunately, today we see that Europe is falling behind global competition. Over the last decade, there has been a 10 percent decrease in clinical trials in the European Union, which has led to 60,000 fewer European patients participating in trials.[1] Europe’s fragmented system for clinical trial approvals is a leading cause of this decline, impacting early access to innovative treatments. As scientific breakthroughs can deliver better health outcomes for patients, governments need to keep pace with this speed of innovation. > Draghi report on EU competitiveness importantly identified pharmaceutical > innovation as a strategic sector for growth in Europe. That said, the report > also noted that what is missing is a simple and strong execution plan behind > it, with simplified regulation and coherent and predictable policies that > could drive the European goals of increased competitiveness and strategic > autonomy. Europe’s marketing authorisation process now exceeds 14 months (444 days), causing patients to wait nearly three months longer than in the US (356 days) and over five months longer than in Japan (290 days) for access to innovative medicines.[2] Such delays, combined with complex and lengthy country-level market access systems, mean patients in Europe are waiting an average of 20 months longer than people living in the United States to benefit from scientific innovation.[3] Last year’s Draghi report on EU competitiveness importantly identified pharmaceutical innovation as a strategic sector for growth in Europe. That said, the report also noted that what is missing is a simple and strong execution plan behind it, with simplified regulation and coherent and predictable policies that could drive the European goals of increased competitiveness and strategic autonomy. Ongoing discussions on the revision of the General Pharmaceutical Legislation and the In Vitro Diagnostic Regulation (IVDR), the Critical Medicines Act and the upcoming Biotech Act (Part 1) mark crucial opportunities for Europe to become a global leader for innovation. However, to make this vision a reality, the EU must address structural challenges that undermine innovation and patient access to novel, lifesaving medicines. > To reverse the worrying decline in European clinical trial activity, the EU > should implement a maximum two-month approval process for clinical trial > applications (CTAs), encompassing the reviews of both regulators and ethics > committees consistent with other global leaders. The successful implementation of structural, future-proof policy changes can ensure timely access to innovative medicines for EU citizens, and this can be achieved through five key policy recommendations: Facilitate and accelerate clinical trial applications To reverse the worrying decline in European clinical trial activity, the EU should implement a maximum two-month approval process for clinical trial applications (CTAs), encompassing the reviews of both regulators and ethics committees consistent with other global leaders. It is equally important to increase collaboration among EU member states to remove unique and specific national CTA requirements and questions, and to also introduce opportunities for an informal dialogue with regulators to expediently address smaller challenges that can be quickly fixed. Legislative overlaps and fragmentation between the Clinical Trials Regulation (CTR) and the IVDR should also be addressed to avoid delays in clinical trials that utilize companion diagnostics. Expand expedited pathways Despite their potential, the EU’s expedited pathways (such as the European Medicines Agency’s PRIME scheme for unmet medical needs, Conditional Marketing Authorisation and Accelerated Assessment) are underutilised, limiting rapid patient access to important medicines. Similar expedited pathways are widely used by other regulators around the world, like the United States and Japan. Expanding the use of expedited pathways in the EU to new indications and aligning eligibility criteria with global standards would ensure that the EU has more competitive regulatory pathways and earlier patient access to life-saving medicines. Shorten scientific advice and approval timelines Shortening the EU’s scientific advice procedure is critical to optimise the development of innovative products, ensure timely and efficient resource management for both applicants and regulators, and maintain the EU’s influence in global scientific and clinical research. By evolving to a more integrated and agile dialogue, the EU can provide comprehensive, consistent guidance throughout the product lifecycle and remain competitive with other regions. Given their growing number, scientific advice should be available for medicines used with all types of medical devices and in vitro diagnostics (including combinations diagnostics) to address the complexities of working across these regulatory frameworks. > An agile, modernized regulatory system — coupled with supportive intellectual > property and access policies — can attract research and development and > advanced manufacturing to Europe. Regarding the current lengthy approval times, the proposed reduction of EMA’s standard assessment timelines from 210 to 180 days — as suggested in the revision of the pharmaceutical legislation — would allow regulators to accelerate their scientific assessments. Furthermore, the European Commission can streamline its decision phase (currently requiring up to 67 days) by conducting its activities in parallel with the scientific assessment. Strengthen the EU Medicines Regulatory Network and embrace regulatory sandboxes Achieving greater speed and agility within a regulatory system requires an appropriately resourced, sustainable regulatory infrastructure. We support transparent regulatory budgets across the network, backed by consistent investments in expertise, funding and infrastructure to support continuous capacity and capability advancements. Collaborative regulatory pathways (such as the EMA OPEN framework) could be further expanded to encourage simultaneous approvals and supply chain resilience across geographies. Additionally, regulatory sandboxes would be beneficial to pilot and adapt frameworks for disruptive future innovations, while ensuring appropriate guardrails to enable the safe development and implementation of these innovations. Enhance patient engagement Effective regulatory decision-making requires both inclusivity and adaptability. Limited patient and expert input can hinder effective regulatory decision-making, while rapid pharmaceutical innovation requires adaptable frameworks. Expert and patient perspectives are crucial for informed benefit-risk and clinical meaningfulness determinations. Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is Eli Lilly & Company * The advertisement is linked to General Pharmaceutical Legislation (GPL), In Vitro Diagnostic Regulation (IVDR), Critical Medicines Act (CMA), Biotech Act (Part 1), Clinical Trials Regulation (CTR), EU Medicines Regulatory Network More information here. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [1] IQVIA, Assessing the clinical trial ecosystem in Europe, Final Report, October 2024: efpia_ve_iqvia_assessing-the-clinical-trial-ct-ecosystem.pdf. [2] Lara J, Kermad A, Bujar M, McAuslane N. 2025. R&D Briefing 101: New drug approvals in six major authorities 2015-2024: Trends in an evolving regulatory landscape. Centre for Innovation in Regulatory Science. London, UK: https://cirsci.org/wp-content/uploads/dlm_uploads/2025/08/CIRS-RD-Briefing-101-v1.1.pdf. [3] The Patients W.A.I.T. Indicator 2024 Survey. https://www.efpia.eu/media/oeganukm/efpia-patients-wait-indicator-2024-final-110425.pdf

LONDON — The European Commission is unlikely to reach an immediate deal on allowing third-party entry to the EU’s flagship loan program for defense, after talks between London and Brussels ran aground over financial issues.  The EU is negotiating with the U.K. and Canada over access to the EU’s €150 billion Security Action for Europe loans-for-weapons initiative, which allows EU member countries to take low interest loans and then jointly procure weapons systems. Gaining access was once trumpeted by PM Keir Starmer as a key target for a “reset” of post-Brexit relations with the EU. The Commission set an informal deadline of Wednesday evening to reach an agreement, but now does not expect to reach a deal imminently, according to one person familiar with discussions. Major differences remain between the two sides over the level of financial contributions the U.K. would need to make and the minimum mandatory share of components produced inside the EU, with senior British figures signaling they would not seek entry at any price. The U.K. and Canada would not be able to take loans, but are negotiating whether their industries can play a greater role in supplying the weapons systems. Two EU officials – granted anonymity like others in this article to speak freely, and who are involved in discussions with London –characterized the mood as tense. However, a Commission spokesperson sought to smooth the waters, saying: “We welcome the U.K.’s interest in negotiating a higher participation in SAFE. The Commission remains open to negotiate with the U.K., but the contribution has to be proportionate to the benefits the U.K. gains from its participation.” Sandro Gozi, a member of the European Parliament who chairs the EU-U.K. Parliamentary Partnership Assembly, confirmed to POLITICO that “we want to reserve high percentages” of projects for EU defense industries. | Ludovic Marin/AFP via Getty Images Brussels has asked for a contribution of between €4.5 billion and €6.5 billion, according to three diplomats close to negotiations, while the U.K. has proposed a much lower figure of €200 million to €300 million; some officials said that the U.K.’s initial offer was even smaller — in the order of tens of millions of euros. Diplomats said talks with Canada are much smoother.  France has been among those pushing to limit U.K. participation so that only 50 percent of components can be made outside the EU. However, other countries like Germany and the Netherlands are keen on the U.K. being allowed to take part. U.K. Defence Secretary John Healey told journalists at a press conference Wednesday: “We’ve always made clear whilst we were willing to pay a fair share of the costs of this program, any deal had to be good value for money for our British taxpayers.” Sandro Gozi, a member of the European Parliament who chairs the EU-U.K. Parliamentary Partnership Assembly, confirmed to POLITICO that “we want to reserve high percentages” of projects for EU defense industries, adding this was “not to put other partner in an uncomfortable position” but to develop strategic autonomy. Hopes remain high that the U.K. will find an agreement with the EU before the end of November, but officials from both camps warn that the outcome may be more limited than was first envisaged when Starmer and Commission President Ursula von der Leyen exchanged warm words in May. A U.K. official said London’s view was that the sum ought to reflect administration costs and the cost of guaranteeing the loans, adding it was “not reasonable to pay the EU just for the privilege of access.” They stressed the U.K. was taking “a pragmatic approach”, and that the EU-U.K. relationship would sit alongside bilateral partnerships with member states as “valuable pieces of the puzzle” in strengthening Europe’s defense.  Under SAFE’s current rules, components from non-member countries can make up 35 percent of a product to qualify for the loans. Expanding that to 50 percent or more would allow a greater participation for the U.K., which has one of Europe’s largest and most advanced defense industries. Jon Stone contributed to this report.

As trilogue discussions on the Critical Medicines Act (CMA) approach, its potential effects on medicine supply, patient access and Europe’s competitiveness are increasingly in focus. From an industry standpoint, several considerations are central to understanding how this act can best achieve its objectives and support a robust pharmaceutical ecosystem in Europe.  Keeping the CMA focused where it matters  Much of the debate around the CMA has centered on its promises to strengthen the availability and security of supply of critical medicines in the EU while improving accessibility to other medicines. These are goals that our industry fully supports.   The European Commission’s proposal is designed to focus on critical medicines, with a vulnerability assessment foreseen to identify which products are truly at risk of disruption and tailor solutions accordingly. Alongside critical medicines, the proposal also introduces a new definition of ‘medicinal products of common interest’. Under current wording, this would include any medicine unavailable in at least three member states, regardless of the underlying reason.   Such a broad definition risks turning a targeted framework for resilience into an all-encompassing mechanism covering almost every medicine on the market, blurring the distinction between supply and access challenges. These are fundamentally different issues that require fundamentally different policy tools.   > Applying the CMA’s tools across the entire medicines market would dilute > priorities, stretch healthcare budgets and create administrative burdens for > industry without delivering real benefits for patients.   The act will be far more effective if it remains focused on where the risks are greatest — in other words, by limiting the ‘medicinal products of common interest’ definition to cases of demonstrable market failure and directing measures toward genuinely critical medicines with a proven risk of supply disruption.  Fixing supply and access hurdles needs more than joint procurement   The CMA places joint procurement at the center of its strategy to address both supply and access challenges. While this approach can contribute to improving availability in certain circumstances, joint procurement will only deliver lasting results if it is designed to address the underlying causes of access delays and shortages, which vary across geographies and products.  For medicines where the main challenge lies in fragile supply chains, joint procurement can play a role, particularly when it enhances predictability and economic viability for suppliers. Experience from the Covid-19 pandemic has shown that coordinated purchasing can be effective in targeted situations. For medicines facing access delays, joint procurement could help improve availability in countries where genuine market failures exist. However, the value of joint procurement for countries where products are already available, or where access barriers can be better addressed by improving national pricing and reimbursement systems, is very questionable.  To ensure that joint procurement does not hinder access, several safeguards are essential. Tenders should reward quality and promote innovation, recognizing the value that innovative medicines bring to patients and society. Price confidentiality must be protected to prevent unintended spillovers, such as reference pricing effects. Once joint procurement agreements are concluded, to ensure commercial and supply predictability there should be no additional national renegotiations or expenditure control measures. Finally, allowing national procurement processes to run in parallel will be key to avoid delays and maintain flexibility.  Beyond these design safeguards, real progress will depend on tackling the broader root causes of shortages and access delays. For supply fragility, this means, among other actions, reducing strategic dependencies where necessary, improving transparency across supply chains and avoiding rigid national stockpiling rules. For access delays, progress will require addressing national pricing and reimbursement challenges, and a greater willingness from governments to reward the value that innovative medicines deliver.  Protectionism won’t make Europe stronger  Few elements of the CMA debate have attracted as much attention as the idea of prioritizing EU-made medicines. The rationale is straightforward: producing more within Europe is expected to reduce reliance on third countries, reinforce strategic autonomy and, ultimately, improve supply security. While this narrative is understandable, taking it at face value risks overlooking the realities of how medicines are manufactured and supplied today.  Europe already has one of the world’s strongest pharmaceutical manufacturing footprints and, unlike some other pharma manufacturing regions, Europe exports 71 percent of its pharmaceutical production. This output depends on global supply networks for active substances, raw materials and specialized technologies. Introducing local-content requirements or preferential treatment for EU-made products would disrupt those networks, fragment supply chains and drive up costs, with limited evidence that such measures would enhance resilience. Local-content requirements could also affect Europe’s trade relationships and weaken, rather than strengthen, its industrial base in the long term, while distorting competition within the single market and undermining the competitiveness of both European and international companies operating in Europe. The likely outcome would be less diversity and greater concentration in supply chains: the opposite of what a resilient system requires.  If procurement criteria referencing resilience or strategic autonomy are used, they should be proportionate and tied to clearly demonstrated dependencies or supply risks. Protectionist approaches, however well-intentioned, cannot substitute for the broader policy environment needed to keep Europe attractive for investment in research and development and manufacturing. A competitive European ecosystem depends first and foremost on predictable intellectual-property rules, timely regulatory processes, access to capital, and a strong scientific and technical skills base.  The EU institutions still have time to steer the CMA on course  The CMA offers a real chance to get things right. The European Parliament’s proposal for more consistent contingency stock rules could help if it stays focused on medicines genuinely at risk of shortage. The act can also make reporting more efficient by using existing systems rather than creating new ones. Policymakers should also be aware that wider regulatory initiatives directly affect Europe’s ability to manufacture and supply medicines. A more coherent policy framework will be essential to strengthen resilience.  Europe’s goal must be to build an environment where pharmaceutical innovation and production can thrive. Europe’s choice is clear: supply security cannot be achieved by weakening the industry that ensures it. The CMA will only work if it tackles the right problems with the right tools and keeps competitiveness at its core.   > Europe’s goal must be to build an environment where pharmaceutical innovation > and production can thrive. Our industry remains ready to engage with EU and national policymakers to make that happen. A high-level forum on the CMA involving all stakeholders could help guide the act’s implementation in a way that improves supply security and speeds up access for patients, while reinforcing Europe’s position as a global player in life sciences.  Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) * The political advertisement is linked to the Critical Medicines Act More information here.