Dora Meredith is the director of ODI Europe. John Clarke is a former senior trade negotiator for the European Commission and former head of the EU Delegation to the WTO and the U.N. He is a fellow at Maastricht University and the Royal Asiatic Society, and a trade adviser for FIPRA public affairs. The EU rarely gets second chances in geopolitics. Yet last week, the European Parliament chose to throw one away. By voting to refer the long-awaited trade agreement with the Mercosur bloc to the Court of Justice of the EU for a legal opinion — a process that may take up two years — lawmakers dealt a serious blow to Europe’s credibility at a moment when speed and reliability matter more than ever. After more than two decades of negotiations, this deal was meant to signal that Europe could still act decisively in a world of intensifying geopolitical competition. As European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen argued this month, it was the ultimate test of Europe’s continued relevance on the world stage. Oblivious to this, the Parliament’s decision reinforces the perception that the bloc is unable to follow through, even when an agreement is finally within reach. It is, by any reasonable measure, a strategic own goal. The consequences of this go well beyond trade. Mercosur governments spent years negotiating this free trade agreement (FTA) in good faith, navigating Europe’s hesitation, shifting demands and inconsistent political signals. Understandably, they are now interpreting the referral to the court as a political move. For partners already hedging their bets in an increasingly contested global landscape, it reinforces doubts over whether Europe can be relied on. Meanwhile, for Europe, the true damage is to a deeper truth it all too often obscures: That its real power comes from the ability to make such agreements and then implement them seriously, consistently and at scale. The EU–Mercosur agreement isn’t just another trade deal. It was designed as a framework for long-term economic, political and strategic partnership with a region where Europe’s influence has been steadily eroding. It offers comprehensive market access in goods and services, clearer investment rules, access to critical materials, structured political dialogue and a cooperation-based approach to managing disputes. Taken together, it is meant to anchor Europe more firmly in South America at a time when others, most notably China, have moved faster and with fewer constraints. And while that level of ambition hasn’t disappeared with the Parliament’s vote, it has been put at serious risk. Over the years, much of the criticism surrounding the Mercosur deal has focused on sustainability. Indeed, if eventually passed, this will be the litmus test for whether the EU can translate its values into influence. And to that end, the deal makes a wide set of previously voluntary commitments legally binding, including the implementation of the Paris climate targets and adherence to international conventions on labor rights, human rights, biodiversity and environmental protection. However, it does so through dialogue-based enforcement rather than automatic withdrawal in the face of noncompliance — an approach that reflects the political realities in both Brussels and the Mercosur countries. This has disappointed those calling for tougher regulation, but it highlights an uncomfortable truth: Europe’s leverage over sustainability outcomes doesn’t come from pretending it can coerce partners into compliance but from sustained engagement and cooperation. That was a red line for Mercosur governments, and without it there would be no agreement at all. The deal’s novel “rebalancing mechanism” sits within this logic, as it allows Mercosur countries to suspend concessions if future unforeseen EU regulations effectively negate promised market access. Critics fear this provision could be used to challenge future EU sustainability measures, but Mercosur countries see it as a safeguard against possible unilateral EU action, as exemplified by the Deforestation Regulation. Moreover, in practice, such mechanisms are rarely used. Plus, its inclusion was the price of securing an additional sustainability protocol. Most crucially, though, none of this will resolve itself through legal delay. On the contrary, postponement weakens Europe’s ability to shape outcomes on the ground. Research from Brazil’s leading climate institutes shows that ambitious international engagement strengthens domestic pro‑environment coalitions by increasing transparency, resources and political leverage. Absence, by contrast, creates space for actors with far lower standards. South American and EU leaders join hands following the signing of the now-delayed Mercosur agreement, Jan. 17, 2026., Paraguay. | Daniel Duarte/AFP via Getty Images The same logic applies to the deal’s economic dimension. The Commission rightly highlights the headline figures: Billions of euros in tariff savings, expanded market access, secure access to critical minerals and growing trade. According to a recent study by the European Centre for International Political Economy, each month of delay represents €3 billion in foregone exports. But these numbers matter less than what lies beneath them: Europe will be gaining all this while offering limited concessions in sensitive agricultural sectors; and Mercosur countries will be gaining access to the world’s largest single market — but only if they can meet demanding regulatory and environmental standards that could strain domestic capacity. Again, the real power lies in the deal’s implementation. If managed well, such pressures can drive investment, modernize standards and reduce dependence on raw commodity exports as Latin American think tanks have argued. This transition is precisely what the EU’s €1.8 billion Global Gateway investment package was designed to support. And delaying the agreement delays that as well. The Parliament’s decision isn’t just a procedural setback — it damages Europe’s greatest strength at a time when hesitation carries real cost. It also creates an immediate institutional dilemma for the Commission. Despite the judicial stay, the Commission is legally free to apply the agreement provisionally, but this is a difficult call: Apply it and enter a firestorm of criticism about avoiding democratic controls that will backfire the day the Parliament finally gets to vote on the agreement; or accept a two-year delay and postpone the deal’s economic benefits possibly indefinitely — Mercosur countries aren’t going to hold out forever. If it is going to recover, over the coming months Europe has to do everything possible to demonstrate both to its Mercosur partners and the wider world that this delay doesn’t amount to disengagement. This means sustained political dialogue, credible commitments on investment and cooperation — including the rollout of the Global Gateway — as well as a clear plan for the deal’s implementation the moment this legal process concludes. Two years is an eternity in today’s geopolitical climate. If Europe allows this moment to pass without course correction, others won’t wait. The deal might be imperfect, but irrelevance is far worse a fate. Europe must be much bolder in communicating that reality — to the world and, perhaps more urgently, to its own public.

The new U.S. defense strategy formally pushes Europe down Washington’s list of priorities while elevating Greenland to a core homeland security concern — suggesting European allies will be expected to shoulder more responsibility for their own defense. “Although Europe remains important, it has a smaller and declining share of global economic power,” the National Defense Strategy, published late Friday, states. “It follows that while the United States will remain engaged in Europe, it must — and will — prioritize defending the U.S. homeland and deterring China.” The strategy also makes clear that in Europe “allies will take the lead” against threats that are “less severe” for the United States but more acute for them, with Washington providing “critical but more limited support.” The document argues that Europe is economically and militarily capable of defending itself, noting that non-U.S. NATO members dwarf Russia in economic scale, and are therefore “strongly positioned to take primary responsibility for Europe’s conventional defense.” At the same time, the strategy places emphasis on Greenland, explicitly listing the Arctic island — alongside the Panama Canal — as terrain the U.S. must secure to protect its homeland interests. The Pentagon says it will provide the president with “credible options to guarantee U.S. military and commercial access to key terrain from the Arctic to South America, especially Greenland,” adding that “we will ensure that the Monroe Doctrine is upheld in our time.” That framing aligns with President Donald Trump’s recent rhetoric on Greenland, which has unsettled European capitals and fueled concern over Washington’s long-term intentions in the Arctic. The defense strategy builds on the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy released in December, which recast the Western Hemisphere — rather than Europe — as the primary arena for defending U.S. security. While the earlier document went further in criticizing Europe’s trajectory, both strategies stress continued engagement paired with a clear expectation that European allies will increasingly take the lead on threats closer to home.

STRASBOURG — Late on Tuesday night, the talk in Strasbourg’s bars and brasseries — packed with EU lawmakers and their aides — was that a decision on whether to freeze the EU-Mercosur trade deal would come down to just a few votes. Even though a majority of European Parliament lawmakers have had their positions on Mercosur fixed for months, a few swing voters could delay ratification of the deal, which was heavily backed by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, by up to two years. The Commission knew Mercosur was heading south for weeks, according to two Commission officials who were granted anonymity to speak freely. A concerted lobbying campaign to ensure that didn’t happen ultimately failed. MEPs ultimately backed a resolution to seek an opinion from the Court of Justice of the EU on whether the texts of the agreement — with the Mercosur countries of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, and which was in the works for over 25 years — comply with the EU treaties. The motion was carried by a margin of 334 to 324 with 11 abstentions. The Parliament now cannot give its assent to the deal until the court has ruled, which can take between 18 and 24 months. The suspension of the deal’s legislative approval sent shockwaves across Europe, especially as von der Leyen had hailed the agreement as a way to bolster EU trade amid turbulent relations with Washington. On a granular level, the freezing of the Mercosur deal can be traced to a handful of MEPs — notably from Romania’s Socialists and Hungary’s center right — whose last-minute U-turns tipped the balance. But it was national politics that really crashed the party, carving deep fault lines in the Parliament’s political groups that will leave deep scars. Mainstream political parties in the likes of Romania, Hungary, Spain, France and Poland are dealing with far-right and right-wing populist movements at home that have made Mercosur a central campaign issue, criticizing Brussels for a deal they claim harms European farmers, which in turn makes it difficult for their MEPs to openly support Mercosur in Europe. “National everyday politics prevailed over the bigger picture, which the EU is trying to present since the start of this Commission,” Željana Zovko, vice-chair of the European People’s Party, told POLITICO. She said she was “totally upset” with those EPP members who had voted to freeze the Mercosur deal out of the “selfishness of national day-to-day politics and elections.” A BITTER TASTE The centrist coalition that in 2024 supported a second term for von der Leyen — the EPP, the Socialists and Democrats and the liberals of Renew — all backed Mercosur, but many of their members did not. Across political parties, certain national delegations have been against the deal for months, if not years, including the Irish, the French and the Poles. “We were expecting this result,” said a Commission official, granted anonymity to speak freely, adding that although the team of Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič had planned for this outcome, it left a ” bitter aftertaste because the vote was really tight.” “The narrative on free trade has over the years more and more been hijacked by the extremes, inciting fear in people by using false information, and that ultimately also resulted in the outcome of Wednesday’s vote,” Renew Europe top trade lawmaker Svenja Hahn told POLITICO. Aware that the vote was likely to go down to the wire, the Commission for weeks calculated which MEPs would vote in favor of the deal in each main political group, and tried to get lawmakers to either “flip” sides or abstain, according to a third Commission official. They devised strategies such as getting their peers to pressure them, and asking heads of government and commissioners to call MEPs, the official said. Pro-Mercosur MEPs and group leaders also exerted a lot of pressure, especially EPP chair Manfred Weber and S&D boss Iratxe García. “I know Manfred put a lot — a lot — of pressure on his various delegations,” said a senior Parliament official. TURNING ON EACH OTHER The one surprise of Wednesday’s vote, according to four Socialist officials and the third Commission official, was the 10 Romanian Socialist lawmakers who, instead of abstaining, ultimately voted to take the Mercosur agreement to court after feeling heat from the far right at home. “In S&D, Romanians and Greeks became more extremist because of agricultural protests only in the last weeks,” said a Socialist MEP, granted anonymity to speak about his peers. Another lawmaker lamented that Commission Executive Vice-President Roxana Mînzatu — a Socialist — had not lobbied her fellow Romanians “to help her friend Ursula.” The Hungarian EPP members were also a wild card. Many expected their seven votes to be counted as abstentions, while others anticipated they would vote in favor of freezing Mercosur because the country goes to the polls in April. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has portrayed the Hungarian EPP party, Tisza, as a Brussels puppet, and ahead of the vote accused them of undermining farmers by supporting Mercosur. Then there were the Spanish EPP lawmakers, who in the last few weeks had raised doubts about their previously strong support for the deal. They hardened their rhetoric on Mercosur in Madrid to fend off the far-right Vox ahead of three key regional elections in agricultural regions — though ultimately they voted against bringing Mercosur to court. The EPP leadership plans to obtain their support when the time comes to ratify the deal. Spanish People’s Party leader Alberto Núñez Feijóo on Thursday came out publicly against German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s call for the Mercosur agreement to be provisionally applied even though the Parliament had sent it to court. Merz’s position is shared by EPP chief Weber. That sets Europe’s biggest party on a collision course, just a day after a heated meeting of all EPP lawmakers in which different national delegations traded accusations. One center-right official described the session as a “shitstorm.” The fact the leaders of the Polish, French and Slovenian factions within the EPP voted against the party line was the “biggest disappointment,” the EPP’s Zovko said. The rebels “need to reflect on their own behavior,” added EPP lawmaker Herbert Dorfmann. French and Irish lawmakers in the Renew Europe group were also scolded at a group meeting described by a person in the room as a “bloodbath.” Lawmakers blasted the party president, Valérie Hayer, from France, as well as the Irish first vice-president, Billy Kelleher, for voting against the group line, accusing them of “betraying” liberalism. A major clash is also looming between Germany and France, with President Emmanuel Macron’s government having come out against any provisional implementation of the trade deal that would bypass the Parliament, labelling it a “democratic violation.”

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen won’t be present when the European Parliament discusses whether to remove her and her team from office. On Monday, MEPs will debate a no-confidence motion brought against von der Leyen by the far-right Patriots for Europe group and its leader, Jordan Bardella, over her handling of the EU–Mercosur trade deal. Von der Leyen has decided not to attend. She will instead be represented by Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič, a longtime ally, Parliament spokesperson Delphine Colard confirmed. No other commissioners will be present at the debate in Strasbourg, according to two officials. A vote on the motion, which is all but certain to fail, will take place on Thursday. During previous debates on censure motions, von der Leyen and her team of 26 commissioners turned out in force to project unity. This time, the message is different: the Commission is no longer playing ball. The shift reflects growing fatigue inside the Berlaymont at a parliamentary tool that was used three times against von der Leyen in the second half of 2025. Two of those motions were brought by the far right and one by the far left. All failed. Support from just 72 of the Parliament’s 720 lawmakers is needed to trigger a motion of censure, and many lawmakers from the center-right European People’s Party, the Socialists and Democrats, and the liberals of Renew say the ease of launching censure motions has diluted their impact. EPP spokesperson Pedro López de Pablo said these “useless efforts” to bring down the Commission “drive me to melancholy.” “If you use this instrument not for its proper purposes, it will be bland by the time you actually need it,” said Vincent Stuer, spokesperson for Renew. However, the Patriots hit back, with spokesperson Alonso de Mendoza saying: “It will be the last one if we win.” MEPs and officials have floated the idea of increasing the threshold, but the Parliament’s leadership has so far resisted, wary of handing far-right groups a win by allowing them to frame any reform as institutional censorship. A Commission spokesperson did not respond to a request for comment.

The Italian government is satisfied with new funding promised by Brussels to European farmers and is signaling that it may cast its decisive vote in favor of the EU’s huge trade deal with the Latin American Mercosur bloc. Ahead of Friday’s vote by EU member countries, Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani said Rome was happy with the European Commission’s efforts to make the deal more palatable. Agriculture Minister Francesco Lollobrigida also said the accord represented an opportunity — especially for food exporters. “Italy has never changed its position: We have always supported the conclusion of the agreement,” Tajani said on Wednesday evening. Yet they stopped short of saying outright that Italy would vote in favor of the deal. Instead, within sight of the finish line, Rome is pressing to tighten additional safeguards to shield the EU farm market from being destabilized by any potential influx of South American produce. Rome’s endorsement of the accord, which has been a quarter century in the making and would create a free-trade zone spanning more than 700 million people, is crucial. A qualified majority of 15 of the EU’s 27 countries representing 65 percent of the bloc’s population is needed. Italy, with its large population, effectively holds the casting vote. France and Poland are still holding out against a pro-Mercosur majority led by Germany — but they lack the numbers to stall the deal. If it goes through, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen could fly to Paraguay to sign the accord as soon as next week. The bloc’s other members are Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay. ‘AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY’ Italy praised a raft of additional measures proposed by the Commission — including farm market safeguards and fresh budget promises on agriculture funding — as “the most comprehensive system of protections ever included in a free trade agreement signed by the EU.” Tajani, who as deputy prime minister oversees trade policy, has long taken a pro-Mercosur position. He said the deal would help the EU diversify its trade relationships and boost “the strategic autonomy and economic sovereignty of Italy and our continent.” Even Lollobrigida, who has sympathized in the past with farmers’ concerns on the deal, is striking a more positive tone. At a meeting hosted by the Commission in Brussels on Wednesday, Lollobrigida described Mercosur as “an excellent opportunity.” The minister, who is close to Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and is from her Brothers of Italy party, also said its provisions on so-called geographical indications would help Italy promote its world-famous delicacies in South America. It would mean no more ‘Parmesão,’” he said, referring to Italian-sounding knockoffs of the famed hard cheese. ONE MORE THING … Lollobrigida said Italy could back the deal if the farm market safeguards are tightened. The EU institutions agreed in December to require the Commission to investigate surges in imports of beef or poultry from Mercosur if volumes rise by 8 percent from the average, or if those imports undercut comparable EU products by a similar margin. Even Francesco Lollobrigida, who has sympathized in the past with farmers’ concerns on the deal, is striking a more positive tone. | Fabio Cimaglia/EPA “We want to go from 8 percent to 5 percent. And we believe that the conditions are there to also reach this goal,” Lollobrigida told Italian daily IlSole24Ore in an interview on Thursday. Meloni pulled the emergency brake at a pre-Christmas EU summit, forcing the Commission to delay the final vote on the deal while it worked on ways to address her concerns around EU farm funding. In response Von der Leyen proposed this week to offer earlier access to up to €45 billion in agricultural funding under the bloc’s next long-term budget. Giorgio Leali reported from Paris and Gerardo Fortuna from Brussels.

Mark T. Kimmitt is a retired U.S. Army brigadier general and has also served as the U.S. assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. Twenty-two years ago, I found myself in a small conference room, which was hastily organized to conduct a ceremony passing sovereignty from the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority to the newly appointed interim government of Iraq. Held with little pomp and circumstance, the event was carried out two days prior to its originally announced date, as there were security concerns that insurgents would attempt an attack. This was hardly an auspicious start for Iraq’s democratic transition. And subsequent decades demonstrated the fragility of the decisions that had led to that very ceremony. Years later, U.S. President Donald Trump has now pronounced that America “will run Venezuela,” implying that the U.S. has similar sovereign control over the country. But one can only hope this administration is careful to avoid similar minefields. Going forward, any U.S. strategy needs to be driven by the philosophical just as much as the practical. And unlike two decades ago, the U.S. must approach the mission in Venezuela with a lighter hand, a shorter timeline, a healthy dose of humility and lower expectations. A lighter hand would recognize the major criticisms that followed the fall of the Saddam regime in Iraq. In retrospect, the decision to disband the Iraqi military under the argument that it was a tool of oppression became a self-fulfilling prophecy. Hundreds of thousands of young, well-armed fighting age men found themselves out of work, unable to support their families and ready to conduct a counterrevolution.  A lighter hand would also be careful to avoid a meat-axe approach to eliminating existing governmental structures. Just because mid- and upper-level bureaucrats voiced support for now-ousted President Nicolás Maduro doesn’t necessarily mean they should be fired. Despite their ideological convictions, they are still experts on managing the thousands of non-ideological activities required of public administration. While generally maintaining both military and government structures, however, there must be no absolution for the individuals who committed crimes, human rights abuses or significant corruption. And Venezuela’s authorities must be required to bring these perpetrators to justice. To be clear, a lighter hand doesn’t mean totally hands-off. So far, the Trump administration seems to want to shape events in Venezuela from a distance, but it remains unclear whether it will continue to do so or be able to do so — especially if the country plunges into anarchy. And if the U.S. is drawn further in, then Iraq holds lessons. A major error in the months following combat operations In Iraq was a breakdown of law and order. Lawlessness was pervasive, looting was endemic and public order nearly evaporated, only for militias step in until coalition troops were given the mission to restore peace. But by then, it may have been too late, as the delay led to subsequent civil war and the institutionalization of extra-governmental militias that exist to this day. So, while the U.S. wishes to avoid boots on the ground, a breakdown in public order, or a brutal crackdown by illegal factions, may well necessitate the introduction of some outside police or paramilitary forces to regulate the situation. However, they won’t be seen as liberators, and their presence must be minimal and time-limited. The U.S. must also be careful to avoid imposing any significant political or cultural changes. Venezuela is a country with a long history, and a heritage recognizing the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist efforts of Simón Bolívar and others. There is no need to pull down his statues, erase Venezuela’s legacy or attempt to turn the country into an analog of America. Just because mid- and upper-level bureaucrats voiced support for now-ousted President Nicolás Maduro doesn’t necessarily mean they should be fired. | Jesus Vargas/Getty Images This is a country that has survived eras of strongmen, dictators like Juan Vicente Gómez, democratic presidents like Rómulo Betancourt and socialist movements under Maduro and former President Hugo Chávez. No matter how askance Americans may look at “warm collectivism,” if that is a freely and fairly decided choice by Venezuelans, the U.S. must be broadly accepting of it. After all, few other oil-rich nations around the world look like America. So, why must Venezuela be the exception? Furthermore, the Trump administration needs to be explicit about a conditions-based timeline — one perhaps shorter than needed. Mission outcomes need not be perfect, as perfection is the enemy of good enough. It will be important for post-Maduro efforts to be seen as legitimate by the Venezuelan people as well as the international community, and an extended period of external control would diminish mission legitimacy. Plus, any prolonged claim of indirect sovereignty by the U.S. would be used by opponents of the new status quo. For example, a small contingent of U.S. forces is still fueling a rationale for resistance by Iran-backed militias in Iraq, justifying their existence as defenders of the Iraqi people from foreign occupation. One could expect these same arguments to be embedded in outreaches by China, Russia and Iran to counter U.S. influence. Lastly, the U.S. must be humble in its approach and clear in its intentions. Messaging will be key in persuading the people of Venezuela that the U.S. is a force for good, an agent for change and committed to returning the national patrimony to its rightful owners. These messages must also emphasize that acrimony between Venezuela and the U.S. didn’t come about from ideological disputes with the country’s citizens, but from a series of dictators that ruined the richest nation in South America, impoverished its people and engaged in activities resulting in the deaths of thousands of North Americans. The Trump administration has wrested sovereignty from the government of Venezuela — at least indirectly so far. This is a burden, a responsibility and an opportunity. There are now clear paths to restore the country to its pre-Chávez and pre-Maduro prosperity, and Washington should carefully consider each of them. The military operation conducted on the night of Jan. 3 was a model of precision, discipline and limited objectives that no other military in the world could pull off. Yet, that operation was built on a foundation of previous military failures and mistakes like the Bay of Pigs in 1961, the Son Tay raid to rescue U.S. prisoners of war in Hanoi in 1970, Desert One in Iran in 1980, and any number of smaller, more classified operations that went wrong but were never made public. While this next mission — restoring sovereignty and wealth to the people of Venezuela — may be less dangerous, it will certainly be more complex. Like the foundational military missions that, with all their shortcomings and missteps, informed the success of bringing Maduro to justice, the task of restoring Venezuela to its previous prosperity comes with a similarly checkered history in post-combat stabilization. And one would hope the administration draws upon lessons from that history to accomplish it.

BRUSSELS — European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen is determined to travel to South America next week to sign the EU’s long-delayed trade pact with the Mercosur bloc, but she’s having to make last-minute pledges to Europe’s farmers in order to board that flight. EU countries are set to make a pivotal decision on Friday on whether the contentious deal with Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay — which has been more than a quarter of a century in the making — will finally get over the line. It’s still not certain that von der Leyen can secure the majority she needs on Friday; everything boils down to whether Italy, the key swing voter, will support the accord. To secure Rome’s backing, von der Leyen on Tuesday rolled out some extra budget promises on farm funding. The target was clear: Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, whose refusal to back the Mercosur agreement forced von der Leyen to cancel her planned signing trip in December. At its heart, the Mercosur agreement is a drive by Europe’s big manufacturers to sell more cars, machinery and chemicals in Latin America, while the agri powerhouses of the southern hemisphere will secure greater access to sell food to Europe — a prospect that terrifies EU farmers. While Germany and Spain have long led the charge for a deal, France and Poland are dead-set against. That leaves Italy as the key member country poised to cast the deciding vote. Von der Leyen’s letter on Tuesday was carefully choreographed political theater. Writing to the EU Council presidency and European Parliament President Roberta Metsola, she offered earlier access to up to €45 billion in agricultural funding under the bloc’s next long-term budget, while reaffirming €293.7 billion in farm spending after 2027. POLITICO was the first to report on Monday that the declaration was in the works. She insisted the measures in her letter would “provide the farmers and rural communities with an unprecedented level of support, in some respects even higher than in the current budget cycle.” The money isn’t new — it’s being brought forward from an existing pot in the EU’s next long-term budget — but governments can now lock it in for farmers early, before it is reassigned during later budget negotiations. Von der Leyen framed the move as offering stability and crisis readiness, giving Meloni a tangible win she can parade to her powerful farm lobby. WILL MELONI BACK MERCOSUR? The big question is whether Italy will view von der Leyen’s promises as going far enough ahead of the crunch meeting on Friday. Early signs suggested Rome might be softening. Meloni issued a statement saying the farm funding pledge was “a positive and significant step forward in the negotiations leading to the new EU budget,” but conspicuously avoided making a direct link to Mercosur. (French President Emmanuel Macron also welcomed von der Leyen’s letter, but there’s no prospect of Paris backing Mercosur on Friday.) taly’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, whose refusal to back the Mercosur agreement forced Ursula von der Leyen to cancel her planned signing trip in December. | Tom Nicholson/Getty Images Nicola Procaccini, a close Meloni ally in the European Parliament, told POLITICO: “We are moving in the right direction to enable Italy to sign Mercosur.” Right direction, but not yet at the destination? The government in Rome would not comment on whether it was about to back the deal. Germany, the EU’s industrial kingpin, is keen to secure a Mercosur agreement to boost its exports, but is still wary as to whether sufficient support exists to finalize an accord on Friday. A German official cautioned everything was still to play for. “A qualified majority is emerging, but it’s not a done deal yet. Until we have the result, there’s no reason to sit back and relax,” the official said. Optimism is growing regarding Rome in the pro-Mercosur camp, however. After all, the pact is widely viewed as strongly in the interests not only of Italy’s engineering companies, but also of its high-end wine and food producers, which are big exporters to South America. Additional curveballs are being thrown by Romania and Czechia, said one EU diplomat, who expressed concern they could turn against the deal on Friday, reducing any majority to very tight margins. The diplomat said they believed Italy would back the deal, however. FINAL STRETCH? The maneuvering is set to continue on Wednesday, when agriculture ministers descend on Brussels for what the Commission is billing as a “political meeting” after December’s farm protests. Officially, Mercosur isn’t on the agenda. Unofficially, however, it’s expected to be omnipresent — in the corridors, in the side meetings, and in the questions ministers choose not to answer. Farm ministers don’t approve trade deals, but the optics matter. Von der Leyen needs momentum — and cover — ahead of Friday’s vote. France — the country most hostile to the deal — will be vocal. On Wednesday, French Agriculture Minister Annie Genevard is expected to open yet another offensive — this time for a lower trigger on emergency safeguards related to the deal. This would reopen a compromise already struck between EU governments, the Parliament and the Commission. It’s a familiar tactic: Keep pushing. “France is still not satisfied with the proposals made by the Commission,” a French agriculture ministry official told reporters on Tuesday, while acknowledging that there has been some improvement. “Paris’ strategy for this week is still to continue to look for a blocking minority.” “Italy has its own strategy, we have ours,” added the official, who was granted anonymity in line with the rules for French government briefings. France’s allies, notably Poland, are equally blunt. Agriculture Minister Stefan Krajewski said the priority was simply “to block this agreement.” If that failed, Warsaw would seek maximum safeguards and compensation. That means it’s all coming down to the wire on Friday. A second failure to dispatch von der Leyen to finalize the agreement would be deeply embarrassing, and would only stoke Berlin’s anger at other EU countries thwarting the deal. For now, it’s still unclear whether von der Leyen will board that plane. Bartosz Brzeziński reported from Brussels, Giorgio Leali reported from Paris, and Nette Nöstlinger reported from Berlin.

Denmark was outraged on Sunday after a rightwing podcaster in the U.S. pivoted from Washington’s Venezuela operation directly to Greenland, the autonomous Danish territory that U.S. President Donald Trump has coveted. Katie Miller, a former U.S. administration official-turned-podcaster and wife of Trump’s deputy chief of staff Stephen Miller, posted an image on X late Saturday showing a map of Greenland in the colors of the Stars and Stripes with a one-word caption: “SOON.” > SOON pic.twitter.com/XU6VmZxph3 > > — Katie Miller (@KatieMiller) January 3, 2026 Trump’s repeated threats to annex the mineral-rich territory have angered the Danes. And there was a quick response to Miller’s provocation. “We expect full respect for the territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Denmark,” Copenhagen’s ambassador to the U.S., Jesper Møller Sørensen, said in a post on X that included Miller’s posting, in what he termed a “friendly reminder” of the longstanding defense ties between the two countries. Trump last month named a special envoy to Greenland, sparking a new diplomatic frenzy in Europe. The U.S. “has to have Greenland for national security,” Trump said at a press conference announcing the appointment of Louisiana Governor Jeff Landry as his envoy to Greenland. U.S. Vice President JD Vance last March did not rule out using military action to bring Greenland under American control, but said it wouldn’t be necessary if Greenlanders chose to break from Denmark and “cut a deal” with Washington. An American military incursion in Venezuela early Saturday captured President Nicolas Maduro and flew him out of the country. Hours later, Trump said the U.S. will “run” Venezuela until a leadership transition is able to take place.

BRUSSELS — Donald Trump’s attack on Europe as “decaying” with “weak” leaders has renewed the EU’s push to get serious about diversifying its economic, military and political ties ― and cutting reliance on the U.S. Leaders at a summit in Brussels on Thursday are supposed to sign off on European support for Ukraine, defense spending and measures aimed at boosting Europe’s competitiveness over the U.S. and China. But while Europe is determined to go it alone after decades of leaning on its friends across the Atlantic, nothing’s that easy. While the American president’s criticism has persuaded the EU’s leadership that making progress on a stalled trade deal with Latin America ― Mercosur ― would be the best way to showcase its geopolitical heft in a region that is increasingly courted by China and the U.S., France and other countries are holding out. “The answer to the U.S. on Europe’s ‘decay,’ the answer to the U.S. National Security Strategy, to the U.S. trade deal, the answer to China, to Russia, to the increased transactionalism between powers is Mercosur,” a senior EU official told POLITICO. Sealing the agreement would require EU leaders to confront entrenched resistance in France — and growing doubts in Italy — where hostility to the deal has permeated the entire political class for years, over fears it could expose their influential farmers to a flood of cheaper Latin American produce. For proponents of the agreement, boosting links with the Mercosur bloc, which groups Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil, is a key test of whether Paris really wants Europe to stand on its own after years of being the loudest champion of Europe’s sovereignty. GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY A group of governments led by Germany and Spain argue the moment has come for France to back up its talk of sovereignty, warning that Paris’ blockade of the Mercosur deal is undermining Europe’s push to stand on its own. To those countries, Mercosur represents a golden opportunity for their companies to expand into new, like-minded markets — away from China or the U.S. “We are pretty much convinced that if there is no possibility of a deal this week then it’s probably going to be dead,” said a German government official. “We see that the deal already starts unraveling.” And after years in which Paris championed Europe’s push for “strategic autonomy,” they warn France seems unable, or unwilling, to reconcile that ambition with its longstanding rejection of the Latin American deal. But for France, there’s no paradox. Nowhere is the EU’s difficulty in striking out alone clearer than in the quarrel over using frozen Russian assets to underwrite a €210 billion loan to keep Ukraine’s finances afloat. | Michael Nguyen/Getty Images “For Paris, this stance aligns neatly with its vision of ‘strategic autonomy’: The EU should do everything possible to protect its producers and uphold its standards,” said Georgina Wright, a senior fellow specializing in France, EU and U.S. relations at the German Marshall Fund, a think tank. In France and Poland, the deal is so toxic across the political spectrum that reassurances from the European Commission have fallen on deaf ears. This despite efforts by Brussels to come up with additional cash for farmers and to impose tariffs if cheap Brazilian beef undercuts domestic farmers.  Paris is worried that the deal will fuel public anger toward the political establishment, with the far right leading in opinion polls for the country’s presidential elections in 2027. “But this stance is seen by a majority of member states as counterproductive at a time when the EU is looking to diversify its trade relations to respond to pressure from the U.S. and China. France is seen as uncompromising, refusing to budge even though it is in the minority,” Wright added. FEAR OF DEFENSE POWER GRAB But it’s not just about trade. Increasing concerns about U.S. unpredictability and the scale of Russian aggression are driving European countries to take charge of their own security.  The European Commission is pushing member countries to sign up to so-called flagship defense projects and pool resources on key areas like drones and anti-drone systems. However, EU heavyweights such as France and Germany have reacted skeptically to the proposals since they were unveiled over the summer. Paris and Berlin worry the moves would undercut their national priorities and give too much power to Brussels over defense policy. The flagship projects do not feature on the latest draft summit conclusions, seen by POLITICO. But while Paris said they were not on the agenda Thursday, Nordic countries are still hoping to salvage the plans. Two EU officials said the bloc’s executive has been working to reassure them that Brussels isn’t overreaching, and that they will still have clear control over their assets and spending. The difficulty in signing off on more collaboration, even as Russian fighter jets and drones breach EU airspace, worries many that they aren’t moving fast enough against hostile states and competitors that can act by executive fiat. DEAL ON THE LINE Nowhere is the EU’s difficulty in striking out alone clearer than in the quarrel over using frozen Russian assets to underwrite a €210 billion loan to keep Ukraine’s finances afloat. Whether Trump is fueling Europe’s strategic autonomy drive — or holding it back — decision time is fast approaching on key issues. “We can have discussions at evenings, at weekends, through the night,” a second official said of the preparations for Thursday’s summit. “But when an issue matters this much, we really don’t have any option but to get on and do it.” Nicholas Vinocur contributed reporting.

Nobel Peace Prize winner María Corina Machado emerged from hiding in Venezuela to collect her award in Oslo. The Venezuelan opposition leader fled her home country by fishing boat to the Caribbean island of Curaçao, then flew by private plane to Norway via the U.S., according to the Wall Street Journal. In a video she posted Thursday around 2 a.m., Machado greeted a cheering crowd from the balcony of Oslo’s Grand Hotel, the venue that annually hosts the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony. Machado missed Wednesday’s event, where her daughter accepted the prize on her behalf. It was Machado’s first public appearance since January, after spending months in hiding in her home country. After arriving in Oslo, Machado met Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre. In a joint press conference Thursday morning, Støre praised the Nobel prize winner: “I would like to salute you … for your struggle. It has cost you, your family and your people a lot.” “I am very hopeful Venezuela will be free. We will turn the country into a beacon of hope and opportunity of democracy,” said Machado, who was seeing her family for the first time in 16 months. In 2023, she was disqualified from running for Venezuelan president against authoritarian leader Nicolás Maduro — prompting her to back candidate Edmundo González, who lost to Maduro in an election that observers described as flawed. González later fled the country for Spain. Machado recently praised Donald Trump for his stance against Venezuela’s authoritarian government, after the U.S. president said Maduro’s days in office were numbered. The Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Machado for her “tireless work promoting democratic rights for the people of Venezuela and for her struggle to achieve a just and peaceful transition from dictatorship to democracy.”