A top Pentagon official told lawmakers Tuesday that existing military operations targeting Latin American drug cartels are “just the beginning” — and left open the possibility of deploying ground forces even as lethal boat strikes against alleged smugglers continue indefinitely. The comments from Joseph Humire, acting assistant secretary of defense for homeland defense, during a House Armed Services Committee hearing raised immediate concerns from congressional Democrats who said the efforts appear to be another “forever war” without clear goals or a stated end date. It’s the latest example of the administration doubling down on aggressive foreign policy interventions without clarifying what victory might look like, despite President Donald Trump’s past campaign pledges to avoid embroiling America in more overseas conflicts. And it raises the prospect that the nation’s armed forces could be further strained amid a massive air war over Iran. Democrats on Tuesday also questioned military leaders’ assertions that the six-month effort to sink smuggling vessels in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific has made a meaningful impact on illegal drugs entering American borders, and whether it follows proper rules of engagement for enemy combatants or amounts to war crimes. “We could shoot suspected criminals dead on the street here in America, and it may be a deterrent to crime, but that doesn’t make it legal,” said Rep. Gil Cisneros (D-Calif.). But Humire insisted the open-ended missions — dubbed Operation Southern Spear — are “saving American lives” and compliment President Donald Trump’s other border security mandates. “Interdiction is necessary, but insufficient,” he said. “Deterrence has a signaling effect on narco-terrorists, and raises the risks with their movements.” At least 157 people have been killed in 45 strikes on alleged drug smuggling boats in the seas around South America since early September, according to Defense Department statistics. More than 15,000 service members have been deployed to the region for counter-drug missions, training efforts and blockade enforcement over the last six months, though some of those numbers have been drawn down since the start of the conflict in Iran. Humire said officials have seen a 20 percent reduction in suspected drug vessels traveling the Caribbean and a 25 percent reduction in the Eastern Pacific traffic since the start of the military operations. But committee ranking member Adam Smith (D-Wash.) questioned whether those numbers actually translate into fewer drugs on American streets, or simply evidence that smugglers are being forced into other shipping lanes or land routes. Humire said officials are looking to expand to land strikes against known cartel routes and hideouts, but are working with partner country militaries on that work. The U.S. Defense Department launched operations with Ecuadorian forces against narco-terrorist groups in that country earlier this month. He would not, however, rule out potential unilateral strikes in South American countries later on. Smith called that hedge concerning. Republicans on the committee largely praised the military’s anti-drug operations, dismissing the Democratic criticism. “Defending the homeland does not stop at our border,” said committee Chair Mike Rogers (R-Ala.). “It also requires confronting threats at their source. The president has made it clear that narco-terrorists and hostile foreign powers will find no sanctuary or foothold anywhere in our hemisphere.”

VIENNA — Colombian President Gustavo Petro issued a stinging rebuke of U.S. foreign policy and urged President Donald Trump’s government to pursue dialogue with Latin America over military interventions. During an interview with POLITICO in Vienna this week, Petro said that Latin America is not a “land to be conquered,” after the Trump administration bombed alleged drug smugglers, toppled the Venezuelan president and menaced Cuba. These aggressive moves are part of a strategic shift from a White House looking to reassert U.S. dominance across the Western Hemisphere and push back foreign influence — an approach nicknamed the “Donroe Doctrine,” after the 1823 policy of U.S. President James Monroe. Petro, a leftist and former rebel, has emerged as one of the world’s most vocal critics of this U.S. foreign policy, periodically landing himself on Trump’s blacklist. The Colombian president avoided any direct barbs against Trump, instead citing their February meeting in the White House as an example of the intercontinental dialogue he wants to see. Prior to that meeting, Trump had called Petro a “sick man;” afterwards, he said Petro was “terrific.” During the conversation with POLITICO, which took place in the gilded front room of the Colombian ambassador’s Vienna residence, Petro reserved his bluntest criticism for U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and former Trump adviser and billionaire Elon Musk. Donald Trump meets with Gustavo Petro in the Oval Office in Washington on Feb. 3, 2026. | Colombian presidency press office/Anadolu via Getty Images Rubio championed “Western civilization” bound by “Christian faith” at the Munich Security Conference in February, identifying mass migration as a crisis destabilizing societies “all across the West.” Musk, meanwhile, has characterized “empathy” as Western civilization’s Achilles’ heel. Petro condemned what he saw as their promotion of a “white, Christian, Western civilization,” and warned against trying to revive “the age of the Crusades.” Such slogans belong to history, he said, and would generate an “enormous level of violence within each society.” He then went on to praise Europe’s diversity, which he described as an “asset” despite the potential for conflict: “I believe that understanding societies in their diversity does not mean nullifying European history or European history in America,” he said. Neither Rubio nor Musk responded to a request for comment in time for publication. SHIELD OF THE AMERICAS After decades of domestic battle against gangs trafficking illegal narcotics, Petro criticized Colombia’s exclusion from Trump’s recent anti-cartel coalition, the Shield of the Americas. “The 17 countries gathered are the least experienced in the fight against drugs in the Americas,” he said about the group’s Miami summit. “Some of them are deeply penetrated by the corruption of drug trafficking. All the countries of America are infiltrated because the effect of cash is very strong on any human being — but if anyone has experience in the fight against drugs, it is Colombia.” Colombia and its neighbors are rich in the coca plant, which places the region at the center of the global cocaine trade and decades of U.S. anti-drug policy. Trump’s war on drugs has involved striking alleged trafficking vessels in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific Ocean, killing more than 150 people since September 2025, according to the New York Times. Last September, Petro told the United Nations that Trump should be investigated for war crimes over the strikes, which he said targeted young people trying to escape poverty. Colombia and its neighbors are rich in the coca plant, which places the region at the center of the global cocaine trade and decades of U.S. anti-drug policy. | Joaquin Sarmiento/AFP via Getty Images Speaking to POLITICO after addressing U.N. drug officials, Petro detailed Colombia’s expertise in fighting narco gangs, noting that it “has built a network of 75 countries whose police intelligence agencies coordinate with each other, and that is why we seized 3,300 tons of cocaine during my administration — the highest figure ever. We have handed over 800 drug traffickers to the U.S., collected 78,000 weapons.” But, he said, in reference to the Shield of the Americas summit, “we weren’t invited. And you don’t go where you’re not invited.” CLIMATE NOT BOMBS Petro is constitutionally barred from seeking another term in May, and with his time in office running out, he issued a plea for governments to pivot to climate action “instead of thinking about bombs.” “We have reached a world where capitalism is showing its end,” said Petro, who joined far-left guerrilla group M-19 as a teenager and now leads the left-wing Historic Pact party. “Its demise is not peaceful. It seems to be mired in bombs, violence and something that I have studied in depth: the climate crisis on which I have built my political project. The climate crisis scientifically heralds the end of existence — if we do not change the way we produce and consume throughout the world,” he warned. The Colombian leader is eager to discuss climate at almost any opportunity. He told U.N. diplomats on Monday that the rise of the deadly synthetic opioid fentanyl revealed something about a society facing the potential “extinction of humanity,” calling it the “drug of the climate crisis.” He also sees people’s reluctance to have children as part of a “culture of extinction” that pervades societies facing climate breakdown. “That decision is based on certain realities — namely, the well-founded belief that capital has reached its limit, and that its limit could be the end of the species of life,” Petro explained. He then added that Cuba, which is now facing the threat of U.S.-sponsored regime change, could be part of an intercontinental solution to the crisis — if only America and other countries were open to dialogue. “I believe that there are people in the U.S. government who think similarly: that instead of imposing an empire from which Cubans always liberate themselves, what is ultimately needed is to establish a dialogue between the Americas and include Cuba in the world of fiber optics and clean energy,” he said. He then pointed to Cuba’s Covid-19 vaccine and contributions to public health as examples of how it could help — were it open to the world. “If the United States engages in dialogue, and this means respect for the other, equity with the other, then we solve a very important part of the problem that afflicts humanity today,” Petro said. Arnau Busquets Guàrdia and Jakob Weizman contributed to this report.

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has decided a showdown with Brussels is exactly what his flagging election campaign needs.  Orbán is on the back foot at home — trailing his rival Péter Magyar by some 8 percentage points in polls ahead of the April 12 election. So he’s gone on the attack against two of his favorite bogeymen abroad: Brussels and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.  In doing so he’s trying to set a trap for Magyar, the 44-year-old member of the European Parliament who is on track to beat him.   Magyar has built his poll lead through a laser-focus on the corruption, mismanagement and cronyism that he says has defined Orbán’s 15 years in power. The last thing he wants is an election race in which he is typecast as the pro-EU or pro-Ukrainian candidate.   But that’s exactly where Orbán is now trying to shift the campaign. On the international stage, Orbán’s government has taken the highly confrontational step of blocking the EU’s €90 billion financial lifeline to Ukraine — agreed at a European Council meeting in December — accusing Kyiv of slow-walking repairs to the Druzhba pipeline that supplies oil to Hungary.  The timing of Orbán’s move is hardly coincidental, given his troubles in the election race. Having engineered a conflagration with Brussels over Ukraine, he upped the ante this week by accusing Magyar’s Tisza party of being traitors, of taking the side of the EU and Zelenskyy in the standoff.   ORBÁN ON THE ATTACK It’s Orbán himself who is leading the offensive. He is styling his clash with Brussels and Kyiv as one and the same as his fight with the Tisza party, which he accused of remaining “shamefully silent” about the problems with the oil supply from Ukraine.  “In line with Brussels and Kyiv, instead of a national government, they [Tisza] want to bring a pro-Ukrainian government to power in Hungary. That is why they are not standing up for the interests of Hungarian people and Hungary,” Orbán argued in a Facebook post on Monday.  He followed up with another post saying Tisza would wreck the country’s energy sector, and insisted his ruling Fidesz party was “the safe choice in April.”  “[The opposition’s] goal is chaos, fuel shortages, and gasoline price increases before the elections. That is why they have sided with Zelenskyy, against the Hungarian people,” Orbán said.   Sidestepping the trap, Magyar hit back against Orbán’s accusations — not by defending the EU or Zelenskyy, but by claiming economic mismanagement by the prime minister was stoking the high prices and insisting fuel was cheaper in Poland, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria.  Péter Magyar has built his poll lead through a laser-focus on the corruption, mismanagement and cronyism that he says has defined Orbán’s 15 years in power. | Bállint Szentgallay/NurPhoto via Getty Images “Orbán does not govern effectively and shows no interest in the continuously deteriorating situation of Hungarian citizens or businesses. Instead, he chooses to lie, incite hatred, and burden the country with some of the highest taxes in Europe,” Magyar said. Tisza declined to comment.   HOW PRO-EU IS MAGYAR, REALLY? For the EU, the big concern is how long Orbán, the EU leader closest to the Kremlin, will drag out this fight. Kyiv desperately needs the now-blocked €90 billion cash injection, and six weeks of uncertainty due to the Hungarian election would inflame geopolitical tensions over the war in Ukraine.   While much of Brussels is holding out for a Magyar win — largely to end Budapest’s obstructionism on Ukraine — the irony of Orbán’s attacks is that Magyar is hardly an unalloyed pro-EU politician, and far less a pro-Ukrainian one. Indeed, he is outdoing Orbán with his some of his more nationalist campaigning. Tisza, for example, voted against the €90 billion loan to Ukraine in the European Parliament and Magyar has strongly opposed plans for Kyiv’s accelerated membership in the European Union.   In an interview with POLITICO in 2024, Magyar said Tisza was pro-EU but was candid about the EU’s shortcomings. He expressed opposition to a European “superstate” and said he didn’t have “friends” in the European Parliament. That followed his first press conference in the Parliament, in which he opposed sending weapons to Ukraine. Earlier this year, Orbán’s Fidesz party sought to corner Magyar over the EU’s giant Mercosur trade deal with South America, which it opposes on the grounds it would harm Hungarian farmers. In Budapest, Orbán accused Magyar of backing the agreement and undermining farmers because Tisza sits with the center-right European People’s Party grouping in the European Parliament, which supported the trade pact.  So Orbán’s gone on the attack against two of his favorite bogeymen abroad: Brussels and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. | Ukrinform/NurPhoto via Getty Images Ultimately, however, Tisza voted in January to freeze ratification of the EU-Mercosur accord, breaking with the EPP line — a move that triggered a “shitstorm” against the Hungarian delegation at a subsequent group meeting, according to an official who was present. CALIBRATED MESSAGING Magyar’s awkward relationship with Brussels was on full display at the Munich Security Conference this month. He used the event to initiate a tentative outreach to European heavyweights including Germany’s Chancellor Friedrich Merz and Vice Chancellor Lars Klingbeil, as well as Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, Croatia’s Prime Minister Andrej Plenković, and Finnish President Alexander Stubb.  The messaging was cautiously calibrated. Magyar said he wanted to undo the damage Orbán had done to democratic and judicial norms, but with the chief goal of restoring Hungary’s access to EU funds and standing up “for Hungarian interests.” His language on Ukraine was far cooler.   “The top priority of a future Tisza government will be to secure the EU funds Hungary is entitled to. To achieve this, we will immediately introduce strict anti-corruption measures, restore judicial independence, and safeguard the freedom of the press and higher education,” he said on X after meeting with Merz Feb. 14. While that was music to EU mainstream ears, Magyar also said he had used his talk with Poland’s Tusk to stress he didn’t support a fast-track EU membership for Kyiv.  Conspicuously, Magyar did not meet with any leader of the EU institutions. The optics would admittedly have been hard to navigate given that the Fidesz camp has flooded the streets of Budapest with AI photos of Magyar conspiring against Hungary with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. MYSTERY MAN All in all, Magyar remains an enigma to observers in both the EU and Ukraine. An MEP from the liberal Renew group in the European Parliament said: “We feel anything is better than Orbán but, honestly, I’m not sure what they are, content wise, what are the things they concretely want to do, for example in Europe and geopolitically.” While that was music to EU mainstream ears, Magyar also said he had used his talk with Poland’s Donald Tusk to stress he didn’t support a fast-track EU membership for Kyiv. | Thomas Kienzle/AFP via Getty Images Even inside the ranks of Magyar’s center-right EPP grouping, the jury remains out. “We need to see, if Magyar wins, how he will organize the government and distribute power,” said an EPP official. “But once you are in power the question is whether he will have the strength to overcome temptations or fall [to them] as Orbán did.” On Ukraine, it’s already clear that a Magyar victory would not signal an overnight thaw in ties with Kyiv. But the hope among diplomats from the EU and Kyiv is that he won’t deliberately wreck EU efforts, as Orbán has done.  “We don’t know the consequences [of the election] so we have to be careful,” said a Ukrainian government adviser, who noted they were communicating with Magyar’s team. “But by following his public speeches, it seems he is a little bit more flexible and we will expect this.”  Swedish European Affairs Minister Jessica Rosencrantz told POLITICO she was still holding out hope for a more emphatic change in Budapest’s position.  “I hope for a shift in the Hungarian approach toward Ukraine because we need to stand united for European security. Given Hungary’s own history I think it’s unbelievable that they did not show solidarity,” she said.  Ketrin Jochecová contributed to this report.

Venezuelan opposition leader María Corina Machado estimated that Venezuela could hold new democratic elections in less than a year, she told POLITICO, but has not yet spoken with President Donald Trump about starting that process. “We believe that a real transferring process with manual voting … throughout the process could be done in nine to 10 months. But, well, that depends when you start,” Machado said Tuesday in an interview with POLITICO’s Dasha Burns for “The Conversation.” Her projection comes as leaders in both parties in Congress urge the president to accelerate the process of relinquishing U.S. control of Venezuela following the capture of Nicolás Maduro in January. But Trump has suggested the U.S. could continue to oversee Venezuela for years, with an eye toward closely controlling the development of infrastructure to extract oil from the country’s vast reservoirs. Trump told The New York Times last month that “only time will tell” how long the U.S. will assert oversight over Venezuela. Machado, who met with Trump at the White House after Maduro’s capture, said the two did not discuss her estimated time frame for new elections during their meeting. But she explained her optimism for the relatively short window to stand up democratic elections in the country, compared with similar nation-building efforts by America in Iraq and Afghanistan during the Bush administration, which took years to fully establish. “In our case, look, we have a democratic culture, strong democratic culture. We have an organized society. We have a legitimate leadership with huge popular support and our armed forces are also supportive of a transition to democracy,” she said. Machado also pointed to recent elections in Venezuela, which she said occurred “under very tough circumstances,” as evidence that Venezuelan people will readily embrace U.S.-backed democratic elections. Venezuela held presidential elections in 2024, which Maduro’s regime said he won, and parliamentary elections in 2025. Independent monitors criticized the elections as being neither free nor fair. “If we were able to do that under such extreme conditions, imagine now, when we have the support of the United States government, when people feel that we are not alone,” she said. Listen to the whole interview on the latest episode of “The Conversation.”

Dora Meredith is the director of ODI Europe. John Clarke is a former senior trade negotiator for the European Commission and former head of the EU Delegation to the WTO and the U.N. He is a fellow at Maastricht University and the Royal Asiatic Society, and a trade adviser for FIPRA public affairs. The EU rarely gets second chances in geopolitics. Yet last week, the European Parliament chose to throw one away. By voting to refer the long-awaited trade agreement with the Mercosur bloc to the Court of Justice of the EU for a legal opinion — a process that may take up two years — lawmakers dealt a serious blow to Europe’s credibility at a moment when speed and reliability matter more than ever. After more than two decades of negotiations, this deal was meant to signal that Europe could still act decisively in a world of intensifying geopolitical competition. As European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen argued this month, it was the ultimate test of Europe’s continued relevance on the world stage. Oblivious to this, the Parliament’s decision reinforces the perception that the bloc is unable to follow through, even when an agreement is finally within reach. It is, by any reasonable measure, a strategic own goal. The consequences of this go well beyond trade. Mercosur governments spent years negotiating this free trade agreement (FTA) in good faith, navigating Europe’s hesitation, shifting demands and inconsistent political signals. Understandably, they are now interpreting the referral to the court as a political move. For partners already hedging their bets in an increasingly contested global landscape, it reinforces doubts over whether Europe can be relied on. Meanwhile, for Europe, the true damage is to a deeper truth it all too often obscures: That its real power comes from the ability to make such agreements and then implement them seriously, consistently and at scale. The EU–Mercosur agreement isn’t just another trade deal. It was designed as a framework for long-term economic, political and strategic partnership with a region where Europe’s influence has been steadily eroding. It offers comprehensive market access in goods and services, clearer investment rules, access to critical materials, structured political dialogue and a cooperation-based approach to managing disputes. Taken together, it is meant to anchor Europe more firmly in South America at a time when others, most notably China, have moved faster and with fewer constraints. And while that level of ambition hasn’t disappeared with the Parliament’s vote, it has been put at serious risk. Over the years, much of the criticism surrounding the Mercosur deal has focused on sustainability. Indeed, if eventually passed, this will be the litmus test for whether the EU can translate its values into influence. And to that end, the deal makes a wide set of previously voluntary commitments legally binding, including the implementation of the Paris climate targets and adherence to international conventions on labor rights, human rights, biodiversity and environmental protection. However, it does so through dialogue-based enforcement rather than automatic withdrawal in the face of noncompliance — an approach that reflects the political realities in both Brussels and the Mercosur countries. This has disappointed those calling for tougher regulation, but it highlights an uncomfortable truth: Europe’s leverage over sustainability outcomes doesn’t come from pretending it can coerce partners into compliance but from sustained engagement and cooperation. That was a red line for Mercosur governments, and without it there would be no agreement at all. The deal’s novel “rebalancing mechanism” sits within this logic, as it allows Mercosur countries to suspend concessions if future unforeseen EU regulations effectively negate promised market access. Critics fear this provision could be used to challenge future EU sustainability measures, but Mercosur countries see it as a safeguard against possible unilateral EU action, as exemplified by the Deforestation Regulation. Moreover, in practice, such mechanisms are rarely used. Plus, its inclusion was the price of securing an additional sustainability protocol. Most crucially, though, none of this will resolve itself through legal delay. On the contrary, postponement weakens Europe’s ability to shape outcomes on the ground. Research from Brazil’s leading climate institutes shows that ambitious international engagement strengthens domestic pro‑environment coalitions by increasing transparency, resources and political leverage. Absence, by contrast, creates space for actors with far lower standards. South American and EU leaders join hands following the signing of the now-delayed Mercosur agreement, Jan. 17, 2026., Paraguay. | Daniel Duarte/AFP via Getty Images The same logic applies to the deal’s economic dimension. The Commission rightly highlights the headline figures: Billions of euros in tariff savings, expanded market access, secure access to critical minerals and growing trade. According to a recent study by the European Centre for International Political Economy, each month of delay represents €3 billion in foregone exports. But these numbers matter less than what lies beneath them: Europe will be gaining all this while offering limited concessions in sensitive agricultural sectors; and Mercosur countries will be gaining access to the world’s largest single market — but only if they can meet demanding regulatory and environmental standards that could strain domestic capacity. Again, the real power lies in the deal’s implementation. If managed well, such pressures can drive investment, modernize standards and reduce dependence on raw commodity exports as Latin American think tanks have argued. This transition is precisely what the EU’s €1.8 billion Global Gateway investment package was designed to support. And delaying the agreement delays that as well. The Parliament’s decision isn’t just a procedural setback — it damages Europe’s greatest strength at a time when hesitation carries real cost. It also creates an immediate institutional dilemma for the Commission. Despite the judicial stay, the Commission is legally free to apply the agreement provisionally, but this is a difficult call: Apply it and enter a firestorm of criticism about avoiding democratic controls that will backfire the day the Parliament finally gets to vote on the agreement; or accept a two-year delay and postpone the deal’s economic benefits possibly indefinitely — Mercosur countries aren’t going to hold out forever. If it is going to recover, over the coming months Europe has to do everything possible to demonstrate both to its Mercosur partners and the wider world that this delay doesn’t amount to disengagement. This means sustained political dialogue, credible commitments on investment and cooperation — including the rollout of the Global Gateway — as well as a clear plan for the deal’s implementation the moment this legal process concludes. Two years is an eternity in today’s geopolitical climate. If Europe allows this moment to pass without course correction, others won’t wait. The deal might be imperfect, but irrelevance is far worse a fate. Europe must be much bolder in communicating that reality — to the world and, perhaps more urgently, to its own public.

The new U.S. defense strategy formally pushes Europe down Washington’s list of priorities while elevating Greenland to a core homeland security concern — suggesting European allies will be expected to shoulder more responsibility for their own defense. “Although Europe remains important, it has a smaller and declining share of global economic power,” the National Defense Strategy, published late Friday, states. “It follows that while the United States will remain engaged in Europe, it must — and will — prioritize defending the U.S. homeland and deterring China.” The strategy also makes clear that in Europe “allies will take the lead” against threats that are “less severe” for the United States but more acute for them, with Washington providing “critical but more limited support.” The document argues that Europe is economically and militarily capable of defending itself, noting that non-U.S. NATO members dwarf Russia in economic scale, and are therefore “strongly positioned to take primary responsibility for Europe’s conventional defense.” At the same time, the strategy places emphasis on Greenland, explicitly listing the Arctic island — alongside the Panama Canal — as terrain the U.S. must secure to protect its homeland interests. The Pentagon says it will provide the president with “credible options to guarantee U.S. military and commercial access to key terrain from the Arctic to South America, especially Greenland,” adding that “we will ensure that the Monroe Doctrine is upheld in our time.” That framing aligns with President Donald Trump’s recent rhetoric on Greenland, which has unsettled European capitals and fueled concern over Washington’s long-term intentions in the Arctic. The defense strategy builds on the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy released in December, which recast the Western Hemisphere — rather than Europe — as the primary arena for defending U.S. security. While the earlier document went further in criticizing Europe’s trajectory, both strategies stress continued engagement paired with a clear expectation that European allies will increasingly take the lead on threats closer to home.

STRASBOURG — Late on Tuesday night, the talk in Strasbourg’s bars and brasseries — packed with EU lawmakers and their aides — was that a decision on whether to freeze the EU-Mercosur trade deal would come down to just a few votes. Even though a majority of European Parliament lawmakers have had their positions on Mercosur fixed for months, a few swing voters could delay ratification of the deal, which was heavily backed by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, by up to two years. The Commission knew Mercosur was heading south for weeks, according to two Commission officials who were granted anonymity to speak freely. A concerted lobbying campaign to ensure that didn’t happen ultimately failed. MEPs ultimately backed a resolution to seek an opinion from the Court of Justice of the EU on whether the texts of the agreement — with the Mercosur countries of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, and which was in the works for over 25 years — comply with the EU treaties. The motion was carried by a margin of 334 to 324 with 11 abstentions. The Parliament now cannot give its assent to the deal until the court has ruled, which can take between 18 and 24 months. The suspension of the deal’s legislative approval sent shockwaves across Europe, especially as von der Leyen had hailed the agreement as a way to bolster EU trade amid turbulent relations with Washington. On a granular level, the freezing of the Mercosur deal can be traced to a handful of MEPs — notably from Romania’s Socialists and Hungary’s center right — whose last-minute U-turns tipped the balance. But it was national politics that really crashed the party, carving deep fault lines in the Parliament’s political groups that will leave deep scars. Mainstream political parties in the likes of Romania, Hungary, Spain, France and Poland are dealing with far-right and right-wing populist movements at home that have made Mercosur a central campaign issue, criticizing Brussels for a deal they claim harms European farmers, which in turn makes it difficult for their MEPs to openly support Mercosur in Europe. “National everyday politics prevailed over the bigger picture, which the EU is trying to present since the start of this Commission,” Željana Zovko, vice-chair of the European People’s Party, told POLITICO. She said she was “totally upset” with those EPP members who had voted to freeze the Mercosur deal out of the “selfishness of national day-to-day politics and elections.” A BITTER TASTE The centrist coalition that in 2024 supported a second term for von der Leyen — the EPP, the Socialists and Democrats and the liberals of Renew — all backed Mercosur, but many of their members did not. Across political parties, certain national delegations have been against the deal for months, if not years, including the Irish, the French and the Poles. “We were expecting this result,” said a Commission official, granted anonymity to speak freely, adding that although the team of Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič had planned for this outcome, it left a ” bitter aftertaste because the vote was really tight.” “The narrative on free trade has over the years more and more been hijacked by the extremes, inciting fear in people by using false information, and that ultimately also resulted in the outcome of Wednesday’s vote,” Renew Europe top trade lawmaker Svenja Hahn told POLITICO. Aware that the vote was likely to go down to the wire, the Commission for weeks calculated which MEPs would vote in favor of the deal in each main political group, and tried to get lawmakers to either “flip” sides or abstain, according to a third Commission official. They devised strategies such as getting their peers to pressure them, and asking heads of government and commissioners to call MEPs, the official said. Pro-Mercosur MEPs and group leaders also exerted a lot of pressure, especially EPP chair Manfred Weber and S&D boss Iratxe García. “I know Manfred put a lot — a lot — of pressure on his various delegations,” said a senior Parliament official. TURNING ON EACH OTHER The one surprise of Wednesday’s vote, according to four Socialist officials and the third Commission official, was the 10 Romanian Socialist lawmakers who, instead of abstaining, ultimately voted to take the Mercosur agreement to court after feeling heat from the far right at home. “In S&D, Romanians and Greeks became more extremist because of agricultural protests only in the last weeks,” said a Socialist MEP, granted anonymity to speak about his peers. Another lawmaker lamented that Commission Executive Vice-President Roxana Mînzatu — a Socialist — had not lobbied her fellow Romanians “to help her friend Ursula.” The Hungarian EPP members were also a wild card. Many expected their seven votes to be counted as abstentions, while others anticipated they would vote in favor of freezing Mercosur because the country goes to the polls in April. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has portrayed the Hungarian EPP party, Tisza, as a Brussels puppet, and ahead of the vote accused them of undermining farmers by supporting Mercosur. Then there were the Spanish EPP lawmakers, who in the last few weeks had raised doubts about their previously strong support for the deal. They hardened their rhetoric on Mercosur in Madrid to fend off the far-right Vox ahead of three key regional elections in agricultural regions — though ultimately they voted against bringing Mercosur to court. The EPP leadership plans to obtain their support when the time comes to ratify the deal. Spanish People’s Party leader Alberto Núñez Feijóo on Thursday came out publicly against German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s call for the Mercosur agreement to be provisionally applied even though the Parliament had sent it to court. Merz’s position is shared by EPP chief Weber. That sets Europe’s biggest party on a collision course, just a day after a heated meeting of all EPP lawmakers in which different national delegations traded accusations. One center-right official described the session as a “shitstorm.” The fact the leaders of the Polish, French and Slovenian factions within the EPP voted against the party line was the “biggest disappointment,” the EPP’s Zovko said. The rebels “need to reflect on their own behavior,” added EPP lawmaker Herbert Dorfmann. French and Irish lawmakers in the Renew Europe group were also scolded at a group meeting described by a person in the room as a “bloodbath.” Lawmakers blasted the party president, Valérie Hayer, from France, as well as the Irish first vice-president, Billy Kelleher, for voting against the group line, accusing them of “betraying” liberalism. A major clash is also looming between Germany and France, with President Emmanuel Macron’s government having come out against any provisional implementation of the trade deal that would bypass the Parliament, labelling it a “democratic violation.”

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen won’t be present when the European Parliament discusses whether to remove her and her team from office. On Monday, MEPs will debate a no-confidence motion brought against von der Leyen by the far-right Patriots for Europe group and its leader, Jordan Bardella, over her handling of the EU–Mercosur trade deal. Von der Leyen has decided not to attend. She will instead be represented by Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič, a longtime ally, Parliament spokesperson Delphine Colard confirmed. No other commissioners will be present at the debate in Strasbourg, according to two officials. A vote on the motion, which is all but certain to fail, will take place on Thursday. During previous debates on censure motions, von der Leyen and her team of 26 commissioners turned out in force to project unity. This time, the message is different: the Commission is no longer playing ball. The shift reflects growing fatigue inside the Berlaymont at a parliamentary tool that was used three times against von der Leyen in the second half of 2025. Two of those motions were brought by the far right and one by the far left. All failed. Support from just 72 of the Parliament’s 720 lawmakers is needed to trigger a motion of censure, and many lawmakers from the center-right European People’s Party, the Socialists and Democrats, and the liberals of Renew say the ease of launching censure motions has diluted their impact. EPP spokesperson Pedro López de Pablo said these “useless efforts” to bring down the Commission “drive me to melancholy.” “If you use this instrument not for its proper purposes, it will be bland by the time you actually need it,” said Vincent Stuer, spokesperson for Renew. However, the Patriots hit back, with spokesperson Alonso de Mendoza saying: “It will be the last one if we win.” MEPs and officials have floated the idea of increasing the threshold, but the Parliament’s leadership has so far resisted, wary of handing far-right groups a win by allowing them to frame any reform as institutional censorship. A Commission spokesperson did not respond to a request for comment.

The Italian government is satisfied with new funding promised by Brussels to European farmers and is signaling that it may cast its decisive vote in favor of the EU’s huge trade deal with the Latin American Mercosur bloc. Ahead of Friday’s vote by EU member countries, Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani said Rome was happy with the European Commission’s efforts to make the deal more palatable. Agriculture Minister Francesco Lollobrigida also said the accord represented an opportunity — especially for food exporters. “Italy has never changed its position: We have always supported the conclusion of the agreement,” Tajani said on Wednesday evening. Yet they stopped short of saying outright that Italy would vote in favor of the deal. Instead, within sight of the finish line, Rome is pressing to tighten additional safeguards to shield the EU farm market from being destabilized by any potential influx of South American produce. Rome’s endorsement of the accord, which has been a quarter century in the making and would create a free-trade zone spanning more than 700 million people, is crucial. A qualified majority of 15 of the EU’s 27 countries representing 65 percent of the bloc’s population is needed. Italy, with its large population, effectively holds the casting vote. France and Poland are still holding out against a pro-Mercosur majority led by Germany — but they lack the numbers to stall the deal. If it goes through, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen could fly to Paraguay to sign the accord as soon as next week. The bloc’s other members are Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay. ‘AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY’ Italy praised a raft of additional measures proposed by the Commission — including farm market safeguards and fresh budget promises on agriculture funding — as “the most comprehensive system of protections ever included in a free trade agreement signed by the EU.” Tajani, who as deputy prime minister oversees trade policy, has long taken a pro-Mercosur position. He said the deal would help the EU diversify its trade relationships and boost “the strategic autonomy and economic sovereignty of Italy and our continent.” Even Lollobrigida, who has sympathized in the past with farmers’ concerns on the deal, is striking a more positive tone. At a meeting hosted by the Commission in Brussels on Wednesday, Lollobrigida described Mercosur as “an excellent opportunity.” The minister, who is close to Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and is from her Brothers of Italy party, also said its provisions on so-called geographical indications would help Italy promote its world-famous delicacies in South America. It would mean no more ‘Parmesão,’” he said, referring to Italian-sounding knockoffs of the famed hard cheese. ONE MORE THING … Lollobrigida said Italy could back the deal if the farm market safeguards are tightened. The EU institutions agreed in December to require the Commission to investigate surges in imports of beef or poultry from Mercosur if volumes rise by 8 percent from the average, or if those imports undercut comparable EU products by a similar margin. Even Francesco Lollobrigida, who has sympathized in the past with farmers’ concerns on the deal, is striking a more positive tone. | Fabio Cimaglia/EPA “We want to go from 8 percent to 5 percent. And we believe that the conditions are there to also reach this goal,” Lollobrigida told Italian daily IlSole24Ore in an interview on Thursday. Meloni pulled the emergency brake at a pre-Christmas EU summit, forcing the Commission to delay the final vote on the deal while it worked on ways to address her concerns around EU farm funding. In response Von der Leyen proposed this week to offer earlier access to up to €45 billion in agricultural funding under the bloc’s next long-term budget. Giorgio Leali reported from Paris and Gerardo Fortuna from Brussels.

Mark T. Kimmitt is a retired U.S. Army brigadier general and has also served as the U.S. assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. Twenty-two years ago, I found myself in a small conference room, which was hastily organized to conduct a ceremony passing sovereignty from the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority to the newly appointed interim government of Iraq. Held with little pomp and circumstance, the event was carried out two days prior to its originally announced date, as there were security concerns that insurgents would attempt an attack. This was hardly an auspicious start for Iraq’s democratic transition. And subsequent decades demonstrated the fragility of the decisions that had led to that very ceremony. Years later, U.S. President Donald Trump has now pronounced that America “will run Venezuela,” implying that the U.S. has similar sovereign control over the country. But one can only hope this administration is careful to avoid similar minefields. Going forward, any U.S. strategy needs to be driven by the philosophical just as much as the practical. And unlike two decades ago, the U.S. must approach the mission in Venezuela with a lighter hand, a shorter timeline, a healthy dose of humility and lower expectations. A lighter hand would recognize the major criticisms that followed the fall of the Saddam regime in Iraq. In retrospect, the decision to disband the Iraqi military under the argument that it was a tool of oppression became a self-fulfilling prophecy. Hundreds of thousands of young, well-armed fighting age men found themselves out of work, unable to support their families and ready to conduct a counterrevolution.  A lighter hand would also be careful to avoid a meat-axe approach to eliminating existing governmental structures. Just because mid- and upper-level bureaucrats voiced support for now-ousted President Nicolás Maduro doesn’t necessarily mean they should be fired. Despite their ideological convictions, they are still experts on managing the thousands of non-ideological activities required of public administration. While generally maintaining both military and government structures, however, there must be no absolution for the individuals who committed crimes, human rights abuses or significant corruption. And Venezuela’s authorities must be required to bring these perpetrators to justice. To be clear, a lighter hand doesn’t mean totally hands-off. So far, the Trump administration seems to want to shape events in Venezuela from a distance, but it remains unclear whether it will continue to do so or be able to do so — especially if the country plunges into anarchy. And if the U.S. is drawn further in, then Iraq holds lessons. A major error in the months following combat operations In Iraq was a breakdown of law and order. Lawlessness was pervasive, looting was endemic and public order nearly evaporated, only for militias step in until coalition troops were given the mission to restore peace. But by then, it may have been too late, as the delay led to subsequent civil war and the institutionalization of extra-governmental militias that exist to this day. So, while the U.S. wishes to avoid boots on the ground, a breakdown in public order, or a brutal crackdown by illegal factions, may well necessitate the introduction of some outside police or paramilitary forces to regulate the situation. However, they won’t be seen as liberators, and their presence must be minimal and time-limited. The U.S. must also be careful to avoid imposing any significant political or cultural changes. Venezuela is a country with a long history, and a heritage recognizing the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist efforts of Simón Bolívar and others. There is no need to pull down his statues, erase Venezuela’s legacy or attempt to turn the country into an analog of America. Just because mid- and upper-level bureaucrats voiced support for now-ousted President Nicolás Maduro doesn’t necessarily mean they should be fired. | Jesus Vargas/Getty Images This is a country that has survived eras of strongmen, dictators like Juan Vicente Gómez, democratic presidents like Rómulo Betancourt and socialist movements under Maduro and former President Hugo Chávez. No matter how askance Americans may look at “warm collectivism,” if that is a freely and fairly decided choice by Venezuelans, the U.S. must be broadly accepting of it. After all, few other oil-rich nations around the world look like America. So, why must Venezuela be the exception? Furthermore, the Trump administration needs to be explicit about a conditions-based timeline — one perhaps shorter than needed. Mission outcomes need not be perfect, as perfection is the enemy of good enough. It will be important for post-Maduro efforts to be seen as legitimate by the Venezuelan people as well as the international community, and an extended period of external control would diminish mission legitimacy. Plus, any prolonged claim of indirect sovereignty by the U.S. would be used by opponents of the new status quo. For example, a small contingent of U.S. forces is still fueling a rationale for resistance by Iran-backed militias in Iraq, justifying their existence as defenders of the Iraqi people from foreign occupation. One could expect these same arguments to be embedded in outreaches by China, Russia and Iran to counter U.S. influence. Lastly, the U.S. must be humble in its approach and clear in its intentions. Messaging will be key in persuading the people of Venezuela that the U.S. is a force for good, an agent for change and committed to returning the national patrimony to its rightful owners. These messages must also emphasize that acrimony between Venezuela and the U.S. didn’t come about from ideological disputes with the country’s citizens, but from a series of dictators that ruined the richest nation in South America, impoverished its people and engaged in activities resulting in the deaths of thousands of North Americans. The Trump administration has wrested sovereignty from the government of Venezuela — at least indirectly so far. This is a burden, a responsibility and an opportunity. There are now clear paths to restore the country to its pre-Chávez and pre-Maduro prosperity, and Washington should carefully consider each of them. The military operation conducted on the night of Jan. 3 was a model of precision, discipline and limited objectives that no other military in the world could pull off. Yet, that operation was built on a foundation of previous military failures and mistakes like the Bay of Pigs in 1961, the Son Tay raid to rescue U.S. prisoners of war in Hanoi in 1970, Desert One in Iran in 1980, and any number of smaller, more classified operations that went wrong but were never made public. While this next mission — restoring sovereignty and wealth to the people of Venezuela — may be less dangerous, it will certainly be more complex. Like the foundational military missions that, with all their shortcomings and missteps, informed the success of bringing Maduro to justice, the task of restoring Venezuela to its previous prosperity comes with a similarly checkered history in post-combat stabilization. And one would hope the administration draws upon lessons from that history to accomplish it.